Mobility Series

Module 4 – Wireless LAN Security

William H. Wolfe II
Cisco Certified Networking Academy Instructor Trainer
So now you need wireless AND security…

© 2014 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 2
 1. Overview of WLAN Security

2. Wireless Vulnerabilities and Threats

Agenda 3. Threat Mitigation Technologies

4. Strong Authentication and Encryption

5. Centralizing WLAN Authentication

6. Conclusion/Remarks/Resources

© 2014 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 3
Overview of WLAN Security

© 2014 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 4
Wired vs. Wireless Privacy
Authentication
 Proving identity can be done using:
− Something you know
 Password
 Something you do
− Something you have
 Physical object
 Value read from a device you have
− Something you are
 Biometric reading
Authenticating Devices vs. Users
Encryption
Symmetric and Asymmetric Encryption
Wireless Threats

 Rogue access points:

− Usually default configuration
− Any client on a rogue access point is a rogue client
 Ad hoc networks:
− Open potential weaknesses
− Occupy one of your channels
 Client misassociation - accessing the right SSID on a rogue AP
 Wireless attacks:
− Management frames spoofing
− Active attacks
− Passive attacks
Wireless IDS
Wireless IPS
Management Frame Protection
Summary

 In wireless networks, authentication determines who accesses the network, and

encryption protects data privacy.
 User authentication can be done using something you know, something you have, or
something you are. The devices used to access the network can also be authenticated.
 In wireless networks, encryption is used to add privacy.
 Authentication or encryption keys can be common to a cell or unique to each user.
 Controllers can be linked to Cisco IDS to cut Layer 3-to-Layer 7 attackers completely
from the Layer 2 wireless connection.
 In Cisco networks, Management Frame Protection can limit the impact of attacks based
on management frames.
Wireless Vulnerabilities and Threats

© 2014 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 15
Why Are Wireless LANs Prone to Attack?
Physical Security Wired Security

 Open air nature of RF

 Propagation Control is difficult
No physical barriers to intrusion
 Standard 802.11 protocol Enterprise
Network
Well-documented and understood
The most common attacks against
WLAN networks are targeted at
management frames
 Unlicensed
Easy access to inexpensive technology,
for deployments and attack

Wireless Access Outside of

Physical/Wired Boundaries
Need for WLAN Security
 Open, Pervasive nature of RF
Can’t control RF Propagation, don’t need physical access to launch attacks
anymore
 Business impact of stolen data
Potential legal and financial implications (specially in retail, healthcare and
government verticals)
 Innate design, per IEEE 802.11, was designed with basic security
needs in mind – times have changed
Known vulnerabilities over time
WLANs are easy DoS targets: jamming, floods, man-in-the-middle attacks, and
dictionary attacks…
No protection of 802.11 Management and Control frames, most solutions address
802.11 Data frames only
 Need to protect and authorize access to network services and
resources
Security Risk Assessment
 Sensitive data
What is classified as Sensitive varies by organization
Determined at all levels of an organization what data must be
protected from both a legal and business viewpoint
Appropriate data is protected with proper protection.
Intellectual property, trade secrets, identity information, financial
information, health information, and employee and customer
databases
Possibility that some data is too high a security risk
 Network services
Availability of a company's network, and such actions would cause
damage to the company's productivity and affect sales.
Services : E-mail services, file servers, database services, directory
services, Internet connectivity, Web-based applications, virus and
intrusion detection services, and custom application services.
Security Policy and what it means
 Security Policy
An organization needs a security policy to define how to protect
sensitive data and network services.
What to do if systems or policies fail..
 Network services
IT organization needs to work with the Security organization to help
define the Security Policy and deploy network services inline with
the Security Policy
 Client Capabilities
Understanding the capabilities of the network and more importantly
the capabilities of the client endpoints will ensure a secure WLAN
deployment able to meet the requirements of the business.
Why Is WLAN Security Important?
Hackers/Criminal
Vulnerabilities: Employees

