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RULES AND REGULATIONS

This is an extract from Oilfield Seamanship, Dynamic Positioning by David Bray FNI:

The IMO Guidelines for Vessels with Dynamic Positioning Systems

This document (MSC/Circ.645) appeared in June 1994, and is intended to apply to st all vessels constructed on or after 1 July 1994. It is an internationally-accepted set of guidance relating to the redundancy levels in DP vessels. The full content of the guidelines is contained in an appendix to this book, but some descriptive comments is made here. Within the guidelines, Redundancy is described thus; Redundancy means ability of a component or system to maintain or restore its function, when a single failure has occurred. Redundancy can be achieved for instance by installation of multiple components, systems or alternative means of performing a function. This introduces the concept of the single point failure mode. The level of redundancy should allow uninterrupted functioning of the DP capability of the vessel after the loss of any single system or component within the DP system. The guidelines base the level of redundancy on three equipment Classes; Classes 1, 2, and 3. The larger the number the greater the amount of redundanc7 provision. Again, quoting from the guidelines:

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The equipment classes are defined by their worst case failure modes as follows: For equipment class 1, loss of position may occur in the event of a single fault. For equipment class 2, a loss of position is not to occur in the event of a single fault in any active component or system. Normally static components will not be considered to fail where adequate protection from damage is demonstrated, and reliability is to the satisfaction of the Administration. For equipment class 3, a single failure includes: Items listed above for class 2, and any normally static component is assumed to fail. All components in any one watertight compartment, from fire or flooding. All components in any one fire sub-division, from fire or flooding In basic terms, Equipment Class 1 refers to non-redundant vessels, Class 2 relates to vessels with full redundancy of systems and equipment, while vessels built or fitted to Equipment Class 3 are able to withstand the loss of all systems in any one compartment from the effects of fire or flooding. Evidence of the standard of redundancy provision in a particular vessel is given in her FSVAD (Flag State Verification and Acceptance Document) which states which equipment class she is in compliance with. Further indication of the level of redundancy available in any vessel is given in the vessels Classification Society DP Class notation. A very relevant question relates to the choice of an appropriate equipment class for any particular project. Obviously the more dangerous the task the higher should be the level of redundancy, and equipment class of the vessel hired in. The guidelines state: The equipment class of the vessel required for a particular operation should be agreed between the owner of the vessel and the customer based upon a risk analysis of the consequence of a loss of position. Else, the Administration or coastal State may decide the equipment class for the particular operation. The above places the onus upon the vessel owner and the client to design the operation around a safety case, with full risk analysis of the hazards associated. The results of the risk analysis will indicate the possible consequences of a loss of position keeping capability by the vessel. The more severe these consequences, the greater the level of redundancy needed. This paragraph within the guidelines also gives the authorities of the coastal state powers to override the decision of the client/shipowner if it is intended to use a vessel of inappropriate equipment class. For example, in the UK sector, the HSE OSD (Health and Safety Executive, Offshore Safety Division) has the power to suspend any operation which it deems unsafe. A practical illustration relating to the level of redundancy available relates to the cranebarge DB 102. When built, this vessel complied with standards equivalent to the modern Class 2. Although full redundancy was available, a number of precautions were always taken when undertaking heavy lifts s(jackets, topsides, etc.) using DP for all or part of the positioning solution. Mooring lines were always deployed, either in tension or kept slack. Often tug assistance would be used where mooring lines could not be effectively deployed. Full reliance was not placed in the DP capability due to the extreme consequences of a run-off. Upgrading
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the vessel of full Class3 allowed the vessel to operate effectively and safely using DP alone for positioning.

