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Envy and Jealousy in Classical Athens
Emotions of the Past
Series Editors
Robert A. Kaster | David Konstan

This series investigates the history of the emotions in premodern societies,

taking 1500 CE as the conventional threshold of modernity. In addition
to new work on Greco-Roman and medieval European cultures, the series
provides a home for studies on the emotions in Near Eastern and Asian
societies, including premodern Egypt, India, China, and beyond.

The Elegiac Passion

Jealousy in Roman Love Elegy
Ruth Rothaus Caston

Envy and Jealousy in Classical Athens

A Socio-Psychological Approach
Ed Sanders
Envy and Jealousy
in Classical Athens
A SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH

Ed Sanders

1
 1
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It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Sanders, Ed, 1973– author.
Envy and jealousy in classical Athens : a socio-psychological approach / Ed Sanders.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978–0–19–989772–8
1. Greek literature—History and criticism. 2. Emotions in literature. 3. Envy in literature.
4. Jealousy in literature. I. Title.
PA3015.E46S26 2014
880.9’353—dc23 2013023458
9780199897728

1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2

Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper

CONTENTS

Preface vii
Acknowledgments ix
Abbreviations xi
Notes on Text  xiii

1. Introduction  1
2. Envy, Jealousy, and Related Emotions—Modern Theories  13
3. The Vocabulary of Greek Envy and Jealousy  33
4. Aristotle on Phthonos 58
5. Phthonos in the Attic Oratorical Corpus  79
6. Audience Phthonos in Old Comedy  100
7. Onstage Phthonos in Old Comedy and Tragedy  118
8. Sexual Jealousy in Classical Athens  130
Envoi  169

Bibliography 171
Index Locorum  187
General Index  203
PREFACE

Emotions vary between cultures, especially in their eliciting conditions, social

acceptability, forms of expression, and co-extent of terminology. This book
examines the sensation, expression, and literary representation of envy and
jealousy in Classical Athens. Previous scholarship on envy and jealousy
(Walcot 1978; Konstan and Rutter 2003) has primarily taken a lexical ap-
proach, focusing on usage of the Greek words phthonos (envy, begrudging,
jealousy, spite) and zêlos (emulative rivalry).
This lexical approach has value, especially in dealing with texts and civiliza-
tions from the past, but it also has limitations. These are particularly apparent
with envy and jealousy in ancient Greece as: a) the discreditable nature of
phthonos means it is never claimed for oneself, and renders its ascription or
disclamation suspect; b) there is no Classical Greek label for sexual jealousy.
Accordingly a different, complementary approach is required, which reads
the expressed values and actions of entire situations.
Building on recent developments in the reading of emotion scenarios in
classical texts (primarily the ‘script’ methodology of Kaster 2005), this book
applies to Athenian culture and literature insights that are derived from
modern (post-1950) philosophical, psychological, psychoanalytical, sociologi-
cal, and anthropological scholarship, and which focus on the contexts, con-
scious and subconscious motivations, subjective manifestations, and indica-
tive behaviors of envy, jealousy, and related emotions. This enables an
exploration of both the explicit theorization and evaluation of envy and jeal-
ousy, and also the more oblique ways in which they find expression across
different genres—in particular philosophy, oratory, comedy, and tragedy.
It is hoped that, as well as providing new insights into the two emotions
under direct consideration, this volume will contribute to ongoing debates as
to how we can best research the emotions of historical cultures, and will also
shed light on a number of literary issues relating to the texts and genres
­discussed.

vii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I have incurred debts to many people in the course of researching and writing
this volume, which arises out of a PhD thesis at UCL. It gives me great plea-
sure to be able to acknowledge and thank them here.
My greatest debt and most profound thanks are owed to my PhD supervi-
sor, Chris Carey. On many occasions I have reflected on how fortunate I was
to be supervised by him. Despite his many commitments he gave unstintingly
of his time, both during and after the PhD, readily making himself available
whenever I needed advice, and reading draft after draft with unfailing atten-
tion to detail. His immense and wide-ranging knowledge was a constant
source of inspiration, and his regular ‘reminders’ of what “of course you will
remember” pointed me both to books I should never have missed, and to an-
cient references I would never have found. Equally important, Chris’s inex-
haustible courtesy, optimism, and humor ensured that being his supervisee
was as much a personal as an intellectual pleasure.
My examiners, Douglas Cairns and Nick Lowe, provided some very useful
comments and were generous with the time they spent in my ‘viva’ discussing
revision for publication as a monograph. Douglas provided me with many
pages of very detailed comments on matters large and small, and has since
read and commented on two revised chapters—very much beyond the call of
duty! I have taken the bulk of their advice into account in revising the thesis
for publication. I have incurred debts to many others. Malcolm Schofield,
Simon Goldhill, and Bob Sharples each supervised some of my earliest work
on phthonos. In addition, Joanna Atkin, Markus Boberek, Vagelis Chaikalis,
Angelos Chaniotis, Steven Colvin, Jamie Dow, Daniel Grey, Dimitra Kokkini,
James Robson, Anne Sheppard, Paul Stenner, Geraint Thomas, and Vasiliki
Zali have all read chapters and provided useful comments. My heartfelt thanks
to all! Mistakes and omissions of course remain entirely my responsibility.
Some parts of this book have already been published in one form or an-
other. I acknowledge with grateful thanks the following publishers for allow-
ing me to reprint material: Koninklijke Brill NV (an earlier version of most of
chapter 4 and some of chapter 5 having appeared as “Pathos phaulon: Aristotle
and the rhetoric of phthonos,” in I. Sluiter and R. M. Rosen (eds.) (2008)
Kakos: Badness and anti-value in classical antiquity); Steiner Verlag (part of
chapter 5 having appeared in ‘“He is a liar, a bounder and a cad’: The arousal
of hostile emotions in Attic forensic oratory,” in A.Chaniotis (ed.) (2012) ix
x { Acknowledgments

­ nveiling emotions: Sources and methods for the study of emotions in the Greek
U
world); and Oxford University Press (part of chapter 8 having appeared as
“Sexual jealousy and erôs in Euripides’ Medea,” in E. Sanders, C. Thumiger,
C. Carey, and N. J. Lowe (eds.) (2013) Erôs in Ancient Greece).
Finally, I would like to thank the following for their financial support: the
Arts and Humanities Research Council (for funding two years of my PhD);
the UCL Department of Greek and Latin (for a departmental studentship); the
UCL Graduate School (for a travel grant to present at a conference in the
USA); the Leverhulme Trust and Royal Holloway, University of London (who
paid my salary during the latter part of my work revising this monograph);
and last—but by no means least—my mother, Sharon Sanders (for both finan-
cial and moral support).
I dedicate this book to all those whose friendship, advice, and support has
helped it come into being.
ABBREVIATIONS

For Greek authors and works, I follow the abbreviations listed in Hornblower,
S. and A. Spawforth (eds.) (1996) The Oxford Classical Dictionary (3rd ed;
Oxford and New York) xxix–liv where possible; otherwise those in LSJ.

Austin Austin, C. (ed.) (1973) Comicorum Graecorum fragmenta

in papyris reperta (Berlin)
Kassel & Austin Kassel, R. and C. Austin (eds.) (1983–2001) Poetae comici
Graeci (Berlin and New York), 8 vols.
Kock Kock, T. (ed.) (1880–1888) Comicorum Atticorum frag-
menta (Leipzig), 3 vols.
Lewis & Short Lewis, C. T. and C. Short (1879) A Latin Dictionary
(Oxford)
LSJ Liddell, H. G., R. Scott, and H. S. Jones (1940 and suppl.) A
Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford)
Maehler Maehler, H. (ed.) (1975) (post. B. Snell) Pindari carmina
cum fragmentis (Leipzig, 4th ed.), 2 vols.
Mette Mette, H. J. (ed.) (1959) Die fragmente der Tragödien des
Aischylos (Berlin)
Mullach Mullach, F. W. A. (ed.) (1860–1881) Fragmenta philosopho-
rum Graecorum (Paris), 3 vols.
Nauck Nauck, A. (ed.) (1889) Tragicorum Graecorum fragmenta
(Leipzig)
OCT Oxford Classical Text
Radt Radt, S. (ed.) (1977) Tragicorum Graecorum fragmenta;
Vol. 4: Sophocles (Göttingen)
SE Freud, S. (1975) The Standard Edition of the Complete Psy-
chological Works of Sigmund Freud (London), 24 vols.
Snell Snell, B. (ed.) (1971) Tragicorum Graecorum fragmenta;
Vol. 1 (Göttingen)
West West, M. L. (ed.) (1989–1992) Iambi et elegi Graeci ante Al-
exandrum cantata (2nd ed; Oxford), 2 vols.

xi
NOTES ON TEXT

1. All dates are BCE unless otherwise stated.

2. Greek text has been copied from the online Thesaurus Linguae Grecae. References to
Greek texts are to the most recent Oxford Classical Text (OCT); where no OCT exists (pri-
marily minor Attic orators) I use the current Loeb. For fragments, see Abbreviations. As
some fragments are not included in the most recent editions (e.g., Tragicorum Graecorum
fragmenta), I have used older editions throughout for consistency.
3. All translations are my own except where otherwise indicated.
4. I have directly transliterated most Greek names (e.g., Perikles, Timarchos, Euphile-
tos). However I have used the Roman spelling for some authors, literary works, and heroes
where it is so much more familiar that a straight transliteration would be pedantic (e.g.,
Thucydides rather than Thoukudides, Trachiniae rather than Trachiniai, Achilles rather
than Achilleus).

xiii
 1}

Introduction

This monograph examines the psychological sensation, social expression, and

literary representation of envy, jealousy, and related emotions in Athens
during the Classical period (479–322). It is primarily a contribution to the in-
creasing body of research into ancient Greek and Roman emotions that has
been published in the last two decades.1 As well as looking specifically at this
family of emotions, one of the main intentions of this book is to develop a
methodological approach that contributes to the ongoing debate as to how
research into emotions of the ancient Greeks and Romans (or indeed any his-
torical culture) should be conducted.
As I am investigating a highly literary society, which has produced a wealth
of literature, I have chosen to base this study entirely on such evidence.2
­Accordingly, alongside these specific emotions and the overarching method-
ological argument of this volume, I also aim to shed light on a number of liter-
ary issues relating to the texts and genres discussed. This will include both
thematic and rhetorical issues, and the dynamics of the text-‘reader’ (or more
properly text-audience) relationship.

1.1 Rationale and Methodological Approach

Emotion studies is a highly multidisciplinary field. There has been a large

amount of research into the nature of emotions (both specific emotions and

1
Major monographs and collections in English include: Cairns (1993); Williams (1993); Nussbaum
(1994); Braund and Gill (1997); Konstan (1997); Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen (1998); Konstan (2001);
W. V. Harris (2001); Nussbaum (2001); Braund and Most (2003); Kaster (2005); Sternberg (2005);
Konstan (2006); Graver (2007); J. T. Fitzgerald (2007); Konstan (2010); Munteanu (2011a); Munteanu
(2011b); Chaniotis (2012); Sanders, et al. (2013).
2
See further chapter 1.2. See Chaniotis (2012) for a range of approaches to ancient Greek emotions
based on epigraphic, papyrological, and archaeological evidence, as well as literary. 1
2 { Envy and Jealousy in Classical Athens

emotions in general) across a variety of disciplines (e.g., cognitive and

­evolutionary psychology, neurobiology, physiology, sociology, anthropology,
philosophy, and history, to name but some). Emotions research has bur-
geoned especially since the cognitivist ‘revolution’ of the 1970s. Those taking a
cognitive approach to emotions argue that an emotion arises from a sensory
perception that is evaluated by our brains (i.e., a cognition), automatically
arousing certain physiological and psychological responses. Strict cognitivists
believe cognition is the only important element in emotion;3 however, most
emotionologists currently ascribe to it a major, but not exclusive role. Set
against the cognitivists are ‘neo-Darwinists,’—so called because their ap-
proach dates back to Darwin— who are most interested in the physiological
and neurobiological effects of an emotion.4 This camp argues that physiologi-
cal changes are the initial emotional response, and thinking comes later (if at
all).5 The cognitivist approach has similarities to Aristotle’s view of the emo-
tions (see chapter 4), though Aristotle was more concerned with the socio-
logical aspect of cognition than most of his latter-day successors.6
Within this large body of research on the emotions, a number of psycholo-
gists have noted that it often makes more sense to speak of an emotional epi-
sode or scenario than an emotion per se.7 Emotional episodes, described by
Parrott as “the story of an emotional event,”8 begin with cognitions—­
perceptions of (or thoughts about) a situation—and our interpretations of
them, frequently called the “antecedent conditions.”9 These arouse psycho-
logical and physiological feelings (frequently confused by laypersons with the
‘emotion’ itself). Attempts to regulate or cope with the emotion may follow
(i.e., as the higher consciousness responds to the social and psychological ram-
ifications of our feelings). Then come verbal expressions and physical actions
resulting from the emotion. And eventually there is some sort of resolution.10

3
For example, Solomon (1993); Lazarus (1991); Nussbaum (2001).
4
For example, Ekman (1980a), whose research has focused on facial expression changes.
5
Darwin (1872); James (1884); Damasio (1994); Prinz (2004).
6
For a more detailed summary by a Classicist of these major approaches, see Konstan (2006) 7–27;
see also Cairns (2003a) 11–20 and (2008). Among non-Classical scholars, Rorty (1980a), Lewis and
Haviland-Jones (2000), and Solomon (2004) are excellent edited volumes that demonstrate a vari-
ety of disciplinary approaches to the emotions. P. E. Griffiths (1997) and Prinz (2004) provide useful
critiques of what the major schools have to offer before propounding their own views. W. M. Reddy
(2001) 3–62 critiques psychological and anthropological approaches from the historian’s perspective.
7
For example, Fehr and Russell (1984); Shaver, et al. (1987); Parrott (1991); Sharpsteen (1991); Rus-
sell and Lemay (2000); Gross (2007).
8
Parrott (1991) 4.
9
Sharpsteen (1991) 37 gives a useful definition of these as “the elements physically or objectively
present in a situation, along with the perceptions, interpretations, and appraisals of them.”
10
P. E. Griffiths (1997) 55 refers to the antecedent conditions (or ‘stimuli’) as the “input” part of
an emotion, and the rest as the “output.” See also Elster (1999) 246–83 and Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 49–78,
whose formulations differ, but who both identify several different parts to an emotion episode. Some
disagree with the concept of emotion episodes (e.g., Prinz (2004), who argues that most elements apart
from feeling (e.g., situational antecedents, resulting actions) are not part of the emotion).
 Introduction } 3

