Swiggy – BUY

Initiating coverage

18 June 2025

An asymmetric play to the upside! Company update

CMP Rs356 Price performance (%)
We initiate coverage on Swiggy with a BUY rating and 12-mth DCF-
based target price of Rs535, implying 50% potential upside. Swiggy 12-mth TP (Rs) 535 (50%) 1M 3M 1Y
is India’s second-largest food tech company, with Food delivery Absolute (Rs) 10.8 9.6 0.0
Market cap (US$m) 10,286
(FD), Quick commerce (QC), and other verticals. We forecast Absolute (US$) 9.8 10.3 0.0
Swiggy to deliver 28% revenue Cagr over FY25-28ii and become Enterprise value(US$m) 9,637
Relative Perf. 11.5 (0.8) 0.0
Ebitda/PAT positive by FY27ii/28ii. Swiggy is potentially 7/5 Bloomberg SWIGGY IN
quarters behind Eternal in FD and 3/8 quarters behind in QC on Cagr (%) 3 yrs 5 yrs
GOV/Ebitda margins respectively. We see this as a function of Sector Internet EPS (Rs) NA NA
slower execution in the past rather than a competitive
Shareholding pattern (%) Stock performance
disadvantage. We value Swiggy’s FD business at USD8.5bn vs.
Zomato at USD14.4bn. With Swiggy’s mcap at USD10.3bn, its QC Promoter 0.0 Vol('000, LHS) Price (Rs., RHS)
Pledged (as % of promoter share) 0.0
business (including other verticals) implies a value of USD1.8bn, 150,000 800
trading at a deep discount of 88% to Blinkit despite being only FII 63.2
600
DII 8.7 100,000
~50% smaller. Hence, we believe successful execution in QC could
400
provide asymmetric upside in the stock, with easing competition in 52Wk High/Low (Rs) 597/305 50,000
QC and market share gains in FD as key catalysts. Initiate at BUY. Shares o/s (m) 2494
200
0 0
Duopoly in FD, oligopoly in QC: We expect FD to reach ~USD20bn GOV Del Value 3mth avg (US$ m) 25.1

Nov-24

Jan-25

Mar-25

May-25
by FY30ii and remain a duopoly business with no new major players Dividend yield FY26ii (%) 0.0
emerging. In QC, we expect it to become an oligopoly with Blinkit and Free float (%) 100.0
Swiggy Instamart as two key players. Competitive intensity may remain Financial summary (Rs m)
elevated for the next few quarters as incumbent e-tailers try to regain their
Y/e 31 Mar, Consolidated FY24A FY25A FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii
share. QC is expected to grow at 50%+ Cagr over FY25-28ii and reach
Revenues (Rs m) 112,474 152,268 208,083 264,381 321,519
~USD40bn by FY30ii, with Swiggy maintaining its top 3 position in our view.
Ebitda margins (%) NM NM NM 1.3 7.0
Structural growth story, but execution is key: Swiggy offers a Pre-exceptional PAT (Rs m) (23,196) (31,051) (23,557) (6,062) 12,876
structural growth story, with execution being the key driver. We expect it Reported PAT (Rs m) (23,502) (31,168) (23,557) (6,062) 12,876
to deliver 28% revenue Cagr over FY25-28ii and 7% Ebitda margin by Pre-exceptional EPS (Rs) (10.6) (13.7) (9.4) (2.4) 5.2
FY28ii. While their duopolistic position in FD is cemented, jury is still out on Growth (%) NM NM NM NM NM
leadership in the QC segment. We expect Swiggy to grow FD at 18% Cagr
and reach 20% Adj. Ebitda margins by FY28ii. However, Instamart could
PER (x) NM NM NM NM 68.9
grow by >4x by FY28ii and achieve Ebitda breakeven by FY29ii only.
ROE (%) NM NM NM NM 16.3
Initiate with BUY: We initiate coverage on Swiggy with 12-mth DCF- Net debt/equity (x) (0.5) (0.5) (0.3) (0.3) (0.5)
based TP of Rs535, implying 6.3x/5.0x on FY26ii/27ii EV/Sales. The stock EV/Ebitda (x) NM NM NM NM 37.7
is trading at 4.1x FY26ii EV/Sales, offering 28% revenue Cagr over FY25- Price/book (x) 10.0 7.9 11.3 12.2 10.4
28ii, vs. Eternal and the Indian internet peers at 7.2x/6.5x EV/Sales, with OCF/Ebitda (x) NM NM NM 2.6 1.3
34%/22% revenue Cagr. Key risks: Competition, regulations. Source: Company, IIFL Research. Priced as on 17 June 2025

Rishi Jhunjhunwala Ankur Pant, CFA Kenil Doshi Vishesh Jain

[email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]
91 22 4646 4686 91 22 4646 4645 91 22 4646 4704 91 22 4646 4650
 Swiggy – BUY

Swiggy: Thesis in key charts

Figure 1: We see Swiggy as a structural growth story with execution being the key stock driver
We expect Swiggy’s Adj. Revenues to grow at 28% Cagr over We expect Ebitda breakeven by FY27ii aided by Among its key segments, FD is a profitable segment
next three years driven by strong 32% Cagr in QC and FD improvement in profitability in both FD and QC for Swiggy while QC is still in cash burn phase
business Ebitda (Rs mn) Key verticals FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii
Platform innovations Ebitda margin (%) Adj. revenues (Rsbn)
Adj. Revenue Ebitda margin (Pre-ESOP) (%) 7.5% 20%
Out of home consumption 40 FD 52 61 73 86 100 118
(Rsbn) Quick commerce (QC) 3.3% QC 5 11 23 47 74 101
Supply chain and distribution -4.0% 22.5 0% Others 38 52 68 89 107 123
20 -14.3%-10.6%
400.0 Food delivery (FD) 3.3 Total 95 123 163 221 281 342
0 -20% Adj. Ebitda (Rsbn)
300.0 FD (10) (0) 6 12 17 23
100.6 -45.3%
73.9 -20 -40% QC (20) (13) (21) (22) (13) (8)
200.0 -55.0% (16.3)
46.6 (22.1) Others (8) (5) (4) (2) 0 3
115.1 (27.9)
22.5 100.1 -40 -60% Total (39) (18) (19) (12) 4 18
10.9 83.4
100.0 1.2 5.5 64.2 (36.5) (42.8) Adj. Ebitda margins
32.9 47.8
14.7 85.5 100.2 118.0 -60 -80% FD -20% -1% 8% 14% 17% 20%
44.3 51.8 60.8 72.6
- FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii QC -370% -120% -93% -47% -18% -8%
FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii Others -23% -9% -6% -2% 0% 3%
Note: Ebitda margins (Pre-ESOP) are not adjusted for lease adjustment
Total -41% -15% -12% -6% 1% 5%
Even after factoring Swiggy’s 3-8 quarters’ lag vs Eternal on …we still see a 50%+ upside from current levels Risk-reward is favourable with downside in bear case
scale and profitability in both FD and QC… limited to 20% but potential upside of 100%+ in bull case
Evaluating difference in Swiggy and Eternal's
Number of quarters lag of (USDbn)
GOV fair value (USDbn)
Swiggy bull and bear case Bull Case
Swiggy vs Eternal (as of 4QFY25) (+100%) - QC
Profitability 28.7 25 flourishes
10 30
20.5
8 25 25% 20
8 7 Base Case
20 60% 15 15.5 (+50%) - Steady
15.5 10.3 5.2 trends in QC
6 5 15 10
8.5
10.3 5.2 1.8
-16.1 ppts 10 8.5 Bear Case (-20%)
4 ~75% of 3 vs. 5 - QC doesn't
Zomato -150bps Blinkit 5 survive
vs. ~50% of 0
2 0 Value of Implied Swiggy Upside in Swiggy
Zomato Blinkit Swiggy Upside Swiggy fair Scale Profitability Eternal fair FD value of market QC scenarios
0 market cap value value QC cap (base
FD QC case)

Source: Bloomberg, Company, IIFL Research

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 Swiggy – BUY

Swiggy: Business overview Figure 2: Swiggy offers a spectrum of services through its unified Swiggy app

Swiggy is a new-age technology company offering a convenience

platform, through a unified app, to browse, select, order and pay for food
(Food delivery) and grocery and household items (Instamart),
enabling doorstep delivery through its on-demand delivery partner
network. Further, Swiggy’s platform provides restaurant reservations
through Dineout and event bookings through Scenes. Swiggy launched
Food delivery in 2014 and Quick commerce in 2020. Swiggy augments
the value proposition through its membership programme Swiggy One
Lite, Swiggy One and Swiggy OneBLCK providing discounts and
offers; in-app payment solutions like Swiggy Money, Swiggy UPI and
Swiggy-HDFC Bank credit card offer additional benefits. Swiggy offers
comprehensive business enablement solutions to restaurant, merchant
and brand partners, including alliance partners, such as analytics-backed
tools to enhance their online presence and user base, fulfilment services
for streamlining their supply chain operations, and last-mile delivery.
Source: Company, IIFL Research

Figure 3: Highlights of Swiggy’s operational journey

Launch of Swiggy
Launch of Swiggy
Launch of Swiggy Mall and co-
Instamart and
Minis branded credit
Swiggy Genie
card

2014 2020 2021 2022 2022 2023 2024

Launch of membership Acquisition and Swiggy platform crossed

Launch of Food
programme Swiggy integration of 110 million ever
Delivery business
One Dineout transacted users

Source: Company, IIFL Research

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 Swiggy – BUY

Swiggy- Overview
Figure 4: Quick commerce’s contribution to overall revenue mix is rising owing to Figure 6: Quick commerce has been the growth driver for Swiggy with its rapidly
exponential growth in the segment, while Food delivery is growing at a steady pace expanding GOV due to rising users, increasing average order value and assortment mix
Food delivery (FD) Supply chain and distribution B2C GOV (%) Food delivery Quick commerce Out of home consumption
Swiggy's Adj.
Revenue Split Quick commerce (QC) Out of home consumption 0%
100% 4% 6% 7% 7% 7% 6%
(%) Platform innovations 8%
18%
100% 80% 23%
8.8% 32%
1.8% 5.8% 13.8% 21.1% 43%
26.3% 29.4% 48% 50%
80%
21.4% 34.7% 60%
38.8% 39.3%
60% 37.7% 92%
35.6% 33.7% 40% 78% 71%
40% 62%
64.6% 50% 45%
54.6% 49.4% 20% 43%
20% 44.5% 38.7% 35.7% 34.5%
0% 0%
FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii
Source: Company, IIFL Research
Source: Company, IIFL Research

Figure 7: We expect FD to further improve its Adj. Ebitda margins while QC would see an
Figure 5: Swiggy’s primary segments of QC and FD showed robust growth at a 28% Cagr Figure 8:
improving trajectory but will still be negative by FY28ii
over FY22-25; we expect these segments to grow strongly at 32% Cagr over FY25-FY28ii
Adj. Ebitda margins (% of
FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii
Adj. Revenue Food delivery (FD) Supply chain and distribution Adj. revenue)
(Rsmn) Quick commerce (QC) Out of home consumption Food delivery -31.8% -20.0% -0.8% 7.9% 13.7% 16.9% 19.5%
Platform innovations Supply chain and
400,000 -20.6% -9.0% -3.9% -4.4% -2.8% -1.1% 0.7%
distribution
Quick commerce -711.0% -370.3% -120.4% -93.0% -46.6% -18.0% -8.0%
300,000 100,649
Out-of-home
73,945 NA -176.4% -111.1% -11.5% 20.4% 36.6% 52.5%
200,000 46,629 consumption
115,130
22,524
83,428
100,113 Platform innovations -75.2% -106.9% -55.5% -49.4% -31.3% -15.5% -9.1%
5,473 10,877 64,175
100,000 1,242 47,796 Source: Company, IIFL Research
14,653 32,863 100,193 118,038
51,792 60,816 72,646 85,550
44,298
-
FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii

Source: Company, IIFL Research

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 Swiggy – BUY

Figure 9: Swiggy – Summary forecasts by segment

Swiggy - Snapshot FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii FY30ii FY34ii FY38ii
Adjusted revenues (Rs mn)
Food delivery 44,298 51,792 60,816 72,646 85,550 100,193 118,038 163,827 302,286 494,555
as % of Total 64.6% 54.6% 49.4% 44.5% 38.7% 35.7% 34.5% 34.3% 34.7% 37.4%
yoy growth 17% 17% 19% 18% 17% 18% 18% 16% 11%
Supply chain and distribution 14,653 32,863 47,796 64,175 83,428 100,113 115,130 132,975 161,632 196,465
as % of Total 21.4% 34.7% 38.8% 39.3% 37.7% 35.6% 33.7% 27.8% 18.6% 14.9%
yoy growth 124% 45% 34% 30% 20% 15% 5% 5% 5%
Quick commerce 1,242 5,473 10,877 22,524 46,629 73,945 100,649 169,768 387,039 601,456
as % of Total 1.8% 5.8% 8.8% 13.8% 21.1% 26.3% 29.4% 35.5% 44.5% 45.5%
yoy growth 341% 99% 107% 107% 59% 36% 30% 19% 11%
Out-of-home consumption - 777 1,572 2,457 3,800 4,588 5,540 7,727 12,529 18,511
as % of Total 0.0% 0.8% 1.3% 1.5% 1.7% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 1.4% 1.4%
yoy growth 102% 56% 55% 21% 21% 16% 11% 11%
Platform innovations 8,411 3,892 2,143 1,513 1,816 2,179 2,615 3,765 6,585 9,641
as % of Total 12.3% 4.1% 1.7% 0.9% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.7%
yoy growth -54% -45% -29% 20% 20% 20% 10% 10% 10%
Reported revenues (Rs mn)
Food delivery 33,913 41,300 51,601 63,529 75,927 88,968 104,813 145,472 267,250 435,265
Supply chain and distribution 14,653 32,863 47,796 64,175 83,428 100,113 115,130 132,975 161,632 196,465
Quick commerce 828 4,514 9,786 21,296 44,204 70,124 95,505 161,205 366,670 563,736
Out-of-home consumption - 777 1,572 2,385 3,510 4,008 4,728 6,654 11,099 16,772
Platform innovations 7,654 3,192 1,719 883 1,016 1,168 1,343 1,699 2,488 3,643
Adjusted Ebitda (Rs mn)
Food delivery (14,095) (10,350) (472) 5,719 11,680 16,937 23,036 34,877 63,150 97,675
Supply chain and distribution (3,015) (2,955) (1,867) (2,809) (2,312) (1,059) 805 4,442 8,361 10,163
Quick commerce (8,833) (20,268) (13,091) (20,952) (21,751) (13,292) (8,071) 9,176 75,942 118,663
Out-of-home consumption - (1,370) (1,746) (283) 776 1,680 2,908 4,408 7,512 11,143
Platform innovations (6,329) (4,159) (1,190) (747) (568) (337) (237) (43) 370 1,069
Adjusted Ebitda margins (% of Adj. Revenue)
Food delivery -31.8% -20.0% -0.8% 7.9% 13.7% 16.9% 19.5% 21.3% 20.9% 19.8%
Supply chain and distribution -20.6% -9.0% -3.9% -4.4% -2.8% -1.1% 0.7% 3.3% 5.2% 5.2%
Quick commerce -711.0% -370.3% -120.4% -93.0% -46.6% -18.0% -8.0% 5.4% 19.6% 19.7%
Out-of-home consumption NA -176.4% -111.1% -11.5% 20.4% 36.6% 52.5% 57.1% 60.0% 60.2%
Platform innovations -75.2% -106.9% -55.5% -49.4% -31.3% -15.5% -9.1% -1.1% 5.6% 11.1%
Source: Company, IIFL Research

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 Swiggy – BUY

Food delivery: Improving market share Figure 10:Swiggy experienced decline in market share during FY24; however, it
successfully stabilised and has regained growth momentum in FY25
Food delivery has evolved into a stable duopoly, and we do not
Food delivery Swiggy's market share (%)
see any major risk to this market structure in the foreseeable
future. After losing relative market share to Zomato for three 46%
years until FY24, Swiggy’s improved execution has helped it 44.9%
45%
start to regain lost share in FY25. We see food delivery as a 44.0%
structural growth story with GOV growing at 15-20% over the 44%
next decade. We expect Swiggy to deliver 17%/18% GOV/adj. 42.9% 42.9%
43% 42.5% 42.6%
revenue growth over FY25-28ii, with market share remaining 42.4% 42.4%
broadly stable. Swiggy is two years away from reaching steady 42%
state optimal Ebitda margins and we forecast it to reach at 5%
41%
of GOV and 20% of revenues by FY28ii.
1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q
Swiggy - a close second in an effective duopoly: Swiggy launched FY24 FY25
its online food delivery business in 2014, being one of the pioneers in
Source: Company, IIFL Research
the market. Over the past decade, the food delivery market has Note: Market share is relative to Zomato
consolidated from numerous competitors into an effective duopoly,
dominated by Zomato and Swiggy. With annualised Gross Order Value Food delivery to remain a stable duopoly: We believe the Food
(GOV) of USD3.4bn in 4QFY25, Swiggy holds a relative market share delivery market in India has matured and settled into a stable duopoly
of 43%, positioning it as a close second in the FD market. Swiggy after several years of intense competition and subsequent
had 15.1mn MTUs and 251.7k average monthly restaurant partners consolidation. We think this market structure is likely to sustain and
on its platform as of 4QFY25. Over FY22-25, Swiggy’s online food do not see a threat of new entrants, given a new player would find it
delivery GOV/Adj. revenue grew at a healthy 16%/18% Cagr. very difficult to carve out a meaningful market share with two
Sharper execution arresting market share decline: Ever since dominant existing players. The business operates at slim margins
the market became a duopoly, Swiggy was ceding market share to and requires sizeable scale to turn profitable. A new entrant would
Zomato. Swiggy’s market share shrunk from 46.5% in FY22 to 42.4% need deep pockets to survive, given it would need to resort to
in 1QFY25. We believe this was largely on account of execution issues customer discounts and incentives to restaurants, leading to high cash
rather than any competitive disadvantage. However, Swiggy has burn. Hence, food delivery would continue to grow at a steady rate
addressed this by investing more and improving branding. It has and competition would be dictated by market share gains, in our view.
fortified its restaurant partner ecosystem and focused on bolstering We expect steady growth and market share: Food delivery is a
its delivery network. This is evident from the fact that contrary to secular growth industry and management continues to see growth of
Zomato, Swiggy did not highlight any delivery challenge. Additionally, 18-22% in GOV in the medium term, which is aligned with Zomato’s
its 10-min food delivery offering Bolt has aided overall growth and 20% medium-term growth expectation as well. Over FY25-28ii, we
now accounts for 12% of order volumes in just three quarters since expect GOV/Adjusted revenue Cagr of 17%/18% with a broadly stable
launch. Over the last two quarters, Swiggy has arrested market market share through FY28ii.
share decline, growing 2-2.5ppts faster than Eternal.

