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Common Weakness Enumeration

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Home > CWE List > CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values (4.16)  
ID

CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values

Weakness ID: 330
Vulnerability Mapping: DISCOURAGED This CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
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+ Description
The product uses insufficiently random numbers or values in a security context that depends on unpredictable numbers.
+ Extended Description
When product generates predictable values in a context requiring unpredictability, it may be possible for an attacker to guess the next value that will be generated, and use this guess to impersonate another user or access sensitive information.
+ Common Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Scope Impact Likelihood
Confidentiality
Other

Technical Impact: Other

When a protection mechanism relies on random values to restrict access to a sensitive resource, such as a session ID or a seed for generating a cryptographic key, then the resource being protected could be accessed by guessing the ID or key.
Access Control
Other

Technical Impact: Bypass Protection Mechanism; Other

If product relies on unique, unguessable IDs to identify a resource, an attacker might be able to guess an ID for a resource that is owned by another user. The attacker could then read the resource, or pre-create a resource with the same ID to prevent the legitimate program from properly sending the resource to the intended user. For example, a product might maintain session information in a file whose name is based on a username. An attacker could pre-create this file for a victim user, then set the permissions so that the application cannot generate the session for the victim, preventing the victim from using the application.
Access Control

Technical Impact: Bypass Protection Mechanism; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity

When an authorization or authentication mechanism relies on random values to restrict access to restricted functionality, such as a session ID or a seed for generating a cryptographic key, then an attacker may access the restricted functionality by guessing the ID or key.
+ Potential Mitigations

Phase: Architecture and Design

Use a well-vetted algorithm that is currently considered to be strong by experts in the field, and select well-tested implementations with adequate length seeds.

In general, if a pseudo-random number generator is not advertised as being cryptographically secure, then it is probably a statistical PRNG and should not be used in security-sensitive contexts.

Pseudo-random number generators can produce predictable numbers if the generator is known and the seed can be guessed. A 256-bit seed is a good starting point for producing a "random enough" number.

Phase: Implementation

Consider a PRNG that re-seeds itself as needed from high quality pseudo-random output sources, such as hardware devices.

Phase: Testing

Use automated static analysis tools that target this type of weakness. Many modern techniques use data flow analysis to minimize the number of false positives. This is not a perfect solution, since 100% accuracy and coverage are not feasible.

Phases: Architecture and Design; Requirements

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use products or modules that conform to FIPS 140-2 [REF-267] to avoid obvious entropy problems. Consult FIPS 140-2 Annex C ("Approved Random Number Generators").

Phase: Testing

Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.
+ Relationships
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000)
Nature Type ID Name
ChildOf Pillar Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things. 693 Protection Mechanism Failure
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 331 Insufficient Entropy
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 334 Small Space of Random Values
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 335 Incorrect Usage of Seeds in Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG)
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 338 Use of Cryptographically Weak Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG)
ParentOf Class Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource. 340 Generation of Predictable Numbers or Identifiers
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 344 Use of Invariant Value in Dynamically Changing Context
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1204 Generation of Weak Initialization Vector (IV)
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 1241 Use of Predictable Algorithm in Random Number Generator
CanPrecede Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 804 Guessable CAPTCHA
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (CWE-1003)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf View View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). 1003 Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 331 Insufficient Entropy
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 335 Incorrect Usage of Seeds in Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG)
ParentOf Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource. 338 Use of Cryptographically Weak Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG)
Section Help This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
+ Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (CWE-1008)
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf Category Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1013 Encrypt Data
+ Background Details
Computers are deterministic machines, and as such are unable to produce true randomness. Pseudo-Random Number Generators (PRNGs) approximate randomness algorithmically, starting with a seed from which subsequent values are calculated. There are two types of PRNGs: statistical and cryptographic. Statistical PRNGs provide useful statistical properties, but their output is highly predictable and forms an easy to reproduce numeric stream that is unsuitable for use in cases where security depends on generated values being unpredictable. Cryptographic PRNGs address this problem by generating output that is more difficult to predict. For a value to be cryptographically secure, it must be impossible or highly improbable for an attacker to distinguish between it and a truly random value.
+ Modes Of Introduction
Section HelpThe different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
+ Applicable Platforms
Section HelpThis listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.

