fix: harden XML parser in FileTypeDetector against XML bomb DoS

[RuffaloLavoisier]

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Description

A crafted APK containing a resource with nested entity expansion (Billion Laughs) could cause excessive memory consumption and crash jadx during file type detection.

[skylot]

Thanks.
Although, this code now looks the same as in

jadx/jadx-core/src/main/java/jadx/api/security/impl/JadxSecurity.java

Lines 99 to 105 in d84f038

	dbf.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true);
	dbf.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/nonvalidating/load-external-dtd", false);
	dbf.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities", false);
	dbf.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-parameter-entities", false);
	dbf.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/dom/create-entity-ref-nodes", false);
	dbf.setXIncludeAware(false);
	dbf.setExpandEntityReferences(false);

I will prepare a change to use parseXml from jadx security class instead this.