Integrity and Security

 Domain Constraints
 Referential Integrity
 Assertions
 Triggers
 Security
 Authorization
 Authorization in SQL
 Domain Constraints

 Integrity constraints guard against accidental damage to

the database, by ensuring that authorized changes to the
database do not result in a loss of data consistency.
 Domain constraints are the most elementary form of
integrity constraint.
 They test values inserted in the database, and test
queries to ensure that the comparisons make sense.
 New domains can be created from existing data types
 E.g. create domain Dollars numeric(12, 2)
create domain Pounds numeric(12,2)
 We cannot assign or compare a value of type Dollars to a
value of type Pounds.
 However, we can convert type as below
(cast r.A as Pounds)
(Should also multiply by the dollar-to-pound conversion-rate)
 Domain Constraints (Cont.)

 The check clause in SQL-92 permits domains to be

restricted:
 Use check clause to ensure that an hourly-wage domain
allows only values greater than a specified value.
create domain hourly-wage numeric(5,2)
constraint value-test check(value > = 4.00)
 The domain has a constraint that ensures that the hourly-
wage is greater than 4.00
 The clause constraint value-test is optional; useful to
indicate which constraint an update violated.
 Can have complex conditions in domain check
 create domain AccountType char(10)
constraint account-type-test
check (value in (‘Checking’, ‘Saving’))
 check (branch-name in (select branch-name from
branch))
 Referential Integrity

 Ensures that a value that appears in one relation for a

given set of attributes also appears for a certain set of
attributes in another relation.
 Example: If “Perryridge” is a branch name appearing in one of
the tuples in the account relation, then there exists a tuple in
the branch relation for branch “Perryridge”.
 Formal Definition
 Let r1(R1) and r2(R2) be relations with primary keys K1 and K2
respectively.
 The subset  of R2 is a foreign key referencing K1 in relation r1,
if for every t2 in r2 there must be a tuple t1 in r1 such that t1[K1]
= t2[].
 Referential integrity constraint also called subset dependency
since its can be written as
 (r2)  K1 (r1)
 Referential Integrity in the E-R
Model

 Consider relationship set R between entity sets E1

and E2. The relational schema for R includes the
primary keys K1 of E1 and K2 of E2.
Then K1 and K2 form foreign keys on the relational
schemas for E1 and E2 respectively.
E1 R E2

 Weak entity sets are also a source of referential

integrity constraints.
 For the relation schema for a weak entity set must
include the primary key attributes of the entity set on
which it depends
 Checking Referential Integrity on
Database Modification
 The following tests must be made in order to preserve
the following referential integrity constraint:
 (r2)  K (r1)
 Insert. If a tuple t2 is inserted into r2, the system must
ensure that there is a tuple t1 in r1 such that t1[K] = t2[].
That is
t2 []  K (r1)
 Delete. If a tuple, t1 is deleted from r1, the system must
compute the set of tuples in r2 that reference t1:

 = t1[K] (r2)
If this set is not empty
 either the delete command is rejected as an error, or
 the tuples that reference t1 must themselves be deleted
(cascading deletions are possible).
 Database Modification (Cont.)
 Update. There are two cases:
 If a tuple t2 is updated in relation r2 and the update modifies values
for foreign key , then a test similar to the insert case is made:
 Let t2’ denote the new value of tuple t2. The system must
ensure that
t2’[]  K(r1)
 If a tuple t1 is updated in r1, and the update modifies values for the
primary key (K), then a test similar to the delete case is made:
1. The system must compute
 = t1[K] (r2)
using the old value of t1 (the value before the update is
applied).
2. If this set is not empty

1. the update may be rejected as an error, or

2. the update may be cascaded to the tuples in the set, or
3. the tuples in the set may be deleted.
 Referential Integrity in SQL

 Primary and candidate keys and foreign keys can be specified

as part of the SQL create table statement:
 The primary key clause lists attributes that comprise the primary
key.
 The unique key clause lists attributes that comprise a candidate
key.
 The foreign key clause lists the attributes that comprise the
foreign key and the name of the relation referenced by the foreign
key.
 By default, a foreign key references the primary key attributes
of the referenced table
foreign key (account-number) references account
 Short form for specifying a single column as foreign key
account-number char (10) references account
 Reference columns in the referenced table can be explicitly
specified
 but must be declared as primary/candidate keys
foreign key (account-number) references account(account-number)
 Referential Integrity in SQL –
Example

create table customer

(customer-name char(20),
customer-street char(30),
customer-city char(30),
primary key (customer-name))
create table branch
(branch-name char(15),
branch-city char(30),
assets integer,
primary key (branch-name))
Referential Integrity in SQL – Example (Cont.)

