Today's Security Professional
Today's Security Professional
Chapter 1
OBJECTIVES COVERED
Level of sophistication/
Internal vs. external
capability
Characteristics that
differentiate cybersecurity
threat actors
Resources/funding Intent/motivation
THREAT ACTORS
Script Kiddies
• A derogatory term for people who use hacking
techniques but have limited skills
• Script kiddies can be a real threat because simplistic
hacking tools are freely available on the Internet and
they are plentiful and unfocused in their work
Hacktivists
• People who use hacking techniques to accomplish
some activist goal.
• The motivations, skill levels, and resources of
hacktivists vary widely.
• There are some organized groups of hacktivists, such
as the hacking group Anonymous.
CRIMINAL SYNDICATES
Cyber-dependent crime
Cybercrime categories
Child sexual exploitation
Payment fraud
Dark web
Terrorism
Political Economic
Motivation Motivation
INSIDERS
Direct Access
Wireless Networks
Removable Media
Cloud
Third-Party Risks
THREAT DATA AND
INTELLIGENCE
OPEN-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE
PROPRIETARY AND CLOSED-SOURCE
INTELLIGENCE
ASSESSING THREAT INTELLIGENCE
STIX
TAXII OpenIOC
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INFORMATION
SHARING CENTERS
<INSERT FIGURE
1.2 FROM BOOK
WHEN
AVAILABLE>
BREACH IMPACT
Financial
Risk
Reputational Strategic
Risk Risk
Operational Compliance
Risk Risk
IMPLEMENTING SECURITY
CONTROLS
SECURITY CONTROL CATEGORIES
Preventive Detective
controls controls
Corrective Deterrent
controls controls
Compensating
Physical controls
controls
DATA PROTECTION
THREE STATES
Data at rest
Data in Data in
processing motion
DATA PROTECTION
Data Protection
Data
Host-based DLP
obfuscation
Pattern
matching Tokenization
Watermarking Masking
Cybersecurity Threat Landscape
Chapter 2
OBJECTIVES COVERED
Level of sophistication/
Internal vs. external
capability
Characteristics that
differentiate cybersecurity
threat actors
Resources/funding Intent/motivation
THREAT ACTORS
Script Kiddies
• A derogatory term for people who use hacking
techniques but have limited skills
• Script kiddies can be a real threat because simplistic
hacking tools are freely available on the Internet and
they are plentiful and unfocused in their work
Hacktivists
• People who use hacking techniques to accomplish
some activist goal.
• The motivations, skill levels, and resources of
hacktivists vary widely.
• There are some organized groups of hacktivists, such
as the hacking group Anonymous.
CRIMINAL SYNDICATES
Cyber-dependent crime
Cybercrime categories
Child sexual exploitation
Payment fraud
Dark web
Terrorism
Political Economic
Motivation Motivation
INSIDERS
Direct Access
Wireless Networks
Removable Media
Cloud
Third-Party Risks
THREAT DATA AND
INTELLIGENCE
OPEN-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE
PROPRIETARY AND CLOSED-SOURCE
INTELLIGENCE
ASSESSING THREAT INTELLIGENCE
STIX
TAXII OpenIOC
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INFORMATION
SHARING CENTERS
Chapter 3
OBJECTIVES COVERED
Ransomware
• A kind of malware that takes over a computer then demands
a ransom.
• An effective backup system that stores files in a separate
location will not be impacted if the system or device it backs
up is infected and encrypted by ransomware.
Trojans
• A type of malware that is typically disguised as legitimate
software.
• They rely on unsuspecting individuals running them, thus
providing attackers with a path into a system or device.
MALWARE
Worms
• Self-install and spread themselves.
• Worms can spread via email attachments, network file
shares, or other methods.
Rootkits
• Specifically designed to allow attackers to access a system
through a backdoor.
• The best ways to prevent rootkits are normal security
practices, including patching, use of secure configurations,
and ensuring that privilege management is used.
• Tools like secure boot and techniques that can validate live
systems and files can also be used to help prevent rootkits
from being successfully installed or remaining resident.
MALWARE
Backdoors
• Provide access that bypasses normal authentication and
authorization procedures, allowing attackers access to
systems, devices, or applications.