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 Swiggy – BUY

Figure 11:We expect Swiggy to deliver 17% GOV Cagr for food delivery over the next three Looking at new vectors of growth: A weaker consumer sentiment
years, slightly below its stated guidance of 18-22% Cagr in the medium term has led to some deceleration in GOV growth for the industry, with the
leader Zomato decelerating to 15.9% yoy in 4QFY25 vs. Swiggy at
Food delivery Gross Order Value (Rsmn)
17.6%. Having expanded to 700 cities already, Swiggy believes
500,000 geographical expansion is not going to be the primary growth driver.
Swiggy is looking at a three-pronged strategy to tackle the recent
400,000 slowdown and position for longer-term growth: 1) Expanding the
range of delivery-friendly categories, which were hitherto not
300,000 amenable to online delivery; 2) targeting value-conscious low-
frequency users and 3) scaling its Bolt platform.
200,000
Figure 13: Swiggy has 14.7mn MTUs in FY25 (~29% conversion of ATUs); we expect it to
184,788

215,171

247,174

287,823

338,958

395,412

465,834
increase to 19.5mn MTUs by FY28ii
100,000
Food delivery Monthly Transacting Users (mn) ATU to MTU conversion
0
FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii 25 50%
Source: Company, IIFL Research
20 40%
32% 34%
Figure 12: Swiggy’s Food delivery segment has clocked a double-digit Adj. revenue Cagr 30%
28% 27% 29%
over the past three years; we expect this momentum to continue in the next three years 15 27% 30%
17.7 19.5
Food delivery 14.7 16.1
10 11.6 12.7 20%
Reported revenue (Rsbn) User delivery charges (Rsbn) 9.9
140 5 10%
120
13 0 0%
100 FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii
11
80 10 Source: Company, IIFL Research
9
60 9 105 Improving profitability: Swiggy’s contribution margin has nearly
10 89
40 10 76 trebled over FY23-4QFY25 to 7.8% of GOV in 4QFY25 due to better
64 monetisation through higher commission and ad revenues, reduction
52
20 41
34 in discounts and cost optimisation. The business has also benefitted
0 from operating leverage and the Adj. Ebitda margin has improved
FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii from -4.8% of GOV in FY23 to 2.9% in 4QFY25. We expect Ebitda
Source: Company, IIFL Research margins approaching ~5% of GOV by FY28ii and stabilising at those
levels in the long term.

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 Swiggy – BUY

Figure 14: Swiggy’s contribution margin has expanded to 7.8% of GOV in 4QFY25; we Figure 16:Rising adoption of food delivery will drive consistent growth in order volumes
expect it to sustain and improve gradually, aided by increasing advertising revenue
Food delivery Food delivery No. of orders (mn)

Contribution (Rsmn) Contribution margin (as a % of GOV) 1000

871
45,000 8.2% 8.4% 9% 900
7.8% 7.8% 776
40,000 7.1% 8% 800 699
35,000 7% 700 629
5.7% 578
30,000 6% 600 517
500 454
25,000 5%
20,000 4% 400
2.9%
15,000 3% 300
1.6% 200 153
10,000 2%
100
5,000 2,938 6,326 14,138 20,337 26,298 32,286 39,153 1%
5,731 0
- 0%
FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 4QFY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii
FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 4QFY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii
Source: Company, IIFL Research Source: Company, IIFL Research

Figure 15: Adj. Ebitda margin for Food delivery is expanding consistently and has reached Figure 17: We expect Swiggy’s food delivery take rate to be broadly steady
2.9% of GOV as of 4QFY25
Food delivery Take rate (ex-Customer delivery charges)
Food delivery Adjusted Ebitda (Rsmn)
Adjusted Ebitda margin (as a % of GOV) (RHS) 25% 22.4% 22.5% 22.5%
22.1% 22.2%
35% 20.9%
18.4% 19.2%
25,000 23,036 20%
16,937 25%
15,000 15%
2.9% 11,680 15%
5,719 4.9%
5,000 2,131 3.4% 4.3% 10%
-0.2% 2.0% 5%
-7.6% -4.8% (472) 5%
(5,000) -5%

(10,350) 0%
(15,000) (14,095) -15%
FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 4QFY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii
FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 4QFY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii

Source: Company, IIFL Research Source: Company, IIFL Research

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 Swiggy – BUY

Figure 18: Food delivery business of Swiggy has shown improving profitability and rise in Figure 19: Swiggy Food delivery unit economics (FY23-38ii)
market share in recent times Food delivery -
FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii FY30ii FY34ii FY38ii
Food delivery (Rs mn) Units FY24 FY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii Unit economics
Average MTU mn 12.7 14.7 16.1 17.7 19.5 Commission &
Order Frequency (Monthly) # 3.8 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.7 Advertising 75.4 82.5 92.8 99.5 104.4 109.6 120.9 141.4 165.4
No. of orders mn 578 629 699 776 871 Revenue (Rs)
Avg monthly transacting as a % of AOV 18.1% 19.3% 20.3% 20.5% 20.5% 20.5% 20.5% 20.5% 20.5%
000 196 238 274 315 362
restaurants partners
Fee from user and
Average order value (AOV) Rs 428 458 485 509 535
enablement 24.8 22.8 22.7 23.0 24.6 25.9 28.5 34.1 40.9
Gross Order Value (GOV) Rsbn 247 288 339 395 466 services (Rs)

Gross Order Value (GOV) USDmn 2,996 3,404 3,941 4,598 5,417 as a % of AOV 6.0% 5.3% 5.0% 4.7% 4.8% 4.8% 4.8% 4.9% 5.1%
Commission + Delivery take rate % 24.6% 25.2% 25.2% 25.3% 25.3%
Adjusted Revenue Rsbn 60.8 72.6 85.5 100.2 118.0 Platform funded
(14.9) (14.1) (8.5) (5.1) (3.0) (1.8) (1.2) (1.4) (1.7)
discounts (Rs)
Customer Delivery charges Rsbn 9.2 9.1 9.6 11.2 13.2
Take rate (ex-delivery charges) % 20.9% 22.1% 22.4% 22.5% 22.5% as a % of AOV -3.6% -3.3% -1.9% -1.0% -0.6% -0.3% -0.2% -0.2% -0.2%
Reported Revenue Rsbn 51.6 63.5 75.9 89.0 104.8
Cost of Delivery (113.8
(60.7) (59.3) (68.0) (73.3) (78.4) (82.9) (92.8) (137.8)
Contribution Rsbn 14.1 20.3 26.3 32.3 39.2 (Rs) )

as a % of Adj. Revenue % 23.2% 28.0% 30.7% 32.2% 33.2% as a % of AOV -14.6% -13.9% -14.9% -15.1% -15.4% -15.5% -15.7% -16.5% -17.1%
as a % of GOV % 5.7% 7.1% 7.8% 8.2% 8.4%
Other variable
(12.3) (7.4) (6.7) (6.4) (6.1) (5.8) (5.9) (7.1) (8.7)
Other semi-variable / fixed costs Rsbn (14.6) (14.6) (14.6) (15.3) (16.1) costs (Rs)
as a % of Adj. Revenue % -24.0% -20.1% -17.1% -15.3% -13.7%
as a % of AOV -3.0% -1.7% -1.5% -1.3% -1.2% -1.1% -1.0% -1.0% -1.1%
Adjusted Ebitda Rsbn (0.5) 5.7 11.7 16.9 23.0
as a % of Adj. Revenue % -0.8% 7.9% 13.7% 16.9% 19.5% Contribution
12.2 24.5 32.3 37.6 41.6 45.0 49.6 53.2 58.1
profit/loss (Rs)
as a % of GOV % -0.2% 2.0% 3.4% 4.3% 4.9%
Source: Company, IIFL Research
as a % of AOV 2.9% 5.7% 7.1% 7.8% 8.2% 8.4% 8.4% 7.7% 7.2%
Note: Some of the above metrics may not be disclosed by the company and are calculated for Source: Company, IIFL Research
comparison purposes Note: Some of the above metrics may not be disclosed by the company and are calculated for
comparison purposes

ri sh i .j h u n j h u n wal a@ iifl ca p. c om 9
 Swiggy – BUY

Food delivery: Zomato vs Swiggy Figure 20: Eternal’s Food delivery GOV has grown faster than Swiggy in FY25…
Food delivery GOV
Zomato Swiggy
(Rsbn)
Swiggy lags Zomato on MTUs: Swiggy’s MTUs stood at

645
14.7mn/15.1mn in FY25/4QFY25. This is lower than Zomato’s MTUs 700

547
at 20.6mn/20.9mn. This is on account of Zomato’s superior execution, 600

466
evident from its larger restaurant network and better branding.

460
500

395
391
386

339
Swiggy’s AOV broadly in-line with Zomato: Swiggy’s Average 400

322

294
288
263

247
order value (AOV) as of FY25 was at Rs458, broadly in-line with

215
213
300

185
Zomato’s AOV at Rs453. Swiggy’s AOV has improved, driven by
200
inflation and increasing proportion of premium restaurants.
100
Swiggy’s GOV is 25% lower than Zomato: Swiggy’s annualised 0
GOV for 4QFY25 was at Rs294bn (USD3.4bn), 25% lower than that of FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 4QFY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii
Zomato. This is primarily on account of lower MTUs, specifically 28%
lower than Zomato’s MTUs as of 4QFY25. Source: Company, IIFL Research; Note: 4QFY25 refers to annualized 4QFY25 numbers

Take rate slightly above Zomato: Swiggy’s take rate ex-delivery Figure 21: …which has resulted in Eternal gaining market share on an annual basis;
charges is ~1ppt higher than Zomato, which implies better however, recent quarters saw Swiggy recouping some market share loss
monetisation/advertising. We note that Swiggy’s GOV comprises only Food delivery
completed orders and does not include cancelled orders. Zomato Swiggy
market share (%)

Lower contribution margin…: Swiggy’s contribution margin stood 70%

at 7.1% of GOV and 28% of Gross revenue in FY25. This has further 57.3% 57.1% 57.6% 58.1% 58.1%
60% 53.5% 55.0% 56.6%
expanded to 7.8% of GOV and 30.7% of gross revenue in 4QFY25. In 46.5% 45.0%
comparison, Zomato’s contribution profit was higher at 8% of GOV 50% 43.4% 42.7% 42.9% 42.4% 41.9% 41.9%
and 32.8% of Adj. revenue in FY25, which further expanded to 8.6% 40%
of GOV and 35% of adjusted revenue. This is possibly on account of
30%
higher discounts.
20%
…and Adj. Ebitda margin: Swiggy’s Adj. Ebitda margin stood at 2%
10%
of GOV and 7.9% of Gross revenue in FY25. This has further expanded
to 2.9% of GOV and 11.4% of gross revenue in 4QFY25. Compared to 0%
this, Zomato’s contribution profit was higher at 3.9% of GOV and 16% FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 4QFY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii
of Adj. revenue, which has increased to 4.4% of GOV and 17.8% of
Source: Company, IIFL Research
adjusted revenue. This is on account of lower contribution margin and Note: This is relative market share of Eternal and Swiggy
high marketing costs on a lower GOV.

ri sh i .j h u n j h u n wal a@ iifl ca p. c om 10
 Swiggy – BUY

Figure 22: The adj. revenue differential between Eternal and Swiggy in Food delivery has Figure 24:Zomato leads Swiggy in terms of contribution margins
widened in the last four years owing to Eternal’s dominant market share
Food delivery Contribution margin (% of GOV)
Adj. revenue (Rsbn)
Food delivery Zomato Swiggy
Zomato Swiggy 10%
180 9% 8.6% 8.5% 8.5%8.2% 8.3%8.4%
157 8.0% 7.8% 7.8%
160 8% 7.1%
134 6.9%
140 7%
113 118 5.7%
120 100 6%
94 96 4.6%
100 86 5%
78 73 75
80 61 61 4% 2.9%
60 48 44 52 3%
1.7%1.6%
40 2%
20 1%
0 0%
FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 4QFY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 4QFY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii

Source: Company, IIFL Research Note: 4QFY25 refers to annualized 4QFY25 numbers Source: Company, IIFL Research

Figure 23: Swiggy’s take rate has been higher than Eternal over the past four years; Figure 25: Swiggy is catching up with Zomato in terms of FD Adj. Ebitda margins
however, the differential has been converging Adj. Ebitda margin (% of GOV)
Take rate- ex delivery charges (%) Food delivery
Zomato Swiggy
Food delivery Zomato Swiggy 6% 4.7% 5.0% 5.0%4.9%

22.5%
4.4% 4.3%
22.4%
22.1%

22.2%

3.9%
22.5%

21.2%
21.1%
21.0%
21.0%
20.9%
20.9%

25% 3.4%
19.7%

4% 2.8% 2.9%
19.2%
18.4%

2.0%
17.2%

2%
16.0%

20%
0%
15% 0.0% -0.2%
-2%
-4% -3.1%
10%
-6% -4.8%
5% -8%
-7.6%
0% -10%
FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 4QFY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 4QFY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii

Source: Company, IIFL Research Source: Company, IIFL Research

ri sh i .j h u n j h u n wal a@ iifl ca p. c om 11
 Swiggy – BUY

Figure 26: Swiggy is lagging Zomato in terms of MTUs…. Figure 28: Average order value of Swiggy has inched up compared to Zomato in FY25
Average MTU (mn) Average order value
Food delivery Zomato Swiggy
Zomato Swiggy (Rs)
30 27.4 600
519 535
24.9 494 509
25 22.7 500 453 458 466 485
20.9 428 428
20.6
19.5 398 407 407 416
20 18.4 17.7 400
17.1 16.1
14.7 14.7 15.1
15 12.7 300
11.6
9.9
10 200

5 100

0 0
FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 4QFY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii

Source: Company, IIFL Research Source: Company, IIFL Research

Figure 27: Zomato has a higher number of orders than Swiggy due to higher MTUs Figure 29: Zomato has a higher fleet of delivery partners for Food delivery, while Swiggy
Number of orders (mn) reserves some flexibility in terms of utilisation of its delivery fleet
Food delivery Zomato Swiggy Food delivery
Avg. delivery partners Zomato Swiggy
1400 1,243 700 655

Thousands
1200 1,108 585
988 600 522
1000 473 498
871 871 500 444 445
753 776 400 397
800 699 355
646 629 400 342
535 578 285 327 301
600 517 259
454 300 223
400 200
220
153
200 100
0 0
FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 4QFY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 4QFY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii

Source: Company, IIFL Research Note: Delivery partners for Swiggy allocated to Food delivery based on number of orders
Source: Company, IIFL Research

ri sh i .j h u n j h u n wal a@ iifl ca p. c om 12
 Swiggy – BUY

QC: Hyper growth, intense competition Gaining from hypergrowth in the industry: Swiggy is witnessing
exponential growth in the QC segment, benefitting from hypergrowth
We expect Swiggy’s GOV to more than treble over the next in the industry. This is on account of rising customer penetration and
three years (FY25-28ii) as the industry continues its hyper- expansion of QC beyond impulsive buying to planned purchases of
growth trajectory. Swiggy is aggressively pursuing growth, groceries and further into new categories like electronics and fashion.
evident from the doubling of dark stores over the last year, and Over FY22-25, Instamart’s GOV has jumped over 8x, and GOV is
is aligning its efforts to drive high-teens AOV growth. expanding 15-25% on a qoq basis, indicating strong growth in this
However, intense competition from both incumbents and new segment, which is still largely untapped.
entrants has dented profitability. While profitability will Figure 31: Instamart has shown strong growth over the last three years, and we expect it
remain strained in the near term, with Adj. Ebitda breakeven to sustain this momentum
only by FY29ii, we expect losses to start narrowing down from
2QFY26ii onwards with improving dark store utilisation and Quick commerce Gross Order Value (Rsbn)
operating leverage. Structurally, we expect QC to operate with 600 538
Adj. Ebitda margins at ~5% of GOV or ~20% of revenues.
500
Swiggy – one of the top three players: Swiggy Instamart was the 419
first to launch the QC offering in 2020. Blinkit, Zepto and Swiggy are 400
the top three players in the QC market. With an annualised GOV of 290
~USD2.7bn (1QFY26 IIFLe), Swiggy is positioned below Blinkit 300
(~USD5bn GOV) and Zepto (~USD3.4bn GOV). Instamart reported
200 147
9.8mn MTUs in 4QFY25 with 88.6mn orders.
81
100 51
Figure 30: Instamart is one of the top three players in the QC market 16
-
Quick commerce Annualised GOV (USDbn) Market share (%)
FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii
6 45% 50% Source: Company, IIFL Research
5 40%
31%
4 24% Chasing growth aggressively: In a bid to compete, Swiggy has
30%
3 focused on aggressively expanding its dark stores. The company
2
20% raised USD520mn during the IPO and has almost doubled its dark
10% stores from 523 in 4QFY24 to 1,021 in 4QFY25. This is a significant
1 5.0 3.4 2.7 step up from 102 dark store additions in FY24. Swiggy has highlighted
0 0%
it has completed its geographic expansion in terms of dark stores and
Blinkit Zepto Instamart
incremental investment would be in densification of its dark store
Source: Press reports, Company, IIFL Research network, while reserving the flexibility to add dark stores in any area.
Note: Market share calculated above is relative market share
Blinkit and Instamart annualised GOVs are annualised 1QFY26 IIFL estimates, whereas for Zepto, it is
annualised for GOV of May month

ri sh i .j h u n j h u n wal a@ iifl ca p. c om 13
 Swiggy – BUY

Figure 32: Instamart saw aggressive dark store expansion in FY25, coupled with Figure 33: Swiggy’s QC revenue has been doubling each year over the last two years; we
increasing avg. dark store size, which reached 3.9k sq. ft. from 2.9k sq. ft. in 2QFY24 expect Swiggy to deliver 65% Cagr over the next three years
Adj. revenue breakup
Quick commerce Dark stores (#) Avg. dark store size (sq. ft.) Quick commerce
Reported revenue (Rsbn) User delivery charges (Rsbn)
1,200 3,888 4,500 120
3,475 4,000
1,000 3,202 100 5
2,873 2,875 2,906 2,980 3,500
800 3,000 80
2,500 4
600
2,000 60
400 1,500 2 96
1,000 40
200 70
421 442 487 523 557 609 705 1,021 500 1 44
20
- 0 1 21
0 5 10
1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q -
FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii
FY24 FY25
Source: Company, IIFL Research Source: Company, IIFL Research

