KG 08803 : - ETHICS AND LAW FOR ENGINEERS

Based on 'Engineering Ethics Concepts and Cases' by Charles E. Harris, Michael S.

Pritchard, Michael J. Rabins, Ray James , Elaine Englehardt

Presented by :-
Ir. A.Sunderaeswaran Nayar
RISK AND LIABILITY
IN
ENGINEERING
MAIN TOPICS
• Risk as the product of likelihood and magnitude of harm
• Identifying harms and benefits with factors that are easily quantified i.e.
economic losses or the number of lives lost
• The “capabilities” approach focuses on the effects of risks and disasters on the
capabilities of people to live the lives they value
• The public conceptualizes risk taking account of factors such as free and
informed consent to risk and whether the risk justly distributed
• The government regulators approach to risk i.e. avoiding harm to the public
rather than producing good
• Engineers techniques for estimating the causes and likelihood of harm
• Protection from unjust liability for harm while also protecting the public
from risk
THE ENGINEER'S APPROACH TO RISK
Risk as the Product of the Probability and Magnitude of Harm

• Engineers define risk as the product of the likelihood of an event and the magnitude of
the resulting harm. Hence a relatively slight harm that is highly likely might then
constitute a greater risk than a more serious harm that is far less likely. However when
engineers quantify risk in this way they must observe that the units of this quantity will
depend on the exact harm being considered, so they must be careful not to
quantitatively compare or add risk quantities that have different units.
• Engineers consider harm in terms of things that can be easily quantified , namely ,as
impairments of our physical and economic well -being or the public health, safety or
welfare.
• The faulty design of a building can result in collapse, resulting in economic loss for the
owner and loss of lives of the inhabitants. This harm is then measured in terms of lives
lost , cost of repairing the building etc..
THE ENGINEER'S APPROACH TO RISK (contd. )
• One Engineering Approach to Defining Acceptable Risk
In order to determine whether a risk is acceptable, engineers often use
a cost-benefit analysis approach. This approach compares the costs
inclusive of the quantified costs of the imposed risks of the engineering
actions under consideration , with the benefits of the actions.
Then the engineering solution that maximises net benefits ( i.e.
benefits minus costs ) consistent with economic and other constraints
is typically selected. For simplest comparison in a cost-benefit analysis,
both the costs and benefits are expressed in equivalent monetary
values.
THE ENGINEER'S APPROACH TO RISK (contd. )
• One Engineering Approach to Defining Acceptable Risk (contd.)
The engineer's criterion for acceptable risk may be stated as :-
An acceptable risk is one in which the product of the probability and
magnitude of the harm is equaled or exceeded by the product of the
probability and magnitude of the benefit.
As an example consider a manufacturing process which produces bad
smelling fumes that pose a threat to public health.From the cost-benefit
standpoint, is the risk to the workers from the fumes acceptable ?
To determine whether this is an acceptable risk from the cost - benefit
perspective , one would have to compare the cost associated with the
risk to the cost of preventing or drastically reducing it.
THE ENGINEER'S APPROACH TO RISK (contd. )
• One Engineering Approach to Defining Acceptable Risk (contd.)
In this case , firstly one has to calculate the cost of preventing the harms . This
would include the costs of modifying the process that produces the fumes, the
cost of providing protective masks, the cost of providing better ventilation
systems , and the cost of any other safety measures necessary to mitigate the
risk.
Then one has to calculate the cost of not preventing the deaths caused by the
