Chapter 8: Network Security

Chapter goals:
 understand principles of network security:
 cryptography and its many uses beyond
“confidentiality”
 authentication
 message integrity

 security in practice:
 firewalls and intrusion detection systems
 security in application, transport, network, link
layers

8: Network Security 8-2

Chapter 8 roadmap

8.1 What is network security?

8.2 Principles of cryptography
8.3 Message integrity
8.4 End point authentication
8.5 Securing e-mail
8.6 Securing TCP connections: SSL
8.7 Network layer security: IPsec
8.8 Securing wireless LANs
8.9 Operational security: firewalls and IDS
8: Network Security 8-3
What is network security?
Network Security protects your network and data from
breaches, intrusions and other threats.
Confidentiality: only sender, intended receiver
should “understand” message contents
 sender encrypts message
 receiver decrypts message

Authentication: sender, receiver want to confirm

identity of each other
Message integrity: sender, receiver want to ensure
message not altered (in transit, or afterwards)
without detection
Access and availability: services must be accessible
and available to users 8: Network Security 8-4
Friends and enemies: Alice, Bob, Trudy
 well-known in network security world
 Bob, Alice (lovers!) want to communicate “securely”
 Trudy (intruder) may intercept, delete, add messages

Alice Bob
data, control
channel
messages

data secure secure data

sender receiver

Trudy
8: Network Security 8-5
Who might Bob, Alice be?
 … well, real-life Bobs and Alices!
 Web browser/server for electronic
transactions (e.g., on-line purchases)
 on-line banking client/server
 DNS servers
 routers exchanging routing table updates
 other examples?

8: Network Security 8-6

There are bad guys (and girls) out there!
Q: What can a “bad guy” do?
A: a lot!
 eavesdrop: intercept messages
 actively insert messages into connection
 impersonation: can fake (spoof) source address
in packet (or any field in packet)
 hijacking: “take over” ongoing connection by
removing sender or receiver, inserting himself
in place
 denial of service: prevent service from being
used by others (e.g., by overloading resources)
more on this later ……
8: Network Security 8-7
Chapter 8 roadmap

8.1 What is network security?

8.2 Principles of cryptography
8.3 Message integrity
8.4 End point authentication
8.5 Securing e-mail
8.6 Securing TCP connections: SSL
8.7 Network layer security: IPsec
8.8 Securing wireless LANs
8.9 Operational security: firewalls and IDS
8: Network Security 8-8
The language of cryptography
Alice’s Bob’s
K encryption K decryption
A
key B key

plaintext encryption ciphertext decryption plaintext

algorithm algorithm

symmetric key crypto: sender, receiver keys identical

public-key crypto: encryption key public, decryption key
secret (private)
8: Network Security 8-9
Symmetric key cryptography
substitution cipher: substituting one thing for another
 monoalphabetic cipher: substitute one letter for another

plaintext: abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz

ciphertext: mnbvcxzasdfghjklpoiuytrewq

E.g.: Plaintext: bob. i love you. alice

ciphertext: nkn. s gktc wky. mgsbc

Q: How hard to break this simple cipher?:

 brute force (how hard?)
 other?

8: Network Security 8-10

 Symmetric key cryptography

KA-B KA-B

plaintext encryption ciphertext decryption plaintext

message, m algorithm algorithm
K (m)
A-B
m=K ( KA-B(m) )
A-B

symmetric key crypto: Bob and Alice share know same

(symmetric) key: K
A-B
 e.g., key is knowing substitution pattern in mono
alphabetic substitution cipher
 Q: how do Bob and Alice agree on key value?

