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2023 SCC OnLine TS 2980

In the High Court of Telangana at Hyderabad

Reversed in Mahnoor Fatima Imran v. Visweswara Infrastructure (P)

Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1062
(BEFORE ALOK ARADHE, C.J. AND T. VINOD KUMAR, J.)

Visweswara Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. and Others …

Appellants;
Versus
Telangana State Industrial Infrastructure
Corporation Ltd. and Others … Respondents.
Writ Appeal No. 697 of 2023
Decided on August 24, 2023
Advocates who appeared in this case :
Counsel for the appellants : Mr. Harin Raval, Learned Senior Counsel
representing Mr. Chetluru Srinivas
Counsel for respondents No. 1 to 5 and 22 : Mr. Harender Pershad,
learned Senior Counsel and Special Government Pleader
Counsel for respondents No. 16 to 21 : Mr. Md. Nawaz Hyder Ali,
learned counsel for Pillix Law Firm
Counsel for respondents No. 6 & 7 : Mr. Shyam S. Agarwal
Counsel for respondents No. 8 and 9 : Mr. T. Rathnakar
Counsel for respondents No. 10 to 15 and 31 to 35 : Mr. E. Ajay
Reddy, learned Senior Counsel representing, Ms. E. Anisha Reddy
Counsel for respondents No. 23 to 26 : Mr. K. Durga Prasad
Counsel for respondents No. 28, 29 and 30 : Mr. K. Ratnam, learned
counsel representing Mr. K. Raghava Charyulu
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
ALOK ARADHE, C.J.:— This intra-court appeal is filed against
common order dated 28.04.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge
by which three writ petitions have been dismissed. However, challenge
in this appeal is confined to order of the learned Single Judge insofar it
pertains to writ petition No. 30855 of 2016 filed by the appellants,
which has also been dismissed. In order to appreciate the appellants'
challenge to the impugned order, relevant facts need mention which
are stated infra:
(i) FACTS : -
2. Eleven pattedars held the land measuring 525.39 acres situated
at Raidurg Village, Serilingampally Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. The
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Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act,

1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Agricultural Ceiling Act’) came into
force on 01.01.1975, which prescribed a ceiling limit on agricultural
lands. A proceeding under the Agricultural Ceiling Act was initiated in
respect of entire land in survey No. 83 measuring 525.39 acres situated
at Raidurg Village, Serilingampally Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. The
Land Reforms Tribunal passed a common order dated 02.06.1976 and
declared the land measuring 27.27 acres in survey No. 83 to be surplus
agricultural land. Thereafter, by another common order dated
16.06.1976, the Land Reforms Tribunal declared land measuring 71.20
acres in survey No. 83 to be surplus land. Thus, out of survey No. 83,
only measuring 99.07 acres was declared as surplus land.
3. The possession of the aforesaid land which was declared as
surplus agricultural land to the extent of 99.07 acres in survey No. 83
was taken on 23.11.1976 by the State Government. The Parliament in
pursuance of resolutions passed by various State Legislatures including
erstwhile State of Andhra Pradesh enacted Urban Land (Ceiling and
Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Urban Land
Ceiling Act’). In the aforesaid Act, the appointed date as defined under
Section 2(a) means the date of introduction of the Urban Land Ceiling
Act in the Parliament which is 15th of January, 1976. The aforesaid Act
became applicable to the State of Andhra Pradesh on 17.02.1976. A
Bench of this Court vide Judgment dated 13.10.1977 in W.P. No. 17077
of 1977 inter alia held that provisions of the Agricultural Ceiling Act are
not applicable to vacant lands situated within the urban agglomeration.
The lands comprised in survey No. 83 were situated within the urban
agglomeration of city of Hyderabad and therefore, the holders of land
were required to file statement under Section 6(1) of the Urban Land
Ceiling Act. Thereupon, the proceedings under the Urban Land Ceiling
Act were initiated to determine the excess land.
4. The competent authority in exercise of powers under Section 8(4)
of the Urban Land Ceiling Act issued separate final statements on
06.12.1979 and declared lands measuring 470.33 acres to be excess
vacant land under the Urban Land Ceiling Act. Thereafter, notification
under Section 10(1) of the Urban Land Ceiling Act was issued on
16.01.1980 in respect of land measuring 470.33 acres, which was
followed by a notification dated 24.01.1981 under Section 10(3) of the
Urban Land Ceiling Act notifying that land measuring 18,94,473 square
meters (468.234 acres) by which the land vested absolutely in the
State Government. The notice under Section 10(5) of the Urban Land
Ceiling Act was issued on 26.02.1981 on the general power of attorney
(GPA) holder by which he was asked to deliver possession of the land to
the extent of 468.234 acres.
5. It appears that GPA holder submitted an application before the
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Land Reforms Tribunal in view of the decision of a Bench of this Court

