As the US braces for a closely fought presidential election on November 5, Latin America has particular cause for concern over a potential return of Donald Trump to the White House. While a handful of countries in the region might welcome a Republican victory, the broader implications for the hemisphere look troubling.

Three pillars of US-Latin American relations hang in the balance: migration, energy and trade. Trump's erratic approach to diplomacy – which often prioritises personal relationships and ideology over economic pragmatism – coupled with his unorthodox use of trade tariffs as a threat to solicit economic and political concessions, could reshape regional dynamics in unexpected ways.

Meanwhile, China stands ready to expand its influence. Beijing's investment in “America’s backyard” has already reached unprecedented levels, and there are signs it may seek deeper defence partnerships should Washington step back from the region.

We rounded up how Latin American countries could fare under a second Trump presidency.

MEXICO

Mexico surpassed China to become the United States' largest bilateral trading partner in 2023. US imports from Mexico totalled nearly $476bn, whilst exports to its southern neighbour amounted to roughly $323bn during the period. This gives a hint to the huge importance of trade between the two countries, with nearshoring poised to play a pivotal role in the coming years as US companies seek to outsource production to neighbouring nations in a bid to diversify away from China.

A big question mark hangs over Trump’s “America First” protectionist mantra which aims to massively boost domestic production: will it apply to Mexico, as well? If so, the US' southern neighbour may find itself in big trouble. During his previous administration, Trump helped conceive the Agreement between the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) which proved beneficial to Mexico. However, those times were marked by a different pragmatism, and many worry a Trump 2.0 administration, packed with MAGA loyalists and few – if any – technocratic appointments, may push a much more radical stance.

Secondly – actually first, on Trump’s agenda – migration is poised to be a sticky point of contention. The Republican nominee plans to “finish the wall” with Mexico, substantially harden migration policies and expel up to 25mn undocumented migrants – even by sending them to transit countries. Some of his advisers went as far as floating the idea of deploying the US army to fight Mexican cartels across the border to combat the traffic of fentanyl, even though this would require an agreement with the Mexican government not to qualify as a military invasion.

Thirdly, in a worst-case scenario, Trump may slap tariffs on Mexico, which already faces accusations of acting as a conduit for Chinese goods to the US. This could drive an irreversible wedge between neighbours, and lead Mexico to do the unthinkable: start knocking at BRICS’ door. Finally, if Trump – a rabid misogynist ₋ successfully buddied up with former president Andrés Manuel López Obrador in spite of their political differences, he is unlikely to feel any particular sympathy for newly-elected President Claudia Sheinbaum. Add to this the latter’s ambitious targets for green energy transition – at odds with Trump’s “drill, baby drill” motto – and her recent push for oil and gas industry nationalisation to get a perfect recipe for a rocky relationship.

CENTRAL AMERICA

On balance, this part of the region feels relatively neutral to a potential change of leadership in Washington. Costa Rica and Guatemala – governed by centrist administrations – have developed strong industry and defence bonds with the US that will likely remain in place regardless of the election’s outcome.

Nicaragua, under the authoritarian rule of leftist President Daniel Ortega, would be damned either way; the regime faces a hardening of sanctions as it tightens the grip of repression, strengthens ties with Russia and allegedly mimics Belarus by flying in illegal migrants from Cuba and Haiti, facilitating their way north to the Mexican border. However, in case of a Trump victory, Nicaragua – with remittances accounting for over 26% of its GDP – is amongst the countries most poised to suffer from reduced remittances inflows that could result from massive migrant repatriations.

Panama’s conservative President Jose Raul Mulino, who has committed to curbing illegal migration through the treacherous Darien Gap, may tepidly welcome a Trump win. But he has refrained from endorsing either candidate, and Panama’s long-standing relations with the US will undoubtedly remain solid in any case.

Trump’s best buddy in Central America, however, would be El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele, who made no secret of his admiration for the outlandish presidential hopeful. Trump and right-wing propagandist Tucker Carlson were guests of honour at Bukele’s inauguration last summer, celebrating the young ruler’s success in crushing gang violence at the expense of democratic institutions and the rule of law. Bukele’s full embrace of the shady crypto world resonates with Trump’s latest forays into the topic under Musk’s advice. Still, it remains to be seen how this crypto bromance could translate into practice.

