Nancy Tatom Ammerman - Studying Lived Religion Contexts and Practices-New York University Press (20-127-210
Nancy Tatom Ammerman - Studying Lived Religion Contexts and Practices-New York University Press (20-127-210
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or her belief in God’s provision for the future and the eternal life to follow,
evoking hope within. When the choir sings, “A mighty fortress is our God, a
bulwark never failing,” those present are reminded of the power and majesty
of God, an image that evokes feelings of praise and worship. When worship-
pers sing the words of the old spiritual “I know I’ve been changed, the angels
in the heaven have changed my name,” it may call to mind their own spiri-
tual journey out of spiritual darkness and evoke joy and gratitude within.
(Nelson 2005, 134–138)
What Emotions Do
People who study emotion sometimes talk about it as the aspect of
human experience that indicates and expresses “involvement” (Barbalet
2002). That is, emotion is our point of connection and commitment. A
group’s solidarity is not just about its ideological unity but also about
its ties of affection. Doing things together and having a common focus
combines with shared emotion to create attachment to the group and
commitment to doing things together in the future.3 We don’t just cal-
culate the costs and benefits of belonging, we feel our relationship to
people. We don’t just think about what we should do, we respond based
on our sense of membership and the collective emotions we generate
together. Emotions do important social work.
Feelings and relationships are, in fact, inseparable. Mutual attention
and affection are at the heart of what it means to be part of a group, and
maintaining positive connections requires “emotion work.” Hochschild
was among the earliest and most important writers about the sociology
of emotion. She says that emotions are something we work at, rather
than simply an uncontrolled bodily reaction. “We feel. We try to feel.
We want to try to feel” (Hochschild 1979, 563). That is, we size up the
social situation and figure out the appropriate feelings for that place and
time for people “like us.” If we do not yet feel enthusiastic enough, we
may evoke memories of exciting past moments or engage in physical
displays of feeling to get ourselves in the mood. As Hochschild (1983)
also showed, getting out of the mood is equally important. If everyone
aboard the plane is terrified by the turbulence, the determined calm of
the flight attendant provides reassurance. In each case, people are work-
ing together to achieve and maintain the feelings that will also establish
or reestablish a group’s sense of well-being. Social psychologist Row-
felt that they were disadvantaged and put down. Notice all the subtle
cues Ha documents—how people talked and what they wore, as much
as what they said. Note also that lived religious practice does not stop
at the church door. We might not think about shopping as a religious
practice, but when it is framed by religious identity markers—a crucifix
necklace and the absence of a head covering—it becomes a religious
part of everyday life. In a situation where religious life is precarious and
contested, the emotional dimension of everyday practice comes to the
fore. Fear and anger stand opposite affection and solidarity.
It should not be surprising that many Christians believed that the geno-
cide was consistent with Christian belief, that it even had the sanction of
the churches. The case of Ngoma parish in Butare, where Christians went
to pray before they went out to kill, was not isolated. The fact that people
could desecrate church buildings and kill even at the foot of the altar or
in the sacristy is not evidence of a lack of respect for Christianity or a
shallowness of Christian faith. Instead it reveals the nature of Christianity
in Rwanda as a politicized, conservative, discriminatory faith. (Longman
2009, 197)
Institutions and political power are the backdrop, but emotions of hatred
and fear, all sacralized by religious authority, are necessary components.
Even after the violence has ended, later rituals may commemorate the
group’s struggles and thereby continue to build group solidarity. National
anthems often state (or at least imply) the godly rightness of vanquish-
ing the nation’s enemies, while invoking the blessing of the divine on the
citizen singers. Studying the role of emotion in religious practice, then,
has to include attention to practices that intensify conflict by generating
and remembering sacralized feelings of outrage and hatred.
Undertaking this kind of research may require taking up historical
cases, given the difficulty posed by being present in the midst of vio-
lent confrontations.6 Longman’s research is remarkable for his close ob-
servations and wide-ranging interviews, both immediately before and
immediately after the 1994 genocide. Even when one is documenting
long-ago events, however, there are many records to tap—visual as well
as written—available for analysis and often accessible soon after the fact
in web-based formats and social media posts. There are tools for “scrap-
ing data” from social media, as well as tools for digital analysis of mas-
sive volumes of historical texts. Theologians Timothy Snyder and Ashley
Theuring used Twitter posts as a basis for studying the lived religious
practices of thousands of people in the wake of the Sandy Hook school
shooting tragedy in the United States (T. Snyder 2013). Digital tools al-
lowed them to see patterns of religious practice, paying special attention
to both the verbal and visual expression of emotion.
Grieving on Twitter
Our research on Sandy Hook indicates that following a national trag-
edy, social media creates new possibilities for religious practice, allow-
ing us to directly access firsthand accounts and to express our faith
ist Church and the Taoist Tai Chi Society, both in Tallahassee, Florida.
She chose in-depth interviewing as her method so as to get at the inte-
rior emotions that are not necessarily expressed outwardly. She speaks
of these emotions as highly personal, but she nevertheless found striking
parallels and patterns in the feelings people described. Lived religious
practice—whether American Protestant worship or tai chi movement—
was characterized by emotions of serenity that were tied to the physical
spaces in which the practice took place. This student of lived religious
practice was able to discover and assess those patterns in the emotional
dimension of practice by both her own observations of the space and the
interviews she conducted.
member’s emotions were shaped by the windows in the church, which are
clear, leaded glass—as opposed to the stained glass found in many other
houses of worship” (1772).
note of all the dimensions of the lived religious practice he observed. The
role of music has been one of the most lively areas of research on lived
religious practice. Recall the account of Sacred Harp singing in chapter 4.
Singing together involves emotions, bodies, material settings, aesthetics,
morality, spirituality, and narrative all at work together. Paying attention
to the emotional dimension sharpens our understanding of all the rest.
2. “Feeling rule” is a term borrowed from Arlie Russell Hochschild (1979), whose
work is discussed a little later in this chapter and is well worth exploring further.
As we will see in chapter 9, her account of the Louisiana Tea Party is a powerful
analysis of the way emotions structure members’ view of the world (Hochschild
2016).
3. Recall Emile Durkheim’s ([1912] 1964) ideas about the way ritual creates identity
and solidarity. He described the heightened emotions of ritual as “collective
effervescence” (250). More recently, Randall Collins (2004) has written about
“entrainment”—emotionally charged mutual attention—in his work on “inter-
action rituals.” Earlier, Rosabeth Kanter (1972) wrote about the necessity of “af-
fective ties” for group commitment in the communes she studied. She outlined
the social mechanisms they employed for achieving those ties. Each of these
theories puts emotional experience at the center of their understanding of how
society works.
4. Those who have studied group emotions point to the complexity and danger in
how we react to outsiders. Actions by a potential rival can easily evoke anger
(Mackie, Silver, and Smith 2004). Or a fear of losing something beloved can pro-
duce what Ahmed calls a “shared ‘communal’ visceral response of hate. Because
we love, we hate, and this hate is what brings us together” (2014, 43).
5. The link between religion and violence is something we need to study carefully,
without leaping to conclusions. All the world’s religions have employed violence
either symbolically or physically, so we should not assume that any one religion
promotes violence more than another. A nuanced quantitative accounting of the
recent entanglements of religion, politics, and violence can be found in research
done by Jonathan Fox (2004), as well as by Monica Toft and her colleagues (Toft,
Philpott, and Shah 2011). Analysis of the practice of violence is more clearly in
view in qualitative studies closer to the ground. Here, too, there are examples
from around the world. A sampling includes Ian Baird’s (2009) work on Cam-
bodia, Richard Parks’s (2012) work on Jews in Tunisia, and Michael Sells’s (2003)
research on the violence in Bosnia-Hercegovina.
