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To Nuala Mole and the AIRE Centre,
who have done so much to advance the rights of all people in Europe
Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (Extracts)
The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the
rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.
1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his
life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his con-
viction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this
article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely
necessary:
a. in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
b. in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully
detained;
c. in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be de-
prived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a proce-
dure prescribed by law:
a. the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;
b. the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful
order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation pre-
scribed by law;
c. the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing
him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having
committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to pre-
vent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;
d. the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational su-
pervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the
competent legal authority;
e. the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infec-
tious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or
vagrants;
f. the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an un-
authorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being
taken with a view to deportation or extradition.
2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he
understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him.
3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph
1.c of this article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer au-
thorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a
reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guar-
antees to appear for trial.
4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled
to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided
speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.
5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the
provisions of this article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (EXTRACTS) xv
1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable
time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment
shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all
or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in
a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the pri-
vate life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion
of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the inter-
ests of justice.
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until
proved guilty according to law.
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
a. to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail,
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;
b. to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;
c. to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing
or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free
when the interests of justice so require;
d. to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attend-
ance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions
as witnesses against him;
e. to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak
the language used in court.
1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omis-
sion which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international
law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed
than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed.
2. This article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act
or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according
to the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations.
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a demo-
cratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic
xvi CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (EXTRACTS)
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the pro-
tection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others.
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or be-
lief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limi-
tations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom
to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without inter-
ference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not pre-
vent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema
enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibil-
ities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests
of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of
the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information
received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the
judiciary.
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of asso-
ciation with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the
protection of his interests.
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (EXTRACTS) xvii
exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the
administration of the State.
Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family,
according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right.
Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall
have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the viola-
tion has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, po-
litical or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority,
property, birth or other status.
PROTOCOL 1
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.
No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to
the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State
to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance
with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or
penalties.
No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions
which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the
right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own
religious and philosophical convictions.
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1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was not drafted with children,
still less children’s rights, in mind. At the time of drafting, the child rights movement
was in its infancy, with children predominantly seen as objects of benevolence and
recipients of special protection, rather than subjects holding individual legal rights.1
Nevertheless, over the past 60 years the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
has developed a substantial and ever-growing body of case law concerning children,
covering issues ranging from juvenile justice and physical integrity to immigration,
education, and religion. Moreover, in the sphere of private and family life the Court
has developed a ‘whole code of family law’,2 significantly expanding the Convention’s
scope and influence.
The aim of this book is to provide a detailed overview of the jurisprudence of the
Court in relation to children, from its humble and essentially paternalistic beginnings
to its recent (though still evolving) recognition of children’s individual agency. It is
hoped that it will provide a foundation for academics, practitioners, and civil society
to better understand the position of the Court in relation to children’s rights, and be
a helpful tool in advancing their protection under the Convention, both domestically
and in Strasbourg.
1 See the 1924 League of Nations Geneva Declaration on the Rights of the Child, which included such
‘rights’ as the ‘the right to be among the first to receive relief ’ and the ‘right to understanding and love by
parents and society’.
2 Marckx v Belgium (6833/74) 13.06.1979, dissenting opinion of Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, para. 15.
3 M. Teitgen, ‘Report on the Establishment of a Collective Guarantee of Essential Freedoms and
Children and the European Court of Human Rights. Claire Fenton-Glynn, Oxford University Press (2021). © Claire Fenton-Glynn.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198787518.003.0001
2 INTRODUCTION
The Convention was drafted in response to twin concerns on the part of the Allied
Powers. First, in the aftermath of the Second World War, the instrument was intended
to provide a ‘collective guarantee of essential freedoms and fundamental rights’,5 to
ensure that such atrocities would never again occur. Second, and related to this, it was
a response to the growing influence of communism in Central and Eastern Europe—a
statement of values to represent a sense of common identity and to act as an early
warning system should a state move towards authoritarianism.6 As Guido Raimondi,
later President of the Court, stated, ‘an undemocratic state could not participate in the
ECHR system: the protection of democracy goes hand in hand with the protection of
rights’.7
The text of the Convention was based, ‘as far as possible’, on the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights,8 proclaimed by the newly formed United Nations two years earlier.9
It did not directly transpose the provisions of the Declaration, but instead chose those
rights that the founding states viewed as most ‘fundamental’, capable of inclusion in
‘an immediate international guarantee’.10 As a result, the Convention incorporates a
tradition of civil liberties and is primarily focused on civil and political rights, which
have conventionally been seen as more easily measurable and enforceable.11
Notably, the provisions of the Universal Declaration which focus on children—for
example, requiring the provision of special care and assistance—were not included.
