1.
Introduction to Computer Security
In collaboration with:
Prof. Leszek T. Lilien, Western Michigan University
Slides based on Security in Computing. Third Edition by Pfleeger and Pfleeger.
© by Bharat Bhargava, 2006
Requests to use original slides for non-profit purposes will be gladly granted upon a written
request.
Introduction to Security
Outline
1. Examples – Security in Practice
2. What is „Security?”
3. Pillars of Security:
Confidentiality, Integrity,
Availability (CIA)
4. Vulnerabilities, Threats, and Controls
5. Attackers
6. How to React to an Exploit?
7. Methods of Defense
8. Principles of Computer Security
2
Information hiding
Security
Applications Negotiation
Privacy
Integrity Access controlThreats
Data
provenance Biometrics
Semantic web security Fraud
Policy making
Trust
Computer epidemic Encryption
Data mining Anonymity
Formal models
System monitoring
Vulnerabilities Network security
3 [cf. Csilla Farkas, University of South Carolina]
1. Examples – Security in Practice
Barbara Edicott-Popovsky and Deborah Frincke, CSSE592/492, U. Washington]
From CSI/FBI Report 2002
90% detected computer security breaches within the last year
80% acknowledged financial losses
44% were willing and/or able to quantify their financial losses.
These 223 respondents reported $455M in financial losses.
The most serious financial losses occurred through theft of proprietary information and
financial fraud:
26 respondents: $170M
25 respondents: $115M
For the fifth year in a row, more respondents (74%) cited their Internet connection as a
frequent point of attack than cited their internal systems as a frequent point of attack (33%).
34% reported the intrusions to law enforcement. (In 1996, only 16% acknowledged
reporting intrusions to law enforcement.)
4
More from CSI/FBI 2002
40% detected external penetration
40% detected denial of service attacks.
78% detected employee abuse of Internet access privileges
85% percent detected computer viruses.
38% suffered unauthorized access or misuse on their Web
sites within the last twelve months. 21% didn’t know.
[includes insider attacks]
12% reported theft of transaction information.
6% percent reported financial fraud (only 3% in 2000).
[Barbara Edicott-Popovsky and Deborah Frincke, CSSE592/492, U. Washington]
5
Critical Infrastructure Areas
Include:
Telecommunications
Electrical power systems
Water supply systems
Gas and oil pipelines
Transportation
Government services
Emergency services
Banking and finance
…
6
2. What is a “Secure” Computer
System?
To decide whether a computer system is “secure”,
you must first decide what “secure” means to you,
then identify the threats you care about.
You Will Never Own a Perfectly Secure System!
Threats - examples
Viruses, trojan horses, etc.
Denial of Service
Stolen Customer Data
Modified Databases
Identity Theft and other threats to personal privacy
Equipment Theft
Espionage in cyberspace
Hack-tivism
Cyberterrorism
…
7
3. Basic Components of Security:
Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability
CIA (CIA)
Confidentiality: Who is authorized to use C I
data? S
Integrity: Is data „good?”
Availability: Can access data whenever need A
it?
S = Secure
CIA or CIAAAN…
(other security components added to CIA)
Authentication
Authorization
Non-repudiation
…
8
Need to Balance
CIA
Example 1: C vs. I+A
Disconnect computer from Internet to increase
confidentiality
Availability suffers, integrity suffers due to lost updates
Example 2: I vs. C+A
Have extensive data checks by different
people/systems to increase integrity
Confidentiality suffers as more people see data,
availability suffers due to locks on data under
verification)
9
Confidentiality
“Need to know” basis for data access
How do we know who needs what data?
Approach: access control specifies who can
access what
How do we know a user is the person she claims to be?
Need her identity and need to verify this identity
Approach: identification and authentication
Analogously: “Need to access/use” basis for
physical assets
E.g., access to a computer room, use of a desktop
Confidentiality is:
difficult to ensure
easiest to assess in terms of success (binary in nature:
10
Yes / No)
Integrity
Integrity vs. Confidentiality
Concerned with unauthorized modification of assets (=
resources)
Confidentiality - concered with access to assets
Integrity is more difficult to measure than confidentiality
Not binary – degrees of integrity
Context-dependent - means different things in different
contexts
Could mean any subset of these asset properties:
{ precision / accuracy / currency / consistency /
meaningfulness / usefulness / ...}
Types of integrity—an example
Quote from a politician
Preserve the quote (data integrity) but misattribute
(origin integrity)
11
Availability (1)
Not understood very well yet
„[F]ull implementation of availability is security’s
next challenge”
E.g. Full implemenation of availability for Internet
users (with ensuring security)
Complex
Context-dependent
Could mean any subset of these asset (data or
service) properties :
{ usefulness / sufficient capacity /
progressing at a proper pace /
completed in an acceptable period of
time / ...}
12
Availability (2)
We can say that an asset (resource) is
available if:
Timely request response
Fair allocation of resources (no starvation!)