8: Network Security 8-11

Symmetric key crypto: DES
DES: Data Encryption Standard
 US encryption standard [NIST 1993]
 56-bit symmetric key, 64-bit plaintext input
 How secure is DES?
 DES Challenge: 56-bit-key-encrypted phrase
(“Strong cryptography makes the world a safer
place”) decrypted (brute force) in 4 months
 no known “backdoor” decryption approach
 making DES more secure:
 use three keys sequentially (3-DES) on each datum
 use cipher-block chaining

8: Network Security 8-12

Symmetric key
crypto: DES
DES operation
initial permutation
16 identical “rounds” of
function application,
each using different
48 bits of key
final permutation

8: Network Security 8-13

AES: Advanced Encryption Standard

 new (Nov. 2001) symmetric-key NIST

standard, replacing DES
 processes data in 128 bit blocks
 128, 192, or 256 bit keys
 brute force decryption (try each key)
taking 1 sec on DES, takes 149 trillion
years for AES

8: Network Security 8-14

Block Cipher
64-bit input

8bits 8bits 8bits 8bits 8bits 8bits 8bits 8bits

loop for
n rounds
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8

8 bits 8 bits 8 bits 8 bits 8 bits 8 bits 8 bits 8 bits

 one pass
64-bit scrambler
through: one
input bit
affects eight 64-bit output

output bits
 multiple passes: each input bit afects all output bits
 block ciphers: DES, 3DES, AES

8: Network Security 8-15

Cipher Block Chaining
 cipher block: if input m(1) = “HTTP/1.1” c(1) = “k329aM02”
t=1 block
block repeated, will cipher
produce same cipher …
m(17) = “HTTP/1.1” c(17) = “k329aM02”
t=17 block
text: cipher
 cipher block chaining: XOR ith
input block, m(i), with previous
block of cipher text, c(i-1) m(i)
 c(0) transmitted to receiver in

+
clear
 what happens in “HTTP/1.1” c(i-1)
scenario from above?

block
cipher

c(i)
8: Network Security 8-16
Public key cryptography

symmetric key crypto public key cryptography

 requires sender,  radically different
receiver know shared approach [Diffie-
secret key Hellman76, RSA78]
 Q: how to agree on key  sender, receiver do
in first place not share secret key
(particularly if never  public encryption key
“met”)? known to all
 private decryption
key known only to
receiver

8: Network Security 8-17

Public key cryptography
+ Bob’s public
K
B key

- Bob’s private
K
B key

plaintext encryption ciphertext decryption plaintext

message, m algorithm + algorithm message
K (m) - +
B m = K B(K (m))
B

8: Network Security 8-18

Public key encryption algorithms

Requirements:
+ . .
1 need K B( ) and K - ( ) such that
B
- +
K (K (m)) = m
B B

2 given public key K , it should+ be impossible to

compute private key K B

-
B

RSA: Rivest, Shamir, Adleman algorithm

8: Network Security 8-19
RSA: Choosing keys
1. Choose two large prime numbers p, q.
(e.g., 1024 bits each)

2. Compute n = pq, z = (p-1)(q-1)

3. Choose e (with e<n) that has no common factors

with z. (e, z are “relatively prime”).

4. Choose d such that ed-1 is exactly divisible by z.

(in other words: ed mod z = 1 ).

5. Public key is (n,e). Private key is (n,d).

+ -
KB KB
8: Network Security 8-20
RSA: Encryption, decryption
0. Given (n,e) and (n,d) as computed above

1. To encrypt bit pattern, m, compute

e
c = m e mod n (i.e., remainder when m is divided by n)

2. To decrypt received bit pattern, c, compute

d
m = c d mod n (i.e., remainder when c is divided by n)

m = (m e mod n) d mod n
Magic
happens!
c

8: Network Security 8-21

 RSA example:
Bob chooses p=5, q=7. Then n=35, z=24.
e=5 (so e, z relatively prime).
d=29 (so ed-1 exactly divisible by z.

letter m me c = me mod n
encrypt:
l 12 1524832 17

d
decrypt:
c c m = cd mod n letter
17 481968572106750915091411825223071697 12 l

8: Network Security 8-22

RSA: Why is that m = (m e mod n) d mod n

Useful number theory result: If p,q prime and

n = pq, then: y y mod (p-1)(q-1)
x mod n = x mod n

e
(m mod n) d mod n = med mod n
ed mod (p-1)(q-1)
= m mod n
(using number theory result above)
1
= m mod n
(since we chose ed to be divisible by
(p-1)(q-1) with remainder 1 )

= m
8: Network Security 8-23
RSA: another important property
The following property will be very useful later:

- + + -
K (K (m)) = m = K (K (m))
B B B B

use public key use private key

first, followed first, followed
by private key by public key

Result is the same!

