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MODELS, NUMBERS, AND CASES

Methods for Studying International Relations

Edited by
Detlef F. Sprinz
and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias

THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN PRESS

Ann Arbor
THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN PRESS
Ann Arbor
2004
 Contents

Preface vii

1. Introduction: Methodology in International Relations

Research Detlef F. Sprinz and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias 1

Part I. Case Study Methods

2. Case Study Methods: Design, Use, and Comparative

Advantages Andrew Bennett 19
3. Case Study Methods in International Political Economy
John S. Odell 56
4. Beyond Story-Telling: Designing Case Study Research in
International Environmental Policy
Ronald Mitchell and Thomas Bernauer 81
5. Case Study Methods in International Security Studies
Arie M. Kacowicz 107

Part II. Quantitative Methods

6. The Promise and Perils of Statistics in International Relations

Bear F. Braumoeller and Anne E. Sartori 129
7. Quantitative Approaches to the International Political
Economy Edward D. Mansfield 152
8. Environment Meets Statistics: Quantitative Analysis of
International Environmental Policy Detlef F. Sprinz 177
9. Research Design in Testing Theories of International Conflict
Paul Huth and Todd Allee 193
 Contents

Part III. Formal Methods

10. Formal Models of International Politics Duncan Snidal 227

11. Formal Methods and International Political Economy
Helen V. Milner 265
12. Consumption, Production, and Markets: Applications of
Microeconomics to International Politics
John A. C. Conybeare 290
13. Game Theory and International Environmental Policy
D. Marc Kilgour and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias 317
14. The Art of Shaker Modeling: Game Theory and Security Studies
Andrew Kydd 344
15. Conclusion: Multimethod Research Detlef F. Sprinz and
Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias 367

Appendix 383
Contributors 387
Name Index 391
Subject Index 401

vi
 1. Introduction: Methodology in
International Relations Research

Detlef F. Sprinz and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias

Studies of international relations try to explain a broad range of political

interactions among countries, societies, and organizations. Whether study-
ing of war and peace or exploring economic cooperation or environmental
con›ict, research on international politics requires a systematic approach to
identifying fundamental processes and forces of change. in response to
increased economic interdependence and other profound changes in the
international system during the last few decades, the analysis of interna-
tional relations (IR) has expanded in three main directions. First, scholars
have tackled new issues, including international environmental politics,
international ethics, and globalization. Second, new methods have
emerged (e.g., two- level game analysis and spatial analysis), and the scope
of methodologies has broadened to include greater use of rational choice
models and statistical methods. Third, scholars have become increasingly
specialized both in their respective sub‹elds and in their use of various
methodologies. These developments have undoubtedly enriched IR
research by drawing attention to additional areas of study, such as compli-
ance with international treaties and the explanation of civil wars, and by
changing how researchers analyze these subjects.
At the same time the combination of new themes of research, increased
methodological diversity, and greater specialization within sub‹elds has
overshadowed common methodological concerns of students of the ‹eld.
While general courses on research methodology are now standard in the
political science curriculum at both the advanced undergraduate and grad-

1
 Models, Numbers, and Cases

uate levels, speci‹c treatments of methodological problems in the analysis

of international relations are still comparatively rare. This volume aims to
‹ll this gap by presenting theoretical and empirical studies that address
central methodological issues as they have emerged in substantive sub‹elds
of international relations research. The authors explore the application of
three methods of research—case studies, quantitative analyses, and formal
methods1—international political economy, international environmental
politics, and international security. The authors also discuss how these
methods have in›uenced key debates in international relations such as
whether and why democratic countries are unlikely to ‹ght each other and
what determines the effectiveness of international regimes.
Following many years of debate on which method is best for studying
international relations, this book is written in a very different spirit. It
argues that a serious dialogue across different methodological approaches
and sub‹elds will generate a better understanding of the advantages and
limits of different methods and will lead to more fruitful research on inter-
national relations.
Leading scholars of the ‹eld have elaborated on the need for a more
robust discourse on methodology in international relations. Two former
presidents of the International Studies Association, Michael Brecher and
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, have recently attempted to stimulate such a dia-
logue. In his 1999 presidential address to the International Studies Associ-
ation, Brecher states that the ‹eld must become more tolerant of compet-
ing paradigms, models, methods, and ‹ndings. He emphasizes the
importance of both cumulation of knowledge and cross-methods research.
Bueno de Mesquita outlines the comparative advantages of the three major
methods used in international relations (case study, quantitative, and for-
mal methods) and suggests that “scienti‹c progress is bolstered by and may
in fact require the application of all three methods.”
This book offers a unique combination of an introduction to these three
methodology approaches and an examination of their application to sub-
stantive research in international relations. It emphasizes the merits of
employing case study, quantitative analysis, and formal methods in IR
research and the trade-offs involved in using each method. Each method is
‹rst introduced, then followed by separate chapters illustrating the appli-
cation of the particular method to three sub‹elds of international relations:
international political economy, international environmental politics, and
international security.

2
 Introduction

These sub‹elds were chosen for several reasons. International security

has been at the heart of the traditional study of international relations and
remains a core sub‹eld. Many of the main intellectual challenges in the
study of international relations center on international security, beginning
with the study of war and its causes at the individual (leader), state, and
international system levels. Over the past half century, scholars have
expanded the range of questions in security studies to include analysis of
nuclear deterrence, civil wars, international alliances, and the effects of dif-
ferent types of domestic regimes on the likelihood of engaging in war (the
democratic peace thesis).
International political economy (IPE) is another central sub‹eld of
international relations. Much current scholarship on international politics
deals with questions of international political economy, including the pol-
itics of international trade and monetary relations. Many studies in this
‹eld focus on foreign economic policy-making, but broader de‹nitions of
the ‹eld also include the study of international institutions and coopera-
tion.2 International political economy has been at the center of the modern
study of international relations owing largely to the growing importance of
economic interactions among countries, and to the ›ourishing global econ-
omy since the end of World War II.
International environmental politics is a relatively new sub‹eld that has
emerged with the growing importance of global and transboundary envi-
ronmental issues including climate change, transboundary air pollution,
and threats to the world’s biodiversity. Its signi‹cance derives from the
possibility that perfectly routine human activities now have the potential
to destroy the basis of life on a global scale. Students of the ‹eld seek to
explain the behavior and motivations of both traditional participants in
policy making, such as governments and international organizations, and
nontraditional players, especially the burgeoning number of international
nongovernmental organizations who now play a prominent role in interna-
tional environmental politics. Given the emerging status of this ‹eld, a
timely discussion of methodological problems and lessons from other ‹elds
can facilitate a coherent research agenda.

Theory and Methodology

There are three main issues that can help to evaluate the intellectual
progress of an academic ‹eld. The ‹rst issue is the set of empirical phe-

3
 Models, Numbers, and Cases

nomena and questions being studied; the second issue is the state of theo-
retical development; and the third is the methodology used to form theo-
retical claims and test their empirical implications. This book focuses on
the issue of methodology, but also addresses the question of how method-
ology informs both theoretical and empirical debates. The links between
theory and methodology are complex and require some elaboration.3
Theory is de‹ned by the American Heritage Dictionary (1985) as

systematically organized knowledge applicable in a relatively wide

variety of circumstances, esp. a system of assumptions, accepted prin-
ciples, and rules of procedure devised to analyze, predict, or other-
wise explain the nature or behavior of a speci‹ed set of phenomena.

Theory provides clear and precise explanations of important phenomena. It

focuses scholarly attention on puzzles that set the research agenda for stu-
dents of the ‹eld. Ideally, theory should also offer a set of testable and
falsi‹able hypotheses, thus encouraging systematic reevaluation of its main
arguments through different research methods.
Methodology refers to systematically structured or codi‹ed ways to test
theories. Methodology is particularly useful in the context of a progressive
research program where hypotheses lend themselves to falsi‹cation. Given
a range of assumptions about the properties of actors and their interactions,
various hypotheses can be deduced and, ideally, corroborated—or
rejected—by empirical case studies or in quantitative research.
Methodology can also help expand the scope of received theories. For
example, game theory offers additional insights into strategic interactions
between players. Formal models can also be used to examine the internal
validity of theories (see chaps. 10, 14).
Theory and methodology are most bene‹cial when they accompany each
other for the advancement of knowledge. While theory provides explana-
tions for particular phenomena based on speci‹c assumptions, purely
axiomatic knowledge, turned into theories, is rarely useful in explaining
“real-world politics.” Theoretical arguments have to be augmented with
systematic methods of testing that can also help guard against chance and
selection bias. Besides formal models, it is mainly case study research that
can help generate new hypotheses to advance theory building. Both case
studies and quantitative methods are often used to test propositions. Care-

4
 Introduction

fully crafted research designs permit the assessment of regularities between

variables, detect their limitations (e.g., scope of the relationship in time
and space), and point to the possibility of generalization as well as replica-
bility and reliability of the ‹ndings.
Political methodology has undergone many changes over the last cen-
tury. King (1991) offered a ‹ve-part history of political methodology dur-
ing the twentieth century. He describes how research was ‹rst based on
direct empirical observations; subsequently, the “behavioral revolution” of
the mid-1960s led to a sharp increase in empirical-quantitative analyses as
large data sets became available in the late 1960s and 1970s. In the late
1970s and 1980s, political scientists borrowed quantitative and formal
methods from other disciplines, especially economics. Finally, since the
1980s political science methodologists have improved existing methods
and developed new tools speci‹cally geared to answering political science
questions.
The history of quantitative studies in international relations resembles
that of political science at large, but since the 1970s case study methodol-
ogy has also proliferated in international relations, particularly in studies
that reach into the comparative politics ‹eld. In addition, the growth of
rational choice approaches ‹rst in economics and subsequently in political
science has now had a marked impact on the study of international politics.
Since the 1980s, both mathematical models and rational choice approaches
have contributed to the development and re‹nement of central ideas in the
‹eld such as hegemonic stability theory and the democratic peace (Gold-
mann 1995; Wæver 1998). During the 1980s and 1990s constructivist,
poststructuralist, and postmodern approaches to international relations
also emerged, although it remains debatable whether these approaches
actually have developed a methodology of their own.
In order to gain more insight about the prevalence of different method-
ological approaches in international relations, we surveyed all articles pub-
lished in several leading journals in the ‹eld between 1975 and 2000. The
survey included articles published in the American Political Science
Review,4 International Organization, International Security,5 Interna-
tional Studies Quarterly, the Journal of Con›ict Resolution, and World
Politics (see ‹g. 1).6
The articles were classi‹ed into ‹ve categories according to the method
of analysis used by the authors.7

5
 Models, Numbers, and Cases

60

50

40

30

20

10

0
1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-2000

descriptive case studies quantitative formal modeling cross-methods

Fig. 1. Trends in methodology of international relations research

(1975–2000). (Data from American Political Science Review, vols. 69–94;
International Organization, vols. 29–54; International Security, vols. 1–25;
International Studies Quarterly, vols. 19–44; Journal of Conflict Resolution,
vols. 19–44; and World Politics, vols. 27–52.)