6. Anthropologists have had long experience navigating research in difficult places.
Ruben Andersson’s (2016) reflection is a helpful reminder of the way definitions
of “the other” (including our own) intersect with fear of danger.
7. The relationship between gender and emotion is not just about women. It also
plays out in how men enact their religiousness. John Bartkowski’s (2000) research
on the evangelical group Promise Keepers noted a move toward emotional inti-
macy among the men he observed in the 1990s. Others have insisted that exagger-
ated displays of “Christian manhood” have been encouraged across evangelical-
ism, especially after World War II (DuMez 2020).
8. The little boy’s status on the autism spectrum added an additional element to his
position as an outsider to the event’s feeling rules. Hierarchies and cultural differ-
ences also affect the intersection of emotion with aesthetics, so we will look at a
similar example, from Tex Sample (1996), in chapter 7.
Over and over, when people are asked what they think of when they
think about spirituality, they say they think about beauty. There is some-
thing in the experience of a beautiful sight or sound that seems to uplift
us, take us out of mundane realities. That connection between beauty
and spirituality tells us that there is probably an aesthetic component to
lived religious practice that bears note. The aesthetics we are concerned
with, however, are not the refined, high-art connoisseurship of the elite.
Nor are we speaking of a philosophical stance that seeks to define essen-
tial qualities of art and beauty. Rather, we are looking for an everyday
dimension of social practice, one that encompasses our shared attempts
to arrange the material world in ways that are satisfying, pleasing, com-
fortable. It is a sensuous dimension of experience that is concerned with
the flavors, sights, sounds, and smells of life and how we perceive them
as either attractive or repulsive, beautiful or alien.
Embodiment, materiality, and emotion are dimensions of experience
that lay the groundwork for an examination of aesthetics. A focus on
the aesthetics of religious practice takes those dimensions and adds at-
tention to how the sensory experience is organized to convey a sense
of the sublime (as religious studies scholar Birgit Meyer [2008] puts it).
Aesthetics is a way of talking about sensual contact with the world—
through bodies and emotions and perception—as well as how we judge
what it is we perceive.1 It is a dimension of all social practices, so-called
high culture and low, sacred and profane. Sociologist Bernice Martin ar-
gues that every religious group has an aesthetic, what she describes as “a
repertoire of appearances, artefacts, representations, self-presentations
and performances” (2006). We might add that every religious practice
has an aesthetic, as well.
Portions of the material, sensual world are, of course, labeled as “art,”
a category as definitionally fraught as religion or spirituality. Still it
would seem only natural for students of lived religion to examine the
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early April each year. After a century in which both the Republic and
the Communist regimes attempted to suppress such traditional “super-
stitious” rituals, there has been a slow opening in recent decades (Pang
2012). Studying the way Qingming is practiced, especially in these years
of cultural transition, reveals the tentative presence of spiritual elements
alongside the thriving aesthetic dimensions. It also reveals the roles of
status and resources—who can afford which flowers? As in cemeteries
around the world, grave decorations very much reflect both social status
and local cultural tradition (Kipnis 2017).
Aesthetics Is Social
Matters of aesthetic taste and style, the things that make something
pleasing or compelling, are inevitably defined by the people making
the judgments. Whether food preferences or attractive colors, our cul-
tures have shaped what we find delightful or nasty. Speaking about art,
social theorist John Levi Martin puts it well: “When ‘we get it’—when we
experience the artistic beauty of a painting, say—we focus on the ‘it,’ the
object in question, and the beauty as a quality of this object. But, when we
get the ‘it,’ we get the ‘we’ as well, in the sense of establishing a presump-
tion of like-mindedness with those of similar taste” (2011, 203). Finding
an object or a body or a place beautiful and pleasing is embedded in the
intricacies of our social location, a location that includes our social class
and educational positions, our religious traditions, and the larger culture
of which we are a part.4 Tastes and experiences of beauty identify us.
The very places we identify as “religious” are recognized as such by
our cultural experiences of what religious space should look like. It’s
not a static definition but one that evolves over time as part of what
actually happens in and around a place. Cultural historian Gretchen
Buggeln has written extensively about church buildings, and her re-
counting of a tragic fire at West Presbyterian Church in Wilmington,
Delaware, can give us a vivid window on how both the church members
and the community articulated ideas about beauty they had previously
taken for granted. She tapped the lived experience of the congregation
and community through church minutes and yearbooks, neighborhood
tour guidebooks, and news reports, as well as her own interviews. She
argues that church buildings, especially large and historic ones, often
“invite a sense of general proprietorship from a community. They . . .
work their way into the cognitive maps of those who are in and around
them” (Buggeln 2001, 88). Note how her description gives attention to
the aesthetic sensibilities of both congregation and community and how
those changed over time.
If fire was the catalyst for reimagining the aesthetics of one religious
space, the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965) was no less dramatic a
catalyst for transforming hundreds of Roman Catholic churches. Be-
fore the Council, churches were often ornate and stuffed full of statuary.
There were ranks of candles and a plethora of colors, textures, styles, and
images adorning the space. The altar was elaborately draped, inhabited
by men who were equally elaborately adorned, and separated from the
congregation by a rail. After the Council, the rail came down, and in
some places, so did just about everything else. New churches were en-
couraged to adopt a more austere style. Over time (and often after much
conflict), the renovations tended to reflect the varied lives and desires of
local parishes. Religious practice, theological claims, and aesthetic style
came to reinforce each other (McDannell 2011). Such times and places of
aesthetic transformation are potentially fertile for examination of lived
religious practice by theologians and others. What insight emerges in
this remaking of aesthetics and practice?
That work can build on the research of sociologists and historians
who have spent time observing what happens in religious spaces. Soci-
ologist Mary Ellen Konieczny described a neotraditional parish where
she spent many months doing ethnographic field work.
with her own First Communion in 1962 and traces the changes through
the life of her mother (Margaret). Her autobiographical approach also
draws on the historical and sociological and news accounts of the times,
and the result is an intimate sense of the spaces and practices she de-
scribes. Again, note how she captures the aesthetic dimension of atten-
dance at Mass and how shifting patterns of participation have existed in
dialogue with the physical changes.
Bold colors and designs might also describe the “hijabi fashionistas”
documented in cultural historian Reina Lewis’s study of changing Mus-
lim fashion in the United Kingdom. The 1990s saw both a renewed sense
of religious identification for Muslims there and an Asian-inspired aes-
thetics in mainstream fashion. But “the advent of hijab wearing redefined
the wearer as Muslim rather than Asian,” she writes (Lewis 2015, 186). A
change in fashion aesthetic and a change in identity went together. The
fashionistas needed to replace the midriff-baring Asian sari with more
modest clothing. The result was an expanded market for modest fashion,
built on the earlier styles from the diaspora Asian fashion industry. Today
the young cohort of hijabi fashionistas buy clothes that express their style
but also identify them as Muslim. What they find beautiful and stylish has
evolved in a complex mix of ethnic, religious, and economic possibilities.
To the extent that aesthetic experience is also religious, there is im-
portant work for theologians to do. Far from the fashionable streets of
England, Rebecca Spurrier has undertaken a remarkable theological
ethnography of a Christian community in Atlanta. The congregation
she calls Sacred Family has a membership that is largely made up of
people with various forms of disability, primarily psychiatric challenges.