Some emotions are often considered to be ‘universal’ or ‘pan-cultural’: for

example, the set of so-called ‘basic’ or ‘primary’ emotions (anger, fear, happi-
ness, sadness, surprise, disgust) which have been identified in very young chil-
dren, and which have associated facial expressions that appear to be present in
all cultures (albeit occasionally repressed).11 However, even for these emo-
tions, many aspects will vary between cultures; Cairns notes these include
their eliciting conditions, social acceptability of the emotion, socially accepted
forms of expression (which may vary not just between societies, but also
within them, e.g., between classes and genders), and the extent their terminol-
ogy overlaps.12 Other emotions, including envy and jealousy, frequently called
‘nonbasic’ or ‘secondary,’ are thought to be more socially complex and there-
fore develop later as the child learns the social rules of his/her culture.13 They
may involve blends of more basic elements (e.g., guilt may include fear and
sadness, jealousy may include fear and anger).14 Nonbasic emotions can vary
even more widely between cultures than basic ones. Constructionists argue
that the elements of emotions that differ between cultures are so vast that each
emotion should be considered as entirely unique to that culture; some claim
Japanese amae and Southeast Asian amok as emotions, and cite them in sup-
port.15 However, even if these can be described as emotions (which is dubi-
ous), they are exceptions. While there may be major differences in a variety of
aspects, other cultures’ emotions are usually identifiable and relatable to our
own. For example, ancient Greek orgê is a phenomenon clearly comparable to
English anger, and ancient Greek aidôs to English shame—even if the bound-
aries of these ancient Greek terms are not coterminous with their English
equivalents, they may be aroused in some different situations, and there are
differences in acceptable means and forms of expression.
Research into classical emotions has so far largely focused on emotions that
are freely and frequently expressed in ancient literature: anger, shame, pity,
grief, etc. It has primarily taken a lexical approach, focusing on Greek emotion

11
Lewis (2000) 275–78; Bates (2000) 384–85; Wierzbicka (1999) 24–25; P. E. Griffiths (1997) 44–99;
Ekman (1980b). Exceptionally, Klein (1957/1975) argues that envy is also primary, associating it with
the frustration a baby directs at his/her mother’s breast when it withholds the milk (s)he wants; cf. Joffe
(1969) 539–42 for a critique; cf. Roth and Lemma (2008) and H. F. Smith (2008) for recent develop-
ments on Kleinian envy.
12
Cairns (2003a) 12–13. There are also personal differences between individuals who are homolo-
gous within their society.
13
Lewis (2000) 277 argues that envy emerges in the latter half of the second year of life, along with
embarrassment and empathy. Frankel and Sherick (1977) report that while a very young child will
desire and take a toy, the awareness that it belongs to another child, and an attendant hostility charac-
teristic of envy, only develop later; cf. Rosenblatt (1988) 57–58.
14
Damasio (1994) 131–39; Elster (1999) 242; Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 104–14; Johnson-Laird and Oatley
(2000) 466–67.
15
On amae, a kind of ‘pleasure at being dependent,’ see Morsbach and Tyler (1986). Newman
(1964) describes amok, or ‘being a wild pig.’ For constructionist approaches to emotions see Harré
(1986), Harré and Parrott (1996).
4 { Envy and Jealousy in Classical Athens

words and the contexts in which they are used (by a particular author or more
generally), and comparing them with the nearest equivalents in our own lexi-
con.16 Previous scholarship on envy and jealousy has, for instance, mostly
concentrated on usage of the Greek words phthonos (envy, begrudging, jeal-
ousy, spite—see chapter 3) and zêlos (emulative rivalry). The two principal
works on these Greek emotions are Walcot’s Envy and the Greeks, and Kon-
stan and Rutter’s edited volume Envy, spite, and jealousy: The rivalrous emo-
tions in ancient Greece.17 Walcot provides an overview of Greek envy over the
thirteen centuries from Homer to Boethius, from a comparative-­
anthropological perspective. He makes some false generalizations;18 however,
the book is still relevant, giving useful pointers to the value system, and con-
taining many insights into individual texts. Very little else was published on
Greek envy, with the exception of Pindar’s poetics,19 until Konstan and Rutter.
This collection of essays has begun the modern socio-psychological investiga-
tion into the ‘rivalrous’ emotions in ancient Greece. However, most of the
chapters limit themselves to an examination of phthonos (and sometimes
zêlos) in one author or genre, and many appear to do so without any wider
insight into investigations into these emotions in fields other than Classics.
This is not to argue that a lexical approach has no value. Indeed it is essen-
tial, particularly in dealing with texts and civilizations from the past, and this
monograph will not neglect lexical issues. However a purely lexical approach
has limitations. First, it encourages too great a dependence on the labels our
own language uses, in trying to understand those of another language and
culture.20 This is exemplified in the most comprehensive study of ancient
Greek emotions to date, Konstan’s The emotions of the ancient Greeks: Studies
in Aristotle and classical literature,21 which, despite its awareness of the differ-
ences between ancient Greek and modern (Anglophone) experiences, still
shows too great a tendency to look for one-to-one equivalents. For instance,
he argues (somewhat unpersuasively) that Aristotle’s praotês (Rh. 2.3) should
be translated into English as “satisfaction,” rather than “calming down.” 22
However, praotês is neither equivalent to satisfaction, nor to calming down:
praotês is praotês, an ancient Greek phenomenon, and translation of any

16
Kaster (2005) is a major exception to the tendency to try to find English-language equivalents
(see below).
17
Walcot (1978); Konstan and Rutter (2003).
18
For example, that zêlos should be translated jealousy, and phthonos envy, their use being in
“much the same way as their English equivalents” (2); or dividing envy into “‘professional envy,’ ‘sib-
ling envy,’ and ‘sexual envy’” (3), passing over the many instances of envy of wealth in fourth-century
oratory, and the phthonos of the gods—though he later devotes two chapters to this, undermining his
own tripartite division.
19
See Bulman (1992); Kurke (1991) 195–224.
20
Kaster (2005) 6–8.
21
Konstan (2006).
22
Konstan (2006) 77–90.
 Introduction } 5

­ articular instance of the word is secondary to understanding that phenome-

p
non.23 Second, our own emotion labels can hide from our conscious minds the
emotional scenarios they imply—which may not, in part or in total, be appli-
cable to those of another culture.24 Third, psychology can be obscured not just
by the lexicon, but also by the fact that people can react to situations with a
mixture of emotions, only some of which they may be conscious of, or choose
to express. A final problem with a lexical approach, which applies particularly
to envy and jealousy in ancient Greece, is that (unlike anger, shame, etc.) these
emotions are not freely and frequently expressed in Greek. There are two rea-
sons for this: first, the discreditable nature of phthonos (the primary Greek
term covering envy and possessive jealousy) ensures that it is never claimed
for oneself, and means that those who disclaim it of themselves or ascribe it to
others have an obvious (and suspect) agenda;25 second, because there is no
ancient Greek word for sexual jealousy until well after the Classical period.26
Such problems are not limited to these two emotions.27
While a lexical approach is useful, therefore, it cannot be the sole method-
ology for a detailed investigation of the emotion concepts of another culture,
and particularly cannot be the sole approach of a work looking at ancient
Greek envy and jealousy. A complementary approach is required, one which
reads the expressed values and actions of entire situations. Accordingly, in
this study I adopt as part of my methodology the emotion ‘scripts’ approach
advocated and used to great effect by Kaster.28 Scripts are essentially similar to
the emotion episodes or scenarios discussed above—an episode/scenario is in
fact a specific instance of a general script. These scripts allow us to get behind
the terms envy and jealousy in order to achieve a greater understanding of the
elements that link a wide variety of envy and jealousy scenarios (and similarly
for related ancient Greek emotions).
However, a purely script-based approach has its limitations too. Kaster
argues that scripts must replace a lexical approach: he argues that one should

23
Kaster (2005) 7 makes a similar point about translating Latin fastidium.
24
Cairns (2008) 46 makes similar points to these two.
25
It is notable that, while Greeks frequently admit anger, shame, pity, grief, etc., they almost never
admit envy (see pp. 35–36).
26
Zêlotupia is normally translated as jealousy, but this is controversial, at least in the Classical
period (see Konstan (2006) 216–43, and pp. 164–65). Furthermore, the first surviving instance of the
term—whatever it means—dates from the 380s, more than halfway through the period covered by this
monograph.
27
For example, arrogance is morally problematic and tends to serve a rhetorical agenda; ‘positive’
pride lacks an ancient Greek label.
28
Kaster (2005) 8–9. Other scholars who argue for the use of scripts to investigate emotions include:
Lakoff and Kövecses (1987) 210–18; Russell (1991) 442–44; P. L. Harris (2000) 285–88; Shweder and
Haidt (2000) 405–6; Russell and Lemay (2000) 496–99; Cairns (2008) 46. Wierzbicka (1999) makes
the case for metalanguage (instead of English language) scripts, though this has attracted criticism
(e.g., Cairns (2008) 49–50). See also Abelson (1981) on scripts more generally in psychological analysis.
6 { Envy and Jealousy in Classical Athens

not seek English equivalents for (in his study) Latin terms, that doing so at best
simplifies, and at worst confuses and misleads, because inevitably one English
term will not cover the full range of scripts covered by one Latin term; further-
more, using an English term does not help at all if the reader’s language is
French or German, or some less-related language.29 I do not agree with these
points. To take the second one first, despite the absence of complete equivalence
in emotional terminology, anyone who can read a book in English (as they must
to make use of this study) can benefit by being given an English label on which
to hang their understanding of a concept. For instance, on seeing the word
phthonos in a Greek text, it is harder to bring instantly to mind a variety of re-
lated but separate scripts, than to remember that it comprises English envy,
possessive jealousy, begrudging, etc.—provided we are clear what these English
terms involve. It is beside the point that, for example, orgê is not anger (or colère
or Zorn, etc.); certainly an ancient Greek might express orgê in some different
situations and some different ways to when or how modern Anglophones might
express anger, and they might think of the emotion in subtly different ways (e.g.,
as expressed by different metaphors), but understanding those differences is the
entire purpose of a scholarly study; if anger will perfectly well translate orgê
95 percent of the time, it seems otiose not to use that perfectly respectable word
when discussing a given instance of orgê in (or translating one into) English—
unless the instance falls within the other 5 percent. This problem is in fact not
confined to the study of emotions but covers a wide range of ethical, social, po-
litical, and institutional vocabulary for which there is no absolute equivalence
between ancient Greek and modern terminology (in any language). To translate
only where there is complete equivalence would, if pursued rigorously, lead to
‘translations’ in which most of the words of necessity remained in Greek. Re-
taining a Greek word is, of course, justified in contexts where it cannot be fully
expressed by one English equivalent (e.g., hubris, where frequently no transla-
tion will adequately cover what the Greek word is conveying). But this problem
is not replicated even with as multifaceted an emotion as phthonos, which covers
a variety of scripts with different English names. While no one English word will
cover all the meanings phthonos might have, in many instances where the word
is used (i.e., many individual phthonos scenarios), the sense is totally unambigu-
ous, and the reader will perfectly well understand what is going on if the English
words envy, jealousy, begrudging, etc., are substituted in an English translation
or discussion of the passage. Only when a Greek passage relies on the ambiguity
between different senses of the word (i.e., different scripts), or when more than
one script is being referred to in discussion, must the scholar stick to the origi-
nal Greek word phthonos, as I shall at certain points in this study.

29
Kaster (2005) 6–8, 29; he sums this up: “the only sound way to understand the emotional lan-
guage of any culture, especially (but not exclusively) one not our own, is in terms not of lexical labels
but of ‘scripts’” (85).
 Introduction } 7

To ensure that we, the investigator and readers, do indeed have a full un-
derstanding of the English scripts implied by such terms as envy and jealousy,
which will allow us to examine ancient Greek scripts in this way, I take a
methodological step so far (to my knowledge) not yet taken by any scholarly
study. This is to apply to Athenian culture and literature directly insights on
the contexts, conscious and subconscious motivations, subjective manifesta-
tions, and indicative behaviors of envy, jealousy, and related emotions, de-
rived from modern research into these emotions in a variety of fields in the
social sciences.30 Such an approach does carry its own risk: there is a danger
that we will import into Athenian society concepts conditioned by an unre-
lated experiential framework; a related problem is how to avoid the circularity
frequently inherent in comparative studies where evidence is limited. These
limitations can be countered, however, by using Aristotle’s examination of the
socio-psychology of phthonos as a control: as will be seen in chapter 4, his
analysis of phthonos, and his comparison of phthonos with a variety of other
related emotions, provides directly comparable evidence to the sort of survey
I undertake of modern social scientific scholarship on envy, jealousy, and re-
lated emotions in chapter 2. This script methodology enables me to explore
not merely the explicit theorization and evaluation of envy and jealousy in
ancient Greece, but also the more oblique ways in which they find expression
across a variety of genres—including texts in which the role of these emotions
is currently underappreciated.

