VOL.

187, JULY 2, 1990 47

People vs. Loveria
*

G.R. No. 79138. July 2, 1990.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

DAVID LOVERIA y SANTOS, defendant-appellant.

Criminal Procedure; Evidence; Credibility of Witnesses; There

was nothing strange nor improbable in the testimony of
Manzanero, Apolinario and Bales that after the jeepney stopped,
the appellant poked a knife at Manzanero, pulled the latter out of
the driver’s seat and together with his companions took him to the
rear portion of the jeepney

_______________

16 People v. Salcedo, 122 SCRA 54; People v. Plandez, 132 SCRA 69; People v.
Arbois, 138 SCRA 24; People v. Sinaw-ay, 138 SCRA 221; People v. Egaras, 163
SCRA 692.

* THIRD DIVISION.

48

48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Loveria

where Manzanero was eventually stabbed and robbed of his

wristwatch and earnings.—It is true that Manzanero could have
been stabbed by the appellant while the former was at the driver’s
seat. But neither was it improbable for appellant to have stabbed
Manzanero in the manner described by the latter and
corroborated by witnesses Apolinario and Bales. The motive
which impelled the appellant and his companions in pulling
Manzanero out of the driver’s seat and stabbing him at the inner
rear portion of the jeepney is known only to them. The Court will
not speculate as to why the appellant and his companions
executed the crime in the manner that they did. Crimes are
known to have been executed in odd and unusual ways. But in the
instant case, the Court is of the considered view that there was
nothing strange nor improbable in the testimony of Manzanero,
Apolinario and Bales that after the jeepney stopped, the appellant
poked a knife at Manzanero, pulled the latter out of the driver’s
seat, and together with his companions took him to the rear
portion of the jeepney where Manzanero was eventually stabbed
and robbed of his wristwatch and earnings.
Same; Same; Same; Apolinario’s use of the expression “I
think” does not necessarily indicate her uncertainty as to the
identity of the appellant.—The appellant next turns to witness
Betty S. Apolinario, contending that she failed to positively
identify the appellant because when asked to identify any of the
holdup men who may be present in court, she stated the following
in reference to the appellant: “I think he is the one wearing a
white T-shirt” [TSN, October 9, 1985, p. 7]. However, Apolinario’s
use of the expression “I think” does not necessarily indicate her
uncertainty as to the identity of the appellant. In fact, when the
defense tried to exploit, during the cross-examination of
Apolinario, the seemingly tentative statement just quoted, it
became apparent that she was sure and positive about the
identity of the appellant.
Same; Same; Same; Affidavits taken ex-parte are generally
considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open court.—To
impugn further the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, the
appellant cites alleged inconsistencies between the sworn
statements given separately by Manzanero and Bales to the police
on the one hand, and their testimonies in open court, on the other
hand. The appellant claims that Manzanero did not mention in
his affidavit (Exh. “I”) that the hold-up men took his money and
valuables but on cross-examination, he declared that the holdup
men took his wristwatch and the boundary for the day. The
appellant further claims that Richard Bales did not implicate him
in his affidavit but pointed to him on the witness stand.
Affidavits, taken ex parte, are generally considered to be infe-

49

VOL. 187, JULY 2, 1990 49

People vs. Loveria

rior to the testimony given in open court [People v. Pacola, G.R.