“War Driving”
Lessons:
 Do not rely on basic WEP encryption; requirement for enterprise class security
(WPA, EAP/802.1x protocols, Wireless IDS, VLANs/SSIDs, etc.)
 Employees often install WLAN equipment on their own (compromises security of
your entire network)
 Business impact due to stolen data: Potential financial and legal
consequences (laws to protect data confidentiality; example: healthcare,
retail, financial, government)
WLAN Security “Visibility”
 Prevalence of technology
PWLAN (Public Wireless LAN) and other public 802.11 networks
 Other security fears—identity theft, phishing, etc.
“Hackers target Xbox Live players”, Feb 20, 2009
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7888369.stm
“Crime to boom as downturn blooms” Dec 30, 2008
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7797946.stm
Public availability of tools
Aircrack—WEP key exploit
coWPAtty—WPA-PSK exploit
Kismac—MAC-based implementation of Kismet
http://www.darknet.org.uk/2006/04/top-15-securityhacking-tools-utilities
 Wireless Security Threats
Classifying the attack types

On-Wire Attacks Over-the-Air Attacks

Ad-hoc Wireless Bridge Evil Twin/Honeypot AP Reconnaissance
HACKER HACKER’S HACKER
AP

Client-to-client backdoor access Connection to malicious AP Seeking network vulnerabilities

Rogue Access Points Denial of Service Cracking Tools

HACKER HACKER
DENIAL OF
SERVICE

Backdoor network access Service disruption Sniffing and eavesdropping

Non-802.11 Attacks
Backdoor access
BLUETOOTH AP Service disruption MICROWAVE BLUETOOTH RF-JAMMERS RADAR
WLAN Security Vulnerabilities
and Threats
Examples of Existing Vulnerabilities and Threats
 WLAN sniffing/war driving
 Encryption vulnerabilities: WEP
 Denial of Service (DoS) attacks: using 802.11
de-authentication/disassociation frames,
RF jamming, etc.
 Authentication vulnerabilities: dictionary attacks,
MITM attacks
 Address spoofing: MAC-address spoofing and
IP address spoofing (both hostile/outsider attacks
as well as insider attacks)
An Example:
How Does a Wireless Exploit Take Place?

 Probe response “listening” (to get SSID)

 Passive WEP key sniffing
 Initial phases of WLAN security exploit
Discovery of WLAN networks by monitoring for
probe/probe responses
Collection of sufficient encrypted packets, offline
processing and attempt to calculate WEP key
An Example:
How Does a Wireless Exploit Take Place?
Active De-Auth to Induce Clients to Probe
(Reduces Time to Overcome SSID “Cloaking”
 For example, “Kismac” tool: offers a “suite”
of exploit tools with a easy-to-use GUI
 http://www.ethicalhack.org/videos.php
 Authentication exploits can then be undertaken,
once a client has been provoked to re-authenticate
 Or, if client may be induced to negotiate
unauthenticated/unencrypted connection,
a direct exploit on client may be undertaken
WLAN Sniffing and SSID Broadcasting

The Simplest Type of WLAN Exploit

 However, given the “open” characteristics of 802.11 association behavior,
one that is not easily fixed
 Disabling SSID “broadcast” simply overcomes passive sniffing; SSID
is easily discovered by observing probe responses from clients
 Thus, SSID “cloaking” shouldn’t be considered a security mechanism
802.11 WEP Vulnerabilities
 802.11 Static-WEP is flawed: encryption passive attacks
RC4 Key Scheduling algorithm uses 24-bit Initialization Vector (IV) and does
not rotate encryption keys
Practical tools that have implemented FMS attack (example: AirSnort) can uncover the WEP key after
capturing 1,000,000 packets
This is about ~ 17 minutes to compromise the WEP key in a busy network;
this attack is passive and all the attack tool needs to do is “listen” to the WLAN network (i.e., sniff WLAN
packets)
 802.11 Static-WEP is flawed: encryption active attacks
Does not protect the WLAN user data integrity
Several forms of attacks possible: Replay attacks, bit-flipping attacks, etc.
 802.11 Static-WEP shared key authentication is flawed
AP challenges (plaintext challenge) the WLAN user to ensure
possession of valid encryption key
Attacker can obtain key stream  plaintext challenge XOR
ciphertext = Key Stream
Wireless: Man in the Middle Attacks

