(a) Noscitur a Sociis
Noscitur a Sociis is a doctrine or rule of construction that asserts the meaning of an unclear
or ambiguous word (as found in a statute or contract) should be determined by considering
the words with which it is associated in the context. This principle helps clarify the meaning
of a particular term by interpreting it in light of its surrounding words, ensuring that the
interpretation aligns with the overall context and intent of the document.
The principle of construction, also known as the interpretation of statutes and other
documents, asserts that the meaning of words should be understood by considering the
context in which they appear. This principle emphasizes that words and phrases cannot be
interpreted in isolation but must be viewed in relation to the surrounding text. By
examining the broader context, including the purpose and structure of the document, the
intended meaning and implications of specific terms can be more accurately discerned.
The maxim “Noscitur a Sociis” can be better understood with the help of another legal
maxim “qua non valeant singular juna juvant” which literally means “Words that are
ineffective on their own become effective when considered together.”
The scope of this rule of interpretation, however, is limited, for it can only be applied in
circumstances where the law is either unclear or ambiguous. When there are no apparent
problems with interpretation, the rule cannot be used. Additionally, the rule cannot be
used nefariously to make any of the associated words redundant. In the case of Shriram
Vinyl and Chemical Industries v. Commissioner of Customs the court held that the rule of
noscitur a sociis cannot be applied in cases where the intention of the legislature or
Parliament reflects a deliberate usage of words to widen the scope.
Noscitur a Sociis and Ejusdem Generis
The principle of noscitur a sociis is closely related to the rule of ejusdem generis, with the
former being broader in scope than the latter. Noscitur a sociis involves interpreting a word
based on its context, while ejusdem generis focuses on interpreting a general term in a list
based on specific accompanying terms. Both rules aid in clarifying ambiguous language in
legal contexts.
To distinguish between the two doctrines, we need to grasp the rule of ejusdem generis. In
the case of Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni v. State of Madras the application of this rule
was discussed. It was mentioned that the rule is applicable when there are general words
following specific words that belong to a particular category or class. Furthermore, it was
established in this case that the rule “…is not an absolute legal principle but rather a
permissible inference when no contrary indication is present.”
This case law clarifies the application of the principle of ejusdem generis effectively.
According to it, this principle is relevant when there exists a specific list or category, and
not otherwise.
Applicability The case of Foster v. Diphwys Casson involved a statute that required
explosives taken into a mine to be carried in a “case or canister.” The defendant used a
cloth bag, raising the question of whether it met the statutory requirement. Applying the
doctrine of “noscitur a sociis”, the court determined that a cloth bag did not fall within the
definition. It concluded that Parliament intended to refer to a container of similar strength
and durability as a canister, thus excluding the cloth bag.
The Supreme Court referred to this maxim in the case of State of Bombay & others v.
Hospital Mazdoor Sabha & others. The court held that in construing the definition, we
must adopt the rule of construction noscitur a sociis. This rule means that when two or
more words which are susceptible to analogous meanings are coupled together, they are
understood to be used in their cognate sense.
In State of Assam v. Ranga Muhammad, the court ruled that the Governor needed to
consult the High Court when transferring a sitting Judge. The term "posting" was associated
with "appointments" and "promotions" but did not extend to "transfers." The court
concluded that the Governor was required to consult the High Court regarding transfers, as
the term "posting" did not encompass the act of transferring a judge.
In the case of M/s. R. K. M. Finance Ltd. v. Union of India [7], the Supreme Court utilized the
principle of noscitur a sociis to interpret provisions of the Companies Act related to
financial regulations and obligations imposed on financial institutions. The Court examined
the context provided by surrounding statutory provisions to clarify the scope and intent of
the relevant regulations. This approach helped ensure that the interpretation of the
provisions was consistent with the overall legislative framework and objectives of the Act.
The Supreme Court interpreted the scope of tax deductions in Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v.
Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay. The court examined the meaning of the term
"profits" in the Act, ensuring its correct application and consistency with legislative intent.
This approach refined the understanding of tax liabilities and deductions, ensuring the term
"profits" was interpreted in a manner consistent with its contextual usage.
The Supreme Court in Vania Silk Mills Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax,
Ahmedabad, interpreted Section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, focusing on the term
"transfer." The court interpreted the phrase "extinguishment of any rights therein" to
mean extinguishment due to a transfer, rather than termination of rights unrelated to a
transfer. This interpretation aligned with the legislative intent by ensuring consistency with
the types of transactions listed in the Act, clarifying the scope of what constitutes a transfer
for tax purposes.
Noscitur a sociis is a principle that states that words or phrases must be understood in the
same sense and their meaning is determined by their conjunction with adjacent words or
expressions in other parts of the same instrument. It cannot be applied when wider words
have been deliberately used to make the scope of the defined word wider, or when the
meaning of words of wider meaning import is doubtful. However, when the object of the
Legislature in using wider words is clear and free from ambiguity, the rule of construction
cannot be applied.
EJUSDEM GENERIS
According to the Black’s Law Dictionary (8th edition, 2004) the principle of Ejusdem
Generis is where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a
particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest
extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or
class as those specifically mentioned. It is a canon of statutory construction, where general
words follow the enumeration of particular classes of things, the general words will be
construed as applying only to things of the same general class as those enumerated.
The expression Ejusdem Generis means of the same kind. Normally, general words should
be given their natural meaning like all other words unless the context requires otherwise.
But when a general word follows specific words of a distinct category, the general word
may be given a restricted meaning of the same category. The general expression takes it’s
meaning from the preceding particular expressions because the legislature by using the
particular words of a distinct genus has shown its intention to that effect. This principle is
limited in its application to general word following less general word only. If the specific
words do not belong to a distinct. Genus, this rule is inapplicable. Consequently, if a general
word follows only one particular word, that single particular word does not constitute a
distinct genus and, therefore, Ejusdem Generis rule cannot be applied in such a case.
Exceptional stray instances are, however, available where one-word genus has been
created by the courts and the general word following such a genus given a restricted
meaning. If the particular words exhaust the whole genus, the general word following
these particular words is construed as embracing a larger genus. The principle of Ejusdem
Generis is not a universal application. If the context of legislation rules out the applicability
of this rule, it has no part to play in the interpretation of general words. The basis of the
principle of Ejusdem Generis is that if the legislature intended general words to be used in
unrestricted sense, it would not have bothered to use particular words at all.
Grasim Industries Ltd. Vs. Collector of Customs, Bombay (AIR 2002 SC 1706): The rule of
ejusdem generis is applicable when particular words pertaining to a class, category or
genus are followed by general words. In such a case the general words are construed as
limited to things of the same kind as those specified.
REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS
Reddendo singula singulis is a Latin term that means by referring each to each; referring
each phrase or expression to its corresponding object. In simple words “reddendo singula
singulis” means that when a list of words has a modifying phase at the end, the phrase
refers only to the last. It is a rule of construction used usually in distributing property.
Where there are general words of description, following a record of particular things, such
general words are to be construed distributively, and if the general words will apply to
some things and not to others, the general words are to be applied to those things to which
they will, and not to those to which they will not apply; that is to say, each phrase, word or
expression is to be referred to its suitable objects.
The best example of reddendo singula singulis is quoted from Wharton’s law Lexicon, “If
anyone shall draw or load any sword or gun, the word draw is applied to sword only and
the word load to gun only, the former verb to former noun and latter to latter, because it is
impossible to load a sword or to draw a gun, and so of other applications of different sets
of words to one another.” The reddendo singula singulis principle concerns the use of
words distributively. Where a complex sentence has more than one subject, and more than
one object, it may be the right construction to provide each to each, by reading the
provision distributively and applying each object to its appropriate subject. A similar
principle applies to verbs and their subjects, and to other parts of speech.
