Skip to content

Add security consideration for computation control-flow attacks #725

New issue

Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.

Sign up for GitHub

By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.

Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account

Merged
fdwr merged 2 commits into from
Jul 17, 2024
Merged

Add security consideration for computation control-flow attacks #725

Changes from all commits
Commits
Show all changes
2 commits
Select commit Hold shift + click to select a range
7b081f5
Add security consideration for computation control-flow attacks
inexorabletash Jul 11, 2024
cb5b8de
typo platform
fdwr Jul 17, 2024
File filter

Filter by extension

Filter by extension
Conversations
Failed to load comments.
Loading
Jump to
Jump to file
Failed to load files.
Loading
Diff view
Diff view
2 changes: 2 additions & 0 deletions index.bs
View file
Open in desktop
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -574,6 +574,8 @@ Once the graph is fully constructed and compiled, the input shapes into each of

Issue: Document operations susceptible to out-of-bounds access as a guidance to implementers.

Implementations must defend against control-flow attacks based on changes to data considered to be constant. For example, optimizations in the underlying platform may assume that a weight remains unchanged throughout a computation. If the API allowed the contents of buffers holding weights to change during a computation then those optimization assumptions would be invalidated, causing undefined behavior in the underlying platform. The API mitigates this category of attacks from script by always copying or transferring buffers, but implementations should consider additional defenses such as process isolation of data assumed to be constant.

As a future-proofing measure, the API design allows certain operations that can be generically emulated to be deprecated for security, performance, or other reasons without breaking compatibility. This is made possible by high-level functions that are defined in terms of smaller primitive operations defined in this specifications. This enables a native implementation of a high-level function to be replaced with a polyfill implementation.

Issue: Investigate side channel attack feasibility considering the current state where CPU is shared between processes running renderers.
Expand Down