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[PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-13508
____________________

JOHN F. LABRIOLA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-23196-PCH
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-13508

Before ROSENBAUM, NEWSOM, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:
When John Labriola was a media aide for the Miami-Dade
Board of County Commissioners, he wrote an off-color opinion
piece for an online newsletter. As a result, the County suspended
him, ordered him to attend anti-discrimination training, and ulti-
mately fired him. In the district court, Labriola alleged that the
County retaliated against him for exercising his free-speech, free-
exercise, and free-press rights, compelled him to express ideas with
which he disagreed, and suspended him pursuant to an unconstitu-
tionally overbroad policy. The district court granted summary
judgment to the County on all counts. We affirm.
I
A
John Labriola was a media aide for the Miami-Dade Board
of County Commissioners. Labriola v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 693 F.
Supp. 3d 1284, 1287 (S.D. Fla. 2023). In his own name and on his
own time, Labriola wrote an opinion piece that criticized the
Equality Act, an as-yet-unenacted bill that would prohibit discrimi-
nation based on sex, sexual orientation, and gender identity. Id. at
1288. In his piece, Labriola used inflammatory language to de-
scribe the LGBT people whom the bill sought to protect. He
warned small-business owners “who resist surrendering their con-
sciences to the new ‘tranny tyranny’” that, if the bill was passed,
“[i]t’s going to be a choice of either baking that sodomy cake and
hiring the scary-looking, child-molesting tranny with a beard or
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23-13508 Opinion of the Court 3

being drowned in legal bills and driven out of business.” Opinion

Piece at 1, Dkt. No. 8-3. So too, Labriola warned local governments
of what was to come: “No conservative small town in the South
or Midwest will be safe from that weird study in perversity known
as Drag Queen Story Hour, in which public libraries host a heavily
made-up, flamboyant, homosexual pedophile in a dress who rolls
around on the floor with little children as he reads them stories
about gender fluidity and LGBT unicorns.” Id.
Soon after, in an email to staff members of the Board of
County Commissioners, a County citizen took issue with the opin-
ion piece and questioned whether Labriola’s views represented the
County’s. Labriola, 693 F. Supp. 3d at 1288. A County employee
forwarded that email to the Miami Herald, after which the paper
published an article describing the opinion piece as a “slur-laden
tirade against transgender people.” Id. (citation modified). At that
point, the County received a barrage of phone calls from con-
cerned residents. Id.
Labriola’s supervisor suspended him from work for three
days without pay and ordered him to schedule “training regarding
the County’s anti-discrimination policies” within seven days and to
complete that training within 30 days. According to the Discipli-
nary Action Report, Labriola’s supervisor’s employment decisions
were partially grounded in Miami-Dade Implementing Order 7-45,
an anti-discrimination policy that “prohibits all forms of discrimi-
nation and harassment.” Implementing Order at 1, Dkt. No. 8-15.
Thirty days came and went, and, despite three written reminders,
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-13508

Labriola never scheduled the training. Labriola, 693 F. Supp. 3d at

1288. For his failure to do so, he was terminated. Id. at 1289.
B
Labriola sued, challenging his termination on multiple First
Amendment grounds. First, he alleged that by suspending him and
ordering him to attend training on account of the opinion piece,
the County retaliated against him for engaging in activity protected
by the Free Speech, Free Press, and Free Exercise Clauses. Next, he
asserted that by terminating him on account of his failure to attend
the training, the County retaliated against him for refusing to un-
dergo compelled speech—the training, Labriola surmised, would
have required him to say things with which he disagreed. Labriola
also contended that his termination violated his rights under the
Free Exercise Clause, as “[h]e refused to undergo the extra training
out of his religious obligation to not (as he sees it) speak falsely
about human sexuality.” Am. Compl. ¶ 177, Dkt. No. 8. Finally,
Labriola alleged that the Implementing Order was unconstitution-
ally overbroad.
The district court granted summary judgment to the
County on all counts. It disposed of Labriola’s claims efficiently.
In one fell swoop, it granted summary judgment to the County on
all of Labriola’s free-speech, free-exercise, and compelled-speech
claims. Labriola, 693 F. Supp. 3d at 1291. Reasoning that the so-
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23-13508 Opinion of the Court 5