fumes. This would include the cost of additional health care, the cost of
possible lawsuits owing to the deaths , the cost of bad publicity, the loss of
income to the families of the workers , and other costs associated with the loss
of life.
If the total cost of preventing the loss of life is greater than the total cost of not
preventing the loss , then the current level of risk is unacceptable.
THE ENGINEER'S APPROACH TO RISK (contd. )
• One Engineering Approach to Defining Acceptable Risk (contd.)
However this utilitarian approach has limitations i.e. :-
i) Not possible to anticipate all of the effects associated with each
option.
ii)It is not always easy to translate all of the risks and benefits into
monetary terms.
What monetary value should be placed on human life ?
THE ENGINEER'S APPROACH TO RISK (contd. )
iii)Cost -benefit analysis in it's usual application makes no allowance for
the distribution of costs and benefits.
iv) The cost-benefit analysis gives no place for informed consent to the
risks imposed by technology. Most people feel that informed consent is
one of the most important features of justified risk. Consequently the
layman sometimes disagrees with the engineers in the assessment of
acceptable risks. A good example of this is the case of the Ford Pinto
where a cost - benefit analysis of the risks proved unacceptable to the
public.
THE ENGINEER'S APPROACH TO RISK (contd. )
• One Engineering Approach to Defining Acceptable Risk (contd.)
Ford compared the costs and benefits of upgrades to the fuel tank, to
reduce the risk of fire resulting from rear end collisions. This included
costs for medical treatment, cost associated with each death , inferred
number of accidents/ accident/ victims/deaths. These costs were
compared to the costs of an improved fuel system and the cost-benefit
calculations favoured production of the Pinto without the
improvements. The fact pertaining to being burned alive in an
otherwise survivable accident ranks high on the juror's list of
unacceptable rights violations.
THE ENGINEER'S APPROACH TO RISK (contd. )
• One Engineering Approach to Defining Acceptable Risk (contd.)
Cost-benefit analysis may be decisive when there are no serious threats
to individual rights. It is systematic, objective ,and provides a way of
comparing risks and benefits via monetary cost.
However as seen from the Pinto case , an engineer using the utilitarian
approach ( cost-benefit analysis ) to risk assessment must ask himself if
a respect- for- persons approach should trump or limit the outcome of
the cost-benefit analysis.
THE ENGINEER'S APPROACH TO RISK (contd. )
• The Capabilities Approach to Identifying Harm and Benefit
• Traditionally engineers have identified harm with factors that easily quantified such
as economic losses and the number of lives lost. However there are 4 limitations to
these :-
i) Only the immediately apparent or focal consequences of a hazard are included e.g.
number of fatalities or the number of homes affected. However hazards can have
auxiliary consequences or indirect harms to society.
ii) Both natural and engineering hazards might create opportunities which should be
accounted for in the aftermath of a disaster. Focusing solely on the negative impacts
and not including these benefits may lead to overestimating the negative societal
consequences of a hazard.
iii) There is a need for an accurate, uniform and consistent standard of measurement
for quantifying the non-fatal physical or psychological harms to individuals or the
indirect impact of hazards on society.
THE ENGINEER'S APPROACH TO RISK (contd. )
• The Capabilities Approach to Identifying Harm and Benefit (contd.)
iv) Present techniques do not demonstrate the connection between
specific harms or losses, such as the loss of a home and the
diminishment of individual or societal well-being and quality of life.

