HBP# NA0832

Boeing 2022: Fighting for a Second

Chance
W. Scott Sherman, Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi
Randall D. Harris, Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi

“We believe in this airplane, period,” Boeing CEO David Calhoun asserted in a July
2022 interview as he discussed the future of Boeing’s newest airliner, the Boeing 737
MAX 10.1 The MAX 10 was three years behind schedule and the U.S. Federal Aviation
Authority (FAA) had predicted it would not pass needed certifications by the end of
2022 to avoid major federally-mandated design changes.2 Boeing needed to decide how
to convince Congress to extend the MAX 10 certification deadline without making
extensive and costly modifications that might further delay delivery of the MAX 10.3
Such delays might further weaken Boeing’s competitive position in the global airliner
industry.4 Experts predicted difficulty in convincing Congress to extend the
certification deadline, after two MAX 10 crashes with 346 deaths and recent revelations
that Boeing had deceived regulators.5 The 737 debacle left Boeing with no goodwill
with Congress and with Congress still mad at Boeing.6,7 How could Boeing fight for a
second chance MAX 10 deadline extension?

BOEING COMPANY BACKGROUND

Boeing History
Boeing, a U.S. aerospace company, was founded in 1916 by William Boeing, an
entrepreneur with little experience in building airplanes,8 and grew over the next 105
years to generate 2021 revenues of $62 billion in commercial and military aircraft,
missiles, space systems, and support services. Commercial aviation comprised about
31% of 2021 revenues9 (See Exhibit A). Boeing was focused more on engineering
innovation than profitability in its first eighty years and was considered an early aviation
engineering leader.10 Boeing’s first ventures were military aircraft to support the U.S.
and its allies in World War I and World War II.11 Boeing did not enter the commercial
aviation market until 1947.12 Boeing grew significantly between 1950 and 1990 due to
the space race and the Cold War, and commercial aviation did not generate a profit
until the early 1970s.13 The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s forced many
aerospace firms to consolidate, and Boeing acquired rival McDonnell Douglas in 1997
in an effort to cut costs for both companies.14 The Boeing engineering-oriented culture
that produced such breakthroughs as the B-52 bomber and the 747 airliner soon 747
airliners.18 Boeing did revamp two older airliners, the 737 in 201119 and the 777 in
2013,20 to counter competitive pressures. Boeing’s chief competitor, Airbus, a

---------------------
Copyright  2024 by the Case Research Journal and by W. Scott Sherman and Randall D. Harris. All
rights reserved by the author and NACRA. An earlier version of the case was presented at the
NACRA 2023 Annual Conference.

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 European consortium, invested extensively in new airliner designs. Airbus received net
yielded to the more finance-oriented McDonnell Douglas culture,15 and new product
development funding was cut significantly.16 Boeing had not developed any new
airliners after the 787 was introduced in 200317 and had not developed replacements
for the retired 757, 767, or orders for 507 airliners in 2021 compared to Boeing’s 479
net orders.21 Boeing and Airbus had operated as a virtual global airliner duopoly since
the 1990s.22 Smaller airline manufacturers based in Brazil, China, and Russia
collectively generated less than 10% of the 2021 global airliner market.23

The Boeing 737 MAX

The Boeing 737 was a single-aisle aircraft that first flew in 1966 and set a world record
for the most-produced airliner model in history with its 10,000th delivery in 2018.24
Commercial airliners that flew in the U.S. were required to receive safety certifications
from the FAA, and other nations required similar safety certifications.25 The Boeing
737 received FAA certification in 1967, and new 737 models were certified in 1984 and
1998.26 Boeing announced the fourth model in the series, the 737 MAX, in 2011,27 with
initial plans for three different versions, the MAX 7, MAX 8, and MAX 9 (See Exhibit
B). A fourth 737 MAX variant, the MAX 10, was added in 2017 to compete with the
Airbus 321neo,28 a newly developed Airbus airliner with similar passenger capacity and
pricing as the MAX 10.29 The FAA certified the MAX 8 in 201730 and the MAX 9 in
2018.31 Boeing ended 2018 with 330 MAX 8 airliners delivered and 4,950 total 737
MAX orders.32 The MAX 7 was scheduled for certification in 2019, and the MAX 10
in 2020.33
The FAA in 2011 updated its certification requirements for the system that alerted
pilots of aircraft malfunctions, to incorporate technology developed since these
standards were set in 1977.34 Boeing developed a fully compliant pilot alert system –
the Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) – for all Boeing airliners
except the 737 series.35 Boeing did not use the EICAS in the 737 series because the
estimated costs to integrate EICAS into 737 cockpits were projected to exceed $10
billion and require extensive pilot re-training.36 Boeing received a waiver in 2014 for
the 737 MAX series from the 2011 FAA requirements.37 The resulting 737 MAX pilot
alerting system was almost identical to the 1984 system adopted when digital displays
were added.38 The 737 MAX pilot alerting system used multiple audio alarms and
warning lights that operated independently and were not connected to each other.39