create table account

(account-number char(10),
branch-name char(15),
balance integer,
primary key (account-number),
foreign key (branch-name) references branch)
create table depositor
(customer-name char(20),
account-number char(10),
primary key (customer-name, account-number),
foreign key (account-number) references
account,
foreign key (customer-name) references
customer)
 Cascading Actions in SQL

create table account

...
foreign key(branch-name) references branch
on delete cascade
on update cascade
...)
 Due to the on delete cascade clauses, if a delete of
a tuple in branch results in referential-integrity
constraint violation, the delete “cascades” to the
account relation, deleting the tuple that refers to
the branch that was deleted.
 Cascading updates are similar.
 Cascading Actions in SQL (Cont.)
 If there is a chain of foreign-key dependencies across
multiple relations, with on delete cascade specified for
each dependency, a deletion or update at one end of the
chain can propagate across the entire chain.
 If a cascading update to delete causes a constraint
violation that cannot be handled by a further cascading
operation, the system aborts the transaction.
 As a result, all the changes caused by the transaction and
its cascading actions are undone.
 Referential integrity is only checked at the end of a
transaction
 Intermediate steps are allowed to violate referential integrity
provided later steps remove the violation
 Otherwise it would be impossible to create some database
states, e.g. insert two tuples whose foreign keys point to
each other
 E.g. spouse attribute of relation
marriedperson(name, address, spouse)
 Referential Integrity in SQL (Cont.)

 Alternative to cascading:
 on delete set null
 on delete set default
 Null values in foreign key attributes complicate SQL
referential integrity semantics, and are best
prevented using not null
 if any attribute of a foreign key is null, the tuple is
defined to satisfy the foreign key constraint!
 Assertions

 An assertion is a predicate expressing a condition

that we wish the database always to satisfy.
 An assertion in SQL takes the form

create assertion <assertion-name> check

<predicate>
 When an assertion is made, the system tests it for
validity, and tests it again on every update that may
violate the assertion
 This testing may introduce a significant amount of
overhead; hence assertions should be used with great
care.
 Asserting
for all X, P(X)
is achieved in a round-about fashion using
not exists X such that not P(X)
 Assertion Example

 The sum of all loan amounts for each branch must

be less than the sum of all account balances at the
branch.
create assertion sum-constraint check
(not exists (select * from branch
where (select sum(amount) from
loan
where loan.branch-name =
branch.branch-name)
>= (select sum(amount) from
account
where loan.branch-name =
branch.branch-
name)))
 Assertion Example

 Every loan has at least one borrower who maintains an

account with a minimum balance or $1000.00
create assertion balance-constraint check
(not exists (
select * from loan
where not exists (
select *
from borrower, depositor, account
where loan.loan-number = borrower.loan-
number
and borrower.customer-name =
depositor.customer-name
and depositor.account-number =
account.account-number
and account.balance >= 1000)))
 Triggers

 A trigger is a statement that is executed

automatically by the system as a side effect of a
modification to the database.
 To design a trigger mechanism, we must:
 Specify the conditions under which the trigger is to be
executed.
 Specify the actions to be taken when the trigger
executes.
 Triggers introduced to SQL standard in SQL:1999,
but supported even earlier using non-standard
syntax by most databases.
 Trigger Example

 Suppose that instead of allowing negative account

balances, the bank deals with overdrafts by
 setting the account balance to zero
 creating a loan in the amount of the overdraft
 giving this loan a loan number identical to the account
number of the overdrawn account
 The condition for executing the trigger is an update
to the account relation that results in a negative
balance value.
 Trigger Example in SQL:1999

create trigger overdraft-trigger after update on account

referencing new row as nrow
for each row
when nrow.balance < 0
begin atomic
insert into borrower
(select customer-name, account-number
from depositor
where nrow.account-number =
depositor.account-number );
insert into loan values
(n.row.account-number, nrow.branch-name,
– nrow.balance );
update account set balance = 0
where account.account-number = nrow.account-
number
end
 Triggering Events and Actions in
SQL

 Triggering event can be insert, delete or update

 Triggers on update can be restricted to specific
attributes
 E.g. create trigger overdraft-trigger after update of
balance on account
 Values of attributes before and after an update can be
referenced
 referencing old row as : for deletes and updates
 referencing new row as : for inserts and updates
 Triggers can be activated before an event, which can
serve as extra constraints. E.g. convert blanks to null.
create trigger setnull-trigger before update on r
referencing new row as nrow
for each row
when nrow.phone-number = ‘ ‘
set nrow.phone-number = null
 Statement Level Triggers