dated 13.10.1977 in W.P. No. 17077 of 1977. The aforesaid application
was rejected by the Land Reforms Tribunal by an order dated
19.04.1982. The said order of the Land Reforms Tribunal was
challenged in an appeal before the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal.
The Appellate Tribunal by an order dated 22.09.1984 held that
possession of the surplus land declared under Agricultural Ceiling Act
was taken on 23.11.1976 ex parte. It was further held that there is no
material to hold that the land in survey No. 83 measuring 468.234
acres is to be treated as vacant land under the Urban Land Ceiling Act.
The matter was, therefore, remitted to the Land Reforms Tribunal to
consider whether the lands measuring 468.234 acres in survey No. 83
are vacant lands within the purview of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, after
affording an opportunity of hearing to the appellants.
6. Pursuant to the order of remand, the Land Reforms Tribunal by an
order dated 10.11.1987 held that the land measuring 99.07 acres in
survey No. 83 which was notionally referred to as survey No. 83/2 was
directed to be reverted with a request to the Revenue Divisional Officer
to hand over the possession to the GPA holder of the land owners. In
compliance of the said order, on 25.04.1990, possession of land
measuring 99.07 acres was handed over to the GPA holder. A sketch of
boundary of the land was also drawn which was annexed to
Panchanama and Form XI-A i.e., the Certificate of Delivery was issued
under the signature of the officer delivering the possession. Thereafter,
a certificate was issued on 22.12.1990 by the Mandal Revenue Officer
certifying that land measuring 99.07 acres was released from the
government custody.
7. The proceedings were initiated in respect of land in survey No. 83
under the Urban Land Ceiling Act subsequently. The Deputy Tahsildar
and the Enquiry Officer under the Urban Land Ceiling Act purported to
take possession of land measuring 424.38 acres on 20.07.1993, which
was declared as excess vacant land. A Division Bench of this Court in
W.A. No. 1220 of 1994 by placing reliance on a decision of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Atia Mohammadi Begum v. State of Uttar Pradesh1
held that the land in question was not vacant land on the date of
commencement of the Act. The authorities, therefore, could not convert
the said land into vacant land by unilaterally including it in a Master
Plan, for purposes other than agriculture. Accordingly, initiation of
proceedings under the Urban Land Ceiling Act was declared null and
void.
8. The State Government filed a civil suit namely O.S. No. 71 of
2001 in which a declaration was sought that the entire land measuring
526.07 acres of survey No. 83 belongs to the State Government. The
aforesaid civil suit was decreed vide the Judgment and decree dated
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03.07.2001. The said judgment and degree was challenged in an

Appeal namely A.S. No. 1475 of 2003. A Bench of Andhra Pradesh High
Court, vide the judgment dated 27.09.2006, allowed the aforesaid
appeal and dismissed the suit preferred by the State Government. The
aforesaid order dated 27.09.2006 was affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court vide the order dated 11.04.2008 passed in S.L.P. (Civil) CC No.
5221-5223 of 2008.
9. The appellants purchased land measuring 53.00 acres as of
survey No. 83 situated at Raidurg Village, Serilingampally Mandal,
Ranga Reddy District (hereinafter referred to as subject land) vide
seven registered sale deeds executed between 06.06.2008 to
15.12.2008. The appellants filed the writ petition in the year 2011,
namely W.P. No. 29547 of 2011 against Lokayukta and four other
respondents, namely Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as ‘APIIC’) and the Revenue
Authorities, which were arrayed in the writ petition as respondents No.
3 to 5. In the writ petition, direction was sought not to disturb the
physical possession of the appellants in respect of the subject land. A
common order was passed by a Division Bench of this Court on
22.01.2011 directing Lokayukta not to pass any orders till hearing of
the matter. However, the State Government or APIIC were granted
liberty to carry on their duties in respect of the subject land in
accordance with law. The aforesaid interim order is still in force.
10. The appellants thereupon filed another writ petition, namely
W.P. No. 4466 of 2012 inter alia on the ground that despite the
aforesaid interim order dated 22.01.2011 passed by a Division Bench of
this Court, the officers of APIIC were illegally trying to interfere with
the possession of the appellants over the land in survey No. 83/2.
Thereupon, an interim order dated 17.02.2012 was passed restraining
the respondents herein including the officers of the APIIC from
demolishing the structures raised by the appellants including the
fencing sheets on survey No. 83/2. The aforesaid interim order is still in
force.
11. Despite pendency of the aforesaid two writ petitions, namely
W.P. No. 29547 of 2011 and W.P. No. 4466 of 2012 and
notwithstanding the fact that the interim orders dated 22.11.2011 and
17.02.2012 were operative against the APIIC, which after
reorganization of the State became TSIIC, its officers tried to interfere
with the possession of the appellants in respect of the subject land on
12.09.2016. The appellants thereupon filed a writ petition namely W.P.
No. 30855 of 2016 in which a prayer was made to declare the action of
the officers of TSIIC in attempting to enter into the subject land of the
appellants and in trying to demolish the fencing without notice and
without any authority of law as illegal and void. The appellants in
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addition sought relief against the officers of the TSIIC not to demolish
the structures raised by the appellants and not to remove the fencing
blue sheets.
(ii) ORDER OF LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE : -
12. The aforesaid writ petition along with two other writ petitions
were dismissed by the learned Single Judge by a common order dated
28.04.2023. The learned Single Judge inter alia held as follows:
(i) The appellants have not filed the registered sale deeds executed
in their favour whereas the same have been filed by respondents
No. 6 to 11.
(ii) The vendor of the appellants, namely Bhavana Cooperative
Society had agreement for sale dated 19.03.1982 in its favour
which was validated by the Assistant Registrar on 19.06.2006.
(iii) The vendor of the appellants, namely Bhavana Cooperative
Society did not have a registered sale deed in its favour.
(iv) The suit for specific performance filed by the appellants was
dismissed for default on 06.04.2001 and the application for
restoration filed under Order IX Rule 9 of Civil Procedure Code,
1908 (CPC) was also dismissed on 23.02.2004. The appellants
neither took any action to challenge the enquiry report dated
12.08.2015 submitted by the Deputy Registrar nor challenged any
action of cancellation of No Objection Certificate by the authorities
under the ULC.
(v) The appellants have miserably failed to discharge their burden,
despite serious objections by the State and private respondents
and fraudulent actions of the appellants are writ large from the
face of the record. The appellants have neither chosen to file the
said documents nor have disclosed the validation certificate which
was obtained fraudulently. The appellants have failed to disclose
the factum of dismissal of suit of specific performance, namely
O.S. No. 248 of 1991. Therefore, the appellants are guilty of
suppression of vital information and the writ petition filed by the
appellants lacks bona fides.
13. In the aforesaid factual background, this present writ appeal has
been filed.
(iii) SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS : -
14. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants submitted that the
grievance of the appellants in this intra-court appeal is confined to
53.00 acres of land bearing survey No. 83/2. It is further submitted
that possession of land measuring 99.07 acres of surplus land was
handed over to the GPA holder on 25.04.1990. The aforesaid order
directing handing over of the possession and the panchanama by which
possession was delivered to the GPA holder of land owners, is not under
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challenge. It is also submitted that appellants have purchased land