1.2 Scope

Envy and jealousy are major topics, and one could spend twenty years and
write several volumes investigating all their aspects in Greek culture. Of ne-
cessity, this monograph must limit its investigations. I have chosen to concen-
trate on Athens during the Classical period (479–322) since a large majority of
surviving (BCE) Greek texts come from this society. Indeed, we have a rela-
tively greater volume and range of evidence, both in kind and chronologically,
about democratic Athenian society and values than for any other ancient
Greek society. In concentrating on Classical Athens, I do not suggest that
phthonos in this society would have differed in every respect from those of
other poleis at the time, or from Athens at different times; however, there may
not be a total commonality of outlook. Even leaving aside such a literary con-
struct as Homeric society, arousal and appropriate expression of envy might
well differ between democratic Athens and oligarchies of the fifth and fourth

30
The fields I draw on most particularly are philosophy, psychology, psychoanalysis, sociology, and
anthropology (see chapter 2). This study will, therefore, reciprocally provide comparative material for
scholars of these emotions in other fields.
8 { Envy and Jealousy in Classical Athens

centuries, or between the oratory of fourth-century Athens and that of the

first- or second-century ce Dio of Prusa. Again, sexual jealousy might be con-
structed differently in the literary genres of fifth-century tragedy and the
second- or third-century ce Greek novel. It makes sense therefore to concen-
trate on one society, after which my findings will provide comparative ­material
when investigating how envy and jealousy are constructed in other periods,
places, genres, texts, and nonliterary media of ancient Greece.
In this book, then, I have concentrated on the literature of Classical Athens.
By this I mean literature either written for performance in Athens (e.g., tragedy,
comedy, oratory) or written in the Athenian intellectual milieu. I therefore in-
clude Aristotle, who lived and worked in Athens, and whose Rhetoric must
clearly have taken account of the development of oratory there.31 However, I
largely avoid authors who are not Athenian (e.g., Herodotus), Classical (e.g.,
Solon), or either (e.g., Homer, Pindar). This is not to say that these authors have
nothing to contribute on the subject of phthonos—all of them do—and I do take
account of them in the lexical review in chapter 3, which considers phthonos and
related words in all Greek literature of the Archaic and Classical periods. How-
ever, I treat them delicately, and I avoid building assumptions based solely on
them into my analysis of Classical Athenian texts. The more in-depth generic
and textual analyses in chapters 4–8 are almost entirely Classical Athenian. I
should perhaps also note here that the lack of a chapter on phthonos in Thucydides
and Xenophon—or indeed Plato—reflects the fact that there is no coherent story
to tell. While the word occurs frequently in these three authors, extended phtho-
nos scenarios and narratives are relatively rare, and those that exist are more
sensibly included within my general discussion of phthonos in chapter 3 (or, in
one Platonic instance, in my discussion of Old Comedy in chapter 6).
Because the socio-psychological approach is particularly well suited to cul-
tural history, to ideas expressed in literature or philosophy, it is these that I
focus on. I therefore ignore material evidence such as decrees, epitaphs, and
curses: 32 the body of inscriptional evidence is vast and disparate; it is not im-
mediately obvious that such texts will give insight into an emotional episode
as such (antecedent conditions, psychological feelings, etc.); and it may be
hard to control the results since (at least in some of the material) imputation
of motivation will often be conjectural. There are also questions of
­methodology, as inclusion of material evidence would require a significant
adjustment of the hermeneutic approach. One final limitation is that I focus
on socio-­psychological aspects, rather than political or economic issues.

31
Similarly Plato in his analysis of comedy in the Philebus (see chapter 6).
32
Eidinow (2007) briefly refers to envy and jealousy in relation to curses in general (230–31), as
well as envy tied specifically to curses relating to commercial competition (204–5) and the institution
of the chorêgia (160, 296 note 17). Also re material evidence, see Dunbabin and Dickie (1983) on Greco-
Roman iconography of phthonos.
 Introduction } 9

­ eaving aside the question of how much institutions such as ostracism really
L
owe to envy,33 political-economic envy has in any case already been well
treated by Ober, as part of his investigation of elite and mass (i.e., non-elite)
relations in Classical Athens.34

1.3 Outline of the Book

The volume is divided into this introduction and seven further chapters,
through which the argument develops in a linear fashion. Chapter 2 surveys
and analyzes the insights of modern (post-1950) philosophical, psychological,
psychoanalytical, sociological, and anthropological research into envy and
jealousy. The two emotions are examined separately, and then compared for
their differences and what they have in common. I show that, while many cog-
nitive psychologists prefer to separate envy (felt when I lack something I want)
from jealousy (felt when I want to retain or regain something I have developed
an exclusive bond with), others prefer to concentrate on the situational aspects
of rivalry between two people for a mutually desired object or person. Both
approaches have analytical value, but also limitations: the former position
tends to draw a dividing line between envy and all types of jealousy (including
sexual), ignoring the fact that laypersons frequently conflate the words envy
and jealousy in speech, and that envy is inextricably part of the jealousy sce-
nario; the latter position draws a helpful distinction between social compari-
son and sexual scenarios, but occasionally downplays genuine differences be-
tween prototypical envy and (possessive) jealousy scripts. As well as examining
envy and jealousy in depth, I compare envy with a number of other emotions
that it overlaps with—such as emulation, greed and covetousness, and spite
and Schadenfreude—and those that it tends to be (consciously) misrepresented
as or (unconsciously) transmuted into—including anger and indignation, and
a desire for justice. These insights into the various emotion scripts covered by
the terms envy, jealousy, and related emotions equip us well for an in-depth
exploration of similar emotions in other cultures—here Classical Athens.
Chapters 3 and 4 take two complementary approaches to the Greek vocabu-
lary of envy and jealousy, in order to map the phenomena we are dealing with
in Greek culture. Chapter 3 begins with a thorough lexical examination of
phthonos, which I show can cover no fewer than twelve scripts. These ­include

33
Some (e.g., Ranulf (1933) I.134–35 and ff., Walcot (1978) 53–61) have seen the institution of ostra-
cism as a licensed outlet for envy against a prominent individual (perhaps instituted to dissuade the
poor from attacking the rich as a class). However most of the evidence for this is provided by Plutarch,
who is hardly contemporary. Cairns (2003b) 243–44 summarizes the evidence, and is rightly skeptical
of this “reductive explanation”; see also Elster (1999) 187–89; Fisher (2003) 188. See Brenne (1994) for
examples of what ostraka actually say.
34
Ober (1989); see also Cairns (2003b).
10 { Envy and Jealousy in Classical Athens

most of the scripts covered by English envy and jealousy (e.g., begrudging
envy, covetous envy, jealous of my position, possessive jealousy), and several
more besides (e.g., begrudging refusal, rivalry, Schadenfreude, moral censure).
I follow this with an analysis of zêlos, which covers one script included in envy
but not phthonos (reflected in the English phrase “I envy you”), and a variety
of other Archaic and Classical terms (megairein, agaasthai, kotos, nemesis, eris,
philon(e)ikia, philotimia, duskolia, dusmeneia, and baskania) which can in-
volve similar scripts to one or more of those included in phthonos.
In chapter 4 I turn to the first detailed socio-psychological examination of
phthonos, that of Aristotle in his Rhetoric and (both) Ethics treatises, both to
make use of his insights in their own right, and to compare his account with
that of modern social scientific research, allowing us to utilize the latter with
confidence. I first consider how Aristotle sites phthonos within a group of
emotions concerned with response to someone else’s good or bad fortune. I
discuss how envy (phthonos) is related to spite (epichairekakia) in his thought,
and how as ‘bad’ emotions these are opposed to such ‘good’ emotions as in-
dignation (to nemesan), justified pleasure in another’s misfortune (unnamed
in Greek), emulation (zêlos), and disdain (kataphronêsis). I go on to show how
this distinction survives, with minor alterations, the intellectual shift to the
‘doctrine of the mean’ in the ethical treatises. Next I turn to Aristotle’s views
on phthonos itself, as described in the Rhetoric, where he discusses the situa-
tions in which phthonos arises, before showing how Aristotle’s ethical training
(as outlined in the Nicomachean Ethics) can remove vices such as phthonos
from one’s character. Finally, I use the findings of modern theory on envy and
jealousy to critique Aristotle’s thought on phthonos, noting that he identifies
scenarios from a variety of scripts (though he does not seem to realize this),
and I also compare Aristotle’s thought on phthonos with other Classical Greek
authors. While he generally reflects the prevailing usage of phthonos, it is ap-
parent that the strict division Aristotle makes between phthonos (envy) and to
nemesan (indignation) is not reflected in contemporary literary sources: nem-
esis (and its cognates) barely survive in the Classical period, their function in
the Archaic period being mostly subsumed in the Classical by phthonos. I rec-
ognize this by introducing the script terms ‘bad phthonos’ and ‘good phtho-
nos,’ henceforward used where necessary for clarity.
Chapters 5–7 examine the roles of phthonos in three genres of literature
written for performance in front of mass (i.e., non-elite) audiences. Chapter 5
focuses on Attic oratory, a genre which makes frequent use of phthonos words.
I begin not with oratory, however, but with Aristotle. Picking up on chapter 4,
I demonstrate how phthonos’s badness prevents the use to which Aristotle
would like to put emotions in rhetoric—namely, persuading an audience. I
explore alternative reasons why Aristotle should still have discussed this emo-
tion in his Rhetoric, and argue that its only acceptable use consistent with his
philosophy is to accuse one’s opponent of being motivated by it. Turning to
 Introduction } 11

oratory proper, I show that this is largely the case, first through a brief survey
of all occurrences of phthonos words in the genre, and second by in-depth
analyses of several speeches in which accusations of phthonos form a crucial
part of the speaker’s strategy (Isae. 2; Lys. 24; Aeschin. 2; Dem. 18 and Epist. 3).
In fact, phthonos words are not once used in the genre to arouse an audience’s
envy. We do find several calls for an audience’s phthonos, but crucially these
are calls for moral censure (i.e., ‘good phthonos’). I evidence this by a detailed
discussion of Dem. 20 and 21. I end the chapter by considering how an orator
might attempt to arouse an audience’s ‘bad phthonos’ covertly. Because of the
negative associations of the term and the concept, an orator must do so with-
out using the word itself, and I examine a number of speeches which attempt
to do just this in trials of Athenian politicians for embezzlement and bribe-
taking (Lys. 28, 29, and 21; with similar passages in Dem. 3).
In chapter 6 I continue to focus on covert arousal of phthonos in an audi-
ence, here in Old Comedy. In the Philebus, Plato argues that one goes to a
comedy in order to laugh at the misfortunes of one’s friends, and he calls this
phthonos. This emotion bears a close similarity to Aristotle’s epichairekakia and
to modern Schadenfreude. For all the difference in emphasis, I show that this
reading has certain affinities in common with the ‘carnival’ approach to under-
standing Old Comedy, and particularly its predilection for onomasti kômôidein
(abuse of named individuals). I focus in particular on phthonos against politi-
cians, both named and as a class, in Aristophanes’ political plays of the 420s, as
providing the clearest and most coherent body of evidence for phthonos arousal
in the genre, and because of the political connections with the previous chapter.
I first consider passages criticizing demagogues in Wasps and particularly
Paphlagon (i.e., Kleon) in Knights, and then consider passages dealing with
ambassadors in Acharnians and generals in Wasps. The arguments advanced
ostensibly play to the audience’s moral censure (i.e., indignation) at the ex-
cesses of these groups and individuals, but in fact appeal as much if not more to
their (transmuted) envy. These, however, are English emotions and, as I dem-
onstrated in chapter 4, both fall within the purview of phthonos in Greek.
In chapter 7 I turn away from the audience to look at phthonos scripts on-
stage in Old Comedy and in tragedy. While this emotion is not one of those
regularly seen as motivating characters, it is not completely absent. I examine
two scenarios in the former genre and three in the latter. In Old Comedy, I
return to Knights, this time Nikias’s and Demosthenes’ phthonos for Paphlag-
on’s swift rise to be Demos’s most trusted slave, and his reciprocal phthonos
for those who wish to take away this status. I then consider the redistribution
of (wealth and) sexual favors in Assemblywomen. Turning to tragedy, Ajax’s
response to the Arms of Achilles being awarded to Odysseus (Soph. Aj.) owes
most to rage and shame, but I argue that phthonos at losing ‘his’ Arms is also
discernible when we compare the punishment he attempts to mete out to
­Odysseus with that of the Atreidai. Phaidra’s response to her rejection by
12 { Envy and Jealousy in Classical Athens

­Hippolytos (Eur. Hipp.) also owes a great deal to shame and rage, but along-
side these what was formerly zêlos of his lifestyle seems to harden into phtho-
nos, contributing to the libelous form of revenge. Finally, Kreusa’s response
on learning that her husband, with whom they had both longed for children
for many years, now had a son while she did not, leads her through phthonos
to try to kill that son. I show that in all of these plays characters exhibit psy-
chology, expression, and action highly typical of English envy/jealousy sce-
narios, and clearly describable as phthonos by what has been revealed of the
nature of that emotion in chapter 3. It is notable that neither Old Comedy nor
tragedy lend themselves well to overt, large-scale, onstage phthonos scenarios,
and a script approach is required in order to ‘read’ the scenarios that are there.
In chapter 8 I leave phthonos proper and move on to a detailed examination
of sexual jealousy. The existence of this emotion in ancient Greece has been
questioned,35 and a minor concern of this chapter is to prove that an emotion
comparable to our sexual jealousy does indeed exist in Greek literature. The
main focus, however, is on how this emotion is constructed and expressed. I
begin with Medea (Eur. Med.), who is normally portrayed as suffering from
heroic pride or rage. While accepting the presence of these emotions as moti-
vators, I argue that it is overly reductive to interpret Medea’s psychology solely
in these terms, and that sexual jealousy should be rehabilitated as one of her
motivations. Erôs plays a major role in Medea’s marriage, and her entire self-
conception is bound up with being a wife, a mother, and a (sexual) woman.
Jason’s abandonment of her wrongs her in all three roles. I show how Medea’s
subsequent emotions (rage, hatred, grief, pride, and begrudging envy) are di-
rectly traceable back to this wrong, and how her desire for ‘justice’ (which
typically masks envy), and the form of the revenge itself, fit in well with both
the English sexual jealousy prototype and Aristotle’s ideas on phthonos, orgê
(anger), and misos (hatred). The main elements of this Greek jealousy script
appear in two other tragedies (Soph. Trach. and Eur. Andr.), which I explore in
similar level of detail. I conclude that Greek sexual jealousy requires three
components: erôs, an exclusive relationship, and a desire to protect the integ-
rity of that exclusivity by beating, damaging, or destroying the rival and/or
partner. This destructive element shows that phthonos, like erôs, is inextricably
part of the Greek sexual jealousy prototype. Finally, I turn to philosophy, ora-
tory, and comedy, and briefly examine a number of texts in which elements of
the sexual jealousy prototype recur (principally Pl. Symp.; Antiph. 1; Lys. 1, 3,
and 4; Aeschin. 1; Ar. Plut.; Men. Sam. and Pk.)—this includes an examination
of the term zêlotupia (normally translated as jealousy) in this period. By con-
sidering this wide variety of texts, I show how the jealousy script changes when
the patient is a man, how male-male relationships differ from male-­female, and
the effect of genre on the use of sexual jealousy scripts to manipulate audiences.