Children are mentioned only twice in the main text of the Convention. First, under
Article 5(1)(d)—the right to liberty and security—an exception is permitted for the
detention of a minor for the purpose of educational supervision or for bringing him or
her before a legal authority. Second, Article 6(1)—the right to a fair trial—allows for
the exclusion of the press or public from a trial where the interests of a juvenile so re-
quire. Two further provisions relating to children were added in subsequent Protocols
to the Convention: Article 2 of Protocol 1, which protects the right to education, and
of parents to educate their children in accordance with their philosophical and reli-
gious beliefs; and Article 5 of Protocol 7, which protects equality between spouses,
with the exception that the state may take such measures ‘as are necessary in the inter-
ests of children’.12
online 2, 5.
8 (1948) GA Res 217A.
9 M. Teitgen, ‘Report on the Establishment of a Collective Guarantee of Essential Freedoms and
been discussed by the Court on one occasion—the case of Chepelev v Russia (58077/00) 26.07.2007—in
which the Court simply stated, in two sentences, that the measures taken were in accordance with the best
interests of the child and that having regard to the assessment made under Article 8, there had been no vi-
olation of Article 5, Protocol 7. There have been further cases in which the Commission and Court have
declared an application under this section inadmissible, but none in which it has been subject to any sub-
stantive examination.
The European Court of Human Rights 3
The success of the European Convention on Human Rights lies not in its provisions,
which can be described as conservative rather than radical, but in its enforcement
through the European Court of Human Rights. The intention of the drafters was to
create an independent judicial body to act as a collective enforcement mechanism of
guaranteed rights. This was expected to function primarily as an independent body to
adjudicate inter-state complaints; however, provision was also made for individuals
to bring a complaint, very much as a secondary apparatus.13 In reality, only approxi-
mately 20 inter-state cases have been brought before the Court in its 60-year history, in
contrast to the hundreds of thousands brought by individuals.
It has been this right of individual petition which has distinguished the Convention
from other human rights instruments. While today the right of an individual to chal-
lenge state practice is a central feature of a large number of regional and international
human rights instruments (for example, the African Court on Human and People’s
Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the majority of United
Nations (UN) treaty bodies)14 this was a significant innovation in 1950, and has been
central to the success of the Convention. It has established human rights not solely as
obligations between states—as in traditional international treaties—but as obligations
towards individuals, facilitating the Convention’s status as ‘hard, enforceable law’.15
Initially, the supervisory function of the Convention was carried out by two bodies.
The Commission, which acted as a filtering body, would first evaluate whether the
13 This was initially optional, but was a de facto requirement for membership of the Council of Europe for
some time, before becoming mandatory in 1998, following the coming into force of Protocol 11.
14 Human Rights Committee; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women;
The Conscience of Europe: 50 Years of the European Court of Human Rights (Strasbourg: Council of Europe,
2010), 25.
4 INTRODUCTION
Throughout its 60-year history, the Court has developed a number of tools and princi-
ples to guide its interpretation of the Convention. In doing so, it must walk a fine line
between judicial independence and political necessity. On the one hand, the Court
must ensure that the Convention guarantees rights that are ‘practical and effective’,
and not merely ‘theoretical or illusory’.20 On the other, it must recognise its role as a
supranational body, which gains its legitimacy from the continued adherence and ac-
quiescence of states.
There are four primary principles of interpretation used by the Court: positive ob-
ligations; the principle of subsidiarity; the margin of appreciation; and the ‘living tree’
principle. I provide a brief outline of each below, in order to give a background to the
jurisprudence of the Court detailed in later chapters.
16 Although in cases of doubt, the judge can refer the application to a three-judge committee to decide on
in which case the judge can refer the case to a three-judge committee, which is empowered to make a deci-
sion on the merits (Protocol 14, Article 8, amending Article 28 of the ECHR).