admeasuring 53.00 acres out of 99.07 acres of which the possession
was handed over to GPA holder. It is contended that despite interim
orders dated 22.01.2011 and 17.02.2012 passed in W.P. No. 29547 of
2011 and W.P. No. 4466 of 2012, the officers of TSIIC are trying to
interfere with the peaceful possession of the appellants over the subject
land and are trying to demolish the structure as well as blue sheets.
15. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants further contended that
no order has been passed by any Court or forum directing the
appellants to hand over the possession. While inviting the attention of
this Court to the prayer made in the writ petition, it is urged that
learned Single Judge grossly erred in travelling beyond the scope of the
writ petition and in deciding the question of title of the appellants. It is
submitted that the enquiry report dated 12.08.2015 was prepared by
the Deputy Registrar behind the back of the appellants and on the basis
of an enquiry report, it could not be held that the appellants have no
title in respect of the subject land. It is further submitted that in the
enquiry report dated 12.08.2015 itself, the District Registrar has stated
that private respondents have to take recourse to cancellation of sale
deeds executed in favour of the appellants.
16. It is contended that objection with regard to the title of the
appellants have to be raised in an appropriate proceeding. It is further
contended that the learned Single Judge grossly erred in adjudicating
the title of the appellants and private respondents No. 10 to 15 and No.
31 to 35 in the writ petition. Our attention has been invited to the
statement of learned Advocate General in W.P. No. 30855 of 2016
wherein learned Advocate General had stated that the Government is
going to protect 470 acres of land by way of fencing. It is also
contended that the appellants were in possession of the subject land,
and they can be dispossessed only in accordance with law. In support
of his submissions, reliance has been placed on the decision of the
2
Hon'ble Supreme Court in East India Hotels Limited v. Syndicate Bank
and Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu3.
17. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants stated that the
appellants are not claiming any interest in respect of land measuring
470.33 acres comprised in survey No. 83/1 which has been allotted to
TSIIC vide the Government Orders dated 13.02.2006 and 02.09.2008.
(iv) SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS No. 1 to 5 AND
22 : -
18. Learned counsel for the respondents No. 1 to 5 and 22 submits
that interest of the aforesaid respondents in respect of land measuring
470.33 acres in survey No. 83/1 be protected.
(v) SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS No. 10 to 15
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AND 31 TO 35 : -
19. On the other hand, learned Senior Counsel for respondents No.
10 to 15 and 31 to 35 submitted that the appellants have neither any
title in respect of the land in question nor any cause of action to file the
writ petition. It is pointed out that the aforesaid respondents have filed
the revenue records for the past 73 years to show that private
respondents are the owners of the land measuring 99.07 acres in
survey No. 83/2. It is further submitted that vendor of the appellants
namely, a society claims title under an unregistered agreement of sale,
which did not culminate into sale deed. It is also submitted that an
agreement for sale cannot create/confer any title. It is argued that
since the vendor of the appellants did not have a title in respect of the
subject land, it could not have conveyed any title to the appellants.
20. While inviting the attention of this Court, the findings contained
in paragraphs 28 to 33 of the common order dated 28.04.2023 passed
by the learned Single Judge, it is contended that the learned Single
Judge has not declared title of appellants and has recorded the findings
only to ascertain the locus of the appellants. It is further contended
that the appellants have miserably failed to prove their prima facie title.
21. It is also contended that a frivolous writ petition was filed by the
appellants and sale deeds executed in favour of the appellants are void
and therefore, under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, they
have the liberty to challenge the void document. It is submitted that
since the appellants had approached the Court, they were under the
obligation to prove their prima facie case. It is further submitted that
the appellants ought to have disclosed all the relevant facts before this
Court, therefore, for this reason also, the writ appeal deserves to be
dismissed. In support of the aforesaid submissions, reliance has been
placed on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Suraj Lamp
and Industries Private Limited v. State of Haryana4, Balwant Vithal
5
Kadam v. Sunil Baburaoi Kadam , State of Telangana v. P. Balabhaksar
Reddy6, Bajranglal Shivchandrai Ruia v. Shashikant N. Ruia7 and
8
Kishore Samrite v. State of Uttar Pradesh .
(vi) SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS No. 23 to 26, 6
AND 7, 8, 9, 28 to 30 : -
22. Learned counsel for respondents No. 23 to 26 as well as
respondents No. 6 and 7, learned counsel for respondents No. 16 to 21,
learned counsel for respondents No. 8, 9, 28, 29 and 30 and learned
counsel respondent No. 27 have adopted the submissions made by
learned Senior Counsel for respondents No. 10 to 15 and 31 to 35.
(vii) REJOINDER : -
23. By way of rejoinder/reply, learned Senior Counsel for the
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appellants has invited the attention of this Court to paragraph 38 of the