No. L-26647, August 14, 1974, 58 SCRA 370]. The Court has
consistently held that an affidavit, taken ex parte, is almost
always incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes from partial
suggestions, sometimes from want of suggestions and inquiries,
without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the
connected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of
the first suggestions of his memory and for his accurate
recollection of all that belongs to the subject.
Same; Same; Same; Inconsistencies between the testimonies
given during the investigation stage and during the court
proceedings may be disregarded without impairing the credibility
of the witnesses considering such factors as illiteracy or inability of
the witness to read the language in which the ex-parte affidavit
was written.—It has likewise been held that inconsistencies
between the testimonies given during the investigation stage and
during the court proceedings may be disregarded without
impairing the credibility of the witnesses, considering such factors
as illiteracy [People v. Sato, G.R. No. L-47911, July 27, 1988, 163
SCRA 602] or inability of the witness to read the language in
which the ex parte affidavit was written [People v. Capinpin, Jr.,
G.R. No. 67785, October 4, 1988, 166 SCRA 233]. In the instant
case, Manzanero explained his failure to state in the affidavit that
certain things were taken from him, by the fact that at the time of
the execution of the affidavit, he had just checked out from the
hospital and was still under medication.
Same; Same; Same; Lapse of time between the commission of
the crime and the filing by Manzanero of a complaint with the
police was due to the fact that he was still recuperating from the
wounds inflicted on him.—The crime was committed on February
21, 1985. Manzanero reported the matter to the police on March
14, 1985 (Exh. “B”). However, Manzanero was confined at the
Quezon City Medical Center from February 21 up to March 2,
1985 [Exh. “A”]. Hence, it is evident that the lapse of time
between the commission of the crime and the filing by Manzanero
of a complaint with the police, was due to the fact that he was still
recuperating from the wounds inflicted on him. Same; Same;
Same; The rule is well-established that the failure to reveal or
disclose at once the identity of the accused does not necessarily
affect much less impair the credibility of the witness.—Although
Richard Bales executed his affidavit only on May 7, 1985 [Exh.
“O”], while Betty Apolinario remained silent until she was
presented in court to testify, these circumstances alone should not
destroy their credibility. The rule is well-established that the
failure to reveal or disclose at

50
50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Loveria

once the identity of the accused does not necessarily affect, much
less impair, the credibility of the witness [People v. Valdez, G.R.
No. 75390, March 25, 1988, 159 SCRA 152]. The initial reluctance
of witnesses to volunteer information about a criminal case and
their unwillingness to be involved in criminal investigations due
to fear of reprisal is common and has been judicially declared not
to affect credibility.
Same; Same; Same; Court finds the trial court’s reliance on
the credibility of the prosecution witnesses to convict the appellant
to be well-founded.—In fine, the Court, after a thorough
examination of the entire record of the case, especially the
transcript of stenographic notes, finds the trial court’s reliance on
the credibility of the prosecution witnesses to convict the
appellant, to be well-founded. The claims made by the appellant
have not impaired the credibility of the prosecution witnesses who
positively identified him as one of the perpetrators of the crime.
Same; Same; Custodial Investigation; The so-called Miranda
rights contained in the constitutional provisions may be invoked
by a person only while he is under custodial investigation.—The
Court must emphasize that the so-called Miranda rights
contained in the abovequoted constitutional provisions may be
invoked by a person only while he is under custodial investigation
[People v. Duero, G.R. No. 52016, May 13, 1981, 104 SCRA 379.]
which has been defined as the “questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way”
[People v. Caguioa, G.R. No. L-38975, January 17, 1980, 95 SCRA
2, 9 citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436]. Hence, for instance,
these constitutional rights may no longer be claimed by a
defendant in a criminal case already pending in court [People v.
Ayson, G.R. No. 85215, July 7, 1989] because he is no longer
under custodial investigation.
Same; Same; Same; Right to counsel; The right to counsel of a
person under custodial investigation cannot be invoked until such
time that the police investigators start questioning, interrogating
or exacting a confession from the person under investigation.—The
ruling enunciated in Gamboa v. Cruz, [G.R. No. 56291, June 27,
1988, 162 SCRA 642], concerning the right to counsel of a person
under custodial investigation finds application in the instant case.
In that case, the accused was arrested for vagrancy and taken to
the police station. The following day he was placed on a line-up
and a female complainant pointed to him as one of the persons
who robbed her. While on trial,
 51