18 The Grand Chamber will also accept referrals in cases that concern case-law consistency and cases
in which it may be called upon to re-examine a development in the case law endorsed by the Chamber.
(European Court of Human Rights, ‘The General Practice Followed by the Panel of the Grand Chamber
When Deciding on Requests for Referral in Accordance with Article 43 of the Convention’ (Council of
Europe, 2011), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Note_GC_ENG.pdf)
19 European Court of Human Rights, ‘Statistical Overview 1959–2018’ (Council of Europe, 2019), https://
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Overview_19592018_ENG.pdf.
20 See, for example, Airey v Ireland (6289/73) 09.10.1979.
Principles of interpretation 5
Traditionally, human rights law was considered as giving rise only to negative
obligations—that is, individual freedoms that states must refrain from interfering
with. However, the recognition of positive obligations—i.e. obligations requiring
states to take action—has been one of the cornerstones of the Court’s success.21 As
Starmer has observed, ‘[i]n many respects, positive obligations are the hallmark of the
European Convention on Human Rights’.22
Positive obligations are not explicitly set out in the text of the Convention, which is
largely framed in proscriptive, rather than prescriptive, language.23 Rather, they have
been carved out by the Court through purposive interpretation. In doing so, it has in-
tentionally declined to establish a comprehensive account of the scope of positive ob-
ligations under the Convention, preferring instead to evaluate these on a case-by-case
basis.24 Nevertheless, there are certain broad principles that can be identified.
First, the doctrine of positive obligations involves a recognition that in order to ‘se-
cure’ the Convention rights to all individuals within their jurisdictions—as is required
under Article 1—it is not enough to refrain from acting, but states must also take cer-
tain positive steps to ensure their effective enjoyment. This involves both substantive
and procedural obligations, including the obligation to provide effective mechanisms
for the prevention, detection, and reporting of abuses of Convention rights, as well as
to conduct effective investigations in response to any such allegations.
Second, and most importantly, the Court has used the doctrine of positive obli-
gations to provide the Convention with horizontal effect. The state not only has to
refrain from violating individual rights itself, but must also put in place appropriate
safeguards to protect individuals from infringement on the part of private actors. This
principle is of particular importance for children, as it acts as a limit on the action of
parents, teachers, and other individuals who may control their day-to-day lives.25
While the drafters of the Convention had no intention of creating such positive
obligations—focusing purely on the freedom of the individual from ‘fascist and com-
munist inquisitorial practices’ and state ‘horrors, tyranny and vexation’26 —the Court
has clearly rejected an originalist method of interpretation, opting instead for a pur-
posive approach to ensure the Convention’s ongoing efficacy and relevance.
21 For a comprehensive discussion of the doctrine of positive obligations under the European Convention
on Human Rights, see K. Starmer, ‘Positive Obligations under the Convention’, in J. Lowell and J. Cooper
(eds), Understanding Human Rights Principles (Oxford: Hart, 2001); L. Lavrysen, Human Rights in a
Positive State: Rethinking the Relationship between Positive and Negative Obligations under the European
Convention on Human Rights (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2017); A.R. Mowbray, The Development of Positive
Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights
(Oxford: Hart, 2004).
22 K. Starmer, ‘Positive Obligations under the Convention’, in J. Lowell and J. Cooper (eds), Understanding
of the reasons for arrest (Article 5(2)); the right to free legal assistance in criminal proceedings where the
interests of justice require (Article 6(3)(c)).
24 See, for example, Plattform ‘Ärzte für das Leben’ v Austria (10126/82) 21.06.1988.
25 See, for example, the jurisprudence of the Court in the area of corporal punishment, as discussed in
Chapter 2.
26 Marckx v Belgium (6833/74) 13.06.1979, dissenting opinion of Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice.
6 INTRODUCTION
In the 70 years since the drafting of the Convention, Europe—and European society—
has seen dramatic changes. Advances in technology, changing demographics, and
evolving social norms mean that the Court is having to apply the Convention to
an ever-expanding range of situations. To respond to these changes, the Court has
adopted a dynamic approach to interpretation that recognises the Convention as a
‘living instrument’, which must be read in light of present-day conditions.27
This means that the Court’s interpretation of the Convention will change as law
and society progresses, with the recognition that the ‘failure . . . to maintain a dy-
namic and evolutive approach would risk rendering it a bar to reform or improve-
ment’.28 Thus, even where an issue has been decided previously, the Court is willing
to reassess its prior judgments in light of domestic and international developments.