common order passed by the learned Single Judge and has submitted
that the learned Single Judge has concluded that the appellants have
no title in respect of the subject land. It is further submitted that in
paragraph 8 of the writ petition, i.e., W.P. No. 30855 of 2016, the
appellants have specifically pleaded the cause of action and aforesaid
averments have not been denied by the official respondents. Learned
Senior Counsel has also invited the attention of this Court to the
photographs filed along with the paper book in support of his
submission that the appellants have raised the structures and
constructed the fencing.
(viii) ANALYSIS:
24. We have considered the rival submissions made on behalf of
both the parties and perused the record. At the outset, we clarify that
the dispute in this intra-court appeal is confined to 53 acres of land
bearing survey No. 83/2 in view of the submission made by learned
Senior Counsel for the appellants as recorded in paragraph 16 of this
Order as well as the statement made by the learned Advocate General
in W.P. No. 30855 of 2016, which reads as under:
“The learned Advocate General submitted that they are going to
protect their 470 acres of land by way of fencing.”
25. The issues arise for consideration in this Appeal can be
summarised as under:
(i) Whether the learned Single Judge could have decided the title of
the appellants in a writ petition?
(ii) Whether a person in possession can be dispossessed except in
accordance with law? and
(iii) Whether the Court can deny relief to a party on a ground not
pleaded by it?
26. We shall now proceed to deal with the issues ad-seriatim:—
(i) Whether the learned Single Judge could have decided the
title of the appellants in a writ petition?
27. We may now advert to the first issue, namely, whether the
learned Single Judge could have decided the title of the appellants in a
writ petition.
28. A Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in Sohan Lal v. Union of
India9, while dealing with the question of title, held that civil suit is an
appropriate remedy rather than approaching the Court under Article
226 of the Constitution of India for exercising prerogative of writs.
Paragraphs 5 and 6 are relevant and are extracted as under:
5. We do not propose to enquire into the merits of the rival claims
of title to the property in dispute set up by the appellant and Jagan
Nath. If we were to do so, we would be entering into a field of
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investigation which is more appropriate for a civil court in a properly

constituted suit to do rather than for a Court exercising the
prerogative of issuing writs. There are questions of fact and law
which are in dispute requiring determination before the respective
claims of the parties to this appeal can be decided. Before the
property in dispute can be restored to Jagan Nath it will be
necessary to declare that he had title in that property and was
entitled to recover possession of it. This would in effect amount to
passing a decree in his favour. In the circumstances to be mentioned
hereafter, it is a matter for serious consideration whether in
proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution such a declaration
ought to be made and restoration of the property to Jagan Nath be
ordered.
6. Jagan Nath had entered into a transaction with the Union of
India up to a certain stage with respect to the property in dispute,
but no letter of allotment had been issued to him. Indeed, he had
been informed, when certain facts became known, that the property
in question could not be allotted to him as he was a displaced person
who had been allotted land in East Punjab. As between Jagan Nath
and the Union of India it will be necessary to decide what rights were
acquired by the former in the property up to the stage when the
latter informed Jagan Nath that the property would not be allotted to
him. Another question for decision will be whether Jagan Nath was
allowed to enter into possession of the property because it was
allotted to him or under a misapprehension as the Union of India was
misled by the contents of his application. The case of the Union of
India is that under the scheme Jagan Nath was not eligible for
allotment of a house in West Patel Nagar, as it was subsequently
discovered that he had been allotted, previous to his application,
agricultural land in the District of Hissar. Being satisfied that Jagan
Nath was not eligible for allotment, the Union of India refused to
allot to him the tenement No. 35, West Patel Nagar and allotment of
that house was made to the appellant who was found to be eligible
in every way. The appellant was accordingly given possession of the
property after Jagan Nath's eviction. The appellant had complied
with all the conditions imposed by the Union of India and a letter of
allotment was actually issued to him and he entered into possession
of the property in dispute under the authority of the Union of India.
Did the appellant thereby acquire a legal right to hold the property
as against Jagan Nath? In our opinion, all these questions should be
decided in a properly constituted suit in a civil court rather than in
proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution.
10
29. In Thansingh Nathmal v. Superintendent of Taxes, Dhubri , the
Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the nature of jurisdiction exercised by
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the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and held
in paragraph 7 as under:
7. … … … The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of
the Constitution is couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is
not subject to any restrictions except the territorial restrictions which
are expressly provided in the Articles. But the exercise of the
jurisdiction is discretionary : it is not exercised merely because it is
lawful to do so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that
it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain self-imposed
limitations. Resort that jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative
remedy for relief which may be obtained in a suit or other mode
prescribed by statute. Ordinarily the Court will not entertain a
petition for a writ under Article 226, where the petitioner has an
alternative remedy, which without being unduly onerous, provides an
equally efficacious remedy. Again the High Court does not generally
enter upon a determination of questions which demand an elaborate
examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce which the
writ is claimed. The High Court does not therefore act as a court of
appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal, to correct errors of
fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under Article 226 trench
upon an alternative remedy provided by statute for obtaining relief.
Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another
tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in
the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not
permit by entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution the machinery created under the statute to be
bypassed, and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the
machinery so set up.
30. In State of Rajasthan v. Bhawani Singh11, Hon'ble Supreme
Court once again held that a writ court cannot go into the disputed
questions of title of a property. Similar view was expressed in Mohan
12
Pandey v. Usha Rani Rajgaria in paragraph 6, which is extracted as
under:
6. … … … It has repeatedly been held by this Court as also by
various High Courts that a regular suit is the appropriate remedy for
settlement of disputes relating to property rights between private
persons and that the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution
shall not be available except where violation of some statutory duty
on the part of a statutory authority is alleged. And in such a case,
the Court will issue appropriate direction to the authority concerned.
If the real grievance of the respondent is against the initiation of
criminal proceedings, and the orders passed and steps taken
thereon, she must avail of the remedy under the general law
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including the Criminal Procedure Code. The High Court cannot allow
the constitutional jurisdiction to be used for deciding disputes, for
which remedies, under the general law, civil or criminal, are
available. It is not intended to replace the ordinary remedies by way
of a suit or application available to a litigant. The jurisdiction is
special and extraordinary and should not be exercised casually or
lightly.
13
31. In Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil , the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a proceeding under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India is not an appropriate remedy for adjudication of
property disputes or disputes relating to title. It was further held that a
regular suit is the proper remedy between private persons and
jurisdiction under Article 226 is extraordinary in nature and is not
meant for such issues unless there is violation of some statutory duty
on the part of some statutory authority or any infraction of statute or it
can be shown that a private individual is acting in collusion with a
statutory authority.
14
32. In Roshina T. v. Abdul Azeez K.T. , it was held that a regular
suit is the appropriate remedy for settlement of disputes relating to
property rights between the private persons. It was held in paragraphs
14 and 17 as under:
14. It has been consistently held by this Court that a regular suit
is the appropriate remedy for settlement of the disputes relating to
property rights between the private persons. The remedy under
Article 226 of the Constitution shall not be available except where
violation of some statutory duty on the part of statutory authority is
alleged. In such cases, the Court has jurisdiction to issue appropriate
directions to the authority concerned. It is held that the High Court
cannot allow its constitutional jurisdiction to be used for deciding
disputes, for which remedies under the general law, civil or criminal
are available. This Court has held that it is not intended to replace
the ordinary remedies by way of a civil suit or application available to
an aggrieved person. The jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution being special and extraordinary, it should not be
exercised casually or lightly on mere asking by the litigant. (See
Mohan Pandey v. Usha Rani Rajgaria [Mohan Pandey v. Usha Rani
Rajgaria, (1992) 4 SCC 61] and Dwarka Prasad Agarwal v. B.D.
Agarwal [Dwarka Prasad Agarwal v. B.D. Agarwal, (2003) 6 SCC
230].)
17. In our opinion, the High Court, therefore, while so directing
exceeded its extraordinary jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 of
the Constitution. Indeed, the High Court in granting such relief, had
virtually converted the writ petition into a civil suit and itself to a
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civil court. In our view, it was not permissible.

33. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court, it is evident that the question of title of a party cannot
be gone into in a writ petition.
34. In the instant case, the order of the Tribunal had attained
finality in respect of lad measuring 99.07 acres and the possession of
the land was also given to power of attorney holders of the land owners.
The aforesaid order of the Tribunal directing delivery of possession to
power of attorney holders of the land owners was not assailed by
anyone. The appellants' case is that they have purchased the subject
land out of 99.07 acres vide registered sale deeds. It is also pertinent
to mention herein that the aforesaid sale deeds have not been assailed
by anyone before any of the forums.
35. Therefore, in our considered opinion, the learned Single Judge on
the basis of averments made by the private respondents in their
counter with regard to title of the appellants erred in adjudicating the
question of title in a summary proceedings under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India which is not permissible, in view of the two
Constitution Bench decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sohan Lal
(supra) and Thansingh Nathmal (supra) and in view of the subsequent
decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court referred supra.
36. Therefore, we answer the first issue, namely whether the learned
Single Judge could have decided the title of the appellants in a writ
petition in the negative by stating that the learned Single Judge could
not have adjudicated the title of the appellants in a writ petition.
(ii) Whether a person in possession can be dispossessed except
in accordance with law?
37. We may now advert to the second issue, namely, whether a
person in possession can be dispossessed except in accordance with
law.
38. It is trite law that person in possession cannot be dispossessed
except in accordance with law. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Yeshwant
Singh v. Jagdish Singh15 in paragraph 10 quoted with approval the
decision of Privy Council in Midnapur Zamindary Company Limited v.
16
Naresh Narayan Roy and held that “in India persons are not permitted
to take forcible possession; they must obtain such possession as they
are entitled to through a court”.
39. Similarly, in paragraph 12 of the judgment, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court referred to the decision of the Allahabad High Court in
17
Yar Mohammad v. Lakshmi Das and held as under:
“Law respects possession even if there is no title to support it. It
will not permit any person to take the law in his own hands and to
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dispossess a person in actual possession without having recourse to

a court. No person can be allowed to become a judge in his own
cause.”
40. The decision in Yeshwant Singh (supra) was approved by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in ITC Limited v. Adarsh Cooperative Housing
18
Society Limited .
41. In the instant case, a writ petition namely W.P. No. 29547 of
2011 was filed by the appellants against Lokayukta and four other
respondents seeking a direction to APIIC and revenue authorities who
were arrayed as respondents No. 2 to 5 in the writ petition not to
interfere with the peaceful possession of the appellants in respect of the
subject land. An interim order dated 01.03.2011 was passed by a
Division Bench of this Court, which is extracted as under:
“We have seen the interim order dated 22.11.2011, it reads as
follows:
“In the meantime, the Lokayukta is directed not to pass any
orders till the hearing of this matter”.
While there is an interim injunction against the Lokayukta from
proceeding further in the matter, there is no order restraining the
State Government or APIIC Limited from carrying on their duties.
Under the circumstances, the State Government or APIIC
Limited are free to carry on their duties in respect of the subject
land in accordance with law.”
42. The aforesaid common order is still in force.
43. Thereafter, the appellants filed another writ petition namely W.P.
No. 4466 of 2012 inter alia on the ground that despite the interim order
passed by the Division Bench of this Court on 22.01.2011, officers of
APIIC were trying to interfere with the possession of the appellants
over the subject land in survey No. 83/2. Thereupon, an interim order
dated 17.02.2012 was passed restraining the respondents herein
including the officers of APIIC from demolishing structures including
the fencing sheets on survey No. 83/2. The aforesaid interim order is
extracted as under:
“There shall be interim stay of demolition of the structures raised
by the petitioners including the fencing sheets in Sy. No. 83/2 of
Raidurg Panmakta Village, Serilingampally Mandal, Ranga Reddy
District.”
44. The said interim order is still in force.
45. However, despite the well settled legal position that a person in
possession cannot be dispossessed except in accordance with law and
notwithstanding the fact that the aforesaid interim orders were
operating against APIIC and its officers again interfered with the
possession of the appellants over the subject land, without any
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authority of law, as pleaded in paragraph 8 of the writ petition by