Focus on improving AOVs: Swiggy is driving concerted efforts to …which is impacting profitability: Rising competition is already
improve its AOV. The company is expanding its SKUs beyond grocery weighing on Swiggy’s profitability, evident from contribution loss of
into high-AOV categories like electronics. Furthermore, it is focused Rs2.6bn (-5.6% of GOV) and Adj. Ebitda loss of Rs8.4bn (-18% of
on average dark store area, replacing smaller dark stores (2.5-2.8k GOV) in 4QFY25, despite significantly higher scale. This is on account
sq ft area) with larger stores (3.5-4.5k sq ft area) and setting up of 1) higher discounts leading to rising CAC, 2) underutilised dark
Megapods (8-10k sq ft area). Swiggy is also promoting large order stores and 3) higher marketing/advertising costs.
sizes by offering discounts on larger baskets (Maxxsaver programme).
Hyper-growth to continue but profitability to be challenged:
Management expects all these efforts to translate into high-teens AOV
We expect Swiggy to benefit from the strong industry tailwinds and
growth (vs. double-digit expectations earlier). Higher AOVs also
improving AOVs. We, thus, expect GOV/Adj revenue to grow at
provide Swiggy the muscle to offer discounts more comparable to
54%/65% Cagr over FY25-28ii. However, we expect growth to lag
other channels like e-commerce and general/modern trade.
Blinkit, given their established business model in select cities could
Competition intensifying in the sector…: Given the large TAM, the lay a template for other cities. We expect profitability to remain
industry has turned hyper-competitive, with established players challenged in the near term, due to elevated discounts and marketing
(Blinkit, Instamart, Zepto) and challengers (Flipkart, Amazon, costs. While Contribution/Adj. Ebitda losses would prevail, we expect
BigBasket, JioMart) all vying for a piece of the market. This is evident losses to subside from 4Q levels due to improved utilisation of dark
from the aggressive dark store expansion over the last 12 months, stores and operating leverage. We, thus, expect Adj. Ebitda losses at
with near-doubling of dark stores for Blinkit and Swiggy. The 1.5% of GOV in FY28ii from 14.3% of GOV in FY25.
discounts have also picked up, leading to higher CAC.

ri sh i .j h u n j h u n wal a@ iifl ca p. c om 14
 Swiggy – BUY

Figure 34: Instamart’s contribution margin saw improvement in FY25; however, 4Q saw Figure 36: Instamart saw improvement of Adj. Ebitda margin in FY25; however, 4Q saw
sharp contraction due to increased customer incentives and dark store expansion; we sharp deterioration due to reduction in contribution margins and increase in marketing
expect Instamart to turn contribution positive by FY27ii Quick commerce Adjusted Ebitda (Rsmn)
Quick commerce
Adjusted Ebitda margin (as a % of GOV) (RHS)
Contribution (Rsmn) Contribution margin (% of GOV) (RHS) 0 0%
1.8% 2.9% (9) -18%
20,000 5% (5,000) -3% -1%
-1.3% -8%
-4.0% 15,783 0% -20%
15,000 -6.0% -5.6% -14%
(10,000) -16% (8,406) (8,071)
10,000 7,451 -5%
-10% (15,000) (13,091) (13,292)
5,000 -40%
-15% (20,000) -40%
0 -23.6% -20% (20,268)
(5,000) (25,000) (20,952) (21,751) -60%
(2,615) (3,713) -25% -54%
(5,302) (4,849) (5,921) FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 4QFY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii
(10,000) -30%
Source: Company, IIFL Research
(15,000) -32.3% (12,054) -35%
FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 4QFY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii
Figure 37:QC as a channel for major FMCG companies is showing strong growth
Company Statement on QC by company
Source: Company, IIFL Research
QC is ~4% of sales, expected to reach 8% in 3 years. It's key for launching
Britannia premium digital-first products and driving impulse/occasion-led purchases,
Figure 35:Aggressive expansion has led to a higher proportion of underutilised dark
with profitability in line with overall margins.
stores. Assuming a 9-mth breakeven period and moderation in pace of dark store rollout,
we expect dark store utilisation to improve in coming quarters Colgate- QC is ~5-6% of business, driving premiumisation. Over 50% of e-commerce is
Palmolive premium; company aims for price parity across channels to support growth.
Quick commerce Breakeven stores (%) QC is a high-growth emerging channel; the company is 'doubling down' on it to
Dabur
drive premiumisation in urban markets, especially for hair care.
100% 88% 91%
79% 80% 80% 84% QC is growing 'almost exponentially' and doing 'extremely well' in e-commerce.
74% GCPL
80% 72% It's reshaping distribution strategies and impacting modern trade.
55% QC is ~2% of business, 1/3rd of e-commerce, but growing 'extremely fast';
60% 50% 53%
HUL considered a high-margin, premium-focused channel with strong investment in
40% assortment and availability.
QC outpaces their e-commerce shares in many categories, showing 'good green
20% Honasa
shoots'. It's a B2B driver with higher unit growth but lower per-unit realisation.
0% QC has 'dramatically improved' supply chain efficiency, driving a shift from days
Nestlé
1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q to hours in delivery; contributes to 8.5% of sales; growing at 33%.
QC is a 'very important platform' for new consumer reach and on-demand
FY25 FY26 FY27
P&G product launches like Vicks Cough Syrup; leveraging 10-min delivery with
Source: Company, IIFL Research; Note: The above calculation is based on IIFL estimates partners like Zepto.
Source: Company, IIFL Research

ri sh i .j h u n j h u n wal a@ iifl ca p. c om 15
 Swiggy – BUY

Figure 38: Swiggy’s Instamart business has shown robust growth over the past years with Figure 39: QC as a channel for major FMCG companies is showing strong growth
improving trajectory of profitability Quick
Quick commerce (Rs mn) Units FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii commerce -
FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii FY30ii FY34ii FY38ii
Average MTU mn 1.1 3.2 4.2 7.1 12.0 15.6 18.7 Unit
Order Frequency economics
# 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.5 Commission
(Monthly)
No. of orders mn 42 128 175 286 490 644 788 & ad revenue 32.8 52.3 70.7 85.8 104.1 116.1 143.1 201.4 244.8
(Rs)
Average order value
Rs 394 398 460 514 591 651 683 as a % of AOV 8.2% 11.4% 13.8% 14.5% 16.0% 17.0% 19.0% 22.0% 22.0%
(AOV)
Gross Order Value Fee from
Rsbn 16 51 81 147 290 419 538 enablement 2.4 3.4 3.8 4.4 4.9 5.1 5.6 6.8 8.3
(GOV)
services (Rs)
GOV USDmn 220 635 978 1,736 3,371 4,869 6,257
as a % of AOV 0.6% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7%
Commission + Delivery
% 7.6% 10.7% 13.5% 15.3% 16.1% 17.7% 18.7% User delivery
take rate 7.5 6.2 4.3 4.9 5.9 6.5 7.9 11.6 16.9
charges (Rs)
Adjusted Revenue Rsbn 1.2 5.5 10.9 22.5 46.6 73.9 100.6
as a % of AOV 1.9% 1.4% 0.8% 0.8% 0.9% 1.0% 1.0% 1.3% 1.5%
Customer Delivery
Rsbn 0.4 1.0 1.1 1.2 2.4 3.8 5.1 Platform
charges
funded
Take rate (ex-Customer (14.4) (3.1) (6.3) (7.5) (3.8) (3.0) (3.3) (4.0) (4.9)
% 5.0% 8.8% 12.1% 14.5% 15.2% 16.7% 17.7% discounts
delivery charges)
(Rs)
Reported Revenue Rsbn 0.8 4.5 9.8 21.3 44.2 70.1 95.5
as a % of AOV -3.6% -0.7% -1.2% -1.3% -0.6% -0.4% -0.4% -0.4% -0.4%
Contribution Rsbn (5.3) (12.1) (4.8) (5.9) (3.7) 7.5 15.8
Cost of
as a % of Adj. (52.0) (45.2) (46.4) (45.9) (47.8) (50.3) (55.8) (69.8) (88.6)
% -427% -220% -45% -26% -8% 10% 16% delivery (Rs)
Revenue
as a % of AOV -13.1% -9.8% -9.0% -7.8% -7.3% -7.4% -7.4% -7.6% -8.0%
as a % of GOV % -32.3% -23.6% -6.0% -4.0% -1.3% 1.8% 2.9%
Other
Other semi-variable / variable costs (70.1) (41.3) (47.0) (49.3) (51.8) (54.4) (59.9) (72.9) (88.6)
Rsbn (3.5) (8.2) (8.2) (15.0) (18.0) (20.7) (23.9)
fixed costs (Rs)
as a % of Adj. as a % of AOV -17.6% -9.0% -9.1% -8.3% -8.0% -8.0% -8.0% -8.0% -8.0%
% -284% -150% -76% -67% -39% -28% -24%
Revenue
Contribution
Adjusted Ebitda Rsbn (8.8) (20.3) (13.1) (21.0) (21.8) (13.3) (8.1) profit/(loss) (93.8) (27.6) (20.7) (7.6) 11.6 20.0 37.6 73.1 88.0
as a % of Adj. (Rs)
% -711% -370% -120% -93% -47% -18% -8%
Revenue as a % of
as a % of GOV % -54% -40% -16% -14% -8% -3% -1% -23.6% -6.0% -4.0% -1.3% 1.8% 2.9% 5.0% 8.0% 7.9%
AOV
Source: Company, IIFL Research Source: Company, IIFL Research
Note: Some of the above metrics may not be disclosed by the company and are calculated for Note: Some of the above metrics may not be disclosed by the company and are calculated for
comparison purposes comparison purposes

ri sh i .j h u n j h u n wal a@ iifl ca p. c om 16
 Swiggy – BUY

Blinkit vs Instamart: Race for land grab Figure 40: Quick commerce GOV for both Eternal and Swiggy has grown at an accelerated
pace, which is expected to continue
GOV (Rsbn)
Instamart behind Blinkit on MTUs: Instamart’s MTUs stood at Quick commerce
7.1mn/9.8mn in FY25/4QFY25. This is lower than Blinkit’s MTUs at Blinkit Instamart
10.2mn/13.7mn, due to the strong foothold Blinkit has established in 1,000 890
Delhi NCR and some other cities as well.
800 692
Instamart’s AOV lower than Blinkit: Instamart’s FY25 AOV at 600 527 538
Rs514 was 23% lower than Blinkit’s Rs667. This is on account of 419
Blinkit’s more seasoned user base (through Grofers), which leads to 377
400 283 290
full basket services, more combo offers, more categories and higher 187
non-grocery items in its mix, enhancing AOV. 200 125
81
147
64 51
Instamart’s GOV is half of Blinkit: Instamart’s 4QFY25 annualised 0
GOV was at Rs187bn (USD2.2bn), which is 50% of Blinkit, primarily FY23 FY24 FY25 4QFY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii
due to lower AOV and MTUs. Instamart’s ordering frequency is also
Source: Company, IIFL Research; Note: 4QFY25 refers to annualized 4QFY25 numbers
lower due to Blinkit’s more established user base in Delhi NCR.
Figure 41: Higher GOV, coupled with better monetisation, has led to higher revenue for
Lower take rate vs Blinkit: Instamart’s take rate (incl. customer
Eternal in the Quick commerce segment
charges) in 4QFY25 at 15.7% is 2.4ppts lower than Blinkit, due to
lower advertising and lower delivery fees due to its loyalty programme Quick commerce Adjusted Revenue (Rsbn)
Swiggy One on QC, which Blinkit doesn’t offer. Blinkit Instamart
200 186
Dark stores lower than Blinkit: In FY24, both Instamart and Blinkit
had similar number of dark stores. However, as of 4QFY25, Swiggy 150 134
has 280 lower number of dark stores (-22%) vs Blinkit, as the
99 101
company is focusing on dark store area rather than the count. 100
68 74
Cash burn at Contribution level…: Instamart is still contribution 52 47
50 29
negative with losses of Rs Rs2.6bn in 4QFY25, vs Blinkit’s contribution 23 23
11 5 11
profit of Rs2.9bn, due to lower take rate and lower dark store
throughput vs Blinkit, which is more established in a city. 0
FY23 FY24 FY25 4QFY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii
…and at Adj. Ebitda level: Instamart reported Adj. Ebitda losses of
Source: Company, IIFL Research; Note: 4QFY25 refers to annualised 4QFY25 numbers
Rs8.4bn in 4QFY25 vs Blinkit’s lower losses at Rs1.8bn. This is due to
contribution losses and lower scale vs Blinkit, while having to incur
high costs in marketing.

ri sh i .j h u n j h u n wal a@ iifl ca p. c om 17
 Swiggy – BUY

Figure 42: Swiggy’s take rates are converging to Eternal’s levels, benefiting from Figure 44: Adjusted Ebitda margin for Eternal and Swiggy is under pressure due to
advertising revenues heightened marketing costs and competition

Quick commerce Take Rate (% of GOV) Quick commerce Adjusted Ebitda (% of GOV)
Blinkit Instamart Blinkit Instamart
25% 10%
20.9% 1.8%
18.5% 18.9% 19.4% 18.7% 0%
20% 18.4% 18.1% 17.7%
16.5% -1.0% -0.8% -0.1% -1.5%
15.3% 15.7% 16.1% -3.1% -1.9% -3.2%
-10%
15% 13.5% -7.5%
10.7% -20% -15.7% -16.2% -14.3%
-18.0%
10%
-30%
5% -40%
-39.6%
0% -50%
FY23 FY24 FY25 4QFY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii FY23 FY24 FY25 4QFY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii

Source: Company, IIFL Research Source: Company, IIFL Research

Figure 43: Gap in contribution margins has expanded between Eternal and Swiggy in 4Q Figure 45: Eternal and Swiggy are focusing on aggressively adding MTUs considering the
owing to heightened competition and store additions; we expect this to reduce in FY26ii heightened competition

Quick commerce Contribution (% of GOV) Quick commerce Average MTU (mn)

Blinkit Instamart Blinkit Instamart
10% 30 27.5
5.1%
5% 3.4% 3.1% 3.2% 3.6% 2.9%
2.1% 1.8% 25 23.0
0% 20 18.4 18.7
-1.3% 15.6
-5% 13.7
-4.0% 15 12.0
-10% -6.9% -6.0% -5.6% 10.2 9.8
10 7.1
-15% 5.1 4.2
5 3.0 3.2
-20%
-25% 0
-23.6% FY23 FY24 FY25 4QFY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii
FY23 FY24 FY25 4QFY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii

Source: Company, IIFL Research Source: Company, IIFL Research

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 Swiggy – BUY

Figure 46: Blinkit’s AOV has been higher than Instamart because of a better assortment Figure 48: Quick commerce GOV for both Eternal and Swiggy has grown at a robust pace;
mix while Swiggy is slowly trying to improve its non-grocery assortment mix however, Eternal leads in terms of GOV per day per dark store
Average Order Value (Rs)
Quick commerce Quick commerce GOV per day, per Dark Store (Rs'000)
Blinkit Instamart Blinkit 942
Instamart
800 729 1,000 929
667 665 674 694 683 848 854
700 651 828
613 591 738 748
541 800 687
600 514 527
601 625
500 460
398 600 487 521
400 442
375
300 400
200
200
100
0 0
FY23 FY24 FY25 4QFY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii FY23 FY24 FY25 4QFY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii

Source: Company, IIFL Research Source: Company, IIFL Research

Figure 47: Eternal aims to reach 2,000 dark stores by the end of 2025 whereas Swiggy has Figure 49: An increased user base of people transacting on QC platforms should drive
highlighted that the pace of store additions would reduce higher order volumes
Dark Stores (#) Orders per day, per Dark Store (#)
Quick commerce Quick commerce
Blinkit Instamart Blinkit Instamart
3,000 2,748 1,600
2,498 1,349
1,400 1,271 1,267 1,275
2,500 1,203 1,190 1,193
2,082 2,121 1,200 1,095
1,018 1,013 1,057 1,055
2,000 1,821 975
1,000 816
1,521
1,500 1,301 800
1,021
600
1,000
526 523 400
400 421
500
200
0 0
FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii FY23 FY24 FY25 4QFY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii

Source: Company, IIFL Research Source: Company, IIFL Research

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 Swiggy – BUY

Competition in QC likely to be unrelenting Competition to continue the cash burn…: A sharp pick-up in
competitive intensity has dampened profitability for the QC players.
Competition is intensifying in QC among the incumbents Swiggy’s losses have ballooned ~3x over the last year at the
(Blinkit, Swiggy and Zepto) and new entrants (Amazon, contribution/Adjusted Ebitda level. This is due to 1) rapid expansion
Flipkart, JioMart, BigBasket), driving aggressive dark store of dark stores leading to a large proportion of underutilised stores less
expansion, increased discounting, and higher marketing costs, than 3 months old, 2) higher discounts driving inflated customer
which is eroding profitability. We believe QC TAM is large acquisition costs and 3) higher advertising and marketing expenses.
enough for the sector to become an oligopoly in the long run
…but deep pockets could prolong it: We draw parallels with Jio’s
where scale will create an entry barrier for new players beyond
entry into telecom, where intense competition led to market
a few large incumbents, and competition is likely to be
consolidation as smaller players with weak balance sheets had to exit
prolonged given deep pockets of all competitors. While cash
amid eroding profitability. However, in QC, all players have deep
burn is likely to continue in the medium term, we believe
access to capital with strong balance sheets, which could lead to
Swiggy could be one of the winners, just as in food delivery.
prolonged competition. However, Swiggy and Eternal, being listed,
Competition heating up in QC: Amazon, Flipkart, Bigbasket and would focus on profitability and not proactively increase competitive
JioMart have each set their sights on gaining a piece of the huge TAM, intensity in the market, in our view.
as traditional ecommerce models are getting disrupted. At the same
time, established players Blinkit, Swiggy and Zepto are also upping How it will play out: We see Blinkit, Swiggy and Zepto at an
advantage as we believe low-frequency platforms (Amazon, Flipkart)
the ante with focus on gaining share while defending their own turf.
This has resulted in higher discounts and elevated marketing costs. struggle to integrate high-frequency categories, while the reverse is
easier. As an example, Flipkart and Amazon’s previous attempts at
New entrants to leverage their strengths: In a hypercompetitive cracking the QC/Food delivery market, respectively, failed to fructify.
market, each player is looking to leverage their strengths to penetrate These players would look to move the market towards higher-AOV
the market. Amazon, Flipkart and Reliance would utilise their more non-grocery items (electronics), to capitalise on their strengths.
developed pan-India supply chain/sourcing, as well as expansive Blinkit and Swiggy will be more reactive rather than proactive in
infrastructure, which will lay the groundwork for their delivery network terms of the competition but will continue to execute well and utilise
as well. Bigbasket already has a delivery network in place, which has the financial muscle to navigate the cash burn phase. Zepto is likely
helped it transition from slotted delivery to quick commerce. We note to remain ultra-aggressive on pricing, also drawing comfort from its
that all these players would need to densify their dark store presence Zepto Café initiative. Reliance and Bigbasket have struggled in the
and have, thus, embarked on aggressive dark store expansion. past in QC and execution will be key for them.
Incumbents relying on expertise: Established players Blinkit, Swiggy well-positioned: Swiggy being one of the pioneers and
Swiggy and Zepto have a deeper understanding of the nuances of the incumbents of QC has a strong supply chain and is well-versed with
delivery network for QC and understand the QC market much better. the nuances and unit economics. Swiggy has a matured and profitable
Blinkit is using the successful template of Delhi NCR in other cities as food delivery segment, which is a cash cow and is likely to cushion the
well. Zepto is resorting to heavy discounting to acquire customers and cash burn. The QC TAM is large enough to accommodate at least 3-4
has escalated competition. Swiggy has expanded in all cities at the players, and we believe Swiggy would be one of the eventual winners
same time and is using a combination of unified platform and as in food delivery. Key risks: 1) Prolonged competition; 2) Market
standalone Instamart app to gain competitive edge. pivoting quickly towards non-grocery items.

ri sh i .j h u n j h u n wal a@ iifl ca p. c om 20
 Swiggy – BUY

Figure 50:QC is set to see intense competition due to aggressive plans of dark store Figure 52: Zepto, Blinkit and Instamart have raised funds to expand rapidly; players like
expansion by all players especially by new entrants of Flipkart and Amazon BigBasket, Flipkart and Amazon have strong parentage flush with funds
Number of dark stores Funds raised by incumbent players Funds (USDmn)
Current dark stores
~2,000 by
2025-end 1,500 1,347
~1,000- 1,012
1,400 1,301 1,000
1,200 by
1,140
1,200 1,021 2025-end ~300 by 536
1,000 2025-end 500
700 ~800 by
800
2025-end -
600
300 Zepto Blinkit Instamart
400
200 13 Source: News reports, Company, IIFL Research
-
Figure 53: Recent statements from QC players suggest heightened competitive intensity
Blinkit Zepto Instamart BigBasket Flipkart Amazon
Minutes Company Statement
Customer incentives (including delivery fee discounts) have been at an
Instamart
Source: Company data, News reports, IIFL Research. elevated level, led by competitive intensity and launches in new geographies
Competitive intensity is likely to remain high in the near term, which may
Figure 51:Adj. Ebitda margins (% of GOV) have declined over the past two quarters owing dictate the pace of the improvement is losses
to rising competitive intensity and higher marketing costs The QC business is witnessing heightened degree of competitive action, and
Adjusted Ebitda margin (% of GOV) investments are being made by incumbents, as well as new players.
Competition is going to intensify further in the near term. This is expected not
0% Blinkit only from existing QC players but also from next-day delivery companies that
-0.1% are investing more in faster deliveries, especially in non-grocery categories.
-1.3% -1.9%
-5% In this competitive landscape, profitability is not a near-term priority. Blinkit
intends to aggressively grow its market share, especially in the face of
-10% heightened competition, and will not allow short-term profitability goals to
-10.6% come in the way of that.
-15% Competition has come in different shapes and forms - aggression in
-14.8% discounting, marketing activity, and free delivery or store expansion.
-20% -18.0% Zepto In 2025, QC will start hitting a scale comparable to e-commerce.
2QFY25 3QFY25 4QFY25 2QFY25 3QFY25 4QFY25 Flipkart More than 90% of the QC volumes are generated from the top eight cities.
Eternal Swiggy
Minutes Flipkart will limit expansion to top six-eight cities to reduce burn.
Amazon We aim to offer the largest selection at the fastest speeds and greatest value
Source: Company, IIFL Research Now to customers in every single pin-code across the country.
Source: Company, IIFL Research

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 Swiggy – BUY

Strong customer metrics for Swiggy platform Figure 55: Swiggy has accelerated the doubling of GOV per
FY19 cohort to just two years for users acquired in FY23
user from four years for an

Swiggy’s platform MTUs have grown at a healthy pace and have B2C GOV retention by cohort Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6
doubled from 10.3mn in FY22 to 19.8mn in 4QFY25. In addition to FY19 1.00x 1.54x 0.98x 1.99x 2.30x 2.83x
benefiting from industry tailwinds, the company’s focus on its FY20 1.00x 0.60x 1.20x 1.37x 1.74x
offerings, innovation-led approach, and unified app have led to strong FY21 1.00x 1.80x 1.66x 1.98x
engagement and retention metrics. This drives higher spends on the
FY22 1.00x 1.11x 1.31x
platform. Swiggy’s customer cohorts over the last six years indicate
how Swiggy has been able to improve the usage of its platform, which FY23 1.00x 2.05x
has seen an acceleration. For example, the cohort of users added in FY24 1.00x
FY19 doubled their GOV on the platform in Year 4, whereas for the Source: Company, IIFL Research
cohort added in FY23, GOV per customer doubled in Year 2 itself,
indicating increasing adoption of services, relevance of offerings, Figure 56: Swiggy is improving its platform frequency retention cohort
rising AOVs and efficiency of Swiggy’s platform. Similarly, the order B2C platform frequency
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6
frequency has been increasing steadily for various customer cohorts. retention by cohort
Instamart’s GOV retention cohort shows that a user acquired in FY19 1.00x 1.55x 0.70x 1.30x 1.58x 1.73x
4QFY23 is spending >1.5x in 9Q as compared to their initial spends. FY20 1.00x 0.43x 0.77x 0.92x 1.06x
FY21 1.00x 1.54x 1.51x 1.65x
Figure 54: Swiggy has grown its MTUs at a healthy pace to 19.8mn in 4QFY25 FY22 1.00x 1.09x 1.16x
Swiggy platform avg. MTUs (mn) FY23 1.00x 1.12x
19.8 FY24 1.00x
20 Source: Company, IIFL Research
17.8
18 17.1 Figure 57: Swiggy Instamart is seeing improvement in its GOV retention cohort, aided by
16.0 increased user retention, coupled with expanded selection
16
14.4 14.7 QC GOV retention by cohort 1Q 3Q 5Q 7Q 9Q
13.9 14.2
14 4QFY23 100% 81% 94% 125% 151%
12.7
2QFY24 100% 79% 106% 130%
12 4QFY24 100% 98% 119%
10.3
2QFY25 100% 103%
10
1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 4QFY25 100%
Source: Company, IIFL Research
FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25

Source: Company, IIFL Research

ri sh i .j h u n j h u n wal a@ iifl ca p. c om 22
 Swiggy – BUY

Unified app a key differentiator as per Swiggy

Figure 58: The unified app strategy has helped Swiggy cross-sell its services, which has
Unlike Eternal, Swiggy’s offerings house in a single app, which resulted in a higher % of users using >1 offering of Swiggy
enhances the cross-sell of services, customer acquisition,
% users using 1 offering % users using >1 offering
scale-up of new services and monetisation. At the same time,
100%
as Instamart expands, Swiggy has also launched it as a 15.2% 23.0%
separate app as it expects the TAM of QC to extend beyond FD. 80%
27.3% 26.7% 28.1% 30.5% 34.8%
Better cross-sell of services: A unified-app strategy helps in more
60%
efficient cross-sell of services. This is evident from the fact that ~ 35%
of Swiggy’s users used more than one service in 4QFY25 and the 40% 84.8% 77.0% 72.7% 73.3% 71.9% 69.5%
proportion has increased from 15% in FY22 and 26% in 4QFY24. 65.2%
20%
Offers enhanced user acquisition: Customer acquisition also
benefits from cross-pollination between the platforms. This is 0%
showcased by the fact that 78% of Instamart users were first acquired 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q
on food delivery platform and 14% of the Instamart users were first FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25
acquired on Instamart and also started transacting on the food
delivery platform (1QFY25). In recent times, QC has become a strong Source: Company, IIFL Research
funnel for food delivery acquisition as 30% of the users acquired on
Instamart in the past six months were new to Swiggy ecosystem. Figure 59: Unified app has allowed cross-pollination of users across FD and QC
QC users who first transacted on FD
Strengthens engagement metrics: A unified app has led to better User analysis
utilisation metrics and better engagement on the platform. This is (as on 1QFY25) Users first acquired on QC
illustrated by Swiggy’s higher FD monthly GOV/MTU (Rs1,636) vs. Users first acquired on QC also transacting on FD
Eternal (Rs1,563) and healthy platform frequency (no. of orders in a
month), despite accelerated customer acquisition on QC.
Scaling up new offerings: A unified app experience helps in scaling
up new offerings. This is demonstrated by Swiggy’s successful scale-
up of new offerings and helps in more cost-effective customer 78% 8% 14%
acquisitions. Swiggy has leveraged its unified app experience to its
Dining Out service, which has scaled up quickly post its acquisition in
2022. This has been a key strategy in scaling newer innovations like
Swiggy Genie, Insanely Good and Bolt.
Better monetisation: A unified app allows Swiggy to drive better 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
monetisation for its partners via better advertising across platforms, Source: Company, IIFL Research
which enables a higher reach for the partner, adding to the partners’
monetisation potential.

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 Swiggy – BUY

Swiggy’s strategy different from its peers GTM and operations

• Focus on dark store area rather than dark store count: Swiggy
Over the last few years, Swiggy has created points of differentiation is focusing on dark store area rather than dark store count. The
in its execution vs. Eternal in both food delivery and quick commerce. The company pivoted its strategy towards larger and optimised dark
unified app approach is one such example, which shows this difference in stores, with a 3x capacity for SKUs. The company replaced smaller
execution. Apart from that, there are other such instances highlighted dark stores of size 2.5-2.8k sq ft. with larger stores of 3.5-4.5k sq
below: feet, that can accommodate up to 20k SKUs. Furthermore, the
company is expanding its Megapods, which are much bigger, with 8-
Customer loyalty initiatives: 10k sq feet area, and can accommodate 50k SKUs. The dark store
area has thus increased from 1.5mn sq feet in FY24 to 4mn sq feet in
• Holistic membership programme: Swiggy’s loyalty programme FY25, and the average dark store size is consistently increasing. We
Swiggy One offers discounts and promotions on the platforms, note that larger dark stores allow for more SKUs and help in improving
including free delivery on select orders, and is designed to amplify AOVs. Swiggy has also highlighted that Megapods have higher
user engagement and experience. As per Swiggy, the user profitability than the average dark store.
engagement of Swiggy One members in terms of order frequency is
60% higher. Additionally, as per the company, ~80% of Swiggy One
• Extracting higher flexibility from its delivery fleet: While Swiggy
members use two or more services and spend 3x more than other
delivers bulk of its orders using a dedicated quick commerce fleet, it
customers. Swiggy has also launched an affordable programme
reserves the flexibility to tap into its food delivery fleet during peak
Swiggy One Lite with fewer incentives than Swiggy One for infrequent
demand. This is enabled by its integrated backend operations,
users. Swiggy has thus taken a cross-platform approach, covering
providing greater adaptability in deploying delivery personnel. The
both FD and QC for Swiggy One, compared to Eternal, which offers
approach is different to Eternal, that operates largely separate fleets
Zomato Gold only for food delivery.
for quick commerce and food delivery. This is also corroborated by
management commentary, which alluded to the fact that Swiggy is
• Taking loyalty a step further: In December, Swiggy upgraded its
not facing a shortage of delivery personnel despite strong growth in
loyalty programme and launched Swiggy One BLCK, an invite-only
QC – a contrasting view to Eternal on this front.
premium membership - first in the industry. The membership, which
came at Rs299 for a 3-month plan, offers faster delivery, priority
• Different GTM approach: Eternal and Swiggy have taken very
customer support, free express delivery on food, on-time guarantee
different approaches to their Quick commerce expansion. While
and complimentary offers on dining out. Swiggy offers BLCK for QC,
Eternal fortified its QC presence in a city (Delhi NCR) and perfected
FD and Dining out.
its operations and unit economics there to serve as a template in its
geographical expansion, Swiggy’s approach is to achieve geographic
• Co-branded credit card: To improve user engagement and drive
expansion as soon as possible and not be a laggard in any city. It is
higher spends, Swiggy has launched a co-branded credit card in
thus expanding in all cities and has expanded its geographical
partnership with HDFC bank, which offers up to 10% cashback across
the Swiggy ecosystem. Swiggy is differentiated here as the largest
presence. Focus would now be on deepening its dark store density
player - Eternal does not have any such card. within a city.

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 Swiggy – BUY

Preferring dark store ownership over a franchise model: The No rush to get into an inventory-owned model: In May’25,
franchise model for dark store operations has now become more Eternal capped its foreign ownership at 49.5%. The aim was to
matured in the QC industry. Our calculations show that the franchise become an Indian owned and controlled company (IOCC) and have
owners can now make 18-20% ROI, which makes it a feasible mode the flexibility to operate an inventory model for quick commerce.
of operations. However, unlike its peers, Swiggy prefers the company Eternal highlighted that an inventory model will offer more resilience,
owned company operated model for dark stores. Management and the incremental working capital investment would not be
believes this allows the company to have more control over its demanding due to the high inventory turnover.
operations and drive better customer experience.
Zepto is actively working towards achieving IOCC status, as per media
Figure 60: Franchise – Unit economics suggest ~19% RoI on a steady state basis reports. To boost Indian ownership above the required 50% threshold,
Particulars Amount (Rsmn) the company is raising Rs15bn through structured, equity-linked debt
taken by its founders and enabling secondary share sales to domestic
Refundable security deposit 7.2 investors. Attaining IOCC status is critical for Zepto to hold inventory
Brand fee 0.8 and operate a full-stack quick commerce model in India.
Other capex (Genset, etc) 1.0 Swiggy believes the margin benefit of pivoting to inventory-based
Total investment 9.0 model in QC is not more than 30-35bps. However, it also involves
Orders per day (#) 1,500 building inventory on the balance sheet, thereby resulting in higher
Average order value (AOV) (Rs) 450
working capital investment. Management did acknowledge that the
inventory model lends flexibility, but the economics are not overly
GOV per day (Rs) 675,000 compelling to force a push towards it. Swiggy is open to it, given
GOV per annum (Rsmn) 246 domestic ownership is going up but will not rush into it. As of now,
Commission (%) (assumed) 3.25% including the impact of ESOP dilution, Swiggy has a foreign ownership
Franchise commission (Rsmn) (A) 8.0 of ~63%. So, we believe this is still some time away.
Less: Expenses Figure 61: Swiggy has higher foreign ownership while the other two competitors are
Pickers (18x18,000x12m) 3.9 trying to bring it under 50% to operate an inventory-owned model
In charge (3x30,000 x12m) 1.1
Foreign ownership (%) Domestic ownership (%)
Housekeeping (2x12,000 x12m) 0.3
Security guard (2x20,000 x12m) 0.5 100%
80% 37% 44%
Miscellaneous expenses (50,000x12m) 0.6 55%
60%
Total expenses (B) 6.3
40%
Net income to franchise owner (A-B) 1.7 63% 56%
20% 45%
Return on investment (%) 19%
0%
Source: Company, IIFL Research Swiggy Zepto Eternal

Source: Press reports, Company, IIFL Research

ri sh i .j h u n j h u n wal a@ iifl ca p. c om 25
 Swiggy – BUY

Other segments offer big opportunities Supply chain and distribution: Swiggy leverages its warehouses to
streamline the value chain for retailers and wholesalers. The solutions
include warehouse management, in-warehouse processing and efficient
Out-of-home consumption order fulfilment, which involves order picking, packing and shipping
processes for wholesalers and retailers. Swiggy also helps in procurement
Dine Out and Scenes: Swiggy caters to restaurant dining services of products. It also enables its customers to enhance their retail presence
through Dineout and curated outdoor event services through Scenes. in India. Swiggy offers supply chain and distribution services through its
Dineout revenues consist of commissions from restaurant partners, subsidiary Scootsy. This is still a loss-making business. Swiggy reported
advertising revenue from restaurant/brand partners and user fees for the revenue of Rs64bn (USD759mn) in this segment with Adj. Ebitda loss of
platform. Scenes includes revenue from events tickets, advertising Rs2.8bn in FY25. We expect an 22% revenue Cagr over FY25-28ii in this
revenue from brand partners and fees for other business enablement segment with improved profitability and FY28ii to be a break-even year
services provided to restaurant and brand partners. for this segment.