In Koteshwar Vittal Kamath v K Rangappa Baliga & Co this rule has been applied in the
construction of the Proviso to Art 304 of the Constitution which reads: Provided that no Bill
or amendment for the purpose of clause (b) shall be introduced or moved in the Legislature
of a State without the previous sanction of the President. It was held by the Supreme Court
that the word ‘introduced’ referred to ‘Bill’ and the word ‘moved’ to ‘Amendment.
UT RES MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT:
The maxim “Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat” is a rule of construction which literally
means the construction of a rule should give effect to the rule rather than destroying it .i.e.,
when there are two constructions possible from a provision, of which one gives effect to
the provision and the other renders the provision inoperative, the former which gives
effect to the provision is adopted and the latter is discarded.
The maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat is based on the following principles and
presumptions:
A statute should not be declared void for sheer vagueness.
• When the courts embark on interpreting a provision, the first and foremost necessity is
that the law survives.
• While pronouncing upon the constitutionality of a statute, the courts must start with the
presumption in favor of its constitutionality.
• The true interpretation of a provision or a statute is one that is in accordance with the
intention of the legislature. The intention of the legislature cannot be otherwise than to
give effect to all the provisions of the statute for achieving the object for which the law was
enacted.
• Adopting an interpretation by which any provision is rendered inoperative or unworkable
will be adverse to the legislative intent.
• The courts are to interpret the law and the making and repealing of legislation is the
exclusive domain of the legislature. In such circumstances, any interpretation by which any
provision or statute turns futile amounts to a rejection of law and that is not within the
jurisdiction of courts.
• Courts can strike down a law on the ground of unconstitutionality but the courts cannot
introduce any vagueness or unconstitutionality in a provision by adopting a peculiar
construction or construing a provision in a particular manner.
But it is to be noted that when the presumption of constitution fails, then the statutes
cannot be rendered valid or operative accordingly. The landmark case of Indra Sawhney
(2000), where the Supreme Court struck down the state legislation as it was violative of
constitution and ultra-vires of the legislative competency.
Cases
1. In the KB Nagpur, MD (Ayurvedic) v. The Union of India (2012) case, the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 7(1) of the Indian Medicine Central
Council Act, 1970. The clause stated that the President, Vice President, or member of
the Central Council would continue until their successor was duly elected or
nominated. The Supreme Court interpreted the clause as Parliament's solution to
delayed election for President, Vice-President, or member positions, ensuring there
was no vacuum in the Central Council's membership. The court construed Section
7(1) to ensure its effectiveness and operativeness.
2. In H.S. Vankani v. The State of Gujarat (2010), the Supreme Court observed that the
maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat also means that where the obvious intention
of the statute gives rise to obstacles in implementing it, then the court must find
ways to overcome those obstacles in order to avoid absurd results.
3. In Swami Atmananda v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam (2005), it was held by the
Supreme Court that the statute must be read in such a manner so as to give effect to
all the provisions thereof. A statute must be read reasonably and construed in a
manner to make it workable.
4. In Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. V. The State of Assam (1990), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that the courts strongly lean against construction that tends to
reduce a statute to futility. A statute or any enacting provision therein must be so
construed as to make it effective and operative. However, if a statute is absolutely
vague and its language is wholly intractable and absolutely meaningless, the statute
could be declared void for vagueness.
5. In Corporation of Calcutta v. Liberty cinema(1965), the supreme court said that on
interpreting the statute on the basis of this principle ut res magis valeat quam
pereat, it was clear that the expression fee used in Section 548 of the Calcutta
Municipal Corporation Act must mean tax because a fee means some amount of
money in lieu of services rendered by someone which is absent in the present case.