35
Konstan (2003b) and (2006).
 2}

Envy, Jealousy, and Related Emotions—Modern

Theories

The academic fields that have contributed the greatest extent to modern
­discussions of envy and jealousy are philosophy, cognitive psychology, psy-
choanalysis, sociology, and anthropology.1 The approaches of these various
disciplines are heterogeneous (both between and within disciplines), with sur-
prisingly little interdisciplinary research.2 My aim in this chapter is not to
weld them into a homogeneous whole, even were this possible. Rather, my
primary concern is to survey this body of research, in order to gain the broad-
est possible understanding of the ways in which the English terms ‘envy’ and
‘jealousy’ are used and understood, how they relate to other emotion terms,
and how envy and jealousy scenarios unfold. This survey will allow me to dif-
ferentiate the various scripts that fall within the terms ‘envy’ and ‘jealousy’
(and related emotions), and will provide the theoretical underpinning of my
reading of Greek texts in subsequent chapters.
The large majority of the research published in the fields mentioned above,
especially as relates to envy and jealousy, is Anglo-American, and even that
which is not is almost entirely published in English. This creates two potential
problems. First, it does not challenge the natural tendency of the author, or of
English-speaking readers, to think of the emotional palette according to the
way it is divided up in modern Anglophone society. Second, it creates p­ otential
problems for readers whose first language is not English—whether because

1
There is some evolutionary and comparative psychological scholarship on emotions (e.g., Aureli
and Whiten (2003); Bard et al. (2004); Keltner, Haidt and Shiota (2006)). However this field has as yet
almost nothing to say about envy. It has a little to say about jealousy, though this has mainly involved
looking at pets’ supposed (nonsexual) jealousy of other humans/animals that their owners demon-
strate affection for (e.g., Morris, Doe and Godwell (2008); Panksepp (2010))—which is of limited use
to our type of study.
2
No academic monograph covering such a variety of disciplinary approaches to envy has appeared
since Schoeck (1966/1969). Salovey (1991), Wurmser and Jarass (2008a), and Hart and Legerstee (2010) are
three important edited collections containing a narrower selection of approaches to envy and/or jealousy. 13
14 { Envy and Jealousy in Classical Athens

the experiential bases of the phenomena are not totally familiar, the range and
acceptability of expression differs in their own society, or simply because their
emotional experience is lexically divided up differently. The script approach
helps to solve these problems, and thus strengthens the overall m­ ethodological
approach. It should not matter, in theory, whether the language of exploration
is English, Russian, Mandarin, Swahili, or indeed a metalanguage—provided
all readers know exactly what are the building blocks used (i.e., the individual
scripts), and what it will mean when I discuss any particular Greek example
using the English words envy, jealousy, etc. Considered in these terms, the
almost wholly Anglocentric nature of this body of research becomes a positive
advantage, providing all the more information about the English terms used
throughout this book, and thus about the various scripts that fall within those
terms—and so all the better assisting non-native English speakers to explore
the Greek phenomena through the medium of English.

2.1 Envy
2.1.1 ETYMOLOGY

The word envy is derived from the Latin noun invidia, which corresponds
with English “envy; jealousy; grudge; ill will; hatred; odium; unpopularity”;
that in turn is derived from the verb invidere, which means “to look askance
at; to look maliciously or spitefully at; to cast an Evil Eye on; to be prejudiced
against; to envy, grudge; to be unwilling; to aspire to rival; to prevent, refuse,
or deny.”3 Dictionary definitions for envy include:4 (noun) ill will, malice,
enmity, harm, emulation, desire, a longing for another’s advantages, mortifi-
cation, and ill will occasioned by the contemplation of another’s superior
­advantages; (verb) to feel envy at the superior advantages of; to regard with
discontent another’s possession of (some superior advantage); to wish oneself
on a level with (another) in some respect, or possessed of (something which
another has); to feel a grudge against, to begrudge, to treat grudgingly; to have
envious, grudging, or malevolent feelings; to vie with, seek to challenge. There
are three related adjectives: enviable, envious, and invidious. Enviable means:
to be envied. Envious means: full of envy, affected or actuated by envy, vexed
at the good fortune or qualities of another; full of ill will; malicious; full of
emulation; grudging, excessively careful; enviable; invidious; odious. Invidi-
ous means: tending to excite ill will or envy; looking with an Evil Eye; envious,
grudging, jealous.

3
Lewis & Short; cf. Spielman (1971) 61. Klein (1957/1975) 181 n. 2 notes this accords with her view
that envy is projective; see Cairns (2011) on the envious gaze in Greek literature.
4
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary for the remainder of the paragraph, which is an abridged direct
quotation.
 Envy, Jealousy, and Related Emotions—Modern Theories } 15

2.1.2 ENVY SCENARIOS

Envy is a complex (or ‘blended’) emotion, and occurs in complex situations of

social comparison.5 Its antecedent conditions involve three perceptions: (1)
that someone else (the target) has some possession or quality; (2) that I (the
patient) do not have it; (3) that this situation is wrong.6 A number of factors
influence this third perception. One is self-esteem: the higher one’s self-­
esteem, the more likely one is to feel a sense of entitlement.7 Secondly, we are
more likely to feel envy of our peers than nonpeers: we might feel entitled to
the promotion our colleague has just been awarded, but we are less likely to
feel entitled to be king.8 Finally there are what Parrott calls “personal ­variables”
(i.e., character: some people are just more likely to feel envy than others).9
The feeling of envy itself is generally considered to be ‘blended’: a number of
simpler affects are simultaneously aroused, with all or most needing to be pres-
ent for envy to result. While modern scholars in a variety of disciplines agree
that it is blended, there is considerable diversity on the number and nature of
its components. Spielman notes four principal components: emulation (admi-
ration and rivalry), a ‘narcissistic wound’ (“a sense of inadequacy,” inferiority,
or “injured self-esteem,” ranging from disappointment to humiliation), covet-
ousness (of the desired quality or possession), and anger (ranging from chagrin,
through resentment, to spite, malevolence, hatred, and a wish to harm). Joffe
sees six elements to envy: aggression, hate, resentment, admiration, covetous-
ness, and narcissism (a desire to boost one’s self-image). B ­ en-Ze’ev notes envy
involves both hostility and admiration, and occasionally self-pity, hope, or de-
spair. Parrott believes it can involve: a longing or frustrated desire, a feeling of
inferiority (which may manifest as sadness, anxiety, or despair), resentment
(generalized or target-specific, manifesting as displeasure, anger, or hatred),

5
Foster (1972) 168–70; Silver and Sabini (1978a) 107; Parrott (1991) 7; R. H. Smith et al. (1996) 158–59;
Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 284-85; R. H. Smith (2004) 43. Salovey (1991b) has been greatly interested in applying
‘social comparison theory’ to envy and jealousy: see chapter 2.4.3. Early psychoanalysts did not believe
envy to be a social phenomenon, but rather that it is rooted in infant psychosexual development – see
Freud (1925) 248–58; Klein (1957/1975) 176–204; Joffe (1969); Spielman (1971) 64–80; Burke (1998) 3–17.
6
Rosenblatt (1988) 63; Elster (1999) 169; Wierzbicka (1999) 98, who prefers the weaker third per-
ception “this is bad.” In this chapter I shall frequently use ‘patient’ to refer to the person feeling the
emotion (some prefer ‘subject’), and ‘target’ to refer to the person arousing it (some prefer ‘object’ or
‘agent’).
7
Parrott (1991) 7; Salovey and Rothman (1991); cf. Festinger (1954). Rawls (1999) 469 for a contrary
view, that the higher one’s sense of self-worth, the less likely one is to care about lacking something.
Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 286–87 sees no “positive correlation between envy and jealousy and a person’s low
self-esteem.” On self-esteem and its maintenance, see Tesser and Campbell (1980); Tesser (1991).
8
Parrott (1991) 7; Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 287; see also n. 59. Elster (1999) 169–70 further notes that in a
hierarchy we are most likely to envy the person immediately above us on the ladder, which he terms
“neighborhood envy”; cf. Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 305–6. Compare Aristotle’s view (chapter 4) that phthonos
is felt for those “similar and equal” to us.
9
Parrott (1991) 8; Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 317. Aristotle would say that this is because they have a base
character—see chapter 4.
16 { Envy and Jealousy in Classical Athens

guilt at feeling these affects, and admiration or emulation. Rosenblatt notes

feelings of helplessness to acquire the desired good, “inadequacy and inferior-
ity,” and target-directed anger.10 Clearly there is no exact agreement; however,
a number of affects command sufficient agreement to allow us to operate with
them as an irreducible minimum in the blend, and these are: emulation, covet-
ousness, anger/aggression, resentment, hostility/hatred, and a feeling of inferi-
ority or damaged self-esteem.
Envious feelings lead to a variety of actions. Elster notes that primarily “the
action tendency of envy is to destroy the envied object or its possessor”;
­Wurmser and Jarass agree, saying envy “wants the humiliation, disempower-
ment, and destruction of the envied one.”11 This is true even if such destruc-
tive action is to our own detriment also.12 This action tendency is the most
fundamental, and verbal and physical actions prompted by envy will fre-
quently act toward this goal. However, we should note that destruction does
not have to be total; damage also helps relieve envious feelings. (For example,
we are more likely to be driven to scratch our neighbor’s new car than destroy
it completely.)13 Alongside direct destructive or damaging actions, anthro-
pologists looking at non-Western cultures also tell us about indirect expres-
sions of invidious hostility, including: “gossip, backbiting, and defamation,”
invoking (or warding against) the Evil Eye, curses, and other types of spells.14
This primary destructive action tendency makes clear something that is not
generally noted in the situational antecedents: it is not a necessary part of envy
that I desire for myself the possession or quality that the other person has; my
principal concern is to deprive them of it. This implies two distinct but related
scripts: i/ I am upset that you have something, and I want to deprive you of it;
ii/ I am upset that you have something, and I want to have it instead of you. If
the good is transferable (i.e., if it is a possession), then the urge to destroy or
damage the desired good is likely to be weaker in the second case (though it
may not be, since envy’s strongest urge is to deprive the other person of their
good). I will label these two envy scripts ‘begrudging envy,’ and ‘covetous
envy.’15 It should be noted that these terms do not derive from social scientific

10
Spielman (1971) 76–77; Joffe (1969) 543–44; Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 301; Parrott (1991) 12–15; Rosenblatt
(1988) 63–64, who actually includes six components, confusing these three affects with the antecedent
conditions discussed in the main text above.
11
Elster (1999) 171. Wurmser and Jarass (2008b) xii. This destructive urge is one of the primary
factors that distinguish envy from other emotions such as greed or emulative rivalry (see chapter 2.2).
12
Rawls (1999) 466–67, 469; Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 283.
13
This suggests that envy is not an all-consuming emotion, as it does not blind us to such consid-
erations as “Will the police care enough to investigate?”, “Will we be caught?”, and “What will be our
punishment?”.
14
Foster (1972) 172–82 (quote: 172); Wolf (1955) 460. On envy and witchcraft in general, see:
Schoeck (1966/1969) 40–76; F. Bowie (2000) 219–32. On envy and the Evil Eye in particular, see also:
Spooner (1976) 284; Dionisopoulos-Mass (1976) 43–44; Kilborne (2008); Jarass and Wurmser (2008).
15
See further chapter 2.2.2 on the relationship between this ‘covetous envy’ script and covetous-
ness proper.
 Envy, Jealousy, and Related Emotions—Modern Theories } 17

research; I adopt them purely for the convenience of the reader, who, I b
­ elieve,
will find it easier to identify scripts quickly when provided with a meaningful
label (as opposed to, e.g., ‘envy script 1’ and ‘envy script 2’).