Dining out market becoming organised: The dining out market is still Platform innovations: This segment includes new innovations and
at a nascent stage but is ripe for digital disruption. The proportion of houses Swiggy’s new service offerings that are at an experimentation
branded restaurants increased from 15-20% in 2018 to 25-30% in 2023. stage. There is a structured framework followed by the company to
The dining out solutions offer affordability, convenience and hassle-free incubate new services, and Instamart, which started as a platform
reservations to customers, and better demand planning and customer innovation and has now grown into a full-fledged segment, is a testament
stickiness to restaurants. The AOV is 4-5x higher than food delivery and to the execution here. Swiggy Mall and InsanelyGood were launched
it possesses high profitability and operating leverage. under Platform innovations but were later merged into the Instamart
offering.
Online market primed for growth: Online dining out market is
expected to grow at a 46-53% Cagr over CY23-28E to reach USD4-5bn • Swiggy Genie: Started in 2020, an on-demand product pick-
by CY28 (as per Redseer), with rising adoption from existing food delivery up/drop-off service. It was shut in May’25.
customers and expansion of restaurant network. Consequently, the
penetration of online dining out in the overall organised out-of-home • Swiggy Minis: Launched in 2022, an offering where local homegrown
consumption market is expected to rise from ~3% in CY23 to ~10% in brands can establish their own mini-storefront on Swiggy’s platform,
CY28. Furthermore, only 3-5% of dining out visits are reserved, which is engage with a broader user base and benefit from technology-enabled
likely to grow given the convenience and rising premiumisation of logistics capabilities and back-end services such as discovery, check-
restaurants. This will play in favour of online dining out as 80% of the out, and payment.
reservations happen online.
• Private brands: Launched private brands to meet the supply gaps.
Swiggy well-placed: Over the last two years, Swiggy’s out-of-home
consumption GOV/Adj. revenue has grown at 67/78% Cagr and now Snacc: Launched in Jan’25, SNACC caters to ultra-fast delivery, but
forms ~7% of Swiggy’s total GOV. We expect industry tailwinds and unlike Bolt, which delivers items from partner restaurants, Snacc
strong execution to drive a 31% GOV/Adj. revenue Cagr over FY25-28ii operates from centralised micro-warehouses stocked with ready-to-ship
with improving profitability driven by strong operating leverage, resulting products.
in FY28ii Ebitda margins of 4.2% of GOV, having already turned
breakeven in 4QFY25 (Adj. Ebitda margin of 0.3% of GOV).

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 Swiggy – BUY

Swiggy’s other verticals

Figure 64: Supply Chain & Distribution business is seeing stable growth with focus to pivot
Figure 62: Out-of-home consumption forms the third B2C vertical of Swiggy; we expect it from trading business to logistics business
to grow at 31% Cagr over next three years Supply Chain &
Revenue (Rsbn) Adjusted Ebitda margin (%) (RHS)
Out of home consumption Distribution
Adj. revenue breakdown (Rsbn) Fee from user Reported revenue
140 5%
0.7%
6.0 -1.1%
120
-3.9% -4.4% -3.5% -2.8% 0%
5.0 100
-9.0% -5%
4.0 80
-10%
3.0 5 60
4 -15%
2.0 4 40 -20.6%
20 -20%
2
1.0
2 15 33 48 64 20 83 100 115
1 0.3 0.6 0.8 0 -25%
0.0 - - 0.1 FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 4QFY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii
FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii
Source: Company, IIFL Research
Source: Company, IIFL Research
Figure 65: Platform innovations segment is seeing declining revenues and remains loss-
Figure 63: Out-of-home consumption vertical has shown substantial operating leverage, making as Swiggy continues to experiment with pilot innovations in this segment
which is driving margins with growing scale
Platform
Gross Revenue (Rsbn) Adjusted Ebitda margin (%) (RHS)
Out of home consumption- Adj. EBITDA margin innovations
10 -9.1% 0%
(% of GOV) -15.5%
10% -31.3% -20%
8
4.2% -49.4% -40%
5% 2.9% -55.5%
1.6% 6
0.3% -60%
-75.2%
0% 4 -83.7%
-0.9% -80%
-5% -106.9%
2 0.4 -100%
-10% -8.0%
8.4 3.9 2.1 1.5 1.8 2.2 2.6
0 -120%
-15% -12.4% FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 4QFY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii
FY23 FY24 FY25 4QFY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii
Source: Company, IIFL Research
Source: Company, IIFL Research

ri sh i .j h u n j h u n wal a@ iifl ca p. c om 27
 Swiggy – BUY

Innovation without apprehension Swiggy Daily: It is a subscription-based meal service to provide

affordable, homestyle meals prepared by home chefs, tiffin service
Swiggy is constantly innovating its current offerings and launching providers and organised vendors. The service was initially launched in
new offerings in the market. The company believes this is required to 2019 but was discontinued due to Covid and relaunched in 2024. The
gain market share, increase its addressable market and drive superior offering aims to add variety to daily meals at affordable prices and
customer experience. The company is committed to new innovations, adds another use case to the food delivery business.
despite acknowledging that many of them may not achieve desired
results. These are categorised into new value-propositions (like Bolt EcoSaver delivery mode (Sustainability initiative): This is
for 10-minute delivery), affordability initiatives (PocketHero, Daily Swiggy’s initiative to drive sustainability, wherein the company offers
meals, Ecosaver delivery mode), user experience improvements customers to opt for slightly longer delivery times for some discounts.
(Eatlists, Bulk delivery fleet), and restaurant partner enablement This allows Swiggy to group multiple orders in a single order, which
(self-serve advertising at scale). helps in optimising its carbon footprint.
New value propositions: Maxxsaver: Through Maxxsaver, Swiggy offers discounts on QC
orders above Rs999 to encourage large grocery orders and shift focus
Swiggy Bolt: Bolt is Swiggy’s 10-min food delivery proposition and from frequent small-ticket orders to larger and planned grocery
was inspired by the quick commerce business. The model operates on orders. While this came as a response to Zepto’s SuperSaver feature,
two premises: serving restricted last mile, generally up to 2kms and Swiggy believes this would drive up AOVs in QC.
enabled by the fact that 30-40% menus have a four-minute
preparation time. The offering helps unlock new use cases for User experience initiatives:
customers and also aids restaurants in increasing volumes. Swiggy is
actively scaling this offering, and the company believes this would be Eatlists: Allows customers to curate themed lists of food items which
a growth driver for food delivery as well. Swiggy has now expanded can be shared with friends and family through social media platforms,
the offering to 500 cities, and Bolt makes up for 12% of order facilitating the discovery of new cuisines and restaurants. This
volumes in 4QFY25, up from 5% in 2QFY25 and 9% in 3QFY25. enhances the overall user experience as it offers customers with
On unit economics, management has highlighted Bolt is not inherently recommendations on food ordering and makes it more personalised.
a low-AOV business, and the AOV is in-line with platform average.
Additionally, rider costs are lower due to lower last miles. XL Fleet: Swiggy's XL Fleet is a strategic initiative to provide efficient
and sustainable solutions for large-scale food deliveries, enhancing
Affordability initiatives the company's service offerings for bulk orders like for weddings,
corporate events and large gatherings.
Pocket Hero: Launched in Dec’23, this is Swiggy’s offering for
budget-conscious consumers like students, young professionals and Self-Serve ads: Self-Serve Ads is a user-friendly advertising
new residents in a city, where Swiggy offers significant discounts and platform designed to empower restaurant partners to independently
free delivery on select restaurant orders. Through this offering, create, manage, and optimise their own promotional campaigns
Swiggy aims to increase the relevance of the platform for a wider directly within the Swiggy Owner app. This initiative aims to enhance
audience and expand the TAM. restaurant visibility, drive sales, and attract new customers.

ri sh i .j h u n j h u n wal a@ iifl ca p. c om 28
 Swiggy – BUY

Revenue growth and margins

Figure 66: Swiggy has shown strong growth of 34% Cagr over the last three years; we
We expect Food delivery and QC GOV to increase at a expect Swiggy to deliver 28% Cagr over FY25-FY28ii, aided by strong growth in QC
17%/54% Cagr over FY25-28ii, respectively. We model
Adjusted revenue to grow at 18%/65% Cagr over the same Adjusted revenue (Rsmn)
period and expect Ebitda margins of 4.9%/-1.5% of GOV in 400,000
FD/QC by FY28ii. This should drive a FY25-28ii Adj. revenue 341,972
Cagr of 28%, with PAT of Rs12.9bn by FY28ii. 281,018
300,000
Food delivery: We expect Food delivery GOV to grow at a 17% Cagr 221,221
over FY25-28ii. We expect take rate to inch up only gradually, driven 200,000 163,315
by higher advertising, with limited room for increasing restaurant 123,203
94,797
commissions. We thus expect Adjusted revenue to grow at 18% Cagr 100,000 68,604
over the same period. Adj. Ebitda margins will expand from 2.9% of
GOV in 4QFY25 to 4.9% of GOV by FY28ii, driven by reduction in
-
discounts, cost optimisation and operating leverage. FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii
Quick commerce: Quick commerce would continue its hypergrowth Source: Company, IIFL Research
trajectory, and we expect strong growth of 54% Cagr in GOV over
FY25-28ii. Take rates will improve marginally driven by better Figure 67: We expect Swiggy to turn Ebitda margin (Pre-ESOP) positive by FY27ii
monetisation from advertising. However, we expect cash burn to
persist even in FY28ii given aggressive competition. We note that cash Ebitda margin (Pre-ESOP) (%)
burn will come down, from rising utilisation of dark stores. 20%
7.5%
Out-of-home consumption: This represents an underpenetrated 10% 3.3%
market, with steady growth potential. We thus expect out-of-home 0%
consumption GOV/adjusted revenue to grow at a 31%/31% Cagr over -10% -4.0%
FY25-28ii and having turned Ebitda positive in 4QFY25, profitability -20% -14.3%
-10.6%
should continue to benefit from operating leverage to reach 4.2% of -30%
GOV by FY28ii. -40%
Supply chain and distribution: This is Swiggy’s backend supply -50% -45.3%
business to wholesalers and retailers and by nature is a low-margin -60% -55.0%
business. We expect 22% revenue Cagr over FY25-28ii and Ebitda to FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii
break-even in FY28ii.
Source: Company, IIFL Research
Platform innovation: This is Swiggy’s unit for experimenting and is
akin to cost of research and development for the business. We expect
20% revenue Cagr over FY25-28ii and -9.1% Ebitda margin in FY28ii.

ri sh i .j h u n j h u n wal a@ iifl ca p. c om 29
 Swiggy – BUY

Figure 68:We expect Swiggy to turn PAT positive in FY28ii Figure 70: Other income is expected to reduce going forward…
Pre-exceptional and ESOP PAT (Rs mn)
Pre-exceptional and ESOP PAT margin (%) (RHS) Other income (Rs mn)

20,000 PAT margin (%) (RHS) 20% 5,000

4,499
4.5% 4,500 4,149
-0.3% 14,606 3,962
10,000 -7.5% 3,870
0% 4,000 3,642
-15.3% -12.7%
3,500 3,204
-
(662) -20% 3,000 2,728
(10,000) 2,500
-44.0%
-51.6% -40% 2,000
(20,000) (17,234) (19,323) (15,597)
1,500
(30,000) -60%
1,000
(29,423)
(40,000) -80% 500
(36,361)
FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii -
FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii
Source: Company, IIFL Research Source: Company, IIFL Research

Figure 69: We expect Swiggy to generate positive FCF from FY28ii Figure 71: … because of cash burn due to intense competition

FCF (Rs mn) Cash and cash equivalents (Rs mn)

30,000 120,000
18,066 101,719
20,000
100,000
10,000
- 80,000
63,592 66,214
(10,000) (3,250) 58,122
60,000 49,301
(20,000) 43,306 40,056
(30,000) (22,908) 40,000
(27,253)
(40,000)
(36,707) 20,000
(50,000)
(47,817)
(60,000) -
FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii

Source: Company, IIFL Research Source: Company, IIFL Research

ri sh i .j h u n j h u n wal a@ iifl ca p. c om 30
 Swiggy – BUY

Valuation makes Swiggy an attractive treat Quick commerce: We value QC and Other businesses using a DCF
methodology and arrive at our 12-mth value of Rs250/share. Our
longer-term estimates assume revenue Cagr of 18% over a 13-year
We initiate coverage on Swiggy with a BUY rating and a 12- period of FY25-38ii, which we believe is reasonable, given the large
mth DCF-based target price of Rs535, implying 50% potential TAM. We believe Ebitda margins can trend towards 5% of GOV, similar
upside. We arrive at a DCF value of Rs285/share for Swiggy’s to FD, in the long term, as the market structure achieves steady state.
food delivery business (including cash) and Rs250/share for
Swiggy’s QC and other businesses. On GOV/profitability, How that compares to Eternal: We assign Blinkit and other
Swiggy is 7/5 quarters behind Eternal in FD and 3/8 quarters businesses of Eternal a valuation of USD14bn, which implies a 4.6x
behind Eternal in QC. Our valuations imply Swiggy’s FD EV/sales (FY27ii), lower than food delivery due to lower profitability.
business to be valued at USD8.5bn, at a 40% discount to Swiggy is 3 quarters behind Eternal on GOV and 8 quarters behind on
Zomato and QC (plus others), valuation to be at USD7.2bn, at profitability. Thus, we believe Swiggy’s fair multiple should be at a
a 50% discount to Eternal, to account for the difference in size 50% discount to Eternal, which implies a valuation of ~USD7bn. This
and lag in profitability. At current valuations, the ex-food is closer to the USD5bn raised by Zepto, but Zepto is potentially
delivery businesses are implying a valuation of just USD1.8bn, burning a lot more, in our view, given aggressive penetration pricing.
grossly undervalued in our view. Hence, we believe Swiggy is
a long-term compounding story and an asymmetric bet to the QC is a snack almost free of cost! As described above, we believe
upside. Swiggy’s food delivery commands a valuation of USD8.5bn, at a 40%
discount to Zomato. Swiggy’s current market cap of USD10.3bn
Food delivery: We value the food delivery business using a DCF implies that QC and its other businesses are valued at only USD1.8bn,
methodology and arrive at our 12-mth value of Rs285/share. Our at a deep discount for a business that is just 14% of Eternal’s
longer-term estimates assume revenue Cagr of 16% over a 13-year valuations and has an enormous TAM.
period of FY25-38ii, which we believe is reasonable given the
significantly underpenetrated market. We believe Ebitda margins can Valuations reasonable vs. peers: Overall, we expect Swiggy to
trend towards 5% of GOV and 20% of revenues in the long term and deliver a strong revenue Cagr of 28% over FY25-28ii. This compares
sustain there, with rising scale and leverage. to 22% revenue for the Indian internet peer and 15% for global food
tech peers. Swiggy is trading at 3.3x FY27ii EV/sales, at 61% discount
How that compares to Eternal: We value Eternal’s Food delivery to the India internet peers. Hence, we believe Swiggy’s valuations are
business – Zomato – at a USD14.4bn valuation, which implies an 8.5x attractive given the strong growth prospects, large TAM, dominant
FY27ii EV/sales. Swiggy is lagging Eternal on GOV/profitability by 7/5 position in food delivery and improving execution.
quarters. Thus, we believe Swiggy’s valuation should be at a 40%
discount to Eternal, which yields a US8.5bn valuation for Swiggy’s Initiate with Rs535/share TP: We initiate on Swiggy with a 12-
food delivery business. The valuation gap can close as Swiggy has mth TP of Rs535, implying 50% potential upside from the current
arrested market share decline over the last few quarters. Its levels. We believe Swiggy is a longer-term compounding story and it
innovations like Bolt (10-minute food delivery) are also seeing a lot would remain a food tech leader once competition subsides and the
more traction vs. Eternal, which had to shut this venture due to low market stabilises. Hence, at current valuations, Swiggy offers a
success rate. disproportionately attractive risk-reward, in our view.

ri sh i .j h u n j h u n wal a@ iifl ca p. c om 31
 Swiggy – BUY

Figure 72: We expect a long-term Cagr of 32% FY28ii onwards, which leads to our DCF-based TP of Rs535
Swiggy DCF (Rs m) FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii FY30ii FY34ii FY38ii
Revenue 57,049 82,646 112,474 152,268 208,083 264,381 321,519 448,005 809,139 1,215,881
YoY % 44.9% 36.1% 35.4% 36.7% 27.1% 21.6% 17.4% 14.8% 10.3%

EBITDA (36,511) (39,102) (18,366) (19,072) (12,175) 3,929 18,441 52,860 155,335 238,712
EBITDA margin (%) -64.0% -47.3% -16.3% -12.5% -5.9% 1.5% 5.7% 11.8% 19.2% 19.6%

EBIT (38,212) (41,959) (22,572) (25,195) (21,539) (6,647) 7,188 39,724 138,797 221,695
EBIT (YoY %) 9.8% -46.2% 11.6% -14.5% -69.1% -208.1% 71.1% 26.7% 11.3%

Tax rate - - - - - - - - 25.2% 25.2%

EBIT*(1-tax rate) (38,212) (41,959) (22,572) (25,195) (21,539) (6,647) 7,188 39,724 103,862 165,894
Depreciation 1,701 2,858 4,206 6,123 9,364 10,575 11,253 13,136 16,538 17,018
Working capital change - 2,493 5,261 11,502 14,210 6,658 8,476 15,905 38,563 57,739
Increase in CA - (2,182) (550) (15,619) (2,573) (1,580) (3,420) (5,337) (8,080) (10,572)
Increase in CL - 852 3,027 24,308 14,666 7,036 10,218 16,501 29,803 44,785
Other Cash Flows - 3,823 2,783 2,813 2,116 1,203 1,679 4,740 16,840 23,526
CFO (36,511) (36,609) (13,105) (7,570) 2,035 10,587 26,917 68,765 158,963 240,651

