Chapter Eleven

THE ARABS, ISLAM, AND THE EARLY

ABBASID CALIPHATE

AT the beginning of the seventh century (hereafter all dates

are AD, unless otherwise specified) an event of great historical
significance took place in the Arabian peninsula (roughly
corresponding to modern Saudi Arabia). We have scarcely
referred to this region so far because the people who inhabited
it lived an isolated existence, away from the settled societies
of West Asia. Except for the fertile mountain valleys of Yemen
in the south-west and Oman in the south-east, the entire
peninsula is a sparsely populated arid zone. Nomadic tribal
communities, who are generally called 'beduin', lived in this
inhospitable land. In the seventh century Arabia became the
centre of a new religious movement-Islam.

I
Arabia is a peninsula of large dimensions. It is surrounded by
the Red Sea in the west, the Arabian Sea in the south and the
Persian Gulf in the east. Most of the peninsula is either desert
or dry grassland (steppe). Very little regular rainfall takes
place in the area. Periods of drought extending up to three
years are quite common. Some parts of the peninsula may go
without rainfall for as many as ten years at a stretch. Rains
are more frequent in the coastal areas than in the interior.
Brief spells of rainfall occur mainly in winter and spring. There
are no permanent rivers in Arabia. However, the land is dotted
 The Arabs, Islam, and the Early Abbasid Caliphate I 319

with a number of oases formed by springs or wells.

At the heart of the peninsula lies a vast unbroken arid
zone called Najd. In the north Najd merges with the Syrian
desert or Nafu.d. In the north-east Najd extends almost to the
banks of the Euphrates in southern Iraq. In the west, the strip
of land which runs parallel to the Red Sea consists of several
low hills. The central part of western Arabia is called Hijaz.
Mecca and Madina, where early Islam was born, are situated
in Hijaz. The hills and rocks of Hijaz are barren and the entire
area is arid. Yemen (South Arabia), which· lies in the south-
western comer of the peninsula, contains mountains and fertile
valleys. The environment of Yemen differs sharply from that
of the rest of Arabia because it receives monsoon rains. South-
eastern Arabia, known as Oman, is also relatively less arid
than Najd and Hijaz. Lying at the entrance to the Persian Gulf,
Oman was a somewhat remote area at the periphery of Arabia
and was socially and economically integrated with the rest of
the peninsula comparatively late.
For centuries the inhabitants of central, northern and
western Arabia had led a nomadic existence. The
domestication and introduction of the camel (sometime after
c. 2000 Be) had facilitated the evolution of specialized pastoral
nomadism based on camel-rearing. Camels can travel
continuously for three weeks with almost no food or water in
temperatures as high as 50° C. They could be used to explore
and exploit the scarce resources of the Arabian desert. The
oases offered pastures for the animals and served as watering
places. Dates, fruits and some grain could be grown in the
oases utilizing natural springs or by digging wells. Date and
camel's milk was the staple diet of the region. The camel
pastoralists, known as beduin (from bdu or nomad), moved
from oasis to oasis with their animals and over a period of
time acquired an intimate knowledge of the harsh environment.
This familiarity with the difficult terrain of Najd and Hijaz
was crucial to their strategy of survival. The beduin knew
exactly where they could find some subsistence for themselves
and their animals (mainly camels, but occasionally a few
320 I Early Social Formations

horses), and for how long they could stay in a particular place.
The beduin were constantly on the move. Their social
organization was based on the independent tribe (qabila), each
tribe recognizing a common ancestor (real or imaginary).
Beduin tribes were usually"units of small size and were divided
into clans or extended families. As clans grew larger they
moved away to form independent units of their own. This
prevented the tribes from becoming too unwieldy. The arid
environment just could not support large concentrations of
population. The beduin lifestyle became typical of Arabia.
There were very few communities which led a settled
existence. In some places where the rainfall was more regular
or where the springs and wells provided sufficient water for
irrigation, especially in Hijaz, there were limited possibilities
for cultivating grain together with date-palms, fruits and
vegetables. Such settlements were often targets of beduin
raids. The beduin combined pastoralism with raids against
neighbouring beduin tribes and settled communities to
augment their resources. A form of tribute, called khuwwa,
might also be realized by the beduin from the agriculturists in
return for protection and an assurance to desist from plunder.
In this way the camel pastoralists exercised a degree of
control over the settled people. They were certainly-the most
prominent inhabitants of the region. Camel nomadic
pastoralism was the dominant feature of the pre-Islamic social
formation of Arabia. There were at the same time inferior
pastoralists who reared sheep and goats. On the other hand
there were some communities which subsisted on cultivation
of dates, fruit and grain. Finally, all groups were involved in
some amount of exchange and trade. As we shall see, a class
of specialist merchants had come into existence by the sixth
century. It should be borne in mind that at this time there
were no urban centres in Arabia proper and no state formation
had taken place.
The beduin tribes and the people of the peninsula as a
whole referred to themselves generally as arab. The ancient
Greeks had used the term Sarakenoi (Latin Saraceni, English
 The Arabs, Islam, and the Early Abbasid Caliphate I 321

Saracens) to designate them. Till very recently Saracen and Arab

were used synonymously in western literature. The language
spoken by them was a form of Semitic which was a variation
of Aramaic. Although there were different dialects, a
distinctive Arabic linguistic identity had been formed by the
end of the fifth century. The most outstanding expression of
this was the growth of a tradition of oral poetry. From c. 500
onwards poems were being composed in Arabic (there is no
record for the earlier period) in a specific form known as rajaz.
There were several poets who composed in this form, usually
extempore. Each tribe had its own poets who entertained their
audience by narrating tales of the glory of the tribe. The rajaz
form was followed by a highly evolved type of poetry called
qasida or ode. These poems were of some length and could be
sung. A particular variety of the qasida acquired great fame
throughout Arabia. These were odes called-for some obscure
reason-'suspended poems' or muallaqat. The earliest and the
most well-known of the 'suspended poems' are those
composed by lmrul Qays who is regarded as the foremost
pre-Islamic poet of Arabia. Tarafa, Zuhayr and Labid were
among the other poets who wrote muallaqat. These poems were
recited far and wide therel;,y giving the language a certain
uniformity. The possession of a common language contributed
towards giving the dispersed Arab tribes some cultural unity
even though they lacked state structures or political cohesion.
Patricia Crone has commented on the remarkable 'cultural
homogeneity' of the Arab tribes during the sixth century.
It would be wrong to assume that the Arabs lived in
complete isolation from the outside world. There were several
points of contact in the north (with Syria and Palestine); in the
north-east (with Iraq); in the south (with Yemen); and across
the Red Sea (with Ethiopia). Syria, Palestine, Iraq, and to a
lesser extent Yemen, were settled societies. In the sixth century
Syria and Palestine were part of the Byzantine empire
(successor to the Roman empire in the east). Iraq was ruled
by the Sassanids whose capital Cstesiphon was situated on
the T~gris in southern Iraq, not very far from the edge of the
312 I Early Social Formations

Arabian desert. Yemen was a settled tract with an agrarian

ecoriomy which yielded a sufficient surplus to activate state
formation. Agriculture in Yemen was supplemented by trade.
By the beginning of the fifth century a few urban centres
had come up in [Link]. The area was ruled by independent
chiefs who had carved out small states. In the middle of the
fifth century Yemen was unified by Abkarib Asad who also
managed to extract tribute from some beduin tribes. A number
of southern beduin tribes had at this time come together in a
confederacy led by the Kinda tribe. The chiefs of Kinda were
allied to the ruler of Yemen to whom they paid tribute. Yemen
was inhabited by people whose language was closely related
to, but quite distinct from, Arabic. In the fifth century a sizeable
section of the Yemeni population practiced Judaism. There
had been a Jewish presence in Hijaz and Yemen since the first
century. Asad himself had converted to Judaism. Yemen also
had a small Christian community.
Throughout the latter half of the sixth century (from c.
540) the Byzantine and Sassanid empires were engaged in a
bitter conflict for the control of Syria and Palestine. Syria, it
may be recalled, had been a part of the Roman empire for a
long time. The Sassanids had consolidated their position in
northern Mesopotamia and were trying to dislodge the
Byzantines from Syri~. In the course of their struggle for
supremacy in West Asia the Byzantines and Sassanids had
extended their control to parts of the Arabian peninsula. This
they did indirectly by entering into unequal alliances with
some tribal groups which were willing to accept Byzantine or -
Sassanid overlordship. It might be mentioned here that several
Arabs had gradually penetrated Syria and Iraq and had
enlisted in Byzantine or Sassanid armies. In the fifth century
one beduin clan, the Banu Lakhm, had established a state on
the borders of the Sassanid empire in north-east Arabia. The
Lakhmid state was subject to the· Sassanids. The capital of this
state was Hira on the lower Euphrates. At the turn of the
sixth century a nomadic Arab clan from Jordan, the Ghassan,
had created a state on the outskirts of Syria. The Ghassanids
 The Arabs, Islam, and the Early Abbasid Caliphate I 323

owed their allegiance to the Byzantine empire. The Sassanids

and the Byzantines used the Lakhmids and the Ghassanids,
respectively, as a buffer against beduin incursions and for
recruiting Arab troops.
On the shore of the Red Sea opposite the Arabian peninsula
is the East African country of Ethiopia. Ethiopia was a
monarchical state with its capital at Axum. The Ethiopian kings
had converted to Christianity in the fourth century. In the
sixth century the dominant religion of Ethiopia was
Christianity. The Ethiopians had adopted a version of
Christianity known as Coptic, the Coptic Church having
descended directly from early Egyptian Christianity. Ethiopia
was a close ally of the Byzantine empire and was used by the
Byzantines to maintain their sphere of influence in Arabia,
especially in Yemen. When inc. 510 a Jewish ruler named Dhu
Nuwas came to power in South Arabia and began persecuting
Christians, the Ethiopians used this as a pretext to invade
Yemen. They were initially unsuccessful but eventually
defeated Dhu Nuwas in 525. The supporters of Dhu Nuwas
sought the help of the Persians to end Ethiopian and Byzantine
predomina,nce over South Arabia. By c. 570 Sassanid influence
had become paramount in Yemen. The Arabs had thus been
drawn into big power politics of the region in various ways.
During the sixth century a slow and gradual change was
taking place within Arabia. Some of the tribes took to trade
as their main occupation and gave up nomadic pastoralism.
The shift to trade was mo·st pronounced in Hijaz. Arabian
trade received an impetus with the dislocation of the
international route passing through the Persian Gulf and Iraq,
caused by the Sassanid-Byzantine conflict. Some of the trade
was now diverted through the Red Sea or went overland from
Yemen to Syria. There were already exchange relatio:uships
between Yemen and Syria-Palestine. Caravans went via Hijaz
where a number of oases could be found on the way. Yemen
now became an important transit point in the international
trade. As a [Link] Hijaz route acquired greater significance.
For the tribes or clans which had adopted trade as their
324 I Early Social Formations

primary occupation this was an excellent opportunity. They

provided camels for carrying goods or organized caravans
on their own account. It was necessary to arrange for protection
against beduin raids, for which purpose alliances had to be
made with neighbouring tribes. Despite the growth of trade
in Hijaz, at least five-sixths of the population of this area was
still nomadic in the sixth century.
It is in this historical situation that Mecca, a settlement of
traders in Hijaz, rose to prominence in the sixth century. The
settlement was located at an oasis and had a well, known as
the Zamzam, the water of which came to be regarded as holy
by the Muslims. Mecca was strategically placed at the junction
of two trade routes: the route running from north to south
linking Palestine with Yemen; and the somewhat less
important route connecting Ethiopia and the Red Sea in the
west with the Persian Gulf in the east. Mecca derived some of
its importance from being a place of pilgrimage, a feature which
the trading community of the settlement might have tried to
promote to strengthen its position. The main shrine at Mecca
was a rectangular structure called Kaba (cube). The Kaba
contained idols and other objects venerated by various tribes
and clans. These sacred objects included a black stone which
was built into the wall of the shrine. Every year there was a
specific sacred period when pilgrims visited the shrine. During
this sacred period, which took on the shape of a fair, no violent
acts of revenge were permissible and hostilities among
conflicting tribes were suspended. Business transactions could
take place peacefully at the fair. Similar fairs were held in
some other neighbouring settlements, as for instance at Ukaz
where there was an annual fair lasting twenty days.
Sometime towards the end of the fifth century Mecca came
under the control of a person named Qusayy who belonged
to the Quraysh tribe. This tribe consisted of numerous clans
which were engaged in trade. The Quraysh soon became the
leading tribe of the settlement. They entered into alliances
with some neighbouring tribes .like the Thaqif. The Thaqif
were the dominant tribe in the settlement of Taif situated
 The Arabs, Islam, and the Early Abbasid Caliphate I 32S

close to Mecca. Tai£ was a fertile oasis where fruits and grain
were cultivated. Speaking of the ascendancy of the Quraysh,
Maxime Rodinson, in his biography of Muhammad, has
remarked that 'the history of the ensuing five hundred years
may be seen in the light of the expansion of this one tribe to
the dimensions of a world power'.
Mercantile activity was the mainstay of the Meccan
economy since there were hardly any possibilities for
agriculture. The proceeds from trade seem to have been large
enough to support the inhabitants of the settlement. Camels,
sheep and goats were also reared, although this was a
secondary activity. Dates were cultivated to supplement the
diet. The surplus accruing from trade had begun to undermine
tribal solidarity by the sixth century. Initially the Quraysh
were split into two broad divisions, those who lived on the
outskirts (Quraysh az-Zawahir) and the more privileged who
dwelt in the heart of the settlement close to the Zamzam well
(Quraysh ~z-Bataih). A few families and clans became
prosperous through trade and this led to a process of social
differentiation. Class distinctions began to appear among the
Quraysh. The adoption of a sedentary lifestyle had necessitated
some elementary structures of authority to contain conflicts.
Clan councils formed by heads of families were the basis of
political organization. Tensions and conflicts generated by the
breakdown of tribal society gave rise to a group with limited
political authority. At the end of the sixth century and the
beginning of the seventh century there were intense factional
conflicts within this group. The factions were divided along
clan lines and their disputes were partly for gaining a larger
share of the trade of Mecca. It was in this historical situation
that Muhammad began preaching his religious message in the
opening decades of the seventh century.

II
Our information about the early life of Muhammad is quite
sketchy. The first accounts of his life which have come down
326 I Early Social Formations

to us were written more than a century after his death. The

generally agreed date for his birth is c. 570. He belonged to
the Hashim clan of the Quraysh tribe. Muhammad's father,
Abudllah, was a person of limited means. Muhammad lost
both his parents when he was still very small. He was brought
up under the care of his paternal uncle, Abu Talib. Abu Talib
was a fairly well-to-do merchant. When Muhammad grew up
he found employment with a rich widow named Khadija.
Khadija was a successful businesswoman who traded with
Syria and Palestine. Muhammad assisted her with her
enterprise. Subsequently Muhammad married Khadija. He was
about twenty-five years old at the time of his marriage while
Khadija was much older.
Inc. 610 Muhammad had an intense spiritual experience
which is supposed to mark the beginning of his Prophethood.
A series of revelations, believed to be divinely inspired, were
made to him. These became the basis of Muhammad's religious
mission. He said that he was the messenger, or Prophet, of
the Supreme Being-Allah. Allah's message was being
communicated to human beings through Muhammad. These
revelations form the Quran, the religious book of the Muslims.
Khadija was among-the first to believe in Muhammad's
Prophethood. Within a few years Muhammad had a small
group of Meccan followers who had accepted his religious
ideas. They came to be known as muslim (plural muslimun),
i.e. those who had submitted (to Allah). The religion itself
was denoted by the term Islam, implying submission, derived
from the same root as the word muslim.
The overriding principle of Muhammad's religion was
uncompromising monotheism. He taught that there was only
one God, namely Allah. All other deities were rejected. One
had to blieve exclusively in Allah and not accept any other
gods and goddesses whatsoever. The worship of idols was
firmly prohibited. Muhammad sought to replace the diverse
religious practices of Arab tribes by a single belief, making it
the ideological basis of tribal unity. There was a strong
emphasis on the unity and equality of all those who had
 The Arabs, Islam, and the Early Abbasid Caliphate I 327

accepted Allah and the Prophet.

Muhammad's faith differed sharply from the religious
practices of the Meccans. He met with stiff opposition since
he had denounced their traditional beliefs. For a few years he
was able to preach his ideas at Mecca due to the protection he
got from his influential uncle, Abu Talib. However, the death
of Abu Talib, as well as of Khadija (who was an important
source of strength to the Prophet), in the same year---619-
made things difficult for him in Mecca. The situation became
more and more unfavourable and eventually Muhammad
decided to shift from Mecca to another Hijaz settlement,
Yathrib, which was about 200 miles north of Mecca. Yathrib
later acquired the name Madina (Madina literally means 'the
city'). Muhammad and his followers emigrated to Madina in
622. This emigration from Mecca to Madina is referred to in
Arabic as hijrat. Subsequently the beginning of the Islamic era
was reckoned from this year.
Madina was a cluster of small villages inhabited by differ-
ent tribes. These villages had come up around an oasis
containing springs and wells with an abundant supply of water.
This was more of a peasant settlement since it was possible to
cultivate fruits and cereals here. A transition from nomadism
to settled agriculture was taking place in Madina. Unlike
Mecca, where the Quraysh were the dominant tribe, there
were various tribes in Madina many of which were contending
for control over the settlement. Some of the tribes were Jewish.
Muhammad had been assured of support by the Madinese.
He soon acquired some authority at Madina when he emerged
as an arbitrator in tribal disputes. This helped him to spread
his message and he now had a number of Madinese followers.
The earliest Meccan converts who had accompanied the
Prophet to Madina were known as the muhajirun (' emigrants'),
while the Madinese supporters were called ansar ('helpers').
These divisions played a role in later political disputes.
Muhammad laid the foundations of a new political structure
in Madina. He was no longer just a religious leader, but the
head of a nascent state centred on Madina. He was looked
328 I Early Social Formations

upon as lawgiver and began to lay down rules for governance.