 Instead of executing a separate action for each

affected row, a single action can be executed for all
rows affected by a transaction
 Use for each statement instead of for each row
 Use referencing old table or referencing new
table to refer to temporary tables (called transition
tables) containing the affected rows
 Can be more efficient when dealing with SQL
statements that update a large number of rows
 External World Actions

 We sometimes require external world actions to be triggered

on a database update
 E.g. re-ordering an item whose quantity in a warehouse has
become small, or turning on an alarm light,
 Triggers cannot be used to directly implement external-world
actions, BUT
 Triggers can be used to record actions-to-be-taken in a separate
table
 Have an external process that repeatedly scans the table, carries
out external-world actions and deletes action from table
 E.g. Suppose a warehouse has the following tables
 inventory(item, level): How much of each item is in the warehouse
 minlevel(item, level) : What is the minimum desired level of each
item
 reorder(item, amount): What quantity should we re-order at a time
 orders(item, amount) : Orders to be placed (read by external
process)
 External World Actions (Cont.)

create trigger reorder-trigger after update of amount on

inventory
referencing old row as orow, new row as nrow
for each row
when nrow.level < = (select level
from minlevel
where minlevel.item = orow.item)
and orow.level > (select level
from minlevel
where minlevel.item =
orow.item)
begin
insert into orders
(select item, amount
from reorder
where reorder.item = orow.item)
end
Triggers in MS-SQLServer Syntax

create trigger overdraft-trigger on account

for update
as
if inserted.balance < 0
begin
insert into borrower
(select customer-name,account-number
from depositor, inserted
where inserted.account-number =
depositor.account-number )
insert into loan values
(inserted.account-number, inserted.branch-name,
– inserted.balance)
update account set balance = 0
from account, inserted
where account.account-number =
inserted.account-number
end
 When Not To Use Triggers

 Triggers were used earlier for tasks such as

 maintaining summary data (e.g. total salary of each
department)
 Replicating databases by recording changes to special
relations (called change or delta relations) and having a
separate process that applies the changes over to a replica
 There are better ways of doing these now:
 Databases today provide built in materialized view
facilities to maintain summary data
 Databases provide built-in support for replication
 Encapsulation facilities can be used instead of triggers
in many cases
 Define methods to update fields
 Carry out actions as part of the update methods instead of
through a trigger
 Security

 Security - protection from malicious attempts to steal or

modify data.
 Database system level
 Authentication and authorization mechanisms to allow
specific users access only to required data
 We concentrate on authorization in the rest of this
chapter
 Operating system level
 Operating system super-users can do anything they
want to the database! Good operating system level
security is required.
 Network level: must use encryption to prevent
 Eavesdropping (unauthorized reading of messages)
 Masquerading (pretending to be an authorized user or
sending messages supposedly from authorized users)
 Security (Cont.)

 Physical level
 Physical access to computers allows destruction of
data by intruders; traditional lock-and-key security
is needed
 Computers must also be protected from floods, fire,
etc.
– More in Chapter 17 (Recovery)
 Human level
 Users must be screened to ensure that an
authorized users do not give access to intruders
 Users should be trained on password selection and
secrecy
 Authorization

Forms of authorization on parts of the database:

 Read authorization - allows reading, but not

modification of data.
 Insert authorization - allows insertion of new data, but
not modification of existing data.
 Update authorization - allows modification, but not
deletion of data.
 Delete authorization - allows deletion of data
 Authorization (Cont.)

Forms of authorization to modify the database schema:

 Index authorization - allows creation and deletion of
indices.
 Resources authorization - allows creation of new
relations.
 Alteration authorization - allows addition or deletion of
attributes in a relation.
 Drop authorization - allows deletion of relations.
 Authorization and Views

 Users can be given authorization on views, without

being given any authorization on the relations used
in the view definition
 Ability of views to hide data serves both to simplify
usage of the system and to enhance security by
allowing users access only to data they need for
their job
 A combination or relational-level security and view-
level security can be used to limit a user’s access
to precisely the data that user needs.
 View Example

 Suppose a bank clerk needs to know the names of

the customers of each branch, but is not authorized
to see specific loan information.
 Approach: Deny direct access to the loan relation, but
grant access to the view cust-loan, which consists
only of the names of customers and the branches at
which they have a loan.
 The cust-loan view is defined in SQL as follows:
create view cust-loan as
select branchname, customer-name
from borrower, loan
where borrower.loan-number = loan.loan-
number
 View Example (Cont.)