Spending three years worshiping and playing and talking and creating
with them, she describes their community life as sometimes (seemingly)
chaotic but joyful. Their worship involves “a performance art” of creativ-
ity in how differences in perception and ability form a “liturgical chore-
ography” (Spurrier 2020, 22). Using the theological concept of liturgy as
communal work of and for the people of God, she looks for all the ways
that aesthetic work is done around the edges and across the week. She
learns to see the pleasures they create together, including the art they
make and use. She learns to see and name beauty as it shapes the life of
this community, even as the challenges remain. The complex aesthetic of
this church expresses the complex world they inhabit.
2010a), even as they improvise with what they have. More basically, it is
important to ask who has the ability to create “art,” to define it as such,
and to get it to the people who will appreciate it. As Colleen McDan-
nell (1995) so provocatively asks, exactly what separates “kitsch” from
art if not the gender and social position of the consumer? Kitsch is not
just different from high art but something to be looked down on and
avoided. Michèle Lamont’s research has also been useful in showing how
a sense of style is linked to moral boundaries (Lamont and Fournier
1992). A sense of style is likely to provoke judgment about the value of
both the art in question and the people who like it. Societies declare
some cultural productions to be worthwhile and others to be trash and
declare some people to be the valued experts who can educate the rest
of us. At the same time, those whose art is being devalued may establish
their own discourse about “elite” art, describing it as worthless splashes
of paint that any child could do.6
Social divisions of style and taste can be seen in all the religious things
people construct and surround themselves with, even the intangible
ones. For example, the intersection of religious practice and aesthetics
can be seen in Black Gospel music as it defines and expresses the experi-
ence of race in the United States. Music historian and performer Pearl
Williams-Jones opened her influential article about Black Gospel by say-
ing, “If a basic theoretical concept of a black aesthetic can be drawn
from the history of the black experience in America, the crystallization
of this concept is embodied in Afro-American gospel music” (1975, 373).
The experience of living and worshiping in a segregated society meant
that there was cultural space for the development of a distinctive style,
a style that expressed the deep pain of living with oppression, as well as
joy in visions of liberation.7
As we saw in chapter 4, musical style proves central in the efforts of
some churches to “cross the racial divide.” Gerardo Marti (2012) found
that a favorite strategy of such churches is to feature a gospel choir and
to expect Black singers to model “true worship” by performing an ex-
pressive, embodied style of praying and singing. While the church’s
professed ideal might have been a universal experience of worship that
could transcend race, the reality was that race was being essentialized.
Sociologist Korie Edwards’s (2008) detailed ethnographic study of an
interracial church in the Midwest was even more explicit about the way
a white aesthetic defined the culture, even if there were Black people
present. She was there for worship and committee meetings and conver-
sations in the halls, so she could observe how people interacted. She also
did formal interviews and found that while Black and white members
were participating in the same events, they brought different aesthetic
sensibilities with them. Whites were far more likely to express satisfac-
tion with the church’s mixing of traditional hymns and praise songs,
for example, since it was consistent with what they knew. “For whites,
worship at Crosstown was upbeat, but for African Americans, that was
far from true” (Edwards 2008, 27). Differences in cultural style were ap-
parent throughout the church, and those differences marked who had
power and who didn’t.
Cultural differences in style were also apparent in the mosque that
John O’Brien (2017) studied. He spent three and a half years interact-
ing with a group of immigrant Muslim teenage boys at a mosque in
a West Coast city in the United States. He was a bit older and not an
immigrant, but he shared their religious identity and practice, which
eased his entry into the community. He saw how they experienced the
cultural expectations that came from urban American teenage life, as
well as the expectations that came from their tight-knit religious com-
munity. It was important for them to be religious but not too religious,
to be cool but not too cool. They dealt with those tensions in a variety of
ways, not least through their use of hip hop performance. They would
poke fun at performers who created strictly Islamic lyrics that seemed
“cheesy,” but they would also go to elaborate lengths to avoid or alter the
obscene lyrics of the mainstream hip hop they heard. This aesthetic tug-
of-war expressed their recognition of the cultural boundaries they were
attempting to navigate.
Clashes of taste and style are nowhere more apparent than in differ-
ences based on social class. Many people have written about this but
perhaps none so vividly as theologian Tex Sample. He wants people to
see how everyday experiences of social-class positioning often alien-
ate working-class people from church life. With a deep dive into coun-
try music (“white soul,” in his words), he highlights its critique of the
church’s failures, the tendency of church people to “close off people who
need it, to serve the rich and neglect the poor and needy, and to be high-
handed and hypocritical” (Sample 1996, 150). But to get to that theologi-
6. This low opinion of modern art—that any child could do it—is expressed by
roughly one-third of Americans when asked by the General Social Survey
(https://gssdataexplorer.norc.org). It is often useful to check general polls and
surveys to put what we see in a larger cultural context.
7. If you are interested in knowing more about the African American gospel music
tradition, James Abbington (2001) and Glenn Hinson (2000) have each written
appreciative accounts. Melva Costen (1999) is a leading liturgical scholar, and
Carolynne Brown’s (2009) dissertation provides a fascinating history. The inter-
section of Black Gospel with “Southern Gospel” is detailed in Douglas Harrison’s
(2012) history, along with the way sexuality has played its own role. There has
always been cultural borrowing, as well as distinction.
The assessments we make about style and beauty are not the only ways
in which social practice involves acts of judging. Even when we are not
consciously aware of it, we make moral judgments, as well. The way we
perceive and react to the everyday world around us is shaped by our
deeply held intuitions about what is right and wrong, good and evil. This
is more than just “following norms” and doing what people expect us to
do. Those are moral practices, too, but some cultural expectations for
behavior carry even more weight because they are situated in emotion-
ally laden stories and practices marking them as good. As sociologist
Christian Smith (2003a) argues, we are “moral, believing animals.” Even
when we aren’t consciously thinking about rules, our behavior is guided
by what we have learned to expect of ourselves and others.
Sociologists Steven Hitlin and Stephen Vaisey have helped to bring
the study of morality back into focus in the social sciences, arguing that
morality “encompasses any way that individuals or social groups under-
stand which behaviors are better than others, which goals are the most
worthy, and what people should believe, feel, and do. . . . [Moral assess-
ments are] thick understandings about what kind of person (or society)
it is good to be” (2013, 55). They go on to say, “Morality is not just about
personal beliefs or intuitions but also involves a combination of psycho-
logical processes, social identities, and institutionalized meanings and
practices” (60). That is, we bring our own ingrained moral sense with
us, but there are also moral meanings embedded in the setting. Both can
be at work shaping our behavior, even if we have difficulty explaining
what those meanings are or why we are doing what we are doing. These
and other writers in the social sciences are increasingly looking at how
our minds, our bodies, our emotions, and our cultures come together to
produce the moral frameworks that guide our action. As we make moral
judgments and evaluations, we are not necessarily engaging in reasoned
deliberation. Rather, we are acting based in the informal theories we
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have in our minds (and hearts) about what is to be desired. Every social
practice, that is, includes a moral dimension in its assessment of the situ-
ation as well as in its pattern of expected behaviors.
The same is true for lived religious practices. When people pray, for
example, they presume a moral judgment that endorses some desired
futures and not others, that lauds some actions and asks forgiveness for
others. Prayers may call down divine wrath on evildoers or express grat-
itude for blessings. Their very form may enact compassion and solidarity
through joined hands for the “Our Father” or the shoulder-to-shoulder
touch of Muslim Ju’mah prayer. Not all moral practices are religious, but
religious practice, like all human action, has moral dimensions.
