Oposa v.
Factoran,
GR No. 101083, 30 July 1993
FACTS:
Petitioners here are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents.
Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a
domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation. The original defendant was the
Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary,
the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the
petitioners. The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the
plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to
the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's
virgin tropical rainforests." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn."
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to
Dismiss the complaint. On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the
motion to dismiss.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner-minors has legal standing in the present case.
RULING:
Yes, the Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for
the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such
a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature."
Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure
the protection of that right for the generations to come.
Chavez v. PCGG,
GR No. 130716, 9 December 1998;
FACTS:
Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as taxpayer, citizen and former government official
alleges that what impelled him to bring this action were several news reports on (1) the
alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded
accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the
government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these
assets.
Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of
the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, demands
that respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to
PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth.
Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the
Marcos heirs. Respondents further aver that the Marcos heirs have submitted the
subject Agreements to the Sandiganbayan for its approval in Civil Case No. 141,
entitled Republic v. Heirs of Ferdinand E. Marcos, and that the Republic opposed such
move. Furthermore, Pres. Ramos, in his Memorandum, commanded the PCGG
Chairman not to approve the Compromise Agreements. Acting on a motion of
petitioner, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has the personality or legal standing to file the instant
petition.
RULING:
Yes, the petitioner has the legal standing to file the instant petition. Access to public
documents and records is a public right, and the real parties in interest are the people
themselves. In Tañada v. Tuvera, the Court asserted that when the issue concerns a
public right and the object of mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a public duty,
the people are regarded as the real parties in interest; and because it is sufficient that
petitioner is a citizen and as such is interested in the execution of the laws, he need not
show that he has any legal or special interest in the result of the action. In the aforesaid
case, the petitioners sought to enforce their right to be informed on matters of public
concern, a right then recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, in
connection with the rule that laws in order to be valid and enforceable must be
published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated. In ruling for the
petitioners' legal standing, the Court declared that the right they sought to be enforced
"is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land."
In Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, while reiterating Tañada, further declared that
"when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement
of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner is a citizen and, therefore,
part of the general 'public' which possesses the right. Similarly, the instant petition is
anchored on the right of the people to information and access to official records,
documents and papers — a right guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. Petitioner, a former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen. Because of the
satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain
petitioner's legal standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a public right (2) espoused by a
Filipino citizen, we rule that the petition at bar should be allowed.
Henares v. LTFRB,
GR No. 158290, 23 October 2006
FACTS:
Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondents
Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs)
to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel. Asserting their right to clean
air, petitioners contend that the bases for their petition for a writ of mandamus to order
the LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section 16, Article II
of the 1987 Constitution, our ruling in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. and Section 14 of Republic
Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999."
Meantime, following a subsequent motion, the Court granted petitioners' motion to
implead the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) as additional
respondent. In his Comment for respondents LTFRB and DOTC, the Solicitor General,
cites Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and explains that the writ of
mandamus is not the correct remedy. The Solicitor General also notes that nothing in
Rep. Act No. 8749 that petitioners invoke, prohibits the use of gasoline and diesel by
owners of motor vehicles. The Solicitor General also adds that it is the DENR that is
tasked to implement Rep. Act No. 8749 and not the LTFRB nor the DOTC. Petitioners
aver that other than the writ applied for, they have no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Petitioners insist that the writ in fact should be
issued pursuant to the very same Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court that
the Solicitor General invokes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have the personality to bring the present action.
RULING:
Yes, there is no dispute that petitioners have standing to bring their case before this
Court. Even respondents do not question their standing. This petition focuses on one
fundamental legal right of petitioners, their right to clean air. Moreover, as held
previously, a party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which may,
in the exercise of the Court's discretion, be set aside in view of the importance of the
issue raised.
Undeniably, the right to clean air not only is an issue of paramount importance to
petitioners for it concerns the air they breathe, but it is also impressed with public
interest. The consequences of the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of a
neglected environment due to emissions of motor vehicles immeasurably affect the
well-being of petitioners. On these considerations, the legal standing of the petitioners
deserves recognition.