 The clerk is authorized to see the result of the

query:
select *
from cust-loan
 When the query processor translates the result into
a query on the actual relations in the database, we
obtain a query on borrower and loan.
 Authorization must be checked on the clerk’s query
before query processing replaces a view by the
definition of the view.
 Authorization on Views

 Creation of view does not require resources authorization

since no real relation is being created
 The creator of a view gets only those privileges that
provide no additional authorization beyond that he already
had.
 E.g. if creator of view cust-loan had only read authorization
on borrower and loan, he gets only read authorization on
cust-loan
 Granting of Privileges

 The passage of authorization from one user to

another may be represented by an authorization
graph.
 The nodes of this graph are the users.
 The root of the graph is the database administrator.
 Consider graph for update authorization on loan.
 An edge Ui Uj indicates that user Ui has granted
update authorization
U on loan
U to Uj.
1 4

DBA U2 U5

U3
 Authorization Grant Graph

 Requirement: All edges in an authorization graph must be

part of some path originating with the database
administrator
 If DBA revokes grant from U 1:
 Grant must be revoked from U4 since U1 no longer has
authorization
 Grant must not be revoked from U5 since U5 has another
authorization path from DBA through U2
 Must prevent cycles of grants with no path from the root:
 DBA grants authorization to U7
 U7 grants authorization to U8
 U8 grants authorization to U7
 DBA revokes authorization from U7
 Must revoke grant U7 to U8 and from U8 to U7 since there is
no path from DBA to U7 or to U8 anymore.
 Security Specification in SQL

 The grant statement is used to confer authorization

grant <privilege list>

on <relation name or view name> to <user list>
 <user list> is:
 a user-id
 public, which allows all valid users the privilege granted
 A role (more on this later)
 Granting a privilege on a view does not imply
granting any privileges on the underlying relations.
 The grantor of the privilege must already hold the
privilege on the specified item (or be the database
administrator).
 Privileges in SQL

 select: allows read access to relation,or the ability to query

using the view
 Example: grant users U1, U2, and U3 select authorization on the
branch relation:
grant select on branch to U1, U2, U3
 insert: the ability to insert tuples
 update: the ability to update using the SQL update
statement
 delete: the ability to delete tuples.
 references: ability to declare foreign keys when creating
relations.
 usage: In SQL-92; authorizes a user to use a specified
domain
 all privileges: used as a short form for all the allowable
privileges
 Privilege To Grant Privileges

 with grant option: allows a user who is granted a

privilege to pass the privilege on to other users.
 Example:
grant select on branch to U1 with grant option
gives U1 the select privileges on branch and allows U1
to grant this
privilege to others
 Roles
 Roles permit common privileges for a class of users can
be specified just once by creating a corresponding “role”
 Privileges can be granted to or revoked from roles, just
like user
 Roles can be assigned to users, and even to other roles
 SQL:1999 supports roles
create role teller
create role manager

grant select on branch to teller

grant update (balance) on account to teller
grant all privileges on account to manager

grant teller to manager

grant teller to alice, bob

grant manager to avi
 Revoking Authorization in SQL

 The revoke statement is used to revoke

authorization.
revoke<privilege list>
on <relation name or view name> from <user list>
[restrict|cascade]
 Example:
revoke select on branch from U1, U2, U3 cascade
 Revocation of a privilege from a user may cause
other users also to lose that privilege; referred to as
cascading of the revoke.
 We can prevent cascading by specifying restrict:
revoke select on branch from U1, U2, U3 restrict
With restrict, the revoke command fails if cascading
revokes are required.
 Revoking Authorization in SQL
(Cont.)

 <privilege-list> may be all to revoke all privileges

the revokee may hold.
 If <revokee-list> includes public all users lose the
privilege except those granted it explicitly.
 If the same privilege was granted twice to the same
user by different grantees, the user may retain the
privilege after the revocation.
 All privileges that depend on the privilege being
revoked are also revoked.
 Limitations of SQL Authorization

 SQL does not support authorization at a tuple level

 E.g. we cannot restrict students to see only (the tuples
storing) their own grades
 With the growth in Web access to databases, database
accesses come primarily from application servers.
 End users don't have database user ids, they are all mapped
to the same database user id
 All end-users of an application (such as a web application)
may be mapped to a single database user
 The task of authorization in above cases falls on the
application program, with no support from SQL
 Benefit: fine grained authorizations, such as to individual
tuples, can be implemented by the application.
 Drawback: Authorization must be done in application code,
and may be dispersed all over an application
 Checking for absence of authorization loopholes becomes
very difficult since it requires reading large amounts of
application code
 Audit Trails

 An audit trail is a log of all changes

(inserts/deletes/updates) to the database along with
information such as which user performed the
change, and when the change was performed.
 Used to track erroneous/fraudulent updates.
 Can be implemented using triggers, but many
database systems provide direct support.
 Encryption

 Data may be encrypted when database

authorization provisions do not offer sufficient
protection.
 Properties of good encryption technique:
 Relatively simple for authorized users to encrypt and
decrypt data.
 Encryption scheme depends not on the secrecy of the
algorithm but on the secrecy of a parameter of the
algorithm called the encryption key.
 Extremely difficult for an intruder to determine the
encryption key.
 Encryption (Cont.)

