CS 259 2008

Key Exchange Protocols

J. Mitchell
Next few lectures
 Today 1/17
• Some possible projects
• Key exchange protocols and properties
 Tuesday 1/19
• Contract-signing protocols
• Choose project partner, topic?
 Next Thurs 1/24
• Wireless security: 802.11i
• Homework #1 due
 Tuesday 1/29
• Probabilistic model checking
 Project presentation #1 1/31
• One page, 1-2 slides on your project topic
Course projects
Choose a subject Choose a tool
 Network protocol  Murphi
• Wired networking (VoIP?) • Standard finite-state tool
• Wireless  PRISM
• Mobility • probabilistic checker
 Security system  MOCHA
• Tamper-proof chip • Games, temporal logic
• “Trusted computing”  Constraint solvers
 Privacy, security policy  Avispa tool set
• HIPAA  Prolog
• GLBA  Isabelle
• … • Automated theorem proving
Some project topics
 Add timestamps to Kerberos
 Group key handshake from 802.11i
 IPv6 binding update (already taken?)
 802.1af, DKIM, …
 TCG protocols register TPM to CA, …
 HIPAA, other privacy laws, GLBA, ...
 Voting machine, voting procedure
• election board “programs” election, votes
cast, counted, possibly recounted …
Send email or talk with us about choosing a project
Process
 Choose your project partner
• You can work alone, or with another person
 Chose a subject for your project
• Can be something already familiar
• Project presentation #1 at this point!
 Formulate an “abstraction” of system
• Separate relevant and irrelevant details
• Identify security properties of interest
 Choose a tool and method
 Complete your study. Success!
• Clear explanation of security goals
• Possible bugs or insecure configurations
• Identify proper, improper use
Key Management
 Out of band
• Can set up some keys this way (Kerberos)
 Public-key infrastructure (PKI)
• Leverage small # of public signing keys
 Protocols for session keys
• Generate short-lived session key
• Avoid extended use of important secret
• Don’t use same key for encryption and signing
• Forward secrecy

Cryptography reduces many problems to key

management
Public-Key Infrastructure
Known public signature verification
key Ka
Certificate
Certificate
Sign(Ka, Ks)
Authority
Ks

Client Sign(Ka, Ks), Sign(Ks, msg) Server

Server certificate can be verified

by any client that has CA key Ka
Certificate authority is “off line”
Key Distribution: Kerberos Idea
Shared symmetric key Kc

KeyCenter
} } Kc
{Kcs Ks
Kc s,
{ Shared
Client symmetri
{Kc c key Ks
s}
Ks {m
sg
}
Kcs
Server
Key Center generates session key Kcs and
distributes using shared long-term keys
Key Exchange
 Parties may have initial information
 Generate and agree on session key
• Authentication – know ID of other party
• Secrecy – key not known to any others
• Avoid replay attack
• Forward secrecy
• Avoid denial of service
• Identity protection – disclosure to others
• Other properties you can think of???
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
 Assume finite group G = S, 
• Generator g so every xS is x = gn
• Example: integers modulo prime p
 Protocol

ga mod p
A B

gb mod p
Alice, Bob share gab mod p not known to
anyone else
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

ga mod p
A B
gb mod p
Authentication?
Secrecy?
Replay attack
Forward secrecy?
Denial of service?
Identity protection?
IPSec: Network Layer
Security
 Authentication Header (AH)
• Access control and authenticate data origins
• replay protection
• No confidentiality
 Encapsulated Secure Payload (ESP)
• Encryption and/or authentication
 Internet Key Management (IKE)
• Determine and distribute secret keys
• Oakley + ISAKMP
• Algorithm independent
 Security policy database (SPD)
• discarded, or bypass
IKE: Many modes
 Main mode
• Authentication by pre-shared keys
• Auth with digital signatures
• Auth with public-key encryption
• Auth with revised public-key encryption
 Quick mode
• Compress number of messages
• Also four authentication options
Aug 2001 Position Statement
 In the several years since the standardization of
the IPSEC protocols (ESP, AH, and ISAKMP/IKE),
… several security problems…, most notably IKE.
 Formal and semi-formal analyses by Meadows,
Schneier et al, and Simpson, have shown …
security problems in IKE stem directly from its
complexity.
 It seems … only a matter of time before serious
*implementation* problems become apparent,
again due to the complex nature of the protocol,
and the complex implementation that must
surely follow.
 The Security Area Directors have asked the
IPSEC working group to come up with a
replacement for IKE.
How to study complex
protocol
General Problem in Security
 Divide-and-conquer is fundamental
• Decompose system requirements into parts
• Develop independent software modules
• Combine modules to produce required
system