8: Network Security 8-24

Chapter 8 roadmap

8.1 What is network security?

8.2 Principles of cryptography
8.3 Message integrity
8.4 End point authentication
8.5 Securing e-mail
8.6 Securing TCP connections: SSL
8.7 Network layer security: IPsec
8.8 Securing wireless LANs
8.9 Operational security: firewalls and IDS
8: Network Security 8-25
Message Integrity
Bob receives msg from Alice, wants to ensure:
 message originally came from Alice
 message not changed since sent by Alice

Cryptographic Hash:
 takes input m, produces fixed length value, H(m)
 e.g., as in Internet checksum

 computationally infeasible to find two different

messages, x, y such that H(x) = H(y)
 equivalently: given m = H(x), (x unknown), can not determine
x.
 note: Internet checksum fails this requirement!

8: Network Security 8-26

 Internet checksum: poor crypto hash
function
Internet checksum has some properties of hash function:
 produces fixed length digest (16-bit sum) of message
 is many-to-one

But given message with given hash value, it is easy to find

another message with same hash value:

message ASCII format message ASCII format

IOU1 49 4F 55 31 IOU9 49 4F 55 39
00.9 30 30 2E 39 00.1 30 30 2E 31
9BOB 39 42 4F 42 9BOB 39 42 4F 42
B2 C1 D2 AC different messages B2 C1 D2 AC
but identical checksums!
8: Network Security 8-27
 Message Authentication Code
(shared secret)
s
H(m+s)

(message) H(.)
m H(m+s) m
public
m append compare
Internet
H(m+s)
H(m+s)
H(.)
s
(shared secret)

8: Network Security 8-28

MACs in practice
 MD5 hash function widely used (RFC 1321)
 computes 128-bit MAC in 4-step process.
 arbitrary 128-bit string x, appears difficult to
construct msg m whose MD5 hash is equal to x
• recent (2005) attacks on MD5
 SHA-1 is also used
 US standard [NIST, FIPS PUB 180-1]
 160-bit MAC

8: Network Security 8-29

Digital Signatures

cryptographic technique analogous to hand-

written signatures.
 sender (Bob) digitally signs document,
establishing he is document owner/creator.
 verifiable, nonforgeable: recipient (Alice) can
prove to someone that Bob, and no one else
(including Alice), must have signed document

8: Network Security 8-30

Digital Signatures
simple digital signature for message m:
 Bob “signs” m by encrypting with his private key
- -
KB, creating “signed” message, KB(m)
-
Bob’s message, m K B Bob’s private -
K B(m)
key
Dear Alice
Bob’s message, m,
Oh, how I have missed public key signed (encrypted)
you. I think of you all the
time! …(blah blah blah) encryption with his private key
algorithm
Bob

8: Network Security 8-31

Digital Signatures (more)
-
 suppose Alice receives msg m, digital signature KB(m)
 Alice verifies m signed by Bob by applying Bob’s
+ - + -
public key KB to KB(m) then checks KB(KB(m) ) = m.
+ -
 if KB(KB(m) ) = m, whoever signed m must have used
Bob’s private key.
Alice thus verifies that:
 Bob signed m.
 No one else signed m.
 Bob signed m and not m’.

non-repudiation:
 Alice can take m, and signature K (m) to court and
B
prove that Bob signed m. -

8: Network Security 8-32

Digital signature = signed MAC
Alice verifies signature and
Bob sends digitally signed integrity of digitally signed
message: message:
large
message H: hash encrypted
m function H(m)
msg digest
-
KB(H(m))
Bob’s digital large
private signature message
- Bob’s
key KB (encrypt) m digital
public
+ signature
key KB
encrypted H: hash (decrypt)
msg digest function
-
+ KB(H(m))
H(m) H(m)

equal
?
8: Network Security 8-33
Public Key Certification
public key problem:
 When Alice obtains Bob’s public key (from web site,
e-mail, diskette), how does she know it is Bob’s
public key, not Trudy’s?
solution:
 trusted certification authority (CA)