VOL. 187, JULY 2, 1990 51

People vs. Loveria

the accused filed a motion to acquit or demurrer to evidence on

the ground, among others, that he was deprived of his
constitutional right to counsel at the time the complainant was in
the process of accusing or identifying him for allegedly
committing a crime. The motion having been denied by the trial
court, the accused filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with the Supreme Court, which ruled that the right to counsel of a
person under custodial investigation cannot be invoked until such
time that the police investigators start questioning, interrogating
or exacting a confession from the person under investigation. The
Court held that in the police line-up conducted in that particular
case, it was the complainant who was being investigated and who
gave a statement to the police while the accused was not
questioned at all. Thus, the Court concluded that the latter could
not, during the line-up, invoke his right to counsel because he was
not under custodial interrogation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Since the appellant was not
investigated when Manzanero was in the process of identifying
him, he cannot claim that his right to counsel was violated because
at that stage he was not entitled to the constitutional guarantee
invoked.—In the case at bar, Manzanero, upon learning that
certain hold-up men were being detained at the 225th PC
Company, Cogeo, Antipolo, Rizal in connection with another
robbery, went there to check. Having identified the appellant
among the detainees, he reported the matter to the Marikina
police [See Exh. “B”]. Thereafter, Pat. Bill Ayun accompanied
Manzanero back to the PC headquarters in Antipolo where
Manzanero identified to Pat. Ayun the appellant as one of the
persons involved in the incident. Pat. Ayun then took the sworn
statement of Manzanero which was presented in court as Exh. “B”
[TSN, December 8, 1986, p. 3]. Since, as in the Gamboa case, the
appellant was not investigated when Manzanero was in the
process of identifying him, he cannot claim that his right to
counsel was violated because at that stage, he was not entitled to
the constitutional guarantee invoked.
Same; Same; Alibi; Courts look upon the defense of alibi with
suspicion and always receive it with caution not only because it is
inherently weak but also because of its easy fabrication.—The
defense of alibi put up by the appellant has not helped him any
for it has not destroyed the damaging effects of the evidence for
the prosecution. Courts look upon the defense of alibi with
suspicion and always receive it with caution, not only because it is
inherently weak but also because of its easy fabrication [People v.
Badilla, 48 Phil. 718 (1926); People v. Lumantas, G.R. No. L-
16383, May 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 157; People v. Genoguin, G.R. No.
L-23019, March 28, 1974, 56 SCRA 181;

52

52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Loveria

People v. Gaddi, G.R. No. 74065, February 27, 1989, 129 SCRA
649: People v. Salcedo, G.R. No. 78774, April 12, 1989; People v.
Somera, G.R. No. 65589, May 31, 1989]. For alibi to succeed, it
must be shown not only that the accused was at some other place
but it was physically impossible for him to have been at the site of
the crime at the time of its commission.
Same; Same; Same; Defense of alibi cannot prevail over the
positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witnesses that
the accused committed the crime.—Moreover, the defense of alibi
cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the
prosecution witnesses that the accused committed the crime.

APPEAL from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of

Pasig, Metro Manila, Br. 159.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney’s Office for defendant-appellant.

CORTÉS, J.:

The accused-appellant David S. Loveria was charged

before the Regional Trial Court, Branch CLIX (159) with
the crime of Robbery with Homicide and Frustrated
Homicide under the following information:

That on or about the 21st day of February, 1985, in the

Municipality of Marikina, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together with three (3)
John Does whose true name, identities and present whereabouts
are still unknown and mutually helping and aiding one another,
armed with a knife, with intent of gain and by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, hold-up a passenger jeepney with
Plate No. NXG-150-Pil. ’84, one of the passengers, Richard Bales y
Andres of his Seiko Wrist Watch worth P300.00 and a colored
brown wallet containing P50.00, to the damage and prejudice of
the latter in the aforementioned amount of P350.00; that on the
occasion of said robbery, said accused, with intent to kill, did, then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
stab with the said knife one Ricardo Yamson y Malanon, thereby
inflicting upon him stab wounds which directly caused his death,
and one Cerilo

53

VOL. 187, JULY 2, 1990 53

People vs. Loveria

Manzanero y Nacion the driver of the said passenger jeepney, on

the vital parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him stab
wounds which ordinarily would have caused his death, thus
performing all the acts of execution which should have produced
the crime of homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of cause independent of the will of the
accused, that is, due to the timely and able medical attendance
rendered to the said Cerilo Manzanero y Nacion which prevented
his death.
Contrary to law. (Rollo, p. 3).