 Common belief:
• Security properties do not compose

Difficult system development problem

Example protocol

Protocol P1
A  B : {message}KB

A  B : KA-1

 This satisfies basic requirements

• Message is transmitted under encryption
• Revealing secret key KA-1 does not reveal
message
Similar protocol
Protocol P2
B  A : {message’}KA

B  A : KB-1

 Transmits msg securely from B to A

• Message is transmitted under encryption
• Revealing secret key KB-1 does not reveal
message
Composition P1; P2
 Sequential composition of two protocols
A  B : {message}KB

A  B : KA-1
B  A : {message’}KA

B  B : KB-1

 Definitely not secure

• Eavesdropper learns both keys, decrypts
messages
 STS family

cookie
STS0 STS0H

distribute
certificates
open
responder
STSa STSaH JFK0

m=gx, n=gy
k=gxy

STS STSH JFK1

protect
identities

STSP STSPH JFK

symmetric
hash
RFK
Example
 Construct protocol with properties:
• Shared secret
• Authenticated
• Identity Protection
• DoS Protection
 Design requirements for IKE, JFK,
IKEv2 (IPSec key exchange
protocol)
Component 1
 Diffie-Hellman
A  B: ga
B  A: gb

• Shared secret (with someone)

– A deduces:
Knows(Y, gab)  (Y = A) ۷
Knows(Y,b)
• Authenticated
• Identity Protection
• DoS Protection
Component 2
 Challenge Response:
A  B: m, A
B  A: n, sigB {m, n, A}
A  B: sigA {m, n, B}

• Shared secret (with someone)

• Authenticated
– A deduces: Received (B, msg1) Λ Sent (B, msg2)
• Identity Protection
• DoS Protection
 m := ga
Composition n := gb

 ISO 9798-3 protocol:

A  B: ga, A
B  A: gb, sigB {ga, gb, A}
A  B: sigA {ga, gb, B}

• Shared secret: gab

• Authenticated
• Identity Protection
• DoS Protection
Refinement
 Encrypt signatures:
A  B: ga, A
B  A: gb, EK {sigB {ga, gb, A}}
A  B: EK {sigA {ga, gb, B}}

• Shared secret: gab

• Authenticated
• Identity Protection
• DoS Protection
Transformation
 Use cookie: JFK core protocol
A  B: ga, A
B  A: gb, hashKB {gb, ga}
A  B: ga, gb, hashKB {gb, ga}
EK {sigA {ga, gb, B}}
B  A: gb, EK {sigB {ga, gb, A}}
• Shared secret: gab
• Authenticated
• Identity Protection
• DoS Protection

(Here B must store b in step 2, but we’ll fix this later…)

Cookie transformation
 Typical protocol
• Client sends request to server
• Server sets up connection, responds
• Client may complete session or not (DOS)
 Cookie version
• Client sends request to server
• Server sends hashed data back
– Send message #2 later after client confirms
• Client confirms by returning hashed data
• Need extra step to send postponed message
Cookie in JFK
 Protocol susceptible to DOS
A  B: ga, A eh1

B  A: gb, EK {sigB {ga, gb, A}}

A  B: EK {sigA {ga, gb, B}}
eh2
 Use cookie: JFK core protocol
A  B: ga, A
B  A: gb, hashKB {gb, ga}
A  B: ga, gb, hashKB {gb, ga}, eh2
B  A: gb, eh1
Efficiency: Reuse D-H key
 Costly to compute ga, gb, gab
 Solution
• Keep medium-term ga, gb (change ~10 min)
• Replace ga by pair ga, nonce
 JFKi, JFKr protocols (except cert or grpinfo, …)
A  B: Na, ga, A
B  A: Nb, gb, hashKB {Nb, Na, gb, ga}
A  B: Na, Nb, ga, gb, hashKB {Nb, Na, gb, ga},
EK {sigA {Na, Nb, ga, gb, B}}
B  A: gb, EK {sigB {Na, Nb, ga, gb, A}}
Note: B does not need to store any short-term data in step 2
Conclusion
 Many protocol properties
• Authentication Secrecy
• Prevent replay Forward secrecy
• Denial of service Identity protection
 Systematic understanding is possible
• But be careful; easy to make mistakes
• State of the art:
need to analyze complete protocol