• Can be both hardware and software based; can be included
in Trojans and rootkits.
Bots
• Are remotely controlled systems or devices that have a
malware infection.
• Groups of bots are known as botnets, and botnets are used
by attackers who control them to perform various actions
ranging from additional compromises and infection to denial
of service attacks or acting as spam relays.
CLIENT/SERVER BOTNET CONTROL
MODEL
PEER TO PEER BOTNET CONTROL MODEL
MALWARE
Keyloggers
• Are programs that capture keystrokes from keyboards to
capture user input to be analyzed and used by an attacker.
• Preventing software keylogging typically focuses on normal
security best practices to ensure that malware containing a
keylogger is not installed.
Logic bombs
• Are functions or code that are placed inside of other
programs that will activate when set conditions are met.
• Logic bombs are a consideration in software development
and systems management and can have a significant impact
if they successfully activate.
MALWARE
Viruses
• Are malicious programs that self-copy and self-replicate.
• Viruses come in many varieties, including: Memory resident
viruses, non-memory resident, boot sector viruses, macro
viruses, email viruses.
Fileless virus
• Spread via methods like spam email and malicious websites
and exploit flaws in browser plugins and web browsers
themselves.
FILELESS VIRUS ATTACK CHAIN
MALWARE
Spyware
• A kind of malware that is designed to obtain information
about an individual, organization, or system.
• Spyware is most frequently combated using anti-malware
tools, although user awareness can help prevent the
installation of spyware that is included in installers for
software or through other means where spyware may
appear to be a useful tool or innocuous utility.
PUPs
• PUPs are typically installed without the user’s awareness or
as part of a software bundle or other installation.
• A discussion around awareness and best practices with the
end-user, removal with appropriate tools, and a return to
normal operation may be the best solution.
MALICIOUS CODE
MALICIOUS CODE
PowerShell Macros
Target for
malicious
actors
(Windows
System)
ADVERSARIAL ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE
ADVERSARIAL ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
• Basic Actions
• Understand the quality and security of source
data.
• Work with AI and ML developers to ensure
that they are working in secure environments
and that data sources, systems, and tools are
maintained in a secure manner.
• Ensure that changes to AI and ML algorithms
are reviewed, tested, and documented.
• Encourage reviews to prevent intentional or
unintentional bias in algorithms.
• Engage domain experts wherever possible.
Social Engineering, Physical, and
Password Attacks
Chapter 4
OBJECTIVES COVERED
Scarcity Trust
Urgency Familiarity
SOCIAL ENGINEERING TECHNIQUES
Phishing
Credential harvesting
Website attacks
Spam
In-person techniques
Identity fraud and impersonation
Reconnaissance
PASSWORD ATTACKS
CRITICAL PASSWORD RELATED ATTACK
Dictionary attacks
JOHN THE RIPPER
PHYSICAL ATTACKS
PHYSICAL ATTACKS
Common examples
Malicious USB cables
Chapter 5
OBJECTIVES COVERED
• Sample questions
• What is the data classification of the
information stored, processed, or transmitted
by the system?
• Is the system exposed to the Internet or other
public or semipublic networks?
• What services are offered by the system?
• Is the system a production, test, or
development system?
QUALYS ASSET MAP
DETERMINING SCAN FREQUENCY
Risk appetite
Licensing Regulatory
limitations requirements
Business Technical
constraints constraints
CONFIGURING A NESSUS SCAN
SAMPLE NESSUS SCAN REPORT
CONFIGURING VULNERABILITY SCANS
Scan Perspective
NESSUS SCAN TEMPLATES
DISABLING UNUSED PLUG-INS
CONFIGURING CREDENTIALED
SCANNING
CHOOSING A SCAN APPLIANCE
SCANNER SOFTWARE
VULNERABILITY PLUG-IN FEEDS
VULNERABILITY SCANNING TOOLS
Infrastructure Web
Application
Vulnerability Application
Scanning
Scanning Scanning
Tenable’s
Static testing Nikto
Nessus
Qualys’s
Dynamic
vulnerability Arachni
testing
scanner
Rapid7’s Interactive
Nexpose testing
OpenVAS
NIKTO WEB APPLICATION SCANNER
ARACHNI WEB APPLICATION SCANNER
REVIEWING & INTERPRETING
SCAN REPORTS
REVIEWING & INTERPRETING
SCAN REPORTS
UNDERSTANDING CVSS
VALUE DESCRIPTION
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Log reviews
Security
Configuration information
management and event
systems management
(SIEM) systems
SECURITY VULNERABILITIES
PATCH MANAGEMENT
LEGACY PLATFORMS
WEAK CONFIGURATIONS
1
Penetration testing provides us with
knowledge that we can’t obtain elsewhere.