This interpretation alone paves the way for a smooth working of the system for
which the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act has been
EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS
Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius means express mention of one thing implies exclusion
of another. If one or more things of particular class are expressly mentioned in an
enactment that means that other things belonging to the same particular class are
excluded from domain of enactment. Mention of one or more thing of a particular class
may be regarded as silently excluding all other members of the class. Express enactment
closes the door to further implication.
The Expression literally means "the express mention of one thing excludes all others".
Where one or more things are specifically included in some list and others have been
excluded it automatically means that all others have been excluded. However, sometimes a
list in a statute is illustrative, not exclusionary. This is usually indicated by a word such as
"includes" or "such as". Thus a statute granting certain rights to "police, fire, and sanitation
employees" would be interpreted to exclude other public employees not enumerated from
the legislation. This is based on presumed legislative intent and where for some reason this
intent cannot be reasonably inferred the court is free to draw a different conclusion.
It is a rule used in the interpretation of statutes, to analyse legislations, laws, agreements,
written documents, or other legal texts to determine whether certain items or situations
were intentionally included or excluded based on the wording used.
Statutory Examples
The statute titled “Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act”, implies the inclusion
of protection of children specifically and the exclusion of adults.
Under the Right to Information Act, 2005, Section 8 specifies exemptions for withholding
information, such as threats to India’s sovereignty, state security etc. Only the listed
reasons can be used to deny access to information; no other grounds are valid under the
RTI Act.
Similarly, in contracts governed by the Indian Contract Act, 1872, specific terms or
conditions explicitly stated in the contract (such as the price, delivery terms, and payment
schedule for goods) imply the exclusion of other terms or conditions not mentioned.
Applicability of this Maxim
This maxim will apply where specific words are mentioned in an enacted law or statute.
Therefore, the list of words mentioned in the document must be complete and exhaustive.
For example: In a rental agreement for an apartment, there might be a clause like: “Pets
are not allowed, except for dogs and cats.” This clause means that dogs and cats are
permitted, but other animals (like birds or reptiles) are not unless explicitly allowed in the
lease. This scenario illustrates the application of the maxim since specific words are
specified.
This maxim has been used in numerous cases to ascertain the legal implications across
different areas of law.
In the case of Tempest v. Kilner a question arose regarding whether the Statute of Frauds
1677, which mandated written contracts for the sale of “goods, wares and merchandise”
above a certain value, applied to the sale of stocks and shares. The court ruled that stocks
and shares were not covered by the act because they were not explicitly listed alongside
the specific terms “goods, wares, and merchandise” in the statute.
Similarly, while determining on the question of censorship of films in Director General of
Doordarshan v. Anand Patwardhan the court ruled that specific grounds for film
censorship listed in Section 5-B of the Cinematograph Act excluded any other grounds not
explicitly mentioned in the regulations.
Conclusion
The maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” often used in statutory interpretation,
has its drawbacks. Its strict application can lead to narrow interpretations that may not
reflect legislative intent or the broader aims of the law. By focusing solely on explicitly
listed matters in a statute and excluding others, there’s a risk of disregarding issues that
legislators may have intended to address but did not expressly mention. This could result in
unjust outcomes, especially in complex legal areas where statutes may not cover every
possible scenario. For instance, in environmental laws, listing specific industries needing
permits might wrongly exclude others posing similar risks. Therefore, a balanced approach
that considers legislative history, purpose, and the statute’s overall context is crucial to
ensure interpretations align with lawmakers’ intent and uphold fairness and justice in legal
decisions.
Statute must be read as a whole in its context (EX VISCERIBUS ACTUS)
The meaning of this maxim is that every part of the Statute must be construed within the
four corners of the Act. No provision should be interpreted in isolation. Wherever the
language of a provision is ambiguous and open to alternative constructions due to
uncertainty of meaning of the words used therein, the provision has to be read as a whole
in its context. It is not permissible to omit any part of it and the construction of a section
should be made of all parts together.