Languages

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

Technologies

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)

+ Likelihood Of Exploit
High
+ Demonstrative Examples

Example 1

This code attempts to generate a unique random identifier for a user's session.

(bad code)
Example Language: PHP 
function generateSessionID($userID){
srand($userID);
return rand();
}

Because the seed for the PRNG is always the user's ID, the session ID will always be the same. An attacker could thus predict any user's session ID and potentially hijack the session.

This example also exhibits a Small Seed Space (CWE-339).


Example 2

The following code uses a statistical PRNG to create a URL for a receipt that remains active for some period of time after a purchase.

(bad code)
Example Language: Java 
String GenerateReceiptURL(String baseUrl) {
Random ranGen = new Random();
ranGen.setSeed((new Date()).getTime());
return(baseUrl + ranGen.nextInt(400000000) + ".html");
}

This code uses the Random.nextInt() function to generate "unique" identifiers for the receipt pages it generates. Because Random.nextInt() is a statistical PRNG, it is easy for an attacker to guess the strings it generates. Although the underlying design of the receipt system is also faulty, it would be more secure if it used a random number generator that did not produce predictable receipt identifiers, such as a cryptographic PRNG.


+ Observed Examples
Reference Description
PHP framework uses mt_rand() function (Marsenne Twister) when generating tokens
Cloud application on Kubernetes generates passwords using a weak random number generator based on deployment time.
Crypto product uses rand() library function to generate a recovery key, making it easier to conduct brute force attacks.
Random number generator can repeatedly generate the same value.
Web application generates predictable session IDs, allowing session hijacking.
Password recovery utility generates a relatively small number of random passwords, simplifying brute force attacks.
Cryptographic key created with a seed based on the system time.
Kernel function does not have a good entropy source just after boot.
Blogging software uses a hard-coded salt when calculating a password hash.
Bulletin board application uses insufficiently random names for uploaded files, allowing other users to access private files.
Handheld device uses predictable TCP sequence numbers, allowing spoofing or hijacking of TCP connections.
Web management console generates session IDs based on the login time, making it easier to conduct session hijacking.
SSL library uses a weak random number generator that only generates 65,536 unique keys.
Chain: insufficient precision causes extra zero bits to be assigned, reducing entropy for an API function that generates random numbers.
Chain: insufficient precision (CWE-1339) in random-number generator causes some zero bits to be reliably generated, reducing the amount of entropy (CWE-331)
CAPTCHA implementation does not produce enough different images, allowing bypass using a database of all possible checksums.
DNS client uses predictable DNS transaction IDs, allowing DNS spoofing.
Application generates passwords that are based on the time of day.
+ Weakness Ordinalities
Ordinality Description
Primary
(where the weakness exists independent of other weaknesses)
+ Detection Methods

Black Box

Use monitoring tools that examine the software's process as it interacts with the operating system and the network. This technique is useful in cases when source code is unavailable, if the software was not developed by you, or if you want to verify that the build phase did not introduce any new weaknesses. Examples include debuggers that directly attach to the running process; system-call tracing utilities such as truss (Solaris) and strace (Linux); system activity monitors such as FileMon, RegMon, Process Monitor, and other Sysinternals utilities (Windows); and sniffers and protocol analyzers that monitor network traffic.

Attach the monitor to the process and look for library functions that indicate when randomness is being used. Run the process multiple times to see if the seed changes. Look for accesses of devices or equivalent resources that are commonly used for strong (or weak) randomness, such as /dev/urandom on Linux. Look for library or system calls that access predictable information such as process IDs and system time.

Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
  • Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Man-in-the-middle attack tool

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
  • Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

Effectiveness: High

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:
  • Source code Weakness Analyzer
  • Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:
  • Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

+ Functional Areas
  • Cryptography
  • Authentication
  • Session Management
+ Memberships
Section HelpThis MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 254 7PK - Security Features
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 723 OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A2 - Broken Access Control
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 747 CERT C Secure Coding Standard (2008) Chapter 14 - Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 753 2009 Top 25 - Porous Defenses
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 808 2010 Top 25 - Weaknesses On the Cusp
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 861 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 18 - Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 867 2011 Top 25 - Weaknesses On the Cusp
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 883 CERT C++ Secure Coding Section 49 - Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 905 SFP Primary Cluster: Predictability
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1152 SEI CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java - Guidelines 49. Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1169 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 14. Concurrency (CON)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1170 SEI CERT C Coding Standard - Guidelines 48. Miscellaneous (MSC)
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1346 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1366 ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols
MemberOf CategoryCategory - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. 1414 Comprehensive Categorization: Randomness
+ Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: DISCOURAGED

(this CWE ID should not be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)

Reason: Abstraction

Rationale:

This CWE entry is a level-1 Class (i.e., a child of a Pillar). It might have lower-level children that would be more appropriate

Comments:

Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit
+ Notes

Relationship

This can be primary to many other weaknesses such as cryptographic errors, authentication errors, symlink following, information leaks, and others.

Maintenance

As of CWE 4.3, CWE-330 and its descendants are being investigated by the CWE crypto team to identify gaps related to randomness and unpredictability, as well as the relationships between randomness and cryptographic primitives. This "subtree analysis" might result in the addition or deprecation of existing entries; the reorganization of relationships in some views, e.g. the research view (CWE-1000); more consistent use of terminology; and/or significant modifications to related entries.

Maintenance

As of CWE 4.5, terminology related to randomness, entropy, and predictability can vary widely. Within the developer and other communities, "randomness" is used heavily. However, within cryptography, "entropy" is distinct, typically implied as a measurement. There are no commonly-used definitions, even within standards documents and cryptography papers. Future versions of CWE will attempt to define these terms and, if necessary, distinguish between them in ways that are appropriate for different communities but do not reduce the usability of CWE for mapping, understanding, or other scenarios.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name
PLOVER Randomness and Predictability
7 Pernicious Kingdoms Insecure Randomness
OWASP Top Ten 2004 A2 CWE More Specific Broken Access Control
CERT C Secure Coding CON33-C Imprecise Avoid race conditions when using library functions
CERT C Secure Coding MSC30-C CWE More Abstract Do not use the rand() function for generating pseudorandom numbers
CERT C Secure Coding MSC32-C CWE More Abstract Properly seed pseudorandom number generators
WASC 11 Brute Force
WASC 18 Credential/Session Prediction
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) MSC02-J Generate strong random numbers
+ References
[REF-267] Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology. "SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULES". 2001-05-25. <https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/publications/fips/140/2/final/documents/fips1402.pdf>. URL validated: 2023-04-07.
[REF-207] John Viega and Gary McGraw. "Building Secure Software: How to Avoid Security Problems the Right Way". 1st Edition. Addison-Wesley. 2002.
[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 8, "Using Poor Random Numbers" Page 259. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04. <https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-44] Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 20: Weak Random Numbers." Page 299. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
+ Content History
+ Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
PLOVER
+ Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Background_Details, Relationships, Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
2008-11-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Description, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2009-03-10 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2009-05-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns
2009-12-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Description, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2010-04-05 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations
2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples
2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2011-09-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships
2014-02-18 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2014-06-23 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Detection_Factors
2015-12-07 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Functional_Areas, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References
2019-01-03 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Description, Relationships
2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Maintenance_Notes, Relationships
2021-07-20 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Maintenance_Notes, Observed_Examples
2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Relationships
2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description
2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-10-26 CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)
CWE Content Team MITRE
updated Mapping_Notes
+ Previous Entry Names
Change Date Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11 Randomness and Predictability
Page Last Updated: November 19, 2024