The 737 MAX Debacle

The 737 MAX airliner model was longer, with larger engines than previous 737 models.
The resulting shift in the airliner's center of gravity required automated flight controls
known as the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) so that the
jet handled similarly to older 737 models.40 The Boeing 737 MAX pilot training did not
clearly inform pilots of MCAS's existence or role.41 Boeing convinced the FAA and
other regulators that pilots who had flown prior 737 models would only need a three-
hour course on a computer tablet to fly the 737 MAX safely.42 Reducing costly pilot
training was critical to Boeing’s plans to market the 737 MAX to a wide variety of
airlines around the world. Boeing had included a $1 million rebate per airplane for
some 737 MAX purchasers if regulators required significant pilot training.43
A 737 MAX 8 aircraft crashed in October 2018, and a second 737 MAX 8 crashed
in March 2019, with a total of 346 fatalities.44 Investigations quickly determined that
MCAS malfunctions and the pilots’ inability to override MCAS contributed to both
crashes.45 All 737 MAX 8 and 9 aircraft worldwide were grounded in March 2019 after

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 the second 737 MAX crash.46 Boeing could not deliver, and airlines could not fly any
737 MAX aircraft until regulators recertified the airliner. Boeing lost competitive
ground, and the Airbus 320 product line, with 15,193 total orders, surpassed the Boeing
737 product line, with 15,136 total orders, in November 2019 to become the best-
selling airliner in history.47 Boeing’s public image was damaged further when Boeing
CEO and Board Chair Dennis Muilenburg was viewed as unresponsive to 737 MAX
crash victims’ families,48 appeared to evade taking responsibility during Congressional
testimony,49 and attempted to rush FAA approval to return the 737 MAX to service.50
The Boeing Board fired Muilenburg in December 2019, named a veteran Boeing Board
member as Board Chair, and appointed Calhoun, another veteran Boeing Board
member, as CEO.51 Boeing’s costs for the 737 MAX debacle through January 2020
exceeded $19 billion.52 Boeing halted 737 MAX production in January 2020,53 which
affected Boeing’s suppliers, including one supplier that laid off 2,800 employees.54 The
737 MAX shutdown was projected to reduce total U.S. 2020 economic growth by an
estimated one-half percent.55
FAA and Congressional investigations found that Boeing engineers and managers
were aware of MCAS deficiencies as early as 2016, hid the faults from the FAA before
the two 737 MAX 8 crashes, and attempted to conceal the cover-up after the crashes.57
Boeing redesigned the MCAS, and the FAA recertified the MAX 8 and 9 in November
2020.58 Boeing paid its airline customers $1.77 billion in damages for the 737 MAX
being grounded and the U.S. government $243 million in fines. Boeing pleaded guilty
in January 2021 to conspiring to defraud the FAA,59 accepted sole responsibility for
the two crashes, and Boeing’s insurers agreed to pay all 737 MAX crash-related punitive
damages.60 The European Union recertified the MAX 8 and MAX 9 in January 202161
after requiring additional modifications to the pilot alerting system.62
Calhoun and Boeing’s struggles with the 737 MAX were further complicated when
the COVID-19 pandemic struck in early 2020. U.S. passenger airline demand dropped
96 percent in April 2020 versus April 2019.63 Boeing lost $11.9 billion in 2020 and $4.3
billion in 2021 due to the combined effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the 737
MAX debacle.64 Boeing’s 2020 total debt topped $63 billion, a 132 percent increase
over 2019, and eased to $58 billion in 2021. Airlines canceled 675 orders for 737 MAX
airliners, and Boeing removed another 570 orders from its books to comply with more
rigid accounting standards.65 The losses, increased debt, and lost orders forced Boeing
to cut 21,000 jobs between March 2020 and mid-2021.66 Boeing restarted MAX 737
production in May 202067 and was still operating below its 2018 production rates in
mid-2022, partially due to pandemic-related supply chain issues.68