 A MiTM is when an attacker poses as the network to the clients and as a

client to the actual network
Attacker must first force client off of intended network in order to lure wireless station to
associate to “rogue network”
The attacker gains security credentials by intercepting user traffic
 Very easy to do with:
MAC Address Spoofing
Rogue Device Setup
DoS Attacks
Easier Sniffing, and war-driving
Wireless: Rogue Devices
 What is a Rogue?
Any device that’s sharing your spectrum, but not managed by you
Majority of rogues are setup by insiders (low cost, convenience,
ignorance)
 When is a Rogue dangerous?
When setup to use the same ESSID as your network (honeypot)
When it’s detected to be on the wired network too
Ad-hoc rogues are arguably a big threat, too!
Setup by an outsider, most times, with malicious intent
 What needs to be done?
Classify
Detect
Reporting, if needed
Track (over-the-air, and on-the-wire) and Mitigate (Shutdown, Contain, etc)
Rogue AP Vulnerability:
Both Internal and External Sources
Frustrated insider Most Rogue APs
 User that installs wireless AP in order to benefit
from increased efficiency and convenience it offers
 Common because of wide availability of
low cost APs
 Usually ignorant of AP security configuration,
default configuration most common
James from Accounting

Malicious hacker
 Penetrates physical security specifically to Less likely
install a rogue AP
 Can customize AP to hide it from detection tools
 Hard to detect—more effective to prevent via 802.1x
and physical security
 More likely to install LINUX box than an AP
What Is a Dictionary Attack Tool?
 What is a dictionary?
Contains variations of passwords
Weak passwords can be cracked using standard dictionaries (found easily in various Internet
discussion forums and web sites)
 Success factors for this tool depend on:
Variation of the user’s password must be found in the dictionary used by the attacker
Attacker’s experience and knowledge in generating dictionaries
Password strength
A weak six character password will be easily compromised compared to a strong ten letter
password
Attacker’s dictionary strength determines whether the password
can be compromised
MAC Address Spoofing
 As with wired networks, MAC address and IP address
spoofing are possible, if not easy, in Wireless Networks Authorized
Client
 Outsider (hostile) attack scenario
Does not know key/encryption policy
IP Address spoofing is not possible if Encryption is turned on
(DHCP messages are encrypted between the client and the AP) Sniff Client
MAC Addr
MAC Address spoofing alone (i.e., without IP Address spoofing) and IP
may not buy much if encryption is turned on Address
Access
 Insider attack scenario Point

Seeking to obtain users’ secure info Inject Packets into

the WLAN Network
MAC address and IP Address spoofing will not succeed if Using Client’s
EAP/802.1x authentication is used (unique encryption key is MAC/IP Address
derived per user (i.e., per MAC address))
Wireless Sniffing: Good and Bad
 First – Sniffing, or capturing packets over the air, is an extremely useful
troubleshooting methodology
 Sniffing, in the old days was reliant on very specific cards and drivers
 Very easy to find support for most cards and drivers today
 Cost (if you like to pay for it) of such software is negligible (or, just use
free/opensource software)
 Provides an insight (with physical proximity) into the network, services, and
devices which comes in handy when performing network reconnaissance
WLAN Security
Denial of Service Attacks

 RF Jamming
– Any intentional or un-intentional RF transmitter in the same frequency can adversely affect the
WLAN
 DoS using 802.11 Management frames (MPF can help mitigate)
– Management frames are not authenticated today
– Trivial to fake the source of a management frame
– De-Authentication floods are probably the most worrisome
 Misuse of Spectrum (CSMA/CA – Egalitarian Access!)
– “Silencing” the network with RTS/CTS floods, Big-NAV Attacks
 802.1X Authentication floods and Dictionary attacks
– Overloading the system with unnecessary processing
– Legacy implementations are prone to dictionary attacks, in addition to other algorithm-based
attacks
Authentication Vulnerabilities
 Management frames are not authenticated !
 Dictionary attacks
On-line (active) attacks: active attack to compromise passwords or
pass-phrases
Off-line attacks: passive attack to compromise passwords or pass-
phrases
 MITM attacks
Active attacks: an attacker attempts to insert himself
in the middle of authentication sequence
 Can be employed in 802.1X as well as PSK environments
Multiple known WEP weaknesses, and many exploits out there
Exploits Using 802.11 as a Launchpad
 Standard Layer 2 exploits, e.g., Dsniff, Nmap
 Penetration test—server and service vulnerabilities:
Metasploit project—open source RPC injector http://metasploit.com
Immunity CANVAS
Core security technology impact
 Application security—exploit/malware
 Specific examples that have been launched:
Installation of various viruses, worms, and other malware, thereby complicating detection—
Security Conference, Canfield University, UK
Simple sniffing of unencrypted user ID, passwords, account
nos., etc.—Wi-Fi hotspots
WLAN Security Vulnerabilities and
Threats Summary