His followers (the male adults among them) constituted his
armed force. Alliances were made with some of the tribes of
adjacent areas. Several tribes embraced the new religion,
thereby becoming part of the Muslim religious community
(umma) as well as of Muhammad's unified polity. Raids were
still an indispensable source of income for this state. A formula
for equitable distribution of the booty was worked out. One-
fifth of the booty went directly to the Prophet so that the
state was provided with independent finances. In addition,
regular voluntary contributions were levied on tribes which
accepted Muhammad's leadership. This developed into a tax
called zakat which all Muslims had to pay to the state. Zakat
was intended to be redistributed, mainly to the less privileged
sections of the Muslims.
Once the framework of an administrative system and an
army had been created, and ties had been forged with beduin
tribes, Muhammad was in a position to carry on an armed
struggle against the Quraysh of Mecca. As a matter of fact the
two processes went hand in _hand. Caravans going north from
Mecca towards Syria and Palestine had to pass close to Madina.
Quraysh trading caravans traversing this route were
frequently attacked. The successful raids against Quraysh
caravans eventually disrupted Meccan trade. The Quraysh had
to sue for peace and in 630 Muhammad was able to occupy
Mecca. The Meccans accepted Islam en masse. With the support
of the powerful Quraysh tribe (and their allies such as the
Thaqif of Taif who had also joined the fold), Muhammad rapid-
ly consolidated his authority in Arabia. The Kaba in Mecca
became the most sacred sanctuary of Islam. All tribal idols
and other objects of worship were removed from Kaba. The
Islamic symbol which was located in Kaba was a black stone
traditionally associated with Abraham. Abraham was regarded
as the common ancestor of all the Arabs. Muslims were
enjoined lo always pray in the direction of Kaba and the
pilgrimage to Kaba (haj) was established as the preeminent
religious ritual of the faith.
 The Arabs, Islam, and the Early Abbasid Caliphate I 329

Muhammad passed away in 632. He had managed to

replace tribal organization with a state which encompassed a
large number of Arab tribes. At the time of Muhammad's death
the overwhelming majority of beduin tribes (especially in Hijaz
and Najd) had acknowledged his leadership. Initially the state
was not territorially well-defined. This is hardly surprising
since this was a state which essentially comprised nomadic
tribes. Madina, and to a lesser extent Mecca, were the focal
points of the government. However the extensive military
potential of this state may be gauged from the fact that when
Muhammad led an expedition in the direction of Syria shortly
before his death his army consisted of 30, 000 troops. It was
in the half-century after 632 that the Arab state was given a
concrete shape.
The work of W. M. Watt helps us to understand why Islam
gained such wide acceptance among Arab tribes in such a short
space of time. Watt has examined the nature of Arab society
on the eve of the this new religious movement (Muhammad at
Mecca; Islam and the Integration of Society). He sees the rise of
Islam as a response to the transformation which was taking
place due to trade and the adoption of a sedentary lifestyle
by some tribes. It was at Mecca that the most striking changes
occurred. The expansion of Meccan commerce eroded
traditional ties and introduced tensions in society. The wealth
which profits from trade, or earnings from pilgrims, brought
into Mecca did not benefit everyone uniformly. This led to
conflicts at various levels. The relatively simple tribal
organization of the Quraysh did not have any mechanism to
cope with the new situation. Similar processes were at work
elsewhere too, especially among tribes which had been drawn
into the network of commercial exchanges. Many of these tribes
had become a part of the Meccan system. Moreover, there
were tribes which were taking up agriculture on a limited
scale while others were coming within the orbit of settled
societies on the periphery of Arabia (Byzantine and Persian
empires; Ethiopia; Yemen). Muhammad's message of unity
was an answer to this social ferment and Islam provided the
330 I Early Social Formations

tribes with a scheme for state formation.

Watt's explanation has profoundly influenced writings on
the subject from the late 1950s onwards. Scholars like Rodinson
(Mohammed) and Marshall Hodgson (The Venture of Islam) have
accepted, and further elaborated, Watt's hypothesis. On the
other hand some historians, as for instance Patricia Crone,
are of the opinion that Watt's 'Meccan trade hypothesis' is
unsatisfactory. Crone has put forward an alternative view in
her Meccan Trade and the Rise of Islam. Crone has tried to
demonstrate that Meccan trade was not on a scale large enough
to undermine traditional society. The trade was essentially in
commodities of small value and was incapable of generating
much wealth. The surplus yielded by the mercantile economy
was not so big as to result in wide disparities in society. In
other words, the traditional way of life was still intact.
According to Crone the evidence indicates that the traditional
way of life 'functioned too well'. The Meccans were initially
opposed to Islam 'because they preferred their traditional way
of life'. Further, for the beduin tribes raids and plunder were
a useful way of augmenting their scanty resources. The new
faith appealed to them as it helped to 'legitimize conquest'.
What was offered to the tribes was a programme of state
formation through unification and conquest. In more general
terms Crone characterizes early Islam as a 'nativist movement',
i.e. a movement born out a deep attachment to the Arabian
way of life in opposition to the penetration of foreign
influences. The foreign influences are identified by her as those
values which were introduced by Byzantine and Persian
attempts to dominate Arabia. Nevertheless, Crone does agree
with Watt's view that the sedentarization which was taking
place in some parts of Arabia had necessitated the growth of
state structures at the expense of tribal ties.

III
Muhammad's death created a political vacuum. He had taught
that he was the last of a long line of prophets sent by God to
 The Arabs, Islam, and the Early Abbasid Caliphate I 331

show the right path to humanity. This line included the

prophets of Judaism and Christianity (Moses, Jesus, etc.). It
was held that there would be no further prophets after
Muhammad. He was, however, not only Prophet but also the
religious leader of the Muslims and head of the newly founded
Arab state. His teachings, which were supposed to be the
word of Allah, comprised the Quran and were to guide his
followers in all aspects of life. There was no question of anyone
assuming his posifion as Prophet, but someone had to take
physical charge of the state and guide the religious community.
As no specific rules had been laid down for this purpose, there
was considerable scope for a dispute on this point. The question
of who should have religious and political authority after
Muhammad was to become increasingly contentious with the
passage of time, leading to fierce conflicts which were to divide
the·believers and often involved serious doctrinal differences
between different groups.
Broadly speaking there were three groups which daimed
the right to succeed. There were, firstly, the Meccan muhajirun
or 'emigrants', who were the earliest followers of Muhammad,
and the ansar or Madinese 'helpers' who had given critical
support to the cause after the. hijrat of 622. They felt that the
prerogative of succession belonged to them as they had been
the first to accept Islam and had stood by Muhammad during
the most difficult phase of his career. The second group, which
is labelled as that of the 'legitimists' (or Alids), argued that
succession should take place within the family of Muhammad.
Since the Prophet had no surviving direct male heir, this
implied that Muhammad's paternal cousin, Ali, should
succeed. Ali was the son of Muhammad's uncle Abu Talib and
was married to Fatima, one of the daughters of Muhammad
and Khadija. An additional qualification of Ali was that he
was one of the muhajirun. Finally, there were the aristocracy
or the Quraysh, particularly the Umayyads. We have already
noted that Muhammad belonged to the Hashim clan of the
Quraysh. In the early seventh century this was not the leading
clan of the tribe. The most powerful clan was that of the
332 ! Early Social Formations

Umayya (Abdul Muttalib, the grandfather of Muhammad was

a first cousin of Umayya). They had converted very late but
wielded enormous political influence.
At times there were overlapping loyalties, as well as inter-
nal divisions within these groups. For instance, the muhajirun,
who were all Meccans, had clan and family ties with the
Quraysh. On occasions when the muhajirun aligned with
members of their own tribe the Madinese ansar complained
that they giving priority to tribal over religious ties. By and
large political authority passed into the hands of the 1eading
Quraysh families after 632. The immediate successors of
Muhammad were his close companions. Ali also become one
of the successors, though at a later date. Subsequently it was
the Umayyads and Hashimites who monopolized power.
Upon the death of Muhammad one of his seniormost
companions, Abu Bakr, was chosen successor or khalifa. Khalifa
literally means successor, which here implied 'successor of
Muhammad'. For the next few centuries khalifa became the
main title for the religious leader of the Muslims and the head
of the state founded by Muhammad. 'Caliph' is the anglicized
form of the word khalifa (and it is this form which we will use
more frequently in our discussion). Early Islamic literature
used the titles khalifa and imam synonymously, though the term
imam was used more in the sense of religious leadership. In a
more restricted sense the word imam denoted anyone who
led the community in prayer. The title imam was also applied
to leaders of sects which grew up within Islam.
The succession of Abu Bakr as the first caliph (632-34)
was fairly smooth. Abu Bakr was widely respected as being
one of the closest aides of the Prophet. He was also the father-
in-law of Muhammad (Muhammad had married Abu Bakr' s
daughter Aisha after the death of Khadija). When Abu Bakr
took over, the newly formed state was in danger of
disintegration as many of the beduin tribes broke away from
Madina. For the nomadic people of Arabia the idea of being a
permanent part of a state was quite new. They were not
accustomed to such formal institutions. Rather they felt that
 The Arabs, Islam, and the Early Abbasid Caliphate I 333

they owed personal allegiance to Muhammad whom they rec-

ognized as their religious leader. The alliances with the tribes
were still quite fragile and this gave an opportunity to some
of the powerful tribal leaders to assert their independence.
The situation became even more serious from the point of
view of the young Islamic state as a few tribal religious leaders
declared themselves to be prophets. One of these was
Maslamah (Musaylimah) of the Hanifa tribe of central Arabia.
Maslamah managed to gather a large following, The Muslims
of Mecca and Madina denounced these leaders as 'false
prophets'. Abu Bakr had to wage a series. of campaigns to
reestablish control over these tribes. These campaigns are called
'wars of the ridda' (ridda means apostasy or defection from
one's religious allegiance).
Abu Bakr died within two years of his becoming caliph
(634). He was succeeded by Umar, whom he had nominated
as his successor. Umar was caliph from 634 to 644. He had
also been one of the earliest Meccan followers of Muhammad.
Umar was the real builder of the Arab empire. The unification
of Arabia was completed under him and large-scale territorial
expansion outside Arabia commenced. The Arabs conquered
Iraq, Syria, Palestine and Egypt. Arab conquests in West Asia
were at the expense of the Sassanid and Byzantine empires.
For over eighty years, prior to the rise oflslam, the Sassanid
and Byzantine empires had been involved in a fierce combat
for supremacy over West Asia. Syria and northern Mesopota-
mia were the main theatres of the wars between the two
empires. At the beginning of the seventh century the Persians
gained an upper hand in this ongoing· conflict. Their armies
marched across Syria into Palestine and occupied Jerusalem
in 615. The Persian army then moved into Egypt (619) and
even threatened Constantinople (626). Internal problems of
the Sassanids prevented them from consolidating their victories.
Further, the Byzantine emperor Heraclius reorganized his
army and launched a counter-offensive against the Persians.
The Persians were pushed back and the Byzantine empire
regained control over its territories in West Asia.
334 I Early Social Formations

In the long run this conflict weakened the two empires.

When the Arabs embarked upon their two-pronged invasion
of Byzantine and Sassanid territories in 633---4, these two West
Asian powers were so exhausted militarily that they were
unable to put up any meaningful resistance. It took the Arabs
just a couple of years to take Iraq from the Sassanids and to
oust the Byzantines from Syria, Palestine and Egypt. In 633
the Arabs began making preliminary forays into Sassanid
territories along the lower Euphrates on the north-eastern
frontier of Arabia. The Lakhmid capital of Hira was besieged
and taken. In 636 the Persian army was routed at the battle of
Qadisiya. In the following year Arab forces led by one of
their leading commanders, Saad, captured the Sassanid capital
Cstesiphon (called Madain by the Arabs). With this, Sassanid
rule came to an end in Iraq. Saad was appointed the military
and civil head of Iraq. In Syria the town of Damascus was
first attacked in 634 and taken in 635. The fall of Damascus
paved the way for the annexation of Syria and Palestine. Apart
from Saad, Khalid bin Walid was another prominent military
commander of the Arabs. Khalid played a major role in the
campaigns in Iraq and Syria. In 639 Egypt was invaded and
within a year almost the entire country was occupied.
Alexandria was captured in 642, thereby completing the
conquest of Egypt. In the east, Arab troops began penetrating
Iran proper from 642. The Sassanids had retreated beyond
the Zagros mountains after the loss of Iraq. In 642 itself the
main Sassanid army was destroyed at the battle of Nehawand
in Iran. By c. 650 the Arabs had taken over most of Iran,
including the north-eastern region of Khurasan. The last
Sassanid ruler, Yazdagird, was killed in I<hurasan (651). At
this stage the Arab empire comprised the Arabian peninsula,
Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Iraq and Iran.
The rapid expansion of the Arabs has been attributed by
G. E. von Grunebaum partly to the mobility of the camel-
riding Arabs and partly to the decline of Byzantine and
Sassanid military power. Using their camels the Arabs could
move with great speed through the difficult desert terrain.
 The Arabs, Islam, and tire Early Ab"basid Caliphate I 335

Nomadic armies are usually capable of very swift manouvres

because they are not encumbered by too much baggage. The
lance and the sword were the traditional weapons of Arab
warfare. Saa~ is credited with introducing archers into the
army. The beduin also relied on horses, which some of the
tribes had bred for a long time as part of their traditional
pattern of subsistence. As already mentioned, the Byzantines
and Sassanids were unprepared for meeting such a determined
challenge. The setbacks which these empires faced in their
first encounters with the Arabs further demoralized their
armies. The religious motivation of the Arabs was an
additional factor which contributed to their success. The
consequences of Arab expansion were more disastrous for
the Sassanids than for the Byzantines. Sassanid ·rule was
completely extinguished, whereas the Byzantine empire
survived for several centuries though its territories were
confined to Anatolia, Greece and a few other parts of south-
eastern Europe.
Umar was killed in 644 by a person who had a personal
grievance against him. Umar had appointed a board of six
selectors to nominate a successor after him. The selectors were
not to name anyone from among themselves as the caliph.
Usman, another early Meccan convert to Islam, was named
successor to Umar. Usman became the third caliph (644-56).
Usman was one of the muhajirun but he belonged to the
Umayyad clan. This caused considerable indignation among
the Hashimites. The most vehement opposition came from
the legitimists-the supporters of _Ali. It may be mentioned
that the claim of Ali had been put forward ever since the death
of Muhammad but he had been overlooked every time a
successor was chosen. Usman made himself unpopular by
allowing members of the Umayyad clan to occupy all major
official positions. Although the conquest of Iran was completed
under Usman, the initial pace of expansion slowed down after
c. 650. This added to the growing dissatisfaction with Usman's
rule. Some of the Arab settlements in southern Iraq and Egypt
became centres of opposition to the caliph. There was a revolt
336 I Early Social Formations

by the Egyptian troops and amidst the ensuing chaos Usman

was assassinated in 656.
The murder of Usman marks the end of one phase of the
formation of the Arab empire. All this while, Madina had
remained the capital. Till the time of Abu Bakr the Islamic
state had been confined to Arabia. Umar and Usman had built
a vast empire extending from the Nile to the margins of Central
Asia. They had to therefore evolve an infrastructure for
governing such a large political entity. Umar had emphasized
the military authority of the caliph by taking on the title of
amir al muminin (commander of the faithful). As amir al muminin
the caliph was the supreme commander of the troops. This
reinforced his religious and political authority. In other words
political, military and religious power was initially combined
in one person-the caliph. The Arab tribes which constituted
the Muslim community or umma were at the the armed force
of the state. All able-bodied male adults of the umma had to
render military service. The soldiers were grouped according
the respective tribes to which they belonged and fought under
the leadership of their tribal chiefs (though the overall
command of the army might be with the amir al muminin or
someone appointed by him).
Unlike in Arabia, the Arabs were outsiders in Iraq, Iran,
Syria, Palestine and Egypt. For several years they were
primarily an army of occupation and it was only gradually
that they got integrated with the conquered areas. The troops
were stationed in fortified camps or garrisons, called amsar
(singular misr; amsar should not be confused with ansar), located
at strategic points. In Iraq the Arabs preferred to set up their
own garrison towns whereas in Syria they usually lived in
existing towns which had been abandoned by the retreating
Byzantines. Significantly, the Arabs did not occupy the
Sassanid capital Cstesiphon despite having captured it. They
founded two new cities in southern Iraq where the troops
and administrative personnel were lodged. These cities were
Kufa and Basra, which were founded between c. 635 and 638.
Kufa was situated on the banks of the Euphrates, very close
 The Arabs, Islam, and the Early Abbasid Caliphate I 337