2.1.3 TRANSMUTATION OF ENVY

Like all painful emotions, the feeling of envy is subject to a number of coping
mechanisms, termed ‘defenses’ by psychoanalysts. These attempt, consciously
or subconsciously, to amend one of the three perceptions that gave rise to the
envious feelings, thus suppressing or preempting them.16 While all painful
emotions are subject to defenses, these are particularly necessary for envy be-
cause of our cultural taboo surrounding the sensation and expression of that
emotion. Envy—one of the Seven Deadly Sins, and (as a prohibition of covet-
ousness) one of the Ten Commandments—is deemed both morally wrong
and socially disruptive, and therefore, as Elster notes, “it is the only emotion
we do not want to admit to others or to ourselves.”17 Accordingly we seek to
‘veil’ or ‘mask’ it—the difference being “between hiding an emotion one feels
and showing an emotion one does not feel. . . . A mask can also serve as a
veil.”18 Elster elaborates by noting that, when one envies, one feels the primary
pain of lacking something another has; however, if aware that our feeling is
envy, we feel a second pain, which is shame or guilt at feeling a morally taboo
emotion.19 The primary pain of envy can cause us to act (destructively) against
the other person or the desired object/attribute, or can cause the sort of psy-
chological adjustments (i.e., defenses) discussed above. However, the second-
ary pain of the shame or guilt attached also causes psychological adjustments.
As Elster puts it: “I can tell myself a story in which the other obtained the
envied object by illegitimate and immoral means, and perhaps at my expense,
thus transmuting the envy into indignation or anger.”20

16
Klein (1957/1975) 215–20; Rosenblatt (1988) 64–66; Elster (1999) 172–75; Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 232–33.
These include: devaluing the good (so as not to want it); idealizing the good or devaluing the self (to
feel unworthy of it); convincing oneself the other person deserves it more; devaluing other aspects
of the rival; turning one’s attention to other goods; redoubling one’s efforts to succeed too; choosing
friends one will not envy, etc.
17
Elster (1999) 164; Schoeck (1966/1969) 14; Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 321; R. H. Smith (1991) 85, who says
this is because envy “betrays . . . inappropriate hostility,” thus undermining claims of injustice. The
Seven Deadly Sins and Ten Commandments only relate to (one or all) Abrahamic cultures; possibly
there are cultures where envy is acceptable, though I have not found an example in anthropological
literature.
18
Elster (1999) 96–97.
19
Elster (1999) 96–97; Parrott (1991) 13–14 and La Caze (2001) 34 also note this pain-enhancing
guilt. Recent psychoanalytical research into envy has also noted the overlap between envy and shame:
Rosenberger (2005); Kilborne (2008); Jarass and Wurmser (2008); Morrison and Lansky (2008).
20
Elster (1999) 97–98, 169; cf. Rawls (1999) 473–74, R. H. Smith (2004). Parrott (1991) 5–6 and
Etchegoyen et al. (1987) 50 also note envy’s tendency to disguise itself. See Elster (1999) 341–402 for a
detailed discussion of the psychological processes of transmutation and misrepresentation, not specifi-
cally re envy.
18 { Envy and Jealousy in Classical Athens

The processes of ‘transmutation’ (which unconsciously hides envy both

from oneself and others) and ‘misrepresentation’ (which consciously tries to
hide it from others) are of enormous importance for a scholarly exploration of
the emotion, because one must examine not just speech and behavior that is
caused by overt envy (i.e., destructiveness, damage, curses, slander, etc.), but
also speech and behavior ostensibly caused by such motivations as a desire for
equality (or ‘justice,’ or ‘fairness’), moral (or ‘righteous’) indignation, resent-
ment, anger, and hatred.21 As Elster points out, such a transmutation can be
very “difficult to document,”22 though it might not be: disinterested observers
often correctly spot envy, and say so, even if the patient cannot.23 Reading an
entire situation, through an understanding of the phenomena, can be very
informative—especially when language points in a different direction24—and
we will find an understanding of envy’s tendency to masquerade as other
emotions invaluable to an exploration of the emotion in Greek literature and
culture. While at a large distance in time, and with only one authorial account
to guide us, it will sometimes not be possible to determine with assurance
whether a given scenario represents genuine indignation or transmuted envy,
the psychology under which a character or individual acts will frequently
prove of secondary importance to the ways in which envious psychology and
envious individuals are portrayed, represented, and misrepresented in their
own, an opponent’s, or an author’s voice in Greek literature.

2.2 Emotions Related to Envy25

2.2.1 EMULATION AND ADMIRATION

It has often been pointed out by psychologists that there are two possible re-
sponses to the three perceptions listed as antecedent conditions for envy: mali-
cious (i.e., begrudging or covetous) envy, and another emotion. Malicious envy
will cause the patient to act to deprive the target of whatever has caused their
envy; the other emotion accepts the merit of the target, and will instead cause
the patient to focus on his/her own shortcomings. This second emotion is
termed ‘nonmalicious envy’ by Parrott, ‘emulation’ by Kristjánsson, ‘admiring

21
Elster (1999) 97–98; Parrott (1991) 6; Etchegoyen et al. (1987) 52; Rawls (1999) 471–74. Parrott
(1991) 10–11 notes that the key difference between envy and anger is whether the hostility is justified—
often easier for an outsider to spot than protagonists.
22
Elster (1999) 165.
23
Parrott (1991) 6: “it is easy to imagine situations in which an envious or jealous person is the last
person to know that envy or jealousy motivates his or her actions.”
24
Silver and Sabini (1978a) 109: “Envy is not identifiable with a particular behavior, but emerges
out of specific contexts.”
25
I exclude jealousy from this section, as its importance requires me to consider it separately in
chapter 2.4.
 Envy, Jealousy, and Related Emotions—Modern Theories } 19

envy’ by Neu, and connected to (if not identified with) admiration by Ben-
Ze’ev and Sandell.26
However, admiration differs from this second emotion, due to the lack or
presence, respectively, of a desire to improve myself. Ben-Ze’ev says admiration
requires that, when I consider another person with an object/attribute I desire,
my feelings are entirely directed toward him and are entirely positive. This will
only happen when I consider him to be outside my reference group (e.g., be-
cause he is not similar to myself, or is not nearby).27 If I want to be rich, I might
admire Bill Gates, but envy my neighbor who has a slightly higher salary than
me: my neighbor is within my reference group, while Bill Gates is not. Sandell
takes a slightly different view. He notes that in admiration we do not separate
the desired object/attribute from the target, who thus becomes a ‘trait-object’—
for instance, we may think we admire Bill Gates for being a successful business-
man, but what we really admire is Bill-Gates-the-successful-businessman; we
might know nothing else about him, and so do not separate the individual from
the admired quality. However, in envy, we do separate the target (whom we
generally despise) from the object/attribute (which we generally desire).28
Admiration does not necessarily have an action tendency; however, emula-
tion does: when I see someone with that desired object/attribute, I am moti-
vated to improve myself.29 For example, I decide to work hard so as to gain a
promotion to a similar salary-band as my colleague, or to be able to buy the
same type of sports car, or take holidays in similarly fashionable resorts. How-
ever, this is different from the malicious action tendency of (begrudging or
covetous) envy, which might motivate me to circulate malicious rumors about
him at work, scratch his car, or break his legs just before his skiing trip (i.e.,
destructive, target-focused actions).
It is also different from another script, which shares with emulation the
desire to be like someone else or possess what they possess too, but does not
share emulation’s motivation to act to make it happen; rather it has no action
tendency, tending to remain passive and unfulfilled. This script is reflected
in the phrase “I envy you” which, despite the use of the word envy, is more
akin to admiration or emulation, and is generally nonmalicious in intent.30

26
Parrott (1991) 9; Kristjánsson (2002) 139; Neu (1980) 433–34; Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 304; Sandell
(1993) 1213. Wierzbicka (1999) 98 refuses to distinguish between the two emotions. La Caze (2001) 32
also does not appear to distinguish them, merely referring to “other forms of envy” including a “mild
response to a friend’s good fortune.”
27
Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 304. In this view, if he is inside my reference group I will not simply feel
admiration.
28
Sandell (1993) 1213–16.
29
Silver and Sabini (1978b).
30
Schoeck (1966/1969) 14. Silver and Sabini (1978a) 106 believe “I envy you” expresses a compli-
ment; conversely, Foster (1972) 172–73 links compliments to envy proper, and Elster (1999) 77 argues
that “damning by faint praise may . . . be an indirect behavioral effect of envy” (italics original).
20 { Envy and Jealousy in Classical Athens

­ evertheless it shares with begrudging and covetous envy a painful feeling on

N
contemplating our lack of something desired, and shares (in English) the term
envy itself.31 This is therefore a third envy script, which is essentially Parrott’s
‘nonmalicious envy.’ However, to reflect its relationship to emulation—which
will prove important when we consider the Greek term zêlos—I shall adopt
the label ‘emulative envy’ for this script. As with ‘begrudging envy’ and ‘covet-
ous envy,’ I am not claiming that this term is of significance to either l­ aypersons
or social scientists; they are all my own labels, chosen because I believe they
best describe the action tendencies (or lack of them) of the individual envy
scripts, and will therefore be the most useful shorthand label for the reader.

2.2.2 GREED AND COVETOUSNESS

There has not been much research published on the connection of envy with
these two emotions. Klein notes the similarity between envy and greed, as
both are “impetuous and insatiable craving[s], exceeding what the subject
needs and what the object is able and willing to give.” However, she distin-
guishes them by noting that greed is merely introjective, while envy is also
projective:32 greed makes us desire someone else’s good, but that other person
is largely irrelevant; envy will accompany our desire for the good with a stron-
ger one to deprive the other person of it. If the good cannot be acquired, envy
will try to destroy it (or the rival), while greed will merely remain frustrated.
We can see that, as with emulation, there has been a change to the antecedent
conditions, this time to the first condition: instead of (1) “someone else has a
good,” greed says (1) “there is a good”—both being followed in the same way
by (2) “I do not have it,” and (3) “this is bad.” The absence of a reference to
another person explains why other affects (emulation, anger, hostility, etc.)
are not triggered, and the action tendency is different.
Covetousness is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as inordinate
desire or lust for another’s possessions. Ben-Ze’ev argues that it involves
­desiring what someone else possesses with “an excessive or culpable desire,”
and says that where envy is a two-person emotion, covetousness is really a
one-person emotion: it is “concerned with having something,” while envy is
“concerned with someone who has something.”33 However, this does not

31
Parrott (1991) 10, who notes (with references) that there is some controversy as to whether what
he calls nonmalicious envy is a type of envy or not. He rather inconsistently includes it within envy
because laypersons use the term envy to mean both, while separating envy and jealousy despite layper-
sons often using jealousy to mean envy.
32
Klein (1957/1975) 181; cf. Silver and Sabini (1978a) 106.
33
Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 303; Kristjánsson (2002) 138–39 makes the same point. Frankel and Sherick
(1977) suggest that covetousness (and greed) is developmentally prior to envy in young children (see
chapter 1 n. 13).
 Envy, Jealousy, and Related Emotions—Modern Theories } 21

accord with the dictionary definition, nor (I would suggest) with the lay un-
derstanding of the term; Ben-Ze’ev is describing not covetousness, but rather
desire or greed. One distinction between the two terms may lie in the empha-
sis placed on getting more than one needs: I might covet my neighbor’s ass
because I need an ass,34 but I am less likely to do so if I do not; I might, how-
ever, still be greedy for it as a possession. A stronger distinction is that covet-
ousness does seem in fact to involve some reference to a current possessor.
This may only be suggested by the familiarity of the aforementioned biblical
injunction; however it is hard to think of coveting (as opposed to merely de-
siring) something that belongs to no one.
It seems, then, that we should put coveting somewhere between emulation
and the script I have termed ‘covetous envy.’ Emulation wants what someone
else has, without any desire to deprive them. Coveting wants what someone
else has, but our focus is on obtaining the good itself, not on depriving the
other, which is purely incidental. In the ‘covetous envy’ script, we ideally want
to obtain the good, but our primary concern is with depriving the other person
of it (see chapter 2.1.2). Coveting and covetous envy share antecedent condi-
tions and may share action tendencies, but their motivation is different.

2.2.3 SCHADENFREUDE, SPITE AND MALICE

Psychologists have noted that envy, a painful feeling, is linked to Schaden-

freude, a pleasurable one. They argue that this is because envy involves a feel-
ing of inadequacy and a sense of injustice, leading to hostility and dislike of
the envied person; when the latter suffers a misfortune, the patient’s invidi-
ous dislike makes him feel his misfortune has somehow been earned, which
gives him pleasure.35 This pleasure in another’s misfortune, a misfortune that
is subjectively seen as deserved, has no English name—the German word
Schadenfreude (Schaden meaning harm, damage, injury; Freude meaning
joy) is generally used. The misfortune need not directly right the wrong, or
counter the perception, that led to the envy;36 for instance, we can feel
Schadenfreude at our rich (hence envied) neighbor’s car being damaged—he
is no less rich, but we feel that on some level he ‘deserves’ it. This feeling that
someone deserves the misfortune, a feeling that derives from the invidious
comparison, is important: Wierzbicka points out that sadism is also a plea-
sure taken in another’s misfortune, but it lacks this element, among others.37

34
Referring to Exodus 20.17.
35
R. H. Smith et al. (1996) 158–59, 167; cf. Wurmser and Jarass (2008b) xii.
36
R. H. Smith et al. (1996) 159.
37
Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 356, 369 and Wierzbicka (1999) 103–4 note this distinction, and that the mis-
fortune should not be serious in Schadenfreude, but that it might be in sadism. Other differences
include: that sadism takes an active part in the misfortune; it is narrower in focus and less discriminate
in object; and it is linked to sex, physical pain, humiliation, and notions of control.
22 { Envy and Jealousy in Classical Athens

Experiments have shown that invidious comparison is necessary for Schaden-

freude to be felt.38 Like envy, Schadenfreude is based on the subjective percep-
tions of the interested party: the misfortune may, or may not, be seen by
disinterested parties (i.e., those with no personal desire for the envied good)
as deserved.39
Schadenfreude is seen as a shameful emotion, like envy, and similarly it
tends to be concealed in public—a certain guilt attaches.40 However, as with
envy, an alternative to concealment is a mask: the envious person, when he
feels Schadenfreude, might consciously (through misrepresentation) or un-
consciously (through transmutation) attempt to show that the target’s mis-
fortune was objectively deserved.41 This is analogous to an envious person
attempting to show that someone’s good fortune is objectively undeserved,
concealing his envy with the mask of indignation. This suggests that
Schadenfreude (like envy) is bivalent, that it can be felt both when the mis-
fortune is subjectively deserved, but also when it is objectively deserved42
(i.e., I would not, in fact, need to envy someone to think they ‘got their
comeuppance,’ I could merely be indignant). However, when invidious
comparison is not present, we may believe someone has ‘got their comeup-
pance,’ but we will not feel pleasure at it, merely satisfaction—the pleasur-
able element is solely derived from our prior envy. The mask of Schaden-
freude, then, lies in persuading others that we have not taken pleasure in
another’s misfortune, merely that we feel satisfied that a wrong has been
righted, that someone undeserving of his good fortune has been ‘taken down
a peg or two.’43
Spite and malice (the two words seem to imply the same phenomenon,
differing merely in their idiomatic usage) are similar to Schadenfreude
­inasmuch as they are invidious: we act to spite someone to whom we have an
invidious hostility, and malice likewise involves an active hostility.44
However, they differ from Schadenfreude in that spite and malice in some
way involve action by the patient against the target, while Schadenfreude
does not.