8: Network Security 8-34

Certification Authorities
 Certification Authority (CA): binds public key to
particular entity, E.
 E registers its public key with CA.
 E provides “proof of identity” to CA.
 CA creates certificate binding E to its public key.
 certificate containing E’s public key digitally signed by CA:
CA says “This is E’s public key.”
- +
K CA(KB )
Bob’s digital
+
public +
signature KB
key KB (encrypt)
CA
certificate for
K-
Bob’s private
identifying key CA Bob’s public key,
information signed by CA
8: Network Security 8-35
Certification Authorities
 when Alice wants Bob’s public key:
 gets Bob’s certificate (Bob or elsewhere).
 apply CA’s public key to Bob’s certificate, get
Bob’s public key

+
- +
K CA(KB ) digital Bob’s
KB signature public
+
(decrypt) K B key

CA
public +
K CA
key

8: Network Security 8-36

A certificate contains:
 Serial number (unique to issuer)
 info about certificate owner, including algorithm
and key value itself (not shown)  info about certificate
issuer
 valid dates
 digital signature by
issuer

8: Network Security 8-37

Chapter 8 roadmap

8.1 What is network security?

8.2 Principles of cryptography
8.3 Message integrity
8.4 End point authentication
8.5 Securing e-mail
8.6 Securing TCP connections: SSL
8.7 Network layer security: IPsec
8.8 Securing wireless LANs
8.9 Operational security: firewalls and IDS
8: Network Security 8-38
Authentication
Goal: Bob wants Alice to “prove” her identity
to him
Protocol ap1.0: Alice says “I am Alice”

“I am Alice”
Failure scenario??

8: Network Security 8-39

Authentication
Goal: Bob wants Alice to “prove” her identity
to him
Protocol ap1.0: Alice says “I am Alice”

in a network,
Bob can not “see”
Alice, so Trudy simply
“I am Alice” declares
herself to be Alice

8: Network Security 8-40

Authentication: another try
Protocol ap2.0: Alice says “I am Alice” in an IP packet
containing her source IP address

Alice’s
IP address
“I am Alice”

Failure scenario??

8: Network Security 8-41

Authentication: another try
Protocol ap2.0: Alice says “I am Alice” in an IP packet
containing her source IP address

Trudy can create

a packet
Alice’s
“spoofing”
IP address
“I am Alice” Alice’s address

8: Network Security 8-42

Authentication: another try
Protocol ap3.0: Alice says “I am Alice” and sends her
secret password to “prove” it.

Alice’s Alice’s
“I’m Alice”
IP addr password

Alice’s Failure scenario??

OK
IP addr

8: Network Security 8-43

Authentication: another try
Protocol ap3.0: Alice says “I am Alice” and sends her
secret password to “prove” it.

Alice’s Alice’s
“I’m Alice”
IP addr password
playback attack: Trudy
Alice’s records Alice’s packet
OK
IP addr and later
plays it back to Bob

Alice’s Alice’s
“I’m Alice”
IP addr password

8: Network Security 8-44

Authentication: yet another try
Protocol ap3.1: Alice says “I am Alice” and sends her
encrypted secret password to “prove” it.

Alice’s encrypted
“I’m Alice”
IP addr password

Alice’s Failure scenario??

OK
IP addr

8: Network Security 8-45

Authentication: another try
Protocol ap3.1: Alice says “I am Alice” and sends her
encrypted secret password to “prove” it.

Alice’s encrypted
“I’m Alice” record
IP addr password
and
Alice’s
OK playback
IP addr
still works!

Alice’s encrypted
“I’m Alice”
IP addr password

8: Network Security 8-46

 Authentication: yet another try
Goal: avoid playback attack
Nonce: number (R) used only once –in-a-lifetime
ap4.0: to prove Alice “live”, Bob sends Alice nonce, R.
Alice
must return R, encrypted with shared secret key
“I am Alice”

R
KA-B(R) Alice is live, and
only Alice knows
key to encrypt
nonce, so it must
Failures, drawbacks? be Alice!
8: Network Security 8-47
Authentication: ap5.0
ap4.0 requires shared symmetric key
 can we authenticate using public key techniques?
ap5.0: use nonce, public key cryptography