1. Descriptive analysis
2. Case studies
3. Quantitative (statistical) analysis
4. Formal modeling
5. Cross-methods studies

The broad trajectory over the period between 1975 and 2000 (grouped
as ‹ve-year intervals with the exception of the most recent group which
comprises six years) demonstrates important methodological trends in
international relations. The most profound trend evident in ‹gure 1 is the
continuing decline in the number of articles using a descriptive-historical

6
 Introduction

approach (and lacking serious consideration of methodology). While in the

late 1970s about half of all the articles published in these journals lacked
any methodological component, in the late 1990s less than one-third of the
articles surveyed could be classi‹ed as such. This trend re›ects an impor-
tant development in the way IR scholars conduct their research, and it sup-
ports the notion that international relations as a ‹eld has become more
methods-oriented than before. In particular, International Studies Quar-
terly, International Security, and World Politics all currently publish
signi‹cantly fewer articles that pursue a descriptive-historical approach
than twenty-‹ve years ago. For instance, during the late 1970s over 70 per-
cent of the articles published in World Politics applied a descriptive or his-
torical approach, while in late 1990s this ratio declined to less than 30 per-
cent. Another interesting ‹nding is the fairly constant frequency of articles
using case studies, which has remained roughly steady at around 13 per-
cent throughout the last quarter century.
In contrast, there has been a sharp increase in the number of articles
using either quantitative or formal methods or a combination of both.
Among articles published in the surveyed journals, the proportion of sta-
tistical studies rose from 26 percent during the late 1970s to 43 percent
during the late 1990s. This trend is most pronounced in International
Organization and World Politics. Edward Mans‹eld found a similar
increase in the frequency of statistical analysis in articles on international
political economy (see chap. 7, this vol.). It is remarkable that close to half
of all articles recently published in these six prominent journals used quan-
titative methods of research. This trend re›ects the growing importance IR
scholars place on systematic analysis of political precesses and world events.
This trend can also be partly explained by the greater availability of data
sets and methodological training of graduate students.
Overall, the number of articles using formal methods increased from less
than 9 percent during the late 1970s to 14 percent in the late 1990s. While
International Organization, International Studies Quarterly, and World
Politics all currently publish more articles using formal methods than they
did twenty-‹ve years ago, the rate of increase is greatest in journals that
have traditionally published more quantitative work, speci‹cally the Jour-
nal of Con›ict Resolution and the American Political Science Review.
Game theory is becoming more in›uential in the study of international pol-
itics although articles using formal methods still constitute a relatively
small portion of IR publications (on par with case study analysis).

7
 Models, Numbers, and Cases

The survey of these leading journals also shows that few scholars in the
‹eld employ multimethod research. Less than 4 percent of all articles pub-
lished during the late 1990s in the journals surveyed combined two
methodological approaches. Cross-method analysis obviously requires
more training (or alternatively, cross-‹eld collaboration). However, it
allows scholars to investigate alternative explanations, compensate for
weaknesses in each of these methods, and corroborate research results.
This volume can foster a dialogue among scholars of international rela-
tions and reduce the costs of cross-method discourse by providing in-depth
discussions of methodological concerns associated with different methods
and substantive areas of IR research.

Plan of the Book

The book is organized around three methodological approaches to the

study of international relations: case studies, quantitative analyses, and for-
mal methods. Each methodological part begins with an introductory essay
that presents an overview of the method and explains its advantages and its
limitations. The introductory chapter is followed by several chapters that
focus on applications of the respective method in different sub‹elds of
international relations, namely, international political economy, interna-
tional environmental politics, and international security. These chapters
evaluate the contribution of the various methods to central debates in the
‹eld as well as to theory building. They do so by discussing the literature
and elaborating on speci‹c methodological issues. Table 1 details the
structure of the book and the authors of the respective chapters.
The chapters are united in their emphasis on exploring common
methodological concerns and providing a critical evaluation of central
ideas from a methodological perspective. Each chapter also offers a list of
‹ve studies for further reading. The conclusion address problems that are
common to different methods and addresses in more detail cross-methods
research.
All the chapters in the book were written for the purpose of offering an
evaluation and critique of the analysis of international relations. Reading
the entire book provides the reader a broad perspective on the use of major
methods of analysis in different sub‹elds of international relations. The
chapters can also be read in alternative ways. Each chapter stands on its
own merits and can be read separately; in addition, the book can be read by

8
 Introduction

methodological part or by substantive ‹eld. For instance, readers can

choose to focus on how a particular method has been applied in several
sub‹elds of international relations. This focus on a particular method may
be more useful for classes on research methods (reading by row in table 1).
Alternatively, readers interested in a particular sub‹eld can compare how
the different methods have been applied in that particular ‹eld (reading by
column). Such reading of the book is most useful for classes in a particular
sub‹eld; for instance, students in a class on international political economy
will bene‹t from reading about the application of the three different
methodological approaches in their sub‹eld. Finally, an introductory
course may choose to use the ‹rst chapters of each part to obtain an
overview of each method, together with a sampling of the applications
chapters tailored to the focus of the course.8
The ‹rst part of the book examines the application of case study meth-
ods to the analysis of international political economy, international envi-
ronmental politics, and international security studies. The introductory
chapter by Andrew Bennett reviews both the design and application of case
study methods in international relations research (chap. 2). Bennett
explains the logic of various case study methods and shows how different
designs can contribute to the development of contingent generalizations or
“typological theories.” He illustrates how to choose between case study
methods on the basis of their relative strengths and weaknesses. Bennett
argues that case studies, when developed to their full potential, can aid in

TABLE 1. Organization of the Book

Methodological Introductory International International International
Domain Chapter Political Environmental Security
Part I: Bennett Odell Mitchell and Kacowicz
Case Study (chap. 2) (chap. 3) Bernauer (chap. 5)
Methods (chap. 4)

Part II: Braumoeller Mansfield Sprinz Huth and

Quantitative and Sartori (chap. 6) (chap. 8) Allee
Methods (chap. 6) (chap. 7) (chap. 9)

Part III: Snidal Milner Kilgour Kydd

Formal (chap. 10) (chap. 11), and Wolinsky (chap. 14)
Methods Conybeare Nahmias
(chap. 12) (chap. 13)

9
 Models, Numbers, and Cases

the generation of new theories. The chapter also provides guidance about
the criteria to use IR for selecting cases and deciding on the number of
variables to be studied. Bennett concludes by stressing the complementary
nature of case study methods, statistical analysis, and formal methods.
Following the introductory chapter on case study methodology, John
Odell reviews the intellectual development of case study analysis in the
sub‹eld of international political economy (chap. 3). The chapter discusses
various forms of single case studies, including the “method of difference,”
and explains both the advantages and limitations of these methods. Using
central studies in the ‹eld, ranging from E. E. Schattschneider’s classic
Politics, Pressures, and the Tariff (1935) to Richard Haass’s Economic
Sanctions and American Diplomacy (1998), Odell shows how qualitative
research has been instrumental in developing theories of international
political economy. He argues that case studies may support a theoretical
relationship but do not provide proof of causality. Therefore, he stresses the
value of using statistical methods empirical case studies.
In chapter 4, Ronald Mitchell and Thomas Bernauer examine the appli-
cation of case study methods to the study of international environmental
policy and outline procedures for designing and conducting qualitative
case studies. They discuss the problems inherent in analyzing small sam-
ples. The chapter offers ways to increase validity and reliability in small-n
studies by disaggregating cases into multiple events or observations.
Mitchell and Bernauer suggest that in order to advance positivist case
study research in international environmental policy and more broadly in
international relations, scholars must aim to derive testable hypotheses
with clearly identi‹ed variables and values.
The ‹rst part of the book concludes with Arie Kacowicz’s review of case
study methods in international security studies (chap. 5). Kacowicz
describes the contribution of empirical case study to ongoing debates in
international relations, such as the democratic peace thesis. He identi‹es
limitations of the method of difference and discusses recurring issues in the
application of case studies such as selection bias and endogeneity problems.
Kacowicz proposes several strategies for overcoming the methodological
limitations of case studies and recommends using case studies to generate
conditional theoretical statements. Finally, Kacowicz evaluates how case
study analysis has advanced research on international security.
Part 2 of the book focuses on the use of quantitative methods in IR
research. In their introductory chapter, Bear Braumoeller and Anne Sartori

10
 Introduction

observe that quantitative methods allow researchers to draw inferences about

the world by applying the laws of probability to the available data. While
the statistical method facilitates summarizing relevant quantitative infor-
mation in a compact way, it also requires careful evaluation of reliability and
validity of measures and inferences. Most important, statistical methods ren-
der simultaneous testing of competing and complementary hypotheses in a
precise way. Braumoeller and Sartori discuss two common shortcomings in
the application of statistical methods, namely, (1) weak theoretical founda-
tions underlying model speci‹cations and (2) errors in inference, especially
confusion over the distinction between statistical and substantive
signi‹cance. Nevertheless, Braumoeller and Sartori show that quantitative
methods, when properly employed, can summarize a wealth of information
in an accessible form and provide a rigorous means of testing theory.
In chapter 7, Edward Mans‹eld reviews how quantitative methods have
been applied in the study of international political economy. He ‹rst high-
lights the important role of these methods (chap. 7) and their growing use.
About 45 percent of the articles published on international political econ-
omy in a sample of leading journals subscribe to quantitative methods—
roughly the same proportion reported for international relations at large
(‹g. 1, this chap.). By focusing mainly on the literature on international
trade, Mans‹eld shows how a progression of theoretical interests has
shaped the explanation of a nation’s trade, including hegemonic stability
theory, the effect of military alliances, the interaction between military
alliances and preferential trading arrangements. Mans‹eld recommends
that more attention be given to the functional form of the relationship
between variables and to developing reliable measures of key concepts of
international political economy.
Detlef Sprinz reviews the quantitative research on international envi-
ronmental policy in chapter 8. He covers recent studies of ecological mod-
ernization, the effects of international trade on the environment, environ-
mental regulation, environmental security, and the effectiveness of
international regimes. He also summarizes common methodological prob-
lems in the ‹eld and provides several examples of multimethod research on
international environmental policy. Sprinz points to the absence of large
databases that would facilitate cumulative research on basic questions in
this realm, such as the effects of domestic regime type on, for example,
democratic environmental performance.
Inspired by the reasoning of game theory, Huth and Allee develop a log-

11
 Models, Numbers, and Cases

ical progression of stylized games to illustrate how quantitative research in

international security studies could advance in the future (chap. 9). Their
sequence includes a dispute initiation game, a challenge of the status quo
game, and subsequently a negotiation or a military escalation game. Using
this sequence of games, the authors highlight several methodological chal-
lenges in the study of international security and provide advice on ways to
overcome selection effects and the lack of independence of observations
both over time and cross-sectionally. Huth and Allee maintain that more
attention should be placed on developing better measures of core concepts.
Part 3 of the book examines the application of formal methods to the
study of international politics. In his introductory chapter, Duncan Snidal
discusses the reasons for using models to study international relations
(chap. 10). Snidal views formal modeling as complementary to other meth-
ods and emphasizes that successful modeling depends on the model being
closely linked to important theoretical and substantive questions. While
models always simplify reality, Snidal argues that models foster progress
by allowing us to draw deductive inferences—thus leading to more precise
theories. Snidal then illustrates the evolution of modeling in international
relations by considering a developmental sequence of simple models start-
ing with Richardson’s arms race model. He shows how the limitations of
previous models inspired new directions and more effective modeling,
especially game modeling, leading to a more precise analysis of competi-
tion and cooperation between states.
Following Snidal’s introductory chapter, Helen Milner provides an
overview of formal methods approaches to the study of international polit-
ical economy (chap. 11). Milner begins by de‹ning the ‹eld of interna-
tional political economy to include the interaction of studies that address
economic and political variables in the international system. Milner notes
that rational choice methods have been an integral part of international
political economy research, dating back to Hirschman’s (1945) early work
on dependence. Milner reviews how rational choice theory has been applied
in three major areas of international political economy: hegemonic stabil-
ity theory; international trade and monetary policy-making; and interna-
tional institutions and cooperation. Milner argues that the use of formal
methods in these areas has been limited but fruitful, leading to progress in
the development of IR theory. She also suggests that using formal methods
to study international political economy can create a better discourse with
international economics.

