Cryptography and
Network Security
Chapter 12
Fifth Edition
by William Stallings
Lecture slides by Lawrie Brown
Symmetric Message Encryption
encryption can also provides authentication
if symmetric encryption is used then:
receiver know sender must have created it
since only sender and receiver now key used
know content cannot of been altered
if message has suitable structure, redundancy
or a checksum to detect any changes
Public-Key Message Encryption
if public-key encryption is used:
encryption provides no confidence of sender
• since anyone potentially knows public-key
however if
• sender signs message using their private-key
• then encrypts with recipients public key
• have both secrecy and authentication
again need to recognize corrupted messages
but at cost of two public-key uses on message
Security of MACs
like block ciphers have:
brute-force attacks exploiting
m/
strong collision resistance hash have cost 2 2
• 128-bit hash looks vulnerable, 160-bits better
MACs with known message-MAC pairs
• can either attack keyspace (cf key search) or MAC
• at least 128-bit MAC is needed for security
Security of MACs
cryptanalytic attacks exploit structure
like block ciphers want brute-force attacks to
be the best alternative
more variety of MACs so harder to
generalize about cryptanalysis
Keyed Hash Functions as MACs
want a MAC based on a hash function
because hash functions are generally faster
crypto hash function code is widely available
hash includes a key along with message
original proposal:
KeyedHash = Hash(Key|Message)
some weaknesses were found with this
eventually led to development of HMAC
HMAC Design Objectives
use, without modifications, hash functions
allow for easy replaceability of embedded
hash function
preserve original performance of hash
function without significant degradation
use and handle keys in a simple way.
have well understood cryptographic analysis
of authentication mechanism strength
HMAC
specified as Internet standard RFC2104
uses hash function on the message:
HMACK(M)= Hash[(K+ XOR opad) ||
Hash[(K+ XOR ipad) || M)] ]
where K+ is the key padded out to size
opad, ipad are specified padding constants
overhead is just 3 more hash calculations than
the message needs alone
any hash function can be used
eg. MD5, SHA-1, RIPEMD-160, Whirlpool
HMAC
Overview
HMAC Security
proved security of HMAC relates to that of
the underlying hash algorithm
attacking HMAC requires either:
brute force attack on key used
birthday attack (but since keyed would need
to observe a very large number of messages)
choose hash function used based on
speed verses security constraints
Using Symmetric Ciphers for
MACs
can use any block cipher chaining mode
and use final block as a MAC
Data Authentication Algorithm (DAA) is
a widely used MAC based on DES-CBC
using IV=0 and zero-pad of final block
encrypt message using DES in CBC mode
and send just the final block as the MAC
• or the leftmost M bits (16≤M≤64) of final block
but final MAC is now too small for security
Data Authentication Algorithm
CMAC
previously saw the DAA (CBC-MAC)
widely used in govt & industry
but has message size limitation
can overcome using 2 keys & padding
thus forming the Cipher-based Message
Authentication Code (CMAC)
adopted by NIST SP800-38B
CMAC Overview
Pseudorandom Number
Generation (PRNG) Using
Hash Functions and MACs
essential elements of PRNG are
seed value
deterministic algorithm
seed must be known only as needed
can base PRNG on
encryption algorithm (Chs 7 & 10)
hash function (ISO18031 & NIST SP 800-90)
MAC (NIST SP 800-90)
PRNG using a Hash Function
hash PRNG from
SP800-90 and
ISO18031
take seed V
repeatedly add 1
hash V
use n-bits of hash
as random value
secure if good
hash used
PRNG using a MAC
MAC PRNGs in
SP800-90,
IEEE 802.11i,
TLS
use key
input based on
last hash in
various ways
Summary
have considered:
message authentication requirements
message authentication using encryption
MACs
HMAC authentication using a hash function
CMAC authentication using a block cipher
Pseudorandom Number Generation (PRNG)
using Hash Functions and MACs