 Data Encryption Standard (DES) substitutes characters and

rearranges their order on the basis of an encryption key
which is provided to authorized users via a secure
mechanism. Scheme is no more secure than the key
transmission mechanism since the key has to be shared.
 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a new standard
replacing DES, and is based on the Rijndael algorithm, but is
also dependent on shared secret keys
 Public-key encryption is based on each user having two
keys:
 public key – publicly published key used to encrypt data, but
cannot be used to decrypt data
 private key -- key known only to individual user, and used to
decrypt data.
Need not be transmitted to the site doing encryption.
Encryption scheme is such that it is impossible or
extremely hard to decrypt data given only the public key.
 The RSA public-key encryption scheme is based on the
hardness of factoring a very large number (100's of digits)
into its prime components.
 Authentication
 Password based authentication is widely used, but is
susceptible to sniffing on a network
 Challenge-response systems avoid transmission of
passwords
 DB sends a (randomly generated) challenge string to user
 User encrypts string and returns result.
 DB verifies identity by decrypting result
 Can use public-key encryption system by DB sending a
message encrypted using user’s public key, and user
decrypting and sending the message back
 Digital signatures are used to verify authenticity of data
 E.g. use private key (in reverse) to encrypt data, and anyone
can verify authenticity by using public key (in reverse) to
decrypt data. Only holder of private key could have created
the encrypted data.
 Digital signatures also help ensure nonrepudiation: sender
cannot later claim to have not created the data
 Digital Certificates
 Digital certificates are used to verify authenticity of public
keys.
 Problem: when you communicate with a web site, how do you
know if you are talking with the genuine web site or an
imposter?
 Solution: use the public key of the web site
 Problem: how to verify if the public key itself is genuine?
 Solution:
 Every client (e.g. browser) has public keys of a few root-level
certification authorities
 A site can get its name/URL and public key signed by a
certification authority: signed document is called a certificate
 Client can use public key of certification authority to verify
certificate
 Multiple levels of certification authorities can exist. Each
certification authority
 presents its own public-key certificate signed by a
higher level authority, and
 Uses its private key to sign the certificate of other web
sites/authorities
End of Chapter
 Statistical Databases

 Problem: how to ensure privacy of individuals while

allowing use of data for statistical purposes (e.g.,
finding median income, average bank balance etc.)
 Solutions:
 System rejects any query that involves fewer than
some predetermined number of individuals.
 Still possible to use results of multiple overlapping
queries to deduce data about an individual
 Data pollution -- random falsification of data provided
in response to a query.
 Random modification of the query itself.
 There is a tradeoff between accuracy and security.
An n-ary Relationship Set
Authorization-Grant Graph
Attempt to Defeat Authorization
Revocation
Authorization Graph
 Physical Level Security

 Protection of equipment from floods, power failure, etc.

 Protection of disks from theft, erasure, physical
damage, etc.
 Protection of network and terminal cables from
wiretaps non-invasive electronic eavesdropping,
physical damage, etc.
Solutions:
 Replicated hardware:
 mirrored disks, dual busses, etc.
 multiple access paths between every pair of devises
 Physical security: locks,police, etc.
 Software techniques to detect physical security
breaches.
 Human Level Security

 Protection from stolen passwords, sabotage, etc.

 Primarily a management problem:

 Frequent change of passwords
 Use of “non-guessable” passwords
 Log all invalid access attempts
 Data audits
 Careful hiring practices
 Operating System Level Security

 Protection from invalid logins

 File-level access protection (often not very helpful for

database security)
 Protection from improper use of “superuser” authority.

 Protection from improper use of privileged machine

intructions.
 Network-Level Security

 Each site must ensure that it communicate with

trusted sites (not intruders).
 Links must be protected from theft or modification of
messages
 Mechanisms:
 Identification protocol (password-based),
 Cryptography.
 Database-Level Security

 Assume security at network, operating system,

human, and physical levels.
 Database specific issues:
 each user may have authority to read only part of the
data and to write only part of the data.
 User authority may correspond to entire files or
relations, but it may also correspond only to parts of
files or relations.
 Local autonomy suggests site-level authorization
control in a distributed database.
 Global control suggests centralized control.