Legislature, while enacting the law, is presumed to have used precise words and clear
language to express themselves and to have taken all precautions to ensure that no
ambiguity remains. Therefore, while construing a provision, the language should be read as
it is and it should not be strained to show an ambiguity therein.
In Kehar Singh v State, the Supreme Court observed that the words and sections like men
do not have their full significance when standing alone because like men they are better
understood by the company they keep.
In Union of India v Mamta Anurag Sharma, the respondent belonged to the IPS of West
Bengal Cadre, married to an IPS officer of Andhra Pradesh Cadre, sought for transfer to AP
which was not considered. She therefore moved the High Court of AP by filing Writ
Petition, which was allowed. On appeal before Supreme Court, it examined the entire
scheme of transfer policy under which respondent had sought transfer to AP cadre,
including its preamble and observed that the High Court has not taken into consideration
the preamble of aforesaid transfer policy which specifically provided that the transfer of
any spouse of All India Service Officers should not be allowed to Home State and since the
Home Stat3e of respondent is AP, there is no question of directing the Central Government
to consider the case of respondent to transfer her to AP IPS Cadre. The order of AP High
Court was set aside.
In O.P. Singla v Union of India, Supreme Court construed the proviso to Rule 7 of Delhi
Higher Judicial Services Rules, 1970, in the light of Rule 8 of these Rules. The Rule 7 deals
with recruitment by promotion and direct recruitment. The proviso attached to this rule
says “provided that not more than one third of the substantive posts shall be filled by direct
recruit.” If the language of this proviso is examined in isolation, it does not provide a quota
of direct recruits, instead imposes a maximum ceiling of one third of substantive posts that
could be filled by direct recruitment proves. This proviso was interpreted by the court
taking help from rule 8, which lays down that the seniority of direct recruitees vis-à-vis
promotes shall be determined in order of rotation of vacancies reserved for both categories
i.e. direct recruitees and promotes, by rule 7. In the light of rule 8, it was held that proviso
of rule 7 truly says that one third of substantive posts must be reserved for direct recruits.
In Poppatlal Shah v State of Madras, the Supreme Court interpreted the word ‘sale’ used
in Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 and held that the word was laying stress on the
element of transfer of property by way of sale and therefore if only a contract of sale has
been entered into within the Province of Madras, then it does not constitute the sale
within the meaning of this term under the Act because actual transfer of property has not
taken place. In view of this, sales-tax cannot be levied. In arriving at such a conclusion, the
Court referred to the title, preamble, definition and other provisions of the statute, as also
subsequent amendments made in the statute. The Court observed that it is settled
principle of construction that all constituent parts of the statute are taken together and
each word, phrase or sentence is to be considered in the light of general purpose of the Act
itself.
In Rupak Kumar v State of Bihar, the Supreme Court held that from a conjoint reading of
sections, 7, 10 and 16 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, it will appear that the
Act is intended to prohibit and penalize the sale of any adulterated article of food, and
hence the term ‘store’ will take color from the context and the collocation in which it
occurs in S7 and S16 of the Act. Therefore, ‘storage’ of an adulterated article other than fro
sale would not fall within the purview of S16 of the Act.
In Raheja Universal Limited v NRC Ltd. & Ors, the Supreme Court held that all the
provisions of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, have to be read
conjointly. Every word and expression used by the Legislature has to be given its proper
and effective meaning, as the Legislature uses no expression without purpose or meaning.
Hence, the Supreme Court held that sections, 22, 22A, 26 and 32 have to be read and
construed jointly and, so construed, the common thread of legislative intent appears to be
to treat this law as a special law and to ensure its effective implementation with utmost
expeditiousness.
In Union of India v Sheo Shambhu Giri , the Supreme Court held that the expression
‘transships’ occurring u/S 23 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985,
must necessarily be understood in the context of the scheme of the section, and the
preceding expressions ‘imports into India’ and ‘exports from India’, to mean only
transshipment for the purpose of either import into India or export out of India.