to Hira, and Basra was at the mouth of the Persian Gulf. Basra
grew into a major commercial centre. In Syria the Arabs
selected an old market town, Damascus, as their main military-
cum-administrative centre. In Egypt the settlement of Fustat
was founded at the edge of the Nile delta inc. 641. Fustat
later developed into Cairo.
As military conquest was looked upon as a collective enter-
prise, the spoils of war were to be shared by the community
as a whole. According the principles laid down by the Prophet,
one-fifth of the booty went to the state and the rest was
distributed among the umma. Given the unprecedented scale
of conquest, Umar had to ensure that the distribution of the
booty did not take place in a haphazard manner. The booty
was distributed by the state in the form of lump-sum military
stipends. The amount of stipend which a person received was
determined by the nature of his service and stage at which his
family or clan had accepted Islam. Thus, the muhajirun and
their descendants would be ranked first and so on. The
allocations were made centrally while the actual disbursement
might be made in the area where a person was serving. All
Muslims were liable to pay the zakat tax, which was assessed
on their possessions.
For the time being the complex question of land was
resolved by keeping it under the control of the state instead
of dividing it among individual Arab families. Land was held
by the central government on behalf of the umma. Th~ land
which caine under the control of the Arab state was i) Byzantine
or Sassanid crown land; ii) land abandoned by the former
owners; and iii) land on which the subject population had
forfeited its property rights because they had resisted the
Arabs. In all these cases a share of the produce was taken
from the cultivators or the intermediaries and redistributed
among the Arabs in the form of pensions along the lines of
the formula for distributing booty. It must be remembered
that this was the first time that the
Arabs had gained access to
such an enormous agrarian surplus derived from land. Hence
it took some time to evolve a regular system of land admin-
338 I Early Social Formations

istration. For over half a century there was considerable confu-

sion with regard to patterns of landownership and categories
of land revenue. We should not assume that the stipends or
pensions paid by the state amounted to an equitable
distribution of wealth. Earlier disparities were reinforced and
soon a privileged Muslim elite emerged in the conquered
territories. Nevertheless the measures of Umar and Usman
helped to maintain the cohesion of the umma in the first phase
of expansion. Usman had placed severe restrictions on the
private pt!trchase of land in southern Iraq by·wealthy Meccans
when he ~ound that provisions laid down by Umar were being
violated.·
Umar was responsible for systematization of Islamic ritual.
The mosque,.where the males of the community gathered for
prayer, became the centre of the religious life of Muslims. In
the amsar the practice of praying collectively was one of the
ways in which the umma could be brought together by giving
to Arab troops drawn from different tribes a strong sense of
identity. Umar sent out Quran reciters to the garrison towns
to familiarize the residents with its text. Although some parts
of the Quran were written down, most of it was transmitted
orally. Umar and Usman initiated the writing down and
standardization of the entire text. This task was completed
under Usman and the standardized text dates from his time.
Umar instituted a new Islamic ~ra commencing from the year
of the hijrat (622). This is a lunar calendar of tw~lve equal
months and is 11 days less than the actual year of 365.25 days.

IV

There was a violent struggle over the question of succession

after Usman. No unanimity could be arrived at and the political
crisis deteriorated to a point where a virtual civil war broke
out in the Arab empire. Some of the differences which arose
in that period have persisted down to the present day in the
shape of numerous religious sects within Islam. At Madina
the supporters of Ali had joined hands with the rebels from
 The Arabs, Islam, and the Early Abbasid Caliphate I 339

Egypt and they proclaimed Ali as the caliph. This was not
acceptable to the Umayyads. Another faction led by Zubayr,
an associate of Muhammad, and Muhammad's widow Aisha
also opposed Ali. The most serious challenge came from
Muawiya, the governor of Syria, who was a descendent of
Umayya and a cousin of Usman. Muawiya had a strong base
among the Arabs of Syria. He openly revolted against Ali. Ali
had shifted his capital from Madina to Kufa in Iraq. He had a
large following at this place. Except for Syria, all other re-
gions had recognized Ali as the caliph. In order to seek Mua-
wiya's submission Ali marched towards Syria with his troops.
An armed encounter [Link] the armies of Ali and Muawiya
took place at Siffin in northern Mesopotamia (657). The battle
was inconclusive and both sides agreed to arbitration. Nothing
concrete emerged from the negotiations and Muawiya became
the de facto ruler of Syria. Ali ruled over the rest of the empire
from his capital at Kufa (Madina was too inconveniently located
to be the seat of government).
The events leading to Ali's withdrawal from Siffin
provoked the first major sectarian division in Islam. There
was one group which held that Ali was divinely endowed
with special qualities of leadership by virtue of his belonging
to the family of the Prophet and being the 'true' successor. He
was incapable of making any error. This group, called shiah
(shiah is a collective noun which literally means 'party', and
here implies 'the party of Ali'; the adherents of this party are
the shii or Shiites), had unquestioning faith in Ali and fully
endorsed his actions at Siffin. On the other hand there was a
breakaway group which was opposed to any arbitration
between Muawiya and Ali. In their opinion Ali's conduct
amounted to a compromise with the Umayyads. For this group
Ali was no longer the leader of the Muslim community. Those
who took this extreme position acquired the label of Kharijis
or secessionists: the Kharijis had seceded from Ali, and of
course from Muawiya and the Umayyads. The Kharijis
continued to be a source of trouble for the Arab state for at
least half a century. Small bands of Khariji rebels harassed the
340 I Early Social Formations

government in different parts of the empire. The Kharijis

evolved their own religious interpretations and their doctrines
influenced the development of Islamic theology everi after
the movement itseli died out by the beginning of the eighth
century. Arab history in the post-Siffin period was marked
by an unequal contest between the Umayyads, Kharijis and
Shiites, a contest in which the Umayyads emerged as the
winners. Of course there were a large number of Muslims
who took no sides in this contest.
Ali was murdered by a Khariji assassin in 661. Muawiycl,
now formally declared himself as the caliph. There was a brief
attempt to promote the candidature of Ali's eldest son Hasan,
but the Shiites failed to muster enough support. Damascus
became the new capital of the Arab empire. Muawiya began
the process of transforming the caliphate into a monarchy.
Between 661 and 750 all caliphs were from the Umayyad clan.
This is known as the period of the Umayyad caliphate. In
Muslim historiography a clear distinction is made between
the first four caliphs and the Umayyad and later caliphates.
Abu Bakr, Umar, Usman and Ali are generally referred to as
the 'pious caliphs' or rashidun (i.e. 'rightly guided' caliphs).
With Muawiya monarchical rule based on the dynastic
principle was established. The Umayyad caliphs projected
themselves as religious leaders but ultimately their power
rested on force. ·
Muawiya, who ruled from 661 to 680, reinforced the
concept of hereditary succession by naming his son Yazid as
the heir. Yazid (680-3) became caliph after his father's death.
Once again the Shiites put forth the claim of Ali's family. They
-announced their support for Ali's younger son, Husayn (Hasan
had died in 669). Husayn' s supporters, who were concentrated
in southern Iraq (mainly in Kufa), mobilized a contingent of
soldiers for ~med resistance against the Umayyads. In 680
Husayn led a small band of followers to fight the Umayyad
army. The battle took place at Karbala, not far from Kufa.
Husayn' s force was massacred and Husayn himself was killed.
The slaying of Husayn on the battlefield made him a martyr
 The Arabs, Islam, and the Early Abbasid Caliphate I 341

not only for the Shiites but for many of those who were
opposed to the shape which the caliphate had taken. Husayn's
martyrdom became a powerful religious symbol for the Shiites
and was henceforth to be the rallying point for their cause.
This event is commemorated every year as a period of
mourning during the Islamic month of Muharram, i.e. the
month in which the battle of Karbala took place.
Yazid's brief reign witnessed numerous uprisings. Besides
the Shiites and the Kharijis, several sections of the people of
Madina were also opposed to his succession. Yazid hardly
had any time to settle down and passed away in 683. He was
survived by a minor son, Muawiya II, who was installed as
the new caliph. Muawiya II died shortly afterwards. To the
opponents of the Umayyads the succession of both Yazid and
Muawiya II was a complete negation of the concept of the
caliphate. From 684 onwards a prolonged civil war engulfed
the Arab empire. The major adversaries of the Umayyads were
the old Muslim families of Mecca and Madina who were
aligned with a tribal confederacy headed by the Qays tribe of
southern Arabia.
With the centre of political power having shifted towards
Syria (and to a lesser extent Iraq) Arabia had been increasingly
marginalized. The growing alienation of Mecca and Madina
was now converted into a revolt led by Ibn Zubayr. Ibn Zubayr
was proclaimed the new caliph in 684 and Madina was restored
as the capital. For the next few years Arabia became virtually
independent. Some areas were controlled by Ibn Zubayr while
others were under the Kharijis. Most. of Iraq owed allegiance
to Ibn Zubayr. The Kharijis briefly upheld Ibn Zubayr' s claim,
but on the whole the two were hostile to each other.
Throughout the empire Arab communities were split along
the lines of the three warring factions: lbn Zubayr, the
Ununayads and the Kharijis.·
Meanwhile the leadership of the Umayyads was assumed
by another branch of the clan. This was the family of Marwan.
Muawiya, Yazid and Muawiya II belonged to the of family
Abu Sufiyan, a grandson of Umayya. They are therefore often
342 I EarlySacial Formations

referred to as [Link] Ummayads. Marwan was descended

from a cousin of Abu [Link]. He and his Umayyad successors
are called Marwanid Umayyads. Marwan had earlier served
as the chief adviser of caliph Usman (to whom he was closely
related). In 684 Marwan defeated lbn Zubayr at the battle of
Marj Rahat which enabled the Umayyads to recover Syria.
Marwan died in 685 and was succeeded by Abd al-Malik.
Abd al-Malik (685-705) rebuilt the Umayyad state,
strengthened the caliphate and extended the borders of the
empire. A series of campaigns had to be directed against Ibn
Zubayr and the Khariji rebels before they could be defeated.
All of Iraq had submitted to Abd al-Malik by 691 and in 692
Mecca and Madina were occupied. Ibn Zubayr was killed. It
was only [Link] 692 that Umayyad rule was stabilized. The
person who played the most prominent role in the campaigns
against lbn Zubayr was a military commander named al-Hajjaj.
He was from the Thaqif tribe of Tai£ and was in-charge of the
action at Mecca. Al-Hajjaj was subsequently appointed
governor of Iraq and the eastern territories of the empire which
he ruled with an iron hand till his death in 714.
Under Abd al-Malik the caliphate became an absolute mon-
archy. Political and military power was concentrated in the
hands of a small ruling elite presided over by the caliph. The
caliph wielded supreme authority. Abd al-Malik developed a
bureaucratic apparatus for governing the empire. The army
was reorganized to make it a professional standing army rather
than a league of tribal contingents. Several features which had
survived from former Byzantine and Sassanid regimes were
abandoned. The Byzantines had used Greek and the Sassanids
had used Pahlavi (a type of Persian which linguists call 'Middle
Persian') as their official languages. When the Arabs occupied
the territories of these empires most of the routine
governmental work was still done in Greek and Pahlavi in
the respective areas. This was partly dictated by necessity
because the bulk of the lower and middle level administrative
personnel had been serving the former rulers. Abd al-Malik
vigorously pursued a policy of arabization. He replaced Greek
 The Arabs, Islam, and the Early Abbasid Caliphate I 343

and Pahlavi with Arabic as the language of the administra-

tion. An innovative and distinctive coinage was introduced
which was very different in its design from the coins issued
by the Byzantines and Sassanids. The coins of Abd al-Malik
carried no portraits but only had some written text engraved
on them. The text was inscribed in Arabic and included words
from the Quran. This was to remain the basic format for coins
issued by Muslim rulers throughout the world. Abd al-Malik' s
reign was also a period of hectic building activity. Monumental
public buildings, mainly mosques and palaces, were
constructed in the principal cities of the empire. A number of
grand buildings came up in the capital Damascus. The most
famous monument built at the initiative of Abd al-Malik was
the structure known as 'Dome of the Rock'-Al-Aqsa mosque--
in Jerusalem (692). The Dome of the Rock was constructed at
a site which was held sacred by the Jews as well the Muslims
due to its association with Abraham. The imposing dome on
this mosque defined a new architectural expression which
became one of the most enduring elements of Islamic archi-
tecture.
Abd al-Malik and his successor al-Walid I (705-15)
embarked upon a new phase of territorial expansion. The most
significant conquests took place in northern Africa and the
western Mediterranean.. Egypt was used as the launching pad
for campaigns in the western parts of northern Africa. The
entire stretch of northern Africa, from the western borders of
Egypt to the Atlantic coast, was referred to by the Arabs as
'the Maghrib'. The Maghrib is bound by the Mediterranean in
the north and the Sahara in the south. It comprises present-
day Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. The Arabs began
making inroads into the Maghrib in the latter half ·of the seventh
century and by the end of the century they had occupied the
Roman province of Africa (called Ifriqiya by the Arabs; now
known as Tunisia). In Ifriqiya the leading garrison town of
the Arabs was Qayrawan (Kairoun, in south-eastern Tunisia),
which was founded inc. 670. Qayrawan became the first Arab
urban centre in the Maghrib. By the beginning of the eighth
• '.! J I Early Social Formations

century the entire Maghrib was under Umayyad rule. Arab

consolidation in the Maghrib was facilitated by the ties which
they forged with local nomadic people known as the Berbers.
Many of the Berber tribes adopted Islam and got arabized.
Subsequent campaigns in the western Mediterranean were
jointly undertaken by the Arabs and Berbers. By 711 Umayyad
armies had invaded western Europe. The Visigoths were
dislodged from Spain, which was incorporated into the Arab
empire. Further advance into Europe was checked by the
Franks.
Umayyad power was based primarily on Syrian support.
The surplus produced by the Syrian economy provided the
initial resources for the Umayyads to extend their authority.
The agricultural produce of the rich and fertile tract lying
between the Tigris and the Euphrates in southern Iraq was
another vital component of the Umayyad economy in the
Marwanid era. The provincial government of Al-Hajjaj laid
great stress on the improvement of irrigation works in
southern Iraq. There is evidence to suggest that there was
some agricultural expansion in this region during the early
decades of the eighth century. It should be borne in mind that
southern Iraq had been the main politica,l and economic centre
of the Sassanid empire.
A few general observations about Umayyad society may
be made at this stage. Firstly, both Syria and Iraq had a fairly
large Arab population at the time of the Islamic conquests.
Secondly, the Arab component of the population was somewhat
larger in Syria than in Iraq. Third, when the Arabs invaded
Syria the Greek-speaking Byzantine landed aristocracy fled
from the country, whereas in Iraq the Persian landowners
remained in place and were initially accommodated as
intermediaries in th~ !and revenue sys·~~m. Fourth, the Arabs
began to penetrate the countryside of Syria at a relatively
early date as compared to Iraq. Fifth, by the beginning of the
eighth century the Arab settlers of Iraq were also not confined
just to the cities but had begun acquiring land in southern
Iraq as private holdings. Sixth, whereas there was extensive
 The Arabs, Islam, and the [Link] Abbasid Caliphate I 345

Arab colonization in Syria and Iraq, Iran (i.e. the area lying
east of the Zagros mountains) itself was not colonized by the
Arabs. Khurasan may be cited as the one exception to this.
There was a sizeable Arab concentration in this north-eastern
frontier region of Iran. Finally, the key to Umayyad domination
over Syria, and through it over the Arab empire, was their
alliance with the Quzaa (or Kalb) tribal confederacy. The tribes
which comprised the Quzaa confederacy were numerically the
single largest Arab group in Syria. Patricia Crone has stated
that (Slaves on Horses), 'Syria was an exceptional province, firstly
in that the Arab population was spread evenly over the
countryside, and secondly in that one confederacy, the Quzaa,
by far outnumbered any other tribe. It was thus possible for
the Syrian as for no other governor to rely on a local group'.
When the Arabs first settled in the amsar in Byzantine and
Sassanid territories they were grouped according to their tribal
affiliations which were combined to form semi-artificial tribal
units. Each garrison town was divided into sectors (or
quarters) which were allotted to separate tribal units. Arab
tribes were the basis of military and administrative
organization. The respective sectors in which the tribes resided
were the centres of their social and religious life. These sectors
were virtually autonomous segments of the wban settlement.
The city was thus more of a collection of tribal localities. Ira
Lapidus states that, 'Quarters [i.e. sectors] were village-like
communities within the urban whole. Indeed some quarters
were suburban districts composed of people of recent village
or beduin origin. These sharply divided city populations
enjoyed relatively few institutions which cut across quarter
boundaries to bind them together'. ·
Initially each sector was· placed under the chief of the
dominant tribe living in it. This chief, or rais al qabila, was the
main link between the central or provincial governments and
the sectors. He was answerable for the tribes under him. It
was through the rais al qabila that stipends or pensions were
paid and taxes were realized. Mobilizing troops from the tribal
units for military campaigns was the duty of the rais al qabila.
346 I Early Social Formations