The IMCA Guidelines

Originally produced under the auspices of the DPVOA (the DP Vessel Owners Association), this body has merged with the AODC to become the International Marine Contractors Association (IMCA). The full title of the document is Guidelines for the Design and Operation of Dynamically Positioned Vessels, original issue dated 1991, revised edition 1995. The guidelines are applicable to all DP vessels, and contain an introductory section relating to all DP vessel types. Further sections detail guidance relating to specific vessel types, viz; Diving Support Vessels, Drilling Vessels, Floating Production Units, Accommodation Vessels, Crane Vessels, Shuttle Tankers, Pipelay Vessels, and Survey and Support Vessels. Some general remarks are made on the subject of redundancy in the introductory section, mainly acknowledging the references to Equipment Classes made in the IMO guidelines already referred to. More s0pecific guidance is found in the sections relating to individual vessel types. The following extract from these guidelines relates to Diving Support Vessel redundancy, and is reproduced with the permission of IMCA. Redundancy Redundancy to reduce the effect of failure modes and improve safe working limits is encouraged on all DP DSVs. The following examples are to provide minimum standards and information on the current practice of some of the most recent DSVs. The amount of redundancy is a matter for owners and designers to optimise to achieve practical and economically viable safe working limits. Thruster Units The arrangement of thrust units should be such as to provide, as far as practicable, a circular capability plot for intact and worst case failure situations if the vessel is not to be heading limited. For a monohull vessel the thruster arrangement should provide a balanced athwartship capability (although this may conflict with passage speed requirements) in the intact and worst case failure conditions. This has been achieved on some vessels with three thrusters fore and aft, where the centre unit is capable of being powered from either switchboard. Cross over capabilities of thrusters may be manual, but automatic transfer is faster and superior, provided that interlocks are installed to prevent the transfer of a faulty unit. The thruster should, as far as is practicable, be independent in location, cable routes and control power so that a power fault, fire or flood would not result in the loss of more than one thruster. This is unlikely to be totally achievable but the risk of fire and flood is negligible in some spaces and known to be present in others, e.g. engine rooms, boiler rooms, machinery spaces etc. It is important that cables are routed such that the designed worst case failure mode, e.g. a switchboard fault, is no longer the worst case, i.e. where a fire in a machinery space could fail more thrust units than a switchboard fault because of common cable routing.
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Power Generation The sudden unexpected failure of one diesel engine must always be a design and operational consideration, as must a fire in one engine room. The latter failure however will normally involve a period of time during which some action can be taken. It is this time, for example between fire detection and halon release, that is relevant on some vessels in the determination of safe working limits. It is unreasonable to consider a whole engine room and the power it generates to be instantly lost from a fire. Vessels with independent engine rooms, each capable of supplying the total DP system power requirement, have a lower risk of position loss and should therefore have higher allowable safe working limits. It is essential that smoke from a fire in one engine room cannot be drawn into the other engine room. Power Management The power management for complicated, redundant, power generation and thruster systems with cross over capability has to be automatic and comprehensive. It has also to be redundant itself or fail safe, e.g. by starting all units and making them available. Designers should ensure that there is a clear interface between the control exercised by the DP computers and that exercised by the power management. Communications between the two is not essential for control, but if this is a feature to improve, for example, the speed of response to a power demand, failures of this communication must also be considered when determining safe working limits. The power management system should be redundant as far as its failure directly affects position keeping. If its failure modes do not result in loss of power until a change of status takes place, redundancy is not necessary. The power management need only operate for the normal DP mode of operation, i.e. with a common switchboard (bus tie closed) provided this meets with the requirements of 1.1.4 and the following sub section. If the vessel is designed to operate with the bus ties open while diving, then a power management system will be needed for each side of the switchboard, without inter-communication between the systems that is capable of creating a common failure mode. Power Distribution The power distribution arrangement should be set up, for diving work on dynamic positioning, so that a fault on any switchboard section separated by bus ties should not cause the loss of the whole switchboard. This must be so for any working combination of generators and thrusters. To achieve this requirement the bus ties must be set and tested at regular intervals (e.g. every year) so that they split the bus before any tripping of generators has taken place on the healthy side of the bus. Position Control For diving work using dynamic positioning, the minimum control requirement is for two automatic, fully redundant control systems providing, on loss of one, a smooth transfer to the other which would be unnoticed by the divers working near the diving bell. In addition there should be a joystick facility for manoeuvring which can be separate or an integral part of the DP control system. If fire or flood is a realistic failure mode within the DP control location then consideration should be given to a separate DP control location independent of the main system. Such a fire
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risk is unlikely to come from within the DP control space, especially if it is continually manned when working. The location of equipment within the DP control space should consider fire both above the deck and to cables below the deck. Redundant control units in a manned space should be physically separated as far as is practicable, and damage to a volume 1m x 1m be considered a possible event, before detecting and extinguishing can be carried out. DP control computers located remotely from the DP control console require fire, heat and water damage protection by means of a suitable fire or smoke detection system, air conditioning, if the temperature is expected to rise significantly above ambient, and by careful routing of pipework. One computer must be uninterrupted by the worst power loss fault possible and be able to continue operating with associated equipment for at least 30 mins. It is prudent to provide independent supplies for each computer, with independent battery back up and no cross connection. Such an arrangement does not increase safe working limits, but it can decrease the risk of a fault causing loss of the redundant DP control. Position References For diving work at least three references should be on line and at least two should be of a different type. Replumbing a taut wire which is one of the three position references does not constitute a violation of the above if such action is completed as quickly as is safe and sensible. Power supplies to position references should not be common and cable routes should be separated, furthermore no single factor should affect more than one reference so as to cause a common failure mode. The three position references selected for use must reflect the circumstances such as deep water, Shallow water, open water, close to a fixed or moving (moored) installation The DP control should be able to identify a fault in a position reference, warn operators, and reject the suspect sensors. Environmental Sensors At least two wind sensors in different locations, with separate supplies and cable routes, are necessary for comparison. The DP control should be able to identify a faulty unit and warn operators before a position change takes place. Vessel Sensors At least two vertical reference sensors are necessary for comparison. Similarly at least two gyro compasses, with separate supplies and cable routes, are necessary for reliability. It is also prudent to provide a third gyro compass so that in the event of a slow loss of heading the correct gyro can be identified by the operator. The DP control should be able to identify a faulty unit and warn operators before position degradation takes place. Vessel sensors should be physically separated so that the redundant unit is unlikely to suffer from the same fire, flood or mechanical damage event. The above extract gives guidance relating to good practice in DSVs. It may happen that more stringent requirements are necessary, as, for example, in the Norwegian sector, where some diving operations will be Class 3 working. Here, there is a requirement for three gyros, which is in excess of that given in the IMCA document.