“I am Alice”
Bob computes
R + -
- KA(KA (R)) = R
K A (R) and knows only Alice
“send me your public key”
could have the private
+ key, that encrypted R
KA such that
+ -
K (K (R)) = R
A A

8: Network Security 8-48

 ap5.0: security hole
Man (woman) in the middle attack: Trudy poses as
Alice (to Bob) and as Bob (to Alice)

I am Alice I am Alice
R -
K (R)
T
R - Send me your public key
K (R) +
A K
T
Send me your public key
+
K
A +
K (m)
Trudy gets T
- +
+ m = K (K (m))
K (m)
A sends T T Alice
m to
- + encrypted with
m = K (K (m))
A A Alice’s public key
8: Network Security 8-49
ap5.0: security hole
Man (woman) in the middle attack: Trudy poses as
Alice (to Bob) and as Bob (to Alice)

Difficult to detect:
 Bob receives everything that Alice sends, and vice
versa. (e.g., so Bob, Alice can meet one week later and
recall conversation)
 problem is that Trudy receives all messages as well!

8: Network Security 8-50

Chapter 8 roadmap

8.1 What is network security?

8.2 Principles of cryptography
8.3 Message integrity
8.4 End point authentication
8.5 Securing e-mail
8.6 Securing TCP connections: SSL
8.7 Network layer security: IPsec
8.8 Securing wireless LANs
8.9 Operational security: firewalls and IDS
8: Network Security 8-51
Secure e-mail
 Alice wants to send confidential e-mail, m, to Bob.
KS

m K (.)
S
KS(m ) KS(m )
KS( ) . m

+ Internet - KS

KS
+.
K ()
B + +
- .
K B( )
KB(KS ) KB(KS )
+ -
KB
KB

Alice:
 generates random symmetric private key, KS.
 encrypts message with KS (for efficiency)
 also encrypts KS with Bob’s public key.
 sends both KS(m) and KB(KS) to Bob. 8: Network Security 8-52
Secure e-mail
 Alice wants to send confidential e-mail, m, to Bob.
KS

m K (.)
S
KS(m ) KS(m )
KS( ) . m

+ Internet - KS

KS
+.
K ()
B + +
- .
K B( )
KB(KS ) KB(KS )
+ -
KB
KB

Bob:
 uses his private key to decrypt and recover KS
 uses KS to decrypt KS(m) to recover m

8: Network Security 8-53

Secure e-mail (continued)
• Alice wants to provide sender authentication
message integrity.

- KA
+
KA
- -
m .
H( )
-.
K ()
A
KA(H(m)) KA(H(m)) +
KA( )
. H(m )

+ Internet - compare

m H( ). H(m )
m

• Alice digitally signs message.

• sends both message (in the clear) and digital signature.

8: Network Security 8-54

Secure e-mail (continued)
• Alice wants to provide secrecy, sender authentication,
message integrity.
-
KA
-
m .
H( )
-
KA( )
. KA(H(m))
KS

+ KS( ) .
m + Internet

KS
+
K B( )
. +
KB(KS )
+
KB

Alice uses three keys: her private key, Bob’s public

key, newly created symmetric key
8: Network Security 8-55
Pretty good privacy (PGP)
 Internet e-mail encryption A PGP signed message:
scheme, de-facto standard.
---BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE---
 uses symmetric key Hash: SHA1
cryptography, public key
cryptography, hash Bob:My husband is out of town
tonight.Passionately yours,
function, and digital Alice
signature as described.
 provides secrecy, sender ---BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE---
Version: PGP 5.0
authentication, integrity. Charset: noconv
 inventor, Phil Zimmerman, yhHJRHhGJGhgg/
was target of 3-year 12EpJ+lo8gE4vB3mqJhFEvZP9t6n7G
6m5Gw2
federal investigation. ---END PGP SIGNATURE---

8: Network Security 8-56

Chapter 8 roadmap

8.1 What is network security?

8.2 Principles of cryptography
8.3 Message integrity
8.4 End point authentication
8.5 Securing e-mail
8.6 Securing TCP connections: SSL
8.7 Network layer security: IPsec
8.8 Securing wireless LANs
8.9 Operational security: firewalls and IDS
8: Network Security 8-57
Secure sockets layer (SSL)
 provides transport layer security to any TCP-based
application using SSL services.
 e.g., between Web browsers, servers for e-commerce (shttp)
 security services:
 server authentication, data encryption, client authentication
(optional)