38
R. H. Smith et al. (1996) 159, 167; Brigham et al. (1997) 364–65.
39
Brigham et al. (1997) 375–76. Chapter 2.3.1 for misfortune seen as deserved even by disinterested
parties.
40
Brigham et al. (1997) 365. Cf. n. 19 on guilt as a part of envy. Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 367–68 compares
the desires to conceal envy and Schadenfreude (which he terms “pleasure-in-others’-misfortune”).
41
Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 356–57; cf. Brigham et al. (1997) 374–76; see also chapter 2.3.1.
42
By which I mean when the point of view of the patient differs from, or matches, that of personally
disinterested observers (see n. 47).
43
Kristjánsson (2006) 96 refers to this feeling, which stands in the same relation to indignation as
Schadenfreude does to envy, as “satisfied indignation.” We could say that envy and Schadenfreude both
seek to hide one’s subjective involvement behind a veneer of personal disinterestedness.
44
Rawls (1999) 467–68.
 Envy, Jealousy, and Related Emotions—Modern Theories } 23

2.3 Emotions That Mask Envy

2.3.1 INDIGNATION AND ANGER

Ben-Ze’ev has noted that envy appears to have two concerns: first, with our
own inferiority; second, with someone else’s undeserved superiority. He has
argued, persuasively, that it is in fact the former that is properly envy, while
the latter is indignation or (as he terms it) resentment.45 There are two issues
here: perceived inferiority/superiority, and desert. Envy often positions itself
as a moral emotion (“He shouldn’t have that,” “It’s not right.”); however this
is a mask—envy can never be moral.46 If a disinterested observer would also
see the difference in outcome as unfair or morally wrong, then the target will
not deserve his superiority, and so the patient’s moral outrage will be
­justified—this is indignation. However, if the patient argues that the target’s
possession of a good is wrong or not fair, while disinterested observers believe
the patient’s inferiority is deserved, then while the patient may think he feels
indignation, observers will correctly perceive him to be experiencing envy.47
As Parrott points out: “The distinction between resentment and malicious
envy is one that is made using the objective facts of the social world.” He notes
that the patient may realize that his resentment is not justified, that his indig-
nation is not so righteous after all; when he does, he may not give over his
­resentment, but may shift its focus from the target to a more generalized dis-
satisfaction with “the unfairness of life itself.”48 While envy tends to mask
itself, true indignation, being personally disinterested and hence socially sanc-
tioned, has no need of a mask. Similarly, while envy seeks the destruction or
damage of the envied person or desired (but unattainable) object, indignation,

45
Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 282–84, 287–88; cf. Rawls (1999) 467, R. H. Smith (1991) 81 ff. I prefer indig-
nation, as the term resentment (e.g., in La Caze (2001); Van Hooft (2002) 146) conflates moral and
immoral responses (as I sometimes do intentionally in chapters 5 and 6, for reasons that will become
clear there). Even more confusingly, the French ressentiment is used widely in the literature on envy
(e.g., Scheler (1915/2007) 25 describes it as including “revenge, hatred, malice, envy, the impulse to
detract, and spite”).
46
Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 283–85; Parrott (1991) 10–11; Rawls (1999) 467. See R. H. Smith (1991) 81 ff.
for a contrary view, though he confuses envy’s personal sense of moral outrage with disinterested
indignation. La Caze (2001) 35 also seems to believe envy can be moral: she distinguishes indigna-
tion concerning a good we want from indignation concerning a good we do not, and calls the former
“moral envy”; I cannot see any justification for this distinction. Ben-Ze’ev (2002) also argues that La
Caze is mistaken.
47
When I talk about disinterested observers, I mean personally disinterested—they may still be
socially interested. (I am not interested in objective ‘truth,’ which is independent of observers, and so
cannot arouse emotions.) We should note that even society is not monolithic: some observers might
agree with the individual involved (saying his view is “fairness”), while others might not (calling it “the
politics of envy”) – see Cairns (2003b) 235–38. This suggests that an attribution of envy will depend
on an observer’s point of view, and in chapter 5.2 I show how Athenians could manipulate listeners’
points of view to portray opponents as motivated by phthonos.
48
Parrott (1991) 11.
24 { Envy and Jealousy in Classical Athens

being directed at someone breaching collective boundaries, merely seeks ap-

propriate punishment. Because of the high frequency of transmutation or
masking of envy, the ‘outsider’s’ evaluation of the facts can be crucial in deter-
mining whether expressed indignation is truly indignation, or really envy in
disguise: indignation will only properly be felt at someone who does not
­deserve the object/attribute in question, while envy masquerading as indigna-
tion will be felt irrespective of whether he deserves it or not.49 However, as
mentioned above, portrayals and (mis)representations of individuals and
groups as envious will frequently be of more interest to us than the rather
sterile fact of whether someone long dead (and sometimes fictional) was gen-
uinely indignant or, rather, envious.
Both Parrott and Ben-Ze’ev note that indignation/resentment is more akin
to anger than to envy.50 But is there a qualitative difference between indigna-
tion and anger, or is it merely a matter of degree? The psychological and
­psychoanalytical literature on envy tends to conflate the two.51 However, Wi-
erzbicka says that anger is target specific, while indignation is more general-
ized,52 and Ben-Ze’ev similarly suggests that indignation is a response to a
transgression of societal norms, while anger is a response to a more personal
transgression.53 These are plausible distinctions.

2.3.2 DESIRE FOR JUSTICE, AND DESIRE FOR EQUALITY

A related emotion, which envy is also frequently misrepresented as or trans-

muted into, is a desire for ‘justice’ or ‘equality.’ Those who are envious often
express themselves with such comments as “You’re no better than the rest of
us!”, “Why should he have that, we haven’t?”, or “That’s an obscene amount to
earn!”. There are similarities here to moral indignation, but whereas that emo-
tion is aroused by someone stepping outside of socially agreed norms of be-
havior, the desire for justice appeals to a more universal abstraction.54 It ini-
tially seems somewhat controversial as to whether there is a justice element to
envy: Ben-Ze’ev and Rawls, for instance, argue that there is not, R. H. Smith
that there is.55 However, the two camps miss each other’s points. Ben-Ze’ev
and Rawls argue from a personally disinterested standpoint, while Smith

49
We will see in chapter 4 that Aristotle makes a very similar point.
50
Parrott (1991) 10–11; Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 283.
51
And, incidentally, also conflates anger with hatred in an ambiguous “hostility.”
52
Wierzbicka (1999) 87–90; she also says that indignation contains some element of surprise (sc.
but anger does not).
53
Ben-Ze’ev (2002) 152–53, who goes on to argue that anger is more transient than indignation (or
“resentment,” as he terms it), and that it is more inclined to seek redress.
54
Elster (1999) 350. Considering n. 47, we might say that indignation refers to expected norms,
while desire for justice refers (incorrectly) to an objective truth.
55
See n. 46. La Caze (2001) 35–36 also makes the same error with a sense of injustice as she does
with “moral envy.”
 Envy, Jealousy, and Related Emotions—Modern Theories } 25

makes his claim from a personally interested one. Just as with indignation/
resentment, someone who is envious might think he is motivated by a sense of
injustice—this would, after all, merely mean his invidious hostility has been
transmuted rather than misrepresented.56 In that sense, the sense of injustice
is indeed often central to envy, as Smith asserts. However, even he does not
believe that a disinterested observer will corroborate that personally inter-
ested sense of injustice.
A desire for equality is related to the desire for justice, and, like the latter,
can be argued for as a ‘just’ end in itself: some societies will aim to redistrib-
ute goods such as money or property—or, indeed, to recognize inalienable
rights—not to manage a specific instance of envy, but in an attempt to lessen
the level of envy in society more generally.57 Rawls argues that there are
three conditions required for general envy: (1) that people feel undervalued,
and do not think they can do anything about it; (2) this is felt as “painful and
humiliating”, and social conditions are such that this painful and humiliat-
ing situation is constantly brought to their attention; (3) their social position
gives no alternative to trying to pull down the rich, even at some loss to
themselves. Societies that try to manage envy (or, from Rawls’s point of
view, societies that set out to create just institutions) will aim to ameliorate
one or more of these conditions—for instance by forbidding ostentatious
displays of wealth, by placing burdens on wealthier citizens, or by enshrin-
ing citizen rights that enhance the status even of the lowliest.58 This may not
do any good, however: many psychologists believe that reduced inequality is
at least as likely to lead to a rise as a fall in envy, due to the oft-noted ten-
dency of envy to be directed at one’s peers.59 Ben-Ze’ev notes two distinc-
tions between envy and a genuine desire for equality: the former will only
call for equality when it favors the envious person, while the latter will call
for it when it disadvantages them as well; second, envy will also occur in
respect of goods which cannot be equal by their very nature (e.g., beauty or
intelligence).60

56
R. H. Smith (1991) 85–87 does not appear to be aware of the distinction between transmutation
and misrepresentation.
57
Rawls (1999) 468–69 distinguishes between particular and general envy.
58
Rawls (1999) 469–71 argues that some (e.g., Schoeck (1966/1969)) see all “tendency to ­equality
. . . [as] the expression of envy” (471); Neu (1980) 437–39 strongly disagrees with Schoeck. Kristjánsson
(2006) 83 notes that we have a concept of justice-based emotions from early childhood, and since we
are not aware of legal institutions at that stage, our innate sense of “what justice is” is essentially pre-
institutional. In this context, we should note the ‘vigilant’ or ‘assertive egalitarianism’ of some hunter-
gatherer societies such as the Hadza and the !Kung (see, for example, Woodburn (1982)).
59
Silver and Sabini (1978a) 107; Parrott (1991) 7; Elster (1999) 170; Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 316; Ben-Ze’ev
(2002) 151; cf. n. 8. None of these studies, however, quotes any experiential evidence for decreased
equality leading to a rise in envy.
60
Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 316. See also R. H. Smith (1991) 90–92 on “natural inequalities”.
26 { Envy and Jealousy in Classical Athens

2.4 Jealousy
2.4.1 ETYMOLOGY

The word jealousy derives from the Greek ζῆλος, meaning “eager rivalry,
­zealous imitation, emulation, jealousy, zeal; (used passively as) the object of
emulation or desire, happiness, bliss, honor, glory; extravagance of style;
fierceness.”61 Dictionary definitions for jealousy include:62 anger, wrath, in-
dignation; devotion, eagerness, anxiety to serve; the state of mind arising from
the suspicion, apprehension, or knowledge of rivalry; suspicion, mistrust. The
related adjective is jealous, which means: vehement in wrath, desire, or devo-
tion; vigilant in guarding, suspiciously careful or watchful; troubled by the
belief, suspicion, or fear that the good which one desires to gain or keep for
oneself has been or may be diverted to another; resentful toward another on
account of known or suspected rivalry; suspicious, fearful.

2.4.2 JEALOUSY SCENARIOS

Jealousy is often believed by laypersons to be similar to envy.63 However, it has

three quite different antecedent perceptions: (1) I have an exclusive relation-
ship with someone (a partner) or something (a possession); (2) I am in danger
of losing that exclusivity or the entire relationship with them/it; (3) because I
have a rival for their affection/possession.64 The prototypical jealousy scenario
is sexual jealousy;65 however one can feel jealous when the rival is a thing (e.g.,
my husband’s car or prized rosebushes), or non-love rival (e.g., the friends my
wife ignores me for); and one can feel jealous at the potential or actual loss of
an object/attribute (e.g., status or privileges), including loss of distinctiveness
or exclusivity in being the only one to possess it. Unlike envy, which is rooted
in social comparison, jealousy is therefore based on personal rivalry and fear
of loss. It involves a unique bond with a unique individual or item, exclusivity,
and (imagined, potential, or actual) alienation of affection or ownership.66
Parrott argues that the partner or possession must be formative to our own
self-concept for jealousy to be possible: what we fear to lose is not so much a
beloved partner or valued possession, but actually a part of ourselves.67

61
LSJ. The English word zealous is also derived from ζῆλος.
62
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary for the remainder of the paragraph, which is an abridged
direct quotation.
63
Indeed they are often used, incorrectly, as partial synonyms (see Cairns (2008) 50). I discuss this
further in the main text below.
64
Parrott (1991) 15–16; Neu (1980) 432–33; see Wierzbicka (1999) 99 for a slightly different formulation.
65
Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 289–90; Parrott (1991) 15–16; Sharpsteen (1991) 32–34, who also discusses emo-
tion ‘prototypes’; Kristjánsson (2002) 155 ff. disagrees with the choice of sexual jealousy as a prototype
for all jealousy. Some psychologists distinguish sexual from possessive jealousy (see chapter 2.4.3).
66
Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 289–90; Parrott (1991) 15–16.
67
Parrott (1991) 16–17; cf. Tov-Ruach (1980) 466–68; Ben-Ze’ev (2010) 44–47.
 Envy, Jealousy, and Related Emotions—Modern Theories } 27

Like envy, jealousy is generally considered a blended emotion, but again

scholars differ considerably on the number and nature of its components. Freud
believes it compounds four affects: grief, a narcissistic wound, enmity against
the rival, and (perhaps) self-criticism. Shengold more vaguely says it is an indi-
vidually varying mixture of hate and love. Spielman believes it has a similar mix
to envy (emulation, narcissistic wound, covetousness, anger) with less emula-
tion and more anger, combined with an unconscious homosexuality, and sus-
picion or mistrust (or paranoia). Sharpsteen and Planalp argue for a blend prin-
cipally of anger, fear, and sadness. Parrott argues for fear of loss, anger, and
insecurity. Kristjánsson plumps for envy, anger, and indignation. Ben-Ze’ev
gives a particularly generous list: anger, hostility, resentment, and suspicion, as
well as love, admiration, and distrust.68 As with envy we find no consensus; but
affects that would command widespread (if not universal) agreement—as an
irreducible minimum to operate with—are anger, envy, hostility, fear of / grief
at loss, and damaged self-esteem.69 It is perhaps surprising that love is rarely
included; possibly it is taken for granted, but perhaps it is simply not necessary:
what matters is not that I love the person/object, but that they are mine.70
Hupka argues that jealousy is more properly a type of anger, distinguished
by the situations in which it occurs (these situations being culturally deter-
mined); thus when societies do not value romantic or monogamous attach-
ments, and when the group is more important than the family or known pa-
ternity, jealousy as we know it is not observed.71 However, as Elster argues: “If
a person is unaware of his emotion, it may be because he lives in a society that
does not provide a unifying cognitive label for the behavioral and physiologi-
cal expressions of that particular emotion.”72 (i.e., jealousy may not be com-
monly observed simply because there is no convenient label for it; it does not
necessarily mean that it does not exist in that society).73