The rais al qabila were the ruling elite (ashraf) of the early
Umayyad state. In Syria at least the ashraf were invariably
drawn from tribes which were loyal to the Umayyad house.
Abd al-Malik reformed· this system in order to create a
standing army with regular troops maintained by the state.
Tribal units were reconstituted into regiments called junds.
funds were not kinship groups. The junds were commanded
by qaids, who were ·military commanders and might not
necessarily be tribal chiefs. This was an attempt to dissolve
tribal loyalties within the army and impart a professional
character to it.
In the first phase of Arab expansion in West Asia the pace
of conversion to Islam in the former Byzantine and Sassanid
territories was very slow. The earliest Muslims identified Islam
with the Arabs. Islam was regarded as the religion of the
Arab tribes. Usually the conversion to Islam was a tribal and
not an individual affair. A tribe as a whole would adopt the
new creed (there were, of course, a few exceptions). The
military, administrative and social organization of the Arab
Muslims, as we have seen, was along tribal lines. Initially ties
of tribe or clan remained intact in the conquered territories.
In Syria, ·Iraq and Egypt the Muslims lived in garrison towns
from where they controlled the neighbouring countryside.
They were not encouraged to have much interaction with the
local populace. The garrison towns were islands of Arab
presence mthese countries. Yet complete isolation was out of
·the question. The practical compulsions .of administering such
vast territories with their highly developed economies
necessitated some intercourse with the subject non-Arab
population. The systematic extraction of surplus by the Arab
ruling class required the collaboration of local elites. In Syria
the problem was more acute since the Byzantine upper class
had taken refuge in the areas which were still ruled by
Constantinople. Nevertheless, there were a few officials who
stayed on and offered their services to the Arabs.
In the case of Iraq and Iran there was a class of well-
entrenched landowners and village chiefs called dihqans who
 The Arabs, Islam, and the Early Abbasid Caliphate I 347

had assisted the Sassanid government in the collection of land

revenue. The dihqans retained their position under the Arabs,
even though they lost many of their privileges. They continued
to be the dominant class in the rural areas. The dihqans collected
the land tax from villages and paid it to the government. They
also carried out numerous other administrative functions.
Over a period of time many of them began to reside
permanently in Arab cities and embraced Islam.
Simultaneously Arab settlers were penetrating the countryside,
a phenomenon which was particularly apparent in Syria. As
more and more Arabs developed economic and social
relationships with areas outside the garrison towns, many local
inhabitants became Muslims. Bythe end of the seventh century
non-Arab Muslims were to be found both in urban centres
and the countryside.
Given that Muslims were only visualized as belonging to
specific Arab tribes and that these tribes were the very basis
of military and administrative organization, a way had to be
found for accommodating non-Arab Muslims-'-who often
converted in small batches-within this structure. The problem
was resolved by allocating the non-Arabs to some Arab tribe.
What is significant is that non-Arabs who entered the fold
had an inferior status. This inferior status was institutionalized
by making the non-Arabs accept the overlordship of the
respective tribes to which they were attached. The non-Arab
convert was classified as maula (plural mawali) or dependent
of the tribe. The mawali had a subordinate position within the
tribe. Later, when tribes ceased to play a role in the military
and administrative organization of the state non-Arc1-b Muslims
became mawali of individuals or families.
There had been an appreciable increase in the proportion
of non-Arab Muslims by the beginning of the eighth century.
Crone has suggested that under the e_arly Umayyads the
greater part of the converts were war captives who had been
made slaves. These slaves were subsequently manumitted
when they converted (theoretically Muslims could not be
slaves). She has pointed out that there was extensive
348 I Early Social Formations

enslavement during the early Arab conquests. The manumitted

slaves were accorded a low status in Muslim society when
they converted. This partly accounts for the subordination of
the mawali.
There was a marginal improvement in the status of the
mawali when the landowning classes (dihqans, etc.) and former
Sassanid officials of Iraq and Iran began to adopt Isla,m. This
process gathered momentum with the incorporation of these
groups into the administrative structure. Al-Hajjaj had
curtailed the autonomy of the dihqans by centralizing the
collection of land revenue and placing the mawali in charge of
it. The dihqans now had an additional incentive to convert.
The adoption of Islam by the dihqans was usually accompanied
by the conversion of the villages controlled by them. Some of
the Marwanid Abbasids, as for instance Umar II (717-20),
actively promoted conversions. Moreover the interaction
between Arab settlers and the local population, which took
place at various levels, undermined Arab exclusivism. The non-
Arab Muslims were no longer content with the status of maula
and aspired for equality within the community. These
developments led to widespread resentment against Umayyad
rule, particularly in Iraq and Iran.
The Umayyads were unpopular among several sections
of the Arabs as well. Their government was looked upon as
being authoritarian and corrupt. The st~te had become
militarily weak which made it difficult for the Umayyads to
control the far-flung areas of the empire. Some of the
commanders took advantage of this situation to make
themselves powerful in the areas in which they were posted.
A new class of Arab traders, government officials, absentee
landlords and rural intermediaries had arisen within the
former Sassanid ':erritories. This class wanted some share in
powe.r. In view of the narrow social base of the Umayyads,
which was primarily confined to Syria, these groups could
not be accommodated without disturbing the delicate balance
of tribal alignments which sustained the state. There had also
been occasional uprisings against the Umayyads by the clans
 The Arabs, Islam, and the Early Abl,asid Caliphate I 349

and tribes opposed to them. The most consistent foes of the

Umayyads were the Hashimites and the Alids. Thus the
dissatisfaction of the mawali combined with the opposition of
diverse Arab groups led to a strong artti-Umayyad sentiment
in the empire by the mid-eighth ·century.
In the 740s an organized movement aimed at the
overthrow of the Umayyads came into existence. Till almost
the last moment the leadership of this movement remained
underground. It worked in complete secrecy to mobilize all
the forces which were opposed to the Umayyads for one reason
or another. Though the origins of the movement are somewhat
obscure, there is no doubt that its real leaders were the
Hashimites. The Hashimites had never reconciled themselves
to Umayyad supremacy. The movement was guided by the
Abbasids, a branch of the Hashimites who were descendants
of Muhammad's paternal uncle al-Abbas. The headquarters
of the Abbasids were at an isolated village named al-Hurnayma
which was situated in the desert to the south of Syria. From
al-Humayma a number of agents were sent out to gather
support for the Abbasid cause. The main strength of the
movement was in Khurasan which, as we have noted, had a
large Arab population. Here a leading role was played by
Abu Muslim:, a military commander and outstanding organizer:.
Abu Muslim managed to collect a large army from among the
Arab settlers of Khurasan. He also enlisted the assistance of
the local mawali. Abbasid propagandists made an appeal to
the anti-Umayyad feelings of the Alids and even vaguely indi-
cated that someone from the family of Ali would be made the
caliph. But it became clear later that the Abbasids had no inten-
tion of handing over power to the Alids. The Abbasids
preferred to remain• concealed until the movement had
attained its objective and only then did they reveal as to who
would succeed the Umayyads.
Umayyad rule came to an end in 749-50. The Khurasani
army mobilized by Abu Muslim was instrumental in ousting
them from power. The last Umayyad caliph, Marwan II, fled
to Egypt and was killed there. It was only when Abu Muslim
350 I Early Social Formations

had accomplished his task that the Abbasid leader Abul Abbas
al-Saffah (al-saffah literally means 'the avenger') was declared
the new caliph. This inaugurated t!,.e 500 year long reign of
the Abbasids. The Abbasid caliphate lasted till 1258, though
they enjoyed supreme power only for about a century after
which they were more of figureheads and were reduced to
being figureheads by the tenth century.

With the rise of the Abbasids the centre of political power

shifted from Syria to southern Iraq. Corresponding to this
was the marginalization of Syria. Whereas the Khurasanis were
the staunchest allies of the Abbasids, Khurasan itself was ~
frontier area and was therefore not suitable for governing
such a large empire. The economy of southern Iraq could
provide the resources necessary for maintaining the Abbasid
imperial government. The Persian empire of the Sassanids too
had its nucleus in this region. It was here that the Sassanid
administrative structure was concentrated. The dihqans and
erstwhile Sassanid officials who had become mawali had a
strong presence in this fertile tract. They had backed the
Abbasids in their 'struggle against the Umayyads and they
were to be henceforth one of the pillars of the Abbasid regime.
Persian mawali were recruited in the· civil administration and
the army on a large scale from the middle of the eighth century.
The mawali rose to high positions and the local and regional
elites among them got a share in political power. Most of the
Iranians adopted Islam in the following two centuries. This
implied that the Iranian component of the Muslim population
of West Asia outnumbered the Arabs. Once a section of the
Persian mawali had become part of the ruling class the dis-
tinction between Arab and non-Arab Muslims no longer had
much meaning. Social differentiation among the Muslims was
now primarily along class lines. Even the use of the term maula
was gradually [Link].
Arab expansion into the Iranian world (which in the
 The Arabs, Islam, and the Early Abbasid Caliphate I 3.51

context of the Abbasid caliphate included parts of present-

day Afghanistan and extended beyond the Oxus river) was a
turning point in the development of Islam. Islamic
consolidation in Iran under the Abbasids produced a rich
synthesis through the fusion of Arab and Iranian traditions.
The civilization which flourished under the early Abbasids
was rooted in this synthesis. As a result of this synthesis many
of the features of the Sassanid monarchical state were carried
over to Islam. Thus, what has been referred to as the 'Abbasid
revolution' had far-reaching implications for Arab-Iranian-
Islamic history.
Al-Saffah died in 754. He was succeeded by his brother
al-Mansur (754-75). Marshall Hodgson regards the eighty years
from the accession of al-Mansur to the death of the Abbasid
caliph al-Mamun in 833 as marking the climax of the 'High
Caliphate'. In his periodization of Islamic history Hodgson,
has termed the era of the Marwanid Umayyads and the early
Abbasids (from 684 to c.' 900) as the 'High Caliphate', as distinct
from the 'Primitive Caliphate' which preceded it (632-683).
The most outstanding of the early Abbasids were al-Mansur,
Harun al-Rashid {786-809) and al-Mamun (813-33).
In al-Mansur's reign the caliphate became even more of
an absolutist monarchy than it had been under the Marwanids.
The Sassanid conception of kingship, combining temporal and
spiritual authority, was adopted to uphold the caliph's
supreme authority. An elaborate court ceremonial, much of it
borrowed from the Sassanids (though there were also
Byzantine inputs) was introduced. The person of the caliph
became unapproachable, signifying distance between ruler and
ruled. If at all someone was allowed into the caliph's presence
it was necessary to prostrate oneself and kiss the ground. The
splendour of the court emphasized the majesty of the caliph.
Southern Iraq at this time had three prominent Arab cities.
We have already referred to Kufa and Basra. Besides, there
was Wasit located on the Tigris, north of Basra. Wasit had
been the headquarters of Al-Hajjaj and had been founded by
him in c. 702. Al-Mansur discovered that none of these cities
352 I Early Social Formations

could cater to his needs. Cstesiphon (Madain), the imperial

capital of the Sassanids was decaying. The caliph decided to
build an imposing capital for himself in southern Iraq. In 762
he founded Baghdad on the banks of the Tigris. The site of
the city was not far from ancient Cstesiphon. Initially this was
a cantonment for the Khurasan army of the Abbasids. Many
scholars regard the founding of Baghdad as having a deeper
symbolic significance whereby al-Mansur tried to present
himself as a ruler in the tradition of the Sassanids and their
Hellenistic predecessors.
Right since the time of Alexander the Great the formal
founding of cities was a symbolic act which denoted imperial
power. This was a concept that was alien to Arabia where
urban centres were non-existent. The first Arab cities in the
Byzantine and Sassanid territories had grown out of the amsar.
Damascus, the capital of the Umayyads, was an old Roman
town which was converted into a military-cum-administrative
centre. Baghdad, on the other hand, was planned on a grand
scale from the outset. It was conceived as a circular city which
came up around the palace of the caliph and a large mosque.
The boundaries of the city were marked by a number of gates.
Baghdad remained the residence of the Abbasid caliphs till
the end (except for a very short period when it was shifted to
Samarra). It grew into one of the great metropolises of the
world and was perhaps the largest city of the Middle Ages.
The eighth and ninth centuries were a period of urban
expansion in the Islamic world. Baghdad, Kufa, Wasit and
Basra were the main cities of Iraq. Al-Mansur was responsible
for building walls around Kufa and Basra (c. 770). The
population of Basra at the beginning of the eighth century is
estimated to have been 200, 000 while Kufa had a population
of 1.00, 000. Basta became the main port for Baghdad and was
an important transit point in the Indian Ocean trade route
which passed through the Persian Gulf. In Iran the leading
urban centres were Nishapur, Marv and Tus in Khurasan. The
prosperity of the cities of Khmasan was directly linked to the
importance of this region in the early phase of Abbasid rule.
 The Arabs, Islam, and the Early Abl,asid Caliphate I 353

Nishapur was the principal town of Khurasan. It lay on the

Central Asian trade route and benefited from the commerce
which went along this artery. Nishapur was also an eminent
centre of learning. Beyond Khurasan in Central Asia new urban
centres like Balkh and Bukhara were rising to prominence.
In the west, Syria had lost its former prestige. Damascus,
which had been the capital of a vast empire for almost a
century, was now just a provincial town. However, it still
remained the chief metropolis of Syria. Aleppo and Antioch
(the capital of the province under the [Link]) were the other
leading cities of Syria. The ancient ports of Byblos, Sidon and
Tyre on the Lebanese coast continued to flourish due the hectic
commercial activity of the eastern Mediterranean. In Palestine,
the development of Jerusalem received a fresh stimulus when
it became a religious centre for the Muslims in the 690s.
Jerusalem was already a major place of pilgrimage for the
Jews and the Christians.
In Egypt, where urban decay had set in with the decline
of the Roman empire, the ruralization of the economy was
almost complete at the time of the Arab conquest. As we have
noted above, the main Arab garrison in Egypt was located on
the Nile, at the edge of the delta. This was called Fw;tat and
became the largest city in Egypt. When Cairo was founded
adjacent to Fustat in the tenth century, Fustat merged with it
(Fustat is now part of Old Cairo). The great Mediterranean
port of Alexandria had already lost its former glory and was
now fully eclipsed with the rise of Fustat. In the Maghrib the
founding of Qayrawan was followed by the creation of a new
city near the Mediterranean coast. The site of this city was a
Roman settlement called Tynes on the outskirts of ancient
Carthage. It is from Tynes, or Tunis, that the name of· the
present-day country of Tunisia (corresponding to Ifriqiya) is
derived. In the rest of the Maghrib the emergence of new
cities was somewhat slower. Most of the old Roman towns
had disappeared. The city of Fez (now in Morocco) at the
western extremity of the Maghrib, which grew into a major
urban settlement, was founded only in 808. Finally, in Spain,
:54 I Early Social Formations

which the Arabs called Andalus, the capital of the territories

ruled by the Muslims was at Cordoba (Qurtuba). Cordoba,
situated on the Guadalquivir river which flows through
southern Spain, was founded inc. 719. As it expanded it became
the preeminent Arab city in western Europe, although the
really intesive growth of Cordoba occurred in the tenth
century.
The urban expansion of this period was not merely
sustained by the military and administrative requirements of
the Arabs but also a reflection of the expansion of trade. Political
unification of such a large area, extending from the western
Mediterranean to Central Asia, promoted commercial
exchanges. Long-distance trade between the Mediterranean
world and the Indian Ocean and Central Asia was facilitated
by the relative stability of the eighth and ninth centuries.
Goods moved along the sea route from China, via India, to
the Persian Gulf. In the Gulf there were two major Abbasid
ports: Siraf in Iran and Basra in Iraq. The seaborne trade from
Siraf and Basra to various places in south-east Asia was
organized by Arab and Iranian merchants, who included a
number of Jews. Ships were regularly sent out as far as China,
altnough the Arab and Iranian merchants tended to
concentrate on the Arabian Sea segment of the route. From
Siraf or Basra goods were taken overland to Syria and Palestine
and then entered the Mediterranean network. Some of the
goods were sent for sale to Baghdad while a small proportion
might go onwards to Nishapur to enter the Central Asian
network. The traditional Central Asian overland route linking
China with West Asia and the Mediterranean was another
busy highway of international commerce.
There was a change in the orientation of the Mediterranean
commercial network in this period. With the decline of trade
in early medieval Europe the focus of long-distance trade in
the Mediterranean sea moved southwards to north Africa
(Egypt and the Maghrib). Ships laden with cargo plied between
Egypt, or the Lebanese ports, and Spain. Tunis, lying midway
along this route, was a major point of transit. Sicily was also
 The Arabs, Islam, and_the Early Abbasid Caliphate I 35.5

part of this network as it was ruled by the Arabs. Later, Venice

too began to participate in this trade. The Jews occupied a
key position in the trading world of the Mediterranean. Egypt
had a large concentration of Jewish merchants who handled a
sizeable proportion of ·the Mediterranean and Red Sea trade,
including the trade between the Indian Ocean and the
Mediterranean. The discovery, a few decades back, of a huge
collection of documents belonging to the Jewish merchant
community of Fustat from a storehouse (the Cairo Geniza}
where these were deposited, has shed considerable light on
the commercial activities of the Jews in the Arab empire.
Spices, fine quality silk and cotton textiles, precious stones,
furs, and a few other luxury goods such as chinaware were
carried from south-east Asia and India to West Asia and
Europe. These commodities were in demand in the new urban
centres of the Arab empire. This international trade catered
to the large market for luxury goods in the cities where the
rulers and their courts resided. The ostentatious lifestyle of
the caliph was imitated by the provincial aristocracy which
also lived lavishly thereby generating the demand for a wide
range of high value commodities. The biggest consumers were
to be found in Baghdad, Damascus, Nishapur, Fustat and
Cordoba. The cities of the Muslim world were themselves
centres of handicraft production, and some of these products
were exchanged for the commodities which were imported.
Weapons, paper, ivory, sugar, olive oil, slaves, gold and horses
were the commodities which the Arab-ruled territories sent
out. The growth of trade rapidly gave rise to a Muslim urban
middle class consisting of traders, shopkeepers, commission
agents and shipowners. However, unlike the bourgeoisie of
medieval Europe which exercised control over the towns, the
Muslim middle class had little control over the political
institutions of cities in which they resided. The reason for this
was, as S. D. Goitein observes, that the urban centres of the
Arabs were primarily developed by the state for
administrative or military purposes and were therefore closely
supervised by the government. In this situation the middle
35(, I Early Social Formations