Upon being arraigned on July 3, 1985, the appellant

entered a plea of not guilty (Record, p. 18.)
The facts as found by the trial court are as follows:

On February 25, 1985, at around 7:00 in the evening, Cerilo

Manzanero was driving a jeepney fully loaded with passengers en-
route from Cubao, Quezon City to Cogeo, Marikina, Metro-
Manila. While crossing the bridge of Barangay Baranca, Marcos
Highway, Marikina, Metro Manila, accused shouted “hold-up” and
Manzanero stopped his jeep. Accused who was seated right
behind Manzanero, poked a knife on the latter’s right side of his
nape and then pulled him off his seat with the assistance of
another companion into the inner rear portion of the jeep; at the
same time, stabbing Manzanero with knives at the front and back
of his body. Accused had three (3) other companions. One was
seated on the right side of the jeep, opposite accused; the two
others were seated opposite each other at the rear side of the jeep.
Accused and his three other companions divested the passengers
of their jewelries, watches, rings and necklaces.
Manzanero had a companion-conductor by the name of Richard
Bales who was seated in front of the jeep at the right side. He was
likewise stabbed by the other companion of accused who he
identified as Martin Castaneda but he sustained only slight injury
on his finger. His Seiko watch was taken from him.
Passenger Ricardo Yamson was likewise seated on the front
part of the jeepney in between driver Manzanero and conductor
Bales. He was stabbed by one of the holduppers and died that
same night. Testimonies of victim driver Cerilo Manzanero;
passenger Betty S. Apolinario; conductor and victim Richard
Bales; Patrolmen Jaime Agueda and Bill Ayun (TSN, Hearings of
August 14 and 21, 1985; October 9, 1985; November 13, 1985;
May 5, 1986; June 23, 1986; July 15, 1986; December 8 and 23,
1986; January 6, 1987; Exhibits B and I, C and O)
Cerilo Manzanero was brought to Sto. Niño Hospital at Marcos

54

54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Loveria

Highway and then transferred to Quezon City Medical Center

where he was treated by Dr. Antonio P. Ligot who issued a
Medico-Legal Certificate with the following diagnosis:
Multiple stab wound antero-posterior chest wall, Bilateral,
Penetrating, Bilateral Hemothoax Bilateral Thoracostomy (Exhs.
A and A-1). Dr. Ligot testified that these injuries would have
caused the death of Manzanero were he not treated medically.
(TSN, hearing of October 21, 1986).
Mrs. Amada Yaco, mother-in-law of Manzanero presented
receipts for medicine expenses in the amount of P2,051.80 (Exhs.
J, J-1 to J-19; M-4 to M-6) doctor’s fee of P3,000.00 (Exh. K);
payments for blood in the amount of P470.00 (Exhs. L and M);
and P2,700.00 for the hospital bills (Exhs. M-1 to M-3) or a grand
total of P8,221.80.
Victim Ricardo Yamson was brought to the Quirino Memorial
Hospital at 8:30 in the evening of February 21, 1985 where he
died of profuse hemmorrhage, secondary to stab wound at 9:20 in
the same evening (Exhs. F, G and H; Testimony of Mrs. Carmelita
Yamson, Hearing of February 3, 1986). Carmelita Yamson,
victim’s mother, testified that for the funeral parlor services, they
spent P5,300.00; for cemetery expenses, P1,700.00; for
transportation expenses, P750.00; for interment, P12,000.00; for
40 days prayer period, P4,500.00; for expenses incurred during
the preliminary investigation on the Fiscal’s office in Marikina,
Metro Manila, P1,500.00; or a total expenses of P28,750.00 which
witness rounded off to P29,000.00 (TSN, Hearing of February 3,
1986).
(Trial Court Decision, pp. 2-3.)
The defense offered by the appellant is summarized by his
counsel as follows:

The accused David Loveria, 25 years old, formerly residing at

Sitio Maagay, Antipolo, Rizal and a volunteer worker of the Share
and Care for Poor Settlers Pastoral (SCAP for short) declared that
on February 18, 1985, he was attending a live-in seminar at the
Communication for Asia in Old Sta. Mesa, Manila. The duration
of the seminar was from February 18 to February 22, 1989.
Between 8:00 and 8:30 o’clock in the evening of February 21,
1985, upon permission from their training officer, he went to the
Farmers Market in Cubao to ask money from his mother for
transportation fare for the following day. When he failed to meet
his mother, he decided to go back to the Communication
Foundation for Asia. Fortunately, at the loading zone for
passenger vehicles bound for Sta. Mesa, he met his father who
gave

55

VOL. 187, JULY 2, 1990 55

People vs. Loveria

him money. After that, he went back to the Communication

Foundation for Asia and stayed there the whole evening. (TSN,
pp. 6-13, January 5, 1987)

(Appellants Brief, p. 6.)