68
Freud (1922) 223; Shengold (1994) 619; Spielman (1971) 78–79, and cf. also Freud (1922) on a
supposed connection between homosexuality and extreme jealousy; Sharpsteen (1991) 31, 36; Planalp
(1999) 174; Parrott (1991) 4, and Neu (1980) 433 agree with fear of loss and insecurity; Kristjánsson
(2002) 141–42, 144 and (2006) 17–18; Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 301, and in (2010) 42–43 he says that “three
major components” are fear of loss, love, and anger or sorrow.
69
Parrott (1991) 18–21 distinguishes ‘suspicious’ and ‘fait accompli’ jealousy (respectively when
infidelity is suspected and certain). In the former, suspicion and fear of loss will be a large part of the
blend; in the latter, grief, envy, and associated feelings (hostility, aggressiveness, destructive hatred)
will be heightened.
70
Ben-Ze’ev (2010) 40. Wurmser and Jarass (2008c) 15–19 discuss the conflict between love and jealousy:
love is theoretically unconditional and about the individuality and unconditional acceptance of the other,
while jealousy is about my sexual desires, my loss, my humiliation, my aggression; however, love seems
almost inherently to contain the capacity to be overpowered by jealousy when sexual desire is frustrated.
71
Hupka (1991); Hupka (1981); see also Sharpsteen (1991) 34 and Salovey (1991b) 280.
72
Elster (1999) 412; see also V. Reddy (2010). Stearns (2010) suggests there are societies (and he
provides some examples) where jealousy may be present psychologically, yet be subject to a strong
social taboo on its expression.
73
Kristjánsson (2002) 21 makes the same point for other emotions. As mentioned in chapter 1, and
as will become clear in chapter 8, Classical Greek exhibits exactly this lack of label.
28 { Envy and Jealousy in Classical Athens

Like envy, jealousy can be disguised, though as it is more socially accept-

able the complexity and variety of disguise is much reduced. Furthermore,
since jealousy is caused by an interpersonal infraction while envy is caused by
a social infraction, this suggests it is more likely to masquerade as anger rather
than indignation (see chapter 2.3.1). Parrott notes that, while an outside
person would perceive jealousy, the patient themselves will most likely expe-
rience, or believe they are experiencing, anxious insecurity (in the case of
‘suspicious’ jealousy) or indignant anger (with ‘fait accompli’ jealousy).74 This
may lead to revenge against either the partner (if love turns to hatred) or the
rival (if there is a strong admixture of envy). In the absence of such closure, a
natural path would be a period of recrimination, followed by some measure
of acceptance.75

2.4.3 COMPARISON OF ENVY AND JEALOUSY

The above analyses concentrate on prototypical envy and jealousy scenarios.

By nature such analyses highlight (and exacerbate) differences between the
two emotions. Differences so far noted are: (1) envy is a desire for what some-
one else has, while jealousy is a desire to retain or regain something we see as
ours; (2) jealousy involves an exclusive bond with a particular object/person,
while envy does not; (3) envy involves social comparison, while jealousy in-
volves personal rivalry; (4) envy is always destructive, while jealousy aims at
possession, and only becomes destructive when there is a fait accompli (which
involves a strong admixture of envy);76 (5) envy has relatively more tendency
to hatred, while jealousy has relatively more tendency to anger; (6) jealousy is
more socially sanctioned than envy, so defenses are fewer, while (7) envy
tends, both consciously and unconsciously, toward disguise.77 Further distinc-
tions have been noted by scholars. For instance, some argue that envy nor-
mally involves two people while jealousy must involve three—or at least a
triangular relationship, if one of the three is not a person.78 Foster notes that
we envy a person, and the possession is only a trigger; however we are jealous
of a possession/partner, and perception of a rival is the trigger.79 And finally,
R. H. Smith, et al. have found that envy tends to be associated with such

74
Parrott (1991) 5–6, 18; see n. 69 for these terms.
75
Hupka (1991) 255–56; Sharpsteen (1991) 43–45.
76
We might think suspicious jealousy is also destructive, but this is only the case when it leads to
extreme anxiety, and the jealous person has become almost convinced of the loss of the loved one/
possession (i.e., when suspicious jealousy approximates to fait accompli).
77
Parrott (1991) 23; Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 281; Klein (1957/1975) 182; Neu (1980) 432–35.
78
Klein (1957/1975) 181; Spielman (1971) 80; Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 289–90; Kristjánsson (2002) 139–40,
who notes three-person situations that involve envy rather than jealousy. For a variety of contrary
arguments, see Sandell (1993) 1216; Laverde-Rubio (2004) 409–10; Cairns (2003b) 239 n. 12.
79
Foster (1972) 168; cf. Neu (1980) 432–33.
 Envy, Jealousy, and Related Emotions—Modern Theories } 29

a­ ffective states as longing, inferiority, and self-awareness, while jealousy is

more concerned with suspiciousness, anxiety, hurt, and fear of loss.80
While it can be analytically helpful to separate envy from jealousy con-
ceptually, so as to understand both better, such a sharp distinction overem-
phasizes their differences at the expense of their similarities. First, in real life
people tend to conflate the two: while ‘envy’ is rarely used for a jealousy
­situation, ‘jealousy’ is frequently used for an envy situation.81 Second, many
situations (especially three-person situations) involve both envy and jeal-
ousy.82 Salovey and others have argued that, instead of trying to separate
envy from jealousy as distinct emotions, one should look at situations that
combine them.83 This ‘situational’ approach sees two rivals O and P, and an
object (or person) X: in envy, O has X, while P desires it; in jealousy, P has X,
and fears to lose it to O; in rivalry, neither O nor P have X, but both try to
possess it.84 Instead of focusing on the distinction between envy and jealousy
(conflating possessive and sexual jealousy in the latter), this approach there-
fore distinguishes between social comparison situations and sexual ones,
both of which might involve any combination of envy and jealousy.85 This
situational approach is a helpful analytical tool. It is a rare situation that will
clearly involve either envy or jealousy alone (as frequently one party will feel
one, while the other feels the other), and the sharp distinction is undermined
even further when we consider that envy is frequently part of the blend of
feelings in the jealousy complex. We should therefore recognize that there
are many situations that will involve some combination of envy and jeal-
ousy, and the prototypical scenarios above can help us pinpoint where these
occur.
These disagreements may vex psychologists, but they are helpful to us in
our aim to distinguish different jealousy scripts. First, there is ‘possessive jeal-
ousy,’ where I alone have something and do not want to lose it to someone

80
Smith, Kim and Parrott (1988); cf. Parrott and Smith (1993). R. H. Smith and Parrott are promi-
nent among scholars arguing for a sharp distinction between envy and jealousy. Kristjánsson (2002)
147–48 disagrees strongly with attempts to distinguish these two emotions, his main criticism of (prin-
cipally) Parrott and R. H. Smith being that their methodologies presuppose their conclusions, and so
the experiments designed merely reinforce those presuppositions.
81
Smith, Kim and Parrott (1988); Parrott (1991) 24; Parrott and Smith (1993) 906; Salovey and Rodin
(1984) 780. Note that the dictionary definition of jealousy in the main text above does not include envy
as a synonym, while the definition of envy does include jealousy. Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 281–82 argues that
the one-way confusion of envy and jealousy arises because of the frequency of situations in which these
emotions co-occur, and because of the social unacceptability of envy.
82
Kristjánsson (2002) 146–47.
83
Salovey and Rodin (1984) 780; Bers and Rodin (1984) 766–67; Salovey (1991b); Kristjánsson
(2002) 147–48.
84
Salovey (1991b) 265–66; cf. Salovey and Rodin (1986) 1111: “Envy may merely be jealousy in a
social-comparison context.”
85
Salovey and Rodin (1986). However, it is clear that even the ‘situational’ approach does not com-
pletely elide the difference between envy and jealousy.
30 { Envy and Jealousy in Classical Athens

else. Second, similar but subtly different, where I alone have something and
will still have it (e.g., a status symbol at work, or a reputation for great wisdom),
but am upset that someone else may come to have it alongside me—for con-
venience I will label this ‘jealous of my position.’ Third, ‘sexual jealousy,’
which many scholars (and, commonsense tells us, laypeople) see as distinct
from possessive jealousy. And finally ‘envy’ (with all its subscripts), since lay-
people frequently use the word jealousy interchangeably with envy to describe
those scripts.
As will later become clear, ancient Greek phthonos covers all the envy and
jealousy scripts so far identified (and more, see chapter 3.1), with the excep-
tions of emulative envy and sexual jealousy; and Greek sexual jealousy seems
necessarily to involve phthonos, though not always the same phthonos script
(see chapter 8). While the envy and jealousy prototypes will therefore be useful
as an analytical tool for reading ancient Greek ‘scripts,’ it is more useful still to
have a variety of modern English envy and jealousy scripts at our fingertips for
reading scenarios in Greek literature.

2.5 Conclusion

Envy is a hostile emotion, usually felt for our peers, when they have some
object or attribute we want. It is characterized by a stronger desire for
them to be deprived of the object/attribute than for us to acquire it our-
selves, and motivates us to act even if depriving them means losing some-
thing ourselves as well. Its action tendency is generally destructive, to the
desired good and/or its possessor, and it operates through such expression
as physical aggression, gossip and slander, compliments designed to
arouse the ‘Evil Eye’ or invidious feelings in others, and curses or other
types of black magic. Envy has a tendency to disguise itself as moral indig-
nation, or some disinterested desire for justice or equality, but in fact it is
never a moral emotion, as the invidious hostility blinds the patient to the
target’s true deserts. In English, the term ‘envy’ can also be used for a
­different (weaker, nonmalicious) emotion, one that arises from similar an-
tecedents, but has no action tendency; a statement that one feels it can act
as a compliment.
The following is a summary of the envy and related scripts that can follow
from noting that (1) you have something, (2) I do not, and (3) I feel a painful
feeling on contemplating our relative positions:
Scripts (a), (b), and (e) are the three scripts that the term ‘envy’ covers in
English. Scripts (a) and (b) are considered morally wrong and socially disrup-
tive, and can be transmuted into indignation, anger, or a desire for equality/
fairness/justice. On performing either of these scripts (i.e., on depriving the
 Envy, Jealousy, and Related Emotions—Modern Theories } 31

TABLE 2.1 }

(a) I feel a strong desire to act to deprive you of the good, but have no desire ‘begrudging envy’
to obtain it myself
(b) I feel a strong desire to act to deprive you of the good, and a weaker desire ‘covetous envy’
to obtain it myself
(c) I feel a strong desire to act to obtain the good, and a weaker desire to ‘covetousness’
deprive you
(d) I feel a strong desire to act to obtain a similar good, but do not want to ‘emulation’
deprive you
(e) I have no strong desire to act, thus leaving you in possession and me ‘emulative envy’
lacking, with the painful feeling unchanged

other person) the satisfaction of our invidious desire can give us pleasure,
termed spite or malice in English. The other person being deprived through
someone else’s action or through fate will give us the feeling of Schadenfreude.
Just as our initial envy may be transmuted into the moral feelings of indigna-
tion, so these invidious pleasurable feelings may be transmuted into a moral
feeling that someone who had an unjustified advantage has received their
­appropriate comeuppance.
Jealousy differs from envy in a number of respects, but has many ­similarities
too. It is principally felt when there is some object/person with which/whom
we see ourselves as having an exclusive bond, and can apply both in sexual and
nonsexual situations. It frequently includes envy in its blend—along with
anger, hostility, and potentially suspicion, fear of loss, or grief. It necessarily
takes place in a three-person scenario (unless it is possessive rather than sexual
jealousy, when one person can be replaced by an object), whereas envy can
occur in a two-person scenario; three-person scenarios tend to contain vari-
ous mixtures of rivalry, envy, and jealousy. Jealousy carries less of a social
stigma than envy, and so has less of a tendency to disguise itself; when it does,
righteous anger is the usual mask. In English, the term ‘jealousy’ can some-
times be used in place of the term ‘envy.’ The scripts covered by the term
jealousy are therefore:

TABLE 2.2 }

(a) I have an exclusive relationship with something I possess, and do ‘jealous of my position’
not want a rival to possess a similar good
(b) I have an exclusive relationship with something I possess, and do ‘possessive jealousy’
not want to lose it to a rival
(c) I have an exclusive sexual/romantic attachment to someone, and ‘sexual jealousy’
do not want to lose him/her to a rival
(d) (Used to mean) envy ‘envy’
32 { Envy and Jealousy in Classical Athens

Now that we are in full possession of the scripts that are covered by the terms
envy and jealousy (and related terms), and the psychology and action
tendencies associated with each, we are in a position to explore the related
terms and scripts in ancient Greek literature and culture, which I do in the
next chapter.
 3}

The Vocabulary of Greek Envy and Jealousy

3.1 Phthonos

The primary Greek word that relates to both envy and jealousy scripts is
phthonos (and cognate forms). This term generally covers the lexical ground
covered by envy and nonsexual jealousy in English (in particular, the scripts I
have labeled ‘begrudging envy,’ ‘covetous envy,’ ‘possessive jealousy,’ and
‘jealous of my position’), but is considerably broader still.
Around a third of phthon- words in the Archaic and Classical periods are
derived from the verbal form phthonein. The substantive phthonos accounts
for around a quarter of instances. The adjectives/adverbs phthoneros/-ôs (en-
vious/jealous/grudging), epiphthonos/-ôs (liable to envy/jealousy, regarded
with envy/jealousy), and anepiphthonos/ôs (the opposite of epiphthonos/-ôs)
are all reasonably common, and we also occasionally find forms such as
phthonêsis (the same as phthonos) or hupophthonos/-ein (secretly jealous,
quite jealous). We also frequently see aphthonia/-os/-ôs, which collectively
­account for around a quarter of all phthon- words, and generally have the
meanings ‘abundant,’ ‘plentiful,’ ‘generous’1 – though occasionally they can
mean ‘lack of phthonos.’2
In the Archaic period we find a number of aphorisms, particularly recorded
under the name of the Seven Sages:3 “Envy no one” (Sept. Sap. Apophth. fr. 7.3
Mullach: μηδενὶ φθόνει). “Do not feel envy for mortal goods” (Sept. Sap. Sent.
p. 216 l. 31 Mullach: μὴ φθόνει θνητά). “Flee the envy of all, and guard against
the plots of those who hate you” (Sept. Sap. Apophth. fr. 1.7 Mullach: φεῦγε μὲν
τὸν φθόνον τῶν πολλῶν, φυλάσσου δὲ τὰς ἐπιβουλὰς τῶν μισούντων). “As the