class could hardly hope to occupy a position of authority in

the city. This might perhaps partially explain why these cities
could not have become the starting point for transition to
capitalism.
In any case the importance of trade in the Abbasid
economy should not be exaggerated. Land was the principal
source of wealth. The early Abbasids were keen to promote
the agrarian economy of southern Iraq since this was the core
area of their state. It was on this region that they depended
first and foremost for their resources. They endeavoured to
maximize production by extending cultivation and improving
irrigation. Al-Hajjaj had launched a programme for repairing
the irrigation works of the Sassanids. The Abbasids took over
from where he had left off and restored and expanded the
complex network of canals in southern Iraq. Existing irrigation
techniques were modified and more efficient devices for lifting
water to irrigate fields were adopted. The most outstanding
achievement in this sphere was the dissemination of the water-
wheel or noria (naura). This device was already in use in Syria.
It was a great iµiprovement over the simple method of lifting
water with the help of a rope and bucket. Noria is a machine
which is powered by oxen or some other draught animal. The
animals turn a horizontal wheel to which a vertical wheel is
attached. The vertical wheel has a number of buckets or jars
which lift the water and discharge it into a channel from where
it is distributed in the fields. Noria and its variants came to be
widely used in Iraq and Egypt and spread as far as Spain.
In Iran the system of constructing underground canals,
called qanats, for carrying water from springs to irrigate fields,
had survived from the Sassanid era. The earlier qanats were
artificial streams which were covered in order to prevent
evaporation of water. Qanat irrigation was mainly prevalent
in places which were situated at the foothills of mountains.
Mountain springs were tapped by this process. In Iran the
ancient qanats which had ceased to function (due to silting or
the collapse of their covers) were rebuilt. The network was
extended within and outside Iran. It was adapted to desert
 The Arabs, Islam, and th.e Early Abbasid Caliphate I 357

springs and the technique was employed wherever water was

scarce.
The collection of land revenue was made uniform in the
eighth and ninth centuries; We have drawn attention to the
fact that it was the conquest of the Byzantine and Sassanid
territories that placed a large agrarian surplus at the disposal
of the Arabs. This was an entirely new situation which had
the potential ofcausing a social upheaval among the nomadic
tribes. The early caliphs had tried to discourage the Muslims
from converting the land in conquered territories as their
private holdings. Later, as Arab settlers began to acquire land
a distinction was made between Muslim and non-Muslim
landowners. The main tax paid by the Muslims was :zakat which
was theoretically meant for charitable purposes. This was
normally assessed at the rate of 2¼ % of the payee's
possessions (exclusive of land). Landowning Muslims had to
pay a tax on land called ushr. Ushr was assessed at the rate of
one-tenth of the produce (hence ushr is often translated as
tithe).
All non-Muslims were liable to pay a general tax called
jizya. Jizya was levied on those who were classified as non-
believers (zimmis), i.e. those who were outside the Muslim
community or umma. This was not a tax on property or income
and was collected on a per head basis. However the zimmis
were classified according to their wealth for the assessment
of jizya. The tax on land payable by non-Muslims was a
separate category. This tax was called kharaj. The rate of
assessment for kharaj depended on various factors (nature of
soil, type of irrigation, status of ownership etc.) but it was
seldom less than one-third of the produce.
We therefore see that there were two types of land tax: i)
ushr, which had to be paid by Muslim landholders at the rate
of one-tenth of the produce and ii) kharaj, which had to be
paid by non-Muslim landholders at the rate of one-third or
more of the produce. As long as there were very few Muslim
landholders the distinction between ushr and kharaj did not
create much of a problem. Most of the landowners were non-
358 I Early Social Formations

Muslims, especially in the Sassanid territories where the dihqans

retained possession of their land, and therefore had to part
with a large share of the surplus. Two simultaneous processes
changed the situation. Firstly, a large landowning class had
emerged among the Muslims by the beginning of the eighth
century. Secondly, the pre-Islamic landed gentry adopted Islam
in a big way and were added to the class of Muslim
landholders.
To have continued with the existing dual structure of taxa-
tion would have reduced the income of the state because a lot
of land which was earlier paying kharaj (the higher rate) would
now be paying ushr (the lower rate). Whatever the terminology,
ultimately it was a question of the rate at which the assessment
was made. The Umayyads had experimented with different
solutions to cope with this problem. Al-Hajjaj had decreed
that any land that had once been assessed as kharaj land could
not become ushr land even if the owner became a Muslim.
Umar II had gone to the extent of prohibiting Muslims from
acquiring kharaj land. In the long run the difference between
these two kinds of taxes disappeared. By the beginning of the
ninth century all land was paying kharaj, irrespective of
whether or not it was owned by Muslims. This ensured that
the state was not deprived of a high level of revenue. Under
the Abbasids kharaj was the main source of agrarian revenue.
Besides, the state derived its income from zakat levied on
Muslims and jizya levied on non-Muslims. Finally, there were
duties on trade and a variety of cesses none of which- were
theoretically valid according to Islamic law.
The Abbasid centralized state was managed by a huge
bureaucracy. The infrastructure of this bureaucracy was a
legacy of the Sassanids. The Sassanid imperial system, it must
be remembered, had evolved over a period of four centuries.
Persian monarchical traditions, going back to the Hellenistic
age, had provided a readymade model for Abbasid
absolutism. But it was the Sassanid administrative apparatus
which helped to give shape to their absolutist state. What is
more, many of the personnel were recruited from families
 The Arabs, Islam, and the Early Abbasid Caliphate I 359

with a history of civil service under the Sassanids. .

From the time of al-Mansur onwards the civil
administration was unified and placed under a powerful official
who was designated 'vazir'. The vizarat developed into one
of the most characteristic institutions of the Islamic state. The
vazir was a powerful official, usually well-educated and having
a knowledge of various branches of administration including
military affairs. He presided over the bureaucracy (though
not the ariny). The vazir was expected to supervise the civil
administration, a job which required some specialized skills.
It was through him that the officials communicated with the
caliph. The term has at times been inaccurately rendered as
'prime minister'. It has been suggested by some scholars that
the vizarat is an institution of Persian Sassanid origin.
However there are others who have questioned this view and
have pointed out that we. must not assume a Persian origin
for the office of 'vazir' merely because the Abbasids borrowed
so heavily from the Sassanids. Goitein has argued that the
vizarat was a specific product of the early Abbasid state. The
word itself, he notes, is of Arabic and not Persian origin (vazir
literally means helper in Arabic). It was first used to designate
the agents who were 'helpers' or vazirs of the Abbasid cause.
By the time of al-Mansur it became the title of the most
prominent official who assisted the caliph.
The most famous of the early vazirs of the Abbasids were
those belonging to the family of the Barmekids. The first
person of the Barmekid family to be appointed vazir was
Khalid bin Barmek. Khalid came from a family of Buddhist
priests. His ancestors were grandpriests of a Buddhist
monastery in Balkh. Khalid began his career under al-Saffah
and rose to the office of vazir. Subsequently he became the
vazir of al-Mansur. Khalid may be said to have given proper
shape to the vizarat as an institution. Al-Mansur entrusted
most of the routine work of governance to Khalid. Oosely
connected with the evolution of the vizarat was the practice
of placing a senior bureaucrat in charge of the education and
training of the heir-apparent and other princes. These tutors
360 I Early Social Formations

were often appointed as vazirs upon the succession of the

princes. Khalid's son Yusuf was the tutor, and later vazir, of
Harun al-Rashid. Yusuf s sons were tutors of Harun al-Rashid' s
sons. Jafar, one of the sons of Yusuf, succeeded his father as
al-Rashid's vazir. The relationship between Harun al-Rashid
and Jafar became legendary and is referred to in the stories
of the One Thousand and One Arabian Nights. This relationship
did not prevent the downfall of Jafar due to court intrigues,
after which the Barmekid family lost its preeminent position.
The fall of the Barmekids underlined the fact that the vazir
was ultimately a civil servant and derived all his authority
from the ruler. This was, after all, a pre-modern bureaucracy.
The institution, nevertheless, continued to grow in importance
and reached the peak of its development in the eleventh
century.
The prosperity of the early Abbasid period was reflected
in the scientific and cultural achievements of the age. The inter-
mingling of diverse cultural traditions gave rise to new ideas
and enriched thought. The Abbasid rulers, especially al-
Mam un, encouraged this process by commissioning
translations of ancient Greek philosophical and scientific
treatises. Major Greek texts were translated to Arabic which
gave the Muslim intelligentsia access to the rich store of Greco-
Roman knowledge. The works of Plato and Aristotle were
translated and became widely known among Muslim thinkers.
Hunyan bin Ishaq, who lived during the ninth century, was
one of the most outstanding of the scholars who translated
important Greek works into Arabic. The translation of Greek
writings on medicine, including the great treatise of
Hippocrates, led to significant advances in the field. A new
tradition of Arab medicine (the Unani system of medicine)
flourished on the basis of the Greek legacy (Unani was the
Arabic term for Greek). This in turn led to the development
of other disciplines such as chemistry. Arab scientists showed
a lot of interest in alchemy, which may be regarded as the
initial stage of chemistry, and thereby acquired a more
thorough understanding of chemical processes.
 The Arabs, Islam, and the Early Abbasid Caliphate I 361

Greek works on astronomy and mathematics were also

read avidly by the Arabs. Al-Khwarazmi, who lived in the
early ninth century, is one of the most famous mathematicians
of the Abbasid period. Al-Khwarazmi. was familiar with Indian
achievements in mathematics and he used the Indian system
of numerals ir). his calculations. The Arabs, it may be pointed
out, hdd Indian science and mathematics in high esteem. Arab
admiration for Indian learning is summed up in the well-known
work of al-Biruni (973-1050). In the words of Albert Hourani,
al-Biruni 'is perhaps the greatest sustained attempt by a Muslim
writer [of the Middle Ages] to go beyond the world of Islam
and appropriate what was of value in another cultural
tradition'. The Abbasid empire acquired knowledge from the
Greco-Roman world on the one hand [Link] (and China)
on the other, and thus became a transmitter of ideas from.
east to west and vice versa.
The writing of history was deeply influenced by Greco-
Roman traditions. The first serious historical narratives by
the Arabs began to appear in the ninth century. Al-Tabari
(839-:-923), who is sometimes referred to as the 'Livy of the
Ar<;1,bs', was among the first Islamic historians. His Tarikh is a
history of the early Abbasid caliphate. Other prominent
historians were al-Masudi, and of course al-Biruni.
The social transformation within the Abbasid empire due
to the assimilation of Arab settlers with indigenous Iranian
Muslims had changed the linguistic character of early Islam.
Arab was no longer the only language spoken by the ruling
elite. The language of a section of the elite, and indeed of the
majority of the people, was Persian. Persian had evolved from
Pahlavi and was written in a modified Arabic script. While
Arabic was the official language and the language in which all
religious and legal texts were written, Persian soon became
the language for everyday administrative purposes and non-
religious literature. Persian and Arabic borrowed freely from
each other, which helped both languages to develop a rich
vocabulary. Most of the educated people were bi-lingual. By
the eleventh century a brilliant Persian literary tradition, which
362 I Early Social Formations

produced great poets such as Nizami and Saeli, had come into
existence.
The conception of the caliphate, it should not be forgotten,
was primarily a religious one. The Abbasid caliphs were
absolute monarchs ruling over a territory, but they also
regarded themselves as the leaders of the Muslim community.
Whereas their power actually rested on force, they legitimized
it in religious terms. This was not just a theoretical question.
It had its roots in the actual struggle over the succession issue.
Every stage in the history of the caliphate had been marked
by disputes over succession ever since the death of
Muhammad. The conflict had given rise to religious sects
within Islam and each sect revolved around a particular
claimant to the caliphate. Thus religious debates were closely
intertwined with the question of succession. This helps us to
understand why the Abbasids were so assertive about their
religious role.
The Shiites were the most determined opponents of the
Abbasids. Nevertheless they did not pose much of a challenge
to the caliphate as they were an amorphous group with little
political or military support (the ascendancy of Shiism in Iran
is a much later development). The Abbasids had made use of
Alid support to dislodge the Umayyads, but marginalized
them as soon as they came to power. The Alids were aware of
the fact that they were hardly in a position to take over the
empire. After the debacle at Karbala in 680 the Shiites did not
launch any concerted movement against the caliphate for the
next two centuries or so. They quietly accepted the political
rule of the caliphs, but refused to acknowledge their religious
leadership. For them, political leadership vested in the family
of Ali and Husayn. The descendants of Husayn were regarded
as the religious leaders, or imams, of the Shiite community.
The imams themselves did not participate in political activities.
After Husayn was killed in battle his son Zayn al-Abidin
was declared imam. When Zayn al-Abidin died in 714 there
was a dispute among his sons, Muhammad al-Baqir and Zayd.
One group of Shiites accepted al-Baqir as the imam, while a
 The Arabs, Islam, and the Early Abbasid Caliphate I 363

small minority declared their support for Zayd. The followers

of Zayd became a distinct sub-sect of the Shiites-the Zaydis.
Another dispute arose (among al-Baqir's loyalists) after the
death of Jafar al-Sadiq who had succeeded al-Baqir as the
imam. Some of the Shiites recognized Musa al-Kazim., one of
al-Sadiq' s sons, as the imam. There were, however, some Shiites
who claimed that al-Kazim's brother Ismail (who had
predeceased Jafar al-Sadiq) was the legitimate imam. They
believed that Ismail would reappear at the end of the world.
The adherents of Ismail were designated· Ismaili Shiites. The
Ismailis developed into a very powerful· sub-sect and in the
tenth and eleventh centuries a dynasty with Ismaili leanings,
the Fatimids, ruled over Egypt and Tunisia. The Fatimids
assumed the title of caliph, challenging the political and relig-
ious authority of the Abbasid caliphate.
Another section of the Shiites was loyal to Musa al-Kazim
and his descendants. The line of succession continued in al-
Kazims' s family till the end of the ninth century. Muhammad
al-Muntazar was the last (twelfth) imam in this line. This section
recognized twelve imams in all, from Ali to al-Muntazar, and
therefore were (and still are) called 'Twelver Shiites'. The
Twelver Shiites held that the imams after al-Muntazar were
'hidden imams', i.e. not visible to the world, and that they
would be revealed at the end of the world.
The Shiites and their sub-sects (Twelvers, Ismailis and
Zaydis} were a very small minority in the early Abbasid
period. The majority of the Muslims accepted the Abbasids as
caliphs and imams. Here it is necessary to point out that in
political terms the Abbasid empire was primarily a. West Asian
entity by the ninth century. The empire had become so
unwieldy that it became difficult to directly rule over territories
which were situated at a great distance from Iraq and Iran.
The western Mediterranean gradually slipped out of Abbasid
control. Independent Arab dynasties were established first in
Spain, then in the Maghrib, and finally in Egypt. A member of
the Umayyad family succeeded in setting up an independent
Arab state in Spain soon after the Abbasids came to power.
364 I Earty Social Formations

The Umayyad dynasty ruled over Spain from 756 till the
eleventh century. Soon after this an Arab dynasty {the Iclrisids)
established its rule over Morocco in 789. Tunisia was lost in
Harun al-Rashid's reign and was ruled for a century by the
Aghlabid dynasty. The Aghlabids were overthrown by the
Fatimids in 909. The Fatimids first brought Tunisia under their
control and then conquered Egypt which they ruled till the
twelfth century. Of these dynasties only the Fatimids and the
Umayyads claimed to be caliphs (the Umayyads of Spain
declared themselves as caliphs as late as the tenth century).
Otherwise, the Abbasids were nominally accepted as religious
leaders of the umma. .
Given the religious significance which was attached to the
caliphate the Abbasids were eager to demonstrate that their
state was based on Islamic ideals. They were guided by
injunctions laid down in the Quran-in theory at least. The
Quran outlined the fundamental principles of the Islamic state
but many provisions had to be properly interpreted and
elaborated upon. Whenever there was a doubt it was resolved
by finding out how the Prophet acted in a similar situation.
The first caliphs, who were also companions of Muhammad,
were personally familiar with the manner in which the Prophet
had dealt with a particular problem. They constantly referred
back to what was called the sunna or sayings and habitual
behaviour of Muhammad. The sunna became a supplemen-
tary source of tenets for the guidance of the community. After
the early caliphs these began to be formally recorded. The
record of the Prophet's sunna was called hadis (usually
transliterated as hadith). The hadis was based on oral traditions
which were handed down by people who had actually heard
the respective sayings or actions of the Prophet. A systematic
attempt was made to classify and record the sunna as well as
to authenticate it. The chain of oral transmission was subjected
to rigorous examination and the reliability of the witnesses/
transmitters was carefully evaluated. The study and
compilation of the hadis developed into a separate theological
discipline with its own methodology.
 The Arabs, Islam, and the Early Abbasid Caliphate I 365