 Wireless LANs have become easy targets for

both “traditional” network exploits, as well as
criminal element
 Passive SSID probe sniffing and WEP key attacks
are just the first stage in WLAN exploits
 More sophisticated WLAN exploits are likely to
employ management frames, as there is currently
no encryption capable for these 802.11 media management packets
 If an attacker can gain access to a WLAN, it is
possible to launch a variety of higher-layer exploits
over this media
Quick Look: Common WLAN Exploits/Tools
 Remote-Exploit/Backtrack/Auditor
 Aircrack, WEPcrack, etc
 coWPAtty
 Kismet
 NetStumbler, Hotspotter, etc
 AirSnort
 Sniffing tools: OmniPeek, Wireshark
 dsniff, nmap
 wellenreiter
 asleap
Over-the-Air Attack Techniques and Tools
Network Profiling and Reconnaissance
Honeypot AP Kismet Excessive device error
Netstumbler Wellenreiter Excessive multicast/broadcast

Authentication and Encryption Cracking

Dictionary attacks ASLEAP Airckrack Illegal frame types
AirSnarf EAP-based attacks Airsnort Excessive association retries
Hotspotter CoWPAtty PSPF violation Excessive auth retries
WEPCrack Chop-Chop WEP Attack LEAPCracker

Man-in-the-Middle
MAC/IP Spoofing Evil Twin AP Fake DHCP server
Fake AP ARP Request Replay Attack Pre-standard APs (a,b,g,n)

Denial of Service
Malformed 802.11 frames EAPOL attacks Microwave interference
FATA-Jack, AirJack Probe-response Bluetooth interference
Fragmentation attacks Resource management Radar interference
Excessive authentication RF Jamming Other non-802.11 interference
De-auth attacks Michael Device error-rate exceeded
Association attacks Queensland Interfering APs
CTS attacks Virtual carrier Co-channel interference
RTS attacks Big NAV VoWLAN-based attacks
Excessive device bandwidth Power-save attacks Excessive roaming
Threat Mitigation Technologies

© 2014 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 40
Cisco’s Attack Detection Mechanisms

Adaptive
Base IDS
wIPS
Built-in to
Controller Requires MSE
Software

Uses Local and Uses wIPS

Monitor Mode Monitor Mode
APs and/or Local APs
Cisco Wired IPS Integration
Unified Intrusion Prevention

Business Challenge

Mitigate Network Misuse, Hacking and

Malware from WLAN Clients Client Shun

 Inspects traffic flow for harmful
applications and blocks wireless
client connections
Malicious Traffic
L2
 Layer 3-7 Deep Packet IDS
Inspection
L3-7
 Eliminates risk of contamination IDS
from wireless clients Enterprise

Intranet
 Zero-day response to viruses,
malware and suspect signatures

Cisco ASA

w/ IPS
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk722/tk809/technologies_configuration_example09186a008080dc8c.shtml
What is CleanAir?

Detect and Classify

97
• Uniquely identify and
100 track multiple interferers
63 • Detects security-risk
90 interferers like RF
20
Jammers and Video
Camera.
35 • Assess unique impact to
Wi-Fi performance
• Monitor AirQuality

High-resolution interference detection and

Cisco classification logic built-in to Cisco’s 802.11n Wi-Fi
CleanAir chip design. Inline operation with no CPU or
performance impact. 43
Management Frame Protection
Concept

Problem Solution
 Wireless management frames are not  Insert a signature (Message Integrity
authenticated, encrypted, or signed Code/MIC) into the management frames
 A common vector for exploits  Clients and APs use MIC to validate
authenticity of management frame
 APs can instantly identify
rogue/exploited management frames

Infrastructure MFP Protected

CCXv5 AP Beacons
Probe Requests/
Probe Responses
Associations/Re-associations Disassociations
Authentications/
Action Management Frames
De-authentications

Client MFP Protected

Di
sa
ss
oc
iat
ion
WLAN Security
Vulnerabilities and Threats
On-Wire Attacks Over-the-Air Attacks
Ad-hoc Wireless Bridge Evil Twin/Honeypot AP Reconnaissance
HACKER HACKER’S HACKER
AP