1
Which as early as Hes. Op. 188; and Hymn. Hom. 3.536, 30.8, 30.16 has lost all but an etymological
link to phthonos proper.
2
For example, Pind. Ol. 6.7, 11.7, 13.25, Pyth. 8.71; Aesch. Supp. 322, Ag. 471, 939; Pl. Prt. 327b5, Resp.
500a5. The rare occurrence aphthonêtos always implies this.
3
Archaic if genuine, though some may be later misattributions. 33
34 { Envy and Jealousy in Classical Athens

red blight is a disease peculiar to food, so envy is a sickness of friendship”

(Sept. Sap. Apophth. fr. 7.4 Mullach: ὥσπερ ἡ ἐρυσίβη ἴδιόν ἐστι τοῦ σίτου
νόσημα, οὕτω φθόνος φιλίας ἐστὶν ἀρρώστημα). “As rust attaches to iron, so
phthonos does to the possessing soul itself” (Sept. Sap. Apophth. fr. 7.5 Mul-
lach: ὥσπερ ὁ ἰὸς σίδηρον, οὕτως ὁ φθόνος τὴν ἔχουσαν αὐτὸν ψυχὴν ἐξαναψήχει).
Disease, sickness, and rust are strong indications of the social and moral unac-
ceptability of phthonos.
Aphorisms continue throughout the Archaic and Classical periods. Pindar
says “Nevertheless, envy is better than pity” (Pyth. 1.85: ἀλλ’ ὅμως, κρέσσον γὰρ
οἰκτιρμοῦ φθόνος).4 A more common theme in Pindar—indeed the epinician
genre as a whole—incorporates phthonos into the rhetoric of praise for the
victor, as something both to be desired as an indicator of success and shunned
as potentially destructive.5 The Archaic poet Mimnermos too contrasts feeling
envy for a live man of great fame with praising a dead one (fr. 25.1–2 West:
δεινοὶ γὰρ ἀνδρὶ πάντες ἐσμὲν εὐκλεεῖ ζῶντι φθονῆσαι, κατθανόντα δ’ αἰνέσαι).6
As well as for someone successful, we feel phthonos for rivals, as when Hesiod
says “Potter grudges potter and carpenter, carpenter; beggar envies beggar
and bard, bard” (Op. 25–26: καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων,
καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ φθονέει καὶ ἀοιδὸς ἀοιδῷ).7 Finally, it is felt for a range of
people close to one: neighbors,8 friends,9 relatives,10 fellow citizens,11 and those
“similar and equal” to oneself in birth, ­relationship, age, disposition, distinc-
tion, or wealth.12 These insights are often paralleled in research into English
envy.

4
Cf. Hdt. 3.52.5.1–2. Envy is also contrasted to pity frequently in the oratorical corpus (e.g., Andoc.
2.6; Lys. 2.67, 20.15, 21.15, 24.2; Dem. 21.196, 28.18, 29.2. Arist. Rh. 2.9, 1387a3–5 and 2.10, 1388a27–30
notes that one cannot simultaneously feel both envy and pity for someone.
5
While the rhetoric of praise in the epinician genre can contain elements of hyperbole, it must nev-
ertheless be rooted in agreed perceptions; hence victors must indeed have been envied by some. It was
part of the encomiast’s task to manage that envy, and help reintegrate victors into their ­communities
– see Most (2003) 134. On phthonos in Pindar, see especially Kirkwood (1984); Vallozza (1989); Kurke
(1991) 195–224; Bulman (1992); Most (2003).
6
Arist. Rh. 2.10.1388a9–11 also notes that one does not feel rivalry, and hence envy, for the dead; cf.
Dem. 18.315, but contra Dem. 20.141.
7
Assimilating phthonein with kotein, on which more in the main text below. On envy for rivals
cf. Thuc. 2.45.1.4; Pl. Spur. 376d8; Isoc. 12.158; and more generally see discussion of philotimia and
philon(e)ikia in chapter 3.3.
8
Pind. Ol. 1.47; Pl. Phlb. 48a8–50a9 (on which see pp. 102–4), Ar. Eccl. 565; Alexis fr. 51.1 Kock.
9
Sept. Sap. Apophth. fr. 7.4 Mullach; Pl. Phlb. 48a8–50a9 (see pp. 102–4), Def. 416a13; Aesch. Ag. 833;
Xen. Mem 3.9.8.1–4. But contra Arist. Rh. 2.4, 1381b21–23 and Xen. Mem. 2.6.22.1–23.7, whose views on
(perfect) friends are somewhat different from those of other Greeks – see also p. 73 with n. 58.
10
Aesch. fr. 610–13 Mette; specifically stepmothers for stepchildren at Eur. Ion 1025; a brother who
shot his brother at Sept. Sap. Apophth. fr. 10.30.3–5 Mullach; Eur. Phoen. 479 between the brothers
Eteocles and Polynices (though this occurs in three lines the latest OCT (ed. Diggle) deletes as an
interpolation); Hdt. 3.30.1.5 between the brothers Cambyses and Smerdis.
11
Hdt. 7.237.2.4.
12
Arist. Rh. 2.9, 1386b19-20; 2.10, 1387b25–28—see chapter 4.3.2; cf. Pl. Lys. 215d3.
 The Vocabulary of Greek Envy and Jealousy } 35

Common uses of phthon- words are to accuse others of phthonos, to in-

struct others not to feel it, or to deny feeling it oneself. Accusations can be
person-specific, and are frequently made by orators against their opponents in
forensic speeches;13 there are similar agonistic accusations in plays,14 and (in
oratory) against other cities.15 Prohibitions are, of course, another form of
accusation—instead of saying merely “you are envious,” the prohibition adds
“but you shouldn’t be.”16 A particular type of prohibition craves the audience’s
indulgence before speaking (i.e., “Don’t begrudge me for speaking”);17 and
Isocrates in particular occasionally comments that ­phthonos is what any
speaker can expect for offering good advice.18 Denials of feeling phthonos are
also not uncommon.19 These will logically only be made where one might be
expected to feel phthonos, which suggests that any denial can indicate its po-
tential presence. Certainly it should be treated skeptically: a speaker will be
keen to show that he is not acting under this most base of emotions, and so
will justify himself by ‘explaining’ the true cause of his actions.
Between them direct accusations, prohibitions, and denials make up around
a quarter of all instances of phthon- words in the Classical period. Indirect ac-
cusations, where an individual other than an opponent, or a part or the whole
of a group, is accused of being envious, account for many more.20 This posi-
tionality—that phthonos is something YOU do (or someone else does), but I do
not—is noteworthy, as it suggests that those who ascribe it to others or disclaim
it from themselves have an obvious, and frequently suspect, agenda. There are
only a handful of instances where the speaker claims p­ hthonos for himself, or a
group of which he is part, which makes these worthy of individual consider-
ation. Isocrates notes that ‘we’ envy all those who are foremost in intelligence

13
Dem. 18 (§§ 13, 121, 279, 303, with similar accusations of baskania at §§ 108, 119, 132, 139, 189, 242,
252, 307, 317), Aeschin. 2 (§§ 10, 22, 51, 54, 139), Lys. 24 (§§ 1 twice, 2, 3), and Isae. 2 (§§ 23, 24, 27) are the
Attic forensic speeches with the most sustained accusations of phthonos, and I discuss them at length
in chapter 5.2. Other accusations occur at Isoc. 15.259; Dem. 9.54, 19.343, 25.52, 39.34, 45.35, Epist. 3.41.
14
For example, Eur. IT 503; Ar. Eq. 880, 1051, Thesm. 252, 757, Eccl. 1043.
15
For example, Lys. 2.48, 2.67; Isoc. 4.47, 14.20; Dem 15.15. Isocrates denies Athens feels phthonos
of rivals at 4.29, 4.104.
16
Prohibitions occur at, for example, Aesch. Sept. 480, PV 584; Soph. OT 310; Eur. Med. 63, Rhes.
193, frs. 703.1, 1064.5 Nauck; Eupolis frs. 316, 358 Kock; Ar. Ach. 497, Eq. 580, Lys. 649, Eccl. 900; Pl.
Symp. 223a1, Euthd. 297b6, Prt. 320c1, Grg. 489a4, Meno 71d6, Hp. mi. 372e7; Resp. 338a3, 528a2; Xen.
Cyr. 8.5.24.5; Andoc. 2.6; Lys. 21.15; Isoc. 3.60, 15.302, 19.23; Isae. 6.61; Dem. 59.15.
17
For example, Dem. 20.74, Exord. 13.1; cf. Ar. Ach. 497, Lys. 649.
18
For example, Isoc. 9.39, 10.30, 15.8; and he says he specifically is envied at 12.15, 12.21, 12.23, 15.4,
15.13, 15.62, 15.163, Epist. 2.22, Epist. 9.15. See Saïd (2003) on phthonos in Isocrates.
19
Denials occur at for example Aesch. Sept. 236, PV 628; Soph. Ant. 553; Eur. Med. 312, Hipp. 20,
Hec. 238, HF333, Bacch. 1005; Ar. Lys. 1192, Thesm. 252; Pl. Ap. 33a8, La. 200b7, Prot. 361e1, Hp. mai.
283e8; Xen. Cyr. 8.4.16.3; Lys. 20.15; Isoc. 4.29, 4.104, 8.124, 14.47; Dem. 23.188, 35.40, 42.22, Epist. 3.32.
20
52 instances in the oratorical corpus alone: Lys.3.9, 12.66; Isoc. 5.68, 5.73, 5.131, 6.61, 8.13, 9.6, 12.81,
12.158, 12.172, 12.241, 12.251, 13.19, 15.142 twice, 15.316, Epist. 2.21, Epist. 4.4 (plus those in n.18); Dem. 4.8,
19.22, 19.228, 20.10, 20.56, 20.139, 20.151, 20.157, 20.164, 23.164, 25.75, 47.70, 57.6, 59.97, Epist.2.4, Epist.
3.6, Epist. 3.10, Epist. 3.20, Epist. 3.28; Aeschin. 2.111; Lycurg. 1.69.
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—— Thomas, 179.
Winnington, Francis, 59.
Wodroofe, John, 208.
Wolsey, Cardinal, 18, 24.
Woodward, Charles, 173.
Worlidge, 213.
'Wreath and Ribbon Style,' the, 65.
Wren, Sir Christopher, 12.
Wyndham, Wadham, 78.

Yale College, 159.

Yates, engraving by, 91.
—— James, 107.
 Printed by T. and A. Constable, Printers to her Majesty
at the Edinburgh University Press

FOOTNOTES:
[1] Among the late Sir Bernard Burke's papers there was
discovered a collection of book-plates said to have been formed in
Ireland in the middle of the last century; but there is nothing to
show that the collection was formed as a collection of book-plates
qua book-plates.
[2] There are two varieties of this book-plate.
[3] Moore, vol. i. p. 87.
[4] There are two sizes of this book-plate.
[5] Report by the Historical MSS. Commission on the papers of
the Duke of Rutland.
[6] A list of some Scottish book-plate engravers, compiled by
Mr. J. Orr, is printed in the Ex Libris Journal, ii. p. 41.
[7] The design has been more recently used by Thomas
Gainsford.
[8] William Oliver's plate from Bibliographica, vol. ii. p. 434.
[9] Svenska Bibliotek och Ex Libris antecknigar af C. M.
Carlander, med 84 illustrationer. Stockholm, 1889, and
Supplement, 1891.
[10] Sixth series, vol. i. p. 2.
[11] American Book-Plates. By Charles Dexter Allen. Bell and
Son, 1895.
 [12] The same remark applies to other book-plates bearing
colonial addresses, such as that of 'Isaac Royall, Esq., of Antigua.'
[13] It may be remarked as curious that William Penn does
not, on his book-plate, impale the arms of Hannah Callowhill, to
whom he was married in 1695.
[14] She married, in 1767, the Hon. John Damer, a son of Lord
Milton.
[15] A variety of this book-plate exists on which the inscription
reads: 'Anna Seymour-Damer.'
[16] See Article in Bibliographica, vol. ii. p. 422.

Transcriber's Notes:
Obvious punctuation errors repaired.
The remaining corrections made are listed below
and also indicated by dotted lines under the
corrections. Scroll the mouse over the word and the
original text will appear.
Page xv, "Bromhill" changed to "Broomhill" (Birnie
of Broomhill)
Page 144, "th" changed to "the" (perhaps the
most gloomy)
Page 150, missing marker "1" added to footnote.
Page 184, the inscription on Sir Philip Sydenham's
book was moved out of the end of the paragraph to
allow the
 {Ætatis: 73
{Domini: 1702.
to be lined up at the end as they are in the original
text. The original page can be seen by clicking here.
Page 184, "mathematican" changed to
"mathematician" (astronomer and a mathematician)
Page 195, "y" changed to "yet" (and have not
yet)
Index:
Page 233, "Chadowiecki" changed to
"Chodowiecki" and moved to new alphabetical
position (Chodowiecki, D. N., 127.)
Page 233, "Maridal" changed to "Maridat" (De
Maridat, Peter)
Page 235, "Henault" changed to "Hénault"
(Hénault, M.)
Page 235, "I'anson" changed to "I'Anson" (I'Anson,
Sir T. B.)
Page 236, this text uses both Jaquéri in the text
once and Jacquéri in the index once. The index was
changed to reflect what was in the text, but the
reader should be aware that the name appears both
ways in other texts and often with "Elie" instead of
"Eli."
Page 235, "Kaler" changed to "Koler" and move
to new alphabetical position (Koler, Susanna)
Page 236, "Linasti" changed to "Linarti" (Linarti,
Filippo)
*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK BOOK-PLATES ***

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