The actions of the community had to be in accordance

with the sunna (and above all with the Quran) and the Abbasids
projected themselves as the upholders of correct behaviour
based on sunna. All those who conformed to the sunna
acceptable to the majority (there was considerable scope for
disagreement on whether or not a particular hadis or recording
of the sunna was correct, hence the need for a consensus) were
generally called Sunnis. Initially the term seems to have
referred to all those who accepted the sunna or traditions
endorsed by the majority and confirmed by the Abbasids. In
view of the refusal of the Shiites to accept the authority of the
Abbasids in religious matters they were considered outside
the fold of the Sunnis. Sunnism eventually became a term for
distinguishing the majority of the Muslims from the Shiites.
In a very limited sense it denoted 'those who were not Shiites'.
Hodgson remarks that when the term sunni is used to
differentiate between Shiites and Sunnis there is an element
of inaccuracy because it is wrong to think that the Shiites do
not follow the sunna. It is only that they have their own set of
traditions, some of which are different from the sunna accepted
by the majority of the Muslims.
Two major hadis compilations were prepared during the
ninth century. These are the hadis collections of two great
Islamic theologians,' Al-Bukhari and Muslim. Bukhari and
Muslim closely scrutinized all the hadis that were then available
and prepared their massive compendiums. Almost
simultaneously separate schools of jurisprudence which
interpreted Islamic laws (shariat) in different ways (the basis
of the law being the Quran and the hadis) were coming into
existence. Four major schools of Islamic law developed in the
early Abbasid period. These schools remain the four major
Sunni shariat traditions down to the present day. The four
schools of interpretation were those of Abu Hanifa (Hanafis),
Malik (Malikis), al-Shafi (Shafiis), and lbn Hanbal (Hanbalis).
The Shiites had their own schools of jurisprudence. These
developments laid the foundations of a complex legal system
for the Islamic state. ·
366 I Early Social Formations

Abbasid power began to decline by the end of the ninth

century. Spain and the Maghrib had already bro:f<en away from
the empire. Control over Egypt had also weakened. In the
east, provincial governors were becoming semi-independent
and eventually set up their own dynasties. Khurasan and the
Central Asian territories of the Abbasids came under the rule
of the Samanid dynasty with its capital at Bukhara (819-1005).
The Samanids had been governors of the Abbasids in
Khurasan. In Baghdad the Abbasids were divested of real
power by the family of one of their military commanders, the
Buyid family. The Buyids (who were Shiites) became de facto
rulers of the Abbasid state from the middle of the tenth century
onwards. By the eleventh century the Abbasid empire was
taken over by a nomadic people from Central Asia, the Turks.
The Turks in turn were displaced by the Mongols. Abbasid
rule formally came to an end with the capture of Baghdad by
the Mongols in 1258.
 Chapter Twelve

EARLY MEDIEVAL WEST ASIA

I
BY the beginning of the tenth century the unified ,Arab empire
had been replaced by several independent Islamic states, some
of which owed nominal allegiance to the Abbasid caliphs
whereas others-especially the states in Egypt, the Maghrib
and Spain-did not even formally acknowledge the Abbasids.
In Asia, Abbasid power was increasingly confined to southern
Iraq and some parts of western Iran while independent or
semi-independent principalities came up in Iran, Central Asia,
Syria, Yemen and northern Iraq. Many of these principalities
were ruled by dynasties w}:tich were founded by provincial
governors (e.g. the Samanids in north-eastern Iran) or military
commanders. Most of the successor states in Asia were
theoretically a part of the Abbasid caliphate but were actually
independent political entities.
The decline of Abbasid power had started in the latter
half of the ninth century. For the next hundred years or so,
i.e. from the end of the ninth century to the end of the tenth,
the core area of the Abbasid state (Iraq and Iran) was controlled
by dynasties of Iranian origi~. T~e two most prominent of
these dynasties were the Samanids and the Buyids. The
Samanids, whom we have already mentioned, ruled over
Khurasan, Transoxiana (the Central Asian zone which lies
between the Oxus and Syr rivers and which was called Mawara
:-l68 I Early Social Formations

al-Nahr by the Arabs), and portions of what is now

Afghanistan. The Buyids (or Buwayhids) originated in the
region of Dailam in northern Iran. Dallam is the name given
to a small mountainous stretch along the south.,.western coast
of the Caspian Sea. The Buyids established their supremacy
over most of Iran and eventually brought Iraq under their
control. They ruled from Baghdad where the caliph was
deprived of all his power.
Buyeh, after whom the dynasty is named, was an ordinary
soldier in the Abbasid army. His sons became military
commanders and seized power in the Fars area of central Iran.
The Buyids were firmly entrenched in the cities of Isfahan,
Kirman and Shiraz during the early decades of the ninth
century. In 945 the Buyids captured Baghdad and became the
de facto rulers of the Abbasid state. A grandson of Buyeh,
who was given the title Azud-ud-daula by the caliph, unified
the Buyid possessions in various parts of Iraq and Iran, c. 977
(members of the Buyid family had been governing different
provinces as autonomous rulers). Azud-1;1d-daula is generally
regarded as the most outstanding of the Buyids. Even though
the Buyids were sympathetic to Shiism they did not oust the
Abbasids. Nor did they themselves take on the title of caliph.
They maintained a firm hold over the Abbasid caliphs and
used them to legitimize their own power. Shiism and Sunnism
coexisted under the Buyids.
The caliphs now ruled only in name. They were allowed
to carry out a few symbolic religious functions (within
Baghdad) but had no say in the civil administration or in
military affairs. The Buyids ruled with the backing of the army.
Initially they derived their main support from [Link] recruited
from their homeland Dallam. Later they relied more and more
on Turkish c_ontingents. The Buyids assumed monarchical titles
of the Sassanid kings such as shahenshah ('king of kings') and
even claimed to be descended from the Sassanids.
One of the salient features of the Buyid state was the
growth of the iqta system. Iqtas were assignments of land
revenue by the state. The origins of this system go back to the
 Early Medieval West Asia I 3t.9

first Arab conquests· when a proportion of the land which had

been in the possession of the Byzantine or Sassanid states
(crown land) was confiscated and some of it distributed to
powerful military commanders. It appears that the assignments
made at this stage carried some sort of ownership rights
(though these rights might not be properly defined). Another
type of assignment was the grant of the right to appropriate
the revenues of a particular area. It was this type of assignment
which developed into the iqta during the eighth and ninth
centuries. Albert Hourani remarks that, 'It could scarcely have
been the intention of any ruler to alienate the tax permanently,
or to give those to whom assignments were made a permanent
control over the land'.
Iqta basically implied a right to the state's share of the produce.
Theoretically speaking it did not give the assignee, termed muqta
(or iqtadar), any ownership rights. The muqta was only entitled
to appropriate the revenues which were due to the state from
the area which was assigned. There could be considerable
variation in the precise nature of the grant. Four distinct kinds
of iqta had evolved by Buyid times: i) a large tract of territory
might be assigned as iqta to members of the royal family or
powerful officials who would govern the territory more or less
autonomously; ii) the iqta might be an administrative unit of
some size where the muqta would have the responsibility of
looking after the administration and collection of revenue and
at times even some military functions; iii) iqtas which were given
in lieu of salary; iv) iqta grants which carried with them
obligation to maintain a certain number of troops out of the
revenues realized from the assignment. In the case of the last
two kinds of iqta the muqta did not necessarily have a personal
connection with his holding. The state would often appoint a
separate set of officials to collect the revenue and give it to the
assignee. A feature which was common to all kinds of iqta was
that the muqtas frequently attempted to establish hereditary
ownership over their grants _whenever they got an opportunity.
This involved them in conflicts with the state on the one hand
and the local landowning classes on the other.
370 I Early Social Formations

The grant of iqtas for payment of salaries had become wide-

spread by the beginning of the tenth century. The Buyids
inherited and expanded this system. Salaries of officials were
paid increasingly in the form of iqtas. The_ Buyid muqtas were
normally not expected to furnish troops out of the revenues
of their iqtas since the salaries of soldiers were disbursed
centrally. Howover, all officials did not receive their pay in
the form of iqta assignments. The Buyid state retained a portion
of the land owned by it and did not alienate all its holdings.
Yet the proportion of the surplus taken away by the state was
somewhat more than under the caliphs. This large surplus
sustained a ruling class in which military leaders had come to
occupy an important place. The Buyid military aristocracy soon
began to dominate the countryside as well. It should be
emphasized that this aristocracy remained fully subservient
to the Buyid rulers.
The territories of the Buyids were mainly confined to Iraq
and Iran. In the east the [Link] maintained their presence
in Transoxiana and parts of Afghanistan. In the west the
Buyids had to contend with the Fatimids of Egypt. As we
have seen the Fatimids first came to power in Ifriqiya (Tunisia)
at the beginning of the tenth century. In 909 a person by the
name of Ubaydullah al-Mahdi, who claimed to be a descendant
of Muhammad's daughter and Ali's wife Fatima (al-Mahdi's
genealogy remains uncertain), came to power in Ifriqiya after
overthrowing the Aghlabid dynasty which had ruled the
province since the latter half of the eighth century. Al-Mahdi
declared himself to be the imam or the leader of the Ismaili
Shiites. He and his successors assumed the title of caliph thereby
directly challenging the authority of the Abbasids. The dynasty
founded by al-Mahdi is referred to as the Fatimid caliphate.
From their base in Ifriqiya the Fatimids began expanding into
other parts of north Africa. They were initially unsuccessful
in the western Mediterranean where the Idrisids of Morocco
(who were also Alids) and the Umayyad dynasty of Spain
kept them in check. The Fatimids were however able to take
advantage of the weakening of Abbasid/Buyi.d authority in
 Early Medieval West Asia I 3i1

Egypt. The Fatimid caliph al-Muizz (953-75) annexed Egypt

in c. 969. In the west, the conquests of al-Muizz extended to
Morocco. The Idrisids were expelled, and for the next few
decades the whole of north Africa (Egypt and the Maghrib)
was unified under Fatimid rule. The Fatimids managed to
annex parts of Arabia and Syria-Palestine and thus were a
serious danger for the Buyids in West Asia. In 970-1 Mecca
and Madina were occupied. The two holiest places of Islam
remained under the Fatimids till the end of the eleventh
century. The Fatimids created a centralized state with a political
structure which was similar to that of the Abbasid caliphate.
In 973 al-Muizz shifted the seat of his government to Egypt.
Here he founded a new capital on the outskirts of Fustat. The
new capital was named Cairo (al-Qahira, i.e., 'the town
founded when the planet Mars was rising'). Within a few
decades Cairo had grown into a major urban centre. In the
first half of the eleventh century it had a population of about
500, 000. It rivalled Baghdad as a great metropolis. The city
contained several magnificent buildings including a grand
mosque, the al-Azhar mosque built in the reign of al-Muizz.
Cairo also became an important centre of learning. Further, it
had a thriving international trade.
By c. 1000 the bulk of the seaborne .trade between the
Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean was passing through the
Red Sea. There had been a shift from the Persian Gulf to the
Red Sea, partly due to the destruction of Siraf which had been
the foremost international seaport of the Persian Gulf. The
disturbed political conditions under the later Abbasids too
had contributed to the decline of the Persian Gulf route. The
Fatimids took advantage of this situation and actively
promoted the Red Sea route. It may be mentioned here that
since ancient times there had been a canal which linked the
Red Sea with the Nile at a point where the delta began. The
Fatimids repaired and improved this canal so that goods could
be carried easily between the Red Sea and Cairo. Cairo itself
was both a centre of consumption and handicraft production
(it was well-known for its silk textiles). Some of the
372 I Early Social Formations

commodities would be marketed in the capital-or goods

produced in Cairo would be sent to the Red Sea via the canal.
Otherwise commodities would be carried to, or from, the
Mediterranean.
The unification of the entire Mediterranean coastline of
Africa under the Fatimids gave a boost to long-distance
seaborne trade. Egypt had an active trade with the Maghrib
and italian cities (Venice and Genoa) as well as with different
parts of Europe. The Fatimids were on fairly cordial terms
with the Byzantine and Frankish empires. Incidentally, a
number of high officials in the Fatimid bureaucracy were
Christians, some of whom rose to the position of vazir. The
Geniza documents of the Jewish community of Fustat (Old
Cairo), which we have already referred to in the previous
chapter, provide ample evidence of the pivotal role played by
the Jews of Cairo in the international trade between the Indian
Ocean and West Asia. Commodities exported to India and
south-east Asia included silk textiles, shawls, paper, sugar,
crockery, glasses, soap and raisins. Areca nuts, Indian locks,
brass bowls, almonds, perfumes, Chinese silk and porcelain
were imported from the Indian Ocean.
The Fatimids were a not only a threat to the political and
military power of the Buyids in West Asia but they also under-
mined the religious authority of the Abbasid caliphate. It
hardly mattered that the Buyids were Shiites like the Fatimids
(it has been pointed out that the Buyids were not very firmly
committed to Shiism). What was more significant was that
the Fatimids claimed to be religious leaders of the entire
Muslim umma and that they were actually able to enforce their
authority over a very large part of the Islamic-ruled territories.
On the one hand the ascendancy of Fatimids during the latter
half of the tenth and the first half of the eleventh centuries
completed the process of Abbasid decline, and on the other
made it difficult for the Buyids to consolidate their position.
Buyid power was considerably weakened due to various
internal and external factors by the middle of the eleventh
century. The economy was facing problems mainly arising
 Early Medieval West Asia I 373

from (a) the crisis of the Persian Gulf trade and (b) decline of
agrarian production. Historians generally agree that the
irrigation system of southern Iraq, which was so vital for the
economic prosperity of the High Caliphate, was no longer in
a good condition by the end of the tenth century. The Buyids
failed to maintain the network of canals in this region. The
neglect of the irrigation system caused silting of the canals,
which in turn resulted in waterlogging. Overexploitation of
the land, without any corresponding investment in better
techniques, might have led to environmental degradation.
Large tracts of land were covered with marshes and swamps.
The area under cultivation had definitely 'shrunk by the
beginning of the eleventh century. The Buyids responded with
an increase in levels of taxation, but this only intensified the
crisis. At this juncture the silver coinage was debased (i.e., its
silver content was reduced), which further disrupted trade.
Although the Buyid state was considered to be a single
entity, in actual practice various parts of the empire were ruled
by different members of the royal family as separate semi-
autonomous units. The Buyid territories which had been
unified by Azud-ud-daula were gradually split up, under his
successors, among different branches of the Buyid family. This
naturally weakened the central authority and speeded up the
collapse of the Buyids. In fact Buyid power had become so
weak by the, first half of the eleventh century that the Abbasid
caliph al-Q,~im (1031-75) was able to briefly reassert his
authority in Baghdad. Nevertheless, the single most important
factor which was responsible for bringing Buyid rule to an
end was the rise of the Turks.
Since the latter half of the ninth century two closely related
developments had been taking place in the territories ruled
by the Muslims. One was the formation of armed contingents
comprising slave soldiers. The second was the penetration of
Turks from Central Asia into West Asia and north Africa. To
a large extent these two developments were interlinked
because a significant proportion of the slave soldiers were of
Turkish origin. The Abbasid caliphs, their provincial
37,1 I Early Social Formations

governors, and rulers of local dynasties had initially employed

slave soldiers as personal bodyguards. The slave bodyguarii.s
were highly trained and had a strong sense of personal loya1ty
for their masters. By the tenth century slave troops (called
mamluks) had become an indispensable part of the armies of
West Asia, Egypt and the Maghrib. Some, though not all,
mamluks were granted freedom following their conversion
to Islam. Mamluk contingents were usually under the
command of slaves who had been manumitted.
The nucleus of elite (i.e. the most well-trained) regiments,
including personal bodyguards, was composed of slave
soldiers. Several thousand Turkish military slaves were serving
in the Buyid and Samanid armies in the second half of the
tenth century. Moreover, provincial governors and high
officials _relied on slave soldiers to man their private armies.
The mamluks emerged as a new factor in the politics of the
region. Commanders of slave troops tried to assert themselves
by constantly interfering in political and military matters. The
mamluk contingents were often a destabilizing factor as they
could be utilized in factional conflicts and for capturing power.
Patricia Crone in her study of the phenomenon of slave ~oldiers
(Slaves on Horses) has attributed the decline of the power of
the Abbasids to their growing dependence on mamluks.
The distinctive feature of slavery in early medieval West
Asia was the large-scale recruitment of slaves into the army.
Many of the mamluks possessed administrative skills as well
and were employed in civilian positions. Unlike ancient Greece
and Rome, slaves were not extensively engaged in production.
There might have been some slaves in mining or handicraft
production. In any case, we can be certain that agrarian
production was not dependent upon slave-labour. This does
not mean that there were no agricultural slaves. We have
evidence of slaves being made to work on sugar plantations
in Iraq. In 868 a major slave revolt broke out at Zanj in southern
Iraq. Zanj had a number of sugar plantations which depended
upon slave labour. The slaves were mostly blacks. The Zanj
revolt was spearheaded by black slaves and lasted till 883.
 Early Medi~al West Asia I 375