called Pickering-Connick test 1 applied to each of these claims—a

contention with which Labriola agrees, except as to his compelled-
speech claim—the district court applied that test to Labriola’s free-
speech claim, ruled that the claim failed at the test’s balancing step,
and concluded that his other claims likewise failed. Id. at 1290–91.
The court handled Labriola’s free-press claim differently, ruling
that, because Labriola “is not a journalist,” he couldn’t bring a free-
press claim. Id. at 1292. Finally, in its analysis of overbreadth, the
district court compared the Implementing Order to the policy at
issue in O’Laughlin v. Palm Beach County, 30 F.4th 1045 (11th Cir.
2022). Labriola, 693 F. Supp. 3d at 1291. Concluding that the Im-
plementing Order wasn’t as broad as the policy at issue there, the
district court granted summary judgment to the County. Id.
This is Labriola’s appeal. He presents four issues for our re-
view. First, he argues that his free-speech and free-exercise claims
survive the Pickering-Connick test. Second, he challenges the district
court’s holding that, as a non-journalist, he is ineligible to assert a
free-press claim. Third, he argues that the court should have ana-
lyzed his compelled-speech claim under Janus v. American Federation
of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, 585 U.S. 878
(2018), rather than the Pickering-Connick test. Fourth, he reiterates

1 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138
(1983).
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6 Opinion of the Court 23-13508

his contention that the Implementing Order is unconstitutionally

overbroad. We address his claims in turn.2
II
First up, Labriola’s free-speech and free-exercise claims.
These claims are rooted in the First Amendment—as incorporated
through the Fourteenth—which prohibits the government from
“mak[ing any] law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion];
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” U.S. Const.
amend. I. “[T]he law is well-established that the state may not de-
mote or discharge a public employee in retaliation for” exercising
his First Amendment rights. See Bryson v. City of Waycross, 888 F.2d
1562, 1565 (11th Cir. 1989). But a public employee’s First Amend-
ment rights are “not absolute.” Id. That’s because “the State’s in-
terest as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees dif-
fers significantly from those it possesses in connection with regula-
tion of the speech of the citizenry in general.” Cook v. Gwinnett
Cnty. Sch. Dist., 414 F.3d 1313, 1318 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation mod-
ified). To accommodate the dueling interests of employee and em-
ployer, we use a four-factor test derived from Pickering v. Board of
Education of Township High School District 205, 391 U.S. 563 (1968),
and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983):
To prevail [on a First Amendment claim], an em-
ployee must show that: (1) the speech involved a mat-
ter of public concern; (2) the employee’s free speech

2We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Anthony v. Georgia, 69

F.4th 796, 804 (11th Cir. 2023).
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23-13508 Opinion of the Court 7

interests outweighed the employer’s interest in effec-

tive and efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities; and
(3) the speech played a substantial part in the adverse
employment action. If an employee satisfies her bur-
den on the first three steps, the burden then shifts to
the employer [4] to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that it would have made the same decision
even in the absence of the protected speech.

Cook, 414 F.3d at 1318 (citation modified).

Labriola contends that the district court misapplied the Pick-
ering-Connick test to his free-speech and free-exercise claims.3 The
first step of that test requires us to evaluate whether Labriola’s
speech involved a matter of public concern. Cook, 414 F.3d at 1318.
Here, the parties agree that it did. See Labriola, 693 F. Supp. 3d at
1290. So we begin at the second step: whether Labriola’s free-
speech interests outweighed the County’s interest in effective and
efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities. Cook, 414 F.3d at 1318.

