ISSUE III: WHETHER SECTION 9(3) OF THE VINDHYA PRADESH PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY ACT,

1982, AND PARAGRAPHS 3 & 4 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 32/2025 CONFER EXCESSIVE,
VAGUE, OR UNCANALISED POWERS, THEREBY VIOLATING THE CONSTITUTION

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that Section 9(3) of the Vindhya Pradesh Public
Order and Safety Act, 1982 and Paragraphs 3 & 4 of Executive Order No. 32/2025 confer
unguided, arbitrary, and excessive discretion upon the District Collector, rendering them
unconstitutional for violating Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution.

Sub-Issue 3.1: Violation of Fundamental Rights (Articles 14 & 19)

It is humbly submitted that the conferment of wide and unguided discretion under Section 9(3)
and Paragraphs 3 & 4 of the Executive Order amounts to an unreasonable restriction on the
freedoms of speech and peaceful assembly guaranteed under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b). The
Constitution mandates that restrictions on fundamental freedoms must be narrowly tailored,
precise, and based on intelligible criteria. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248,
the Court underscored that any restriction must be “just, fair, and reasonable,” and not
arbitrary. Likewise, in Chintaman Rao v. State of M.P., AIR 1951 SC 118, a blanket prohibition
was invalidated as unreasonable. Thus, restrictions that leave citizens at the mercy of subjective
executive satisfaction cannot be sustained.

Further, Article 14 embodies the principle of non-arbitrariness, and arbitrary state action is
inherently violative of equality. In E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 4 SCC 3, this
Hon’ble Court held that arbitrariness and equality are sworn enemies. By permitting District
Collectors to selectively allow or deny assemblies based on vague standards such as “public
interest” or “adequate arrangements,” the provisions create scope for discriminatory
enforcement. In Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1, the Court struck down Section
66A of the IT Act precisely for such vagueness and arbitrariness. Therefore, the impugned
provisions not only restrict but also distort the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the
Constitution.

Moreover, the doctrine of proportionality, now firmly embedded in Indian constitutional

jurisprudence, mandates that restrictions on rights must be necessary, suitable, and the least
restrictive means available. In Modern Dental College v. State of M.P., (2016) 7 SCC 353, the
Court reiterated this principle, while in Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386,
proportionality was held to be part of Article 14’s guarantee. Since less intrusive alternatives
such as regulated permissions, deployment of additional security forces, or staggered
assemblies could have achieved the stated objective of safety, the blanket prohibition and
unguided discretion under Section 9(3) are clearly disproportionate. Thus, Sub-Issue 3.1
establishes a direct and substantive violation of fundamental rights.
Sub-Sub-Issue 3.1.1: Unguided discretion and vagueness violate Articles 14 & 19

It is humbly submitted that Section 9(3) and Paragraphs 3 & 4 of the Executive Order vest
unfettered discretion in the District Collector without laying down objective standards or clear
legislative guidance. Such absolute discretion enables arbitrary enforcement and undermines
the guarantee of equality under Article 14. In State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952
SC 75, the Hon’ble Court held that laws conferring wide, unguided powers violate the principle
of equality. Similarly, in Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 224, arbitrary
licensing powers were struck down as unconstitutional. Thus, absence of safeguards against
subjective executive satisfaction renders the impugned provisions unconstitutional.

Further, the use of vague expressions such as “adequate arrangements,” “public safety,” and
“legitimacy of purpose” fall foul of the doctrine of vagueness, leading to chilling effects on the
exercise of free speech and assembly. In K.A. Abbas v. Union of India, (1970) 2 SCC 780, the
Court stressed that censorship restrictions must be based on clear standards. In Shreya Singhal
v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1, Section 66A of the IT Act was struck down for using undefined,
broad terms that enabled arbitrary action. Similarly, in State of M.P. v. Baldeo Prasad, AIR 1961
SC 293, vague terms in legislation were declared void for conferring excessive discretion. Hence,
the impugned provisions are void for vagueness and unconstitutional.

Sub-Sub-Issue 3.1.2: Blanket restrictions & disproportionality infringe fundamental freedoms

It is respectfully submitted that the blanket restriction on assemblies exceeding 5,000 persons
constitutes a disproportionate restriction on the freedoms guaranteed under Articles 19(1)(a)
and 19(1)(b). The doctrine of proportionality requires that restrictions must be necessary,
suitable, and the least restrictive alternative. In Modern Dental College v. State of M.P., (2016) 7
SCC 353, this Court affirmed proportionality as the governing standard for restrictions on
fundamental rights. Similarly, in Chintaman Rao v. State of M.P., AIR 1951 SC 118, a blanket
prohibition on industrial activity was struck down as unreasonable.