Generally, however, slave labour does not appear to have

been widespread in agriculture. Besides being forced to serve
as soldiers, slaves were also used for domestic work. The
slaves should not be thought of as an undifferentiated class.
While at one end there were well-trained warriors who fought
on horseback, at the other end there were many more who
performed only menial dutie~.
The expansion of the Abbasid empire beyond the Oxus
river had brought it to the edge of the pastures of Central
Asian nomads. These were lands which were inhabited by
Turkish-speaking tribes. The Turkish tribes were essentially
nomadic pastoralists. From the ninth century onwards we find
references to several Turkish tribal confederacies-such as the
Oghuz, Qipchaq, Qarluq and Qirghiz confederacies. Over a
period of time small bands belonging to these confederacies
had been moving into Transoxiana and north-eastern Iran.
Some of these bands (usually comprising a few fa;milies) came
in search of pastures and lived a nomadic existence. However,
there were others who began to settle down and mingled
with the local population. Turks were to be found in both
rural and urban areas. It would be wrong to assume that all
Turkish soldiers were slaves. Several free Turks enlisted as
mercenary soldiers. Nevertheless, it is true that the overwhelm-
ing majority of slaves were captured from the relatively
backward Central Asian region lying across the Oxus. The
conquests of the Abbasids and-their successor states caused
extensive dislocation, making the Turkish nomads easy targets
for slave traders. Frequent wars too resulted in wholesale
enslavement of many tribes.
The interaction between Turkish nomadic tribes of Central
Asia and settled societies of W_est Asia accelerated the pace of
change within the existing Turkish social formation. Some of
the changes in the nomadic social formation were related to
conflicts between tribal confederacies for control over
pastures. The coming. together of tribes in the form of tribal
confederacies had given rise to new political structures.
Simultaneously a Turkish warrior aristocracy had come into
376 I Early Social Formatwns

existence. This in tum led to social differentiation within the

tribes. Raiding expeditions were carried out regula~ly into
settled areas and the booty added to the surplus that was
available to the aristocracy.
The expanding slave trade too acted as a catalyst for change.
Many Turks were themselves engaged in this trade and earned
large profits from it. Then there were Turks who enlisted as
mercenary soldiers in the armies of the Muslim-ruled states.
These soldiers helped to recruit others from their tribes,
thereby forming compact contingents of Turkish soldiers in
the armies of West Asian states. Finally there were the Turkish
families or clans which had migrated to the settled areas. The
migrants either became peasants in the countryside or took
up various occupations in the urban areas. All these
developments transformed Turkish nomadic society.
This background helps us to understand how the Turks
were drawn into the process of state formation. The acceptance
of Islam by most of the Turkish [Link] (and the conversion of
mamluks) provided the ideological framework for Turkish
state formation. The Turkish tribes penetrated and eventually
cortquered large parts of West Asia. Together with their
acceptance of the Muslim faith the Turks borrowed heavily
from Iranian culture, or, to be more precise, the culture which
was a synthesis of Arab and Iranian elements. The Turks in
tum fused this Iranian culture with their own hibal customs.
The social and linguistic character of Transoxiana, Afghanistan,
Iran and large parts of Iraq was getting modified in the tenth
and eleventh centuries due to the growing presence of the
Turks.
C. E. Bosworth has noted that the prosperity of the early
Abbasid caliphate provided resources for buying and traming
Turkish slaves for a professional standing army which owed
its loyalty to the ruler. The Buyids resorted to the grant of
iqtas for raising contingents -of Turkish mamluks. The
recruitment of military slaves was further systematized by
the Samanids. The employment of mamluks in the army first
attained its full expression under them. The Samanid state
 Early Medieval West Asia I 377

became the nerve centre of the slave trade of Central Asia

and Iran. This was facilitated by the proximity of the San,.anid
territories to the homeland of the Turkish nomadic pastoralists.
After c. 950 a few mamluk military commanders emerged
as warlords in the Samanid state. One of these warlords was
Alp-Tegin. Alp-Tegin was a Turk who had several mamluk
contingents under him. With the help of his army he virtually
became independent in the Samanid territories in Afghanistan.
Ghazna was the main stronghold of Alp-Tegin. When Alp-
Tegin died in 977 he was succeeded by his leading slave
commander Sebuk-Tegin. Sebuk-Tegin founded the
Ghaznavid dynasty which briefly created a huge empire, in
the first half of the eleventh century, extending from eastern
Iran to north-west India.
Sebuk-Tegin belonged to the Qarluq tribe of the Turks.
He originally came from the area around the Syr Darya in
Central Asia. He had been captured in a tribal conflict and
sold as a slave. He became ·a slave soldier and rose to be a
military commander in the Samanid army, serving under Alp-
Tegin. Sebuk-Tegin became the successor of his master in 977.
Ghazna was the capital of this state. Within the next two
decades Sebuk-Tegin brought the southern part of the Samanid
territories (the territories lying south of the river Oxus) under
his control. Khurasan was also annexed by him.
Following the death of Sebuk-Tegin, his son Mahmud
became the ruler of the Ghaznavid state (998-1030). It was in
the reign of Mahmud that the Ghaznavid state reached its
greatest territorial extent. Mahmud embarked upon a policy
of aggressive expansion and extinguished the local dynasties
which ruled over different parts of Transoxiana, Afgh~nistan
and Iran. The Samanids were finally overthrown in 999. The
state of Khwarazm, lying between the Aral Sea and the middle
Oxus, was conquered. The Buyids were confined mainly to
Iraq. In the east, Mahmud invaded northern India and annexed
parts of the Panjab.
In his struggle against the Buyids, Mahmud championed
the cause of orthodox Sunnism. He attempted to legitimize
378 j Early Social Formations

his authority by portraying himself as a religious w~rior who

was fighting against the Shiite tendencies of the Buyids. He
declared himself to be a supporter of the religious leadership
of the Abbasids. He thus sought the sanction of the Abbasid
caliph to uphold his own power. From the time of Mahmud
we find a. sharp distinction being made on the one hand
between the ruler who wielded supreme political power and,
on the other hand, the caliph who was seen as the religious
head of the Muslim umma. It became customary to designate
the ruler as 'sultan', which literally means 'holder of power'.
Sultan was the title which was henceforth commonly used for
kings as distinct from caliphs and imams.
Mahmud's rule marks the beginning of a new kind of
monarchical state. In Mahmud's conception of kingship the
sultan's authority was supposed to derive from the recognition
granted to the sultan by the Abbasid caliph. In reality however
the power of the sultan rested on force. Mahmud ruled as an
absolute and despotic monarch. He pursued a policy of
vigorous centralization of the state apparatus. The success of
this policy was dependent upon having a large and well-
disciplined army. Turkish mamluks were the core of Mahmud's
army. For maintaining such an army Mahmud required access
to sufficient resources. A very large proportion of the surplus
was concentrated in the hands of a small ruling elite which
owed its loyalty to Mahmud. This ruling elite was mainly of
Turkish extraction but also included Iranian, Arab and some
local elements.
Mahmud endeavoured to maximize revenue collection by
increasing the level of taxation, especially in Khurasan. Most
histo~ans agree that Ghaznavid rule was a period of great
hardship and suffering for the Iranian peasantry in general
and the Khurasani peasantry in particular. This made them
quite unpopular in this region. Mahmud augmented his
resources by frequent raids into India. The iqta system was
expanded to provide for the support of troops. In fact under
Mahmud iqtas came to be· used more and more for military
purposes. Iqta holders were supposed to maintain a specified
 Early Medieval West Asia I 379

number troops out of the revenues of the holdings that were

assigned to them . This type of iqta became even more preva-
lent under the successors of Mahmud. Bosworth states that
'the Ghaznavids became the channel whereby the iqta system
passed [from the Buyids] to the Ghurids and was firmly
implanted in northern India under the Delhi Sultans and their
successors'. The Ghaznavid state and the Turkish military
aristocracy which owed allegiance to it undermined the
economic and political power of the Iranian landowning class.
This allowed the absolutist monarchical state to consolidate
its position-a process which culminated under the Saljuqs
who became. the leading power. of the region after Mahmud.
Nevertheless, the Iranian bureaucracy continued to occupy a
key position in the civil administration both under the
Ghaznavids and the Saljuqs.
The Ghaznavid state did not survive intact for very long
after the death of Mahmud in 1030. Mahmud was succeeded
by his son Masud. Within a decade of his accession Masud
had lost the empire created by Mahmud. Masud was himself
deposed by his military commanders in 1040 and was replaced
by his brother Muhammad. Thereafter the Ghaznavids were
reduced to a minor local dynasty ruling over Ghazna and the
surrounding area. The disintegration of the Ghaznavid empire
was speeded up by the growing pressure of Turkish
penetration into Transoxiana and West Asia. Bosworth is of
the view that it was in the eleventh century that Turkish tribal
movements into the settled regions of West Asia intensified.
According to him the large-scale tribal movements of the
eleventh century combined with the slower penetration of
the preceding two. centuries 'gradually chqnged the ethnic
complexion of much of the northern tier of the Middle East'.
Within a short space of time the newly arrived Turkish
groups displaced the Ghaznavids as well as the Buyids. In the
1030s the Saljuqs emerged as one of the leading Turkish bands
which invaded the Ghaznavid and Buyid territories. The
Saljuqs were a small clan of the Qiniq tribe which formed part
of the Oghuz confederacy. We have already noted that the
380 I Early Social Formations

Oghuz were one of the prominent Turkish tribal confederacies.

The Saljuqs had been carrying out raids in eastern Iran in the
opening decades of the eleventh century. Their raids had
become a regular feature by the time Mahmud died. By this
time the Saljuqs had mobilized a fairly large army. It did not
take long for the Saljuqs to overrun most of Khurasan.
According to contemporary accounts, Ghaznavid rule in this
area had become so oppressive that the residents of the leading
cities of Khurasan themselves invited the Saljuqs.
The unpopularity of the Ghaznavids certainly made the
Saljuq conquest of eastern Iran much easier. The inhabitants
of Marv surrendered to them in 1037 and those of Nishapur
in the following year. Then in 1040 the Saljuqs routed Masud' s
army at a battle which took place at Dandanqan lying to the
west of Marv. The Ghaznavids were expelled from eastern
Iran following their defeat at Dandanqan. This area now
passed into the hands of the Saljuqs. Once the Saljuqs were
firmly established in Khurasan they used it as their base for
expanding westwards.
At this stage the Saljuqs were led by Toghril and his broth-
er Chaghri Beg. After a series of military campaigns during
the next fifteen years, the Saljuqs succeeded in bringing Iraq
and western Iran under their control. In 1055 Toghril occupied
Baghdad. The last Buyid king, al-Malik al-Rahim, was made a
captive. Toghril became the ruler of Iraq and western Iran
while Chaghri Beg ruled over Khurasan and the eastern part
of the Saljuq kingdom. Chaghri' s capital was at Marv. Chaghri
Beg died in 1060 and was succeeded by his son Alp Arslan.
Three years later Toghril died without leaving any male heir
(1063). This was followed by a brief struggle for succession at
the end of which,Alp Arslan established himself as the master
of all the Saljuq territories (i.e. both the western and eastern
parts of the state). Alp Arslan laid the foundation of a great
Saljuq empire.
The second half of the eleventh century was the most glori-
ous period of the Saljuq empire. The empire reached its zenith
under Alp Arslan (1063-73) and his son Malik Shah (1073-
 Early Medieval West Asia I 381

1092). The territories which were ruled by the Saljuq dynasty

included Transoxiana, Khwarazm, western Afghanistan, Iran,
Iraq, Syria and parts of Anatolia. They also controlled Mecca
and Madina and extracted tribute from some areas of Arabia.
Whereas the centre of the Ghaznavid state was located in
Afghanistan (Ghazna), the base of Saljuq power lay essentially
in Iran. Marv in Khurasan was the main capital of Alp Arslan.
Isfahan, lying at the heart of Iran, was the capital of Malik
Shah. In other words the Saljuqs were much more firmly
rooted in Iran than was the case with the Abbasids, the Buyids
or the Ghaznavids. This imparted a specifically Iranian
character to the Saljuq state.
_ The Saljuqs carried forward the monarchical traditions of
the Ghaznavid state. The evolution of the saltanat which had
begun under Mahmud of Ghazna reached its culmination under
the Saljuqs. The saltanat, as we have noted, must be seen as a
type of monarchical state in which supreme political and
military authority vested in the sultan. The authority of the
sultan was legitimized through the nominal acceptance of the
religious authority of the Abbasid caliphate. Like the
Ghaznavid state the Saljuq state was also highly centralized.
The ruler was surrounded by an extravagant court. The
splendour of the court and its elaborate ceremonial were
intended to underline the majesty of the sultan. Court etiquette
bore the imprint of Persian and Abbasid traditions.
The Saljuqs had a large standing army which was partly
composed of mamluks. The army contained Turk, Mongol,
Arab, Iranian, Greek, Armenian, and African soldiers. Saljuq
military organization was closely linked to the iqta system.
Iqtas were now specifically assigned for the upkeep of troops.
The system of assigning iqtas was expanded considerably for
this purpose. The practice of collecting revenue from the iqtas
by a separate set of officials appointed directly by the central
government was more or less given up. Iqta holders, or iqtadars,
collected the revenue themselves and used a part of it for
supporting troops and retained the rest of the revenue as their
salary. The main taxes which accrued to the state were kharaj,
382 I Early Social Formations

ushr, zakat and jizya. There was a tendency for the iqta grants
to be held on a semi-permanent basis since the assignments
were made for relatively long periods. This resulted in many
of the iqtas being converted into hereditary private holdings
(milk or mulk) by the twelfth century. The Saljuq iqta system
sustained a powerful military aristocracy which was mainly
of Turkish origin. This military aristocracy derived its
authority from the sultan and was an important component
of the ruling elite.
The Saljuqs maintained the fiction that they ruled· with
the sanction of the Abbasid caliph. Although the caliph had
no real power, the sultans formally acknowledged his
i:,upremacy. The caliph had his own court at Baghdad. In their
dealings with the caliphs the Saljuqs showed respect for the
customary protocol. A military official called shahna was
permanently stationed at Baghdad for representing the Saljuq
ruler at the caliph's court. Of course, the diplomatic functions
of the shahna were only secondary. The shahna's main
responsibility was to keep a watch over the activities of the
caliph. It should be kept in mind that Baghdad, being the
residence of the caliph, only had a symbolic value. The city
had lost its political significance. In fact Alp Arslan did not
visit Baghdad even once.
The Saljuq rulers continued with the practice of entrusting
the civil administration to Iranian officials. This was all the
more so because Iran was the focal point of the Saljuq state.
The role of tl}.e Iranian bureaucracy assumed a new significance
under the Saljuqs and this period may be said to mark the
climax of the evolution of the early medieval Iranian
administrative structure. The most outstanding of the
bureaucrats of this era was Abu Ali Hasan Tusi, who is better
known by his title Nizam al-Mulk. Nizam al-Mulk was the
vazir of Alp Arslan and Malik Shah. The Saljuq state was as
much the creation of the Saljuq sultans as it was the product
of Nizam al-Mulk's towering personality. In the words of
Bosworth the thirty years from 1063 to 1092 may also be char-
acterized as 'the age of the great Vazir Nizam al-Mulk who
 Early Medieval West Asia I 383

typified the class of Iranian secretaries and officials upon whom

the sultans relied'. Nizam al-Mulk was not only an
administrator but was also an eminent scholar. He was the
author of a famous work [Link] entitled Siyasat" Nama
('Book of Government'). This lays down general principles of
governance and gives advice to kings and princes on a wide
range of topics related to the manner in which they should
rule.
Nizam al-Mulk was born in 1017 and had his ea'rly
education in the Khurasani city of Nishapur. He began his
career as an official in the Ghaznavid government. Later he
took up service under the Saljuqs and became Alp Arslan' s
vazir. Nizam al-Mul.k had been appointed vazir even before
Alp Arslan became the ruler of the entire Saljuq empire. When
Toghril died in 1063 Nizam al-Mul.k assisted Alp Arslan in the
struggle for succession. The success of Alp Arslan made Nizam
al-Mulk even more [Link]. He conti4ued as vazir under
Alp Arslan's successor Malik Shah. Nizam al-Mulk was
murdered in 1092. It was a matter of coincidence that Malik
Shah died a few days after his vazir was killed. Thus the
assassination of Nizam al-Mulk and the, death of the last of
the Great Saljuqs (Toghril, Alp Arslan and Malik Shah are
referred to as the Great Saljuqs as distinct from the later Saljuqs)
occurred at the same time. The close of the eleventh century
brought to an end a significant era in the history of the Islamic
state.
Nizam al-Mul.k headed the civil administration or the divan-
i-vazir. The divan-i-vazir had its own elaborate bureaucracy
which included a chief secretary (munshi) and chief accountant
(mustaufi). Nizam al-Mulk streamlined the training of officials
by setting up a network of educational institutions called mada-
rsas which were intended to produce a class of civil servants
who had acquired higher learning. These madarsas were
financed by the state. The madarsas founded by Nizam al-Mulk
were referred to as Nizamiyyas. The origin of madarsas can be
traced to the tenth century. The earliest Abbasid madarsas were
institutions for imparting instruction in Sunni religious tenets.
384 I Early Social Formations