visiting the subject land on 11.09.2016 in early hours at about 5.00 am
and unauthorisedly removed the temporary blue sheet fencing partially
and tried to forcibly dispossess the appellants. The aforesaid action of
the authorities of APIIC along with respondent No. 3, namely Tahsildar
is not supported by any statutory provision. Therefore, the action of the
respondents in trying to dispossess the appellants and demolish their
structures despite subsisting interim orders dated 01.03.2011 and
dated 17.02.2012 passed by this Court and in violation of law laid down
in Yeshwant Singh (supra) is not permissible course of action in law.
The appellants can be dispossessed from the subject land only in
accordance with law. Therefore, the learned Single Judge ought to have
appreciated that the appellants are entitled to relief sought for in the
writ petition in respect of their dispossession from the subject land.
46. Therefore, we answer the second issue namely, whether a person
in possession can be dispossessed except in accordance with law by
stating that a person in possession cannot be dispossessed except in
accordance with law.
(iii) Whether the Court can deny relief to a party on a ground not
pleaded by it?
47. We may now advert to the third issue, namely whether the Court
can deny relief to a party on a ground not pleaded by it.
19
48. In V.K. Majotra v. Union of India , the Hon'ble Supreme Court
did not approve the action of the High Court in issuing a direction
beyond the pleadings or the points raised by the parties during the
course of arguments. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of West
Bengal v. West Bengal Registration Copywriters Association20 did not
approve the order of the High Court which travelled much beyond the
pleadings.
49. In State of Himachal Pradesh v. Himachal Pradesh Nizi Vyaysayik
Prishikshan Kendra Sangh21, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down the
procedure in case of grant of relief beyond the prayer and held that the
Court should first allow the writ petitioner to amend so as to include the
relief sought to be given and then afford opportunity to all to put forth
their stand on the issued.
50. In Union of India v. Dinesh Prasad22, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
held that no relief to a party can be granted on the grounds not taken
in the writ petition as it is not permissible for the Court to grant the
relief beyond pleadings.
51. In Akella Lalitha v. Konda Hanumantha Rao23, while dealing with
a special leave petition based on child custody matter under the family
law, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 held as
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under:
16. … … … It is settled law that relief not found on pleadings
should not be granted. If a Court considers or grants a relief for
which no prayer or pleading was made depriving the respondent of
an opportunity to oppose or resist such relief, it would lead to
miscarriage of justice.
17.In the case of Trojan & Co. Ltd. v. Rm.N.N. Nagappa Chettiar
((1953) 1 SCC 456 : AIR 1953 SC 235), this Court considered the
issue as to whether relief not asked for by a party could be granted
and that too without having proper pleadings. The Court held as
under:—
“It is well settled that the decision of a case cannot be based
on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties and it is the case
pleaded that has to be found. Without an amendment of the
plaint, the Court was not entitled to grant the relief not asked for
and no prayer was ever made to amend the plaint so as to
incorporate in it an alternative case.”
18.In the case of Bharat Amratlal Kothari v. Dosukhan
Samadkhan Sindhi ((2010) 1 SCC 234) held:
“Though the Court has very wide discretion in granting relief,
the Court, however, cannot, ignoring and keeping aside the norms
and principles governing grant of relief, grant a relief not even
prayed for by the petitioner.”
52. In view of the aforesaid decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is
evident that it is not permissible for a Court to grant the relief which is
not even prayed for by the petitioner in the writ petition. Thus, the
Court dealing with a writ petition has to bear in mind the prayer made
by the petitioner in the case.
53. In Akella Lalitha (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
paragraph 17 referred to the decision in Trojan and Company v.
24
Rm.N.N. Nagappa Chettiar with approval and has held that “it is well
settled that the decision of a case cannot be based on the grounds
outside the pleadings of the parties and it is the case pleaded that has
to be found”. The aforesaid principles laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court for granting relief, in our opinion would apply with equal
vigour to denial of a relief to a party on a ground not pleaded by it.
54. In view of the aforesaid legal principles, we may advert to the
averments made in the writ petition. The appellants in paragraph 4 of
the writ petition have averred that they had purchased the subject land
and have been in continuous possession and in enjoyment of the
property. Paragraphs 4 to 14 are reproduced for the facility of
reference:
4. It is submitted that having purchased the lands, the petitioners
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are in continuous possession and enjoyment of the property since

the date of purchase without interference from anybody else. The
petitioners have constructed temporary shed rooms (3) 10″ × 12″
for the purpose of security personnel and also for keeping the
construction material like cement bags. It is submitted that the
petitioners have also fenced its property after purchasing the same
and within the fenced area the constructions are made and the
petitioners are making plans for the development of the property. It
is further submitted that the petitioners are exclusive owners and
possessors of the property.
5. It is further submitted that when the Hon'ble Lokayukta has
passed series of orders, at the instance of Andhra Pradesh Industrial
Infrastructure Corporation, the petitioners herein filed W.P. No.
29547 of 2011 questioning the orders of the Hon'ble Lokayukta.
Under the orders dated 01.08.2011, this Hon'ble Court was pleased
to pass the following order (relevant portion):
“While there is an interim injunction against the Lokayukta
from proceeding further in the matter, there is no order
restraining the State Government or APIIC Limited from carrying
on their duties.
Under the circumstances, the State Government or APIIC
Limited are free to carry on their duties in respect of the subject
land in accordance with law.”
6. It is respectfully submitted that when there was an
apprehension of interference without due process of law from
respondents No. 2 to 4, the petitioner No. 1 herein filed W.P. No.
4466 of 2012. This Hon'ble Court was pleased to pass the following
order (operative portion) on 17.02.2022:
“There shall be interim stay of demolition of the structures
raised by the petitioners including the fencing sheets in Sy. No.
83/2 of Raidurg Panmakta Village, Serilingampally Mandal, Ranga
Reddy District.”
7. It is submitted that such interim orders were extended from
time to time and ultimately by way of order dated 16.04.2012 the
interim orders passed earlier by this Hon'ble court was directed to be
continued till further orders. The orders are still in force and the writ
petition is pending.
8. It is further submitted that both the orders are in the
knowledge of the respondent No. 1. Without reference to the orders
passed by this Hon'ble Court, on 11.09.2016 in the early hours at
about 5 a.m., the officials of the respondent No. 1 along with the 3rd
respondent, Serilingampalle Mandal came to the land of the
petitioners unauthorisedly and removed the temporary blue sheet
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fencing partially and tried to forcibly dispossess the petitioners. The