Capex - (7,551) (10,434) (20,350) (20,808) (13,219) (12,861) (13,692) (15,355) (17,018)
Free cash flow (firm) (36,511) (44,160) (23,539) (27,921) (18,774) (2,632) 14,057 55,073 143,608 223,633
Source: Company, IIFL Research

Figure 73: With an assumption of 12% WACC and 4% terminal growth, our DCF-based TP comes at Rs535
DCF - Key assumptions
Risk free rate 6.5% Term. growth 4.0%
Market risk premium 5.5% NPV-ex term 521,969
Beta 1.0 NPV-Term 768,600
Cost of equity 12.0% Cash & equivalents 42,493
Cost of debt (after tax) 9.75% Long term debt -
Debt / (Market cap + debt) 0% USD / INR 86
WACC 12.0% Price 535
Source: Company, IIFL Research

ri sh i .j h u n j h u n wal a@ iifl ca p. c om 32
 Swiggy – BUY

Scenario analysis: Risk reward favourable What-if analysis: Asymmetric potential upside
We run a scenario analysis to arrive at our 12-mth TP in the bull and bear We analyse two extreme scenarios of how the quick commerce sector will
case by varying the longer-term growth prospects (FY28ii-38ii revenue shape up in future to assess potential upside/downside risks to Swiggy’s
Cagr) and terminal Ebitda margins. Based on the analysis, we see that valuations. We assume that either the intense competition will
the TP can range from Rs228 (36% downside) to Rs1,116 (3x). We also structurally dent the profitability of the quick commerce sector in the long
run a sensitivity analysis to WACC and terminal growth rates. term (similar to the telecom sector in the past) or on the other extreme,
post consolidation, sanity will prevail and competition will normalise as 3-
Bull Case: We expect strong growth in Food delivery and QC, with 4 players will command a distributed market share and operate at
increasing adoption and market share gains for Swiggy, emerging as a reasonable profitability levels. Our analysis suggests more than 100%
strong player in both markets. We thus expect FY28ii-38ii revenue Cagr potential upside in the bull case and less than 20% downside in a bear
of 20% and FY38ii Ebitda margin of 30%, implying a TP of Rs1,116. case scenario for Swiggy based on the eventual market structure of the
quick commerce sector in future.
Bear Case: We expect slower adoptions in Food delivery and QC outside
of tier 1 cities and market share loss and profitability pressure on Swiggy. What if industry competition stabilises, with 3-4 players sharing
We expect FY25-28ii revenue Cagr at a modest 8% and FY38ii Ebitda the market, and pricing sanity prevails?
margins to be just 10%, implying a Rs228 (-36%) 12-mth TP.
In a scenario where post the rapid expansion of dark store capacity, each
Figure 74: Sensitivity analysis highlights favourable risk-reward
of the large players ends up owning their customer cohorts through their
Terminal Ebitda margin differentiation on value, convenience and assortments, we believe the
10% 15% 20% 25% 30% industry profitability can improve to long-term Ebitda margins at 5% of
Revenue Cagr
FY28ii-FY38ii

8% 228 293 354 418 481 GOV. In such a scenario, Swiggy’s QC business could be valued at close
11% 277 358 435 515 590 to USD12bn at least, still at a 15% discount to Eternal’s Blinkit valuation.
Eternal’s premium could be attributable to its industry leadership on
14% 336 437 535 635 730
scale, execution and profitability. At USD12bn valuation, it would imply
17% 409 532 658 783 903 near 100% potential upside for the stock from the current levels.
20% 497 652 808 961 1,116
Source: Company, IIFL Research What if heightened competitive intensity leads to a potential dent
in the long-term profitability of the sector?
Figure 75: Swiggy’s sensitivity to WACC and terminal growth rate
WACC In a scenario where prolonged heightened competition fuelled by
significant capital infusion leads to a potential dent in the long-term
Terminal growth

10% 11% 12% 13% 14%

profitability of the sector, we see limited risk to Swiggy’s valuations. At
2% 632 539 466 407 360
the current market cap, Swiggy’s QC business is valued at USD1.8bn.
3% 692 581 497 430 377 Assuming no value to this business due to the above scenario would imply
4% 772 636 535 458 398 20% potential downside to the current market price, as FD will still remain
5% 883 708 584 493 423 a profitable duopoly, valued at USD8.5bn. Hence, Swiggy’s stock price
6% 1,050 808 649 537 455 has a limited potential downside of 20% in case the quick commerce
Source: Company, IIFL Research sector fails to profitably scale up in future.

ri sh i .j h u n j h u n wal a@ iifl ca p. c om 33
 Swiggy – BUY

Figure 76:Swiggy’s valuations are reasonable with respect to its growth prospects vs Figure 78: We expect consensus PAT estimates to be revised upwards with improved
global peers execution
10 Swiggy FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii
Comparison with Global players
Revenues (Rs mn)
8 Eternal IIFLe 208,083 264,381 321,519
EV/Sales (FY26E)

DoorDash Consensus estimate 211,415 272,749 344,642

6 Difference -1.6% -3.1% -6.7%
Ebitda margin (%)
4 Swiggy IIFLe -7.8% 1.3% 7.0%
Just Eat
Consensus estimates -11.0% -2.8% 4.0%
2 Takeaway Meituan
Deliveroo Dianping Difference 320 bps 410 bps 300 bps
0 HelloFresh Delivery Hero PAT (Rs mn)
0 10 20 30 IIFLe -23,557 -6,062 12,876
-2 Consensus estimate -27,468 -13,690 5,957
Revenue Cagr (FY26E-28E) Difference NM NM 116.1%
Source: Company, IIFL Research Source: Company, IIFL Research

Figure 77: Even against India Internet players, there is comfort on Swiggy’s valuation Figure 79:Swiggy is trading at ~46% discount to Eternal on EV/Sales basis (1YF)

Comparison with India Internet players EV/Sales (1YF)

18 Eternal Swiggy
25
16
MapMyIndia
EV/Sales (FY26E)

14 20
PB Fintech
12
15
10 CarTrade Affle India
8 IndiaMART Nykaa Eternal 10 7.0
6
4 Nazara PayTM Swiggy 5
JustDial RateGain 3.8
2
0
0

Jun-22

Jun-23

Jun-24

Jun-25
Dec-21

Mar-22

Sep-22

Dec-22

Mar-23

Sep-23

Dec-23

Mar-24

Sep-24

Dec-24

Mar-25
10 20 30 40
Revenue Cagr (FY26E-28E)
Source: Company, IIFL Research Source: Company, IIFL Research

ri sh i .j h u n j h u n wal a@ iifl ca p. c om 34
 Swiggy – BUY

Swiggy vs Eternal: Swiggy playing catch-up Figure 82: Swiggy’s QC GOV is currently lagging that of Eternal by ~3 quarters
Numbers of quarters by which Instamart lags Blinkit
160 3 Qtrs
Figure 80: Swiggy’s FD GOV is currently lagging that of Eternal by ~7 quarters Instamart's QC GOV (Rsbn)
140
Numbers of quarters by which Swiggy lags Zomato
120
Swiggy's FD GOV (Rsbn)
350 6 Qtrs 100 2 Qtrs
300 6 Qtrs
4 Qtrs 80
250 1 Qtr 1 Qtr 3 Qtrs
60 3 Qtrs
200
150 6 Qtrs 40 3 Qtrs
7 Qtrs 3 Qtrs
100 5 Qtrs 6 Qtrs
20
50
0
0
1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q
1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q
FY23 FY24 FY25 FY25
FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY25

Source: Company, IIFL Research Source: Company, IIFL Research

Figure 81: Swiggy’s FD Adj. Ebitda margins are lagging that of Eternal by ~5 quarters Figure 83: Swiggy’s QC Adj. Ebitda margins are lagging that of Eternal by ~8 quarters
Numbers of quarters by which Swiggy lags Zomato Numbers of quarters by which Instamart lags Blinkit
Swiggy's FD Adj. Ebitda margins (%) Instamart's QC Adj. Ebitda margins (%)

20% 5 Qtrs 5 Qtrs

6 Qtrs 0%
10% 5 Qtrs 5 Qtrs
-50%
0% -100% 6 Qtrs
6 Qtrs 7 Qtrs
-150% -120.4%
-10% 8 Qtrs 8 Qtrs
4 Qtrs -200%
-20% -250%
-30% -20.0% -300%
-350%
-40% -31.8%
-400% -370.3%
1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q
FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY25 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY25
Source: Company, IIFL Research Source: Company, IIFL Research

ri sh i .j h u n j h u n wal a@ iifl ca p. c om 35
 Swiggy – BUY

Swiggy vs Eternal: Head-to-head comparison

Figure 84: Eternal is leading in terms of GOV, while Swiggy will look to arrest the declining Figure 86: Swiggy lags Eternal in terms of Ebitda margin (ex ESOP) with the differential
market share gap converging over time
Eternal Swiggy Swiggy's share (RHS) Ebitda margin
Total GOV (Rsbn) Eternal Swiggy
(%) (ex ESOP)

1,535
1,800 51% 11.2%
20%
8.2% 7.5%

1,240
1,600 49% 4.6% 7.1% 5.0% 6.7%
10% 3.3%
1,400

1,004
47% 0%

987
1,200 45% -10%

814
-4.0%

768
1,000
669
43% -9.9% -10.6%

629
800 -20% -14.3% -14.4%

481
447

435

600 41% -30% -23.1%

328
328
266
213
201

400 39% -40%

200 37% -50% -45.3%
0 35% -60% -55.0%
FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 4QFY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 4QFY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii

Note: The total GOV includes GOV of Food delivery and Quick commerce only Source: Company, IIFL Research
Source: Company, IIFL Research

Figure 85: While Swiggy led in terms of Adj. revenues over FY22-23, the trend reversed in Figure 87: Eternal has already become profitable in FY24, while Swiggy still lags and is
FY24 with the rise of Blinkit loss-making
Adj. revenue (Rsbn) Pre-exceptional
Eternal Swiggy Eternal Swiggy
PAT margin (%)
600
503 20% 9.3%
2.9% 2.6% 2.9% 6.1% 4.0%
500 10% 0.7%
400 0%
400 342 -10%
317 -2.3%
281 -20% -11.3%
300 221 -13.7%
216 -30% -20.6% -20.4% -24.5%
200 163 -40%
135123
87 95 -35.9%
55 69 62 47 -50%
100
-60% -50.5%
0 -70% -60.6%
FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 4QFY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 4QFY25 FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii

Source: Company, IIFL Research Source: Company, IIFL Research

ri sh i .j h u n j h u n wal a@ iifl ca p. c om 36
 Swiggy – BUY

Figure 88: Swiggy vs Eternal – Comparison on key metrics of Food delivery and Quick commerce
Swiggy Eternal FY25 Gap 4QFY25 Gap
FY23 FY24 FY25 4QFY25 yoy (%) FY23 FY24 FY25 4QFY25 yoy (%)
Food delivery
Average MTU (mn) 11.6 12.7 14.7 15.1 17.1% 17.1 18.4 20.6 20.9 10.0% -29% -28%
FD restaurants (000) 175 196 238 252 16.8% 210 247 297 314 16.3% -20% -20%
Avg. monthly delivery partners (000) 323 393 516 539 32.1% 327 400 473 444 6.2% 9% 21%
GOV (Rsbn) 215.2 247.2 287.8 73.5 17.6% 263.1 322.2 386.5 97.8 15.9% -26% -25%
GOV (USDmn) 2,670 2,996 3,404 849 12.8% 3,264 3,906 4,571 1,129 11.1% -26% -25%
Commission + Delivery take rate (%) 24.1% 24.6% 25.2% 25.4% 45bps 23.4% 24.2% 24.4% 24.6% 34bps 87bps 77bps
Adj. Revenue (Rsbn) 51.8 60.8 72.6 18.7 19.8% 61.5 77.9 94.2 24.1 17.5% -23% -22%
Take rate (ex-Customer delivery charges) (%) 19.2% 20.9% 22.1% 22.2% 23bps 17.2% 19.7% 20.9% 21.0% 40bps 116bps 116bps
Reported Revenue (Rsbn) 41.3 51.6 63.5 16.3 18.9% 45.3 63.6 80.8 20.5 18.1% -21% -21%
Contribution (Rsbn) 6.3 14.1 20.3 5.7 36.9% 12.0 22.3 30.9 8.4 33.0% -34% -32%
as a % of Adjusted Revenue (%) 12.2% 23.2% 28.0% 30.7% 385bps 19.5% 28.6% 32.8% 35.0% 407bps -485bps -426bps
as a % of GOV (%) 2.9% 5.7% 7.1% 7.8% 110bps 4.6% 6.9% 8.0% 8.6% 111bps -94bps -81bps
Adjusted Ebitda (Rsbn) (10.3) (0.5) 5.7 2.1 582.2% (0.1) 9.1 15.1 4.3 55.6% -62% -50%
Adjusted Ebitda margin (%) (%) -20.0% -0.8% 7.9% 11.4% 9ppts -0.2% 11.7% 16.0% 17.8% 4ppts -8ppts -6ppts
Adjusted Ebitda (% of GOV) (%) -4.8% -0.2% 2.0% 2.9% 2ppts 0.0% 2.8% 3.9% 4.4% 1ppts -2ppts -1ppts
Quick commerce
Average MTU (mn) 3.2 4.2 7.1 9.8 108.5% 3.0 5.1 10.2 13.7 114.1% -31% -28%
Order Frequency (Monthly) (#) 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.0 -15.0% 3.4 3.3 3.5 3.4 1.4% -3% -13%
Orders (mn) 128 175 286 89 77.2% 119 203 424 142 117.0% -33% -37%
Dark Stores (#) 421 523 1,021 1,021 95.2% 400 526 1,301 1,301 147.3% -22% -22%
AOV (Rs) 398 460 514 527 13.4% 541 613 667 665 7.8% -23% -21%
GOV (Rsbn) 51 81 147 47 101.0% 64 125 283 94 133.9% -48% -50%
GOV (USDmn) 635 978 1,736 539 92.8% 800 1,512 3,344 1,088 124.2% -48% -50%
GOV/day/store (Rs'000) 375 487 521 601 20.3% 442 738 848 942 2.4% -39% -36%
Take rate (incl. Customer delivery charges) (%) 10.7% 13.5% 15.3% 15.7% 93bps 16.5% 18.5% 18.4% 18.1% -95bps -307bps -244bps
Revenue (Rsbn) 5.5 10.9 22.5 7.3 113.7% 10.6 23.0 52.1 17.1 122.2% -57% -57%
Contribution (Rsbn) (12.1) (4.8) (5.9) (2.6) 196.3% (4.5) 2.7 9.5 2.9 82.9% NA NA
as a % of Revenue (%) -220.3% -44.6% -26.3% -35.7% -10ppts -41.9% 11.6% 18.3% 16.9% -4ppts -45ppts -53ppts
as a % of GOV (%) -23.6% -6.0% -4.0% -5.6% -2ppts -6.9% 2.1% 3.4% 3.1% -1ppts -7ppts -9ppts
Adjusted Ebitda (Rsbn) (20.3) (13.1) (21.0) (8.4) 174.1% (10.1) (3.8) (2.9) (1.8) 381.1% NA NA
Adjusted Ebitda margin (%) (%) -370.3% -120.4% -93.0% -114.7% -25ppts -95.1% -16.7% -5.6% -10.4% -6ppts -87ppts -104ppts
Adjusted Ebitda (% of GOV) (%) -39.6% -16.2% -14.3% -18.0% -5ppts -15.7% -3.1% -1.0% -1.9% -1ppts -13ppts -16ppts
Source: Company, IIFL Research

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 Swiggy – BUY

Key risks to our thesis Regulatory risk: Food tech must operate within stringent regulatory
guardrails, which does pose a threat to the players. This includes
Potential disruption in food delivery: In food delivery, while the
intense scrutiny around the adverse impact that QC may have on
market is an effective duopoly at present, there is a risk of disruption
Kirana stores, which the industry believes is offset by the job creation
to this market structure from ONDC players. At the same time, the
and promotion of franchise models, making QC a net positive for the
recent announcement of a launch by Rapido named ‘Ownly’, aiming
economy. The players also have to navigate challenges around FDI
to bridge the price gap between online and offline food could
regulations and the laws governing the business model
potentially disrupt the industry and drive a higher level of discounting.
(inventory/marketplace). The industry is also expected to comply with
While this does pose a risk, past attempts to disrupt the online food
food/product quality norms and labour laws.
delivery market by players like UberEats, Foodpanda, Amazon have
not fructified and even ONDC has failed to take off. We thus believe it
Challenges in the delivery rider ecosystem: Exponential growth
would be challenging to cause a meaningful dent to Swiggy/Eternal.
in QC has led to challenges in aligning growth in delivery fleet with
Intense competition in QC: The quick commerce segment is industry growth. Furthermore, there is regulatory uncertainty due to
witnessing hyper competition with all players vying to create a evolving gig worker laws. While the Code on Social Security, 2020,
meaningful position for themselves in this market with a huge TAM. sets a central framework for gig and platform workers’ welfare, states
The market is witnessing competition from incumbents (Eternal, like Rajasthan and Karnataka have introduced their own laws
Swiggy and Zepto) on the one hand and the threat of new entrants mandating registration and potential welfare contributions. These
(Amazon, Flipkart, JioMart and Bigbasket) on the other. This could rules are yet to be notified, delaying operational enforcement.
lead to aggressive dark store expansion, higher discounting and Divergent state-level requirements could increase compliance
higher sales and market costs, which would dent profitability. burdens and welfare fund obligations, potentially impacting Swiggy’s
cost structure, profitability, and operational flexibility.
Broad-based slowdown in consumer sentiment: On a structural
basis, management expects Food delivery to be a segment that can Unsuccessful initiatives: Swiggy’s ventures such as Dineout and
deliver 18-22% growth in the medium term. However, in recent Genie have their own distinct competitive dynamics and operational
quarters, GOV growth for both Eternal and Swiggy decelerated in requirements. The company continues to innovate, and if these
4QFY25 due to a general weakness in consumer sentiment. With Food innovations fail to scale profitably or meet industry trends, they could
delivery contributing to 62%/42% of Swiggy’s GOV/Revenues during drag down financial performance.
FY25, a slowdown here could impact overall growth materially.
Execution risk: Swiggy operates in businesses that involve a very
Food delivery/QC is still an urban phenomenon: The top 60 cities
high degree of execution across many micro markets within India. The
still account for 75-80% of the food delivery market. QC is still in
nascent stages and is concentrated in metro and tier 1 cities. We key success factors in these industries are often fulfilment rate,
believe secular growth in these segments hinges upon their ability to assortment of restaurants/SKUs, speed of delivery and overall
reputation and reliability of services. Additionally, there is tight cost
expand outside the urban areas, which would require new marketing
control that drives the overall profitability. Hence, any slip-ups in
strategies and value proposition. An inability to expand outside the
major cities could risk the longer-term growth potential. execution could dent the business and lead to market share loss.