3 As already explained, see supra at 4–5, the district court applied the Pickering-
Connick test only to Labriola’s free-speech claim, ruled that this claim failed at
the test’s balancing step, and concluded that his free-exercise claim likewise
failed. Labriola, 693 F. Supp. 3d at 1290–91. On appeal, Labriola takes a similar
approach. In his brief, he argues at length about why his free-speech claim
survives Pickering-Connick, but he mentions his free-exercise claim only at the
very end of his analysis, in a footnote, which asserts that his free-exercise claim
succeeds because it, too, is “based on the Pickering-Connick Test.” Br. of Ap-
pellant at 35–36 n.20. We’ll follow suit and apply the Pickering-Connick test one
time—in its free-speech iteration—to assess both claims.
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8 Opinion of the Court 23-13508

And because Labriola fails at this second step, it’s also where our
analysis will end.
In order to balance Labriola’s free-speech interests against
the County’s efficiency interests, we must consider several factors,
including “(1) whether the speech at issue impedes the govern-
ment’s ability to perform its duties efficiently, (2) the manner, time
and place of the speech, and (3) the context within which the
speech was made.” Morales v. Stierheim, 848 F.2d 1145, 1149 (11th
Cir. 1988). Taken together, these factors defeat Labriola’s claim.
A
First, did Labriola’s speech impede the government’s ability
to perform its duties efficiently? The Supreme Court has “recog-
nized as pertinent considerations whether the statement impairs
discipline by superiors or harmony among co-workers, has a detri-
mental impact on close working relationships for which personal
loyalty and confidence are necessary, or impedes the performance
of the speaker’s duties or interferes with the regular operation of
the enterprise.” Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987).
There is evidence that the opinion piece “impair[ed] . . . har-
mony among co-workers.” See id. After one staff member read the
opinion piece, she told Labriola’s supervisor that she found it
“[v]ery upsetting” because “she was offended by the words he
used.” Vega Dep. 31:10–14, Dkt. No. 45-4. Other coworkers were
apparently shocked. Labriola’s supervisor stated, “I think people
just couldn’t believe it.” Id. at 33:2. Referring to one of Labriola’s
coworkers in particular, his supervisor recounted that “she knew
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23-13508 Opinion of the Court 9

John, and she said something like I can’t believe he would use those
offensive words.” Id. at 33:12–13.
The record also indicates that the opinion piece had “a det-
rimental impact on close working relationships for which personal
loyalty and confidence are necessary.” See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388.
Labriola’s supervisor testified that after she learned of the opinion
piece, she “kind of lost confidence in him.” Vega Dep. 37:12–13.
She elaborated: “[A]s my number [two], I would sometimes talk
to him about certain things that pertained to each office that, you
know, [we] kept to ourselves”—i.e., confidential things—“so I just
felt like I couldn’t speak to him freely about those things anymore
or get his opinion on certain things.” Id. at 37:15–20. Moreover,
she specified that it was because “the words that he used in the ar-
ticle were offensive to [her]” that she “couldn’t really speak to him
freely about things anymore.” Id. at 38:20–23.
Finally, there is ample evidence that the opinion piece “in-
terfere[d] with the regular operation of the enterprise.” See Rankin,
483 U.S. at 388. The piece “brought a lot more work” to the office,
in part because, following its publication, the office received “a lot
of phone calls.” Vega Dep. 29:20–21, 35:8–9. According to Labri-
ola’s supervisor, no other event had ever “caused such a large num-
ber of phone calls.” Id. at 39:10–14. Confirming this description,
the Chairman’s chief of staff testified that the calls “became such a
problem that it really prevented us from doing our day-to-day op-
erations during those days.” Lopez Dep. 75:5–7, Dkt. No. 45-15.
He continued: “[W]e had to refocus a lot of our attention from
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10 Opinion of the Court 23-13508