The 737 MAX Situation in July 2022

The U.S. Congress responded to the 737 MAX debacle by passing the Aircraft
Certification Safety and Accountability Act (ACSAA) in December 2020.69 The
ACSAA gave the FAA a more direct role in approving aircraft designs, setting airline
safety standards, and establishing financial penalties for non-compliance with FAA
directives or non-disclosure of critical safety information.70 The ACSAA also required
all airliners certified after December 2022 to meet all current FAA requirements for
the pilot alerting system.71 The 2014 FAA decision to exempt the 737 MAX from some
pilot alerting system requirements was a controversial move criticized after the two
fatal 737 MAX crashes.72 The 737 MAX pilot alerting system did not meet the ACSAA
and 2011 FAA requirements that a pilot alerting system “displays and differentiates
among alert(s)” and assists pilots “in prioritizing corrective actions.”73 The December
2022 deadline gave Boeing two years after the ACSAA became law in December 2020

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 to complete FAA safety certification of the MAX 7 and MAX 10 with the same pilot
alerting system as the MAX 8 and the MAX 9.74 Boeing, the FAA, and Congress were
confident in 2020 that Boeing would meet the December 2022 certification deadline
for the MAX 7 and MAX 10.75
The process of certifying the MAX 7 and MAX 10 moved more slowly than
anticipated because the FAA took a more demanding stance on certification following
the two 737 MAX crashes, criticism of the FAA’s previously close relationship with
Boeing, and the passage of the ACSAA.76 Boeing CEO Calhoun noted the MAX 7 and
MAX 10 certifications were “definitely a more rigorous process. Everything has to be
completed.”77 Most observers in early 2022 believed the MAX 7 certification was on
track to meet the December 2022 deadline, with the primary issue being proper
certification process documentation.78 The FAA assigned additional FAA employees
to its certification process review to prevent internal delays.79
The FAA informed Boeing in March 2022 that the agency doubted that the MAX
10 would meet the December 2022 deadline because of Boeing documentation and
testing delays.80 The FAA noted that only Congress could extend the December 2022
MAX 10 FAA certification deadline with the current 737 MAX pilot alerting system
by amending ACSAA or passing new legislation.81 The FAA would stop its work on
MAX 10 certification at the end of December 2022 if Congress did not extend the
deadline.82
Public skepticism about Boeing’s actions increased further when a Netflix
documentary on the 737 MAX debacle was the eighth-most-watched film globally in
March 2022.83 Boeing’s public image also was impacted in June 2022 when a group of
737 MAX crash victims’ families and former Boeing managers made a joint public
appeal for Boeing to upgrade the 737 MAX pilot alerting system.84 Boeing continued
to claim the 737 MAX was safe, and the victims’ families continued to meet with
lawmakers and regulators regarding 737 MAX safety concerns.85 Boeing’s tarnished
reputation led one unnamed senior Boeing executive to note that Boeing’s “problem
is they can’t generate any goodwill” in Congress.86
The release of an FAA-commissioned independent report in June 2022 increased
concerns over the existing 737 MAX pilot alerting system because the report concluded
that the 737 MAX pilot alerting system and MCAS malfunctions contributed to the
two 737 MAX 8 crashes.87 European regulators (EASA) added additional MAX 10
pilot alerting system requirements, further slowing Boeing’s documentation and testing
process.88 These additional required modifications were expected to delay the MAX 10
EASA certification until at least late 2023.89 EASA had no deadline for MAX 10
certification.90

DECISION POINT
Boeing CEO Calhoun met with aviation journalists at Boeing’s new headquarters in
Arlington, Virginia in July 2022 to provide his perspective on Boeing’s MAX 10
options before the 2022 Farnborough Airshow in England.91 The Farnborough
Airshow was a major arena for Boeing and Airbus to announce new products and
orders.92 Questions about the MAX 10’s future would be center stage at Farnborough
as airlines worldwide considered whether to order the MAX 10, cancel existing MAX
10 orders, or consider Airbus aircraft as an alternative to the MAX 10.93 Calhoun told
the journalists that Congress needed to allow the FAA more time to complete the MAX
10 certification with the existing pilot alerting system.94 He also noted that persuading
Congress to approve a deadline extension would be contentious, and that he was ready