After trial, the trial court found the appellant guilty as

charged. The dispositive portion of the decision dated May
26, 1987 reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the prosecution having

established the guilt of (the) accused beyond reasonable doubt, the
Court hereby finds accused David Loveria GUILTY of the
complex crime of Robbery with Homicide and Frustrated
Homicide under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code with the
aggravating circumstance of having been committed in band,
without any mitigating circumstance; and, in relation to Article
III, Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, hereby imposes upon him to suffer life imprisonment
or reclusion perpetua; and orders said accused:

(1) to pay the compulsory heirs of deceased victim Ricardo

Yamson, represented by his mother Conchita Yamson, the
amount of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) as
an indemnity for Ricardo Yamson’s death; TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) as and for actual
damages; TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) as and
 for moral damages; TEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P10,000.00) as and for exemplary damages:
(2) to pay victim Cerilo Manzanero the amount of EIGHT
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY ONE PESOS &
80/ 100 (P8,221.80) as indemnity for actual damages;
P5,000.00 as and for moral damages; and P5,000.00 as
and for exemplary damages; and
(3) to indemnify Richard Bales the amount of THREE
HUNDRED PESOS (P300.00) for the unrecovered watch.

[Trial Court Decision, p. 7]

From this judgment of conviction, the appellant filed the

present appeal.
The first issue raised by the appellant pertains to the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
To prove the culpability of the appellant, the prosecution
presented the following witnesses: Cirilo Manzanero, the
driver of the jeepney: Richard Bales, the
companion/conductor of Man-

56

56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Loveria

zanero; Betty Apolinario, a passenger of the jeepney; Dr.

Antonio Ligot, the physician who examined Manzanero;
Pat. Bill Ayun and Pat. Jaime Ganueda, of the Marikina
Police Station who conducted an investigation of the
incident. The following witnesses were also presented to
prove the civil liability arising from the crime: (1)
Carmelita Yamson, the mother of the victim Ricardo
Yamson; and (2) Amada Yaco, the mother-in-law of
Manzanero.
The appellant specifically assails the credibility of Cerilo
Manzanero, Betty Apolinario and Richard Bales, all of
whom positively identified the appellant as one of the
perpetrators of the crime.
According to Manzanero, while he was driving his fully
loaded passenger jeepney on the evening of February 21,
1985 from Cubao to Cogeo, Marikina, he heard a person
from the back announce a hold-up, which made him pull
the jeepney to a sudden stop. Whereupon, the passenger
immediately behind him, or on the extreme left side of the
jeepney, poked a bladed weapon on the right side of his
neck (TSN, August 14, 1985, p. 5). Manzanero was able to
identify the person who poked the knife at him as the
appellant David Loveria because the former managed to
turn his face towards the latter (TSN, August 21, 1985, p.
13).
Manzanero was then taken by the appellant and three
other men inside the jeepney, at the back portion thereof,
and was stabbed several times (TSN, August 14, 1985, p.
6). After the stabbing, Manzanero’s wristwatch and
earnings were taken from him (TSN, August 21, 1985, p.
17). Injured, Manzanero rolled down from the jeepney but
was able to flee (TSN, August 14, 1985, p. 11).
Richard Bales, the companion/conductor of Manzanero,
who was seated on the front seat corroborated the
testimony of Manzanero on almost all its material points.
He testified that he saw the appellant stab Manzanero
(TSN, June 23, 1986, pp. 3-4 & 16). However, Bales added
that after the four men were finished with Manzanero, they
turned to him and Ricardo Yamson, a passenger who was
also seated on the front seat beside Bales (Id, pp. 6-7). One
of the robbers, whom Bales identified as a certain Martin
Castañeda, stabbed him, injuring his finger, and took his
watch (Id. ). The other robbers chased