12
 Introduction

In chapter 12, John Conybeare explains the logic of the microeconomic

approach to the study of international relations. Following a brief intro-
duction to the principles of microeconomics, Conybeare shows how mod-
els of supply and demand can be applied to a variety of foreign policy issues
such as war, peace, and trade liberalization. He argues that microeconom-
ics can help organize information in ways that facilitate theory testing. The
chapter also suggests that microeconomic models provide better explana-
tions of some phenomena than alternative IR theories such as the hege-
monic stability theory. Finally, Conybeare points to several additional
areas of IR in which the application of microeconomic approaches will
improve current research.
Marc Kilgour and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias evaluate the potential con-
tribution of game- theoretic methods to the study of international envi-
ronmental policy (chap. 13). They argue that although the application of
game theory to international environmental politics is new, its focus on
strategic interactions lends it particularly well to central issues in global
environmental governance. Kilgour and Wolinsky-Nahmias discuss both
cooperative and noncooperative game theory and show how game models
provide insights into the likelihood, stability, and fairness of possible solu-
tions to environmental con›icts. A general deterrence model is used to
illustrate game modeling and is applied to water con›icts in the Middle
East. The article also discusses how two-level game models improve our
understanding of international environmental negotiations by addressing
domestic constraints. Finally, the authors evaluate the challenges and lim-
itations of employing game-theoretic methods in the study of international
environmental politics.
In chapter 14, Andrew Kydd argues that formal models are suited to
security studies because the ‹eld focuses on situations with small number
of actors who have high stakes and long familiarity with the strategic prob-
lems they face. To illustrate, Kydd presents a simple bargaining model
based on the work of Fearon (1995) and Schultz (1999), and applies it to
the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir. By delineating rational responses
to uncertainty and to the role of signaling, Kydd shows how formal analy-
sis has greatly improved our understanding of the origins of war. Kydd also
discusses the contribution of game theory to other central debates in the
‹eld, including the democratic peace, arms races, and alliances.
In the concluding chapter, the editors, Detlef Sprinz and Yael Wolin-
sky-Nahmias, re›ect on how the three methods (empirical case studies, sta-

13
 Models, Numbers, and Cases

tistical analyses, and formal methods) have advanced our knowledge of cen-
tral issues in international relations. We discuss some of the methodologi-
cal challenges raised in the book and address the opportunities and chal-
lenges of cross-methods analysis. We suggest a few thoughts about new
methodological developments and how they may affect future research on
international relations.
In summary, this book introduces the main methods of research in
international relations and addresses a broad range of questions, from how
empirical case studies of international relations can be designed to over-
come methodological challenges to how quantitative analysis can be inte-
grated with formal methods to advance IR research. It discusses limitations
and trade- offs in using case studies, statistical analysis, and formal meth-
ods in the study of international relations and evaluates applications of
these methods in studies of international political economy, international
environmental politics, and security studies. Improving methodologies
and generating a dialogue among scholars who specialize in different issue
areas and methods will enhance the ability of researchers to conceptualize,
theorize, and better understand trends and changes in international poli-
tics.

Notes

We would like to thank Roshen Hendrickson and especially So Young Kim for
their research assistance.
1. We chose to focus on these three methods because these are the most com-
mon methods used in IR research.
2. Helen Milner (chap. 11) suggests that studies of international institutions
and cooperation should be thought of as part of the ‹eld of international political
economy if they involve the study of economic variables.
3. Books on methodology in the social sciences do not always distinguish
between theory and methodology. For example, some consider “quantitative stud-
ies” and “formalized rational choice” either a “metatheoretical orientation” or
“theoretical position” (Wæver 1998, 701–3). More generally, some social science
methodology books, in particular in Europe, restrict themselves to a philosophy-
of-science perspective—at the expense of more modern methodological considera-
tions for social science research.
4. We also reviewed the statistical data excluding APSR because the journal
publishes political science research not limited to the study of international rela-

14
 Introduction

tions. We found that excluding APSR led to higher ratios of formal and statistical
articles, but the reported trends remain the same.
5. International Security began publishing in 1976, so we surveyed the period
1976–2001.
6. The authors thank So Young Kim for her research assistance for this survey.
7. The classi‹cation is based on the following criteria: “Descriptive analysis”
includes articles based on historical analysis that lack clearly detectable methodol-
ogy; “Case studies” include articles that use any of the research approaches dis-
cussed in chapter 2 and justi‹cation for the case selection; “Quantitative analysis”
ranges from simple correlation/covariance analysis and factor analysis to more
sophisticated regression analysis; “Formal modeling” ranges from soft rational
choice theory, simulation, and game-theoretic models to more sophisticated for-
mal analysis that includes a mathematical proof; and “Cross-methods” analysis
includes articles that combine at least two methodologies (mostly quantitative and
formal analyses).
8. The book can also be read in conjunction with other books that have a dif-
ferent focus. One of the prominent books on methodological problems in the social
sciences is Designing Social Inquiry by Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sid-
ney Verba (1994). It considers general methodological problems of social inquiry
such as research design and causal inference (but it does not focus on issues that are
of particular importance to the study of international relations). Another valuable
book in the area of methodology, more speci‹c to international relations, is Daniel
Frei and Dieter Ruloff’s Handbook of Foreign Policy Analysis (1989), which cov-
ers mostly formal and statistical approaches to the study of foreign policy. Other
books that discuss theories of international politics include Patrick M. Morgan’s
Theories and Approaches to International Politics (1987) and Michael Don
Ward’s Theories, Models, and Simulations in International Relations (1985).
These books, however, were published during the late 1980s or early 1990s. A
more recent edited volume that offers a re›ective evaluation of methodology in
international studies is Frank P. Harvey and Michael Brecher’s Evaluating
Methodology in International Studies (2002).

References

Brecher, M. 1999. ISA Presidential Address. International Studies Quarterly 43

(2): 213–64.
Bueno de Mesquita, B. 2002. Domestic Politics and International Relations.
International Studies Quarterly 46 (1): 1–9.
Fearon, J. D. 1995. Rationalist Explanations for War. International Organization
49:379–414.

15
 Models, Numbers, and Cases

Frei, D., and D. Ruloff. 1989. Handbook of Foreign Policy Analysis : Methods for
Practical Application in Foreign Policy Planning, Strategic Planning, and
Business Risk Assessment. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.
Goldmann, K. 1995. Im Westen Nichts Neues: Seven International Relations
Journals in 1972 and 1992. European Journal of International Relations 1 (2):
245–58.
Guetzkow, H. S., and M. D. Ward. 1985. Theories, Models, and Simulations in
International Relations: Essays and Research in Honor of Harold Guetzkow.
Boulder: Westview.
Haass, R. N., ed. 1998. Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy. Washing-
ton, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Harvey, F. P., and M. Brecher, eds. 2002. Evaluating Methodology in Interna-
tional Studies. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Hirschman, A. 1945. National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade. Berke-
ley: University of California Press.
King, G. 1991. On Political Methodology. In Political Analysis: An Annual Pub-
lication of the Methodology Section of the American Political Science Associa-
tion, edited by J. A. Stimson. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
King, G., R. O. Keohane, and S. Verba. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry: Scienti‹c
Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Lakatos, I. 1986. Falsi‹cation and the Methodology of Scienti‹c Research Pro-
grammes. In Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, edited by I. Lakatos and
A. Musgrave. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Morgan, P. M. 1987. Theories and Approaches to International Politics: What
Are We to Think? New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
Schattschneider, E. E. 1935. Politics, Pressures, and the Tariff. Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice- Hall.
Schultz, K. A. 1999. Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrast-
ing Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War. International Organiza-
tion 53 (2): 233–66.
Wæver, O. 1998. The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American
and European Developments in International Relations. International Organi-
zation 52 (4): 687–727.

16
Part I. Case Study Methods
 2. Case Study Methods: Design, Use,
and Comparative Advantages

Andrew Bennett

There is a growing consensus among social scientists that research pro-

grams advance more effectively through the iterative or collaborative use of
different research methods than through the use of any one method alone.
Making the most of the synergies among research methods requires an
understanding of the relative comparative advantages, trade-offs, and lim-
itations of each method and an ability to translate between different meth-
ods. The comparative advantages of case study methods include identify-
ing new or omitted variables and hypotheses, examining intervening
variables in individual cases to make inferences on which causal mecha-
nisms may have been at work, developing historical explanations of partic-
ular cases, attaining high levels of construct validity, and using contingent
generalizations to model complex relationships such as path dependency
and multiple interactions effects. Particularly important is the ability to
identify new hypotheses, which case studies can do through a combination
of deduction and induction.
Recurrent trade-offs in the use of case study methods include the prob-
lem of case selection and the danger of selection bias, which can have more
severe consequences in case studies than in statistical studies, and the ten-
sion between parsimony and richness in selecting the number of variables
and cases to be studied. In addition, case study ‹ndings are usually con-
tingent and can be generalized beyond the type of case studied only under
speci‹ed conditions, such as when a case study shows that a variable is not

19
 Models, Numbers, and Cases

a necessary condition or a suf‹cient condition for an outcome, or when a

theory fails to ‹t a case that it appeared most likely to explain. Potential
limitations of case studies, though not inherent in every one, include
indeterminacy or inability to exclude all but one explanation, lack of
independence of cases, and the impossibility of perfectly controlling case
comparisons.
The inherent limitations of case study methods include their relative
inability to render judgment on the frequency or representativeness of par-
ticular cases and their weak capability for estimating the average “causal
weight” of variables. These are inferential processes for which case studies
are not designed and cannot be used except in a rudimentary manner. For-
tunately, these inherent limitations correspond almost exactly with the
comparative advantages of statistical methods, which give various measures
of frequency and can estimate the expected causal weight of a variable.
This chapter de‹nes and explicates case study methods and details their
comparative advantages and limitations. It then more brie›y reviews the
strengths and limits of formal models and statistical methods. This analy-
sis substantiates the conclusion that the comparative advantages of case
study methods are complementary to those of statistical methods and for-
mal models. It concludes with suggestions for increasing multimethod col-
laboration among researchers to make the best possible use of this comple-
mentarity.