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 for a fight.95 Calhoun stated that Boeing might cancel the MAX 10 if Congress did not
approve a certification deadline extension, although he did not expect to cancel the
MAX 10.96 Mentioning a potential MAX 10 cancellation may have been a bargaining
ploy with Congress, because such a cancellation would negatively impact the U.S.
economy, increase unemployment, impact voters, and increase pressure on Congress.
The cancellation also would cost Boeing up to $25 billion in sales,97 weaken Boeing’s
competitive position, and leave Boeing offering no direct competitor to the Airbus
321neo, which had 4,241 orders by June 2022.98 A MAX 10 cancellation also might
also prod Boeing to develop a new airliner at an estimated cost of $15 billion, and a
commitment of at least seven years before the airliner could be in commercial use.99
A major decision facing Calhoun and Boeing was what was the best means to
convince Congress to approve a certification deadline extension: keep the effort
internal to Boeing, or work with affected stakeholders. Boeing's Government
Operations office employed 115 government affairs specialists and spent over $13
million to win support for Boeing programs from Congress in 2021.100 An alternative
to influencing Congress was eliciting stakeholder support to persuade Congress, from
groups that might be impacted if the MAX 10 deadline was not extended.101 These
stakeholder groups included Boeing customer airlines, suppliers and contractors, their
employees and unions, the communities where Boeing and subcontractor plants were
located, and the U.S. government, which purchased defense and commercial Boeing
products (See Exhibit C). The Boeing 737’s economic impact had been demonstrated
as significant when Boeing 737 production was halted in 2019 and caused the U.S.
gross domestic product (GDP) to drop one-half percent in the first quarter of 2020.102
Another estimate noted that The Boeing Company employed about 140,000
Americans, and utilized 13,600 subcontractors who employed another 1.3 million.103
Any effort to persuade Congress also would need to counter efforts by those opposed
to a MAX 10 deadline extension, including crash victims’ families, former Boeing
executives publicly opposed to a MAX 10 certification extension,104 safety experts who
questioned why the 737 MAX was the only U.S. airliner without a modern pilot alerting
system105 and those who believed Boeing should have met the original December 2022
certification deadline and should not receive a second chance.106 The efforts to sway
Congress would occur in a politically charged environment as Congress dealt with
domestic issues, mid-term elections, and the War in Ukraine.107
Calhoun needed to decide quickly how Boeing would fight for the MAX 10
certification deadline extension. The required legislation could take weeks or months
to wind through the appropriate congressional committees and win House and Senate
approval before the certification deadline. The FAA would be forced to stop MAX 10
certification efforts in late December 2022 without a deadline extension.108 Getting
approval was further complicated by Congressional politics. The Democrats had a
narrow majority in both the House and Senate in 2022, and the Republicans were
predicted (in July 2022) to win a majority in both houses of Congress in the November
mid-term elections109 (See Exhibit D). Who supported the deadline extension was
more complex than political party affiliation, as members of both parties supported or
opposed extending the MAX 10 certification deadline based on constituent needs and
politicians’ individual agendas.110 Waiting for a new Congress to approve restarting the
FAA certification would delay MAX 10 deliveries and increase Boeing’s costs.111 It also
was uncertain that the new Congress would support a deadline extension, which might
force costly redesigns and further delivery delays.112 A major concern, as Calhoun
prepared to leave for the Farnborough Airshow, was how Calhoun and Boeing should
fight for a second chance for the MAX 10.