2
In the event that attackers are successful,
penetration testing provides us with an
important blueprint for remediation.
3
Penetration tests can provide us with
essential, focused information on specific
attack targets.
PENETRATION TEST TYPES
Initial access
Privilege
escalation
Pivoting (lateral
movement)
Persistence
TRAINING AND EXERCISES
TRAINING AND EXERCISES
Chapter 6
OBJECTIVES COVERED
Analysis and
Feasibility requirements Design
definition
Ongoing
operations & Disposition
maintenance
SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT MODELS
Waterfall
Agile Spiral
THE WATERFALL SDLC MODEL
THE SPIRAL SDLC MODEL
AGILE SPRINTS
DEVSECOPS AND DEVOPS
DevSecOps
DevOps
CONTINUOUS INTEGRATION AND
CONTINUOUS DEPLOYMENT
DESIGNING AND CODING
FOR SECURITY
SECURE CODING PRACTICES
Pair Programming
Over-the-Shoulder
Tool-Assisted Reviews
Fagan Inspection
CODE REVIEW METHOD COMPARISON
FAGAN CODE REVIEW
SOFTWARE SECURITY
TESTING
ANALYZING AND TESTING CODE
Dynamic
Static code
code Fuzzing
analysis
analysis
INJECTION VULNERABILITIES
INJECTION VULNERABILITIES
Directory Traversal
File Inclusion
Privilege Escalation
DIRECTORY TRAVERSAL
Web-based exploits
Cross-Site Scripting
Request Forgery
(XSS)
Cross-Site Request
Reflected XSS
Forgery (CSRF/XSRF)
Server-Side Request
Stored/Persistent XSS
Forgery (SSRF)
STORED/PERSISTENT XSS
• Message board post rendered in a browser
Web Application
Input Validation
Firewalls
Database
Code Security
Security
WEB APPLICATION FIREWALL
DATABASE SECURITY
• Normalization
• Prevent data inconsistency
• Prevent update anomalies
• Reduce the need for restructuring existing
databases, and
• Make the database schema more informative
• Parameterized Queries
• Obfuscation and Camouflauge
• Data minimization
• Tokenization
• Hashing
CODE SECURITY
• Code Signing
• Code Reuse
• Software Diversity
• Code Repositories
• Integrity Measurement
• Application Resilience
• Scalability
• Elasticity
SECURE CODING PRACTICES
SECURE CODING PRACTICES
• Resource Exhaustion
• Pointer Dereferencing
• Buffer Overflows
• CVE 1999-1058: Buffer overflow in Vermillion
FTP Daemon
• CVE 2001-0876: Buffer overflow in Universal
Plug and Play (UPnP) on Windows 98, 98SE,
ME, and XP
• CVE 2002-0126: Buffer overflow in
BlackMoon FTP Server 1.0 through 1.5
• CVE 2003-0818: Multiple integer overflows in
Microsoft ASN.1 library
Cryptography and the Public Key
Infrastructure
Chapter 7
OBJECTIVES COVERED
Substitution Ciphers
Polyalphabetic Substitution
Transposition Ciphers
Steganography
VIGENÈRE CIPHER TABLE
TRANSPOSITION CIPHERS
THE ENIGMA MACHINE
OPENSTEGO STEGANOGRAPHY TOOL
GOALS OF CRYPTOGRAPHY
GOALS OF CRYPTOGRAPHY
Confidentiality Integrity
Authentication Nonrepudiation
CONFIDENTIALITY
Block ciphers
Stream ciphers
SYMMETRIC ASYMMETRIC
Single shared key Key pair sets
Out-of-band exchange In-band exchange
Not scalable Scalable
Fast Slow
Bulk encryption Small blocks of data, digital
signatures, digital certificates
Confidentiality, integrity Confidentiality, integrity,
authentication, nonrepudiation
SYMMETRIC
CRYPTOGRAPHY
DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD
Counter Mode
TRIPLE DES
DES-EE3 E(K1,E(K2,E(K3,P)))
DES-EDE3 E(K1,D(K2,E(K3,P)))
DES-EEE2 E(K1,E(K2,E(K1,P)))
DES-EDE2 E(K1,D(K2,E(K1,P)))
ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD
MD5
• Processes 512-bit blocks of the message
• Has been demonstrated that MD5 protocol is subject to
collisions, preventing its use for ensuring message integrity
DIGITAL SIGNATURES
TWO DISTINCT GOALS
Certificate
authorities (CAs) Registration
authorities (RAs)
CERTIFICATE GENERATION AND
DESTRUCTION
• Enrollment
• Verification
• The digital signature of the CA is authentic
• You trust the CA
• The certificate is not listed on a CRL
• The certificate actually contains the data you are
trusting
• Revocation
• Certificate Revocation Lists
• Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
• Certificate Stapling
CERTIFICATE FORMATS
Brute Force
Frequency Analysis
Known Plain Text
Chosen Plain Text
Related Key Attack
Downgrade Attack
Rainbow Tables, Hashing, and Salting
Exploiting Weak Keys
Exploiting Human Error
EMERGING ISSUES IN
CRYPTOGRAPHY
EMERGING ISSUES IN CRYPTOGRAPHY
Lightweight Homomorphic
Cryptography Encryption
Quantum
Computing
Identity and Access Management
Chapter 8
OBJECTIVES COVERED
Certificates
identity
Tokens
SSH keys
Smart cards
AUTHENTICATION AND
AUTHORIZATION
AUTHENTICATION TECHNOLOGIES
Kerberos
CHAP CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE
SEQUENCE
802.1 AUTHENTICATION ARCHITECTURE
WITH EAP, RADIUS, AND LDAP
KERBEROS AUTHENTICATION PROCESS
CLOUD AUTHENTICATION AND
AUTHORIZATION
OpenID
Security
Assertions
Markup OAuth
Language
(SAML)
Core
technologies
FEDERATION
Something you
know
Something Something
you are you have
A TITAN KEY USB SECURITY KEY
ONE TIME PASSWORDS
Time-based one-
time passwords HMAC-based one-
(TOTP) time password
(HOTP)
GOOGLE AUTHENTICATOR SHOWING
TOTP CODE GENERATION
A HOTP PAYPAL TOKEN
BIOMETRICS
Fingerprints
Retina scanning
Iris recognition
Facial recognition
Voice recognition
Vein recognition
Gait analysis
BIOMETRICS
MANAGING AUTHENTICATION
Password Password
key vaults
Trusted
Hardware
Platform
Security
Module
Modules
standard
(HSMs)
(TPM)
ACCOUNTS
ACCOUNT TYPES
User accounts
Guest accounts
Service accounts
ACCOUNT POLICIES AND CONTROLS
Password
Complexity
Account
Password
policies & The time of day
lifespan
controls
The network
Other
location of the
information
system
Geolocation
data
ACCESS CONTROL SCHEMES
COMMON ACCESS CONTROL SCHEMES
Chapter 9
OBJECTIVES COVERED
RAID
Copy of the live storage system
Snapshot
Images
VDI
Copies of individual files
Backup media
Online backups
Offsite or on-site storage
RAID
RAID Description Description Advantage Disadvantage
RAID 0 – Striping Data is spread across all drives Better I/O performance (speed), Not fault tolerant – all
in the array all capacity used data lost if a drive is lost
RAID 1 – Mirroring All data copied exactly to High read speeds from multiple Uses twice the storage
another drive or drives drives, data available if a drive for the same amount of
fails data
RAID 5 – Striping with parity Data is striped across drives, Data reads are fast, data writes Can only tolerate a
with one drive used for parity are slightly slower. single drive failure at a
(checksum) of the data. Parity is time.
spread across drives as well as Drive failures can be rebuilt as
data. long as only one drive fails. Rebuilding arrays after a
drive loss can be slow
and impact performance.