Fault tolerant (no total breakdown)
Easy to use in the intended way
Provides controlled concurrency
(concurrency control, deadlock control, ...)
[Pfleeger
& Pfleeger]
13
4. Vulnerabilities, Threats, and
Controls
Understanding Vulnerabilities, Threats, and Controls
Vulnerability = a weakness in a security system
Threat = circumstances that have a potential to cause
harm
Controls = means and ways to block a threat, which
tries to exploit one or more vulnerabilities
Most of the class discusses various controls and their
effectiveness
[Pfleeger & Pfleeger]
Example - New Orleans disaster (Hurricane Katrina)
Q: What were city vulnerabilities, threats, and controls?
A: Vulnerabilities: location below water level, geographical
location in hurricane area, …
Threats: hurricane, dam damage, terrorist attack, …
Controls: dams and other civil infrastructures,
emergency response
14 plan, …
Attack (materialization of a vulnerability/threat
combination)
= exploitation of one or more vulnerabilities by a threat; tries
to defeat controls
Attack may be:
Successful (a.k.a. an exploit)
resulting in a breach of security, a system
penetration, etc.
Unsuccessful
when controls block a threat trying to exploit a
vulnerability
[Pfleeger & Pfleeger]
15
Threat Spectrum
Local threats
Recreational hackers
Institutional hackers
Shared threats
Organized crime
Industrial espionage
Terrorism
National security threats
National intelligence
Info warriors
16
Kinds of Threats
Kinds of threats:
Interception
an unauthorized party (human or not) gains
access to an asset
Interruption
an asset becomes lost, unavailable, or unusable
Modification
an unauthorized party changes the state of an
asset
Fabrication
an unauthorized party counterfeits an asset
[Pfleeger & Pfleeger]
Examples?
17
Levels of Vulnerabilities / Threats
(reversed order to illustrate interdependencies)
D) for other assets (resources)
including. people using data, s/w, h/w
C) for data
„on top” of s/w, since used by s/w
B) for software
„on top” of h/w, since run on h/w
A) for hardware
[Pfleeger & Pfleeger]
18
A) Hardware Level of Vulnerabilities /
Threats
Add / remove a h/w device
Ex: Snooping, wiretapping
Snoop = to look around a place secretly in order to discover
things about it or the people connected with it. [Cambridge
Dictionary of American English]
Ex: Modification, alteration of a system
...
Physical attacks on h/w => need physical security: locks
and guards
Accidental (dropped PC box) or voluntary (bombing a
computer room)
Theft / destruction
Damage the machine (spilled coffe, mice, real bugs)
Steal the machine
„Machinicide:” Axe / hammer the machine
...
19
Example of Snooping:
Wardriving / Warwalking,
Warchalking,
Wardriving/warwalking -- driving/walking
around with a wireless-enabled notebook
looking for unsecured wireless LANs
Warchalking -- using chalk markings to
show the presence and vulnerabilities of
wireless networks nearby
E.g., a circled "W” -- indicates a WLAN
protected by Wired Equivalent Privacy
(WEP) encryption
[Barbara Edicott-Popovsky and Deborah Frincke, CSSE592/492, U. Washington]
20
B) Software Level of Vulnerabilities /
Threats
Software Deletion
Easy to delete needed software by mistake
To prevent this: use configuration
management software
Software Modification
Trojan Horses, , Viruses, Logic Bombs,
Trapdoors, Information Leaks (via covert
channels), ...
Software Theft
Unauthorized copying
via P2P, etc.
21
Types of Malicious Code
Bacterium - A specialized form of virus which does not attach to a specific file. Usage obscure.
Logic bomb - Malicious [program] logic that activates when specified conditions are met.
Usually intended to cause denial of service or otherwise damage system resources.
Trapdoor - A hidden computer flaw known to an intruder, or a hidden computer mechanism
(usually software) installed by an intruder, who can activate the trap door to gain access to the
computer without being blocked by security services or mechanisms.
Trojan horse - A computer program that appears to have a useful function, but also has a
hidden and potentially malicious function that evades security mechanisms, sometimes by
exploiting legitimate authorizations of a system entity that invokes the program.
Virus - A hidden, self-replicating section of computer software, usually malicious logic, that
propagates by infecting (i.e., inserting a copy of itself into and becoming part of) another
program. A virus cannot run by itself; it requires that its host program be run to make the virus
active.
Worm - A computer program that can run independently, can propagate a complete working
version of itself onto other hosts on a network, and may consume computer resources
destructively.