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 Exhibit A: Boeing Company Key Financial Data 2017-2021
All numbers in million US$ 2021 2020 2019 2018 2017
Total revenues 62,286 58,158 76,559 101,127 94,005
Commercial Airplanes 19,493 16,162 32,255 57,499 54,612
Defense, Space & Security 26,540 26,257 26,095 26,392 23,938
All Other Businesses1 16,253 15,739 18,209 17,236 15,455
Total costs and expenses (59,269) (63,843) (72,093) (81,490) (76,612)
General and administrative expense (4,157) (4,817) (3,909) (4,567) (4,095)
Research and development expenses, net (2,249) (2,476) (3,219) (3,269) (3,179)
Operating investments, Disposition gains 487 211 687 186 225
(Loss) Earnings from Operations (2,902) (12,767) (1,975) 11,987 10,344
Interest, Income Tax, and Other Income (1,388) 826 1,339 (1,527) (1,886)
Total Net (Loss)/Earnings (4,290) (11,941) (636) 10,460 8,458
(Loss)/Earnings from operations
Commercial Airplanes (6,475) (13,847) (6,657) 7,830 5,285
Defense, Space & Security 1,544 1,539 2,608 1,657 2,383
All Other Businesses1 2,123 513 2,725 2,615 2,365
Assets
Current assets 108,666 121,642 102,229 87,380 85,194
Total assets 138,552 152,136 133,625 117,359 112,362
Liabilities
Short-term debt and current portion of
long-term debt 1,296 1,693 7,340 3,190 1,335
Other current liabilities 80,696 85,587 89,972 78,400 75,313
Current Liabilities 81,992 87,280 97,312 81,590 76,648
Long-term debt 56,806 61,890 19,962 10,657 9,782
Total liabilities 2 153,398 170,211 141,925 116,949 110,649
Retained earnings 34,408 38,610 50,644 55,941 49,618
Total equity (14,846) (18,075) (8,300) 410 1,713
1 All Other Businesses include Global Services, Boeing Capital, and miscellaneous revenues/expenses.
2 2017, 2018, and 2019 Total liabilities calculated based on 10-K information.
Sources: Boeing Company 10-K, 2018-2022

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 Exhibit B: The Boeing Company
Boeing versus Airbus Single-Aisle Airliner
Product Line Technical Specifications113

Net
Orders as
List Price
Maximum Range of June
(Estimate in Year
Seatsa (nm) Length 30, 2022b
Million US$)c Certified
The Boeing Company 737 Series
737 MAX 7 172 3,850 119 ft. 8 in. 248 99.7 -e
737 MAX 8 210 3,550 129 ft. 8 in. 2,043 121.6 2017
737 MAX 9 d 220 3,550 138 ft. 4 in. 105 128.9 2018
737 MAX 10d 230 3,300 146 ft. 0 in. 550 134.9 -e
Note: Boeing received 1,121 737 MAX orders as of 6/30/2022 with the specific 737 MAX model
not specified and to be determined later based on market conditions and customer needs.

Airbus SE 320 Series

319neo 160 3,700 111 ft. 0 in. 73 101.5 2018
320neo 194 3,400 123 ft. 3 in. 3,801 110.6 2015
321neo 244 3,500 146 ft. 0 in. 4,241 117.4 2017

nm = nautical miles
a one (1) class seating
b Net orders are new orders less cancellations
c Prices were discounted based on aircraft order volume. Discounts not public information.
d one (1) auxiliary fuel tank
e Not certified at the time of the case

Source: Compiled by the authors.

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 Exhibit C: Boeing 737 MAX U.S. Stakeholders (as of July 2022)114

Stakeholder Description Estimated 2022 U.S. States Impacted

Groups U.S. Employees
Boeing 737 MAX Alaska Air, Delta, 262,000 Headquarters in Washington,
Customer Airlines Southwest, and United Georgia, Illinois, and Texas,
and operate across the U.S.
Suppliers and More than 600 firms 1,000,000 California, Connecticut,
Subcontractors globally, many with U.S. (Boeing estimate) Kansas, Ohio, Oklahoma,
operations South Carolina, and others
Boeing Employees Employees of Boeing and 125,000 Washington, South Carolina,
the communities Illinois, Texas
surrounding Boeing plants.
US Federal Purchased Defense and NA All US States, specifically
Government Commercial Aircraft. California, Kansas, South
Boeing is also a major Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and
contributor to the US Washington
economy.
Source: Compiled by the authors.

Exhibit D: Voting Membership of the 117th Congress (2021-2022)

(as of July 13, 2022)115

Democrats Independents1 Republicans Vacant Total

House 220 0 211 4 435
Senate 48 2 50 0 100
1 Two (2) Independents in the Senate caucused with the Democrats.
The Democratic Vice-President served as the Senate's presiding officer, could vote to break a tie, and
gave the Democrats the majority in the House.
Source: Compiled by the authors.