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The Norwegian Sector

Within the Norwegian sector, rules and regulations are more prescriptive. Although the IMO guidance referred to above applies, that guidance is superseded by rules and regulations which are more stringent in many areas. The authorities concerned are: NMD NPD The Norwegian Maritime Directorate The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate

The relevant rules and regulations are: The NMD Regulations for Mobile Offshore Units, 1987 The NMD Guidelines and Notes No. 23, 1993 The NMD Guidelines and Notes No. 28 enclosure A, 1994 enclosure B, 1994 The NPD Guidelines relating to the Specification and Operation of Dynamically Positioned Diving Support Vessels, 1983. The NMD Guidelines and Notes No. 28, enclosure B is a verbatim transcription of the IMO guidelines referred to earlier, however for vessels built prior to June 1994, the provisions of enclosure A refer. In these guidelines, reference is made to four Consequence Classes, numbered 0, 1, 2, and 3. As with equipment classes, the higher the number the greater the level of redundancy. The Norwegian authorities specify criteria which should be referred to when specifying equipment, or consequence class. For the consequence classes, the criteria are as follows: Class 0 Operations where loss of position keeping capability is not considered to endanger human lives, or cause damage. Class 1 Operations where loss of position keeping capability may cause damage or pollution of small consequence. Class 2 Operations where loss of position keeping capability may cause personnel injury, pollution, or damage with large economic consequences. Class 3 Operations where loss of position keeping capability may cause fatal accidents, or severe pollution or damage with major economic consequences.