A notable example of this is the characterisation of same-sex relationships under the
Convention—once considered as constituting only ‘private life’, now recognised as
‘family life’.29 Furthermore, treatment that may have constituted ‘inhuman and de-
grading treatment’ in the past might cross the threshold into torture in the future, as
increasingly high standards are enforced.30
As can be seen throughout this volume, for children this has meant that the Court
has shifted from a patriarchal understanding of their place in the family and society
to a recognition of their individual rights, updating the Convention in line with newly
adopted international standards.
Despite these expansive interpretative techniques, which have broadened the scope
of the Convention beyond the original intention of the drafters, at the heart of the
Convention system lies respect for national sovereignty. This respect manifests itself
in two separate but interrelated interpretative principles: the principle of subsidiarity
and the margin of appreciation.
The principle of subsidiarity requires that the role of the Court be conceived nar-
rowly, only intervening with state practice where necessary. As evidenced by Article
13 (the right to an effective domestic remedy) and Article 35(1) (exhaustion of do-
mestic remedies), the primary responsibility for implementing and enforcing the
Convention is placed on states within their domestic legal system. The Court will in-
tercede only when it has failed in this task.31
Moreover, subsidiarity requires the Court to adopt a cautious approach to the adju-
dication of cases. It does not operate as a tribunal of fourth instance, with jurisdiction
to review any errors of law or fact alleged against the domestic judgments,32 but only
has the power to review whether the decision was made ‘in disregard of fundamental
rights.’33 In doing so, the Court will not re-try the case: it will not investigate the facts,
nor hear witnesses and evidence afresh. Nor will it interfere with the interpretation
and application of domestic law. Rather, it will accept the determination of the do-
mestic authorities on these issues, unless there is clear evidence of arbitrariness.34
These rules are important for the functioning of the Court—it allows this body to focus
on its role as a guarantor of fundamental rights, rather than having to undertake a fresh
investigation of the entirety of the case, while also ensuring that it does not overstep the
boundaries of the powers delegated to it by states.35 It also recognises that the role of the
Court is not to harmonise European laws, but to set common minimum standards. As
Lord Hoffman has argued, ‘at the level of abstraction, human rights may be universal’, but
at the level of application they require ‘trade-offs and compromises, exercises of judgment
which can be made only in the context of a given society and its legal system’.36
32 See, for example, Belgian Linguistic Case (1474/62, 1677/62, 1691/62, 1769/63, 1994/63, 2126/64)
Fundamental Rights’ (Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, 05.09.1949), para. 26.
34 Sisojeva and others v Latvia (60654/00) 15.01.2007.
35 Jurisconsult of the European Court of Human Rights, ‘Interlaken Follow-Up. Principle of Subsidiarity’
19.03.2009), https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Hoffmann_2009_JSB_Annual_
Lecture_Universality_of_Human_Rights.pdf, 9.
37 Greer suggests this could be translated as ‘margin of assessment/appraisal/estimation’. (S. Greer, The
Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion under the European Convention on Human Rights
(Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2000), 5)
38 See F. Matscher, ‘Methods of Interpretation of the Convention’ in R.S.J. MacDonald, F. Matscher, and
H. Petzold, The European System for the Protection of Human Rights (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993).
39 See E. Benvenisti, ‘Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards’ (1999) 31
International Law and Politics 843. For a critique of this principle, see Chapter 12.
8 INTRODUCTION
40 See J. Kratochvil, ‘The Inflation of the Margin of Appreciation by the European Court of Human Rights’
73, 75.
43 See Dudgeon v the United Kingdom (7525/76) 22.10.1981.
44 See ibid.; S and Marper v the United Kingdom (30562/04, 30566/04) 04.12.2008 (GC).
45 Handyside v the United Kingdom (5493/ 72) 07.12.1976; Buckley v the United Kingdom (20348/92)
25.09.1996.
46 Handyside v the United Kingdom (5493/ 72) 07.12.1976; Dickson v the United Kingdom (44362/04)
04.12.2007 (GC).