Application
Application
SSL sublayer SSL
TCP TCP TCP socket
socket
IP IP
TCP API TCP enhanced with SSL

8: Network Security 8-58

SSL: three phases
TCP SYN
1. Handshake:
 Bob establishes TCP NA CK
TCP SY
connection to Alice
TCP ACK
 authenticates Alice
via CA signed SSL hello
certificate
cat e
 creates, encrypts certifi
(using Alice’s public
key), sends master create
secret key to Alice Master
Secret KA +(MS)
 nonce exchange not (MS) decrypt using
shown KA-
to get MS

8: Network Security 8-59

SSL: three phases

2. Key Derivation:
 Alice, Bob use shared secret (MS) to generate 4
keys:
 EB: Bob->Alice data encryption key
 EA: Alice->Bob data encryption key
 MB: Bob->Alice MAC key
 MA: Alice->Bob MAC key
 encryption and MAC algorithms negotiable between
Bob, Alice
 why 4 keys?

8: Network Security 8-60

SSL: three phases
3. Data transfer
TCP byte stream b1b2b3 … bn

block n bytes together d MB

.
H( )
compute
MAC

d H(d) EB

.
H( ) SSL
encrypt d,
MAC, SSL
seq. #
seq. #
d H(d)

SSL record
format Type Ver Len d H(d)

unencrypted encrypted using EB

8: Network Security 8-61
Chapter 8 roadmap

8.1 What is network security?

8.2 Principles of cryptography
8.3 Message integrity
8.4 End point authentication
8.5 Securing e-mail
8.6 Securing TCP connections: SSL
8.7 Network layer security: IPsec
8.8 Securing wireless LANs
8.9 Operational security: firewalls and IDS
8: Network Security 8-62
 IPsec: Network Layer Security
 network-layer secrecy:
 for both AH and ESP, source,
 sending host encrypts the
data in IP datagram destination handshake:
 create network-layer
 TCP and UDP segments;
ICMP and SNMP messages. logical channel called a
 network-layer authentication security association (SA)
 each SA unidirectional.
 destination host can
authenticate source IP  uniquely determined by:
address  security protocol (AH or
 two principal protocols: ESP)
 authentication header (AH)  source IP address
protocol  32-bit connection ID
 encapsulation security
payload (ESP) protocol

8: Network Security 8-63

Authentication Header (AH) Protocol
 provides source AH header includes:
authentication, data  connection identifier
integrity, no
 authentication data:
confidentiality
 AH header inserted source- signed message
between IP header, data digest calculated over
field. original IP datagram.
 protocol field: 51  next header field:
 intermediate routers specifies type of data
process datagrams as usual (e.g., TCP, UDP, ICMP)

IP header AH header data (e.g., TCP, UDP segment)

8: Network Security 8-64

ESP Protocol
 provides secrecy, host  ESP authentication
authentication, data field is similar to AH
integrity. authentication field.
 data, ESP trailer encrypted. 
Protocol = 50.
 next header field is in ESP
trailer.

authenticated
encrypted
ESP ESP ESP
IP header TCP/UDP segment
header trailer authent.

8: Network Security 8-65

Chapter 8 roadmap

8.1 What is network security?

8.2 Principles of cryptography
8.3 Message integrity
8.4 End point authentication
8.5 Securing e-mail
8.6 Securing TCP connections: SSL
8.7 Network layer security: IPsec
8.8 Securing wireless LANs
8.9 Operational security: firewalls and IDS
8: Network Security 8-66
IEEE 802.11 security
 war-driving: drive around Bay area, see what 802.11
networks available?
 More than 9000 accessible from public roadways
 85% use no encryption/authentication
 packet-sniffing and various attacks easy!
 securing 802.11
 encryption, authentication
 first attempt at 802.11 security: Wired Equivalent
Privacy (WEP): a failure
 current attempt: 802.11i