There is a capabilities based approach to risk analysis which focuses on

the effect of disasters on overall human well-being. Well-being is defined
in terms of individual capabilities or “the ability of people to lead the
kind of life they have reason to value.” Capabilities are defined in terms
of functionings such as being alive , being healthy, and being sheltered.
Capabilities are constituent elements of individual well-being.
THE ENGINEER'S APPROACH TO RISK (contd. )
• The Capabilities Approach to Identifying Harm and Benefit (contd.)
Note:- Capabilities are different from utilities which refer to the mental
satisfaction, pleasure or happiness of a particular individual. Using utilities
to measure the well-being of individuals is problematic because happiness
or preference satisfaction is not a sufficient indicator of an individuals well-
being. For example, a person with limited resources might learn to take
pleasure in small things , which are only minimally satisfying to a person
with more ample means. From a utilitarian standpoint , the person could
be described as happy and enjoying a high standard of living. However the
same individual might be objectively deprived. The problem here is that
utilitarianism does not take into account the number and quality of
options available to individuals, which is exactly what capabilities capture.
THE ENGINEER'S APPROACH TO RISK (contd. )
• The Capabilities Approach to Identifying Harm and Benefit (contd.)
From the capabilities standpoint , a risk is the probability that
individuals' capabilities might be reduced due to some hazard. In
determining a risk , the first step is to identify the important capabilities
that might be damaged by a disaster. This can be quantified by
“indicators” that are corelated with the capabilities. Then the indicators
must be scaled on to a common metric so that normalised values are
obtained.This is then followed by development of the Hazard Index and
Hazard Impact Index which gives the hazard impact per person.
THE ENGINEER'S APPROACH TO RISK (contd. )
• The Capabilities Approach to Identifying Harm and Benefit (contd.)
There are 4 benefits in the capabilities based approach:-
i) It captures the adverse effects and opportunities of hazards beyond
the consequences traditionally considered.
ii) Since capabilities are constitutive aspects of individual well-being,
this approach focuses attention on what should be the primary concern
in assessing the societal impact of a hazard.
iii) Offers a more accurate way to measure the actual impact of a
hazard on an individual's well-being.
iv) Requires considering a few properly selected capabilities.
THE ENGINEER'S APPROACH TO RISK (contd. )
• The Capabilities Approach to Identifying Harm and Benefit (contd.)
A risk is acceptable if the probability is sufficiently small that the
adverse effect of a hazard will fall below a threshold of the minimum
level of capabilities attainment that is acceptable in principle.
THE PUBLIC'S APPROACH TO RISK
Expert and Layperson : Differences in Factual Beliefs
There are differences between the engineering and public approach to
risk . This gives rise to 2 questions :-
i) Why does an engineer need to understand these differences ?
If the engineer makes decisions about the acceptability of a certain risk
but miscalculates the public's perception, and if harm should occur from
risks considered acceptable , the public may view the engineer's actions
from a different perspective and unsympathetically.
ii)What are the grounds for these differences ?
Engineers believe that the public is sometimes mistaken in estimating the
probability of death and injury from various activities or technologies.
THE PUBLIC'S APPROACH TO RISK ( contd. )
Expert and Layperson : Differences in Factual Beliefs ( contd.)
People tend to overestimate the likelihood of low probability risks
associated with causes of death and to underestimate the likelihood of
high probability risks associated with causes of death. The latter
tendency can lead to overconfident biasing or anchoring wherein the
original estimate of risk can be substantially erroneous. This original
estimate anchors all future estimates and precludes sufficient
adjustment despite new evidence.
THE PUBLIC'S APPROACH TO RISK ( contd. )
“Risky” Situations and Acceptable Risk
Engineers and the public differ regarding the probabilities of certain
events. One difference is that the public combines the concepts of risk
and acceptable risk whereas engineers separate these.
In public discussion, the term “risky” rather than “risk” has the function
of a warning sign. One reason for classifying something as risky is that it is
new and unfamiliar. Another reason is that the information about it might
be from a questionable source.
For laypersons , voluntarily assumed risks are more acceptable than risks
not voluntarily assumed. The amount of risk people are willing to accept
in the workplace is proportional to the cube of the increase in the wages
offered in compensation.
THE PUBLIC'S APPROACH TO RISK ( contd. )
“Risky” Situations and Acceptable Risk (contd. )
Two issues in the public's concept of risk and acceptable risk have
special moral importance :-
i)Free and informed consent

ii)Equity or justice
THE PUBLIC'S APPROACH TO RISK ( contd. )
Free and Informed Consent
To give free and informed consent to the risks imposed by technology,
three conditions must be met i.e. :-

i) A person must not be coerced.

ii) A person must have the relevant information.

iii) A person must be rational and competent enough to evaluate the

information
THE PUBLIC'S APPROACH TO RISK ( contd. )
Free and Informed Consent ( contd. )
However determining when meaningful and informed consent has been
given may not be easy because :-
i)It is difficult to know when consent is free.
ii)People are often not adequately informed of dangers or do not evaluate
them correctly. Sometimes lay people err in estimating risks.
iii) Often not possible to obtain meaningful informed consent from
individuals who are subject to risks from technology.
As there are problems in getting free and informed consent ,one could
compensate the individuals afterwards for actual harm done through
technology. This approach has the advantage that consent does not have to
be obtained , but there are disadvantages :-
THE PUBLIC'S APPROACH TO RISK ( contd. )
Free and Informed Consent ( contd. )
i) Does not tell how to determine adequate compensation

ii)Limits the freedom of individuals as some persons would never have

consented.