Client-to-client backdoor access Connection to malicious AP Seeking network vulnerabilities

Cisco wIPS Detects These Attacks
Rogue Access Points Denial of Service Cracking Tools
HACKER HACKER

DENIAL OF
SERVICE

Backdoor network access Service disruption Sniffing and eavesdropping

Non-802.11 Attacks
Cisco CleanAir
Backdoor access Detects These Attacks
BLUETOOTH AP Service disruption MICROWAVE BLUETOOTH RF-JAMMERS RADAR
WLAN Security
Vulnerabilities and Threats
On-Wire Attacks Over-the-Air Attacks
Ad-hoc Wireless Bridge Evil Twin/Honeypot AP Reconnaissance
MFP
MFP Neutralizes
Neutralizes all
all
HACKER’S
HACKER HACKER
Management
Management Frame
Frame AP
Exploits,
Exploits, such
such as
as Man-in-
Man-in-
the-Middle
the-Middle Attacks
Attacks
Rogue
Rogue detection,
detection,
Client-to-client backdoor access Connection to malicious AP WPA2/802.11i
WPA2/802.11i
Seeking network vulnerabilities
classification
classification and
and
Cisco wIPS Detects These Attacks
mitigation
mitigation addresses
addresses
Neutralizes
Neutralizes Recon
Recon
Rogue Access Points Denial of Service and
and Cracking
Cracking Attacks
CrackingTools
Attacks
these
these attacks
attacks
HACKER HACKER

DENIAL OF
SERVICE

Backdoor network access Service disruption Sniffing and eavesdropping

Non-802.11 Attacks
Cisco CleanAir
Backdoor access Detects These Attacks
BLUETOOTH AP Service disruption MICROWAVE BLUETOOTH RF-JAMMERS RADAR
Strong Authentication and Encryption

© 2014 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 47
802.11 Security Fundamentals:
Setting up a secure 802.11 link
Authentication
 Enforce strong, mutual authentication of client & server
 Recommendation is 802.1X/EAP
 802.1X blocks user access until authentication successful
AAA
Server

Association
 Establish a virtual port for the link

Encryption
 Enforce strong encryption to provide data privacy over the
802.11 link
– Recommendation is AES (WPA2) or TKIP (WPA)
Secure or open SSID?
 Secure SSID

 Open SSID

 A secure SSID cannot fall back to open.

– Example: users not supporting 802.1X cannot fall back to web portal authentication on
the same SSID as corporate users.
 Pre-shared keys (PSK) and keys derived from 802.1X cannot co-exist on a
secure SSID.
 On both types of SSIDs you can combine multiple identity services if needed.
– Examples: guest users going through posture assessment, employees going through
MDM, employees going through web portal after device authentication, etc.
Authentication Evolution

MAC Address 802.1x /

Authenticatio WEP Dynamic WPA/WPA2
n WEP
WPA/WPA2 Breakdown

• A Snapshot of the 802.11i Standard

WPA • Commonly Used with TKIP Encryption

• Final Version of 802.11i

WPA2 • Commonly Used with AES Encryption

Authentication • Personal (PSK) – Home Use

• Enterprise (802.1x/EAP) – Office Use
Mechanisms
Authentication: Open
Authentication: PSK (WEP)
Authentication: PSK (WEP) (Cont.)

 WLAN security protocol defined in the 802.11 specification:

− Operates at Layer 2 and does not offer end-to-end security
 Uses key plus initialization vector:
− Initialization vector is a random number generated through the WEP algorithm
− Key and initialization vector are used in encryption of the data
 Three user-specified key lengths:
− 40-bit key, combined with initialization vector to yield 64 bits
− 104-bit key, combined with initialization vector to yield 128 bits
− 128-bit key, combined with initialization vector to yield 152 bits
 Cisco wireless supports pre-shared key authentication:
− Disabled by default
WEP Limitations

 No per-packet authentication or message integrity check

 Hackers can easily obtain challenge phrase and encrypted
response:
– Crack the WEP key
– Correctly decrypt captured data traffic
 Weak encryption of data
 Repeating initialization vector can provide insight into cracking
WEP key
 Each client and AP must be configured with matching WEP key
 Managing keys can be difficult in enterprise WLAN
 Less secure than using open Layer 2 association and then
applying user authentication with dynamic encryption method
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)