57

VOL. 187, JULY 2, 1990 57

People vs. Loveria

Yamson, who attempted to flee, and stabbed him on the

neck (Id., pp. 16-17). Yamson was taken to the Quirino
Memorial General Hospital but died that same night. [Exh.
“F” (Medico-Legal Certificate) and Exh. “G” (Autopsy
Report)].
Betty S. Apolinario, a passenger who was seated on the
left side of the jeepney testified that the four hold-up men
boarded the jeepney in Cubao (TSN, October 9, 1985, p. 5)
and seated themselves on the four corners of the jeepney
(Id, p. 6). Apolinario stated that she saw the appellant
David Loveria poke a knife at the driver, pull the latter
from the driver’s seat, and stab him after taking him to the
inner back portion of the jeepney (Id., pp. 4-5). She was
able to remember the appellant because she was the third
passenger from the driver’s back. In other words, there was
only one person between her and the appellant (Id., p. 4).
Apolinario also testified that the hold-up men forcibly took
valuable from the passengers (Id., p. 8).
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in
giving credence to the testimony of Cerilo Manzanero, the
driver, because of its improbability. The appellant argues
that “(i)f indeed the purpose was to stab the jeepney driver,
then there was no need to bring him to the rear portion of
the jeepney to accomplish the purpose. He could be stabbed
while seated at the driver’s seat.” (Appellant’s Brief, p. 7).
The contention is without merit. It is true that
Manzanero could have been stabbed by the appellant while
the former was at the driver’s seat. But neither was it
improbable for appellant to have stabbed Manzanero in the
manner described by the latter and corroborated by
witnesses Apolinario and Bales. The motive which impelled
the appellant and his companions in pulling Manzanero out
of the driver’s seat and stabbing him at the inner rear
portion of the jeepney is known only to them. The Court
will not speculate as to why the appellant and his
companions executed the crime in the manner that they
did. Crimes are known to have been executed in odd and
unusual ways. But in the instant case, the Court is of the
considered view that there was nothing strange nor
improbable in the testimony of Manzanero. Apolinario and
Bales that after the jeepney stopped, the appellant poked a
knife at Manzanero, pulled the latter out of the driver’s
seat, and together with his companions took him to the
rear portion of the jeepney where Manzanero was eventu-

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58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Loveria

ally stabbed and robbed of his wristwatch and earnings.

The appellant next turns to witness Betty S. Apolinario,
contending that she failed to positively identify the
appellant because when asked to identify any of the holdup
men who may be present in court, she stated the following
in reference to the appellant: “I think he is the one wearing
a white T-shirt” [TSN, October 9, 1985, p. 7]. However,
Apolinario’s use of the expression “I think” does not
necessarily indicate her uncertainty as to the identity of
the appellant. In fact, when the defense tried to exploit,
during the cross-examination of Apolinario, the seemingly
tentative statement just quoted, it became apparent that
she was sure and positive about the identity of the
appellant. The pertinent portion of the cross-examination is
quoted as follows:

Q Mrs. Witness you also testified last time in answer to

— the question of the private prosecutor, I quote, “This
person who stabbed the driver if you will see him, will
 you be able to identify him?” and you said “Yes, sir”.
The next question, “Will you please tell us whether this
person is present in this courtroom?” and you said “I
think he is the one wearing a white T-shirt”. What do
you mean by “I think he is the one wearing a white T-
shirt”?
A What I have in mind he is the one there that is why I
— am pointing to him. (Witness pointing to the accused
David Loveria.)
Q Are you positive about the identification of the accused
— David Loveria or could it be also another person?
A No, I am not wrong.
—
(TSN, November 13, 1985, pp. 18-19.)

To impugn further the credibility of the prosecution

witnesses, the appellant cites alleged inconsistencies
between the sworn statements given separately by
Manzanero and Bales to the police on the one hand, and
their testimonies in open court, on the other hand. The
appellant claims that Manzanero did not mention in his
affidavit (Exh. “I”) that the hold-up men took his money
and valuables but on cross-examination, he declared that
the holdup men took his wristwatch and the boundary for
the day. The appellant further claims that Richard Bales
did not implicate him in his affidavit but pointed to him on
the