iii)What is adequate compensation for a harm as in the case of serious

injury or death.
THE PUBLIC'S APPROACH TO RISK ( contd. )
Equity or Justice
The ethics of respect for persons places great emphasis on respecting the moral
agency of individuals , regardless of the cost to the larger society.
This is referred to in the case of a cotton mill plant where a worker suffered
byssinosis caused by cotton dust. A utilitarian might be willing to trade off the
harm to the worker (due to a lack of protection ) for the smaller advantages to
an enormous number of people. Protection is expensive and these expenses
will eventually be passed on to the consumers , and possibly result in the
closing of the mills. Such disutilities to the majority of workers may outweigh the
disutilities to the cotton mill worker in this case.
Although many persons enjoyed the benefits of the cotton plant , only a few
workers suffered the consequences of unhealthy working conditions. As such
the benefits and harms have been inequitably distributed.
THE PUBLIC'S APPROACH TO RISK ( contd. )
Equity or Justice ( contd. )
It is not possible to distribute all risks and benefits equally. For
example , a proposal was made to build a port in Texas for off-loading
LNG. Natural Gas would then be transported to many places in the USA
whereby many persons would benefit from the project. However only
the persons living near the port would share the risks of storage tanks
exploding. However as there is no way to equalize the risk , informed
consent and compensation must be major considerations in the
planning of the project. Hence , informed consent , compensation , and
equity are closely related considerations in moral evaluation.
THE PUBLIC'S APPROACH TO RISK ( contd. )
Equity or Justice ( contd. )
A layman's criterion for acceptable risk is :-
i) Risk assumed by free and informed consent or properly
compensated
ii) Risk is justly distributed or propertly compensated
COMMUNICATING RISK AND PUBLIC POLICY
Communicating Risk to the Public
i)Engineers define risk as the product of the magnitude and likelihood
of harm and are favourable towards the utilitarian way of accepting
acceptable risk.
Also as per the professional codes , engineers are to uphold safety,
health , and welfare of the public .Hence engineers are expected to
minimize risk. However so as to determine an acceptable level of risk
for engineering works they are likely to use a cost-benefit approach.
ii) The layp ublic considers free and informed consent and equitable
distribution of risk ( or appropriate compensation ) to be important in
the distribution of acceptable risk.
COMMUNICATING RISK AND PUBLIC POLICY (contd.)
Communicating Risk to the Public (contd.)
iii) Government regulators with their special obligations to protect the public from
undue technological risks ,are more concerned with preventing harm to the public
than with avoiding claims for harm that turn out to be false. Though they may
often use cost-benefit analysis to determine acceptable risk, they have an
obligation to prevent harm to the public, which may go beyond what cost- benefit
considerations require. At the same time , considerations of free and informed
consent and equity may be balanced by cost-benefit considerations.

There are certain guidelines to be followed by engineers in risk communications :-

1/. Engineers in communicating risk to the public ,must be aware that the public's
approach to risk is not the same as that of the risk expert.
COMMUNICATING RISK AND PUBLIC POLICY (contd.)
Communicating Risk to the Public (contd.)
2/. Engineers must be careful when saying “ There is no such thing as zero
risk.” For the public the term “zero risk “ means a familiar risk that requires
no further deliberation.
3/. Engineers , in presenting the risks to the public , should be careful to
acknowledge the possible limitations in their position.
4/. Engineers should be aware that government regulators have a special
obligation to protect the public, and that this may require them to take into
account considerations other than a strict cost-benefit approach.
5/. Professional engineering societies have a special obligation to present
information regarding technological risk . Information on probabilities of
harm must be provided objectively.
COMMUNICATING RISK AND PUBLIC POLICY (contd.)
An Example of Public Policy : Building Codes
One of the most immediate ways in which public policy must rely on
engineering expertise and engineering is in turn affected by public policy is
through local building codes.
The local building codes specify factors of safety and construction steps
that are required. Building Codes have the status of law and may not be
changed without public hearings and legislative action. The legislature will
often appoint a committee of experts to propose a new building code or
necessary changes to an existing one.
An example of this is the collapse of the World Trade Centre's Twin
Towers , after which there was a major multiagency effort to identify the
causes for the collapse and to propose changes to the building codes.
COMMUNICATING RISK AND PUBLIC POLICY (contd.)
An Example of Public Policy : Building Codes ( contd. )
When an engineer recognizes a violation of a building code in a design and
does not object to it, the engineer bears some responsibility for injuries or
deaths that result. Also when an engineer learns of a proposed change in a
building code that he is convinced creates dangers for the public and does
nothing to prevent this change, the engineer bears some responsibility for any
harm done.
In the years between the design of the Empire State Building and the design of
the World Trade Centre Twin Towers, building codes underwent a change
nationwide.It is up to today's engineers to help maintain performance
standards without introducing unacceptable risks to the public they serve.
Building codes are one of the aspects of public policy that directly affect
engineers and also require information from engineers in their formulation.
DIFFICULTIES IN DETERMINING THE CAUSES AND LIKELIHOOD OF HARM : THE
CRITICAL ATTITUDE