petitioners have deployed their security men at the land belonging to
the petitioners. The respondent No. 1 officials along with the officials
of the respondent No. 3 have threatened the security personnel of
the petitioners with dire consequences and tried to take law into
their hands.
9. It is submitted that no notice was caused by the respondents
to the petitioners either by the respondent No. 1 or by the
respondent No. 3 before such illegal attempt to remove the fence
and before entering into the land belonging to the petitioners.
10. The respondent No. 1 is not having any right or interest over
the petitioners' property. The Special Officer and Competent
Authority, Urban Land Ceiling have issued no objection certificates
dated 10.05.2013 to all the petitioners very clearly stating that the
enquiry officer and Deputy Inspector of Survey inspected the land
jointly and the report dated 04.05.2013 filed by the enquiry officer
revealed that the land is fenced and it is within the possession of the
petitioners. It is also stated that there is a room constructed and
electricity connection is standing in the name of the petitioners. It is
further observed that the land belonging to the petitioners is not
falling within the portion of land determined as surplus and that it is
not attracted under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1976. With these
observations, the ULC has given No Objection Certificates to the
petitioners. All the 7 NOCs are herewith filed. Evidencing the
existence of sale deeds in favour of the petitioners and that there are
no encumbrances, the certificates of encumbrances are filed
herewith.
11. It is further submitted that the action of the respondent No. 1
is malicious. 11.09.2016 being Sunday, 13.09.2016 is declared
Holiday for Bakrid the first respondent initiated this illegal action
that too at 5 AM. The petitioner would take appropriate criminal
actions, if necessary.
12. Immediately, on furnishing information by the Security people
of the petitioner, the representatives of the petitioner companies
went to the site with the documents and the orders of the Hon'ble
court, showed them to the officials of the respondent No. 1.
However, the officials of the respondent No. 1 were not ready to give
any importance to the orders of this Hon'ble court. Since the officials
of respondent No. 3 were also present, and were briefed up about
the orders this petitioner would take appropriate steps for
disobedience of the orders of his Hon'ble Court dated 17.02.2012
and 16.04.2012. The officials of respondent No. 1 threatened the
security personnel that the first respondent would dispossess the
petitioners and demolish the constructions, claiming that they are
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interested in the property. Therefore, this writ petition is filed