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 Swiggy – BUY

Figure 89:Shareholding pattern of Swiggy Figure 90: IPO structure and objects of fresh issue
Listing date % of total o/s
Particulars Current Particulars Issue price (Rs) No. of shares (mn) Amount (Rs mn)
Pre-IPO (12 Nov 24) (Post IPO)
Mutual funds NA 3.7% 5.8% Fresh Issue 390 115.4 4.9% 44,990
Offer for Sale 390 175.1 7.5% 68,284
AIFs NA 2.0% 1.0%
TOTAL 290.4 12.4% 113,274
Insurance companies NA 1.6% 1.4% Use of IPO funds (Rs mn) Fresh issue FY25E FY26E FY27E FY28E
Provident/Pension funds NA 0.3% 0.5% Debt repayment 1,648 1,648 NA NA NA
Dark store expansion 7,554 453 2,428 2,747 1,926
Foreign investors (incl. Foreign companies) NA 68.1% 63.5% Lease/license payments 4,233 297 1,249 1,311 1,376
Prosus 30.9% 24.8% 23.3% Invt in tech & cloud infra 7,034 355 2,177 2,418 2,084
Brand mkt & business promotion 11,153 615 3,319 3,590 3,629
Softbank 7.7% 7.4% 6.9%
Inorganic growth & GCP 13,368 NA NA NA NA
Accel 6.1% 5.3% 5.0% TOTAL 44,990 3,368 9,173 10,066 9,015
Tencent 3.6% 3.2% 3.0% Source: Company, IIFL Research

Qatar Investment Authority 2.9% 2.8% 2.6% Figure 91: Key events and milestones of Swiggy
Norwest 3.2% 2.7% 2.6% CY Key Events and Milestones
Elevation Capital 3.1% 2.6% 2.5% 2013 Swiggy incorporated as a company
2014 Commenced operations of its Food delivery business
Invesco 1.8% 1.7% 1.6%
2015 Successfully completed its first major round of fund-raising
Coatue Pe Asia Xi 1.9% 1.6% 1.5% 2019 Expanded food delivery business to more than 500 cities
DST EuroAsia V B.V 1.6% 1.3% 1.3% 2020 Introduced ‘Swiggy Instamart’ and ‘Swiggy Genie’
2021 Launched its membership subscription programme ‘Swiggy One’
Alpha Wave 1.2% 1.1% 1.1%
Acquired the DineOut business and rolled-out restaurant discovery, table
Meituan 1.5% 1.1% 1.0% 2022
reservations, and in-restaurant payment services on its platform
Others NA 12.4% 11.0% 2022 Scaled Swiggy Instamart to 25 cities, with over 400 Dark Stores and >8,400 SKUs
2023 Introduced the co-branded Swiggy-HDFC Bank credit card
ESOP Pool 4.9% 4.7%* 8.2%
2023 Completed the acquisition of 100% equity stake in Lynks
Others 29.5% 19.6% 19.7%
2023 Rolled out ‘Swiggy Mall’
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 2023 Grew its fleet of active electric vehicles (EVs) to 7,500
Source: Company, IIFL Research 2024 Swiggy One membership base surpassed 5.7mn subscribers
*Assumed same as on date of Prospectus
2024 Achieved a milestone of over 110mn cumulative transacting users on its platforms
Source: Company, IIFL Research

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 Swiggy – BUY

Figure 92: Funding history of Swiggy Acquisitions by Swiggy: Swiggy has made several strategic
Post-money Post-money acquisitions to expand beyond food delivery. In Aug’18, it acquired
Date Funding Round valuation valuation Per share price Scootsy for Rs371mn, a premium delivery platform later integrated
(Rsmn) (USDmn) into Instamart. In Sep’18, Swiggy bought Supr Daily for Rs515mn, a
Feb-April 2015 Series A 1,163 19 13.52 subscription-based milk and grocery delivery service, later rebranded
as InsanelyGood. Swiggy also acquired Shandaar Foods in Feb’21 for
June 5, 2015 Series B 1,755 27 8.60 Rs222mn to strengthen its cloud kitchen operations. In Apr’22, it
December 31, 2015 Series C 5,923 89 17.73 invested Rs9,505mn in Rapido and took a minority stake in
UrbanPiper, a restaurant SaaS platform. A major acquisition followed
April 22, 2016 Series C 6,397 96 17.73
in Jul’22 with Dineout for Rs6,446mn. Most recently, Swiggy bought
September 16, 2016 Series D 9,648 145 23.97 Lynks Logistics for Rs3,855mn in Aug’23, marking its entry into FMCG
June 15, 2017 Series E 19,709 306 36.05 distribution for kirana stores.

Jan - Feb 2018 Series F 37,566 583 56.98 Figure 93: List of acquisitions done by Swiggy
July 5, 2018 Series G 70,289 1,023 85.12 Consideration
Date Target Stake Description
(Rsmn)
January 11, 2019 Series H 193,645 2,738 165.11
Bengaluru-based Asian food cloud-
Feb - May 2020 Series I 208,915 2,761 168.54 Dec-17 48East NA NA
kitchen team
April 16, 2021 Series I-2 244,625 3,283 171.50 Premium food & essentials delivery arm;
Aug-18 Scootsy 371 100%
integrated into Instamart & Scootsy
April 30, 2021 Series J 295,582 3,967 188.65
Subscription-based milk & grocery
Sep-18 Supr Daily 515 100%
July 27, 2021 Series J-2 337,709 4,531 194.12 delivery; rebranded as InsanelyGood
Feb-Mar, 2022 Series K 746,295 9,794 357.87 AI/computer vision startup to enhance
Feb-19 Kint.io NA NA
Swiggy’s tech capabilities
August 29, 2023 Series K-1 756,576 9,138 357.87
Nov-20 Maverix 310 19% Ready-to-eat food brand
Source: Company, IIFL Research
Manufacturing of food products and
Shandaar
Feb-21 222 Slump operating centralised cloud kitchens
Funding and valuation history: Swiggy’s valuation has steadily Foods
across Hyderabad and Bengaluru
increased across funding rounds. It began with a Series A valuation of
Jul-22 Dineout 6,446 Slump Dining reservation platform
USD19mn in early-2015, rising to USD89mn by Series C in Dec’15. By
Series E in mid-2017, its valuation reached USD306mn. In Series J-2 Aggregator tech platform of 2- and 4-
Apr-22 Rapido 9,505 15%
(Jul’21), Swiggy’s valuation jumped to USD4.5bn. In Aug’23, it was wheelers
valued at USD9.1bn in its Series K-1 round. Swiggy had launched its Apr-22 UrbanPiper USD5mn
Minority Restaurant SaaS platform for POS, order
IPO at a valuation of ~USD11.3bn in Nov’24. stake integration and management
Lynks Chennai-based FMCG distributor to
Aug-23 3,855 100%
Logistics kirana stores
Source: Company, IIFL Research

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 Swiggy – BUY

Figure 94:Swiggy’s Global Comps

Company Mkt Cap (USD m) EV/Sales (x) EV/ Ebitda (x) P/E (x) 3 yr Cagr Price perf (%)
1YF 2YF 2YF 2YF Revenue 3M 6M 1Y
Swiggy 10,283 4.1 3.3 259.1 NA 28% 0% -39% NA
Eternal 27,658 7.2 5.6 84.9 103.2 34% 21% -17% 33%
Meituan Dianping 107,491 1.7 1.5 10.1 14.2 15% -25% -11% 22%
Door Dash 93,957 6.8 5.8 24.7 39.7 18% 17% 25% 97%
Grab Holdings 19,189 4.0 3.4 17.2 42.8 18% 6% -8% 31%
Deliveroo 3,567 1.0 0.9 9.5 24.4 7% 44% 24% 30%
Delivery Hero 7,579 0.6 0.5 6.0 24.7 12% -7% -24% -19%
Just Eat Takeaway 4,714 1.2 1.1 9.6 NA 7% 0% 33% 63%
HelloFresh 1,723 0.2 0.2 3.3 NA -1% 2% -30% 61%
Average 3.1 2.5 47.1 41.5 15% 6% -5% 40%
Source: Bloomberg, Company, IIFL Research

Figure 95: India Internet comps

Market Revenue EBITDA PAT Revenue CAGR EV/Sales (x) Price Performance (%)
CMP
India Internet comps Cap (Rs m) % % FY FY
(Rs) FY22-25 FY25-27E 3M 6M 1Y
(USD m) FY25E FY25E FY25E 26E 27E
Swiggy 356 10,283 152,268 -18% -20% 39% 32% 4.1 3.3 0.3 -39 NA
Eternal 247 27,658 202,430 3% 3% 69% 37% 7.2 5.6 21.4 -16.7 32.8
Zinka Logistics (Blackbuck) 440 911 4,267 24% 21% 53% 33% 11.9 8.8 8.5 NA NA
Nykaa 194 6,435 79,542 6% 1% 28% 23% 5.8 4.7 17.7 10.0 13.4
PayTM 865 6,401 69,004 -21% -11% 12% 28% 4.7 3.7 25.6 -14.7 103.5
PB Fintech 1,950 10,384 49,772 2% 7% 52% 29% 12.8 10.0 43.9 -8.6 42.1
Affle India Ltd 1,941 3,162 22,663 21% 17% 28% 21% 9.5 7.8 36.2 6.3 54.7
IndiaMART 2,481 1,727 13,884 38% 40% 23% 13% 7.6 6.2 27.7 5.7 -2.9
MapMyIndia 1,745 1,101 4,633 39% 32% 32% 29% 15.3 11.8 9.7 0.8 -10.9
Nazara 1,308 1,329 16,239 9% 6% 38% 22% 5.5 4.7 40.5 26.6 51.7
RateGain 429 588 10,767 22% 19% 43% 12% 3.0 2.4 -1.1 -42.1 -41.5
CarTrade 1,699 935 6,411 23% 21% 27% 17% 10.1 8.6 6.3 11.2 110.8
Matrimony 548 137 4,558 13% 10% 2% 7% 1.9 1.7 6.2 -17.3 -11.9
Info Edge 1,475 11,084 26,536 40% 29% 19% 17% 29.2 24.5 13.8 -16.7 18.2
Delhivery 359 3,104 89,319 2% 0% 9% 15% 2.5 2.1 48.0 -6.4 -11.7
eMudhra 742 712 5,099 25% 17% 41% 26% 8.7 6.9 -9.4 -24.6 -14.4
Tracxn 57 70 931 8% 11% 14% 22% 4.7 4.4 13.7 -29.5 -34.0
Median 13% 11% 28% 22% 6.5 5.1
Source: Company, IIFL Research

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 Swiggy – BUY

Figure 96: Comparison with global peers across key metrics

Key Metrics 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Cagr
GMV (USDmn)
Meituan Dianping 2,482 8,840 25,348 42,719 56,913 70,848 108,846 NA NA NA 88%
DoorDash 2,812 8,039 24,664 41,944 53,414 66,771 80,231 75%
Delivery Hero 1,588 2,900 3,536 5,261 8,323 14,116 38,470 47,015 49,006 52,762 48%
Just Eat Takeaway 10,157 16,007 24,439 33,335 29,738 28,900 28,462 19%
Eternal (1) 770 1,580 1,281 2,855 3,264 3,906 4,571 35%
Swiggy (1) 2,477 2,670 2,996 3,404 11%
GMV growth (%)
Meituan Dianping 256% 187% 69% 33% 24% 54% NA NA NA
DoorDash 186% 207% 70% 27% 25% 20%
Delivery Hero 83% 22% 49% 58% 70% 173% 22% 4% 8%
Just Eat Takeaway 58% 53% 36% -11% -3% -2%
Eternal (1) 105% -19% 123% 14% 20% 17%
Swiggy (1) 8% 12% 14%
Revenue (USDmn)
Meituan Dianping 28 798 3,116 5,762 7,948 9,604 14,932 23,905 29,277 34,859 121%
DoorDash 291 885 2,886 4,888 6,583 8,635 10,722 82%
Delivery Hero (2) 185 360 418 690 1,279 2,590 5,887 7,395 8,702 10,638 57%
Just Eat Takeaway 1,839 3,056 4,561 6,307 5,858 5,572 5,503 20%
Eternal (1) 130 246 205 458 562 771 956 39%
Swiggy (1) 455 512 625 751 18%
Take rate (%)
Meituan Dianping 1.1% 9.0% 12.3% 13.5% 14.0% 13.6% 13.7% NA NA NA
DoorDash 10.3% 11.0% 11.7% 11.7% 12.3% 12.9% 13.4%
Delivery Hero 11.6% 12.4% 11.8% 13.1% 15.4% 18.3% 15.3% 15.7% 17.8% 20.2%
Just Eat Takeaway 18.1% 19.1% 18.7% 18.9% 19.7% 19.3% 19.3%
Eternal (1) 15.5% 16.0% 16.0% 17.2% 19.7% 20.9%
Swiggy (1) 18.4% 19.2% 20.9% 22.1%
Source: Company Reports, IIFL Research

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 Swiggy – BUY

Figure 97: Comparison with global peers across key metrics (Contd…)
Key Metrics 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Cagr
No. of orders (mn)
Meituan Dianping 637 1,585 4,090 6,393 8,722 10,147 14,368 17,670 21,893 NA 56%
DoorDash 83 263 816 1,390 1,736 2,161 2,583 77%
Delivery Hero 103 197 248 369 666 1,304 2,792 NA NA NA 73%
Just Eat Takeaway 469 593 816 1,086 984 926 879 11%
Eternal (1) 191 403 239 535 646 753 871 29%
Swiggy(1) 454 517 578 629 11%
Volume growth (%)
Meituan Dianping 149% 158% 56% 36% 16% 42% 23% 24% NA
DoorDash 217% 210% 70% 25% 24% 20%
Delivery Hero 91% 26% 49% 80% 96% 114% NA NA NA
Just Eat Takeaway 26% 38% 33% -9% -6% -5%
Eternal (1) 111% -41% 124% 21% 17% 16%
Swiggy(1) 14% 12% 9%
Average Order Value (USD)
Meituan Dianping 3.90 5.58 6.20 6.68 6.53 6.98 7.58 NA NA NA 12%
DoorDash 33.88 30.57 30.23 30.18 30.77 30.90 31.06 -1%
Delivery Hero 15.37 14.72 14.26 14.24 12.50 10.82 13.78 NA NA NA -2%
Just Eat Takeaway 21.66 26.99 29.95 30.69 30.22 31.21 32.38 7%
Eternal (1) 4.03 3.92 5.36 5.34 5.05 5.18 5.25 5%
Swiggy(1) 5.45 5.16 5.19 5.41 0%
Gross margin (%)
Meituan Dianping -123.7% -7.7% 8.1% 13.8% 2.6% 4.3% 6.4% 18.4% 18.7% 20.9%
DoorDash -20.3% -22.6% 23.0% 21.9% 23.8% 28.7% 32.4%
Delivery Hero 82.3% 73.4% 61.7% 52.2% 25.1% 20.0% 19.7% 24.2% 28.4% 26.0%
Just Eat Takeaway 11.0% 9.1% -6.6% 0.3% 6.6% 9.0%
Eternal (1) (3) -146.8% -52.3% 22.8% 7.4% 19.5% 28.6% 32.8%
Swiggy (1) (3) 6.6% 12.2% 23.2% 28.0%
Source: Company Reports, IIFL Research
Notes: 1) For Eternal and Swiggy, GMV refers to food delivery gross order value alone; 2) Delivery Hero's revenue over 2016-2024 is ex-customer delivery charges; 3) Calculated on adjusted revenues 4) 2024
corresponds to FY25 for Eternal and Swiggy, similarly for other years 5) Starting 2022, Revenue and Gross margins for Meituan Dianping are shown for the core local markets business, as against standalone food
delivery business for the years prior to 2022.