some of the legislative strategies that we had to dealing with the

damage control. . . . [W]e were put in a situation where we had to
reprioritize this issue with Mr. Labriola and completely step off
from other initiatives that we had . . . .” Id. at 75:13–25.
On the whole, the evidence indicates that the opinion piece
“impede[d] the government’s ability to perform its duties effi-
ciently.” See Morales, 848 F.2d at 1149. Had Labriola presented any
evidence to the contrary, there might have been a genuine issue of
material fact. But he didn’t, and so there isn’t.
B
Second, time, place, and manner. Labriola has time and place
in his favor: He was off-duty and away from work when he wrote
the opinion piece—a time and place at which his speech enjoys
greater constitutional protection. See Waters v. Chaffin, 684 F.2d
833, 837–38 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that a public employee had
“an interest in being free from unnecessary work-related re-
strictions while off-duty[,] . . . after he had left work, while he was
out of uniform, [and] while he was out of the department’s juris-
diction”).
But manner weighs heavily against him. “If the manner and
content of an employee’s speech is disrespectful, demeaning, rude,
and insulting, and is perceived that way in the workplace, the gov-
ernment employer is within its discretion to take disciplinary ac-
tion.” Mitchell v. Hillsborough Cnty., 468 F.3d 1276, 1288 (11th Cir.
2006) (citation modified). To put it mildly, the opinion piece was
“disrespectful, demeaning, rude, and insulting.” See id. And, based
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23-13508 Opinion of the Court 11

on the shock and appall of his coworkers, it was clearly perceived

that way at the office.
C
Third, context. Precedent in both the Supreme Court and
this Court has emphasized that the state possesses a greater interest
in controlling employee speech when it occurs in public, rather
than private. See Morales, 848 F.2d at 1150 (“While Morales’ poor
choice of words in criticizing [the Melrose Board’s chairman] might
be less significant in a private context, when spoken at the public
meetings of the Board these remarks impeded [his public em-
ployer]’s interests in Melrose.” (footnote omitted)); Rankin, 483
U.S. at 389 (“Nor was there any danger that McPherson had dis-
credited the office by making her statement in public.”); Waters,
684 F.2d at 838–39 (“We do not doubt that the department may
restrict the actions of its off-duty officers in many ways, but it does
not follow that these off-duty restrictions may unnecessarily im-
pinge upon private, social conversation.” (footnote omitted)). Lab-
riola disseminated his views through an opinion piece in a public,
online newsletter—as opposed to, say, a private conversation with
a friend. So “context” indicates that Labriola’s interest in his speech
is limited.
***
On balance, these factors make clear to us that the County’s
interest in effective and efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities
outweighs Labriola’s free-speech interests. Accordingly, we hold
that the County prevails at the second, balancing step of the
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12 Opinion of the Court 23-13508

Pickering-Connick test, and so we need go no further. We affirm the

district court’s judgment rejecting Labriola’s free-speech claim.
III
Labriola also challenges the district court’s holding that be-
cause he “is not a journalist,” he can’t bring a free-press claim. Lab-
riola, 693 F. Supp. 3d at 1292. Labriola is right that the district court
erred in so holding. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972)
(holding that “[f]reedom of the press is a fundamental personal
right which is not confined to newspapers and periodicals” (citation
modified)). Even so, his free-press claim fails on the merits.
Labriola’s only substantive argument is that “even if [his]
freedom of the press claim sinks or swims with his other First
Amendment claims (as the district court implies), it swims in this
case because the other First Amendment claims succeed.” Br. of
Appellant at 40 (footnote omitted). But as just explained, his free-
speech and free-exercise claims fail. Labriola might have offered
additional free-press arguments, separate from those underlying
his First Amendment arguments. But he didn’t, so his free-press
claim sinks along with them.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment reject-
ing Labriola’s free-press claim.
IV
Next, Labriola contends that the district court erred in re-
jecting his compelled-speech claim. In particular, Labriola takes is-
sue with the district court’s application of the Pickering-Connick test
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to his compelled-speech claim. The court, he insists, should have