Moral judgment combines with the emotional and aesthetic dimen-
sions of religious practice to stir people toward action. Practices are not
just rote, habitual behaviors but “projects” that contain within them move-
ment toward beauty, virtue, happiness, and other states we have learned to
value. Our interactions are animated by a sense of “what is good to strive
for” (J. Martin 2003, 37). This is not to posit that there are a priori val-
ues that consciously and directly lead to actions but that practices contain
values within them. Those same judgments may also lead us to avoid im-
moral things by triggering emotions of shame or disgust. That is, attention
to emotional, moral, and aesthetic qualities of religious practice can pro-
vide a window on both the patterned, taken-for-granted reactions and the
emergent energies that motivate action—both the established structure of
the situation and the struggles of the actors. The emotional, aesthetic, and
moral qualities we have packaged into our cognitive interpretations of the
world pull us toward some practices and away from others.
Sometimes they pull us away out of fear of contamination, of being
soiled or profaned. It is not just that “cleanliness is next to godliness.”
The very notion of contamination has moral implications. As much as
we may think we are avoiding dirt or germs out of purely scientific and
medical necessity, our judgments about where the danger lies are al-
ways tinged with our assessments of the moral character of the people
and places we shun.1 As anthropologist Mary Douglas put it, “certain
moral values are upheld and certain social rules defined by beliefs in
dangerous contagion” (1966, 3). In response, religious rituals of all sorts
symbolically use water to wash away the contamination of sin. Christian
baptism, immersion in the Jewish mikveh or in the river Ganges, the
There are indeed moral systems that are bigger than any one situation
or any one person, like the elements of Confucian teaching that linger in
the culture. But the link between stated logic and individual action is not
always as straightforward as learning the precepts. Religious communi-
ties and traditions have explicit moral rules, and they do attempt to pass
those principles along to their followers. Studying the moral dimension
of lived religious practice means paying attention to those explicit mor-
ally focused religious practices. But it also requires the hard work of
paying attention to the less explicit everyday routines that carry moral
logics, as well.
The implicit moral logic of everyday routines can sometimes be illumi-
nated by attention to the larger moral narratives—both the institutional
ideals and the larger cultural goals—but generalizations can be tricky. It
is probably a mistake to imagine that any society can be characterized
by one or even just a few ways of thinking about morality. Nevertheless,
explorations such as those of Robert Bellah and his associates in Habits of
the Heart (1985) often suggest moral questions to ask as we observe. The
authors listened to a broad sample of Americans, seeking evidence of the
moral projects guiding the culture. They were able to identify “utilitarian
individualism” and “expressive individualism” as the dominant ways peo-
ple justify their actions. Their historical and philosophical reading then
led them to contrast these moral projects with the United States’ earlier
“biblical republicanism.” But that long view sometimes missed impor-
tant realities on the ground. The young nurse they call Sheila Larson, for
example, was their epitome of expressive individualism, but as Meredith
McGuire points out, their preoccupation with the larger cultural narra-
tives led them to pay little attention to any spiritual depth or collective
significance in Larson’s everyday practices of care (2008, 151–152).
While the larger cultural narratives may give us clues about the moral
dimensions of everyday practice, they may also lead us astray. This is
especially apparent in efforts like the “World Values Survey.” Aimed at
broad cultural characterizations, this multinational survey lacks any
base in local conversations. Its generalizations presume a universaliz-
able list of beliefs and values that can be compared across countries,
and researchers use it then to divide up the world into moral categories
(e.g., Norris and Inglehart 2004). Despite its “world values” claim, there
is little for a student of lived religious practice to glean from the results.
A more solidly grounded study, by the sociologists Michèle Lamont
and Laurent Thévenot (2000), used in-depth interviews to compare the
“repertoires of evaluation” found in France and the United States. They
suggest that each society provides its members with a variety of ways of
thinking about what matters and what is of value. Those repertoires are
by no means uniform across the society, but they are recognizably dif-
ferent from one country to the next.3 Just as a given religious tradition
provides distinct moral repertoires, so does the larger culture in which
it is located. Both will help to set the terms for how a religious social
practice is enacted.
Thus, the moral dimensions of any practice are enmeshed in how
people think about what it means to be a member of a group. Certain
actions and attitudes are simply part of what it means to belong. In dif-
ferent religious traditions and different practices, the moral dimension
may come more and less to the fore, but each will incorporate moral
virtues and taboos that become part of a religious identity. In studying
Christians across a variety of denominations in the 1990s, I was sur-
prised how many answered, “Do unto others as you would have them
do unto you,” when we asked what it means to be a Christian. I dubbed
these people “Golden Rule Christians” because their everyday ethics
seemed to be more definitive of their religious identity than doctrine
or religious observance (Ammerman 1997b). More recently, the Jewish
historian and theologian Jack Wertheimer has argued that “Golden Rule
Judaism” has become similarly prevalent. Jews who are otherwise not
very observant say that “being a good person is the essence of being a
good Jew” (Wertheimer 2018, 64).
Wertheimer’s argument would seem to be borne out in sociologist
Philip Schwadel’s (2006) analysis of the data on Jewish teens from the
Religious moral practice can also take the form of explicit ethical re-
flection, especially in times of crisis. Anthropologist Jarrett Zigon (2010)
describes what he calls “moral assemblages,” arguing (not unlike Swidler
[1986]) that it is useful to think about “ethical moments” as times when
there is a moral breakdown (an “unsettled time”) and a person or com-
munity is forced to work on what sort of life they should lead. Whether
it is a community forum in the church fellowship hall or a book discus-
sion group at temple or a Confucian after-school program or an aca-
demic treatise on ethics, there are religiously based practices designed
to do moral work when the situation calls for it.
The practices of collective moral learning and teaching are one way
religious practitioners acquire practical knowledge about moral expec-
tations and adopt a religious identity. Children and newcomers learn
that to be a member, there are moral rules to follow. People facing an
ethical challenge work out new ways of acting. But, expectations about
a good life are conveyed more implicitly in other religious practices, as
well. From scriptural injunctions to heroic stories to mitzvah challenges
and volunteer service, communal religious life often embodies moral
lessons (Lichterman 2005; Allahyari 2001). People learn their commu-
nity’s “golden rules” by observing and doing.
Students of lived religion can also learn which moral practices are
most central to the community’s identity by looking for boundary work.
That was what sociologist Jeffrey Guhin learned in his ethnographic
study of four high schools—two conservative Christian and two Mus-
lim. In spite of what seemed like similar beliefs about the importance
of scripture and of conservative gender norms, gender was a key moral
practice for the Muslim schools, while opposition to evolution was the
key defining practice for the conservative Protestants. Guhin heard
much more about evolution at the Christian schools, “because evolu-
tion was dissonant with Christian key practices (reading the Bible liter-
ally) and boundaries (also reading the Bible literally)” (2016, 152). He
continues, “The problem is not only that evolution goes against the Bible
but that if it is true, evolution would render the way Conservative Prot-
estants understand the Bible ridiculous. For an intellectual community
that prides itself on the plain truth of the Bible and the priesthood of all
believers, this threat is particularly grave” (163). His careful listening to
classroom and hallway discussions, along with his interviews, revealed
that Muslim key practices (prayer) and boundaries (gender perfor-
mance) were not challenged by evolution. “Whereas Muslims worried
about being called sexist and violent, Christians feared being deemed
ignorant and intolerant” (167). A community’s moral center is often re-
vealed by the practices that maintain the boundaries.