Madarsa education was free. It has been suggested that initially

the Abbasid madarsas were a response to Shiite propaganda
carried out by the Fatimids. The Fatimids, it should be borne
in mind, actively encouraged and financed institutions which
were engaged in propagating Ismaili beliefs. By the Saljuq
period madarsas were teaching a wide range of subjects which
included Sunni theology, 1aw, jurisprudence, history and
political theory. The Nizamiyyas maintained very high
standards and renowned scholars were brought to teach at
these madarsas. The students were given liberal stipends in
order to attract the best talent. The most famous Nizamiyyas
were those of Baghdad (founded in 1067), Nishapur, Marv,
Isfahan and Basra. The Nizamiyyas served the ideological
purpose of evolving a uniform religious outlook for the Saljuq
state. The officials who graduated from these institutions
became the instruments for disseminating such an outlook.
The office of vazir owes its decisive development to Nizam
al-Mulk. Under him the vizarat became a key element within
the administrative structure of the medieval Islamic state. The
vazir' s secretariat looked after all aspects of the civil admin-
istration. This was a complex task which required considerable
attention to intricate details. It was necessary to have a large
official machinery to carry out the work of day-to-day gover-
nance. The Saljuq sultans, assisted by Nizam al:.Mulk and his
team, expanded the infrastructure which they had inherited
from the Abbasids, the Buyids, the Samanids and the
Ghaznavids. A word of caution is essential here. We should
not exaggerate the level of centralization in a pre-modem state.
Much of the routine administrative work of the· state would
have been taken care of at the local or provincial level. The
arrangements at these levels· were frequently of an informal
nature and the local officials were not always a part of the
central bureaucratic apparatus. They might be village
headmen, relatives of iqtadars, tribal chiefs, or persons with
some local influence. Nevertheless Nizam al-Mulk did
endeavour to make the functioning of the vazir' s secretariat
as comprehensive as was possible in the given historical
 Early Medieval West Asia I 385

situation. One might also add that Nizam al-Mulk.'s status was
somewhat exceptional. There were very few vazirs who, after
him, attained the preeminence which he enjoyed.
Nizam al-Mulk' s tenure saw the evolution of yet another
institution. This was the institution of atabegs. Atabegs were
senior and highly trusted officials who were entrusted with
the responsibility of training princes of the royal family,
especially the heir apparent. We have seen that the practice of
appointing such tutors goes back to early Abbasid times. But
atabegs were a peculiarly Turkish phenomenon. More
specifically, the atabegate as an institution was a product of
the Saljuq period. The appointment of an atabeg was a much
more formal affair than was the case with ordinary tutors.
The designation of atabeg had social connotations as well. The
atabeg's authority was similar to that of one's father. He could
not be easily disobeyed. Under the Saljuqs the appointment
of atabegs was not confined to princes alone. Young sons of
iqtadars (i.e. royal heirs of large hereditary iqtas) too had atabegs.
A. K S. Lambton is of the view that the appointment of atabegs
had an additional political objective. They were supposed to
keep a watch over the princes and prevent the possibility of
any rebellion. Nizam al-Mulk gave concrete shape to this
institution when he was appointed atabeg of Alp Arslan' s son
and heir apparent, Malik Shah. When Malik Shah became sultan
he made Nizam al-Mulk his vazir. Under the later Saljuqs the
position of the atabeg was often misused. Many atabegs became
regents with independent power and even founded their own
dynasties.

II (a)
After the death of Malik Shah in 1092 there was a prolonged
struggle over the question of succession. Sanjar, who was one
of the sons of Malik Shah, was able to bring most of the Saljuq
territories under his rule by 1118. By this time the authority
of the Saljuq state had become quite weak in Iraq and western
Iran. The conflict between rival claimants disrupted the unity
386 I Early Social Formations

of the empire and it was witp great difficulty that Sanjar gained
recognition as sultan of the entire realm. Sultan Sanjar's main
base was in Khurasan where he had firmly established himself
following the death of his father. Khurasan remained the
nucleus of the Saljuq empire during the twelfth century. Sanjar
ruled till 1157 but his last years were marked by violent
upheavals caused by the irruption of Turkish tribes.
The hundred years from the death of Sanjar in 1157 and
the capture of Baghdad by the Mongols in 1258 is a period
with a complicated political history. Several dynasties, the
Saljuqs being only one of them, ruled over different parts of
West Asta, Transoxiana and Afghanistan. Not all the dynasties
were Turkish. There was even a revival of Abbasid authority
in southern Iraq. The Abbasids took advantage of the struggle
within the Saljuq family to recover some of their prestige. The
caliph al-Nasi.r (1180-1225) came to be regarded as a senior
statesman i.J.1 the politics of West Asia. He was often called
-[Link] to mediate in the conflict5 between various groups. This
does not imply that the Abbasids had regained their former
authority. Their effective area of control was Baghdad and its
environs.
The Abbasid caliphate and the numerous kingdoms of West
Asia were destroyed by the Mongol invasions led by Chingiz
Khan and [Link]. [Link] entered Baghdad in 1258 and killed
the· last caliph (al-Mustasim). Thereafter the Mongols became
the dominant ethnic group in Central Asia and parts of West
Asia. In due course they accepted the Islamic faith. The Turks
continued to be a significant factor in the politics of the region.
In Egypt the Fatimids ruled till 1171. They were ousted by a
dynasty which had originally been founded by an atabeg in
northern Iraq and which in the process of expansion had ·
established itself in Egypt. One of the members of this family,
named Salah al-Din (Saladin), became the ruler of Egypt. He
overthrew the Fatimids and founded a new dynasty-the
Ayyubids-which ruled over Egypt-till 1252. The Ayyubids
were in turn overthrown by a military aristocracy consisting
of mamluk soldiers.
 Early Medieval West Asia I 387

Although the twelfth century witnessed the decline and

fall of the Saljuqs, this was a period of cultural efflorescence.
The post-Sanjar period is the great age of classical Persian
literature. A rich literary tradition had come into existence by
the early eleventh century with the composition of a great
epic entitled Shah Nama. Shah Nama was composed by Firdausi
(c. 940-1020). This tradition was further enriched by the poetry
composed by Nizami. Nizami is regarded as one of the most
outstanding poets in the Persian language. Nizami (c. 1140-
1209) belonged to the city of Ganja in Azarbaijan (northern
Iran). He is most famous for his romantic epics which remain
popular down to the present day. One of his most beautiful
epics is Laili u Majnu.,This is a poem consisting of over four
thousand lines. Khusru u Shirin is another well-known poem
of Nizami. The other epics of Nizami include Haft Paikar and
Iskandar Nama. Many of Nizami' s epics were inspired by ancient
Iranian legends.
The classical Persian literary tradition continued to flour-
ish during the thirteenth century despite the dislocation caused
by the collapse of the Saljuq empire and the Mongol invasions.
Provincial courts became centres of hectic cultural activity.
Out of the immense output of this period the works of two
towering literary figures-Sadi and Jalaluddin Rumi-deserve
special mention. Sadi (c. 1213-1292) belonged to the town of
Shiraz in Iran. His two major compositions are Bustan ('The
Orchard'), which is an epic poem, and Gulistan ('The Rose
Garden'), which is written partly in verse and partly in prose
and contains numerous anecdotes which are meant to highlight
certain morals. The writings of Sadi are deeply imbued· with
Sufi mysticism. Jalaluddin Rumi (1207-73) composed an
encyclopedia of Sufism. This encyclopedia, known as Masnavi-
i Manavi, is in verse and contains about 27, 000 lines.
The foundations of natural science in the Arab and Iranian
world had been firmly laid during the early Abbasid period
(see chapter eleven). The translation of ancient Greek texts
into Arabic had stimulated the development of medicine,
chemistry, mathematics and astronomy. We have noted that
388 I Early Social Formations

the Greek legacy in the field of medicine formed the basis of

a new tradition of Arab medicine-the Unani system of
medicine. Ibn Sina (called Avicenna by the Europeans), who
was the most distinguished exponent of this system, lived at
the close of the tenth and the beginning of the eleventh
centuries (980-1037). Ibn Sina hailed from Bukhara. He had
made a thorough study of ancient Greek scientists and
philosophers. Aristotle left a lasting impression on him. Ibn
Sina' s enduring contribution to science was in the discipline
of medicine. He wrote a work which is generally known as
Qanun, or Principles of Medicine. Through this work Ibn Sina
popularized the writings of Hippocrates and Galen. Qanun
incorporated the ideas of some of the most important Greek
scientists. This became the standard textbook on medicine not
only in the Arab and Iranian world but also in Europe. Qanun
was translated into Latin and other European languages. It
was the basic reference work on medical science in Europe
down to the sixteenth century. Umar Khayyam, who was a
contemporary of Nizam al-Mulk, was another outstanding
scholar of the Saljuq era. Umar Khayyam, it may be noted,
was politically opposed to the Saljuq state. He was a scholar
with a wide range of interests. Though he is popularly known
as a poet, i.e. as the composer of a form of Persian poetry
known as rubai, he was primarily a mathematician [Link]
contributed to the development of algebra, geometry, physics
and astronomy. Umar Khayyam was also a profound
philosopher. There can be little doubt that Umar Khayyam
was the most brilliant product of early medieval West l,\.sian
scholarship.

II (1?)
The decline of the caliphate and the shift in political focus
from the caliph to the sultan created an urgent need for
evolving a constitutional theory of the saltanat. The saltanat
as a form of government was a relatively new phenomenon.
Its beginnings may be dated to the latter half of the tenth
 Early Medieval West Asia I 389

century. The central dilemma of Islamic polity was that it had

no provision for a monarchy. Yet, right from the time of the
Umayyads the Islamic state had been monarchical in nature.
As long as political and religious authority were merged in
the person of the caliph the monarchical nature of, the state
did not pose a serious theoretical problem. The caliph was
seen as exercising his political authority by virtue of his being
the religious leader or imam of the Muslim community (umma).
This situation no longer held true under the later Abbasids.
The rise of provincial dynasties like the Aghlabids in
Ifriqiya or the Samanids in north-eastern Iran and Central
Asia altered the position of the Abbasid caliphs. The rulers of
these dynasties nominally acknowledged the overlordship of
the Abbasids (the Samanids held that they were ruling on
behalf of the caliph) and broadly accepted their religious
authority, but were independent for• all practical purposes.
By the beginning of the tenth century northern Africa and
Spain had ceased to be of much concern to the Abbasids
because they had no role to play in the religious or political
life of the Islamic societies of these regions. With the
establishment of the Fatimid empire in north Africa and the
firm grip of the Umayyads over Spain-both the Fatirnids and
the Umayyads claimed the title of caliph for themselves-
Abbasid sovereignty was limited to West Asia.
In West Asia, the ascendancy of the Buyids decisively
transformed the status of the caliphs. The Abbasids were now
reduced to being virtual prisoners of the Buyid rulers.
Nevertheless the Buyids did not remove the caliphs because
they found it useful to continue with the tradition of
recognizing the religious authority of the caliphs. This helped
them to legitimize their usurpation of political power. From
the middle of the tenth century there was a clear distinction
between the constitutional position of the caliph as the head
of the Islamic state and leader the of umma on the one hand,
and the actual ruler on the other hand.
It may be recalled that the Buyids used monarchical titles
such as shahenshah. It is pertinent to note over here that the
390 I Early Social Formations

Fatimids and the Umayyads of Spain sought legitimacy for

their power by taking on the title of caliph. Some scholars
have wondered as to why the Buyids did not do the same.
This might have been due to the fact that the Buyids with
their Shiite sympathies felt themselves somewhat insecure in
a region in which orthodox Sunnism was so deeply entrenched.
Moreover the Abbasids were closely identified with the Sunni
traditions of West Asia. Their presence had a symbolic value.
The Buyids probably felt that it was not easy disregard the
sentiments which were attached to the Abbasids. As for the
Ghaznavids and the Saljuqs, both of them projected themselves
as champions and liberators of the Abbasids in the formative
stages of their respective empires. This was one of the ways
in which they tried to gain wider acceptance. Incidentally,
once Saljuq rule had stabilized, sultan Malik Shah declared his
intention of ousting the Abbasids. In the last year of his life
(1092) Malik Shah had been planning to dislodge the Abbasid
caliph al-Muqtadi, with the aim of ending the Abbasid caliphate
and possibly making someone else the caliph. The plan was
cut short by the death of Malik Shah. What is significant is
that Nizam al-Mulk was not in favour of such a move. This
indicates that even at this point of time the Abbasids retained
their symbolic prestige.
Whatever might have been the symbolic or nominal status
of the caliphs, the fact remains that by the latter half of the
tenth century they had almost no say in the affairs of the state.
Real power was concentrated in the hands of the Buyids and
the Samanids (there were a host of minor local dynasties as
well), and subsequently in the hands of the Ghaznavids and
the Saljuqs. A new type of Islamic monarchical state-the
saltanat-had come into existence. The sultan exercised
absolute power but tried to legitimize his rule by seeking the
sanction of the caliph. The reign of Mahmud of Ghazna marks
the beginning of the mature phase of the saltanat as a form of
government. Although Mahmud ruled like a despot over a
vast centralized empire, he maintained that he derived his
authority from the caliph. To contemporary observers and
 Early Medieval West Asia I 391

Muslim political theorists Mahmud represented a new type of

ruler and the saltanat was seen as an innovative form of
government. This form of government evolved further under
the Saljuqs.
One thing that was immediately obvious was that despite
the sultan's outward show of respect for the caliph, his power
was absolute and that it ultimately rested on force. The sultan
was a monarch in every sense of the term, except that he
regarded himself (at least formally) as the deputy of the caliph.
This was a contradiction which was not provided for in' the
existing writings on jurisprudence or political theory. Even
before Nizam al-Mulk some Islamic scholars had tried to
grapple with this problem. The first prominent thesis on the
political theory of the saltanat appeared around the middle of
the eleventh century. This was a work entitled Ahkam al-
Sultaniyya ('The Principles of Government') written by al-
Mawar_di (died 1058). Al-Mawardi made an attempt to
reconcile the historical reality of the saltanat with the Islamic
concept of the state. He clearly stated that the authority of
the caliph was supreme. The apparent aim of Ahkam al-
Sultaniyya is to present grounds in favour of the authority of
the caliphs. H. A. R. Gibb has pointed out that al-Mawardi
was writing at a time when Buyid power was declining and
the Abbasids were reasserting themselves, especially under
al-Qaim (see above). It is likely that al-Mawardi was
commissioned to write Ahkam al-Sultaniyya by al-Qaim. What
is more relevant is that even though al-Mawardi strongly
defended the supremacy of the Abbasid caliphate, he
enunciated a theory for rationalizing the saltanat. The
Ghaznavids were his main reference point for this (the Saljuqs
had not yet come to power). Al-Mawardi's principal argument
was that while the caliphate was ordained by Allah, and
therefore supreme, the caliph could delegate his power. The
power that was delegated could either be limited or unlimited.
The person to whom the power was delegated should exercise
it in accordance with the shariat. Al-Mawardi justified the
usurpation of power by force by stipulating that this type of
392 ! Early Social Formations

power was valid if the usurper recognized the authority of

the caliph. It is clear that he had someone like sultan Mahmud
in mind while discussing this type of government.
In this context one should mention the contribution of
Nizam al-Mulk. The basic framework of Nizam al-Mulk's
Siyasat Nam.a is the saltanat. Whereas this was not a theoretical
work it did contain a detailed exposition of the Saljuq saltanat.
Given the influence of Nizam al-Mulk on Muslim contemporary
scholars and his popularity with the Iranian bureaucracy it is
hardly surprising that the Siyasat Nama helped to regularize,
in theoretical terms, the saltanat as a form of government.
Nizam al-Mulk emphasized the absolute nature of the sultan's
power. In the final analysis this power was based on force.
Nizam al-Mulk. went so far as to state that the sultan did not
need any constitutional sanction for his authority. The absolute
power which was vested in the sultan was crucial for
maintaining order in society and as such it had divine approval.
In the latter half of the eleventh century al-Ghazali (1058-
1111 ), who was a leading authority on Islamic jurisprudence,
published a series df treatises in which he formulated a detailed
political theory of the saltanat. Al-Ghazali began with the
proposition that from the point of view of the Islamic
conception of the state all power was vested in the caliph by
virtue of his being the head of the Muslim umma.:The <.aliph
was after all the successor of the Prophet. The caliphate as an
institution combined three elements: i) the caliph represented
legitimate succession to the Prophet; ii) the caliph exercised
political authority; and iii) the caliph was the religious leader
of the Islamic community. In an ideal situation all these three
elements should be concentrated in one and the same person.
If the historical circumstances did not permit this then it was
perfectly valid to divide these three elements among different
persons. The caliph would then only embody legitimate
succession from the Prophet and be the constitutional, though
nominal, head of the state. Political and military power would
be exercised by the sultan. The ulama or religious scholars
would guide the community in religious matters.
 Early Medieval West Asia I 393

We can see here that in al-Ghazali's scheme the role of the

caliph has been marginalized. Al-Ghazali was more concerned
with providing a legal justification for the sultan's authority.
He dealt exhaustively with the saltanat as a form of
government in his work Nasihat al-Muluk. According to him
the sultan should recognize the supremacy of the caliph and
should rule according to the shariat. But in aqtual practicP. the
power of the sultan had no limits. Al-Ghazali\argued that the
sultan's power had a divine origin. The sultan was' the Shadow
of God upon Earth'. This made it obligatory for all his subjects
to obey him completely. Any kind of rebellion, even if it was
directed against a tyrant, was unlawful. Al-Ghazali' s writings
contain the most explicit statement on the absolute power of
the sultan. These writings, together with the works of al-
Mawardi and Nizam al-Mulk, were to function as the
ideological basis of the saltanat as a form of government for a
long time. With the abolition of the Abbasid caliphate by the
Mongols· in 1258 these writings acquired even more
significance. Since it was no longer possible to maintain the
fiction that the sultan was exercising political power on behalf
of the caliph, theories which emphasized the independent and
divine origin of the sultan's power were useful for legitimizing
the Islamic monarchical state from the thirteenth century
onwards.