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 Swiggy – BUY

Figure 98: Swiggy’s key management details

Name Designation Profile
He has more than 10 years of experience in Swiggy. He holds a bachelor’s degree in engineering, specifically in electrical and electronics
Sriharsha Majety MD and Group CEO
engineering from BITS, Pilani, and a PG diploma in management from IIM, Calcutta.
He has more than 10 years of experience in Swiggy. He has previously worked with Intellectual Capital Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd.
Nandan Reddy WTD - Head of Innovation
(Intellecap) as an associate, business consulting. He holds a master’s degree in science (honours) in physics from BITS, Pilani.
He has been associated with Swiggy since 16th Aug’22. Prior to joining Swiggy, he was associated with OYO as the Global CMO and with
Rohit Kapoor CEO – Food Marketplace Max Healthcare as a senior director and Chief Growth Officer, as well as with McKinsey as an engagement manager. He holds a BCom
from the University of Calcutta and has completed the PG programme in management from ISB. He has also cleared CFA level 3.
He has been associated with Swiggy since 10th Mar’15. Prior to joining Swiggy, he was associated with BCG as a senior associate. He holds
Phani Kishan Chief Growth Officer
a BTech degree in computer science and engineering from IIT, Madras, and a PG diploma in management from IIM, Calcutta.
He has been associated with Swiggy since 1st Sep’17. He has domestic and international experience in accounting, business finance,
Rahul Bothra CFO treasury, taxation, M&A, and assurance. Prior to joining Swiggy, he was associated with Wipro, Britannia Industries and Olam
International. He is a qualified CA and an associate member of the ICAI. He holds a BCom degree from Bangalore University.
He has been associated with Swiggy since 21st Jun’18. Prior to joining Swiggy, he was associated with Boomerang Commerce India Private
Madhusudhan Rao Chief Technology Officer
Limited and Amazon. He joined Swiggy as VP – engineering. He holds a BE (CS), from VTU, Belgaum, Karnataka.
He has been associated with Swiggy since 19th Apr’16. Prior to joining Swiggy, he was associated with Flipkart Internet as associate director
Chief Human Resources HRBP, Indus Mobile Distribution as VP - HR, HSBC as a VP - regional HR, Vistaar Livelihood Financial Services as VP – HR, and Fullerton
Girish Menon
Officer India Credit as assistant VP. He is a fellow member of the ICSI. He holds a BE (Mechanical) from Annamalai University, a bachelor’s degree
in law from Karnataka State Law University, and a PGDBM from XIME, Bangalore.
He is the CEO of Instamart, effective 4th Sep’24. Previously, he was associated with Flipkart Private Limited for 14 years as senior vice
Amitesh Jha CEO – Instamart president. He holds a BTech degree (chemical engineering), master’s degree in technology (process engineering and design) from IIT,
Delhi, and has completed the PG programme in management from IIM, Ahmedabad.
Source: Company, IIFL Research
Figure 99: Swiggy has seen some churn in management in recent times as some of its management has moved on to leadership positions in other companies/startups
Name Designation Joined Resigned Current role
Ashwath Swaminathan Chief Growth and Marketing Officer Jan-24 Sep-24 Chief Operating Officer, Indira IVF group
Dale VAZ CTO Jul-18 May-23 Cofounder & CEO, Sahi.com
Anuj Rathi SVP - Revenue and Growth Aug-16 Sep-23 Chief business and growth officer, Cleartrip
Karthik Gurumurthy SVP Instamart & Head Swiggy Mall Aug-20 Dec-23 CEO, TEN x YOU
Nishad Kenkre VP - Head of Revenue & Growth at Instamart Jun-19 May-23 Operating Partner, Verlinvest
Karan Arora VP & Head of SCM at Instamart Nov-20 Apr-24 Cofounder and COO, TEN x YOU
Sidharth Satpathy VP Head Category Jun-19 Jan-24 National Sales Director - India, Redbull
Kedar Gokhale VP - Operations Jul-17 Aug-23 Cofounder, Orbit Farming
Ashish Lingamneni VP - Brand and product marketing Jul-17 Apr-23 NA
Source: Company, IIFL Research

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 Swiggy – BUY

Figure 100: Swiggy’s board of directors

Name Designation Profile
He has been a Director at Swiggy since 4th Dec’23. He is currently the MD and global CEO at EPL. He was previously associated with Diageo in India -
Chairman and
United Spirits Limited for 8 years. Further, he was also associated with Cadbury Schweppes Asia Pacific, Hindustan Lever, and DCM Data Products. He
Anand Kripalu Independent
holds a BTech degree in electrical engineering from IIT Madras and a PG diploma in management from Indian Institute of Management, Calcutta. He also
Director
holds a certification in the advanced management programme by The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
He has been an Independent Director of Swiggy since 24th Jan’23. He has more than 15 years of experience, given his previous association with Blue Star
Shailesh Independent Limited, L&T Finance Holdings Limited, Raymond Limited, Ambuja Cements Limited and Torrent Pharmaceuticals Limited. He is a member of the ICAI, an
Haribhakti Director associate member of the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners and a certified financial planner under the Financial Planning Standards Board India.
He is a certified internal auditor under the Institute of Internal Auditors, Inc. He has cleared the final examination of the ICWAI.
She has been an Independent Director at Swiggy since 1st Apr’24. She is the CEO of the watches and wearables division of Titan Company Limited (Titan)
Independent and has been associated with Titan for 18 years and has also served on the Board of Governors for IIM, Kozhikode for 5 years. Further, she has previously
Suparna Mitra
Director served on the board of Tata Power Solar Systems Ltd. She holds a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering from Jadavpur University and a PG diploma
in management from IIM, Calcutta.
He has been a Nominee Director of Swiggy since 4th Dec’23. He is currently associated with Prosus Services B.V. and has been associated with Prosus
Roger Clark Non-Executive
Group for more than 10 years. He holds a bachelor of arts degree in economics from the University of Texas and master of arts in the field of economics
Rabalais Nominee Director
from Harvard University.
He has been a Nominee Director of Swiggy since 21st Jun’17. He is currently associated with MIH Internet India Private Limited as Investment Partner,
Ashutosh Non-Executive Growth+, and has been associated with Prosus Group for more than 7 years. He was previously associated with Norwest Venture Partners as vice
Sharma Nominee Director president, and Qualcomm India Private Limited. He holds a bachelor’s degree in electronic engineering from Banaras Hindu University and an MBA from
the Booth School of Business at the University of Chicago.
He has been a Nominee Director of Swiggy since 27th Jul’21. He is currently the managing partner and head of Europe Middle East and Africa (EMEA) and
Non-Executive India at SB Investment Advisers (UK) Limited. He was previously associated with entities affiliated to SB Investment Advisers (UK) Limited for 4 years and
Sumer Juneja
Nominee Director NVP Venture Capital India Private Limited as a director for more than 9 years. He holds a bachelor of science degree from the London School of Economics
and Political Science, University of London.
He has been a Nominee Director of Swiggy since 10th Jul’15. He was previously associated with Accel India Management LLP for 4 years and is currently
Non-Executive
Anand Daniel associated with Accel Partners India LLP as Partner for 10 years. He holds a bachelor’s degree in engineering (computer science) from the University of
Nominee Director
Madras, a master’s degree in engineering from Purdue University and an MBA from Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
MD and Group He has more than 10 years of experience in Swiggy. He holds a bachelor’s degree in engineering, specifically in electrical and electronics engineering,
Sriharsha Majety
CEO from BITS, Pilani, and a PG diploma in management from IIM, Calcutta.
WTD - Head of He has more than 10 years of experience in Swiggy. He has previously worked with Intellectual Capital Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. (Intellecap) as an
Nandan Reddy
Innovation associate, business consulting. He holds a master’s degree in science (honours) in physics from BITS, Pilani.
Source: Company, IIFL Research

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 Swiggy – BUY

Appendix
Figure 101: Overview of all segments of Swiggy
Supply chain &
Particulars Source of revenue Food delivery Quick commerce Out-of-home consumption Platform innovations
distribution
Genie, Minis, Private
Brands Swiggy NA Instamart Dineout, Scenes
brands
On-demand product pick-
Restaurant discovery & Comprehensive supply Provision of restaurant
On-demand grocery and up/ drop-off service for
Description delivering food ordered by chain solutions to dining services and access
various household items users, D2C offering for
users wholesalers and retailers to curated outdoor events
homegrown & pvt brands
From businesses/
Revenue model Commissions Sale of goods Commissions Commissions Sale of food/ products
partners
Revenue for supply chain
Advertising Advertising Advertising Advertising
management services
Business enablement fees Business enablement fees Business enablement fees - Business enablement fees
From users Platform Fees - Platform Fees Platform Fees Delivery fees
# of monthly transacting # of monthly transacting # of monthly transacting # of monthly transacting
Revenue drivers # of wholesalers/ retailers
customers customers user user
Order Frequency Value of good supplied Order Frequency # of Restaurant Partners Order Frequency
Commission rates charged # of private brands and
AOV Order frequency AOV
to Restaurant partners minis
Commission rates charged # of Restaurant Partners
# of Restaurant Partners
to partners paying for Advertising
Commission rates charged # of Partners paying for
to Restaurant partners Advertising
# of Restaurant Partners
paying for Advertising
Cost drivers Delivery cost Cost of Goods Sold Delivery cost Marketing spend Delivery cost
Discounts and marketing Supply chain management Discounts and marketing
spend services spend
Outsourcing support
Source: Company, IIFL Research

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Figure 102: Business model of Food delivery Figure 104: Business model of Quick commerce

Source: Company, IIFL Research Source: Company, IIFL Research

Figure 103: Business model of Out-of-home consumption Figure 105: Business model of Supply chain and distribution

Source: Company, IIFL Research Source: Company, IIFL Research

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 Company snapshot Swiggy – BUY

Background: Swiggy is one of India’s leading online food tech platforms, accessible through a unified app to browse, select, order and pay for food (Food
delivery), and grocery and household items (Instamart), and has orders delivered to the doorstep through an on-demand delivery partner network. As of
FY25, Swiggy's 14.7mn monthly transacting users present across India placed ~629mn food delivery orders with a Gross Order Value (GOV) of over
USD3bn. Swiggy Instamart, a marketplace that facilitates quick delivery of groceries and essentials through its ~1,021 dark stores as of FY25, catered to
~285mn orders with a GOV of ~USD1.7bn.

Management
Segment mix - FY25 (Rs bn) Revenue and Ebitda
Name Designation
Adj. Revenue Adj. Ebitda
Anand Kripalu Chairman Platform
Out of home 200
innovations, 0.9% 163
Sriharsha Majety MD and CEO consumption, 1.5% 150 123
95
Nandan Reddy WTD – Head of innovations Quick commerce, 100 69
13.8%
Rahul Bothra CFO 50

Food delivery, 0
44.5% (18) (19)
Supply chain and (50) (32) (39)

FY23
FY22

FY24

FY25
Competitors: Eternal, Zepto, BigBasket: distribution, 39.3%

Assumptions PB Chart (1YF) EV/Sales (1YF)

Y/e 31 Mar, Consolidated FY24A FY25A FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii
Food delivery-Revenue 24.9 23.1 19.5 17.2 17.8 Swiggy - P/B
Swiggy - EV/sales
growth (%) 16.0
Number of orders (Mn) 577.7 628.9 698.7 776.2 870.9 14.0 8.0
Average Order Value (Rs) 427.8 457.7 485.1 509.4 534.9 12.0
6.0
Contribution as a % of AOV 5.7 7.1 7.8 8.2 8.4 10.0
8.0 4.0
Quick commerce-Revenue 116.8 117.6 107.6 58.6 36.2
6.0
growth (%) 2.0
4.0
Number of orders (Mn) 175.5 285.5 490.2 643.6 787.8 2.0
Average Order Value (Rs) 459.9 514.3 591.4 650.6 683.1 - -

Apr-25
Apr-25
Dec-24
Dec-24

Mar-25

May-25
Nov-24

Jan-25

Jun-25
Feb-25
Feb-25
Contribution as a % of AOV (6.0) (4.0) (1.3) 1.8 2.9
Nov-24

Apr-25

Apr-25

May-25

Jun-25
Dec-24

Dec-24

Jan-25

Mar-25
Feb-25

Feb-25

Adj EBITDA margin (%) (14.3) (10.6) (4.0) 3.3 7.5

Source: Company data, IIFL Research

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 Swiggy – BUY

Financial summary
Income statement summary (Rs m) Balance sheet summary (Rs m)
Y/e 31 Mar, Consolidated FY24A FY25A FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii Y/e 31 Mar, Consolidated FY24A FY25A FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii
Revenues 112,474 152,268 208,083 264,381 321,519 Cash & cash equivalents 49,301 66,214 43,306 40,056 58,122
Ebitda (22,080) (27,858) (16,309) 3,311 22,450 Inventories 487 555 869 940 1,260
Depreciation and amortisation (4,206) (6,123) (9,364) (10,575) (11,253) Receivables 9,639 24,625 22,857 21,943 22,080
Ebit (26,286) (33,981) (25,673) (7,264) 11,197 Other current assets 11,048 3,550 4,162 5,288 6,430
Non-operating income 3,870 3,962 3,642 2,728 3,204 Creditors 8,809 18,180 25,979 28,973 34,966
Financial expense (714) (1,006) (1,500) (1,500) (1,500) Other current liabilities 9,538 14,116 20,822 24,735 28,826
PBT (23,130) (31,025) (23,531) (6,036) 12,902 Net current assets 52,128 62,648 24,392 14,518 24,100
Exceptionals (306) (117) 0 0 0 Fixed assets 10,406 26,838 38,283 40,926 42,534
Reported PBT (23,436) (31,142) (23,531) (6,036) 12,902 Intangibles 10,008 9,470 9,470 9,470 9,470
Tax expense 0 0 0 0 0 Investments 11,318 9,652 9,652 9,652 9,652
PAT (23,436) (31,142) (23,531) (6,036) 12,902 Other long-term assets 3,088 11,150 14,566 15,863 17,684
Minorities, Associates etc. (66) (26) (26) (26) (26) Total net assets 86,948 119,757 96,362 90,429 103,439
Attributable PAT (23,502) (31,168) (23,557) (6,062) 12,876 Borrowings 8,642 17,029 17,029 17,029 17,029
Other long-term liabilities 391 533 694 823 957
Ratio analysis Shareholders equity 77,915 102,195 78,638 72,576 85,452
Y/e 31 Mar, Consolidated FY24A FY25A FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii Total liabilities 86,948 119,757 96,362 90,429 103,439
Per share data (Rs)
Pre-exceptional EPS (10.6) (13.7) (9.4) (2.4) 5.2 Cash flow summary (Rs m)
DPS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Y/e 31 Mar, Consolidated FY24A FY25A FY26ii FY27ii FY28ii
BVPS 35.5 45.0 31.5 29.1 34.3 Ebit (26,286) (33,981) (25,673) (7,264) 11,197
Growth ratios (%) Tax paid 0 0 0 0 0
Revenues 36.1 35.4 36.7 27.1 21.6 Depreciation and amortization 4,206 6,123 9,364 10,575 11,253
Ebitda (48.4) 26.2 (41.5) (120.3) 578.0 Net working capital change 2,478 8,689 12,094 5,456 6,797
EPS (45.2) 29.4 (30.9) (74.3) (312.4) Other operating items (306) (117) 0 0 0
Profitability ratios (%) Operating cash flow before interest (19,908) (19,286) (4,215) 8,767 29,248
Ebitda margin (19.6) (18.3) (7.8) 1.3 7.0 Financial expense (714) (1,006) (1,500) (1,500) (1,500)
Ebit margin (23.4) (22.3) (12.3) (2.7) 3.5 Non-operating income 3,803 3,936 3,616 2,703 3,179
Tax rate 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Operating cash flow after interest (16,819) (16,356) (2,099) 9,969 30,926
Net profit margin (20.8) (20.5) (11.3) (2.3) 4.0 Capital expenditure (10,434) (20,350) (20,808) (13,219) (12,861)
Return ratios (%) Long-term investments 0 0 0 0 0
ROE (27.5) (34.5) (26.1) (8.0) 16.3 Others 0 0 0 0 0
ROIC ex goodwill 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Free cash flow (27,253) (36,707) (22,908) (3,250) 18,066
Solvency ratios (x) Equity raising 10,851 55,448 0 0 0
Net debt-equity (0.5) (0.5) (0.3) (0.3) (0.5) Borrowings 2,112 (1,830) 0 0 0
Net debt to Ebitda 1.8 1.8 1.6 (7.0) (1.8) Dividend 0 0 0 0 0
Interest coverage (36.8) (33.8) (17.1) (4.8) 7.5 Net chg in cash and equivalents (14,290) 16,912 (22,908) (3,250) 18,066
Source: Company data, IIFL Research Source: Company data, IIFL Research

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 Swiggy – BUY

Published in 2025, © IIFL Capital Services Limited (Formerly known as IIFL Securities Limited)

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 Swiggy – BUY

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SCORES/Exchange portal at https://scores.sebi.gov.in and for online dispute Resolution platform - Smart ODR- https://smartodr.in/login )

For any queries, feedback or assistance, please contact SEBI Office on Toll Free Helpline at 1800 22 7575 / 1800 266 7575.

Registration Details: Stock Broker SEBI Regn: INZ000164132(BSE/NSE/MCX/NCDEX), CDSL & NSDL SEBI Regn.: IN-DP-185-2016, PMS SEBI Regn. No. INP000002213, IA SEBI Regn. No.
INA000000623, RA SEBI Regn. No. INH000000248, Merchant Banking SEBI Regn. No. INM000010940, AMFI Regn. No. ARN - 47791

Key to our recommendation structure

BUY - Stock expected to give a return 10%+ more than average return on a debt instrument over a 1-year horizon.
SELL - Stock expected to give a return 10%+ below the average return on a debt instrument over a 1-year horizon.
Add - Stock expected to give a return 0-10% over the average return on a debt instrument over a 1-year horizon.
Reduce - Stock expected to give a return 0-10% below the average return on a debt instrument over a 1-year horizon.

Distribution of Ratings: Out of 308 stocks rated in the IIFL coverage universe, 156 have BUY ratings, 4 have SELL ratings, 104 have ADD ratings, 1 have NR ratings and 43 have REDUCE ratings

Price Target: Unless otherwise stated in the text of this report, target prices in this report are based on either a discounted cash flow valuation or comparison of valuation ratios with companies seen by the analyst as
comparable or a combination of the two methods. The result of this fundamental valuation is adjusted to reflect the analyst’s views on the likely course of investor sentiment. Whichever valuation method is used there
is a significant risk that the target price will not be achieved within the expected timeframe. Risk factors include unforeseen changes in competitive pressures or in the level of demand for the company’s products. Such
demand variations may result from changes in technology, in the overall level of economic activity or, in some cases, in fashion. Valuations may also be affected by changes in taxation, in exchange rates and, in certain
industries, in regulations. Investment in overseas markets and instruments such as ADRs can result in increased risk from factors such as exchange rates, exchange controls, taxation, and political and social conditions.
This discussion of valuation methods and risk factors is not comprehensive – further information is available upon request.

i. Investments in securities market are subject to market risks. Read all the related documents carefully before investing.
ii. Mutual Funds Investments are subject to market risk. Please read the offer and scheme related documents carefully before investing.
iii. Registration granted by SEBI, membership of BASL (in case of IAs) and certification from NISM in no way guarantee performance of the intermediary
or provide any assurance of returns to investors

ri sh i .j h u n j h u n wal a@ iifl ca p. c om 52