 WPA introduced in late 2003

 Pre-standard implementation of IEEE 802.11i WLAN security
 Addresses currently known security problems with WEP
 Allows software upgrade on already deployed 802.11 equipment to
improve security
 Components of WPA
− Authenticated key management using 802.1X: EAP authentication,
and PSK authentication
− Unicast and broadcast key management
− Standardized TKIP per-packet keying and MIC protocol
− Initialization vector space expansion: 48-bit initialization vectors
− Migration mode—coexistence of WPA and non-WPA devices (optional
implementation that is not required for WPA certification)
WPA Authentication Modes

Enterprise Personal
(802.1X Authentication) (PSK Authentication)
Authentication server required Authentication server not
required
RADIUS used for authentication Shared secret used for
and key distribution authentication
Centralized access control Local access control

Encryption uses TKIP, AES Encryption uses TKIP, AES

optional optional
WPA2 and IEEE 802.11i
 802.11i
− Ratified in June 2004
− Standardizes
 802.1X for authentication
 AES to be used for encryption
 Key management
 WPA2
– Supplement to WPA ”version 1”, which uses TKIP encryption
– Provides for AES encryption to be used
– Third-party testing and certification for WLAN device
compatibility
IEEE 802.11i and AES Encryption

Uses AES encryption in lieu of RC4 encryption

 Specific AES implementation used in 802.11i is called
“AES Counter Mode with CBC-MAC authentication” (a.k.a. AES-CCMP)
 128-bit, symmetric block cipher (versus RC4 stream cipher)
 AES cryptographically more robust than RC4 (and requires more computational power)
 AES is implemented in hardware
WPA/WPA2/802.11i Comparison

WPA WPA2 802.11i

SOHO Enterprise Enterprise

802.1X 802.1X 802.1X authentication

authentication/PSK authentication/PSK
128-bit RC4 w/ TKIP 128-bit AES 128-bit AES
encryption cipher encryption cipher encryption cipher
Ad hoc not supported Ad hoc not supported Allows ad hoc

Test devices for Test devices for No test, specification

compliance compliance
MAC Filtering

 Allows clients based on their MAC addresses

 The option is enabled on a per WLAN basis
 Controller checks for the presence of the client MAC address:
− In a local database
− If the address is not present, relays to a RADIUS server
 Local list contains 500 addresses, can be extended to 2000
− The database is shared by local management users (including
lobby ambassadors), net users (including guest users), MAC
filter entries, and disabled clients.
Choosing an EAP Method

Security vs.
Complexity

Authenticatio
Client
n Server
Support
Support

EAP
Type(s)
Deployed

 Most clients such as Windows, Mac OSX, Apple iOS devices support
EAP-TLS, PEAP (MS-CHAPv2).
Additional supplicants can add more EAP types (Cisco AnyConnect).

 Certain EAP types (TLS) can be more difficult to deploy than others
depending on device type.
Authentication Best Practices:
WPA2-Enterprise

Strong Authentication

• Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)

• Outside Methods (Protective Tunnel):
• PEAP
• EAP-FAST
• Inside Methods (Authentication Credentials):
• EAP-MSCHAPv2
• EAP-GTC
• EAP-TLS (Certificate Based)

Strong Encryption

• AES
EAP Authentication Types

Tunneling-Based Certificate
EAP-
-Based
PEAP Inner Methods
EAP-
TTLS
EAP-GTC EAP-MSCHAPv2 EAP-TLS
EAP-
FAST

 Tunnel-based - Common deployments use a tunneling protocol

(EAP-PEAP) combined with an inner EAP type such as EAP-
MSCHAPv2.
This provides security for the inner EAP type which may be vulnerable by itself.

