Rail Transit Security

in an International Context
Security Issues and Impacts Conference
UCLA, June 1, 2006

Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris
Department of Urban Planning, UCLA

A Collaborative Research Project:

UCLA Department of Urban Planning
UC Berkeley Institute of Transportation Studies
 “For those intending to kill in quantity and
willing to kill indiscriminately,

public transit offers an ideal target”

While air transport security has been given great

attention, urban transport systems carry more people
and depend on open, accessible design to function well
 Public Transit Terrorist Incidents
• Over 900 incidents since 1920
• Two-thirds intended to kill people rather than just
to disrupt service
• More than one-third of attacks actually produced
fatalities
• Of fatal incidents, three-quarters produced
multiple deaths, and one quarter produced ten or
more deaths
 Since 1990 more than 40% of all
terrorist attacks in the entire world
have been on transportation
systems
 Stages in Security Planning

• Stage 1: Planning, Design, & Building

• Stage 2: Planning for Incident Response
• Stage 3: Immediate Response to Incidents
• Stage 4: Long-Term Recovery and Adoption of
New Rules & Procedures
 Components of the Project

• Review of the literature on transit terrorist

incidents
• Survey of 113 U.S. transit agencies
• Case studies of U.S. transit systems: New York,
Washington, D.C.
• International case studies: London, Madrid,
Paris, Tokyo
 A Great Deal to Learn From International
Experience

• London after IRA attacks

• Japan after sarin gas attacks
• Paris after GIA bombings
• Madrid after Al-Queda attack
 Scope of Research
• Comparing strategies of transit agencies in U.S.
and around the world
• Contrasting transit security processes of
different transit authorities and ministries
• Evaluating transit station design for security
• Assessing lessons learned from actual attacks in
different contexts for future response &
prevention
Survey of Domestic Transit Operators
• The survey looked at the perceptions and experiences
after the 9-11 attacks, in four distinct areas of transit
security planning
– Policing
– Security hardware and technology
– Public education/user outreach
– Environmental design strategies
• 113 transit agencies responded (44% of agencies
contacted)
– 108 cities in 40 different states
Most Recent Incidents Experienced By
Systems
Vulnerability of System Modes to Attack
Bus 6% 19% 29% 45% 97

Vulnerability of System Components

Paratransit 7% 41% 27% 26% 83

TABLE 20 : Vulnerability of System Components

Don't Somewhat Very

Component Not Vulnerable n
Know Vulnerable Vulnerable

Tracks and rail lines 8% 15% 11% 66% 26

Rail Stations 12% 14% 11% 63% 27

Bridges/tunnels 4% 8% 26% 62% 38

Multi-modal terminals (bus and rail) 11% 10% 23% 56% 50

Vehicles 6% 10% 32% 52% 67

 Threat and Vulnerability Assessments
• Of 113 agencies, 85% have conducted some level of
threat and vulnerability assessment of key system
infrastructure
• Almost half (46%) of systems have conducted
comprehensive security assessments
• Among agencies who have not conducted assessments
(n=11), reasons given for not doing so included lack of
resources, agency in the process of planning
assessment, and one respondent claimed that his
agency was not a “high value target”
 Frequency of Assessments

• A third of agencies reported doing assessments

at least once a year
• Other agencies did not have regular policy –
conduct assessments as deemed necessary
• 70% have conducted an assessment in the last
3 years
Importance of Strategies in Security Planning
 Perceived Effectiveness of Strategies
TABLE 16: Perceived Effectiveness of Strategies in Security Planning
Agency Somewhat
Strategy Very Effective Not Effective Don't Know n
Type Effective
Rail 40% 53% 7% 0% 27
Policing No Rail 24% 57% 9% 10% 79
TOTAL 28% 56% 8% 8% 106
Rail 27% 62% 4% 7% 26
Security Hardware/
Technology No Rail 26% 53% 13% 9% 80
TOTAL 26% 55% 10% 8% 106
Rail 32% 50% 9% 9% 21
CPTED No Rail 19% 62% 11% 8% 37
TOTAL 24% 58% 10% 9% 58
Rail 22% 49% 18% 11% 27
Public Education/ User
Outreach No Rail 11% 43% 20% 26% 80
TOTAL 14% 44% 19% 22% 107
 CPTED Strategies and Transit Security