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3 Ibid.
4 Broderick, S., et al., (2022).
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26Askey, L.S., Bozlinski, L.M., Campbell, K.C., Feerar, W. N., Kline, M.N.,
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32 The Boeing Company (2019). 2018 Annual Report, p. 129.
33 Ibid.
34 Askey, et al. (2022).
35 Ostrower, J. (2022).
36 Askey, et al. (2022).
37 Ibid.
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39Niles, R. (2022). “MAX 10 held up over crew alerting system.” AVWEB., April 21,
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40DeFazio, P. A., and Larsen, R. (2020). Final Committee Report: The Design
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Transportation and Infrastructure., September 15, 2020. P.42.
41 DeFazio, P. A., and Larsen, R. (2020).
42Gates, D. (2022). “FAA tells Boeing it doubts MAX 10 will meet safety standard
deadline.” The Seattle Times, March 24, 2022.
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/faa-tells-boeing-it-
doubts-max-10-will-meet-safety-standard-deadline/
43 Gelles, D. and Kitreoff, N. (2019).
44 Gates, D. (2022). “As Boeing pushed for exemption for MAX 10, report to FAA
critiques 737 crew-alerting system.” The Seattle Times, June 7, 2022.
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/as-boeing-pushes-for-
exemption-for-max-10-report-to-faa-critiques-737-crew-alerting-system/
45Gates, D. (2019). “Flawed analysis, failed oversight: How Boeing, FAA certified
the suspect 737 MAX flight control system.” Seattle Times, March 21, 2019.

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 https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-faa-
missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/
46Chokshi, N. (2020). “Boeing 737 MAX is deemed safe to fly again.” The New
York Times, November 19, 2020, A1.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/18/business/boeing-737-max-faa.html
47Derrick, E. (2019). “Airbus’s A 320 Now Has More Total Orders Than the Boeing
737.” Simple Flying, November 15, 2019.
48Gates, D., Kamb, L., and Miletich, S. (2019). “In Five-Hour Grilling Over 737
MAX Crashes, House Panel Reveals Boeing Memos, Calls on CEO Muilenburg to
resign.” Seattle Times, October 30, 2019, A1.
49 Ibid.
Kitroeff, N. and Gelles, D. (2019). “At Boeing, CEO’s Stumbles Deepen a Crisis.”
50

New York Times, December 23, 2019. A1.

51 The Boeing Company. (2020). Annual Report, p. 3.
52Cameron, D. and Tangel, A. (2020). “Boeing Posts Its First Annual Loss Since
1997 As MAX Costs Surge.” Wall Street Journal. January 30, 2020.
53Gelles, D. and Kitroeff, N. (2019). “Boeing will halt MAX production.” New York
Times, December 17, 2019, A1.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/16/business/boeing-737-max.html
54Newburger, E. (2020). “Boeing 737 MAX crisis could slow U.S. growth by a half
point in 2020, Mnuchin says.” CNBC, Jan. 12, 2020.
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/12/mnuchin-says-boeing-737-max-grounding-
could-slow-us-growth-by-a-half-point.html
55 Ibid.
56Gates, D. (2019). “Flawed analysis, failed oversight: How Boeing, FAA certified
the suspect 737 MAX flight control system.” Seattle Times, March 21, 2019.
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-faa-
missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/
57Koenig, D. (2021). “Boeing will pay $2.5 billion to settle charge over 737 MAX.”
Seattle Times, January 7, 2021.
Tangel, A. and Paztor, A. (2020). “Boeing 737 MAX Cleared to Fly Again, but
58

COVID-19 Has Sapped Demand.” Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2020.
59 Koenig, D. (2021).
Gates, D. (2021). “Boeing Accepts Sole Responsibility for 737 MAX Crashes, Wins
60

Agreements to Avoid Punitive Damages.” Seattle Times, November 11, 2021.

The Boeing Company. (2021). “Boeing responds to EASA approval to resume 737
61

MAX operations in Europe.” Boeing Press Release, January 27, 2021.

62Hemmerdinger, J. (2022). “Tougher oversight slows MAX approvals.” Flight
International, July 2022.
63Bureau of Transportation Statistics (2020). “Preliminary Air Traffic Data, April
2020: 96% reduction in U.S. Airline Passengers from 2019.” United States