 Certificate-based – For more security EAP-TLS provides mutual

authentication of both the server and client.
EAP Methods Comparison

EAP-TLS PEAP EAP-FAST

Fast Secure Roaming (CCKM) Yes Yes Yes

Local WLC Authentication Yes Yes Yes

OTP (One Time Password) Support No Yes Yes

Server Certificates Yes Yes No

Client Certificates Yes No No

PAC (Protected Access Credentials)* No No Yes

Deployment Complexity High Medium Low

* PACs can be provisioned anonymously for minimal complexity.
Encryption Evolution

WEP TKIP AES

(RC4 and
(RC4) MIC) (CCMP)
Encryption Best Practices:
TKIP and AES
TKIP (Temporal Key Integrity Protocol)
• Use only for legacy clients without AES support
• Often a software update for WEP clients
• Can be run in conjunction with AES (mixed-
mode)
• Is being discontinued by the WiFi Alliance for
certification.
AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)
• Requires hardware support (~2005 chipsets or
later)
• Achieves line-rate speeds
• Only encryption standard supported for 802.11n
data rates
The TKIP Vulnerability
 Once thought safe, TKIP encryption is cracked:
http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/153396/once_thought_safe_wpa_wifi_encryption_is_
cracked.html
 Security researchers claim that they can crack the message integrity (MIC) key used in
TKIP
 Recovery of MIC key facilitates packet forgeries, but only between AP and client
 Encryption key is *not* recovered, therefore data traffic cannot be read via this attack –
this is not like the WEP crack of years back
 What is the Risk?
Common traffic types, such as ARP and DNS, can be replayed to client for very limited duration…
at most 7 times
Centralizing WLAN Authentication

© 2014 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 69
802.1x

WLC
802.1x Architecture
Credentials Certificate Username and Password
Microsoft/
Cisco/
Microsoft Cisco RSA

Authentication TLS EAP-Fast PEAP

PEAP

EAP

Session Key WPA WPA2

802.1x

Encryption WEP TKIP AES

 802.1x Identity Information Types
Different types for different mobility use cases:

1. Username/Password Combination EAP

- User authentication (also Machine Auth for Windows) Extensible Authentication Protocol
- Active Directory/LDAP/RADIUS ID Stores
PEAP
- EAP types: PEAP-MSCHAPv2, PEAP-GTC, EAP-FAST
Protected EAP
2. Two-Factor Authentication GTC
- Something you know, you have, you are Generic Token Card
- Mostly for user authentication
FAST
- RSA SecurID and other token-based ID Systems
- EAP types: PEAP-GTC, EAP-FAST/EAP-GTC Flexible Authentication
via Secure Tunneling
3. Digital Certificates TLS
- Signed/emitted by a public or private Certificate Authority
Transport Layer Security
- Can be used for user and/or device authentication
- Microsoft AD Certificate Services, Entrust, Verisign, etc.
- EAP types: EAP-TLS, EAP-FAST

© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. 7272

Local EAP

 The following EAP methods are supported with local EAP:

− LEAP
− EAP-FAST (both username and password with PAC and
certificates)
− EAP-TLS
− PEAP
 MAC authentication is also supported in addition to the above
methods
 Local EAP authentication can be used if the Cisco WLC fails to
reach the configured RADIUS servers
 Supports local users or LDAP users
 Requires WLAN configuration
LEAP

 Cisco WLAN security solution

 User authentication via user ID and password
 Single login using Windows NT/2000 Active Directory
 Dynamic WEP keys and mutual authentication
− Key integrity protocol/message integrity recommended
 Simplified deployment and administration
 Supports multiple operating systems
− Windows, Mac OS, Windows CE, DOS, and Linux
 Strong password policy recommended
EAP-FAST

Considered in three phases:

 Protected Access Credentials (PAC) is
generated in phase zero
(Dynamic PAC provisioning)
− Unique shared credential used to
mutually authenticate client and server
− Associated with a specific user-ID and
an Authority ID
− Removes the need for PKI
 A secure tunnel is established in phase one
 Client is authenticated via the secure tunnel
in phase two
EAP-TLS
Client support
 Windows 2000, XP, Vista and Windows CE (natively supported)
 Linux, Mac AirPort Extreme
 Each client requires a user certificate

Infrastructure requirements
 EAP-TLS-supported RADIUS server
 RADIUS server requires a server certificate
 Certificate Authority server (PKI Infrastructure)

Certificate management
 Both client and RADIUS server certificates to be managed
PEAP