As Guhin shows us, moral practice can be discerned in ways of talk-
ing, but the moral dimension of practice is also found in embodied re-
ligious disciplines. Saba Mahmood’s study of Egyptian Muslim women
has drawn attention to the way religious practice itself embodies un-
derstandings of morality. Morality as “habitus,” she says, is a product
bags, and verbal references to one’s Christian identity” that Barton calls
a “Bible Belt panopticon” (2012, 24–25). Ordinary religious practices of
material display signaled moral evaluations that then shaped social in-
teraction and sometimes exclusion.
Religious studies scholar Lynne Gerber has taken up similar ques-
tions, noting that “the moralization of homosexuality has been a major
stake in symbolic struggles both within religious traditions and between
religion and secular society” (2011, 24). Her book examines the history
of “ex-gay” ministries like Exodus International and includes observa-
tions at conferences, along with interviews with members, leaders, and
ex-members. What makes her study stand out, however, is the inclusion
of a strategic comparison—to the way religious practices (along with
much of US culture) also moralize fat. That comparison allows us to see
the social mechanisms at work beyond the specifics of a given issue. Al-
ready by the turn of the twentieth century, Gerber writes, fat had become
synonymous with gluttony and sin: “Questions of eating, body size, and
weight loss are infused with the gravity of the moral and the power of
the sacred” (25). From her observations and interviews with First Place,
a Christian weight-loss program, she describes the bodily disciplines
that are part of the lifestyle change they promote—calorie exchanges,
exercise, bodily measurement, weigh-ins. But the distinguishing feature
of the program is its disciplines of mind and spirit. Each weekly meeting
includes a Bible study and a verse to memorize. Gerber’s careful atten-
tion to what participants were doing enabled her to show how religious
practice reinforced moral evaluations of body size.
time.” . . . Shaping the Christian mind along scripture’s contours is also be-
hind commitments to Bible reading and Bible study. . . . The assignments . . .
are implicitly or explicitly related to weight loss; some tackle food and eating
head-on, while others address self-esteem, sin, and other issues thought to
cause excessive eating or body weight. (Gerber 2011, 130–131)
practices. Liberal religious advocacy groups often occupy just such lim-
inal social places, and sociologists Grace Yukich and Ruth Braunstein
(2014), both of whom study these groups, combined their research
projects to gain even deeper insight. Braunstein interviewed national
leaders in a variety of liberal advocacy organizations and supplemented
those interviews with ethnographic observations and public records.
Yukich combined in-depth interviews with New Sanctuary movement
activists and allies with content analysis of movement documents. They
were both interested in how actual interactional settings had an effect
on the practices that developed, so they needed to observe the practices;
but they also needed to talk to the participants about their perceptions.
The result is a fine-grained analysis of interfaith practices like the rabbi’s
prayer we examined in chapter 6. Both Yukich and Braunstein pay atten-
tion to the material settings and patterns of communication, as well as to
the embodied and emotional expressions of touch and presence. Atten-
tion to these multiple dimensions of religious practice enables them to
understand how new patterns emerged and how new practices worked
in redefining boundaries and identities.
of “moral work,” that is, how we assign blame or make a credible complaint in the
course of a simple conversation.
3. The question of cultural moral repertoires has been especially important to
researchers exploring the intersection of religion and politics. Here, it is impor-
tant to listen for the ways religious ideas can be adapted to secularized, “public”
ways of talking. Jack Delahanty, Penny Edgell, and Evan Stewart (2018) have
identified what they call “secularized evangelical discourse,” and they argue that
one does not have to be a member of an evangelical community to engage in
ways of talking about politics that draw on evangelical presumptions. This is
another reminder that the moral dimensions of social practice may not be defined
exclusively by a given religious community, but those communities can be highly
influential nevertheless.
4. The initial book from the first wave of the NYSR (when the teens were fourteen
to seventeen) is Christian Smith and Melinda Lundquist Denton’s Soul Searching
(2005). Smith and Patricia Snell Herzog (2009) followed with Souls in Transition,
based on follow-up interviews as their subjects became “emerging adults.” There
are many other publications based on the data from this study, all drawing on a
rich combination of survey and interview methods.
5. We have already encountered the religious practices of social movements, but
here we might add sociologist Richard Wood’s (2002) analysis of faith-based
community organizing. The collection edited by Ruth Braunstein, Todd Fuist, and
Rhys Williams (2017) is a fascinating introduction to a range of good research that
takes everyday movement practices seriously.
6. If you are interested in following up on these various modes of exclusion, there
are many, many studies to draw on across multiple disciplines. Here are a few
places to start: Ruth Braunstein’s (2019) analysis of US politics provides an excel-
lent overview of how various religious groups have challenged white Protestant
views of “good citizens” and thereby been painted as outsiders to be excluded.
On the American propensity to define atheists as “other,” see the study by Penny
Edgell, Joseph Gerteis and Douglas Hartmann (2006). The opposite dynamic—
religious expression itself as “other”—is at work in Quebec, in France, and else-
where, where religious clothing is banned in public (Elver 2012). On the way ideas
about “the deserving poor” shape welfare policy, Brian Steensland’s (2006) work
is insightful. Practices of religious exclusion are almost always intertwined with
political and ethnic histories, which is clear in John Brewer and Gareth Higgins’s
(1999) study of the history of anti-Catholicism in Ireland. A fascinating case study
of tradition, heresy, and political change analyzes a post-Soviet community where
the traditional “priestless” Old Believers confronted the willingness of some of
their members to adapt to new realities by having priests and a nice new building.
Each group had different ideas about how people should relate to each other and
what virtues define a proper community (Rogers 2008).
We have so far explored the way lived religious practice is spiritual but
also embodied, material, emotional, aesthetic, and moral. Each of those
qualities of social practice takes us beyond the usual focus on religious
words and ideas, but that does not mean that words are unimportant. A
study of religious practice needs to include attention to the way people
communicate with each other. While there are many ways to approach
communicative action, we will use the metaphor of narrative to think
about this shared activity—with two meanings of “narrative” at play. The
more obvious meaning is that there are religious practices of storytell-
ing, both specific stories to be told and shared ways of telling them. That
is the primary focus of this chapter.
The other meaning is more subtle but no less important. Practices
themselves have a shared narrative dimension that is as much a part of
the experience as the other dimensions we have studied. That is, prac-
tices are shaped by implicit stories about what is happening and why,
and those temporal and relational narrative structures are as important
as the more overt practices of religious storytelling. Every time a person
engages in assessing a situation and deciding how to act, they are work-
ing with a kind of structured story in their heads, even as they may be
called on to improvise. There may not be a clear plotline from start to
finish (in fact, there probably isn’t), but our perceptions of what is hap-
pening draw on the “characters” we recognize (including the role into
which we ourselves are cast) and the “events” we can recall or imagine.
How we then take up our role plays out in an ensemble effort of inter-
action that happens in a particular place on a particular stage.1 We are
never acting alone or without context and script.
Margaret Somers (1994) is a political theorist who argues that narra-
tives make events understandable by connecting them to a set of rela-
tionships and practices. We act in terms of our place in the social world
(relationships) and the habits we have formed (practices). Those actions
177
sit within a temporal arc; they are layered with expectations that come
from the past and imaginations of possible futures.