8: Network Security 8-67

Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP):

 authentication as in protocol ap4.0

 host requests authentication from access point
 access point sends 128 bit nonce
 host encrypts nonce using shared symmetric key
 access point decrypts nonce, authenticates host
 no key distribution mechanism
 authentication: knowing the shared key is enough

8: Network Security 8-68

WEP data encryption
 host/AP share 40 bit symmetric key (semi-permanent)
 host appends 24-bit initialization vector (IV) to
create 64-bit key
 64 bit key used to generate stream of keys, kiIV
 kiIV used to encrypt ith byte, di, in frame:

ci = di XOR kiIV
 IV and encrypted bytes, ci sent in frame

8: Network Security 8-69

 802.11 WEP encryption
IV
(per frame)
KS: 40-bit key sequence generator
secret ( for given KS, IV)
symmetric
k1IV k2IV k3IV … kNIV kN+1IV… kN+1IV 802.11 WEP-encrypted data
key IV
header plus CRC
plaintext
frame data d1 d2 d3 … dN CRC1 … CRC4
plus CRC
c1 c2 c3 … cN cN+1 … cN+4

Sender-side WEP encryption

Figure 7.8-new1: 802.11 WEP protocol

8: Network Security 8-70

Breaking 802.11 WEP encryption
security hole:
 24-bit IV, one IV per frame, -> IV’s eventually reused
 IV transmitted in plaintext -> IV reuse detected
 attack:
 Trudy causes Alice to encrypt known plaintext d1 d2 d3
d4 …
 Trudy sees: ci = di XOR kiIV
 Trudy knows ci di, so can compute kiIV
 Trudy knows encrypting key sequence k1IV k2IV k3IV …
 Next time IV is used, Trudy can decrypt!
8: Network Security 8-71
802.11i: improved security
 numerous (stronger) forms of encryption
possible
 provides key distribution
 uses authentication server separate from
access point

8: Network Security 8-72

802.11i: four phases of operation

STA: AP: access point AS:

client station wired Authentication
network server

1 Discovery of
security capabilities

2 STA and AS mutually authenticate, together

generate Master Key (MK). AP servers as “pass through”

3 STA derives 3 AS derives

Pairwise Master
same PMK,
Key (PMK)
sends to AP

4 STA, AP use PMK to derive

Temporal Key (TK) used for message
encryption, integrity 8: Network Security 8-73
EAP: extensible authentication protocol
 EAP: end-end client (mobile) to authentication
server protocol
 EAP sent over separate “links”
 mobile-to-AP (EAP over LAN)
 AP to authentication server (RADIUS over UDP)

wired
network

EAP TLS
EAP
EAP over LAN (EAPoL) RADIUS
IEEE 802.11 UDP/IP
8: Network Security 8-74
Chapter 8 roadmap

8.1 What is network security?

8.2 Principles of cryptography
8.3 Message integrity
8.4 End point authentication
8.5 Securing e-mail
8.6 Securing TCP connections: SSL
8.7 Network layer security: IPsec
8.8 Securing wireless LANs
8.9 Operational security: firewalls and IDS
8: Network Security 8-75
Firewalls
firewall
isolates organization’s internal net from larger
Internet, allowing some packets to pass, blocking
others.

administered public
network Internet

firewall

8: Network Security 8-76

Firewalls: Why
prevent denial of service attacks:
 SYN flooding: attacker establishes many bogus TCP
connections, no resources left for “real” connections
prevent illegal modification/access of internal data.
 e.g., attacker replaces CIA’s homepage with something
else
allow only authorized access to inside network (set of
authenticated users/hosts)
three types of firewalls:
 stateless packet filters
 stateful packet filters
 application gateways

8: Network Security 8-77

Stateless packet filtering
Should arriving
packet be allowed
in? Departing packet
let out?

 internal network connected to Internet via

router firewall
 router filters packet-by-packet, decision to
forward/drop packet based on:
 source IP address, destination IP address
 TCP/UDP source and destination port numbers
 ICMP message type
 TCP SYN and ACK bits
8: Network Security 8-78
Stateless packet filtering: example
 example 1: block incoming and outgoing
datagrams with IP protocol field = 17 and with
either source or dest port = 23.
 all incoming, outgoing UDP flows and telnet
connections are blocked.
 example 2: Block inbound TCP segments with
ACK=0.
 prevents external clients from making TCP
connections with internal clients, but allows
internal clients to connect to outside.