applied Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees, Council 31, 585 U.S. 878 (2018). See Br. of Appellant at
37.
To Labriola’s credit, Janus did call Pickering a “poor fit” for
compelled-speech claims. 585 U.S. at 909. Ultimately, though, the
Court there held that the question whether “Pickering applies at all
to compelled speech” was “a question that [it would] not decide.”
Id. at 908. And most problematically for Labriola, Janus didn’t pur-
port to establish a new or different compelled-speech test for gov-
ernment employees. Instead, to reach its holding that the state’s
compulsion of speech was unconstitutional, it employed a modi-
fied version of the Pickering test. Id. at 909–916.
In the years since Janus, neither the Supreme Court nor this
Court has clarified what legal test governs public-employee com-
pelled-speech claims. Happily, we needn’t resolve that question
today because, as a threshold matter—and irrespective of the appli-
cable framework—we must first determine whether the record ev-
idence supports a finding that the County compelled Labriola to
speak. It doesn’t.
Labriola asserts that “there is a good possibility that in th[e]
[anti-discrimination] training session, the instructor would have
pressured or forced [him] to recant his views and/or to say things
that he disagrees with.” Br. of Appellant at 38. In particular, Lab-
riola suggests that the training would have compelled him to disa-
vow his opposition to “transgenderism, homosexual marriage, and
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14 Opinion of the Court 23-13508

Drag Queen Story Hours.” Id. But the record evidence under-
mines Labriola’s allegation. As part of his discipline, Labriola was
directed to attend a generic anti-discrimination training, whose ac-
companying presentation barely touched on LGBT-related topics.
The presentation mentioned such issues only twice: (1) by listing
“sexual orientation” and “gender identity or expression” as among
twelve “[p]rotected [c]lasses,” and (2) by including “LGBTQ Aware-
ness” as one of seven training modules available to—but not re-
quired of—County employees. Overview of the County’s Anti-
Discrimination Policy at 6, 24, Dkt. No. 1-20. Labriola offers no
evidence to the contrary—he relies solely on his conjecture that
there was a “good possibility” that he would have been made to say
something with which he disagreed. Even construed in the light
most favorable to him, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, his allegation is rank
speculation. And “[s]peculation does not create a genuine issue of
fact.” Cordoba v. Dillard’s, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005).
We accordingly affirm the district court’s judgment reject-
ing Labriola’s compelled-speech claim.
V
Finally, Labriola raises a facial overbreadth challenge to the
Implementing Order on which the County partially grounded its
employment decisions. 4 The policy, which applies to all County

4 Labriola purports to bring both facial and as-applied overbreadth claims. But
an overbreadth claim is never as-applied; it is, by its nature, a facial challenge.
See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008) (“According to our First
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23-13508 Opinion of the Court 15

employees, “prohibits all forms of discrimination and harassment.”

Implementing Order at 1. It defines “unlawful harassment” as “un-
welcome conduct based on a protected class where the conduct:
(1) [h]as the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile,
humiliating, or offensive working environment; (2) [h]as the pur-
pose or effect of unreasonably interfering with a person’s work per-
formance; or (3) [o]therwise adversely affects a person’s employ-
ment opportunities.” Id. at 3.
Labriola’s overbreadth claim fails at the gate. The Supreme
Court has held that in order to succeed on a facial overbreadth chal-
lenge, an “appellant must demonstrate from the text of [the law]
and from actual fact that a substantial number of instances exist in
which the [l]aw cannot be applied constitutionally.” New York State
Club Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 14 (1988). And where
the appellant hasn’t “describe[d] the instances of arguable over-
breadth of the contested law,” a court generally will “not apply the
strong medicine of overbreadth analysis.” Wash. State Grange v.
Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008) (citation
modified).
Here, Labriola hasn’t described the instances in which the
Implementing Order couldn’t be applied constitutionally. Accord-
ingly, we decline to administer the overbreadth doctrine’s “strong

Amendment overbreadth doctrine, a statute is facially invalid if it prohibits a

substantial amount of protected speech.” (emphasis added)).
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16 Opinion of the Court 23-13508

medicine.” We affirm the district court’s judgment rejecting Lab-

riola’s overbreadth claim.
VI
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s
grant of summary judgment to the County on all counts. 5

5 Labriola’s motion to strike portions of the County’s brief is DENIED.