The Norwegian interpretation of the IMO equipment classes is worded in a very similar manner: Class 1 DP units with equipment class 1 should be used during operations where loss of position is not considered to endanger human lives, cause significant damage3 or cause more than minimal pollution. Class 2 DP units with equipment class 2 should be used dur ing operations where loss of position could cause personnel injury, pollution or damage with great economic consequences.
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Class 3 DP units with equipment class 3 should be used during operations where loss of position could cause fatal accidents, severe pollution or damage with major economic consequences. The difference between the Norwegian approach and the IMO approach is the NMD have stated specific criteria for the choice of equipment/consequence class, where the IMO guidelines leave the decision up to the client and shipowner based upon a risk assessment. A formal risk assessment is necessary within the Norwegian scheme also, as the criteria listed above are very subjective and subject to wide differences in interpretation. Evidence of the standard of redundancy provision in a particular vessel is given in her FSVAD (Flag State Verification and Acceptance Document) which states which equipment class she is in compliance with. If the vessel is approved by the NMD and approval was prior to 1994, the equivalent document is the GAD (Government Acceptance Document). A foreign (i.e. non-Norwegian) vessel wishing for approval may apply to the NMD for a Letter of Compliance leading to the issue of a NMD SVA, or Statement on Verification and Acceptance for her equipment class.

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Equipment Requirements
A brief summary of the requirements for DP equipment, systems and sub-systems relating to the different class notations is given below:

Subsystem or component

Minimum requirements for group designation IMO Equipment Class DNV LR ABS 1 AUT DP(AM) DPS-1 nonRedundant 1 2 AUTR DP(AA) DPS-2 redundant 1 with bus tie 3 AUTRO DP(AAA) DPS-30 redundant, separate compartments 2 with normally open bus-ties in separate compartments 2 redundant, separate yes redundant, in separate compartments 2 + 1 in alternative control station yes with auto heading yes 3, inc. 1 in alternat. control station 2 2 3 2 (1 of which in alternative control station).

Class notations Power system

Generators and Prime movers Main Switchboard

Bus Tie Breaker Distribution system Power management Thrusters Arrangement of thrusters

0 non-redundant no non-redundant

1 redundant compartments yes redundant

Control

Auto control: no.of control computers Manual control: joystick Single levers for each thruster

1 yes yes 2

2 yes yes 3

Sensors

Pos.ref. systems External Sensors Wind VRS Gyro other

1 1 1 1 1 No

2 2 2 2 1 No

UPS Alternate control station for back-up unit

1+1 in separate compartment Yes

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NORSOK
The NORSOK (Norsk Sokkels Konkurranseposisjon) Standards are a set of requirements drawn up by the NORSOK standardisation workgroup and agreed by the Norwegian industry for the widest possible national and international application. The NORSOK standards represent the common requirements of the Norwegian oil industry, and replace the many company standards recently in force. Several oil companies working on the Norwegian continental shelf have adopted the NORSOK package, and the standards have thus been made a contractual requirement in connection with current projects. They are the only accepted standards which tabulate guidelines for types of operation together with locations, listing NMD Consequence classes appropriate. This guideline tabulation is given below:
OPERATION EQUIPMENT CLASS NOTES

Drilling Production of hydrocarbons Subsea well workover Wireline operations on subsea wells Well stimulation Manned subsea operations, Manned subsea operations, Support of diving from light craft. Unmanned subsea intervention with ROT

3 3 3 2 2 3 2 2 2

Applies to all drilling in hot zones

Workover operations entailing hydrocarbons on deck With subsea lubricator

For diving inside structures etc. For diving in open water When the light craft is attached to the support vessel Inside hot template