More types of malicious code exist… [cf. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2828.txt]
22
C) Data Level of Vulnerabilities /
Threats
How valuable is your data?
Credit card info vs. your home phone number
Source code
Visible data vs. context
„2345” -> Phone extension or a part of SSN?
Adequate protection
Cryptography
Good if intractable for a long time
Threat of Identity Theft
Cf. Federal Trade Commission:
http://www.consumer.gov/idtheft/ \
23
Identity Theft
Cases in 2003:
Credit card skimmers plus drivers license, Florida
Faked social security and INS cards $150-$250
Used 24 aliases – used false id to secure credit
cards, open mail boxes and bank accounts, cash
fraudulently obtained federal income tax refund
checks, and launder the proceeds
Bank employee indicted for stealing depositors'
information to apply over the Internet for loans
$7M loss, Florida: Stole 12,000 cards from
restaurants via computer networks and social
engineering
Federal Trade Commission:
http://www.consumer.gov/idtheft/
[Barbara Edicott-Popovsky and Deborah Frincke, CSSE592/492, U. Washington]
24
Types of Attacks on Data CIA
Disclosure
Attack on data confidentiality
Unauthorized modification / deception
E.g., providing wrong data (attack on data integrity)
Disruption
DoS (attack on data availability)
Usurpation
Unauthorized use of services (attack on data confidentiality,
integrity or availability)
25
Ways of Attacking Data CIA
Examples of Attacks on Data Confidentiality
Tapping / snooping
Examples of Attacks on Data Integrity
Modification: salami attack -> little bits add up
E.g/ „shave off” the fractions of cents after interest calculations
Fabrication: replay data -> send the same thing again
E.g., a computer criminal replays a salary deposit to his
account
Examples of Attacks on Data Availability
Delay vs. „full” DoS
Examples of Repudiation Attacks on Data:
Data origin repudiation: „I never sent it”
Repudiation = refusal to acknowledge or pay a debt or honor a
contract (especially by public authorities).
[http://www.onelook.com]
26
Data receipt repudiation: „I never got it”
D) Vulnerab./Threats at Other
Exposure
Points
Network vulnerabilities / threats
Networks multiply vulnerabilties and threats, due to:
their complexity => easier to make
design/implem./usage mistakes
„bringing close” physically distant attackers
Esp. wireless (sub)networks
Access vulnerabilities / threats
Stealing cycles, bandwidth
Malicious physical access
Denial of access to legitimate users
People vulnerabilities / threats
Crucial weak points in security
too often, the weakest links in a security chain
Honest insiders subjected to skillful social engineering
Disgruntled employees
27
5. Attackers
Attackers need MOM
Method
Skill, knowledge, tools, etc. with which to pull off an
attack
Opportunity
Time and access to accomplish an attack
Motive
Reason to perform an attack
28
Types of Attackers
Types of Attackers - Classification 1
Amateurs
Opportunistic attackers (use a password they found)
Script kiddies
Hackers - nonmalicious
In broad use beyond security community: also malicious
Crackers – malicious
Career criminals
State-supported spies and information warriors
Types of Attackers - Classification 2 (cf. before)
Recreational hackers / Institutional hackers
Organized criminals / Industrial spies / Terrorists
National intelligence gatherers / Info warriors
29
Example: Hacking As Social
Protest
Hactivism
Electro-Hippies
DDOS attacks on government agencies
SPAM attacks as “retaliation”
[Barbara Edicott-Popovsky and Deborah Frincke, CSSE592/492, U. Washington]
30
New Internet
Attacks
High Packet Forging & Spoofing
Stealth Diagnotics
DDOS Sophistication of
Hacker Tools
Sweepers Sniffers
Hijacking Sessions
Back Doors
Self-Replicating Code Technical Knowledge
Required
Password Cracking
Password Guessing
Time
[Barbara Edicott-Popovsky and Deborah Frincke, CSSE592/492, U. Washington]
31
6. Reacting to an Exploit
Exploit = successful attack
Report to the vendor first?
Report it to the public?
What will be public relations effects if you do/do not?
Include source code / not include source code?
Etc.
32
“To Report or Not To Report:”
Tension between Personal
Privacy and Public
Responsibility
An info tech company will typically lose
between ten and one hundred times more
money from shaken consumer confidence
than the hack attack itself represents if they
decide to prosecute the case.
Mike Rasch, VP Global Security, testimony before
the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee,
February 2000 reported in The Register and online
testimony transcript
[Barbara Edicott-Popovsky and Deborah Frincke, CSSE592/492, U. Washington]
33
Further Reluctance to Report
One common fear is that a crucial piece of
equipment, like a main server, say, might be
impounded for evidence by over-zealous
investigators, thereby shutting the company
down.