Overview of Case Study Methods

Defining Case and Case Studies

A case is often de‹ned as a “phenomenon for which we report and interpret

only a single measure on any pertinent variable” (Eckstein 1975). This
wrongly implies, however, that each case has only one observation on the
dependent variable but many independent variables. If this were true, it
would present an inherent problem of indeterminacy, or an inability to
choose among competing explanations for a case.1 Yet each “case” in fact
has a potentially large number of observations on intervening variables and
may allow several qualitative measures of various dimensions of the inde-
pendent and dependent variables, so case studies do not necessarily suffer
from indeterminacy (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 225; Campbell
1975, 179, 181–82). I therefore follow the de‹nition of a case as an instance

20
 Case Study Methods

of a class of events of interest to the investigator (George 1979a), such as an

instance of revolution, type of governmental regime, kind of economic sys-
tem, or personality type. A case study is thus a well-de‹ned aspect of a his-
torical happening that the investigator selects for analysis, rather than a
historical happening itself. The Soviet revolution, for example, is an
instance of civil con›ict, war termination (the Soviet pullout from World
War I), the role of personality in politics, and so on. The investigator
decides which class of events, which facets of the Soviet revolution, and
which variables to focus upon.2
There is also potential for confusion among the terms comparative meth-
ods, case study methods, and qualitative methods. I use the term case study meth-
ods to refer to both within-case analysis of single cases and comparisons
among a small number of cases, as most case studies involve both kinds of
analysis due to the limits of either method used alone. Even single-case
studies usually draw implicit comparisons to wider groups of cases. As for
the term qualitative methods, this is sometimes used to encompass both case
studies carried out with a neopositivist view of the philosophy of science
and those implemented with a postmodern or interpretive view. In the pre-
sent chapter I use the term case study to refer only to studies that aspire to
causal explanations, setting aside those interpretivist and postmodernist
analyses that eschew such explanations or view them as unattainable.

Types of Theory-Building Contributions of Case Studies

Within this general de‹nition of case studies, there are many types of case
studies. Some methodological texts focus on theory-testing cases at the
expense of theory development. It is important to keep in mind, however,
that there are several kinds of contributions to theory, including the gen-
eration of new hypotheses (the “logic of discovery”) as well as the testing of
existing ones (the “logic of con‹rmation”). In addition, there are several
kinds of research objectives, including not only the development of gener-
alized theories but the historical explanation of particular cases, that is,
explanation of a sequence of events that produce a particular historical out-
come in which key steps in the sequence are in turn explained with refer-
ence to theories or causal mechanisms. Case studies can contribute to all of
these kinds of theory building, as Arend Lijphart (1971) and Harry Eck-
stein (1975) indicated in their similar taxonomies of different kinds of case
studies, outlined in table 1 (from George 1979a).

21
 Models, Numbers, and Cases

Apart from the ‹rst type, which is simply a kind of chronological narra-
tive, case studies have an explanatory or theory-building purpose. “Inter-
pretive” or “disciplined con‹gurative” cases use theoretical variables to
provide historical explanations of particular cases. In other words, they use
theories to show that in the particular historical circumstances of the case,
the outcome was to be expected. Heuristic case studies seek to generate
new hypotheses inductively. “Deviant” cases, or cases whose outcomes are
not predicted or explained well by existing theories, can be particularly
useful in identifying new or left-out variables. Finally, researchers can use
case studies to test whether extant theories accurately explain the processes
as well as the outcomes of particular cases. Herein, I use Eckstein’s termi-
nology, which is more common, with the addition of Lijphart’s term for
the study of “deviant” cases.

Within-Case Methods of Analysis

Process Tracing

There are three methods of within-case analysis: process tracing, congru-

ence testing, and counterfactual analysis.3 Process tracing focuses on
whether the intervening variables between a hypothesized cause and
observed effect move as predicted by the theories under investigation. Put
another way, process tracing looks at the observable implications of puta-
tive causal mechanisms in operation in a case, much as a detective looks for
suspects and for clues linking them to a crime. The goal is to establish
which of several possible explanations is consistent with an uninterrupted
chain of evidence from hypothesized cause to observed effect. The power of
process tracing arises from the fact that it requires continuity and com-

TABLE 1. Equivalent Terms for Types of Case Studies

Arend Lijphart Harry Eckstein
Atheoretical case study Configurative-ideographic case study
Interpretative case study Disciplined-configurative case study
Hypothesis-generating case study Heuristic case study
Deviant case study (No comparable term or concept)
Theory-confirming/infirming case study Crucial, most likely, least likely test cases

22
 Case Study Methods

pleteness in explaining a case (although there are pragmatic limits on the

ability or need to examine the in‹nite “steps between steps” in a temporal
process). If even a single signi‹cant step in a hypothesized process is not as
predicted, the hypothesis must be modi‹ed, sometimes trivially and other
times substantially, if it is to explain the case. If, for example, 98 of 100
dominoes standing in a straight line knock one another over but the 99th
domino does not fall or strike the ‹nal domino, we need a separate expla-
nation for why the 100th domino has fallen.
This contrasts sharply with statistical methods, which rely on proba-
bilistic associations but do not require continuity or completeness in any
given case. In this sense, process tracing is different from the notion of
“pattern matching” outlined by Donald Campbell (1975). Campbell does
not elaborate in any detail on what he means by “pattern matching,” but
he indicates that it involves ‹nding similar patterns or sequences in differ-
ent cases, and he does not de‹ne it to include an analysis of the full
sequence of events in either case. This is potentially an important form of
inference that combines elements of cross-case comparison with some
degree of within-case analysis, but it does not require full continuity or
completeness and hence cannot constitute a historical explanation of either
case. The distinction is analogous to the difference between ‹nding com-
mon short sequences in a long strand of DNA that may offer clues to its
operation (pattern matching) and attempting to explain how the full
strand operates to express itself in the life form to which the DNA belongs
(process tracing).
In any particular study, there can be a deductive element to process trac-
ing, an inductive element, or both. Deductively, the researcher uses theo-
ries to predict the values of intervening variables in a case and then tests
these predictions. This may require ‹lling in the predictions that under-
speci‹ed theories should make in a case, and it is important to trace the
predicted processes of alternative hypotheses as well as those of the main
hypothesis of interest. Inductively, the researcher should be open to unex-
pected clues or puzzles that indicate the presence of left-out variables. This
can lead to the development of new hypotheses.
One common misconception here is that it is always illegitimate to
derive a hypothesis from a case and then test it against the same case. In
fact, it may be possible to develop a hypothesis from a case and then test it
against different evidence in the same case. Detectives, of course, do this all
the time: clues may lead to a new “theory of the case,” which prompts the

23
 Models, Numbers, and Cases

detective to look for “new” evidence in the case that had previously been
ignored or considered irrelevant. If the new evidence ‹ts the prediction of
the new theory, this is considered an independent corroboration.4
Process tracing is not infallible. Measurement error and omitted vari-
ables can lead to incorrect inferences in process tracing just as they can in
statistical methods. There are also practical limits on our ability to observe
or trace processes in all of their nearly in‹nite detail and to establish fully
continuous sequences. The requisite evidence may not be available at key
steps in the process, and even where evidence is available, we may not have
the time to go through all of it. Yet by insisting that we establish explana-
tions that document the intervening variables and processes through which
the hypothesized independent variables are purported to have brought
about the observed outcome, process tracing differs from and complements
statistical inferences. Although no case study is undertaken in the in‹nite
level of detail that would be needed to establish a fully continuous process,
case study explanations are open to challenge if they are inconsistent with
the ‹nest level of detail that is observable. For example, if a rational choice
theory posits that an individual should have gone through a rational calcu-
lation that led to a certain behavior, but it can be shown in a case study that
the individual’s thinking process was actually very different from that
posited by the theory, then the theory cannot constitute a satisfactory
explanation of the case even if its predicted outcome is consistent with the
observed outcome.

Congruence Testing

In congruence testing, the researcher focuses on the values of the indepen-

dent and dependent variables rather than the intervening variables. Here,
the researcher tests whether the predicted value of the dependent variable,
in view of the values of the case’s independent variables, is congruent with
the actual outcome in the case. Congruence tests are usually less conclusive
than process tracing because in the social sciences we usually lack precise
models of the value that the individual variables, individually and collec-
tively, should produce in the dependent variable. In this sense, congruence
tests in a single case or a small number of cases are a less reliable version of
statistical tests of covariation or estimates of partial correlations among a
large number of cases. Still, congruence tests may be able to rule out pro-

24
 Case Study Methods

posed necessary or suf‹cient conditions, and they may weaken the plausi-
bility of particular historical explanations of cases.

Counterfactual Analysis

Counterfactual analysis inverts the standard mode of inference for empiri-

cal testing of assertions such as “x in a speci‹ed case was necessary for y.”
This assertion poses a logically equivalent counterfactual, namely, “if not-
x had occurred in the case, then not-y would have occurred.” Analogously,
a claim that a variable x is suf‹cient for an outcome y, whether made for all
y or only for speci‹c contexts, can be assessed by looking at the equivalent
counterfactual, “not-y could occur only if not-x.” Interest in counterfactual
analysis has increased in recent years (Fearon 1991; Tetlock and Belkin
1996). At the same time, there is an obvious danger of con‹rmation bias
and spuriousness if counterfactual analysis is carried out in an undisci-
plined way.
Philip Tetlock and Aaron Belkin have devised a useful taxonomy of
counterfactual analyses. These include “idiographic case-study counterfac-
tuals,” which focus on points of supposed historical contingency in indi-
vidual cases, and “nomothetic counterfactuals,” which apply well-de‹ned
theories to speci‹c antecedent counterfactual conditions. These authors
argue that an especially important type of counterfactual combines these
two, bringing together in-depth knowledge of particular cases with strong
theories about the consequences of particular values of a variable to produce
convincing accounts of what should have been true if one variable in a case
had assumed a particular value. They illustrate this with the example of
dinosaur extinction (1996, 6–11): If an asteroid of a size suf‹cient to cause
climatic change had struck the earth 65 million years ago, what testable
implications should be observable in contemporary geologic evidence?
This combines the known speci‹cs of the dinosaur extinction case with
theories on asteroid impacts to produce testable assertions, and it thus
moves from the counterfactual to the factual. The dif‹culty of applying
this to the social sciences, as they note, is that we generally lack “idio-
graphic-nomothetic syntheses of comparable scope and sweep in world pol-
itics” (11).
Tetlock and Belkin also offer sensible advice on criteria for de‹ning
good counterfactual analyses, including clarity in de‹ning the variables,

25
 Models, Numbers, and Cases

minimization of the necessary rewriting of history, and consistency with

established theories and statistical ‹ndings. Most important, they suggest
that good counterfactuals must have testable implications in the factual
world (1996, 18). They also note that if we ‹nd a causal argument plausi-
ble but its equivalent counterfactual argument implausible, or vice versa,
we must reconcile the asymmetry in our thinking. This can help identify
double standards, inconsistent causal reasoning, and hindsight bias (13).
Subject to these criteria, counterfactual analysis is a useful tool in the
explanation of individual cases and can provide a check on con‹rmation
bias rather than an open license to rewrite history.