Narratives also have multiple social layers that both constrain and
enable our action. One kind of narrative, Somers argues, is a kind of
internal story we tell ourselves about “who I am.” While this autobi-
ographical narrative may seem like a psychological and idiosyncratic
creation, it is very much a collaborative effort, since we have looked to
others throughout life for feedback and reinforcement.2 It is also con-
stantly being disrupted and rewritten when new situations and relation-
ships appear. Nevertheless, the identities and personal stories we claim
for ourselves are ever present in our practices. Those identities are also
lodged in the second kind of story—what Somers calls “public narra-
tives.” These are part of the institutions and contexts themselves. They
are about “who we are,” the memberships and identifications that we
claim and that are thrust on us. And the “we” is, in turn, lodged in big-
ger cultural stories, ways of talking about the world that we share with
others far beyond our immediate situation.
Throughout this chapter, we will look for both the temporal and the
social layers in the narrative religious practices we study. As through-
out this book, the focus is on everyday action and the shared practical
understanding that guides it. In turning to this narrative dimension, we
continue to look at the religious practices that happen among ordinary
laypeople, as well as the practices of specialists and elites. We continue
to remind ourselves that practices are both structured and habitual, that
they often reinforce inequality and division but are also open to disrup-
tion and improvisation. And we continue to keep the full multidimen-
sional nature of lived religious practice in view. Even when a narrative
religious practice takes the form of a written text, there are questions to
be asked about materiality (its form), embodiment (its accessibility and
use), emotion (its desired attitude), aesthetics (its fit and pleasingness),
morality (what it teaches), and the spiritual character of the world it
describes.
There are a variety of disciplinary partners who have taken up work
like this and on which many students of lived religion may want to draw.
While communication certainly goes beyond mere words, it is good to
pay attention to the words themselves, to vocabulary and jargon. That
can help to identify the boundaries of the group we are observing. Hear-
ing specialized words can also invite us to ask about the experiences
that called for new language. Drawing on other disciplinary partners,
we might pay attention to style and genre in what we read and hear.
Linguistic analyses can fill in important historical context, for example,
just as semiotics alerts us to the work done by signs and symbols in the
social world. In addition, when we ask about the use of language in the
exercise of power, critical discourse analysis is a useful way of think-
ing. By looking for the way language is used, by whom, and in which
contexts, we can ask questions about the relationships and structures of
power that are revealed.3 Scholars have studied language and communi-
cation in a variety of ways, but as always, our work will start with people
using words rather than the words themselves. Using the metaphor of
narrative, we will look for what is communicated about past and future,
about relationships and boundaries, as they are present in everyday lived
religious practices.
In this book about studying lived religion, you may have been sur-
prised to see so little so far about beliefs and meaning systems. Schol-
ars and ordinary people alike often think of belief as central to what
it means to be religious, and they turn to definitive texts (scriptures,
sermons, treatises—words) as a way of studying such beliefs. Survey re-
searchers, in turn, ask people if they believe in God or if they think the
Bible is literally true. Social theorists echo that theme in their own way
by talking about religion as a “meaning system” or a “sacred canopy.”4 As
we look at the narrative dimension of lived religious practice, the role of
beliefs and meanings will come more directly into view. We will see that
people use words and stories to construct the meanings that guide their
actions. We will see that they talk about beliefs, and in doing so, they
are saying something about who they are and where they belong. But
the beliefs and meanings that show up in everyday narratives are usu-
ally more modest than world-defining interpretations of life, death, and
tragedy. Nor are they usually formed into a coherent system. There may
be many different stories about life in a person’s cognitive library, with
vignettes sometimes jumbled and discarded in any given interaction.
Analyzing the narrative dimension of practice takes us beyond dogmatic
formulae, but without leaving belief aside.
Instead, we will train our attention on the way divine beings and spir-
itual moments and religious institutions populate the stories people tell
about everyday life and the way their lived religious practices tell stories
about what is right and true and possible. That does not mean theology
is irrelevant to this task. Not only will we listen for how people use exist-
ing theological language and categories, but we can also ask how theo-
logians themselves are working with the stories of everyday life to think
about what they can learn. Religious studies scholar Charles Marsh has
pioneered a turn toward “lived theology.” He argues that “crafting a more
direct and communicative rendering of the divine-human encounter re-
quires us to place new demands on [theology]. . . . Restoring the power
of the individual encounter with God in the concrete situation and in
its community to words, into language—this is the task and responsi-
bility given to each generation of theologians” (Marsh 2017, 10–11). If
that divine-human encounter can happen anywhere, the theologian’s
task may include asking people to tell a story about what happened after
church on Sunday or what they are praying about or what makes them
angry about the world as it is. These stories may even be more revealing
than asking them directly about life’s meaning or about their beliefs.
of event.” That is, the immediate social rules, material places, and insti-
tutions matter. Places we observe have rituals and histories. The stories
people tell and the way they tell them are situated, both in social spaces
and in relation to the legends and plots available to us in our cultural
and religious traditions. Studying lived religion means paying attention
to the social patterning in all three levels—interacting individuals, struc-
turing institutions, and overarching cultural resources.
Think about the narratives that structure an individual life as it is
lived in the cultural and legal contexts we have called institutional. There
are separate public narratives that describe life’s progression through
educational institutions (up through the grades) and occupational ones
(entry level to the top), through citizen involvement, through families
and relationships, through stages of health, illness, and aging. Each
person’s story will be different, but each will be structured by familiar
markers that place us in recognizable roles and at recognizable places
along the way. There are also religious ways of telling the story. A child
may be marked at birth by sacred words whispered in their ear or holy
oil and water on their head. Those rituals define that child’s place in a
family and a community. The story continues with key markers such as
bar mitzvahs or quinceñeras and marriage rituals. Similarly, at death,
stories are told by the families and communities who wish to keep the
ancestor alive in memory. The telling and the doing are intertwined,
each shaped by the community that is the audience and the institution
in which it is told.
Because there are multiple institutions offering public narratives in
this kind of context, creating a spiritually defined version of a life story
requires work. Anthropologist Michael Brown’s ethnography of New
Age human “channels” (spirit mediums) can give us a window on how
that work happens. The wide range of practices that are clustered under
the “New Age” umbrella share a common emphasis on self-exploration
and improvement. Brown says, “The New Age seems largely consti-
tuted by narratives: life histories, tales of spiritual adventure and ‘self-
empowerment,’ moments of ‘personal sharing,’ and accounts of affliction
and recovery. The movement’s networks and collective gatherings are
designed to provide opportunities for storytelling” (2002, 103). That is,
there is a social context in which this individualized spirituality takes
shape. New Age practice often involves workshops that bring together a
ish identity and love of Israel in their young participants. Shaul Kelner
(2010) studied these tours for several years, first as a program evaluator
and then as an independent researcher. His original role meant that he
was predisposed to seeing how the programs succeeded, a critical rec-
ognition for anyone who is doing research from within an organization.
To check what he had learned, he returned later with the specific goal of
looking for things he had missed. His primary method in all instances
was simply being there—on the bus, in the discussion circles, and listen-
ing to the presentations. His interviewing of participants seems mostly
to have been informal, although his book provides less specific informa-
tion about his methods than ethnographies usually do. What he was able
to document was the intentional linking of Jewish stories to individual
life stories, and he was able to show how the context of the liminal, in-
between space provided by a group tour made this possible. The set-
ting and the relationships prove central to understanding how narrative
practices do their work, and both watching and listening are the tools
we need.
one hundred teens who were part of a larger, multimethod project called
“Symbolism, Meaning, and the Lifecourse,” begun in the late 1990s. Her
book includes a detailed and helpful discussion of the methods the team
used. The team followed up initial individual interviews with conversa-
tions that involved whole families and circles of friends. The broad so-
cioeconomic and ethnic diversity of the sample, along with its religious
diversity, makes for a rich picture of the spiritual and religious lives of
teens in the United States and especially the way they weave together
their own stories and those available in popular media.