Estimate: fewer than one in ten serious intrusions
are ever reported to the authorities.
Mike Rasch, VP Global Security, testimony before the Senate
Appropriations Subcommittee, February 2000
reported in The Register and online testimony transcript
Barbara Edicott-Popovsky and Deborah Frincke, CSSE592/492, U. Washington]
34
Computer Forensics
Against Computer Crime
Technology
Law Enforcement
Individual and Societal Rights
Judiciary
…
35
7. Methods of Defense
Five basic approaches to defense of
computing systems
Prevent attack
Block attack / Close vulnerability
Deter attack
Make attack harder (can’t make it
impossible )
Deflect attack
Make another target more attractive than
this target
Detect attack
During or after
36 Recover from attack
A) Controls
Castle in Middle Ages Computers Today
Location with natural Encryption
obstacles Software controls
Surrounding moat Hardware controls
Drawbridge Policies and
Heavy walls procedures
Arrow slits
Physical controls
Crenellations
Strong gate
Tower
Guards / passwords
37
Medieval castles
location (steep hill, island, etc.)
moat / drawbridge / walls / gate / guards /passwords
another wall / gate / guards /passwords
yet another wall / gate / guards /passwords
tower / ladders up
Multiple controls in computing systems can include:
system perimeter – defines „inside/outside”
preemption – attacker scared away
deterrence – attacker could not overcome defenses
faux environment (e.g. honeypot, sandbox) –
attack deflected towards a worthless target (but
the attacker doesn’t know about it!)
Note layered defense /
multilevel defense / defense in depth (ideal!)
38
A.1) Controls: Encryption
Primary controls!
Cleartext scambled into ciphertext (enciphered text)
Protects CIA:
confidentiality – by „masking” data
integrity – by preventing data updates
e.g., checksums included
availability – by using encryption-based protocols
e.g., protocols ensure availablity of resources for
different users
39
A.2) Controls: Software Controls
Secondary controls – second only to encryption
Software/program controls include:
OS and network controls
E.g. OS: sandbox / virtual machine
Logs/firewalls, OS/net virus scans, recorders
independent control programs (whole programs)
E.g. password checker, virus scanner, IDS (intrusion
detection system)
internal program controls (part of a program)
E.g. read/write controls in DBMSs
development controls
E.g. quality standards followed by developers
incl. testing
40
Considerations for Software Controls:
Impact on user’s interface and workflow
E.g. Asking for a password too often?
41
A.3) Controls: Hardware
Controls
Hardware devices to provide higher degree of
security
Locks and cables (for notebooks)
Smart cards, dongles, hadware keys, ...
...
42
A.4) Controls: Policies and
Procedures
Policy vs. Procedure
Policy: What is/what is not allowed
Procedure: How you enforce policy
Advantages of policy/procedure controls:
Can replace hardware/software controls
Can be least expensive
Be careful to consider all costs
E.g. help desk costs often ignored for for passwords (=> look
cheap but migh be expensive)
43
Policy - must consider:
Alignment with users’ legal and ethical standards
Probability of use (e.g. due to inconvenience)
Inconvenient: 200 character password,
change password every week
(Can be) good: biometrics replacing passwords
Periodic reviews
As people and systems, as well as their goals, change
44
A.5) Controls: Physical
Controls
Walls, locks
Guards, security cameras
Backup copies and archives
Cables an locks (e.g., for notebooks)
Natural and man-made disaster
protection
Fire, flood, and earthquake protection
Accident and terrorism protection
...
45
B) Effectiveness of Controls
Awareness of problem
People convined of the need for these controls
Likelihood of use
Too complex/intrusive security tools are often disabled
Overlapping controls
>1 control for a given vulnerability
To provide layered defense – the next layer compensates
for a failure of the previous layer
Periodic reviews
A given control usually becomess less effective with time
Need to replace ineffective/inefficient controls with better
ones
46
8. Principles of Computer Security
[Pfleeger and Pfleeger]
Principle of Easiest Penetration (p.5)
An intruder must be expected to use any
available means of penetration.
The penetration may not necessarily be by the most
obvious means, nor is it necessarily the one against
which the most solid defense has been installed.
Principle of Adequate Protection (p.16)
Computer items must be protected to a
degree consistent with their value and only
until they lose their value.
[modified by LL]
47
Principle of Effectiveness (p.26)
Controls must be used—and used properly—to be
effective.
They must be efficient, easy to use, and appropriate.
Principle of Weakest Link (p.27)
Security can be no stronger than its weakest link.
Whether it is the power supply that powers the firewall or
the operating system under the security application or
the human, who plans, implements, and administers
controls, a failure of any control can lead to a security
failure.
48
End of Section 1:
Introduction