Research Design Tasks

There are ‹ve research design tasks common to both single and compara-
tive case studies, many of them common to statistical studies as well
(George 1979a; George and McKeown 1985). First, the researcher must
de‹ne the research objective, including the class of events to be explained,
the alternative hypotheses under consideration, and the kind of theory
building to be undertaken. Second, the researcher must specify the inde-
pendent, dependent, and intervening variables and decide which of these
are to be controlled for and which are to vary across cases or types of cases.
Third, the researcher selects the cases to be studied, possibly assisted by the
typological space that results from the speci‹cation of the variables and
alternative hypotheses. Fourth, the researcher should consider how best to
describe variance in the independent and dependent variables, considering
not only individual variables but also types of cases, or combinations of
variables, and the sequential pathways that characterize each type. Finally,
the researcher speci‹es the structured questions to be asked of each case in
order to establish the values of the independent, intervening, and depen-
dent variables.
An example from my own work illustrates how these tasks were accom-
plished in one study.5 I chose to study Soviet and Russian military inter-
ventionism and to try to explain the puzzle of why such interventionism
appeared to increase in the 1970s, decrease in the 1980s, and increase once
again in the mid-1990s. I ‹rst had to de‹ne interventionism, the propensity
for intervention, as distinct from actual military interventions. This required
de‹ning in a general way what constituted an inviting or uninviting

26
 Case Study Methods

“opportunity” for military intervention, which I did by looking at a typol-

ogy of situational factors, and by comparing opportunities in which the
Soviet Union or Russia intervened in one period to analogous opportuni-
ties in which there was no intervention, or a withdrawal from an existing
intervention, in another period. I also decided to focus on one subtype of
intervention: the high end of the scale involving the direct use of Soviet or
Russian troops or commanders.
For the alternative explanations of patterns in Soviet-Russian interven-
tionism, I included standard theories from the IR literature based on the
systemic, domestic, organizational, and individual levels, as well as theo-
ries based on the arguments of area experts and policymakers. The expla-
nation that interested me most was that Soviet and Russian leaders learned
lessons from their ongoing experiences that made them more willing to
resort to military intervention in the 1970s, less so in the 1980s, and more
so once again in the mid-1990s.6 I speci‹ed the variables for each of the
alternative explanations and carried out both congruence and process-trac-
ing tests on each explanation. Explanations based on changes in the balance
of military forces, for example, were consistent with the rise of Soviet inter-
ventionism in the 1970s, but not with its decline in the 1980s when Soviet
forces were still strong or with its resurgence in 1994 when Russian forces
were weak. For the “learning” explanation, eight speci‹c beliefs on the
ef‹cacy of using force were listed, such as beliefs on whether “balancing” or
“bandwagoning” is the most likely response by others to the use of force. I
also de‹ned corresponding behaviors, such as the intensity of efforts to get
other regional states or national liberation movements to bandwagon with
Soviet-Russian efforts.
After considering for study more than a dozen cases of interventions,
noninterventions, and withdrawals, I chose to examine the Soviet-Cuban
intervention in Angola in 1975, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in
1979, the ongoing occupation of Afghanistan through the 1980s, the
withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, and the Russian intervention in
Chechnya in 1994. I was assisted in this process by a chart outlining my
preliminary knowledge on how each of the possible cases for study ‹t with
respect to their values on the seven independent variables identi‹ed by the
hypotheses. This helped ensure that the cases I chose included wide varia-
tion in both the independent and dependent variables. It also made clear
which other cases might have been included, thereby “leaving up the scaf-

27
 Models, Numbers, and Cases

folding” for future researchers to build upon or future critics to question

(King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). This is an important aspect of research
design that is seldom adequately carried out.
I also used my preliminary knowledge of the cases to select from among
the cases that history provided the ones that provided the most analytical
leverage on my research objective and that best ‹t a strong “most similar
cases” research design. Since the learning hypothesis focused on a path-
dependent historical process, I chose cases that covered the entire historical
period from 1973 (the lead-up to Soviet intervention in Angola) to 1996
(the peak of modern Russia’s ‹rst intervention in Chechnya). I also
included cases of different types of intervention, such as direct intervention
(Afghanistan, Chechnya) and proxy intervention (Angola). Also, the
before-and-after cases of intervention in and withdrawal from Afghanistan
provided a most-similar-case comparison that controlled for many vari-
ables, such as intrinsic geographic importance. Controlling for other vari-
ables that changed over time, such as U.S. policy, was done through a com-
bination of case comparisons and process tracing. Thus, as is common, the
research design included both within-case analysis of every case and cross-
case comparisons.
The questions asked of each case included those that established the val-
ues of the independent and intervening values for each hypothesis and the
outcome of the case. For the learning hypothesis, the case studies tested
whether stated Soviet and Russian beliefs changed in response to experi-
ence and were congruent with Soviet behavior. They also tested whether
the patterns and timing of changes in stated beliefs ‹t the dynamics pre-
dicted by theories of individual, organizational, and governmental learn-
ing. A particularly important test was whether individuals’ stated beliefs
‹t better with their apparent material interests, as many explanations
argued they should, or with the experiences and information to which indi-
viduals were exposed, as learning theory predicted. Finally, the study des-
ignated ‹fty-‹ve key Soviet and Russian of‹cials whose stated views were
traced through public statements, archival documents, interviews, and
memoirs.7
The actual case studies found substantial changes in stated beliefs over
time that correlated closely with actual Soviet-Russian behavior. It was
also able to trace these changes of beliefs to ongoing Soviet-Russian expe-
riences in the use of force and to show that beliefs were often correlated
more closely with individuals’ experiences than with their bureaucratic or

28
 Case Study Methods

material interests. Many military of‹cers who fought in Afghanistan, for

example, strongly protested the use of Russian troops in Chechnya, even to
the point of losing their jobs and ending their careers. These conclusions
constituted strong evidence for the general applicability of learning theory,
as in many respects the closed Soviet system was a least likely case for learn-
ing. The cases studied did not include any crucial cases, however, as U.S.
policy responses and Soviet-Russian domestic politics were also broadly
consistent with changes in Soviet behavior.

Single-Case Research Designs

Within the context of general research design tasks, there are speci‹c con-
siderations that apply to single and comparative case studies. Some
methodologists have downplayed the theory-building contributions that
can be made by single-case research designs (King, Keohane, and Verba
1994, 209–11). In contrast, most case study researchers have argued that
single-case studies can provide tests that might strongly support or
impugn theories. Many in›uential research ‹ndings in political science
have come from single-case studies that presented anomalies for accepted
theories.8
An important single-case research design is the study of crucial, most
likely, and least likely cases that pose severe tests of theories. Harry Eck-
stein developed the idea of a “crucial case,” or a case that “must closely ‹t a
theory if one is to have con‹dence in the theory’s validity, or, conversely,
must not ‹t equally well any rule contrary to that proposed” (1975, empha-
sis in original). Because true crucial cases were rare in Eckstein’s view, he
pointed to the alternative of “most likely” and “least likely” cases. A most
likely case is one that is almost certain to ‹t a theory if the theory is true
for any cases at all. The failure of a theory to explain a most likely case
greatly undermines our con‹dence in the theory. A least likely case, con-
versely, is a tough test for a theory because it is a case in which the theory
is least likely to hold true. Eckstein’s conception is a useful starting point
on theory testing in case studies, but it is at best incomplete because he
does not address whether the cases in question are most or least likely for
competing theories, or whether these theories predict the same outcome as
the theory of interest or a different outcome altogether. Thus, a more com-
plete version of Eckstein’s insight would be that a theory is most strongly
supported when it makes a clear prediction on the outcome or process of a

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 Models, Numbers, and Cases

case, all other theories make clear predictions that we should not ‹nd this
outcome or process, and the ‹rst theory is corroborated in the case. Con-
versely, if both our theory of interest and the alternative theories make the
same prediction on the outcome or process of a case, but this prediction
proves wrong, then the theory of interest is strongly impugned because its
failure cannot be explained away by the operation of other theories or
mechanisms.9 Single-case studies that ‹t either of these situations can
greatly increase or decrease our con‹dence in a theory or require that we
alter its scope conditions, although we can never entirely rule out the pos-
sibility that the outcome or process of the case was caused by probabilistic
processes analogous to those of quantum mechanics.
Another important single-case research design is the study of a deviant
or outlier case. Research on deviant cases can help inductively identify
variables and hypotheses that have been left out of existing theories.
Deviant cases may also uncover measurement errors that may exist in less
extreme forms in other cases.
Single-case study designs can ful‹ll the other theory-building purposes
identi‹ed by Lijphart and Eckstein as well. Idiographic studies, while
often disdained, may provide data for later more theoretically oriented case
studies. Also, a study of a newly de‹ned puzzle or phenomenon might
begin with a fairly open-ended effort—sometimes called “soaking and
poking” in the data—to generate hypotheses that can then be tested more
systematically.10

Comparative Methods

Mill’s Methods and Most-Similar and

Least-Similar Case Comparisons

Comparisons between cases are a powerful source of causal inferences but

also a potential source of inferential errors. One mode of case comparisons
is Mill’s method of agreement, in which the investigator looks for the
potentially causal antecedent conditions that are the same between two
cases that have the same outcome. Ideally, these would turn out to be nec-
essary conditions. Thus, if we compared the following two cases using
Mill’s method of agreement, we might infer that the variable A is causally
related to the outcome Y, as it is the only independent variable common to
the two cases.

30
 Case Study Methods

Mill’s Method of Agreement

Independent Variables Dependent Variable
Case 1 ABCDE Y
Case 2 A FGHI Y

This method of agreement corresponds, somewhat confusingly, with

what has been called the “least similar cases” research design. If, for exam-
ple, we ‹nd that teenagers are “dif‹cult” in both tribal societies and indus-
trialized societies, we might be tempted to infer that it is the nature of
teenagers rather than the nature of society that accounts for the dif‹culty
of teenagers (Przeworski and Teune 1970).
In Mill’s method of difference, the investigator would look for
antecedent conditions that differ between two cases that have different
outcomes, and they would judge that those antecedent conditions that
were the same despite differing outcomes could not be suf‹cient to cause
either outcome. In the following example (where ~A represents “not A”)
the researcher would draw the inference that the variable A was causally
related to the outcome because it is the only one that varies when the out-
come varies.