59

VOL. 187, JULY 2, 1990 59

People vs. Loveria

witness stand. Affidavits, taken ex parte, are generally

considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open
court [People v. Pacola, G.R. No. L-26647, August 14,
1974, 58 SCRA 370]. The Court has consistently held that
an affidavit, taken ex parte, is almost always incomplete
and inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions,
sometimes from want of suggestions and inquiries, without
the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the
connected collateral circumstances necessary for the
correction of the first suggestions of his memory and for his
accurate recollection of all that belongs to the subject.
(People v. Tan, 89 Phil. 337 (1951); People v. Gonzales,
G.R. No. L-40727, September 11, 1980, 99 SCRA 697;
People v. Avanzado, Jr., G.R. No. 73116, February 29,
1988, 158 SCRA 427).
It has likewise been held that inconsistencies between
the testimonies given during the investigation stage and
during the court proceedings may be disregarded without
impairing the credibility of the witnesses, considering such
factors as illiteracy [People v. Sato, G.R. No. L-47911, July
27, 1988, 163 SCRA 602] or inability of the witness to read
the language in which the ex parte affidavit was written
[People v. Capinpin, Jr., G.R. No. 67785, October 4, 1988,
166 SCRA 233]. In the instant case, Manzanero explained
his failure to state in the affidavit that certain things were
taken from him, by the fact that at the time of the
execution of the affidavit, he had just checked out from the
hospital and was still under medication (TSN, August 21,
1985, p. 17).
As a final assault on the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses, the appellant notes the delay by the former in
reporting the incident.
The crime was committed on February 21, 1985.
Manzanero reported the matter to the police on March 14,
1985 (Exh. “B”). However, Manzanero was confined at the
Quezon City Medical Center from February 21 up to March
2, 1985 [Exh. “A”]. Hence, it is evident that the lapse of
time between the commission of the crime and the filing by
Manzanero of a complaint with the police, was due to the
fact that he was still recuperating from the wounds
inflicted on him.
Although Richard Bales executed his affidavit only on
May 7, 1985 [Exh. “O”], while Betty Apolinario remained
silent until

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People vs. Loveria

she was presented in court to testify, these circumstances

alone should not destroy their credibility. The rule is well-
established that the failure to reveal or disclose at once the
identity of the accused does not necessarily affect much less
impair, the credibility of the witness [People v. Valdez,
G.R. No. 75390, March 25, 1988, 159 SCRA 152]. The
initial reluctance of witnesses to volunteer information
about a criminal case and their unwillingness to be
involved in criminal investigations due to fear of reprisal is
common and has been judicially declared not to affect
credibility (People v. Rosario, G.R. No. L-46161, February
25, 1985, 134 SCRA 497).
In fine, the Court, after a thorough examination of the
entire record of the case, especially the transcript of
stenographic notes, finds the trial court’s reliance on the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses to convict the
appellant, to be well-founded. The claims made by the
appellant have not impaired the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses who positively identified him as one
of the perpetrators of the crime.
Finally, the appellant assails the manner in which he
was identified by Manzanero at the headquarters of the
225th Philippine Constabulary (PC) in Cogeo, Antipolo,
Rizal, claiming violation of his constitutional right to
counsel.
Sec. 20, Art. IV of the 1973 Constitution, which was in
force at the time the events under review occurred reads:

Sec. 20. No person shall be compelled to be witness against

himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to
be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation,
or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used
against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section
shall be inadmissible in the evidence.

Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution provides

similar guarantees by stating:

Sec. 12(1). Any person under investigation for the commission of

an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.
If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the

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VOL. 187, JULY 2, 1990 61

People vs. Loveria

presence of counsel.

The court must emphasize that the so-called Miranda

rights contained in the abovequoted constitutional
provisions may be invoked by a person only while he is
under custodial investigation [People v. Duero, G.R. No.
52016, May 13, 1981, 104 SCRA 379]. which has been
defined as the “questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way” [People v. Caguioa, G.R. No. L-38975,
January 17, 1980, 95 SCRA 2, 9 citing Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436]. Hence, for instance, these constitutional
rights may no longer be claimed by a defendant in a
criminal case already pending in court [People v. Ayson,
G.R. No. 85215, July 7, 1989] because he is no longer under
custodial investigation.
The ruling enunciated in Gamboa v. Cruz, [G.R. No.
56291, June 27, 1988, 162 SCRA 642], concerning the right
to counsel of a person under custodial investigation finds
application in the instant case. In that case, the accused
was arrested for vagrancy and taken to the police station.
The following day he was placed on a line-up and a female
complainant pointed to him as one of the persons who
robbed her. While on trial, the accused filed a motion to
acquit or demurrer to evidence on the ground, among
others, that he was deprived of his constitutional right to
counsel at the time the complainant was in the process of
accusing or identifying him for allegedly committing a
crime. The motion having been denied by the trial court,
the accused filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with the Supreme Court, which ruled that the right to
counsel of a person under custodial investigation cannot be
invoked until such time that the police investigators start
questioning, interrogating or exacting a confession from the
person under investigation. The Court held that in the
police line-up conducted in that particular case, it was the
complainant who was being investigated and who gave a
statement to the police while the accused was not
questioned at all. Thus, the Court concluded that the latter
could not, during the line-up, invoke his right to counsel
because he was not under custodial interrogation. In the
case at bar, Manzanero, upon learning that certain hold-up
men were being detained at the 225th PC Company, Cogeo,

