Lecture 9
(Chapter 12)
Common-Pool
Resources:
Commercially
Valuable Fisheries
Chapter 12: Common-Pool Resources:
Commercially Valuable Fisheries
• Introduction
• Efficient Allocations
• Appropriability and Market Solutions
• Public Policy Toward Fisheries
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Introduction
• This chapter considers the efficiency and
sustainability in fisheries management.
• Biological populations are the interactive
resources.
• Efficient levels of harvest are defined and
economic incentives for sustainable
harvests are discussed.
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Efficient Allocations
The Biological Dimension
• The Schaefer model posits an average
relationship between the growth of the fish
population and the size of the fish
population.
• The shape of the graph (Figure 12.1)
shows the range of population sizes where
population growth leads to population
increases and a range where population
growth will lead to stock decreases.
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FIGURE 12.1 Relationship between
the Fish Population (Stock) and
Growth
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Efficient Allocations
Static Efficient Sustainable Yield
• The static-efficient sustainable yield is the catch
level that, if maintained perpetually, would
produce the largest annual net benefit.
• Assumptions of the economic model are:
– The price of fish is constant and does not depend on the
amount sold.
– The marginal cost of a unit of fishing effort is constant.
– The amount of fish caught per unit of effort expended is
proportional to the size of the fish population.
• The static-efficient sustainable yield allocation
maximizes the constant net benefit.
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FIGURE 12.2 Relating Equilibrium
Effort, Harvest, and Stock Size
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FIGURE 12.3 Sustainable Harvest
(Yield)
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FIGURE 12.4 Efficient Sustainable
Yield for a Fishery
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Efficient Allocations
Static Efficient Sustainable Yield
• Consider what would happen to the static efficient
sustainable yield if a technological change were to
occur?
– lower marginal cost
– more annual effort
– a lower population level
– a larger annual catch
– a higher net benefit for the fishery
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Efficient Allocations
Dynamic Efficient Sustainable Yield
• The dynamic-efficient sustainable yield
incorporates discounting.
– The dynamic efficient sustainable yield will equal the
static efficient sustainable yield if the discount rate equals
zero.
– Higher discount rates mean higher costs (foregone
current income) to the resource owner of maintaining the
stock.
– With an infinite discount rate, net benefits equal zero.
– Extinction could occur if the growth rate is lower than the
discount rate and if the costs of extracting the last unit
are sufficiently low.
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Efficient Allocations
Dynamic Efficient Sustainable Yield
• A dynamically efficient management scheme and
extinction of the fishery
– For extinction to occur under a dynamic efficient
management scheme, the benefit from extracting the
very last unit would have to exceed the cost of extracting
that unit.
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Efficient Allocations
Dynamic Efficient Sustainable Yield
• Actual fisheries differ from the standard model
– Harvesting marginal costs are typically not constant, but
rather increase as the remaining stock size diminishes.
– The size of the harvest can affect prices; larger harvests
can depress prices.
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Appropriability and Market
Solutions
• A sole owner of a fishery would have a
well-defined property right to the fish and
would want to maximize his or her profits.
– Profit maximization will lead to the static-
efficient sustainable yield.
• Ocean fisheries are typically open-access
resources. Thus, no single fisherman can
keep others from exploiting the fishery.
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FIGURE 12.5
Market
Allocation in a
Fishery
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Appropriability and Market
Solutions
• Open-access creates two kinds of external costs:
– Contemporaneous external costs are the
costs imposed on the current generation from
overfishing. Too many resources (boats,
fishermen, etc.) are committed to fishing.
– Intergenerational external costs are the
costs imposed on the future generation from
the exploitation of the stock today. Overfishing
reduces stocks and thus future profits.
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Appropriability and Market
Solutions
• Unlimited access creates property rights
that are not well-defined.
• With free-access, individual fishermen have
no incentive to “save” the resource.
• Open-access and common-pool resources
are not synonymous.
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Public Policy Toward Fisheries
Raising the Real Cost of Fishing
• Raising the marginal cost of effort results in a
lower harvest and higher stock sizes.
• While the policies may result in an efficient
catch, they are inefficient because the efficient
level of catch is not caught at the lowest
possible cost.
• Technological innovations have lowered the cost
of fishing, offsetting the increases imposed by
regulations.
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FIGURE 12.6 Effect of
Regulation
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Public Policy Toward Fisheries
Taxes
– Unlike regulations, the tax can lead to the
static-efficient sustainable yield allocation
because the tax revenues represent transfer
costs and not real-resource costs.
– Transfer costs involve the transfer of resources
from one part of society to another.
– For the individual fisherman, however, a tax still
represents an increase in costs.
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Public Policy Toward Fisheries
Catch Share Programs
• The Magnuson Stevens Act and “limited
access privilege” program
– Individual Fishing Quotas (IFQs)
– Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs): An ITQ
program is a specific IFQ program where
privileges can be transferred subsequent to initial
allocations.
– Territorial Use Rights Fisheries (TURFs) which
grant rights to a geographic area.
• By 2012, all fisheries were covered by
annual catch limits.
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Public Policy Toward Fisheries
Catch Share Programs
• ITQs have the following characteristics:
– The quotas entitle the holder to catch a
specified volume of a specified type of fish.
– The total amount of fish authorized by the
quotas should be equal to the efficient catch
level for that fishery.
– The quotas should be freely transferable among
fishermen.
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TABLE 12.1 Countries with Individual
Transferable Quota Systems
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Public Policy Toward Fisheries
Territorial Use Rights Fisheries(TURFs)
• TURFs can allow access to a layer of the
water column in a specific zone.
– More economically efficient use of fishery
resource
– Improve the welfare of small fishing
communities
– Particularly useful for stocks not migrating far
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Public Policy Toward Fisheries
Aquaculture
• Aquaculture is the controlled raising and
harvesting of fish. It is currently the fastest-
growing animal food production sector.
– Fish farming involves cultivating fish over their
lifetime, which can create environmental
problems (see Debate 12.2).
– Fish ranching involves holding fish in captivity
for the first few years of their lives.
– Aquaculture works well for certain species.
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FIGURE 12.7 China’s Rising
Share of Aquaculture
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Public Policy Toward Fisheries
Subsidies and Buy Backs
• A management option to reduce
overcapacity
– Payments used to buy out excess fishing
capacity are useful subsidies, but if additional
capacity seeps in over time, they are not as
effective as other management measures.
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Public Policy Toward Fisheries
Marine Protected Areas and Marine Reserves
• Areas that prohibit harvesting and are
protected from other threats such as
pollution
– Marine protected areas are designated ocean
areas within which human activity is restricted.
– Marine reserves protect individual species by
preventing harvests within the reserve
boundaries.
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Public Policy Toward Fisheries
The 200-Mile Limit
• The 200-Mile Exclusion Zone is an international
policy solution that has been implemented.
– Countries bordering the sea now have
ownership rights that extend 200 miles
offshore. Within the 200-mile limit, the
countries have exclusive jurisdiction.
– This ruling protects coastal fisheries, but not the
open ocean.
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Public Policy Toward Fisheries
Preventing Poaching
• Poaching (illegal harvesting) can introduce
unsustainability.
• Poaching can be discouraged by
– Raising the relative cost of illegal activity
– Economic incentive to local community
– Transition from hunting to compensation
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