Mill’s Method of Difference

Independent Variables Dependent Variable
Case 1 ABCDE Y
Case 2 ~A B C D E ~Y

This corresponds with the “most similar case” research design (Prze-
worski and Teune 1970). It has also been called the method of “controlled
comparison,” because if two cases in fact are the same in all but one inde-
pendent variable, then we have the functional equivalent of a controlled
experiment. The practical limitation here, of course, is that two cases are
almost never identical in all but one independent variable (George
1979a).11
In actual practice, case study researchers almost never draw conclusions
on the basis of Mill’s methods alone because these methods require
demanding and unrealistic assumptions in order to provide nonspurious
inferences. One key limitation of Mill’s methods, which Mill himself
identi‹ed, is that they cannot work well in the presence of equi‹nality
(George 1982). A condition of equi‹nality, or what Mill called a “plurality

31
 Models, Numbers, and Cases

of causes,” holds when the same outcome can arise through different path-
ways or combinations of variables. Thus, when equi‹nality is present, there
might be no single necessary or suf‹cient variable for a phenomenon: it
might be that either ABC or DEF causes Y, and that none of the variables
A through F is by itself suf‹cient to cause Y. In such circumstances, pair-
wise comparisons of cases might lead us wrongly to reject variables that can
cause an outcome in conjunction with some contexts but not others, and it
might also lead us to accept a confounding variable as causal rather than
recognizing that its relationship to the outcome is spurious.
Thus Mill’s methods can work well at identifying causal relations only
under three conditions that are impossible to realize fully in practice. First,
the causal relations being investigated must be deterministic regularities
involving conditions that by themselves are either necessary or suf‹cient
for a speci‹ed outcome. This implies that there can be no causally relevant
interaction effects. Second, all variables that contributed causally to the
outcome would have to be identi‹ed and included in the analysis. Third,
cases that represent the full range of all logically and socially possible
causal paths must be available for study (Little 1998; George and McKe-
own 1985).
Because these requirements are unrealistic, case study researchers use
Mill’s methods in only a very general and preliminary way to identify
potentially relevant variables, but they then rely heavily on process tracing
to compensate for the evident weakness of Mill’s methods (Mahoney
1999).12 For example, when it is not possible to ‹nd cases similar in all but
one independent variable and the dependent variable, process tracing can
test whether each of the potentially causal variables that differ between the
imperfectly matched cases can be ruled out as having causal signi‹cance.13

Structured, Focused Comparison of Cases and the

Development of Typological Theories

In response to the limitations of Mill’s methods and controlled compari-

son, Alexander George (1979a, 1979b) systematized case study procedures
and developed the method of “structured focused case comparisons.” In
this method, the researcher systematically (1) speci‹es the research prob-
lem and the class of events to be studied; (2) de‹nes the independent,
dependent, and intervening variables of the relevant theories; (3) selects

32
 Case Study Methods

the cases to be studied and compared; (4) decides how best to characterize
variance in the independent and dependent variables; and (5) formulates a
detailed set of standard questions to be applied to each case.
In addition, consistent with his emphasis on equi‹nality, George
argued that case studies could be especially useful in developing what he
called “typological theories,” or contingent generalizations on “the variety of
different causal patterns that can occur for the phenomena in question [and]
the conditions under which each distinctive type of causal patterns occurs” (1979a,
emphasis in original). He advocated a kind of “building block” approach to
the development of theories. In this approach, each case, while rendered in
terms of theoretical variables, might prove to be a distinctive pathway to
the outcome of interest. Typological theories treat cases as con‹gurations of
variables that may involve complex interactions among all of the variable
values in the case. While statistical methods can model interactions effects
as well, this puts added pressure on the sample size necessary to be
con‹dent in one’s results, and statistical studies rarely model interactions
among all the variables acting together, as a typological theory may do.
Typological theories make less restrictive assumptions about case com-
parisons than Mill’s methods. Speci‹cally, typological theory assumes that
if cases within the same type, or with the same mix of independent vari-
ables, have different outcomes on the dependent variable, the difference in
the outcome is due to measurement error or left-out variables, not to the
type of probabilistic relations theorized in quantum physics. This
addresses a common misinterpretation of case study methods, namely, that
they assume or require restrictive forms of determinism (Lieberson 1992).
It is certainly true that all forms of case comparison are much stronger
sources of inference when a variable is a necessary or suf‹cient condition for
a particular outcome. But it is also true that some forms of case comparison
require more deterministic assumptions than others, and most case study
researchers appear to assume that equi‹nality is a common condition in
social life (Ragin 1987). The minimal assumptions of typological theory
are in fact similar to those of the statistical researchers who interpret the
“error term” in their equations as including measurement error or left-out
variables.14 This assumption sets aside a third possibility, which can never
be de‹nitively ruled out, namely, that the error term can also represent a
fundamentally stochastic element analogous to the irreducible probabilism
of quantum mechanics.

33
 Models, Numbers, and Cases

Comparative Advantages of Case Study Methods

Case study methods have considerable comparative advantages relative to

statistical methods or formal models (Collier 1993). These include the
operationalization and measurement of qualitative variables (construct
validity), the heuristic identi‹cation of new variables or hypotheses, the
examination of potential causal mechanisms within particular cases or con-
texts, the historical explanation of cases, and the incorporation of complex
relations like equi‹nality and path dependency into typological theories.

Construct Validity

One of the greatest strengths of case studies is the opportunity to achieve

high levels of construct validity, or the ability to measure in a case the indi-
cators that best represent the theoretical concept we intend to measure.
Many of the variables of interest to researchers, such as democracy, power,
and political culture, are notoriously dif‹cult to operationalize and mea-
sure. What constitutes a “democratic” procedure in one cultural context
might be profoundly undemocratic in another. Thus, it is important to
carry out “contextualized comparison,” that is, comparison that “self-con-
sciously seeks to address the issue of equivalence by searching for analyti-
cally equivalent phenomena—even if expressed in substantively different
terms—across different contexts” (Lock and Thelen 1998, 11). This
requires detailed consideration of contextual variables, which is extremely
dif‹cult to carry out in statistical studies but common in case studies.
Whereas statistical studies run the risk of “conceptual stretching” if they
lump together dissimilar cases to get a higher sample size (Sartori 1970),
case studies move in the opposite direction, re‹ning concepts with a higher
level of validity but doing so at the cost of producing generalizations
applicable only over a smaller number of cases. Put in other terms, there is
a trade-off between achieving a high level of construct validity, which is
easier to do in case studies, and establishing a high level of external valid-
ity, or the ability to apply ‹ndings across a wide population of cases, which
statistical studies are better suited to doing.15
Because case studies can achieve high construct validity, statistical
research is not only usefully preceded by case study research to identify rel-
evant variables, it is often followed by case study work that focuses on
deviant cases and further re‹nes concepts (Collier 1998). For example, after

34
 Case Study Methods

a range of statistical studies suggested that democracies do not ‹ght other

democracies, case study researchers started to explore which aspects of
democracy—democratic values, democratic institutions, the transparency
of decision making in democracies, and so on—might be responsible for
this apparent “inter-democratic peace” (George and Bennett forthcoming).
Should these case studies indicate, to take a hypothetical example, that a
free press and transparency are more important factors than competitive
elections in producing an interdemocratic peace, then statistical databases
that weighted competitive elections heavily in the de‹nition of democracy
will have to be redone, and new statistical tests performed.

Generating New Theories

Case studies can also heuristically identify new variables and hypotheses.
This can take place through the study of deviant cases, as noted earlier, but
it also happens in the ordinary course of ‹eldwork, such as archival research
and interviews with participants, area experts, and historians. The popular
refrain that observations are theory-laden does not mean that they are the-
ory-determined. When a case study researcher asks a participant, “Were
you thinking x when you did y,” and they get the answer, “No, I was think-
ing z,” they may have a new variable demanding to be heard. Statistical
methods lack any counterpart for this process; some methods of “data min-
ing” or “exploratory data analysis” can be used to identify potentially rele-
vant variables, but even these methods can use only data that is already
coded into data sets, or data that someone has already identi‹ed as
suf‹ciently useful to be worth coding. Statistical studies that do not
involve archival work or interviews to measure or code variables have no
inductive means of identifying new variables, although deductive theoriz-
ing, whether by a researcher using statistical methods or a formal modeler,
can also identify new variables.16

Making Inferences Regarding Causal Mechanisms

Case studies can use process tracing to examine in detail the observable
implications of hypothesized causal mechanisms in individual cases. Causal
mechanisms can be de‹ned as the ultimately unobservable entities or
structures that operate in speci‹c contexts to generate the phenomena that
we observe in the physical or social world.17

35
 Models, Numbers, and Cases

Thus, as the philosopher David Hume famously argued, we cannot

directly observe theories or causal mechanisms. As noted earlier, process
tracing, like all methods (even experimental ones), does not allow direct or
infallible assessment of causal mechanisms as there is always the danger of
measurement error, speci‹cation error, and omitted variables. Hume also
noted, however, that we have several sources of inference on the operation of
hypothesized causal entities, so that our inferences on underlying causal
mechanisms, while fallible, are not mere guesswork. Some of the sources of
inference that Hume pointed to— constant conjunction and congruity
(similarity in size)—relate to statistical methods, but others—temporal
succession and contiguity—relate more directly to process tracing.18 The
detailed tracing of sequential processes among spatially and/or temporally
contiguous entities in a single case is a fundamentally different source of
inference from the assessment of correlations among cases. Process tracing
involves examining the hypothesized causal sequences that a theory and its
associated causal mechanisms predict should have taken place in a case,
then determining whether the intervening variables along these pathways,
or those predicted by alternative explanations, were in fact extant in the
case. This provides a basis for inference on whether the hypothesized expla-
nation can or cannot be ruled out as a historical explanation for the case,
which in turn allows inferences on the more general scope conditions of the
theories under investigation (a theory that fails to explain a “most likely
case,” for example, is strongly impugned).
It is the demand for a high level of detail and continuity in explaining
an individual historical case that distinguishes process tracing from statis-
tical analysis. As noted previously, the ‹nding that 98 of 100 dominoes
have knocked one another over in sequence is not enough to establish that
the 99th domino caused the 100th to fall. In this regard, process tracing is
quite different from the “manipulation account” of causal inference, in
which the value of one variable is manipulated in a controlled experiment
to provide a basis for causal inference. Process tracing is useful primarily in
nonexperimental studies of historical cases, where controlled experiments
are impossible. It can still be useful even in experimental settings, how-
ever, as a check on possible sources of error or failure to fully control all of
the differences between two trials of an experiment. It can also be useful as
a supplement to statistical studies of nonexperimental data by providing a
check on possibly spurious interferences and giving evidence on causal
direction, or helping to discern which of two correlated variables appears to

36
 Case Study Methods

be causing the other by temporally preceding it. By combining deductive

inquiry—what should I expect to see in the detailed processes in a case if a
theory is true?—and inductive inquiry—how might I explain the unantic-
ipated sequences or processes that I ‹nd in the case?—process tracing is a
powerful source of inference. The inductively derived insights that arise in
a case can be distinguished from mere storytelling if they can be explained
by extant theories or if they lead to additional novel predictions about the
processes in the case or in other cases that are then empirically veri‹ed.
To take one example from the medical sciences, scientists have been
con‹dent for many years on the basis of statistical analysis of nonexperi-
mental data in humans and experimental data in animal studies that smok-
ing cigarettes increases the likelihood of contracting lung cancer. But this
data did not provide much insight into the microlevel causal mechanisms
that linked the act of smoking to the outcome of cancer. Nor did it offer
explanations of individual cases of lung cancer, as nonsmokers can contract
lung cancer as well. Only recently has an improved understanding of cel-
lular-level mechanisms begun to ‹ll in the missing linkages between
smoking and cancer. This knowledge has been fostered by pathology stud-
ies of individual cases of both human and animal subjects, analogous to
process tracing, and of how healthy and cancerous cells and organs changed
over time. This improved understanding may eventually improve our abil-
ity to predict which individuals are most likely to contract cancer if they
smoke, who may be at low risk of cancer despite smoking, and who may be
at high risk of cancer despite not smoking. An individual who de‹ed the
odds in either direction would be a prime candidate for closer pathology
studies (process tracing) that might lead to new insights about the under-
lying mechanisms.