It would be highly desirable to be able to accurately predict the harm

result from engineering work. However engineers can only estimate the
magnitude and probability of harm. In actual practice , risk assessment
involves an uncertain prediction of the probabilty of harm.
DIFFICULTIES IN DETERMINING THE CAUSES AND LIKELIHOOD OF HARM : THE
CRITICAL ATTITUDE

Limitations in Identifying Failure Modes

One method for assessing risk involves the use of a 'Fault Tree’. In a 'Fault
Tree' analysis , one begins with an undesirable event e.g. loss of cooling
water to a nuclear plant. 'Fault Trees' are often used to anticipate hazards for
which there is little or no direct experience such as nuclear meltdowns. The
'Fault Trees' enable an engineer to analyze systematically different events or
failure modes that could produce the undesirable end result.
'Fault Tree' analysis has been criticized as offering too optimistic a
perspective because the analysis is the estimation of the aggregate
probability of identified failure modes. Sometimes certain failure modes are
not identified during analysis and hence the associated risks are not
estimated. Hence the result is misleading implying a lower risk than actually
exists.
DIFFICULTIES IN DETERMINING THE CAUSES AND LIKELIHOOD OF HARM : THE
CRITICAL ATTITUDE ( contd. )

Limitations due to Tight Coupling and Complex Interactions

High-risk technologies have two characteristics that make them especially susceptible to
accidents i.e. :-
i) Tight Coupling
Processes are tightly coupled if they are connected in such a way that one process is
known to affect another within a short period.Hence there is little time to correct a failure
and little likelihood of confining failure to one part of the system. As a result the entire
system is damaged e.g. chemical plant.
ii) Complex Interactions
In complex interaction , the inability to predict consequences is crucial. Processes can be
complexly interactive in that the parts of the system can interact in unanticipated ways for
example in chemical plants.
These two factors make accidents more likely to occur and also more difficult to predict
and control. This makes risk more difficult to estimate.
DIFFICULTIES IN DETERMINING THE CAUSES AND LIKELIHOOD OF HARM : THE
CRITICAL ATTITUDE ( contd. )

Limitations due to Tight Coupling and Complex Interactions (contd.)

It is difficult to change tightly coupled and complexly interactive
systems to make accidents less likely or easier to predict. To reduce
complexity , decentralisation is required to give operators the ability to
react independently to unanticipated events. However to deal with
tight coupling , centralization is required. Engineers try to overcome
this dilemma by including localized automatic controls to protect to
protect against tight coupling failures. against failures due to
complexity and also couple them with manual overrides
DIFFICULTIES IN DETERMINING THE CAUSES AND LIKELIHOOD OF HARM : THE
CRITICAL ATTITUDE ( contd. )

Normalizing Deviance and Self-Deception

A factor that increases risk and also decreases our ability to anticipate harm is
increasing the allowable deviations from proper standards of safety and acceptable risk.
Every design carries with it certain predictions about how the designed objects should
perform in use. Sometimes these predictions are not fulfilled thus producing anomalies.
However rather than correcting the design or the operating conditions, engineers may
accept the anomalies or even increase the boundaries of acceptable risk. This can be
fatal as happened in the Challenger disaster.
In the case of the shuttle disaster , neither the contractor Morton Thiokol nor NASA
expected the rubber O-rings that sealed the joints in the solid rocket booster to be
touched by the hot gases of motor ignition , much less to be partially burned. However
because previous shuttle flights showed damage to the sealing rings, the reaction by
contractor and NASA was to accept the anomalies without attempting to remedy the
problems which caused the anomalies.
DIFFICULTIES IN DETERMINING THE CAUSES AND LIKELIHOOD OF HARM : THE
CRITICAL ATTITUDE ( contd. )

Normalizing Deviance and Self-Deception (contd.)