 Hybrid authentication method

− Server side authentication with TLS
− Client side authentication with EAP authentication types
 EAP-GTC
 EAP-MSCHAPv2
 Clients do not require certificates
 RADIUS server requires a server certificate
− RADIUS server self-issuing certificate capability
− Purchase a server certificate per-server from public PKI entity
− Setup a simple PKI server to issue server certificates
 Allows for one-way authentication types to be used
− One-time passwords
− Proxy to LDAP, Unix, Microsoft NT and Active Directory, Kerberos
 CCX—Providing Security Alternatives/
Tools/Cross-Platform Compatibility
More Than Just Standards
CCX v1 CCX v3
802.1x authentication • WPA2 compliance
EAP-TLS and LEAP • EAP-FAST
Cisco pre-standard TKIP
• CCKM with EAP-FAST
Client rogue reporting
• AES encryption
CCX v5
• MFP
• Client policies/
reporting

CCX v2 CCX v4
 WPA compliance  CCKM with EAP-TLS,
 Fast roaming with PEAP
CCKM  WIDS
 PEAP  MBSSID

© 2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. IUWNE v1.0—4-78

 EAP Protocols: Feature Support
EAP-TLS PEAP LEAP EAP-FAST

Single Sign-on Yes Yes Yes Yes

Login Scripts (MS DB) Yes1 Yes1 Yes Yes

Password Expiration (MS DB) N/A Yes No Yes

Vista, XP, CE, Cisco/CCXv1 or Cisco/CCXv3

Vista, XP, CE,
Client and OS Availability and Others2 CCXv2 Clients3, Above Clients Clients4 and
and Others2 and Others2 Others2

MS DB Support Yes Yes Yes Yes

LDAP DB Support Yes Yes5 No Yes

OTP Support No Yes5 No Yes6

1 Windows OS supplicant requires machine authentication (machine accounts on Microsoft AD)
2 Greater operating system coverage is available from via CSSC and third party supplicants
3 PEAP/GTC is supported on CCXv2 clients and above
4 Cisco 350/CB20A clients support EAP-FAST on MSFT XP, 2000, and CE operating systems
EAP-FAST supported on CB21AG/PI21AG clients with ADU v2.0 and CCXv3 clients
5 Supported by PEAP/GTC only
6 Supported with 3rd party supplicant

© 2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. IUWNE v1.0—4-79

 EAP Protocols: Feature Support
EAP-TLS PEAP LEAP EAP-FAST

Off-Line Dictionary Attacks? No No Yes1 No

Local Authentication No No Yes Yes

WPA Support Yes Yes Yes Yes

Application Specific Device (ASD)

Support No No Yes Yes

Server Certificates? Yes Yes No No

Client Certificates? Yes No No No

Deployment Complexity High Medium Low Low

RADIUS Server Scalability Impact High High Low Low/Medium

1 Strong password policy mitigates dictionary attacks; please refer to:

http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/wireless/ps430/prod_bulletin09186a00801cc901.html

© 2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. IUWNE v1.0—4-80

 Web Authentication

 This allows users to authenticate through a web interface

 Clients who attempt to access the WLAN using HTTP are
automatically directed to a login page:
– Login page is customizable for logos and text
– Maximum simultaneous authentication requests using web
authentication is 21
– Maximum number of local web authentication users is 2048
(default 512)
 This is generally used for guest access
 The Login page on the controller is now fully customizable

© 2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. IUWNE v1.0—4-81

 Web Authentication Page Configuration

Default Login Page Customized Login Page (based on the

previous slide’s configurations and a
custom logo uploaded to the controller)

© 2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. IUWNE v1.0—4-82

Conclusion/Remarks/Resources

© 2014 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 83
Conclusion / Remarks
• When Deploying Wireless Networks… Security should always be the primary concern.
• Deploy WLAN Security with a MINIMUM security configuration of WPA2/PSK and AES
Encryption.
• Guest Wireless Access should adhere to the MINIMUM security configuration, but in the event
that is not feasible, use WebAuth with a Splash Page and disclaimers and a Login.
• Enterprise WLAN Deployments should ALWAYS separate Guest Access and Corporate Access
with WVLANs and separate SSIDs.
• WLANs are always being scanned… Be aware and monitor your RF environment.

© 2014 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 84
Resources
• The Cisco Learning Network
https://learningnetwork.cisco.com/welcome

• CCNA Wireless Study Materials

https://learningnetwork.cisco.com/community/certifications/wireless_ccna/wifund/study-material

• CCNA Wireless Certification Exam Topics

https://learningnetwork.cisco.com/community/certifications/wireless_ccna/wifund/exam-topics

© 2014 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 85
Thank you.