Historical Explanation of Cases

Conversely, not only can we use a case study to explore causal mechanisms,
we can use causal mechanisms to give historical explanations of cases. His-
torical explanation is quite different from the development and testing of
variable-centered theories based on the statistical study of a large number
of cases. In historical explanation, the researcher uses theories at each step
of a historical process to show how the variables made subsequent steps and
the ultimate outcome likely under the historical circumstances of the case
(Roberts 1996). This is quite different from establishing statistical gener-

37
 Models, Numbers, and Cases

alizations. As statistical researchers readily acknowledge, correlation does

not imply causality, and a statistically signi‹cant correlation does not nec-
essarily “explain” any or all of the cases upon which it is based. It is not
enough to know, for example, that an individual ‹tting speci‹ed relation-
ships to a murder victim is more likely than most to have committed the
murder. The prosecutor needs to establish empirically that means, motive,
and opportunity existed in this particular case. Ideally, they need a com-
plete and uninterrupted chain of evidence, using forensic, psychological,
and other theories to bolster each point in the chain, establishing how the
crime was likely have been done by the accused, together with evidence
and theoretical explanations that help rule out other likely suspects.
Process tracing allows this kind of analysis in individual cases.
Process tracing is thus similar in some respects to standard techniques
of writing diplomatic or political history, and there has been an active and
growing dialogue between case study researchers and historians.19 Histori-
ans often use theories implicitly to explain rather than merely describe
events, and they frequently generalize, though usually only to limited
domains of time and space. Yet the purposes, methods, and writings of his-
torians and political scientists remain quite different. As Jack Levy argues,
historians seek to understand single unique events, the milieu et moment,
while political scientists aim to generalize about classes of events; histori-
ans tend to favor complex explanations, while political scientists aim for
elegant and parsimonious explanations. Historians construct narrative-
based explanations; political scientists construct theory-based explana-
tions. Political scientists are explicit about their theoretical assumptions
and causal argument; historians are more implicit.20
Levy notes that these distinctions are best understood as lying on a con-
tinuum, and case study methods are closer to the writing of history than
are other political science methods. Yet the difference remains that case
study researchers in political science are interested in the theory-based
explanation of individual cases for the purposes of generalizing to other
cases, while for historians the explanation of individual cases is a primary
goal in itself.

Addressing Complex Causal Relations

A ‹nal advantage of case studies is their ability to accommodate complex

causal relations such as equi‹nality, complex interactions effects, and path

38
 Case Study Methods

dependency (Ragin 1987).21 If equi‹nality holds and there are several

paths or combinations that can lead to the same outcome, a typological
theory can provide contingent generalizations on each path or combina-
tion, and case studies can examine the processes of each. Similarly, by treat-
ing cases as con‹gurations of variables, rather than seeking partial correla-
tions among speci‹ed variables, case studies can capture complex
interactions effects and model path-dependent relationships. The ability to
address complexity comes at a price, however, as the more contingent and
‹ne-grained a typological theory, the less parsimonious it becomes and the
fewer the cases to which it applies.

Limitations and Trade-offs in the Use of Case Studies

Case Selection Biases and Con‹rmation Biases

One of the most common critiques of case study methods is that they are
prone to “selection bias” (Achen and Snidal 1989; Geddes 1990). Selection
bias, in statistical terminology, occurs “when some form of selection
process in either the design of the study or the real-world phenomena
under investigation results in inferences that suffer from systematic error”
(Collier and Mahoney 1996, 59). Such biases can occur when the researcher
selects cases that represent a truncated sample along the dependent vari-
able of the relevant universe of cases (Collier and Mahoney 1996, 60; King,
Keohane, and Verba 1994, 128–32). In statistical research, the standard
presentation of selection bias suggests that a truncated sample typically
understates the strength of the relationship between the independent and
dependent variables. In other words, it reduces the magnitude of the esti-
mated beta coef‹cients; Huth and Allee note that in some instances selec-
tion biases can also reverse the sign of the coef‹cients in statistical studies
(see chap. 9, this vol.). This is why statistical researchers are recurrently
admonished not to select cases on the dependent variable (Collier and
Mahoney 1996, 60).
Practitioners and analysts of case study methods, however, have argued
that cases selected on the dependent variable can test whether a variable is
necessary for the selected outcome (Dion 1997; Collier 1995; Goertz and
Starr 2003, 30). If a variable hypothesized to be necessary for a speci‹ed
outcome can be shown to have been absent in even a single case in which
the outcome occurred, then this case can disprove the claim that the vari-

39
 Models, Numbers, and Cases

able is a necessary condition for the outcome. In addition, in the early

stages of a research program, selection on the dependent variable can serve
the heuristic purpose of identifying the potential causal paths and variables
leading to that dependent variable. Later, when this ‹rst stage of research
has clari‹ed the causal model, this model can be tested against cases in
which there is variation on the dependent variable.22 Of course, ideally,
researchers would have the functional equivalent of a controlled experi-
ment, with controlled variation in independent variables and resulting
variation in dependent variables. However, the requisite cases for such
research designs seldom exist.23
Statistical views of the problem of selection bias also understate the
most severe and the most common kinds of selection biases in qualitative
research. The potential case study selection bias with the most damaging
consequences arises from a form of con‹rmation bias: selecting only those
cases whose independent and dependent variables vary as the favored
hypothesis suggests and ignoring cases that appear to contradict the the-
ory. This type of selection bias can occur even when the traditional warn-
ings against selection bias have not been violated; that is, even when there
is variation on both independent and dependent variables, and even when
this variation covers the full range of values that these variables can assume.
Rather than understating the relationship between independent and
dependent variables, this selection bias can understate or overstate the rela-
tionship, and it is particularly misleading when the results are overgener-
alized to wider populations (Collier and Mahoney 1996, 71–72). Thus,
researchers need to be extremely careful in generalizing results from case
study designs that include only “present-present” and “absent-absent”
cases; that is, they should look hard for similar cases in which the indepen-
dent variable of interest is present but the predicted effect is absent and for
those in which the independent variable is absent but the dependent vari-
able is present.
While this is the most dangerous kind of selection bias, it is also usually
easy to identify and avoid. Several other potential biases are more common
in case study selection. These include selection of cases based on extreme
values of the variables, on the availability of evidence, or on cases’ “intrin-
sic” historical importance. Each of these criteria for case selection has value
for some research goals. Looking at cases with extreme values on the vari-
ables, for example, can allow studying particular causal mechanisms in
especially stark or obvious forms (Van Evera 1997, 42–49). However, there

40
 Case Study Methods

is also a risk in emphasizing these criteria to the exclusion of other stan-

dards. Selection of cases based on extreme values may lead to overgeneral-
ization if researchers are not vigilant in reminding others (and themselves)
that they are working on an extremely truncated sample (Collier and
Mahoney 1996, 71). Selection of historically “important” or easily
researched cases is less useful for theory building than the selection of cases
that are likely to be the most theoretically informative such as deviant,
most likely, or most similar cases.24
In addition to contributing to case selection biases, con‹rmation biases
can affect the selection and interpretation of evidence within cases. This
can lead to competing or contradictory interpretations by different
researchers studying the same case. It is important to guard against this
problem by explicitly considering a wide range of alternative explanations
for a case and doing systematic process-tracing on these alternatives. Also,
whenever researchers modify a historical explanation to better ‹t a case,
they should endeavor wherever possible to ‹nd some novel facts that the
new explanation also ‹ts and to place more con‹dence in modi‹cations that
do lead to new and empirically veri‹ed facts.25

Potential Indeterminacy

Particular case studies may suffer from indeterminacy, or an inability to

exclude all but one explanation of a case on the basis of the available
process-tracing evidence from that case (Njolstad 1990). When this occurs,
it may still be possible to narrow the number of plausible explanations, and
it is also important to indicate as clearly as possible the extent to which the
remaining hypotheses appear to be complementary, competing, or incom-
mensurate in explaining the case.
One version of the problem of indeterminacy has been widely misap-
plied to case study methods. This is the “degrees of freedom” problem,
which is one kind of indeterminacy that can af›ict statistical studies. The
degrees of freedom problem arises in statistical work when there are more
independent variables than cases, so that it becomes impossible to ‹nd
coef‹cient estimates for the variables. Thus, when a researcher has many
independent variables but only one or a few observations on the dependent
variable, the research design is indeterminate. Some analysts have thus
suggested that case studies inherently suffer from a degrees of freedom
problem since they have many variables and few “cases” (Achen and Snidal

41
 Models, Numbers, and Cases

1989, 156–57). An important misinterpretation arises on this issue, how-

ever, from using de‹nitions of case, variable, and observation that are exces-
sively narrow. Earlier I criticized the de‹nition of a case as a phenomenon
in which we report only one measure on any pertinent variable. It is this
misguided de‹nition, plus inattention to the potential for process tracing,
that leads to the conclusion that case studies suffer from an inherent
degrees of freedom problem. In fact, as noted previously, an entity may
have many different dimensions or contrast classes rather than providing a
“single observation.” An apple, for example, has a certain color, texture,
sugar content, ›avor, and so on; we might aggregate these into a single
index de‹ning a “good” apple, but this is different from capturing the
many distinct qualities of the apple. In addition, within a single case there
are many possible process-tracing observations along the hypothesized
causal paths between independent and dependent variables. A causal path
may include many necessary steps, and they may have to occur in a partic-
ular order. De‹ning and observing the steps along the hypothesized causal
path can lead to “a plethora of new observable implications for a theory”
and circumvent the degrees of freedom problem (King, Keohane, and
Verba 1994, 119–20; Campbell 1975). There is still the possibility, noted
earlier, that a particular case study will be indeterminate in discerning
which of several competing hypotheses apply. This is more appropriately
described as an indeterminacy problem rather than a degrees of freedom
problem, however, as it is more a matter of how the evidence in a particu-
lar case matches up with competing hypotheses than a mechanical issue of
the number of cases and the number of variables.