The case of the Challenger shows how the self-deception involved in normalising
deviance can limit the ability of engineers to correctly anticipate risk. Some of the
engineers and managers repeatedly convinced themselves that allowing still one
more deviation from design expectations would not increase the chance of failure
or was at least an acceptable risk.
THE ENGINEER'S LIABILITY FOR RISK
Risk is difficult to estimate and often engineers are tempted to allow anomales to
accumulate without taking remedial action, and in fact to even expand the scope
of acceptable risk so as to accomodate them.
Another issue that raises ethical concerns for engineers regards legal liability for
risk. There are two points to be considered here i.e. :-

i) The standards of proof in tort law and science are different thus producing ethical
conflict.

ii) In protecting the public from unnecessary risk , engineers may themselves incur
legal liabilities.
THE ENGINEER'S LIABILITY FOR RISK
The Standards of Tort Law
Litigation that seeks redress from harm most commonly appeals to the law of Torts,
whch deals with injuries to one person caused by another, usually as a result of fault
or negligence of the injuring party. Numerous high profile legal cases pertaining to
claims of harm from technology have been brought under the law of Torts.
The standard of proof in tort law is that more and better evidence is required in
favour of the plaintiff rather than the defendent. The plaintiff must show :-
i) That the defendent violated a legal duty imposed by the tort law.
ii)That the plaintiff suffered injuries compensable in the tort law.
iii)That the defendent's violation of legal duty caused the plaintiff's injuries
iv) That the defendent's violation of legal duty was the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injuries
THE ENGINEER'S LIABILITY FOR RISK (contd.)
The Standards of Tort Law (contd.)
The standard of proof that a given substance was the proximate cause of a harm is
less stringent than that which would be demanded by a scientist who might call for
95% certainty. Example of these are :-
i) Rubanick versus Witco Chemical Corporation and Monsanto Co. where the
deceased's cancer was caused by exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls.

ii) Richard Ferebee who alleged that he suffered lung damage as a result of spraying
paraquat.
However some courts have begun to impose higher standards of evidence for
recovery of damages which are similar to those used in science. This approach could
be fairer to to the defendents because some decisions in favour of plaintiffs may not
be based on valid proof of responsibility for harm
THE ENGINEER'S LIABILITY FOR RISK (contd.)
The Standards of Tort Law (contd.)
By requiring higher standards of proof , the courts place burdens of evidence on
plaintiffs that they cannot meet.

The major ethical question is whether we should be more concerned with

protecting the rights of plaintiffs who may have been unjustly harmed or with
promoting economic efficiency and protecting defendents against unjust charges of
harm.
THE ENGINEER'S LIABILITY FOR RISK (contd.)
Protecting Engineers from Liability
The threat of legal liability can inhibit engineers from adequately protecting the
public from risk. Engineers may face difficult considerations regarding liability and
risk, and as such may require increased protection from liability.

Consider the safety issues in excavating trenches for foundations,sewers etc. To

reduce the risk of death or injury from trench wall collapse , engineers can specify
the use of trench boxes. Engineers are placed in an awkward position as regards
the trench boxes particularly if the boxes are not required by building codes.Hence
if the engineers do not specify the use of the boxes , then they may be
contributing to a situation that subjects workers to a high risk of death or injury. If
they do specify the boxes then they may be incurring liability in case of an accident
due to the use of the trench boxes.
BECOMING A RESPONSIBLE ENGINEER REGARDING RISK

The obligation of engineers is to be ethically responsible with regard to risk.

The first step is to be aware of the fact that risk is often difficult to estimate and can
be increased in subtle and dangerous ways.

The second step is to be aware that there are different approaches to the
determination of acceptable risk. Engineers have a strong bias towards
quantification in their approach to risk, which may make them insufficiently
sensitive to the concerns of the lay public and even government regulators

The third step is to assume their responsibility, as the experts in technology, to

communicate issues regarding risk to the public, with full awareness that both the
public and government regulators have a somewhat different agenda with regard to
risk.
THANK YOU !