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People vs. Loveria

Antipolo, Rizal in connection with another robbery, went

there to check. Having identified the appellant among the
detainees, he reported the matter to the Marikina police
[See Exh. “B”]. Thereafter, Pat. Bill Ayun accompanied
Manzanero back to the PC headquarters in Antipolo where
Manzanero identified to Pat. Ayun the appellant as one of
the persons involved in the incident. Pat. Ayun then took
the sworn statement of Manzanero which was presented in
court as Exh. “B” [TSN, December 8, 1986, p. 3.] Since, as
in the Gamboa case, the appellant was not investigated
when Manzanero was in the process of identifying him, he
cannot claim that his right to counsel was violated because
at that stage, he was not entitled to the constitutional
guarantee invoked.
But even assuming that the process of identification of
the appellant by Manzanero at the PC headquarters was
attended by constitutional infirmities, only Manzanero’s
sworn statement (Exh. “B”) where he identified appellant
and which was taken by Pat. Ayun, would be excluded for
being inadmissible in evidence. The testimony of
Manzanero made in open court positively identifying the
appellant, as well as those of Richard Bales and Betty
Apolinario, would not be affected. These testimonies, taken
together with the other evidence on record, would be
sufficient to sustain the trial court’s judgment of conviction.
The defense of alibi put up by the appellant has not
helped him any for it has not destroyed the damaging
effects of the evidence for the prosecution. Courts look upon
the defense of alibi with suspicion and always receive it
with caution, not only because it is inherently weak but
also because of its easy fabrication [People v. Badilla, 48
Phil. 718 (1926); People v. Lumantas, G.R. No. 16383,
May 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 157; People v. Genoguin, G.R. No.
23019, March 28, 1974, 56 SCRA 181; People v. Gaddi,
G.R. No. 74065, February 27, 1989, 129 SCRA 649: People
v. Salcedo, G.R. No. 78774, April 12, 1989; People v.
Somera, G.R. No. 65589, May 31, 1989]. For alibi to
succeed, it must be shown not only that the accused was at
some other place but that it was physically impossible for
him to have been at the site of the crime at the time of its
commission. (U.S. v. Oxiles, 29 Phil. 587 (1915): People v.
Alcantara, G.R. No. 26807, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 812;
People v. Pigon, G.R. No. 76048,

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People vs. Loveria

May 29, 1989). In People v. Lumantas (G.R. No. L-28355,

July 17, 1969, 28 SCRA 764), where the accused claimed
that at the time of the killing he was in another barangay
two kilometers away from the scene of the crime, the Court
 held that it was not impossible for him to have been at the
place where the crime was comitted at the time of its
commission. In the case at bar, the appellant admitted his
presence in Cubao on the night the crime was committed
(TSN, January 6, 1987, p. 14). The Court notes the fact
that the four men who committed the crime boarded the
jeepney in Cubao (TSN, October 9, 1985, p. 5). And
although according to the appellant, he was in Cubao at
8:30 p.m. while the crime was committed between 7:00 p.m.
to 8:00 p.m. in Marikina, the Court rules that the required
physical impossibility of being at the scene of the crime has
not been proved for alibi as a sufficient defense to become
available to the appellant.
Moreover, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the
positive and credible testimony of the prosecution
witnesses that the accused committed the crime (People v.
Chavez, G.R. No. L-38603, September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA
221; People v. Torres, G.R. No. 76711, September 26,
1988, 165 SCRA 702; People v. Sabado, G.R. No. 76952,
December 22, 1988, 168 SCRA 681.)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Fernan (C.J.), On leave.

Decision affirmed.

Note .—Alibi is not a good defense where it was not

physically impossible for accused to be at the scene of the
crime where it was committed. (People vs. Maribung, 149
SCRA 292.)

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