47 See, for example, Dickson v the United Kingdom (44362/04) 04.12.2007 (GC).
48 S. Greer, The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion under the European Convention on
in defining the meaning of terms and notions in the text of the convention, [the
Court] can and must take into account elements of international law other than
the Convention, the interpretation of such elements by competent organs, and the
practice of European States reflecting their common values.49
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child50 has been particularly
influential in this regard, recognised by the Court as constituting ‘the standards to
which all governments must aspire in realising . . . rights for all children’.51 Moreover,
the Court has also referred frequently, if not consistently, to other regional and in-
ternational instruments such as the Hague Conventions on Child Abduction and on
Intercountry Adoption,52 and the European Social Charter,53 which have thus played
a crucial role in its jurisprudence. Importantly, however, the Court has held that it is
not necessary for the state in question to have ratified all the international instruments
being referred to by the Court,54 but only that the instruments ‘denote a continuous
evolution in the norms and principles applied in international law’55 and that there is
common ground in modern societies. In undertaking an analysis of the Court’s pro-
tection and advancement of children’s rights, this book also refers to these applicable
standards, examining where they have been noted, affirmed, rejected, or simply ig-
nored by the Court.
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, the aim of this book is to provide an over-
view of the case law of the Court in relation to children. For reasons of space, I do not
undertake an extensive analysis of every case that has come before the Court in this
area—instead, I attempt to draw out the main threads of the jurisprudence, showing
the evolution of the Court’s position throughout time and explaining and critiquing its
current position. In doing so, I have tried to walk a fine line between breadth of cov-
erage and depth of analysis. I wanted this book to be as comprehensive as possible, so
on Legal Status of Children Born out of Wedlock as evidence of emerging consensus, despite the fact that
Belgium had not signed or ratified it.
55 Demir and Baykara (34503/97) 12.11.2008, para. 86.
10 INTRODUCTION
that academics, practitioners, and civil society could understand at a glance what the
Court has—or has not—said on a topic. At the same time, I did not wish this to be a
purely descriptive volume, and have tried to highlight for readers some of the key criti-
cisms that have been levelled at the various cases or lines of jurisprudence.
The book comprises ten substantive chapters, and is organised thematically, rather
than by Convention article. Not all issues fall neatly into one section, however, and
there is inevitable overlap, particularly where a case has been examined from a number
of different perspectives. Nevertheless, I have tried to provide a coherent and logical
categorisation of the jurisprudence in a way which will be useful for all readers, what-
ever their aim in consulting this text.
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 goes on to examine the child’s right
to freedom from violence and exploitation, including protection from corporal pun-
ishment, child abuse, and sexual violence, as well as child marriage, forced labour, and
modern slavery. Chapter 3 then analyses the right to respect for private life in the con-
text of privacy, the right to receive information, and the right to individual identity.
Chapter 4 considers the rights of the child in relation to the juvenile justice system,
and Chapter 5 the immigration system, including deportation and expulsion, family
reunification, and the detention of accompanied and unaccompanied minors.
Chapter 6 then examines the jurisprudence in the area of education, and in partic-
ular the form and content of schooling, as well as school uniform and religious sym-
bols, followed by an analysis of the Court’s approach to social and economic rights in
Chapter 7.
The final four substantive chapters relate to the child within the family unit: family
life and the establishment of parenthood (Chapter 8); disputes concerning custody
and access (Chapter 9); child protection (Chapter 10); and adoption (Chapter 11).
Finally, Chapter 12 presents some conclusions of this analysis, highlighting the fields
where the Court has made significant advances for children’s rights and areas where
there remains work to be done.
Language: English
THE
AMATEUR
DRAMA.
THE DUCHESS
OF DUBLIN.
BOSTON:
GEO. M. BAKER & CO.
149 Washington Street.
A Farce.