For example, Clark describes Jake, a teen with little knowledge of re-
ligion, who nevertheless told a story about a miraculous appearance of
an angel. “When I asked Jake to further describe what he thought an-
gels were like, he noted, ‘Well, there’s a lot of movies that have angels in
them, so that’s always what I thought they were like’” (Clark 2003, 101).
In fact, she continues, in teens’ stories “an angel could be a ghost and
vice versa, or a ghost could be an ancestor. Stories and symbols might
be drawn from religious sources or from places like family stories of
good fortune, ‘legend trips,’ the entertainment media, or popularized
African traditions of ancestors” (112). The cultures we live in have always
been repositories for a pastiche of stories. As we listen to people narrate
their lives, we may find that occupational lore, neighborhood myths,
congregational histories, and family legends are woven together with
whatever religious stories to which they have had access, even through
mass media.
Some of those stories can rise to widely shared myths and aphorisms,
but as they do, competing voices may be silenced. The “civil religion”
that presumably tells the moral story of a nation, for example, is likely
to ignore its conquest of Indigenous people or the subjugation of ra-
cial minorities.8 As we hear religious words and stories, it is worth pay-
ing attention to their sources. Whose symbols are mass produced and
widely heard, and whose are forbidden? While individuals may seem to
be stitching together a personal narrative, there are both audiences and
producers at work. Some cultural sources are more readily available to
them than others, some symbols and roles more respected than others,
some voices louder than others.
Stories about everyday life take place in complex social layers, but
they also have real material and embodied settings and evoke moral and
When I reach Muhammad at the front desk, I tell him, “I thought that was
a woman speaking.” Muhammad puts on a heavy “Arab” accent and an
expression of mock horror, and says, “Astaghfirullah [God forgive you],
bruzzer! A woman addressing the masjid [mosque]? Zis is not right!
What do you want to have next? A stripper in ze mosque? Would you
want to put a stripper over zere instead of the bookstore? [he points to the
bookstore]. Maybe you think zis would be a good way to raise money, be-
cause no one is buying ze books? Maybe you are right.” (O’Brien 2017, 66)
Humorous stories are often the medium for just this sort of bound-
ary setting and negotiation. Peter Berger’s delightful book about humor
building itself is cleared but still bears stains of blood and fire. A guide takes
visitors through the church, telling the story of the genocide. (Longman and
Rutagengwa 2006, 141)
While guides tell official stories, the people in the communities tell
their own. Some echo the story of necessary remembrance (“never
again”), while others reject this focus on the past, and still others incorpo-
rate these places into long-standing ways of remembering ancestors. Like
all stories, memorial stories are dynamic, being shaped by the moment,
the tellers, and the audience. Outside observers who did not experience
the event need to listen carefully. Who is being constructed as victim and
who as perpetrator? What about the event is to be remembered and what
forgotten? Who now belongs, and who must therefore be excluded? Pay-
ing attention to the places themselves, to embodied responses to them, to
the emotions they generate, and to the moral message can help students
of lived religious practice to hear the story more clearly.
Stories, that is, can perpetuate differences within a society or a com-
munity. Some stories explain why one group deserves to be privileged
and another not. Karl Marx famously posited that a religious life nar-
rative with a “sweet by and by” was a convenient salve for this life’s
economic wounds and might therefore serve the interests of people in
charge ([1844] 1963). Similarly, every patriarchal tradition has stories
to explain the inferiority of women and the legitimacy of male power.
Such institutionalized patterns of inequality also impose constraints on
who can tell which story (Barr 2021). Conservative Christian organiza-
tions may, for example, establish a familiar story about how a person
is “called” to be a leader, but that story can only be told about a male
member of the group. In many traditions, stories that combine being a
faithful person and being LGBTQ are illegitimate (or just impossible). In
many places in the world, telling a story about one’s conversion to a new
religion is a practice discouraged by law or custom (Hackett 2008; Yang
2012). Spiritual narratives, that is, are situated in particular legal and
cultural contexts and can be part of the repertoire that is used to mark
distinctions of status, privilege, and exclusion. The constrained condi-
tions that make some stories hard to tell pose particular challenges for
an observer of lived religious practice. Sometimes the narratives of a
group hide as much as they reveal so that seeking out marginal members
and moments of disruption becomes especially critical.
that they didn’t incite divine punishment, so that the story they had in-
ternalized began to fall apart. At some point, they began a phase of “pass-
ing,” in which they were presenting themselves as Orthodox when they
were inside the community but freely breaking Orthodox norms when
they were not. Finally, they “stepped out,” risking loss of family, com-
munity, and way of life. They became “scriptless,” in Davidman’s words
(142). Relationships, habits, and their very bodies were changed, but in
the end, she notes, “You can’t turn off your past” (181). This research is a
good reminder that narratives are not just words. The religious practices
of constructing and reconstructing a life story are just as embodied and
material and emotional as every other religious practice is.
The negotiated character of that reframing is even more apparent
when the effort fails. Among evangelicals, a central religious practice is
witnessing to one’s faith and attempting to win new converts. Not nearly
all evangelicals actively engage in this practice (Pew Research Center
2015, 84), but we can see a vivid example in an encounter recorded by
sociologist David Smilde. He was taking a break from an event at one
of the Pentecostal churches he was studying in Caracas, Venezuela,
chatting in the parking lot with one of the church leaders. Enrique (the
leader) spotted a kid nearby smoking crack and took the opportunity to
confront him. As Smilde records the conversation, we hear an unsuc-
cessful attempt to reframe the present and the future for this young man.
Ultimately, Juan Carlos walks away, smoking his crack. The evangelical
life is not a story he can imagine, in spite of the intervention of Enrique.
For Enrique, on the other hand, engaging in this kind of evangelizing
conversation is part of the narrative religious practice of his life.
jini and the other leaders of Ujamaa Centre (faculty and local community
partners) nurtured an approach to interpretation that invited analysis of
community consciousness, starting with the community in the biblical text.
In their study sessions she would ask the members of the women’s groups if
any of them knew a woman who had been raped like the woman in Judges
[who was given up by her husband to be gang-raped by strangers]. “And
then the stories begin,” Sarojini said. “Oh, my goodness. You never have
enough time” to get through all of the stories the women have to tell or to
explore all of the insights that emerge. (West 2019, 173)
By speaking across time, stories are also intended to call forth imagi-
nation about how the world might be.11 Stories are constructed to evoke
possible futures, to speak of dreams and visions. The story of the Exo-
dus, from the Hebrew scriptures, inspired African American slaves to
dream of freedom, and that same story is claimed by Zionists in Israel,
as well as by immigrants elsewhere who are seeking a better life. Martin
Luther King Jr. famously proclaimed, “I have a dream” and “I’ve been
to the mountaintop.” He invited listeners to imagine a future when the
content of character matters more than the color of skin. It is precisely
that imaginative function that has made storytelling, including religious
storytelling, so central to social movement activism.12 We have already
benefited from Ruth Braunstein’s research on faith-based liberal advo-
cacy, and her attention to stories is as astute as her analysis of other
dimensions of religious practice. She recalls Rev. James Forbes speaking
to a health-care-focused Interfaith Service of Witness and Prayer. He
conjured this narrative scene for the crowd: “The Lord has asked me,
‘How do you have the nerve to pray to me for yourself with respect to
your health needs, and you show no concern for the other 46 million of
your brothers and sisters who have no coverage’” (quoted in Braunstein
2012, 119). Rather than presenting a theological treatise justifying move-
ment activism, leaders draw on grassroots stories, including their own,
and frame them symbolically as stories of faith that carry within them
the promise of change.