ARGENTINA

To little surprise, Argentina's President Javier Milei is banking on a Donald Trump victory in the US election due to ideological affinities and to help unlock fresh international funding, though analysts warn the strategy carries significant risks.

The self-styled “anarcho-libertarian” leader, who has met Trump and tech billionaire Elon Musk during his six visits to the US since taking office, believes ideological alignment with a Republican administration could help sway the International Monetary Fund to provide additional support. Such funding would be crucial for lifting Argentina's currency controls, a key pillar of Milei's economic strategy.

The strategy draws from precedent. In 2018, Trump's administration helped secure Argentina's record $57bn IMF package under then-president Mauricio Macri. However, experts note that fundamental policy differences could complicate any alliance. Trump's protectionist stance and enthusiasm for tariffs stand in stark contrast to Milei's free-market vision, and a strengthening of the dollar may hurt Argentina’s strongly dollarised economy and even thwart Milei’s dollarisation plans.

Argentina's economic challenges remain acute as the country faces massive cuts to public spending under Milei’s “shock therapy.” The peso is now overvalued by approximately 15 per cent according to The Economist's Big Mac index, whilst the central bank's net reserves remain more than $6bn in negative territory. Meanwhile, the annual inflation rate remains above 200% – the highest in the world. This reality has already forced Milei to soften his previously hostile stance towards China, recently describing Beijing as "very interesting partners" despite earlier denouncing them as "communist murderers".

Should Kamala Harris prevail instead, relations would likely follow established patterns under the Biden administration, focused on strategic cooperation in areas such as technology and natural resources. Either way, analysts suggest Argentina is unlikely to be an immediate priority for the incoming US administration.

BOLIVIA

Gifted with vast lithium reserves and currently locked in an internal leftist struggle between President Luis Arce and former leader Evo Morales, Bolivia is already gravitating in the orbit of Russia and China, which have invested heavily in “white gold” mining. The country was recently welcomed into the BRICS fold as a “partner nation” and will not likely change course, regardless of the outcome of the US election.

BRAZIL

Brazilian government officials are extremely concerned about the prospect of Trump returning to the White House, with sources in Brasília indicating heightened potential for bilateral tensions across climate policy and tech sector governance.

President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who has softened his erstwhile leftist stance by distancing himself from countries such as Venezuela and Nicaragua, has publicly expressed his preference for Kamala Harris in the upcoming US election, marking an unusual departure from diplomatic convention. The cordial relationship cultivated between Lula and Joe Biden—who is scheduled to visit Brazil in November for the G20 summit—appears unlikely to persist under a Trump administration.

Environmental cooperation stands as a primary concern. Trump's previous withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and his continued advocacy for fossil fuels threatens to undermine Brazil's climate ambitions, particularly as the country prepares to host next year's UN climate conference in Belém. The promised $500mn US contribution to the Amazon Fund would likely founder under a Republican-controlled executive.

Some Brazilian officials, however, see potential for pragmatic engagement, particularly regarding critical minerals—an area where the US seeks to reduce Chinese dependence. Sources familiar with Republican Party discussions suggest Trump might pursue a "transactional" approach prioritising, in this case, economic interests over ideological alignment. Still, a Trump win may push Brazil further into the arms of BRICS and China, which has overtaken the US as Brazil’s top trading partner and is eyeing the country’s natural resources.

Last but not least, Brazil’s recent feud with Trump’s master cheerleader Elon Musk over disinformation on X and the Republican nominee’s unrepented support for former far-right president Jair Bolsonaro – who staged an attempted coup inspired by the events of January 6, 2021 following his election loss – would sink relations to a new low under a Trump administration.