BY THE AUTHOR OF
"Sylvia's Soldier,"
"Once on a Time," "Down by the Sea," "The Last Loaf,"
"Bread on the Waters," "Stand by the Flag," "The Tempter," "A Drop
too
Much," "We're all Teetotalers," "A Little more Cider," "Thirty Minutes
for Refreshments," "Wanted, a Male Cook," "A Sea of Troubles,"
"Freedom of the Press," "A Close Shave," "The Great
Elixir," "The Man with the Demijohn," "Humors of
the Strike," "New Brooms sweep Clean," "My
Uncle the Captain," "The Greatest Plague
in Life," "No Cure, no Pay," "The
Grecian Bend," "War of the
Roses," "Lightheart's
Pilgrimage,"
"The
Sculptor's
Triumph," "Too
Late for the Train,"
"Snow-Bound," "The Peddler
of Very Nice," "Bonbons,"
"Capuletta," "An Original Idea," "My
Brother's Keeper," "Among the Breakers,"
"The Boston Dip," "The Duchess of Dublin," "A
Tender Attachment," "Gentlemen of the Jury," "A Public
Benefactor," "The Thief of Time," "The Hypochondriac," "The
Runaways," "Coals of Fire," "The Red Chignon," "Using the Weed,"
"A Love of a Bonnet," "A Precious Pickle," "The Revolt
of the Bees," "The Seven Ages,"
&c., &c., &c.
BOSTON:
GEORGE M. BAKER & CO.,
149 Washington Street.
Maggie. 'Pon my sowl, it's the docthor's a jewel, that he is! Didn't I
burn me wid the hot fat, that made me howl wid the pain uv it? And
didn't the blissid docthor tind me loike his own sisther—wid the
cooling and haling salve for me fisht, and the wee sugar pills for the
faver that was burnin' me up intirely? And didn't the blissid crayther,
wid the bountiful heart in 'im, charge niver a cint for it, or sthop it
out uv the wages uv a poor girl, as many a hathen would do, bad
luck to 'em. To be sure he did; and, by that same token, it's Maggie
Mullen would run the wide worrld over for the sakes uv him. Och,
but it's little docthoring he has onyhow, and perhaps I did him a
sarvice giving him the practice loike. Will, if the sick folks only knew
how handy he is, there'd be little rist for the sole uv my fut
answering the bill.
Enter Friskey, l.
Enter Dennis, l.
Dennis. The top uv the mornin' to ye's. Is the docther man in—I
donno?
Dr. A. Yes, I'm the doctor.
Dennis. Is that so? Yer rivirance, if ye plaze, Squire Croony wants
ye's quick. The ould missus's howlin' in the pangs uv insinsibility, the
young masther's took wid the jumpin' croup in his skull, and the
babby's got the janders—an' it's pisoned they all are intirely.
Dr. A. What, Squire Croony?
Dennis. The same, yer rivirance, onto the hill beyant.
Dr. A. O, you've made a mistake. He wants Dr. Allopath.
Dennis. Niver at all, at all. It's Dr. Ac—Ac—Acraoniting I was to sind.
Dr. A. (jumping up, and pulling off his dressing-gown). My coat—
quick! quick! (Annie runs off, r.) Maggie, Maggie, my hat and cane!
Here's luck. (Enter Annie, with coat. He jumps into it.) You're sure he
sent for me?
Dennis. To be sure I am.
Dr. A. Glory! glory! Rich Squire Croony! I'm a fortunate man. Where's
my medicine case? (Runs to table, r., and takes it.) My good man,
I'm terribly afraid you've made a mistake.
Dennis. Troth, I'm afraid they'll all git well afore you git there.
Dr. A. That would be fatal—ahem!—to me. I'm off. I'll return at the
earliest possible moment. Should anybody call, let them wait. Tell
them I am suddenly called to my rich patient, ahem! Squire Croony.
(Going off, l.)
Dr. A. The ice is broken. I've cured four individuals in ten minutes.
My fortune's made. (Comes, c.)
Plumpface (jumping up). O, doctor (cough), my cough!
Oldbuck (jumping up). Dear doctor, my foot—O!
Plumpface. Please attend to me first. (Cough.)
Oldbuck. No, I arrived first, and claim your attention first.
Plumpface. It's a lie. I sent an hour ago. (Cough.)
Oldbuck. He's a humbug. That cough's hereditary.
Plumpface. You villain! (Shakes fist at Oldbuck.)
Oldbuck. You swindler! (Shakes fist at Plumpface.)