• More than two-thirds (69%) of respondents

familiar with crime prevention through
environmental design (CPTED)
• 58% of the transit systems employ CPTED
strategies
• Familiarity and use of CPTED was higher among
systems with rail
Components where CPTED Strategies
are used
Components of Rail Systems where
CPTED strategies are used
 General Survey Conclusions
• Significant attacks are so far rare in the US although
transit agencies have received at times credible threats
• Attention to transit security increased significantly after
9-11; CPTED and information and outreach was given
much more attention after 9-11
• Survey findings reflect fundamental dilemmas of transit
security planning – systems inherently open and
vulnerable, but security has increased dramatically in
the past decade
 International Case Studies: Research
Questions
• How are transportation systems in different cities
of the world handling transit security?
• What mix of strategies do they use?
• Do they perceive crime prevention through
environmental design as a valid security
strategy?
• What lessons can U.S. transit systems learn
from the international experience?
 International Fieldwork

• Interviews with transit managers, transit officials

responsible for security, architects, and engineers
designing the operation of transit systems in 4 cities.
• Visits to stations of case study systems and their control
and command centers
• Visits to ‘model stations’ with state of the art measures
of security (Alto del Arenal in Madrid, METEOR’s Gare
de Lyon, and St. Lazare on the EOLE line in Paris).
 Paris

• Previous attacks more limited in scope.

• Recognition that “threat is different today.”
• “Security has become more of a goal than a
reality. The primary goal is to create a feeling of
security rather than reduce the risk to zero,
which is practically impossible.”
 Paris
A Hierarchical System of Security- A Web of Plans

• Government plans for civil security under the authority of Prefet –

‘Plan Rouge’
• In each region, ‘local communities of security’ composed of police,
local government officials, and transit operators
• After Algerian attacks of 1995, ‘Vigipirate Plan’ for periods of high
alert in Paris
• Security Audits and prioritization of security needs by French
Ministry of Transport
• Security plans for specific types of threats (chemical, biological,
radioactive
• Security measures by transit operators (SNCF and RATP)
 Paris
Key Security Emphasis
• Comprehensiveness, coordination,
communication, adoption of a ‘systemic
approach to security,’ integration of different
strategies
• Coordination transcends national borders. Pan-
European cooperation through the International
Union of Transportation (UITP)
 Line 14 - Meteor
Integration of Security Strategies
• Security Technology:
Computerized trains under a
command center which can
communicate with each train.
Glass doors on platforms,
adjustable locks on trains,
remote control CCTV cameras
• Policing: Uniformed and
civilian-clothed staff and police
on platforms and trains.
• Information Campaigns
 Integration of Security Strategies
• Design: Wide, straight
passageways, corridors,
and platforms, limited
exits, use of natural and
artificial lighting, shatter
proof fiberglass,
transparent and resistant
materials, transparent
trashcans
 Tokyo

• Sarin attack came as a shock to the “safe

society” of Japan; it was perceived as an
isolated incident, an indiscriminate large-scale
murder – not a terrorist incident
• 9-11 attacks forced the Japanese to perceive
terrorism as “a very serious threat” to their
transit systems
 Tokyo
Responsibility on Transit Operators
• Minimal role of the national government in issuing
security regulations or implementing transit security
improvements
• National government issues at times security
suggestions and “guidance memos”
• Broad security directives and strategies are decided by
the Board of Directors of transit companies; smaller
security issues are decided upon by the Safety Affairs
Division of each company
 Tokyo
Transit Security Strategies
• Policing and
patrolling by
staff, private
security
guards,
municipal
police
 Tokyo
Transit Security Strategies

• User outreach through

posters, stickers and
public announcements
 Tokyo
Transit Security Strategies
• Security technologies with
security cameras and CCTV
technology. Since sarin
attack 2,200 security
cameras have been
installed at strategic points
(platforms, ticket gates,
restrooms)
• Alarm and security buttons
 Tokyo
Transit Security Strategies
• Design strategies only considered after 9-11
 Efforts to minimize ‘dead space’
 Make inaccessible certain station areas
 Locate restrooms away from secluded spaces; make
walls out of translucent materials
 Remove trashcans and cigarette receptacles
 New train windows open more easily
 Fireproof train materials
 London

• Very comprehensive system of security

directives and standards due to the series of
terrorist attacks by IRA in last 30 years
• The Al-Queda attacks were perceived as “a
different brand of terrorism” and have injected a
new sense of urgency
 London
A Layered Network of Security
• National Level: Two national committees under the Department of
Transport – Rail Safety and Standards Board (sets safety standards)
and TRANSEC (regulates airports, ports, and railway stations)
• Regional Level: Transport for London (TfL) facilitates emergency
planning and response of transportation agencies in the greater London
area
• Industry-wide:
1. British Transport Police (BTP) for all railway systems in Great
Britain
2. Network Rail (nonprofit) owns and controls railway infrastructure;
deals with the security of stations and infrastructure
• Transit Operators operate their own Security Division, which oversees
implementation of security standards and suggests enhancements
 London
Key Security Emphasis