questioning the illegal action of the respondent No. 1.
13. The action of the respondent No. 1 in trying to take law into
its hand, trying to dispossess the petitioner, trying to demolish the
petitioners by taking the help of respondent Nos. 2 to 4 is arbitrary,
illegal, void, against the principles of natural justice and malafide,
without any authority or interest.
14. In the circumstances stated above, the petitioner has no
efficacious alternative remedy, except to approach this Hon'ble Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner has not
filed any writ petition, suit or other proceedings for the relief or
relives sought herein.
55. In view of the aforesaid facts pleaded, the appellants had prayed
for the relief in the writ petition, which is extracted below for the facility
of reference:
“For the reasons stated in the accompanying affidavit, it is hereby
prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue a direction,
order or writ, more particularly one in the nature of Writ of
Mandamus, declaring the action of the first respondent, in
attempting to enter into the land of the petitioners to an extent of
Ac.53.00 guntas situated in Sy. No. 83/2 of Raidurg Panmaktha,
Serilingampalle Mandal, Ranga Reddy District and attempting to
demolish the fencing, without causing any notice or without any
right, authority and in spite of the orders of this Hon'ble court as
illegal, void, malicious and direct the first respondent not to cause
any demolition of the structures raised by the petitioners and not to
remove the fencing blue sheets, in the interest of justice and pass
such other order or orders as the Hon'ble Court may deem fit and
proper in the circumstances of the case.”
56. Thus, it is evident that the scope of the writ petition was
confined only to seek a writ not to dispossess the appellants except in
accordance with law. The appellants had nowhere sought declaration of
their title in the writ petition. It is pertinent to note that the averments
made by the appellants in paragraph 8 of the writ petition were not
denied by the respondents. It is noteworthy that the private
respondents had denied the title of the appellants in their counter.
However, the fact remains that the registered deeds of sale exist in
favour of the appellants in respect of the subject land. The private
respondents have also not taken recourse to Section 31 of the Specific
Relief Act, 1963, assailing the sale deeds in favour of appellants. It is
also pertinent to note that there is no order by any forum to dispossess
the appellants.
57. Therefore, we answer the third issue, namely whether the Court
can deny relief to a party on a ground not pleaded by it in the
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affirmative and hold that the Court cannot deny the relief to a party on
the ground not pleaded by it.
58. The learned Single Judge ought to have appreciated that in view
of law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Yeshwant Singh (supra)
and ITC Limited (supra), the appellants could not have been
dispossessed from the subject land except in accordance with law. The
learned Single Judge ought to have appreciated that in paragraph 27.6
of the common order, the learned Single Judge himself, found that
Land Reforms Tribunal was directed to re-deliver the possession of the
land measuring 99.07 acres to the declarants under the cover of
Panchanama dated 25.04.1990 and the possession of the land was
taken.
59. In our opinion, no adverse interference could have been drawn
against the appellants for not filing the seven sale deeds as the
appellants had sought the relief restraining the official respondents
from dispossessing the appellants from the subject land except in
accordance with law. In any case, the registered sale deeds were filed
by respondents No. 6 to 11. The learned Single Judge erred in
examining the title of the vendor of the appellants in the absence of
any challenge to the registered sale deeds executed in favour of the
appellants. The learned Single Judge ought to have appreciated that in
a writ petition filed by the appellants impugning the action of the TSIIC
and its officials in forcibly taking possession of the land of which the
appellants are in possession, the question of title of the appellants, in
the light of the stand taken by the private respondents in the counter
could not have been examined. The learned Single Judge ought to have
appreciated that no material has been placed on record either by the
appellants or by the private respondents with regard to their title and in
any case, under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the private
respondents ought to have sought a declaration with regard to title of
the appellants. The learned Single Judge ought to have appreciated
that the title of the appellants can be challenged in an appropriate
proceeding and should have left the question of title to be adjudicated
by a competent civil court.
60. The learned Single Judge ought to have seen that that factum of
dismissal of previous suit for specific performance of contract filed by
the appellants for default or non-prosecution and dismissal of
application for restoration of suit were not relevant for the purpose of
controversy involved in the writ petition and therefore, the appellants
could not be said to be guilty of suppression of vital information and it
could not be concluded that the writ petition filed by the appellants
lacks bana fides. The learned Single Judge ought to have appreciated
that there was no material placed on record to demonstrate that the
enquiry report dated 12.08.2015 was prepared by the Deputy Registrar
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after giving notice to the appellants. In any case on the basis of the
enquiry report submitted by the Deputy Registrar it could not be
concluded that the appellants had no title in respect of the subject
land.
61. The finding recorded by the learned Single Judge that fraudulent
action of the appellants is apparent from the face of record is not based
on any material on record. The learned Single Judge ought to have
appreciated that the appellants had pleaded all the relevant facts
necessary for seeking an order restraining the official respondents from
dispossessing them from the subject land except in accordance with
law.
62. So far as the submission made by the learned Senior Counsel for
respondents No. 10 to 15 and 31 to 35 that the appellants had no title
in respect of subject land is concerned, suffice it to say that, the
aforesaid question of title in view of the Constitution Bench decision of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sohan Lal (supra) and Thansingh
Nathmal (supra) cannot be gone into in a writ petition. Similarly, the
contention that the appellants have no cause of action to file the writ
petition is concerned, it is noteworthy that the appellants had stated in
paragraph 8 of the writ petition that the officers of the TSIIC visited the
subject land on 11.09.2016 and unauthorisedly removed the temporary
blue sheet fencing and tried to forcibly dispossess the appellants, were
not denied by the respondents. Therefore, the contention that the
appellants had no cause of action to file the writ petition does not
deserve acceptance.
63. The question, whether predecessor in title of the appellants had
the title could not have been considered under summary proceeding
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The contention made on
behalf of the respondents that the learned Single Judge has not
declared any title is concerned, does not deserve acceptance as the
learned Single Judge has dismissed the petition primarily on the
ground that the appellants did not prove their title. Even assuming
such a contention made by learned counsel for private respondents to
be correct, in that scenario the appellants could not have been
dispossessed from the subject land except in accordance with law.
64. In view of the preceding analysis, the impugned order dated
28.04.2023 passed in W.P. No. 30855 of 2016 by the learned Single
Judge is set aside. However, it is clarified that the this intra-court
appeal is confined only to 53 acres of land bearing survey No. 83/2
covered by seven registered sale deeds executed in favour of the
appellants. It is further clarified that the land measuring 470 acres in
survey No. 83/1 is in possession of the State Government in view of the
statement made by the learned Advocate General in W.P. No. 30855 of
2016.
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65. The respondents are restrained from dispossessing the

appellants in respect of the land measuring 53.00 acres situated in
survey No. 83/2 of Raidurg Panmakta Village, Serilingampally Mandal,
Ranga Reddy District except in accordance with law. The respondents
are also restrained from demolishing the fencing sheets and
constructions raised by the appellants without taking recourse to law.
However, it is also clarified that this Court has not expressed any
opinion with regard to the title in respect of the subject land and the
same is kept open to be adjudicated in appropriate proceedings before
the competent civil court.
66. The writ appeal is accordingly disposed of.
67. Miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.
However, there shall be no order as to costs.
———
1.
(1993) 2 SCC 546

2.
1992 Supp (2) SCC 29

3.
(2004) 1 SCC 769

4.
(2012) 1 SCC 656

5.
(2018) 2 SCC 82

6.
2021 SCC OnLine TS 2591 : (2021) 6 ALT 226

7.
(2004) 5 SCC 272

8.
(2013) 2 SCC 398

9.
AIR 1957 SC 529

10.
AIR 1964 SC 1419

11.
1993 Supp (1) SCC 306 : AIR 1992 SC 1018

12.
(1992) 4 SCC 61 : AIR 1993 SC 1225

13.
(2010) 8 SCC 329

14.
(2019) 2 SCC 329

15.
AIR 1968 SC 620

16.
AIR 1924 PC 144

17.
ILR (1958) 2 All 394
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18.
(2013) 10 SCC 169

19.
(2003) 8 SCC 40

20.
(2009) 14 SCC 132

21.
(2011) 6 SCC 597

22.
(2012) 12 SCC 63

23.
2022 SCC OnLine SC 928

24.
(1953) 1 SCC 456 : AIR 1953 SC 235

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