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Teori Pertandingan Dan Tingkahlaku Stratregispert-10

This document discusses game theory and strategic behavior between firms. It provides two examples of firms (Firm A and Firm B) deciding whether to advertise or not. In the first example, the dominant strategy for both firms is to advertise, resulting in a Nash equilibrium where both firms advertise. In the second example, Firm B's dominant strategy is to advertise, while Firm A's optimal strategy depends on Firm B's action. If Firm B advertises, Firm A's optimal strategy is also to advertise.

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73 views39 pages

Teori Pertandingan Dan Tingkahlaku Stratregispert-10

This document discusses game theory and strategic behavior between firms. It provides two examples of firms (Firm A and Firm B) deciding whether to advertise or not. In the first example, the dominant strategy for both firms is to advertise, resulting in a Nash equilibrium where both firms advertise. In the second example, Firm B's dominant strategy is to advertise, while Firm A's optimal strategy depends on Firm B's action. If Firm B advertises, Firm A's optimal strategy is also to advertise.

Uploaded by

Isna Sarwah Tanza
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PPT, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Ekonomi Manajerial

dalam Perekonomian Global


Bab 10:

Teori Pertandingan dan


Tingkahlaku Stratregis
Tingkah laku Strategis
• Keputusan-keputusan yang
mempertimbangkan reaksi pesaing (yang
dapat diprediksi)
– Interdependence of outcomes
• Teori Pertandingan
– Pemain (Players)
– Strategi (Strategies)
– Matrik hasil (Payoff matrix)
Tingkah laku Strategis
• Tipe Pertandingan (Types of Games)
– Zero-sum games
– Nonzero-sum games
• Keseimbangan Nash (Nash-Equilibrium)
– Setiap pemain memilih strategi optimal
tergantung pada strategi lawan
– Suatu strategi disebut dominan jika strategi
tersebut optimal apapun stategi yang dimainkan
oleh lawannya.
Contoh-1 : Strategi Iklan

Firm B
Advertise Don't Advertise
Advertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Firm A
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (3, 2)
Contoh-1 : Strategi Iklan
What is the optimal strategy for Firm A if Firm B chooses to
advertise?

Firm B
Advertise Don't Advertise
Advertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Firm A
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (3, 2)
Contoh-1 : Strategi Iklan
What is the optimal strategy for Firm A if Firm B chooses to
advertise?
If Firm A chooses to advertise, the payoff is 4. Otherwise,
the payoff is 2. The optimal strategy is to advertise.

Firm B
Advertise Don't Advertise
Advertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Firm A
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (3, 2)
Contoh-1 : Strategi Iklan
What is the optimal strategy for Firm A if Firm B chooses
not to advertise?

Firm B
Advertise Don't Advertise
Advertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Firm A
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (3, 2)
Contoh-1 : Strategi Iklan
What is the optimal strategy for Firm A if Firm B chooses
not to advertise?
If Firm A chooses to advertise, the payoff is 5. Otherwise,
the payoff is 3. Again, the optimal strategy is to advertise.

Firm B
Advertise Don't Advertise
Advertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Firm A
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (3, 2)
Contoh-1 : Strategi Iklan
Regardless of what Firm B decides to do, the optimal
strategy for Firm A is to advertise. The dominant strategy
for Firm A is to advertise.

Firm B
Advertise Don't Advertise
Advertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Firm A
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (3, 2)
Contoh-1 : Strategi Iklan
What is the optimal strategy for Firm B if Firm A chooses to
advertise?

Firm B
Advertise Don't Advertise
Advertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Firm A
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (3, 2)
Contoh-1 : Strategi Iklan
What is the optimal strategy for Firm B if Firm A chooses to
advertise?
If Firm B chooses to advertise, the payoff is 3. Otherwise,
the payoff is 1. The optimal strategy is to advertise.

Firm B
Advertise Don't Advertise
Advertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Firm A
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (3, 2)
Contoh-1 : Strategi Iklan
What is the optimal strategy for Firm B if Firm A chooses
not to advertise?

Firm B
Advertise Don't Advertise
Advertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Firm A
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (3, 2)
Contoh-1 : Strategi Iklan
What is the optimal strategy for Firm B if Firm A chooses
not to advertise?
If Firm B chooses to advertise, the payoff is 5. Otherwise,
the payoff is 2. Again, the optimal strategy is to advertise.

Firm B
Advertise Don't Advertise
Advertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Firm A
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (3, 2)
Contoh-1 : Strategi Iklan
Regardless of what Firm A decides to do, the optimal
strategy for Firm B is to advertise. The dominant strategy
for Firm B is to advertise.

Firm B
Advertise Don't Advertise
Advertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Firm A
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (3, 2)
Contoh-1 : Strategi Iklan
The dominant strategy for Firm A is to advertise and the
dominant strategy for Firm B is to advertise. The Nash
equilibrium is for both firms to advertise.

Firm B
Advertise Don't Advertise
Advertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Firm A
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (3, 2)
Contoh-2 : Strategi Iklan

Firm B
Advertise Don't Advertise
Advertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Firm A
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (6, 2)
Contoh-2 : Strategi Iklan
What is the optimal strategy for Firm A if Firm B chooses to
advertise?

Firm B
Advertise Don't Advertise
Advertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Firm A
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (6, 2)
Contoh-2 : Strategi Iklan
What is the optimal strategy for Firm A if Firm B chooses to
advertise?
If Firm A chooses to advertise, the payoff is 4. Otherwise,
the payoff is 2. The optimal strategy is to advertise.