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 Department of Transportation. https://www.bts.gov/newsroom/preliminary-air-
traffic-data-april-2020-96-reduction-us-airline-passengers-2019
64Schaper, D. (2021). “Pandemic piles on already reeling Boeing, leading to nearly
$12 billion loss in 2020.” National Public Radio, January 27, 2021.
https://www.npr.org/2021/01/27/961339159/pandemic-piles-on-already-reeling-
boeing-leading-to-nearly-12-billion-loss-in-20
65Hemmerdinger, J. (2021). “MAX crisis and pandemic wipe nearly 1,250 737s from
Boeing’s backlog since January 2020.” Flight Global, March 2021.
https://www.flightglobal.com/737-max-two-years-on/max-crisis-and-pandemic-
wipe-nearly-1250-737s-from-boeings-backlog-since-january-2020/142589.article
66Gates, D. (2021). “Boeing turns profitable as CEO promises an end to job cuts.”
Seattle Times, July 28, 2021. https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-
aerospace/boeing-turns-profitable-and-leadership-promises-stability-ahead/
67Gates, D. (2020). “Boeing restarts production of the still-grounded 737 MAX amid
coronavirus-caused financial distress.” The Seattle Times, May 27, 2020.
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-restarts-
production-of-the-still-grounded-737-max/
68Singh, R. K., and Canapavaram, A. (2022). “Boeing cuts estimates for 737 MAX
deliveries, flags supply-chain constraints.” Reuters, July 27, 2022.
https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/boeing-final-stages-
dreamliner-restart-keeps-cash-flow-goal-2022-07-27/
69Pasztor, A. (2020). “Provision Tightening Jet-Design Standards Approved.” The
Wall Street Journal, December 21, 2020. https://www.wsj.com/articles/congress-
poised-to-raise-standards-for-assessing-new-airliner-designs-
11608592031?mod=Searchresults_pos1&page=1
70 Ibid.
71 Gates, D. (2022). March 24, 2022.
72Gates, D. Miletich, S., and Kamb, L. (2019). “Boeing pushed FAA to relax 737
MAX certification requirements for crew alerts.” The Seattle Times, October 3, 2019.
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-pushed-faa-
73 Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act, 49 U.S.C. § 44741 (2020).
74 Broderick, S. et al. (2022).
75 Ostrower, J. (2022).
76Hemmerdinger, J. (2022). “Tougher oversight slows MAX approvals.” Flight
International, July 2022.
77 Ostrower, J. (2022).
78 Chokshi, N. (2022).
79Gates, D. (2022). “Boeing may ask Congress to extend MAX 10 exemption from
safety rule.” The Seattle Times, March 9, 2022.
80 Hemmerdinger, J. (2022).
81 Gates, D. (2022). June 7, 2022.

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 82Godlewski, M. (2022). “Boeing may miss end-of-year 737 deadline.” Flying,
November 18, 2022. https://www.flyingmag.com/boeing-may-miss-end-of-year-737-
deadline/
83 Ostrower, J. (2022).
84 Chokshi, N. (2022).
85 Ibid.
86 Ostrower, J. (2022).
87 Askey, et al. (2022).
88 Hemmerdinger, J. (2022).
89Gates, D. (2022). “Boeing may ask Congress to extend MAX 10 exemption from
safety rule.”
90Kaminski-Morrow, D. (2021). “737-10 processes to undergo revision after EASA’s
MAX scrutiny.” FlightGlobal, January 27, 2021.
https://www.flightglobal.com/safety/boeing-737-10-processes-to-undergo-revision-
after-easas-max-scrutiny/142149.article
91 Broderick, et al. (2022).
92Root, A. (2022). “Boeing’s embattled 737 MAX 10 to soar in high-profile air
show.” Barron’s, July 11, 2022. https://www.barrons.com/articles/boeing-stock-
max-10-51657557832
93Anselmo, J. Broderick, S., and Norris, G. (2022). “Interview: Why Boeing’s CEO
says he’s bucking his critics.” Aviation Week, July 8, 2022.
https://aviationweek.com/shownews/farnborough-airshow/interview-why-boeings-
ceo-says-hes-bucking-his-critics
94 Broderick, et al. (2022).
95 Ibid.
96 Broderick, et al. (2022).
Root, A. (2022). “Boeing could lose billions in sales to Airbus if it cancels the 737
97

MAX 10.” Barron’s, July 11, 2022. https://www.barrons.com/articles/boeing-737-

max-10-dave-calhoun-51657397521
98Dawal, A. (2022). “Airbus A321neo is attracting more interest than the Boeing
737-10 Max”, Jetline Marvel, May 29, 2022. https://jetlinemarvel.net/airbus-a321-
neo-attracting-interest-boeing-737-10-max/
99 Askey, et al. (2022).
100Open Secrets (n.d.). Client Profile: Boeing Company, 2021 Summary.
OpenSecrets.org. Retrieved June 17, 2023. https://www.opensecrets.org/federal-
lobbying/clients/summary?cycle=2021&id=D000000100
101 Ostrower, J. (2022).
102Tappe, A., (2019). “Boeing’s 737 MAX crisis will weigh on America’s GDP
growth in 2020, CNN Business, December 19,
2019.