1st set CASE SYNTHESIS:
In Oposa v. Factoran, GR No. 101083, 30 July 1993 the Supreme Court ruled that they
can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations,
file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only
be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Needless to say, every generation has a
responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of
a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their
right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
In Chavez v. PCGG, GR No. 130716, 9 December 1998 the Supreme Court ruled that
when the issue concerns a public right and the object of mandamus is to obtain the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real parties in interest; and
because it is sufficient that petitioner is a citizen and as such is interested in the
execution of the laws, he need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the
result of the action. In ruling for the petitioners' legal standing, the Court declared that
the right they sought to be enforced "is a public right recognized by no less than the
fundamental law of the land."
In Henares v. LTFRB, GR No. 158290, 23 October 2006 the Supreme Court ruled that
this petition focuses on one fundamental legal right of petitioners, their right to clean
air. Undeniably, the right to clean air not only is an issue of paramount importance to
petitioners for it concerns the air they breathe, but it is also impressed with public
interest. The consequences of the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of a
neglected environment due to emissions of motor vehicles immeasurably affect the
well-being of petitioners. On these considerations, the legal standing of the petitioners
deserves recognition.
Oposa v. Factoran,
GR No. 101083, 30 July 1993
FACTS:
Petitioners here are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents.
Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a
domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation. The original defendant was the
Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary,
the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the
petitioners. The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the
plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to
the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's
virgin tropical rainforests." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn."
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to
Dismiss the complaint. On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the
motion to dismiss.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction.
RULING:
Yes, we do not agree with the trial court's conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to allege
with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong
committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions
based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is
solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution.
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the
complaint fails to state a cause of action, the question submitted to the court for
resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other
matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth or falsity of the said allegations is
beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue
to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court
render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? In Militante vs.
Edrosolano, this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost
care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the
absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of
the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or
recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The
law itself stands in disrepute."
Sta. Ines v. Macaraig,
GR No. 808409, 2 December 1998
FACTS:
These consolidated petitions pertain to a boundary dispute between petitioner Sta. Ines,
and private respondents Agwood and Kalilid. The complaints of Agwood and Kalilid
that Sta. Ines had encroached on their timber license areas, were decided in their favor,
in the first instance, by the Director of Forest Development; on appeal, by the Minister
of Natural Resources; and on further appeal to the Office of the President, by the
Deputy Executive Secretary, now the Executive Secretary as well as by the Acting
Deputy Executive Secretary. Sta. Ines assails their decisions in G.R. No. 80849 on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 81114, Sta. Ines prays for the annulment of the writ of
attachment issued by respondent Judge Vicente A. Hidalgo of the Regional Trial Court
of Agusan del Norte/Butuan City, Branch V. On the strength of that writ, the
respondent Provincial Sheriff of Agusan del Norte/Butuan City levied upon 2,600 cubic
meters of logs belonging to Sta. Ines as security for Kalilid's claim to P8 Million worth of
logs felled and hauled by Sta. Ines from the area subject of their boundary dispute.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he refused to
discharge/dissolve the Writ of Preliminary Attachment upon motion by petitioner that
it was improperly and irregularly issued.
RULING:
No, it is well-settled that the grant or denial of a writ of attachment rests upon the
sound discretion of the court. This Court finds that on the basis of the verified allegation
of fraud, the definitive statement of damages, and the bond posted by Kalilid, the trial
court soundly exercised its discretion in issuing a writ of attachment on December 8,
1987. In the first place, the counterbond posted by Sta. Ines to quash the writ of
attachment is undisputedly spurious. The bonding company has made it of record that
it will not honor any obligation arising from the fake counterbond because it never
issued the same. Without a valid counterbond, there is nothing to stand in place of the
property attached if it were to be released, leaving the plaintiff thus with nothing to
secure payment of any judgment that he may recover in the action.
Secondly, Sta. Ines is undoubtedly guilty of fraud and bad faith in having felled, cut
and hauled logs from the disputed area in blatant violation of the Memorandum of
Agreement dated June 5, 1979.