Accommodation Vessel with gangway 3 connection to Installation Accommodation Vessel outside 500 m 2 safety zone Well stimulation, platform wells Construction activities in general, inside 500 m safety zone. Construction activities in general, outside 500 m safety zone 2 2 1

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Consequence Analysis
One of the requirements of the IMO Class 2 and 3 guidelines, is a system of Online Consequence Analysis to be incorporated in the DP system. This function continually performs an analysis of the vessels ability to maintain its position and heading after a predefined, worst case failure during operation. Possible consequences are based on the actual weather conditions, enable thrusters and power plant status. Typical worst case single failures are: failure in the most critical thruster failure in one thruster group failure in one power bus section

If the consequence of the predefined failure is a loss of position, it is reported to the operator via the DP alarm system. The Consequence Analysis will run configurations for Class 2 operations, or for Class 3 operations. A typical response would be a warning message Consequence Analysis Warning On. The associated description reads: Single worst case failure will cause drift-off. The analysis function runs every minute, simulating the loss of one bus, for all buses, one at a time. If one of these simulated breakdowns results in a driftoff, the warning is activated. Additional information may indicate whether the situation is thrust-critical or power-critical, together with an indication of which bus, generators and thrusters are the critical ones. When the analysis indicates that the situation is no longer critical, the message is replaced by Consequence Analysis Warning off which is an information rather than a warning message.

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CERTIFICATION OF DP OPERATORS

The following is an extract from Norwegian Maritime Directorate, Guidelines and Notes no. 23:

This note is dated 15.06.93 and refers to Regulations of 4 September 1987 concerning anchoring/positioning systems on mobile offshore units, 6 section 5.6

02 ANCHORING/POSITIONING CERTIFICATION OF DP-OPERATORS Operators of dynamic positioning systems (DP-systems) with the NMDs DP Consequence Class 2 or 3, shall be certified by the NMD. Certificates issued by The Nautical Institute (UK) are accepted as equivalent. It is sufficient with one certified DP-operator at each shift. Other DP-operators should at least hold the basic course, ref. item 1 below.

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The training program for certification by the NMD shall contain the following elements, normally carried out in stated sequence: Certificate (DP Consequence Class 2 and 3) 1. Basic course at an approved training institution (see next page). The course shall provide an introduction to the functions and use of DP-systems. 2. Documented practical DP-experience on DP-units/ships (irrespective of consequence class) for a minimum of 30 days. 3. Advanced course at an approved training institution. The course shall provide training in the use of DP-systems including simulator exercises and emergency operations. 4. One of the following requirements shall be met: a) 6 months documented practical experience in the use of DP-systems on units/vessels operating in Consequence Class 2 or 3. b) 12 months documented practical experience in the use of DP-systems on units/vessels operating in Consequence Class 0 or 1. If this experience is from units/vessels, which spend more than 50% of their operational time on DP, 1 months practice on units/vessels operating in Consequence Class 2 or 3 is required in addition. If the experience is from units/vessels which spend less than 50% of their operational time on DP (e.g. shuttle tankers or supply ships), 2 months practice on units/vessels operating in Consequence Class 2 or 3 is required in addition. 5. The platform manager/captain on the Consequence Class 2 or 3 unit/vessel shall give written confirmation that the operator has the necessary practical experience, and that he assumes him qualified as a DP-operator. Validity of DP-certificates DP-operators shall keep a log of their DP-practice in an approved log book. If the last documented period of DP-practice on Consequence Class 2 or 3 units/ships is older than 5 years, the DP-certificate ceases to be valid. To renew an invalid DP-certificate, the items 3, 4 and 5 given above, have to be carried out once more. Limited Certificate (DP Consequence Class 0 and 1) After request from the industry, the NMD has decided to allow the issue of a LIMITED CERTIFICATE for DP-operators working on units/vessels with the NMDs DP Consequence Class 0 and 1. It is, however, provided that the DP-operator meets the requirements specified in 1, 2 and 3 above.

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