Dr. A. (stepping between them). Gentlemen, be calm. 'Tis the proud
boast of medical science that it can settle all difficulties, mental as
well as physical. You need my aid; but such are the claims upon my
time that I cannot, without doing injustice to my numerous patients,
attend to you at present. Give me your address, and I will call upon
you at the earliest possible moment.
Oldbuck. I am Squire Oldbuck.
Dr. A. (aside). The rich squire—good!
Plumpface. And I am Peter Plumpface. (Cough.)
Dr. A. (aside). The great manufacturer—good!
Oldbuck. I can pay handsomely.
Plumpface. I can pay liberally.
Dr. A. Gentlemen, you shall receive my early attention. You will
pardon me, but I have a patient in the house who requires my
immediate attention.
Oldbuck (aside). "The Duchess of Dublin."
Plumpface (aside). The Dublin duchess. (Cough. Aloud.) My dear
doctor, I have heard of your skill. May I depend upon you?
Dr. A. At the earliest possible moment.
Oldbuck. You will give me early attention?
Dr. A. Immediate.
Oldbuck. Then I'll hobble home at once. Good day, doctor. (Aside.)
When old Plumpface is out of the way, I'll slip back again.
[Exit, l.
Plumpface (coughs). I know your skill, doctor (cough,) and shall
depend upon you. Good day. (Cough. Aside.) I'll come back and
quicken his memory when Oldbuck is out of sight.
[Exit, l.
Dr. A. (rubbing his hands). Ha, ha! that's a capital joke. Dr. Aconite,
poor physician, turns two of the richest men out of his office to wait
his pleasure! But that's the right way. 'Twill never do to be too
anxious. Egad! they're rich acquisitions; for, though I have never met
them, that cough and that gouty foot have been the rounds of the
medical fraternity. Wonder how they happened to drop in upon me?
No matter; I can cure them both in time. Ah, Time, you are the
doctor's best friend, for you pay as you go. Luck's come at last, and
that imaginary dinner shall be a real, substantial feast, to mark the
day when Dr. Aconite took his first fee.
Enter Sharpset, l.
Original, very.
Abigail. Joshua Billings.
Dr. A. (reading). "Duz time fli in fli time? Josh Billings." That's a very
bad spell.
Abigail. Alfred Tennyson.
Dr. A. (reading).
A. Tennyson."
Abigail. Exquisite poet!
Dr. A. I admire his taste.
Abigail. Now, dear doctor, I would add one other name to my
valuable collection. You can aid me. Will you? O, say you will—will
you? and take the burden from the heart of a lone orphan.
Dr. A. Madam, or miss, I should be very happy to assist you—
Abigail. O, rapturous answer! O, noble disciple of Æsculapius! The
lips of the lone orphan will bless you; the tears of the lone orphan
shall bless you; the smiles of the lone orphan—
Dr. A. Be calm, be calm. In what way can I assist you?
Abigail. You have beneath your roof a noble lady—
Dr. A. Eh?
Abigail. From a foreign clime. You hold her here in secret. Let me
but get her name in my autograph album, and Abigail Alllove will die
happy.
Dr. A. Noble lady? (Aside.) Another lunatic.
Abigail. Yes, the name of "The Duchess of Dublin."
Dr. A. The—dickens! Stark, staring mad. My dear young lady, you are
laboring under a hallucination. Go home at once. Call your friends.
Abigail. Alas! I have no friends. Did I not tell you I am a lone—
Dr. A. Yes, yes; but call in the neighbors, the kind neighbors—
Abigail. But the duchess! I must see the duchess. The hopes, the
fears, the life of a lone orphan—
Dr. A. Lone orphan, go home; let me alone. I have no duchess, know
no duchess. You are deceived. No, no, dear, go home.
Enter Oldbuck, l.
Oldbuck. I say, doctor, what's the matter with Plumpface? I met him,
running. Is there a fire anywhere?
Dr. A. Yes, very near him—in his head. It has been turned.
Oldbuck. You don't say so. By what, pray?
Dr. A. By "The Duchess of Dublin."
Oldbuck. Egad! she's enough to turn anybody's head. But I say,
doctor, how is she?
Dr. A. What?
Oldbuck. I'm mightily interested in her. How's she getting along? I've
seen her, too.
Dr. A. O, this is too much. Oldbuck, look at that foot.
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