Therefore, the said order of denial was rendered, the validity and efficacy of the writ of
attachment itself, as issued on December 8, 1987, cannot be doubted.
Southeast Mining v. Balite,
GR No. 135190, 3 April 2002
FACTS:
On March 10, 1988, Marcopper Mining Corporation was granted Exploration Permit
No. 133 over 4,491 hectares of land, which included the hotly contested Diwalwal area.
Subsequently, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7076, or the People's Small-Scale
Mining Act. Pursuant thereto, DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran issued
Department
Administrative Order No. 66, declaring 729 hectares of the Diwalwal area as non-forest
land open to small-scale mining. Resultantly, conflicting mining rights claims arose.
Meanwhile, Marcopper assigned its EP No. 133 to petitioner Southeast Mindanao Gold
Mining Corporation (SEM). To resolve the conflicting claims, the DENR Secretary
issued
Memorandum Order (MO) No. 97-03. Petitioner then filed a special civil action for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Court of Appeals. It prayed for the
nullification of Memorandum Order No. 97-03 on the ground, among others, that the
"direct state utilization" espoused therein would effectively impair its vested rights
under EP No. 133. However, it was dismissed by the Court of Appeals. It ruled that the
DENR Secretary did not abuse his discretion in issuing MO 97-03 since the same was
merely a directive to conduct studies on the various options available to the
government for solving the Diwalwal conflict. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that the assailed
memorandum order did not adopt the "direct state utilization scheme" in resolving the
Diwalwal dispute.
RULING:
No, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals' ruling that the challenged
MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt "direct state utilization" as a policy in resolving
the Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the memorandum clearly indicate that what was
directed thereunder was merely a study of this option and nothing else. Contrary to
petitioner's contention, it did not grant any management/operating or profit-sharing
agreement to small-scale miners or to any party, for that matter, but simply instructed
the DENR officials concerned to undertake studies to determine its feasibility.
Consequently, the petition was premature. The said memorandum order did not
impose any obligation on the claimants or fix any legal relation whatsoever between
and among the parties to the dispute. At this stage, petitioner can show no more than a
mere apprehension that the State, through the DENR, would directly take over the
mines after
studies point to its viability. But until the DENR actually does so and petitioner's fears
turn into reality, no valid objection can be entertained against MO 97-03 on grounds
which are purely speculative and anticipatory.
2nd set CASE SYNTHESIS:
In Oposa v. Factoran, GR No. 101083, 30 July 1993 the Supreme Court ruled that it is
settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the
complaint fails to state a cause of action, the question submitted to the court for
resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. In
Militante vs. Edrosolano, this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise
the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground
of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct
appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law
grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal
order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
In Sta. Ines v. Macaraig, GR No. 808409, 2 December 1998 the Supreme Court ruled that
on the basis of the verified allegation of fraud, the definitive statement of damages, and
the bond posted by Kalilid, the trial court soundly exercised its discretion in issuing a
writ of attachment on December 8, 1987. In the first place, the counterbond posted by
Sta. Ines to quash the writ of attachment is undisputedly spurious. Secondly, Sta. Ines is
undoubtedly guilty of fraud and bad faith in having felled, cut and hauled logs from
the disputed area in blatant violation of the Memorandum of Agreement dated June 5,
1979. Therefore, the validity and efficacy of the writ of attachment cannot be doubted.
In Southeast Mining v. Balite, GR No. 135190, 3 April 2002, the Supreme Court ruled
that the terms of the memorandum clearly indicate that what was directed thereunder
was merely a study of this option and nothing else. Consequently, the petition was
premature. The said memorandum order did not impose any obligation on the
claimants or fix any legal relation whatsoever between and among the parties to the
dispute. At this stage, petitioner can show no more than a mere apprehension that the
State, through the DENR, would directly take over the mines after studies point to its
viability. But until the DENR actually does so and petitioner's fears turn into reality, no
valid objection can be entertained against MO 97-03 on grounds which are purely
speculative and anticipatory.