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 Boeing’s troubles cost the aerospace industry $4bn a quarter. (2019). The
103

Economist, August 22, 2019.

104 Chokshi, N. (2022).
105 Ibid.
106Levin, A. (2022). “Boeing 737 MAX 10 faces costly delay from lawmaker’s
stance.” Bloomberg (U.S. Edition), April 6, 2022.
107“2022 Congressional Outlook: Key Dates, Legislative Priorities, and Midterms
Preview.” (2022). Bloomberg Government, July 19, 2022.
https://about.bgov.com/brief/2022-congressional-outlook/
108Shepardson, D. (2022). “FAA does nt expect to certify Boeing 737 MAX 7 before
end of year.” Reuters, November 17, 2022.
https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/faa-does-not-expect-certify-
boeing-737-max-7-before-end-year-2022-11-17/
109 Broderick, et al. (2022).
110 Ostrower, J. (2022).
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
113 Exhibit B Sources
I. Airbus SE (n.d). “Key figures” A319neo.
https://aircraft.airbus.com/en/aircraft/a320-the-most-successful-aircraft-
family-ever/a319neo
II. Airbus SE (n.d). “Key figures” A320neo.
https://aircraft.airbus.com/en/aircraft/a320-the-most-successful-aircraft-
family-ever/a320neo
III. Airbus SE (n.d). “Key figures” A321neo.
https://aircraft.airbus.com/en/aircraft/a320-the-most-successful-aircraft-
family-ever/a321neo
IV. Airbus SE (2015). "Airbus A320neo receives joint EASA and FAA
Type Certification." Airbus Press release, November 24, 2015.
V. Airbus SE (2017). "A321neo powered by CFM LEAP-1A engines
receives type certification.” Airbus Press release, December 21, 2018.
VI. Airbus SE (2018). "A319neo with CFM LEAP-1A engines wins joint
Type Certification from FAA and EASA" Airbus Press release, December
21, 2018.
VII. Ahlgrem L. and Pande, P. (2022). How much do Airbus aircraft cost.
Simple Flying, August 14, 2022. https://simpleflying.com/how-much-do-
airbus-aircraft-cost/
VIII. Boeing.com (n.d.). “Technical Specs.” About the Boeing 737 MAX.
Retrieved December 19, 2022,
https://www.boeing.com/commercial/737max/

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Nov 2025.
 IX. Hardiman, J. and Bodell, L. (2022). Money talks: A look at the list
price of Boeing aircraft. Simple Flying, July 26, 2022.
https://simpleflying.com/how-much-do-boeing-aircraft-cost/
X. The Boeing Company. (2017). “Boeing 737 MAX 8 earns FAA
certification.” Boeing Press Release, March 9, 2017.
XI. The Boeing Company. (2018). “Boeing 737 MAX 9 awarded FAA
certification.” Boeing Press Release, February 16, 2018.
114 Exhibit C Sources
I. Alaska Air Group, Inc. (2023). Form 10-K Annual Report Pursuant
to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 for the
Fiscal Year ended December 31, 2022. Released February 13, 2023.
II. The Boeing Company (2023). Boeing: Orders and Deliveries. January
31, 2023.
III. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (2023). Form 10-K Annual Report Pursuant to
Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 for the Fiscal
Year ended December 31, 2022. Published February 10, 2023.
IV. Schwartz, E. (2020). “A Global Look at the 737 MAX.” Econlife.
Published January 13, 2020. https://econlife.com/2020/01/the-737-max-
supply-chain/
V. Southwest. (2023). Form 10-K Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13
or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 for the Fiscal Year
ended December 31, 2022. Published February 3, 2023.
VI. The Boeing Company. (2023) Form 10-K Annual Report Pursuant to
Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 for the Fiscal
Year ended December 31, 2022. Published January 27, 2023.
VII. United Airlines, Inc. (2023). Form 10-K Annual Report Pursuant to
Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 for the Fiscal
Year ended December 31, 2022. Published February 16, 2023.
VIII. Schwartz, E. (2020). “A Global Look at the 737 MAX.” Econlife.
Published January 13, 2020. https://econlife.com/2020/01/the-737-max-
supply-chain/
115 Exhibit D Source
Manning, J. E. (2022). Membership of the 117th Congress: A Profile.
Congressional Research Service, July 13, 2022. R46705,
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46705/21

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