Firm B
Advertise Don't Advertise
Advertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Firm A
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (6, 2)
Contoh-2 : Strategi Iklan
What is the optimal strategy for Firm A if Firm B chooses
not to advertise?

Firm B
Advertise Don't Advertise
Advertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Firm A
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (6, 2)
Contoh-2 : Strategi Iklan
What is the optimal strategy for Firm A if Firm B chooses
not to advertise?
If Firm A chooses to advertise, the payoff is 5. Otherwise,
the payoff is 6. In this case, the optimal strategy is not to
advertise.
Firm B
Advertise Don't Advertise
Advertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Firm A
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (6, 2)
Contoh-2 : Strategi Iklan
The optimal strategy for Firm A depends on which strategy
is chosen by Firms B. Firm A does not have a dominant
strategy.

Firm B
Advertise Don't Advertise
Advertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Firm A
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (6, 2)
Contoh-2 : Strategi Iklan
What is the optimal strategy for Firm B if Firm A chooses to
advertise?

Firm B
Advertise Don't Advertise
Advertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Firm A
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (6, 2)
Contoh-2 : Strategi Iklan
What is the optimal strategy for Firm B if Firm A chooses to
advertise?
If Firm B chooses to advertise, the payoff is 3. Otherwise,
the payoff is 1. The optimal strategy is to advertise.

Firm B
Advertise Don't Advertise
Advertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Firm A
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (6, 2)
Contoh-2 : Strategi Iklan
What is the optimal strategy for Firm B if Firm A chooses
not to advertise?

Firm B
Advertise Don't Advertise
Advertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Firm A
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (6, 2)
Contoh-2 : Strategi Iklan
What is the optimal strategy for Firm B if Firm A chooses
not to advertise?
If Firm B chooses to advertise, the payoff is 5. Otherwise,
the payoff is 2. Again, the optimal strategy is to advertise.

Firm B
Advertise Don't Advertise
Advertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Firm A
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (6, 2)
Contoh-2 : Strategi Iklan
Regardless of what Firm A decides to do, the optimal
strategy for Firm B is to advertise. The dominant strategy
for Firm B is to advertise.

Firm B
Advertise Don't Advertise
Advertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Firm A
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (6, 2)
Contoh-2 : Strategi Iklan
The dominant strategy for Firm B is to advertise. If Firm B
chooses to advertise, then the optimal strategy for Firm A
is to advertise. The Nash equilibrium is for both firms to
advertise.

Firm B
Advertise Don't Advertise
Advertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Firm A
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (3, 2)
Dilemma Tersangka
Dua tersangka ditahan karena perampokan
bersenjata. Mereka ditahan secara terpisah.Jika
terbukti, mereka akan dipenjara masing-masing
10 tahun. Tetapi bukti-bukti tidak cukup kecuali
sebagai pencurian biasa yang hanya bisa
memenjarakan 1 tahun saja.
Tersangka diberitahu : Jika mengaku, tetapi
temannya tidak mengaku dia akan bebas.
Tetapi jika tidak mengaku, sementara temannya
mengaku, temannya akan bebas dan dia dapat
10 tahun. Jika kedua-duanya mengaku, maka
mereka masing-masing akan kena 5 tahun.
Dilemma Tersangka

Payoff Matrix (negative values)

Individual B
Confess Don't Confess
Confess (5, 5) (0, 10)
Individual A
Don't Confess (10, 0) (1, 1)
Dilemma Tersangka

Dominant Strategy
Both Individuals Confess
(Nash Equilibrium)

Individual B
Confess Don't Confess
Confess (5, 5) (0, 10)
Individual A
Don't Confess (10, 0) (1, 1)
Dilemma Tersangka

Application: Price Competition

Firm B
Low Price High Price
Low Price (2, 2) (5, 1)
Firm A
High Price (1, 5) (3, 3)
Dilemma Tersangka

Application: Price Competition

Dominant Strategy: Low Price

Firm B
Low Price High Price
Low Price (2, 2) (5, 1)
Firm A
High Price (1, 5) (3, 3)
Dilemma Tersangka

Application: Nonprice Competition

Firm B
Advertise Don't Advertise
Advertise (2, 2) (5, 1)
Firm A
Don't Advertise (1, 5) (3, 3)
Dilemma Tersangka

Application: Nonprice Competition

Dominant Strategy: Advertise

Firm B
Advertise Don't Advertise
Advertise (2, 2) (5, 1)
Firm A
Don't Advertise (1, 5) (3, 3)
Dilemma Tersangka

Application: Cartel Cheating

Firm B
Cheat Don't Cheat
Cheat (2, 2) (5, 1)
Firm A
Don't Cheat (1, 5) (3, 3)
Dilemma Tersangka

Application: Cartel Cheating

Dominant Strategy: Cheat

Firm B
Cheat Don't Cheat
Cheat (2, 2) (5, 1)
Firm A
Don't Cheat (1, 5) (3, 3)
Perluasan Teori Pertandingan

• Repeated Games
– Many consecutive moves and
countermoves by each player
• Tit-For-Tat Strategy
– Do to your opponent what your
opponent has just done to you
Perluasan Teori Pertandingan

• Tit-For-Tat Strategy
– Stable set of players
– Small number of players
– Easy detection of cheating
– Stable demand and cost conditions
– Game repeated a large and uncertain
number of times
Perluasan Teori Pertandingan

• Threat Strategies
– Credibility
– Reputation
– Commitment
– Example: Entry deterrence

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