8: Network Security 8-79

Stateless packet filtering: more examples
Policy Firewall Setting

No outside Web access. Drop all outgoing packets to any IP

address, port 80

No incoming TCP connections, Drop all incoming TCP SYN packets to

except those for institution’s any IP except 130.207.244.203, port
public Web server only. 80

Prevent Web-radios from eating Drop all incoming UDP packets - except
up the available bandwidth. DNS and router broadcasts.

Prevent your network from being Drop all ICMP packets going to a
used for a smurf DoS attack. “broadcast” address (eg
130.207.255.255).
Prevent your network from being Drop all outgoing ICMP TTL expired
tracerouted traffic

8: Network Security 8-80

Access Control Lists
 ACL: table of rules, applied top to bottom to
incoming packets: (action, condition) pairs
source dest source dest flag
action protocol
address address port port bit
outside of any
allow 222.22/16 TCP > 1023 80
222.22/16

allow outside of 222.22/16

TCP 80 > 1023 ACK
222.22/16
outside of
allow 222.22/16 UDP > 1023 53 ---
222.22/16
allow outside of 222.22/16
UDP 53 > 1023 ----
222.22/16
deny all all all all all all

8: Network Security 8-81

Stateful packet filtering
 stateless packet filter: heavy handed tool
 admits packets that “make no sense,” e.g., dest port =
80, ACK bit set, even though no TCP connection
established:
source dest source dest flag
action protocol
address address port port bit

allow outside of 222.22/16

TCP 80 > 1023 ACK
222.22/16

 stateful packet filter: track status of every TCP connection

 track connection setup (SYN), teardown (FIN): can determine whether
incoming, outgoing packets “makes sense”
 timeout inactive connections at firewall: no longer admit packets

8: Network Security 8-82

Stateful packet filtering
 ACL augmented to indicate need to check
connection state table before admitting packet
source dest source dest flag check
action proto
address address port port bit conxion
outside of any
allow 222.22/16 TCP > 1023 80
222.22/16

allow outside of 222.22/16 x

TCP 80 > 1023 ACK
222.22/16

outside of
allow 222.22/16 UDP > 1023 53 ---
222.22/16

allow outside of 222.22/16 x

UDP 53 > 1023 ----
222.22/16

deny all all all all all all

8: Network Security 8-83
Application gateways gateway-to-remote
host telnet session
host-to-gateway
telnet session
 filters packets on
application data as well as application
gateway
router and filter

on IP/TCP/UDP fields.
 example: allow select
internal users to telnet
outside.

1. require all telnet users to telnet through gateway.

2. for authorized users, gateway sets up telnet connection to
dest host. Gateway relays data between 2 connections
3. router filter blocks all telnet connections not originating
from gateway.

8: Network Security 8-84

Limitations of firewalls and gateways

 IP spoofing: router  filters often use all or

can’t know if data nothing policy for UDP.
“really” comes from  tradeoff: degree of
claimed source communication with
 if multiple app’s. need outside world, level of
special treatment, each security
has own app. gateway.  many highly protected
 client software must sites still suffer from
know how to contact attacks.
gateway.
 e.g., must set IP address
of proxy in Web browser

8: Network Security 8-85

Intrusion detection systems
 packet filtering:
 operates on TCP/IP headers only
 no correlation check among sessions

 IDS: intrusion detection system

 deep packet inspection: look at packet contents
(e.g., check character strings in packet against
database of known virus, attack strings)
 examine correlation among multiple packets
• port scanning
• network mapping
• DoS attack

8: Network Security 8-86

 Intrusion detection systems
 multiple IDSs: different types of checking
at different locations

application firewall
gateway

Internet
internal
network Web
IDS server DNS
sensors server
FTP
server demilitarized
zone
8: Network Security 8-87
Network Security (summary)
Basic techniques…...
 cryptography (symmetric and public)
 message integrity
 end-point authentication

…. used in many different security scenarios

 secure email
 secure transport (SSL)
 IP sec
 802.11

Operational Security: firewalls and IDS

8: Network Security 8-88