Studying religious practices that put forward a narrative of change
can be done with a wide variety of methods. Seeing a narrative on the
page or on the screen may fall short in capturing the emotional impact of
the words or the response of the audience, but from internet archives to
Alcohol and then slavery were defined not simply as harmful but as sin,
not just individual sin but the sin of a nation. Confessing and repenting
were established practices in revival culture, but now they were tied to
new causes. Narratives can be both pliable and powerful in producing
new futures for individuals and societies.
A new narrative interpretation, linked to a religious practice, can
often have powerful effects on how people act in the moment and into
the future. As we have seen, such adaptations are likely to include themes
and plots drawn from a wide array of sources, taking existing practices
and envisioning a new ending. Because the underlying narratives may
not be right on the surface, it is often useful to engage in an iterative
process of listening, analyzing, and trying out what we think we have
heard. That is what sociologist Arlie Russell Hochschild (2016b) did as
she listened to the talk of Louisiana Tea Party activists, then constructed
a “deep story” and took it back to them to see if it resonated. It was a
story about being left behind in US political and economic life. Hochs-
child could have said it with stark statistics, but she painted a narrative
picture instead, a picture of other people unfairly skipping ahead in line;
and that resonated with her participants. But she also heard strands of
a religious story in their conversation, namely, the “left behind” narra-
tive found in the massively popular series of books that fictionalized
biblical accounts of the end-time (Frykholm 2004). Interwoven with the
political and economic story about the indignities of contemporary life
were stories of the Rapture, featuring a messianic figure who radically
alters history, rewarding the deserving ones and punishing the evildo-
ers. Those stories helped Hochschild explain these activists’ reaction to
Donald Trump, then a candidate for US president. As they saw him de-
scending a golden escalator or sitting at the head of the table casting out
failed apprentices, they saw a powerful savior punishing those who had
gained unfair advantage. Interlocked stories explained the present and
allowed them to imagine a new future.
The narrative dimension of religious practice includes telling stories
that constitute, motivate, and interpret both everyday and extraordinary
social action. Religious communities and traditions provide vocabular-
ies and genres, but stories and images from throughout the culture can
be adapted to give shape to what people see and experience. Like all
elements of lived religious practice, narrative practice is both struc-
tured and creative. It can unite, and it can divide. For students of lived
religious practice, it is useful to examine the ways in which collective
narratives allow people to explain their behavior and their desires to
themselves and to others.
in a garden makes you feel close to the earth, crouching to clean a grave
reminds you that you are earth.” His contemporary interpretation is accom-
panied by learning the proper modern practice of bowing (rather than pros-
tration). He notes, “My older uncle went first because the order, by seniority,
is important. When it was my turn, the adults taught me how to do it, ‘Three
times. With good posture.’” He ends his blog this way: “There are times I can’t
help but cry when we talk about happy days they weren’t around to see. But
I also can’t help but laugh at times like when my grandmother shouts to the
dead about the A’s we got on our report cards. Because the tour goes on, I
feel like they’re still with us.” He notes, as well, his feeling of connection to
the larger Chinese community: “It’s hard not to think about other Chinese-
Canadian families on Qingming when we see them at the cemetery. I love
seeing how they pay their respects.”
who are at the cemetery on this day. Religious practices are, that is, im-
plicated in social identity.
Studying lived religion means paying attention to the places where
people recognize a layer of nonordinary reality, and that is certainly the
case here. Even though neither the Chinese state nor these “modern”
Canadians might call their practice religious, there is nevertheless a spir-
itual dimension in the way time is collapsed, bringing together past and
present, but also in the way participants interact with ancestors and use
material objects (willow branches) to drive evil spirits (ghosts) away. In
modern Vancouver, our blogger noted that for his family, the older tra-
ditions (as he put it) that were focused on spiritual presence—bringing
food and gifts for the dead, the willow branches to scare off evil spirits—
were not part of their ritual. “But we did clean the grave, and we did
bring flowers, and we did bow to my grandfather in respect” (Cheung
2019). Even if the participants are not involved in any organized reli-
gious group and do not identify with a single religious tradition, the
practices themselves—by invoking awareness of a spiritual reality—can
be analyzed as religious practices.
In an earlier time, all these practices might have been part of a highly
entangled religious social world, but today they are perhaps best un-
derstood as happening within a fluid but highly regulated set of state-
sanctioned activities.13 While traditional popular ancestor practices are
not part of the major recognized religions in China, they are generally
tolerated. Where practices are being absorbed into one of the official
religions (Buddhist or Daoist), both state and religious authorities might
attempt to exercise oversight. Indeed, the establishment of Qingming as
one of the four public holidays celebrating Chinese traditional culture
demonstrates its quasi-establishment status on the mainland. As a rela-
tively newly revived and rapidly evolving set of customs, however, there
are also a variety of interstitial innovations. Wherever religious practices
are being developed and redeveloped in interstitial social circumstances,
we have a window on the social mechanisms through which innovation
happens. The tug between tight state regulation and churning social in-
novation, in fact, mirrors the way much of the rest of Chinese society is
changing.
It is important, that is, to place this and any other religious practice
in its historical and legal context. That leads us to wonder how the ex-
those who have gone before. If asked to explain these things, they might
well point to their grounding in Confucian ethics of filial piety (Pang
2012). But in the People’s Republic of China, official state guidelines play
a role, as well. Proper respect and commemoration is codified into sug-
gestions for the virtues to be celebrated in tombstone carvings (Kipnis
2017). The moral dimension of Qingming practice is carried by family
expectation, social striving, and state guidelines, which might lead us to
wonder about how those social forces are at work in less obvious ways
elsewhere. How are spiritually infused acts of commemoration shaping
how we think about what is right and wrong?
The grandmother’s recitation of family accomplishments was accom-
panied, of course, by a rich array of other storytelling. As with any fes-
tival gathering, there are narrative practices, stories of past celebrations
and of what memorable things extended family members did—which
uncle was drunk at the Hanukah party or the memorable time a long-
estranged brother came home for Christmas. Cheung (2019) recalled,
“On some of those Qingming visits, as my family reminisced, I’d hear
new snippets of information about my departed relatives.” That suggests
that Qingming narratives might be analyzed alongside other family-
focused religious practice and other accounts of the filial piety that char-
acterizes the social heritage of Confucianism. One might also wonder
how those stories conveyed expectations about proper practice or what
one does or does not have to believe. Sometimes narrative practices in-
clude official theological writing about how commemoration should
happen, but even more often, the narratives are recorded in something
like Cheung’s blog, recounting, “On Qingming My Family Tidies the
Graves.” Especially when practices are dislodged, challenged, and chang-
ing, there will be many stories—official and unofficial—explaining why
and how a lived religious practice matters.
If you wanted to learn more about this practice, then, you might
look for official guides, but you would also want to observe and inter-
view ordinary people. That is especially true where religion is not being
carried primarily by organized institutions, either those established
by a state or those organized into a professionalized religious sector.
In entangled contexts, religious practices are pervasive, and no single
set of experts is in charge. In interstitial contexts, whatever religious
practices exist have been improvised (often in spite of the experts).