Moreover, less restrictive measures such as regulated permissions, adequate police

deployment, and crowd management could have addressed safety concerns without imposing a
blanket ban. In Superintendent, Central Prison v. Ram Manohar Lohia, AIR 1960 SC 633, the
Court held that restrictions must have a proximate nexus to public order, not a remote
connection. Likewise, in S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 SCC 574, it was held that
freedom of expression cannot be suppressed on account of hypothetical threats. Therefore, the
impugned provisions, by imposing a blanket prohibition, fail the test of proportionality and
constitute an unreasonable restriction under Articles 19(2) and 19(3).
Sub-Issue 3.2: Colourable Legislation & Excessive Delegation

It is respectfully submitted that Section 9(3), by conferring unguided powers upon the District
Collector, amounts to excessive delegation of essential legislative functions, thereby violating
the constitutional principle of separation of powers. The legislature is expected to lay down
policy and guiding principles, leaving only subordinate details to the executive. In Delhi Laws
Act Case, AIR 1951 SC 332, it was held that essential legislative functions cannot be delegated.
In State of Punjab v. Khan Chand, AIR 1974 SC 543, arbitrary licensing powers were struck
down for lack of legislative policy. In the present case, the impugned provisions lack any clear
yardstick, permitting executive authorities to legislate in substance, which is constitutionally
impermissible.

In addition, the selective and biased manner in which exemptions have been granted
demonstrates a colourable exercise of power. Though the provisions ostensibly serve public
safety, their implementation shows a collateral purpose—tilting the electoral field. In K.C.
Gajapati Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa, AIR 1953 SC 375, the Hon’ble Court held that
colourable legislation arises when power is exercised for an indirect or ulterior purpose.
Similarly, in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975 Supp SCC 1, the Court underscored that
free and fair elections are part of the basic structure. Here, the denial of exemptions to
opposition rallies while granting them to a gathering associated with the ruling party reveals
mala fides, violating both Article 14 and the principle of electoral fairness.

Furthermore, arbitrariness in executive discretion amounts to constitutional infirmity under

Article 14. In Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P., (1991) 1 SCC 212, the Court observed
that even contractual or discretionary state actions must be guided by fairness. In A.K. Roy v.
Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 271, it was held that unguided discretion undermines
accountability. Thus, the conferment and exercise of uncanalised discretion under Section 9(3)
and Paragraphs 3 & 4 of the Executive Order are unconstitutional both for excessive
delegation and for being a colourable device to suppress political opposition.

Sub-Sub-Issue 3.2.1: Excessive delegation of legislative power without policy framework

It is submitted that Section 9(3) amounts to excessive delegation of essential legislative

functions to the executive, as it provides no guiding principles for the exercise of discretion. The
legislature cannot abdicate its essential role and vest uncanalised authority in the executive. In
Delhi Laws Act Case, AIR 1951 SC 332, the Court held that essential legislative functions cannot
be delegated. In Harishankar Bagla v. State of M.P., AIR 1954 SC 465, delegation was upheld
only because a clear legislative policy was laid down. Here, however, no such framework exists.

Further, in State of Punjab v. Khan Chand, AIR 1974 SC 543, licensing powers were struck down
for lack of policy control. Similarly, in A.K. Roy v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 271, the Court
emphasized that excessive delegation undermines constitutional accountability. Since Section
9(3) uses vague and broad standards such as “legitimacy of purpose” without defining them,
the District Collector effectively legislates by granting or denying exemptions. This constitutes an
abdication of legislative responsibility and violates the separation of powers.

Sub-Sub-Issue 3.2.2: Selective enforcement amounts to colourable exercise of power

It is humbly contended that the selective grant of exemptions under the Executive Order
demonstrates colourable exercise of power. While the Petitioner’s political rally was denied,
Swami Hardev’s gathering — attended by ruling party leaders — was exempted, despite
exceeding the numerical threshold. This indicates mala fides and discriminatory enforcement. In
E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 4 SCC 3, this Court held that arbitrariness is
antithetical to equality. Similarly, in Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P., (1991) 1 SCC 212,
arbitrary state action was held violative of Article 14.

Furthermore, colourable exercise of power occurs when state action, though facially neutral, is
used to achieve an unconstitutional purpose. In Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975 Supp
SCC 1, the Court emphasized that free and fair elections are part of the basic structure.
Likewise, in K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa, AIR 1953 SC 375, the doctrine of
colourable legislation was invoked where powers were exercised for a collateral purpose. Here,
the impugned provisions, though ostensibly aimed at public safety, have been enforced
selectively to tilt the electoral playing field in favour of the ruling party, thereby undermining
democratic fairness.