I work at the intersection of security engineering, infrastructure, and governance — the kind of role where you're hunting IOCs in the morning, rewriting firewall rules at lunch, and arguing for security budget in the afternoon. I've built and operate a security program largely from scratch at a public sector organization, covering everything from edge networking to endpoint detection to incident response to GRC.
I didn't start in security. I came up through MSP work and years of hands-on IT, which means I understand the systems I'm trying to protect before I think about how to protect them. That foundation shapes how I approach everything.
Security Operations Endpoint detection and response, log aggregation and alerting, IOC extraction, threat hunting, phishing simulation and awareness training. I've handled real incidents end to end — containment, forensic analysis, PII scoping, coordination with external agencies including CISA, FBI, and State Police, and full after action reporting. I build detection capability rather than just consuming it.
Infrastructure & Networking Linux server administration and deployment, network architecture and segmentation, VLAN design, edge firewall configuration and management with pfSense. I've migrated environments off legacy infrastructure, rebuilt networks that grew piecemeal without a plan, and made deliberate choices about what to self-host versus what to trust to a vendor.
Governance, Risk & Compliance Incident response planning tied to NIST CSF and CIS controls, policy writing, internal audits, GRC documentation. I write things down in ways that protect the organization and the people making decisions inside it. I've used that documentation in live incidents and it held up.
Tooling & Automation I build tools to fill gaps rather than reach for another vendor. Rust is my primary language for systems and security tooling. I care about performance, explicit memory handling, and shipping binaries that don't require a runtime on the target machine. Python and PowerShell for automation and scripting. I have a Java background from earlier work and pick up new languages as the problem demands.
| Area | Tools |
|---|---|
| Endpoint | SentinelOne |
| Log Aggregation & Alerting | OpenSearch |
| Incident Response | IRIS |
| Threat Intelligence | MISP |
| Authentication & MFA | PrivacyIDEA |
| Edge Networking | pfSense, Ubiquiti |
| Patch Management | Patch Manager Plus |
| Identity & Productivity | Active Directory, Microsoft 365 |
| Virtualization | Hyper-V |
| Network Analysis | Wireshark, Nmap |
A suite of focused, single-purpose security and system tools built in Rust. Designed in the spirit of NirSoft and Sysinternals; small, transparent, composable, JSON-first output so everything can feed into something else. Tools cover asset inventory, system health baselining, change detection, suspicious indicator hunting, log analysis, disk management, and network scanning.
GPL licensed. Built to solve real problems in real environments, not to demo well.
Security is mostly reading, configuration, documentation, scripting, and fighting for initiatives that matter. The interesting parts are understanding how systems actually work, finding the gaps between how things are supposed to behave and how they do, and building the capability to know when something has gone wrong before it becomes a catastrophe.
I keep tooling lean on purpose. Every vendor is an attack surface. Every SaaS subscription is data you don't fully control and a configuration you might get wrong. Self-hosting costs time but buys visibility and control that managed services rarely match.
I came to security through real incidents before I had the full theory. That order of operations — experience first, then framework — means I think about risk in terms of what actually breaks in real environments, not just what the textbook says should.
- IT & Security professional with roots in MSP work across diverse client environments
- Cybersecurity B.S.
- Freelance technical work across the career alongside full-time roles
- Former ransomware incident responder including threat actor negotiation
- Current: sole security and infrastructure owner at a 150-person public sector organization
Security doesn't exist in a vacuum. How we build technology, who owns it, and who bears responsibility for its failures are questions that matter as much as the technical work itself.
Privacy as a right, not a feature. Privacy should be the default, not something users have to opt into or pay extra for. Data minimization and user control aren't compliance checkboxes — they're the baseline.
Right to repair is a security issue. If you can't inspect, modify, or repair the devices you own, you can't audit them. Proprietary black boxes in critical infrastructure and consumer hardware aren't just inconvenient — they're a security problem that affects everyone downstream.
Security should be accessible. The tools and knowledge to operate securely shouldn't require enterprise budgets or a dedicated team. Part of why I build open, focused tooling is because smaller organizations deserve real security capability too.
The onus belongs on companies, not people. We've spent decades telling individuals to be more security aware while shipping products with poor defaults, opaque data practices, and misaligned incentives. The responsibility for secure outcomes should sit with the people building and deploying systems, not the people using them.
I keep personal and professional separate so you won't find much else here. The work speaks for itself.