RAID 6 – Striping with double Like RAID 5, but additional Like RAID 5, but allows for Slower write
parity parity stored on another drive. more than once drive to fail at a performance than RAID
time. 5 as the additional parity
data is managed.
RAID 10 – mirroring and Data is striped across 2 or more Combines the advantages and Combines the
striping drives and then mirrored to the disadvantages of both RAID 0 advantages and
same number of drives and RAID 1. disadvantages of both
RAID 0 and RAID 1.
COMMON BACKUP MEDIA
Tape Disks
Optical Flash
media media
CONSIDERATIONS FOR THIRD PARTY
BACKUP OPTIONS
Bandwidth requirements
Reliability
Vertical scalability
requires a larger or
Horizontal scaling uses
more powerful
smaller systems or
system or device
devices but adds more
of them
THREE MAJOR TYPES OF DISASTER
RECOVERY SITES
Hot sites
Industrial
Fences
camouflage
Bollards Lighting
Fire suppression
Badges Alarms
systems
Shredding Can be done on-site, can support Traditional paper shredders may
paper or devices using an industrial allow for recovery of documents,
shredder. even from cross-cut shredded
documents. For high security
environments, burning or pulping
may be required.
Pulverizing Breaks devices down into very The size of the output material can
small pieces, preventing recovery. determine the potential for recovery
of data, typically pulverizing results
in very small fragments of material.
Degaussing Magnetically wipes data from tapes Only effective on magnetic media,
and traditional hard magnetic media will not work on SSDs, flash media,
hard drives. optical media, or paper.
Cloud and Virtualization Security
Chapter 10
OBJECTIVES COVERED
Scalability
Elasticity
Measured service
Cloud consumers
Cloud partners
Cloud auditors
Cloud carriers
CLOUD SERVICE MODELS
Infrastructure
as a Service
(IaaS)
Platform as a Software as
Service a Service
(PaaS) (SaaS)
ACCESS SAAS THROUGH
A THIN CLIENT DEVICE
AWS LAMBDA FUNCTION
A SERVICE ENVIRONMENT
AWS LAMBDA FUNCTION
A SERVICE ENVIRONMENT
Public Private
Cloud Cloud
Community Hybrid
Cloud Cloud
EXAMPLE OF COMMUNITY CLOUD
COMPUTING - HATHITRUST
AWS OUTPOSTS OFFER
HYBRID CLOUD CAPABILITY
SHARED RESPONSIBILITY MODEL
CLOUD STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES
CLOUD STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES
VIRTUALIZATION
HYPERVISORS - TYPE I HYPERVISOR
HYPERVISORS - TYPE II HYPERVISOR
CLOUD INFRASTRUCTURE
COMPONENTS
PROVISIONING A VIRTUALIZED SERVER
IN AWS
CONNECTING TO AN AWS VIRTUAL
SERVER INSTANCE WITH SSH
CONNECTING TO AN AWS VIRTUAL
SERVER INSTANCE WITH RDP
CLOUD STORAGE RESOURCES
Block storage
Object storage
AWS ELASTIC BLOCK STORAGE (EBS)
VOLUMES
AWS SIMPLE STORAGE SERVICE (S3)
BUCKET
THREE KEY SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
Set permissions
properly
Consider high
Use encryption
availability and
to protect
durability
sensitive data
options
ENABLING FULL-DISK ENCRYPTION ON
AN EBS VOLUME
CLOUD NETWORKING
– SECURITY GROUP
CLOUD NETWORKING
VIRTUAL PRIVATE CLOUD (VPC)
CREATING AN EC2 INSTANCE WITH
CLOUDFORMATION JSON
CLOUD SECURITY ISSUES
CLOUD SECURITY ISSUES
Availability
Data Sovereignty
Virtualization Security
Application Security
API-based CASB
Inline CASB solutions
solutions
CLOUD SECURITY CONTROLS
Resource Policies
Secrets Management