COLOMBIA

During his previous tenure, Trump had an easy relationship with Colombian former right-wing president Iván Duque. Today, though, the country is ruled by leftist Gustavo Petro, who has had a rocky ride with the Biden administration and suffered recent cuts to US aid funding. Things could only get worse with a Republican victory. Still, the US cannot write off Colombia entirely as it needs Bogota’s cooperation on security, migration and to combat drug trafficking, just as the country has seen the highest levels of coca cultivation in the last decade.

ECUADOR, CHILE AND PERU

Ecuador could potentially benefit from a return of Trump to the White House, as the country bets strong on the oil industry. However, the nation’s deteriorating security situation will continue to be a nuisance for any US administration, and the country may return under leftist leadership next year as it goes to the polls in February 2025.

Chile, a burgeoning copper and lithium exporter, is set to lose from a potential Trump victory as the Republican candidate rows back on renewables and green transition. In recent years, Chinese firms have invested heavily in Chile's lithium sector as Washington seeks to strengthen critical minerals cooperation with Santiago under their free trade pact, part of broader US efforts to secure clean energy supply chains with South American partners. Liberal leftist President Gabriel Boric and paleo-conservative Trump could not be more distant on every level. However, allegiances may shift as analysts predict a right-wing victory in next year’s elections.

Similarly, Peru has been successfully pursuing a multi-vector policy equally embracing China and the US. It will likely remain a balanced player, save from possible Trump’s whims or sudden political upheavals pushing it further into Beijing’s field.

GUYANA, SURINAME, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

A Trump victory could strengthen the emerging oil and gas triangle of Guyana, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago, as the Republican candidate signals a retreat from Biden's green energy agenda.

The three nations, which constitute the Southern Caribbean Energy Matrix, would likely benefit from a more hydrocarbon-friendly US policy stance. Guyana, facing territorial pressure from Venezuela, could expect particularly robust diplomatic backing, continuing support received during Trump's previous administration.

Industry analysts suggest the policy shift would accelerate offshore development in a region that has attracted mounting international investment interest.

However, none of the countries’ presidents have publicly voiced any endorsement, and constructive engagement would likely continue under transactional terms with either Harris or Trump.

PARAGUAY AND URUGUAY

These two countries are currently ruled by conservative leaders who might welcome a return of Trump, however they would not shy away from cooperating with a Harris administration, as they did with Biden over the past years.

Uruguay, known for its moderate politics and stability in the region, is heading for a runoff presidential election next month with the centre-left candidate leading the polls, thus relations may chill in the event of a Trump victory.

VENEZUELA

Venezuelan leftist dictator Nicolas Maduro has benefited immensely from what can be described as the Biden administration’s most conspicuous policy failure in the region. Maduro has been given a new lease of life by a short-lived sanctions relief granted last year – moved by surreal naivete or full-fledged incompetence – in a bid to facilitate free and fair elections and, potentially, a democratic transition. Not only this has not come to pass as Maduro blatantly stole the July 28 vote, but the regime has also ramped up repression, stacking prisons with political opponents and forcing many – most notably the opposition’s candidate Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia – to flee abroad.

Rumours go that Trump – who imposed hard sanctions on Maduro in 2019 and supported then self-appointed president-elect Juan Guaido – privately praised the autocratic leader as a “smart and tough man” to the bewilderment of his own cabinet.

But as with all things Trump, it is hard to make predictions. He may well double down on sanctions and dial up aggressive rhetoric while lashing out at “communist” Maduro.

Venezuela, home to the world’s largest proven crude reserves, exported 280,000 barrels per day (bpd) to the US last month, mostly through Chevron’s joint venture with state-run oil company PDVSA. Chevron operates under a waiver issued by the Biden administration in November 2022. As oil prices are at risk due to global conflicts, it would not be surprising if this time Trump, on top of maintaining the current licences, further eased sanctions on Caracas to keep prices down and Americans – perhaps also Russians in view of future appeasement – happy. In exchange, Maduro would be asked to welcome back some of the 600,000 refugees currently hosted in the US. Cherry on top: Venezuela’s firebrand opposition leader, Maria Corina Machado, is a moderate conservative. But sadly, her being a woman is not a winning card in Trump’s world.