Risk Analysis
Risk Analysis
Introductory session
Coverage
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Risk: What is it?
OR
Risk Assessment
Mitigation Risk
requires requires
assessment mitigation
Risk Management
Evaluate recommendations
Decisionmaking against current environment
and values to select an option.
Benefits of Risk
Analysis
Justify and defend decisions
Evaluate decisions of others
Prioritize resources
View risk objectively and
realistically
Identify research and information
needs
Identify technical points of
difference
Important
Linkages
Policy makers
Regulators
Researchers
Civil society
Introduction
Risk Analysis and Management
Framework
Assets Threats Vulnerabilities
Risks
} Analysis
threat
Attack: A threatening event
Attacker: The agent causing an attack (not
necessarily human)
Vulnerability: a weakness in the system
Types of asset
Hardware
Software: purchased or developed programs
Data
People: who run the system
Documentation: manuals, administrative procedures, etc
Supplies: paper forms, magnetic media, printer liquid,
etc
Money
Intangibles
Goodwill
Organisation confidence
Organisation image
Risk Analysis – Impact Valuation
an activity
Accept it and do nothing
Lack of precision
Volume of work and volume of output
Integrating them into a ”normal”
development process
CURRENT RISK
MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES
Risk Management Techniques 1
Commercial tools
Mostly rely on check lists
CRAMM (CCTA Risk Assessment and Management Methodology):
UK Government approach
Supported by software
PROTEUS (BSI) software:
Gap analysis to identify necessary actions and
existing strengths
Comprehensive practical guidance and the text of
BS 7799
Reporting, for easy monitoring and maintenance
Evidence to customers and auditors
Risk Management Techniques 2
Generic processes
Threat trees (see below):
Threat analysis
Based on fault trees
Only addresses the threat identification stage
Attack trees (see below)
Vulnerability analysis
Threat Trees 1
AT&T Bell Laboratories
Categorisation of threats
Disclosure / Integrity / Denial of service
Categorisation of vulnerabilities by view
Personnel view
Physical view
Operational view
Communications view
Network view
Computing view
Information view
[Amoroso, E., W.E. Kleppinger, and D. Majette, An
Engineering Approach to Secure System Analysis, Design
and Integration. AT&T Technical Journal, 1994. 73(5): p.
40-51.]
Threat Trees 2
Model of system
Calculate risks from
Impact Threats to
Electronic Mail
Vulnerability
Message
Originato Handling Recipient
r R Disclosure Integrity Denial of
M Service
O
Other
Subscriber
s
S
External O R M S E O R M S E O R M S E
Electronic E
Mail
System
Attack Trees
Tree Structure
Goal is root node
Ways of achieving goals are leaf nodes
Costs can be associated with nodes