• Interagency coordination: Regular meetings of

representatives from each agency
• Coordination with European agencies to share
best practices
• Not much collaboration with American transport
operators
 London
Transit Security Strategies
• Mix of security technology, customer outreach,
policing, and design strategies
• “I don’t think one of these strategies sits on its
own. You’ve got to do each one. And you’ve got
to have an element of each one in terms of
combating terrorism”
– London Underground official
 London
Transit Security Strategies
• Security technology: 6,000 CCTV cameras, some
connected to alarms, and some with recording
capabilities – some skepticism about their effectiveness
• Policing and staff vigilance; 630 officers in London
Underground in 2004
• Information and outreach has resulted in significant
vigilance by the public; reports of 10,000 unattended
items every month!
 London
Transit Security Strategies
• Design strategies emerged in the last decade
– Elimination of concealment spaces (vending
machines and phone booths with sloping tops)
– Securing in-between spaces (walkways, escalators,
elevators, storage and power supply rooms)
– Many decentralized control rooms for the system.
– Redesigned trash receptacles (see-through plastic)
 Madrid

• Long experience with terrorism because of ETA

attacks
• New understanding of terrorism after 3-11-04
attack as “indiscriminate,” “international,”
“unexpected”
 Madrid
Triple Layer of Security
National – Municipal – Transit Operator

• National Level: Ministry of Defense provides information about

threats; Ministry of Interior instigates security regulations and
standards; Civil Guard protects Metro Madrid.
• Local Level: Municipal police protects Metro Madrid; Consorcio
Regional de Tranportes de Madrid (CRTM) coordinates
transportation agencies.
• Transit Operators: Operate security departments, contract private
security officers
• Association holding bi-monthly meetings of representatives of
local and regional agencies dealing with security.
 Madrid
Transit Security Strategies
• Security Technology
 Retrofit of Metro Madrid and
RENFE stations with anti-
intrusion and detection
systems, and video and
security cameras.
 Scanning system of
passengers of high-speed
(AVE) trains.
 Command and control center
 Madrid
Transit Security Strategies
• Public Outreach: Only
training of employees;
absence of warning
posters and advice for the
public
• Policing: Combination of
private and municipal
police forces, and national
forces for Metro Madrid
 Madrid
Transit Security Strategies
• Design Strategies: Design
guidelines for new stations
 Limited entrance points
 Clearly visible, open
corridors, platforms, waiting
areas
 Avoidance of underground
passages and footbridges,
and winding corridors
 Madrid
Design Strategies (cont)
 Elimination of dark
zones
 Panoramic
elevators
 No space on top or
underneath
vending machines
 Transparent
materials in station
design
 Good lighting
 Ten Lessons Learned
1. Public transit systems are inherently vulnerable to
terrorist attacks; they cannot be closed and secured
like other parts of the transportation system.
2. The threat of transit terrorism is probably not
universal; most attacks in the western world have
been on largest systems in the largest cities.
3. Transit managers are struggling to balance the costs
and benefits of increased security against the costs
and benefits of attracting passengers.
4. Close coordination among government, security and
transit sectors is critical to effective planning.
 Ten Lessons Learned
5. Despite significant progress in increasing
coordination, much work remains (particularly in the
U.S.).
6. Standardization of emergency training, security
audits, and guidelines, and disaster preparedness
procedures is important.
7. Passenger education is a challenge: Informed
passengers can increase safety, fearful passengers
may stop using transit.
 Ten Lessons Learned
8. Anti-terrorism efforts have had as a positive
side-effect the reduction of person and
property crime in transit systems.
9. The role of crime prevention through
environmental design is waxing.
10. Transit agencies have been more likely to
adopt comprehensive, multi-pronged
approaches to security after 9-11.
“You can have the cleanest trains in the world,
you can have the most luminous trains in the
world, and you can have the most comfortable
trains in the world, and you can have the most
punctual trains in the world. But when you go
in a train and do not feel safe you are not
going to use that train.”
– Manuel Rodriguez Simons, Director of Security and Civil
Protection, RENFE, Madrid
Questions & Comments