Lack of Representativeness

Statistical methods require a large sample of cases that is representative of

and allows inferences about an even wider population of cases. To get a rep-
resentative sample, such studies often rely on random selection of cases.
While useful and necessary in statistical studies, these requirements and
practices are inappropriate and counterproductive when extended to case
study methods (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 124–27).
Case study researchers do not aspire to select cases that are “representa-
tive” of large and diverse populations, and they ordinarily cannot make
claims that their ‹ndings are applicable to such populations, with the par-
tial exception of case studies that show that a theory failed to explain its

42
 Case Study Methods

most likely case or that disprove purported necessary or suf‹cient condi-

tions (McKeown 1999). Case study researchers are usually more interested
in ‹nding out the conditions under which speci‹ed outcomes occur and the
mechanisms through which they occur than the frequency with which
those conditions and their outcomes arise (George and Bennett forthcom-
ing). Researchers often select cases with the goal of providing the strongest
possible inferences on particular theories or of using deviant cases to help
identify left-out variables. In either research design, the cases selected are
intentionally and necessarily unrepresentative of wider populations, and
researchers must be careful to point out that they seek only contingent
generalizations that apply to cases that are similar to those under study
(George and Smoke 1989; George and Bennett forthcoming). To the
extent that there is a “representativeness” problem, it is more accurately
presented as a problem of overgeneralization that arises if case study
researchers or their readers extend research ‹ndings to types of cases unlike
those actually studied.26
In this regard, case studies involve a trade-off between generalizability
and speci‹city. Rich generalizations in the social sciences often apply only
to small and well-de‹ned populations or subtypes, whereas theories that
apply to broader populations are usually not very speci‹c. In part, choices
between rich but narrow generalizations and less speci‹c but broadly
applicable generalizations depend on aesthetic decisions about the kind of
theory one prefers and pragmatic considerations such as whether the theory
is to focus on “manipulable variables” that policymakers can change to
affect outcomes. Choices between broad or deep theorizing can also re›ect
theoretical assumptions about the complexity of the world. If the
researcher believes that similar causal relations hold for large populations
and that there are limited interactions effects, then broad theories may
prove fruitful, and they may even be fairly rich as well. If multiple interac-
tions effects are present, on the other hand, then only highly contingent
theorizing for small and well-de‹ned subpopulations may be possible.27

Potential Lack of Independence of Cases

Another issue concerns whether cases are independent of one another. Here
again, there is a particular statistical version of this problem that does not
apply to case studies, and a more fundamental version that does. In a sta-
tistical study, if a correlation is the result not of the hypothesized relation-

43
 Models, Numbers, and Cases

ship under consideration but of learning or diffusion from one case to the
others, then the additional cases do not provide as much new information
as if they were fully independent of one another, so in effect the sample size
is smaller than if the cases were independent (George 1982, 19–23; King,
Keohane, and Verba 1994, 222; and see Huth and Allee, chap. 9, this vol.,
for a related discussion of this issue in the context of statistical methods).
This is sometimes referred to as Galton’s problem. In case studies, there is
a danger that the researcher will fail to identify a lack of independence
between cases, but this danger does not manifest itself as a problem related
to the sample size or number of cases studied, and it is not necessarily
ampli‹ed by the intentional selection of cases based on a preliminary
knowledge of their variables (indeed, such intentional selection may be
designed speci‹cally to assess the independence of cases or the diffusion
processes among them). As Alexander George has argued, the question of
whether the independence of cases is a relevant consideration is not a ques-
tion that can be answered “on a priori grounds; the answer surely depends
on the research objectives of a particular study, what theory or hypothesis
is being developed, and how the comparison of cases is structured” (1982,
21). As George notes, process tracing can inductively uncover linkages
between cases and reduce the dangers of any unanticipated lack of inde-
pendence of cases. When learning or diffusion processes are anticipated or
uncovered and taken into account, they need not undercut the value of
studying partially dependent cases. Indeed, only cases that are perfectly
dependent provide no additional information (King, Keohane, and Verba
1994, 222). Moreover, as George points out, case study methods can be
particularly effective at examining precisely the kinds of path-dependent
learning and diffusion processes that give rise to Galton’s problem (George
1982, 21).
Other limitations of case study methods require only brief mention.
Case studies are better at determining the scope conditions under which
variables have an effect than estimating the magnitude of that effect. This
latter task of assessing the causal “weight” or causal effect of variables is
better performed through statistical studies. Case study researchers also
face a trade-off between doing richly detailed studies of a small number of
cases versus seeking broader generalizations across a larger number of cases.
Often the best approach is for each researcher to focus in detail on a small
but well-de‹ned subset of cases or types of cases, while making compar-

44
 Case Study Methods

isons to existing research in the same research program so that the ‹eld as
a whole incrementally ‹lls out the typological space.
In sum, critiques of case study methods through the prism of statistical
concepts have often misconstrued the strengths and weaknesses of case
studies. On the issues of degrees of freedom, “representativeness,” inde-
pendence of cases, and the use of Mill’s methods, case studies are generally
stronger than their critics have suggested. On the question of case selection
and selection bias, standard statistical critiques have overstated some
methodological problems but understated others. The two most constrain-
ing limits of case study methods are the problem of getting a range of cases
for study that covers many of the possible causal paths or types and the
problem of interpreting outcomes and processes that are consistent with
more than one theory. Both of these problems have received less attention
because they do not ‹t as readily into statistical terms (for exceptions see
Little 1998; Ragin 1987; Lieberson 1992; Njolstad 1990).

Comparative Strengths and Limitations of Formal Models

and Statistical Methods

To underscore the essential complementarity of the leading methods in

political science, it is useful to review brie›y the comparative advantages of
formal models and statistical methods. The comparative advantages of for-
mal models center on their rigorous deductive logic. Deductive logic can
be useful in elucidating the dynamics of causal mechanisms, and it can lead
to counterintuitive hypotheses that can then be tested. Well-known exam-
ples include the literatures on collective action dilemmas, principal-agent
relations, problems of credible commitment, two-level games, gatekeep-
ing, veto points, and tipping points. Limitations of formal models include
presence of multiple equilibria, the potential for path dependencies, and
the possibility of self-denying prophecies (that is, understanding of the
model itself can lead to changes in behavior, though this problem is not
unique to formal models). Of course, formal modeling is not an empirical
method and must be linked to either case studies or statistical studies to
provide empirical tests.28
The primary advantages of statistical methods include their ability to
estimate the average explanatory effects of variables, their ability to analyze
the representativeness or frequency of subsets of the data collected, their

45
 Models, Numbers, and Cases

visual display, and the high degree of replicability of studies using the
same database. Limitations of standard statistical methods include the
challenges they face in identifying new variables, dealing with multiple
conjunctural causality or equi‹nality, devising conceptually valid opera-
tionalizations of qualitative variables, and providing or testing historical
explanations of individual cases. Some of these limitations may be inherent
in statistical methods, while others may involve trade-offs that could ease
somewhat with the development of more sophisticated statistical tech-
niques. Notably, these advantages and limitations are almost precisely the
converse of the ones associated with case study methods, which are poor at
partial correlations and measures of frequency but good at identifying new
variables, dealing with complex causal relations, and devising and testing
historical explanations.

The Outlook for Increased Multimethod Collaborative Research

As the editors to this volume conclude, the increasingly evident comple-

mentary relationship between case studies, statistical methods, and formal
modeling has begun to lead toward more multimethod and collaborative
research. Because case studies, statistical methods, and formal modeling
are all increasingly sophisticated, however, it is dif‹cult for a single
researcher to be adept at more than one set of methods while also attaining
a cutting-edge theoretical and empirical knowledge of his or her own ‹eld.
As a result, much multimethod work is collaborative. Encouraging such
cooperative efforts will require that political science departments do not
discriminate against multiauthored works in their hiring and promotion
decisions, as they currently often do. This will raise the problem of evalu-
ating the work of individual contributors to multiauthored works, but in
many other ‹elds (particularly the medical and physical sciences) multiau-
thored works are common. One means of apportioning credit for such
works, which is often done in books but could be extended to articles, is to
provide a brief footnote that outlines which parts of a work were done pri-
marily by one author or another and which were fully collaborative.
Collaboration can also take place sequentially if researchers work to
build on ‹ndings generated by those using different methods. For exam-
ple, statistical analysis might identify outliers or deviant cases, and case
studies can investigate why these cases are deviant (Ness 1985). Case stud-
ies can also look at the “average” or “representative” cases identi‹ed in sta-

46
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
so small as to embarrass Government, it would be much worse than
if they were to vote for a little too much. There would be a certain
number of men who must be fed, and he thought they might rely
upon the Administration's not giving more for rations than was
necessary. But, if the sum voted was too small, what would be the
consequence? The rations must be got, be the prices what they
may; the men must be fed. Difficulties would arise if the fund
appropriated should prove inadequate. He did not see that there
would be any real saving by reducing the sum appropriated.
Mr. Bourne hoped the blank would be filled up with the sum proposed
by the gentleman from South Carolina. It had been stated that
rations might be purchased at Pittsburg for 11 cents, but they could
not be bought for less than 30 at Detroit, and he thought they could
not calculate upon any other price than that, as it was uncertain
whether or not the contract would be fulfilled; and if it failed, and
the Secretary of the Treasury was obliged to purchase at Detroit, if
they calculated the rations at 20 cents only, he would not be able to
purchase the necessary provisions for their men; but if, on the
contrary, 30 cents were agreed to, there would be enough in any
case, and if the ration could be bought for 20 cents, he did not fear
that the money would be expended unnecessarily.
Mr. Venable said he should not feel himself justified in appropriating
more than was necessary for the object before them; for, if they
were not to be guided by a proper estimate, they might as well at
once give an unlimited power on the Treasury. All the expenses
could not be estimated to be made at Detroit. If one-third of our
men were kept at Detroit, he should think it a large number. Why,
then fix the price as if the whole Army was to be kept there? And,
even in that case, 20 cents would be a large appropriation. Why,
then, embarrass themselves by making a larger appropriation than
was necessary? The Army would be extended on the whole frontier,
and at some places rations would be bought cheaper than at
Pittsburg.
Mr. Dayton (the Speaker) observed, that the gentleman from
Pennsylvania (Mr. Gallatin) assumed as undeniable, and established
as the foundation of his arguments and objections, what he did not
only not admit, but absolutely denied, viz: that the rations of
provisions would cost the United States more when delivered at
Detroit, than at any other post. He believed there were two or three
others at which the price would be higher than at Detroit, and
mentioned Michilimacinac in particular. The gentlemen who were for
reducing this item of appropriation, had referred to the contract
which had been made some time since, and had, at the same time,
acknowledged the extraordinary advance in the price of the
necessaries of life, even in the interior of the country. The latter
event, said Mr. D., was of a nature to excite much fear that the
contract would be thrown back upon the United States, owing to the
inability it would create in the individuals to fulfil it, and ought,
therefore, to prompt Congress to guard against such an exigency, by
a more ample provision than would otherwise have been requisite.
Mr. W. Smith said there was one fact which he forgot to mention. The
Secretary of the Treasury informed the Committee of Ways and
Means that the contractor would lose money by the contract to
deliver the rations at 11 cents at Pittsburg, and it was possible,
therefore, that it might not be fulfilled. Gentlemen say—why provide
the money if it be not wanted? They seemed to mistake the
business; the money was to be borrowed, and if not wanted, it
would not be taken. No more would be expended because there was
more than sufficient appropriated. There would be no money lying
unemployed in the Treasury.
Mr. Gallatin believed the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Smith)
would not deny that his information was correct. The contract was
made to deliver the rations either at Pittsburg or Detroit, at the
option of Government. To calculate the whole number of rations at
30 cents, was considering the whole Army at Detroit; and, though it
be true, that there be one post more distant than Detroit, yet, the
greater number were far nearer, and consequently, where provisions
would be got cheaper. Therefore, considering the price at Detroit to
be the general price, was allowing too much. This, he believed,
would not be controverted.
Mr. Nicholas said, he should be glad to know what was the price of
rations in the Atlantic States. One half of the Establishment would be
upon the Eastern waters, and, therefore, the money necessary to be
appropriated would depend, in some degree, upon the price of
rations there. He thought 20 cents would be a full average price for
the whole.
Mr. Havens said, that if they were to fix the price too high, it might
produce a combination amongst the contractors to advance the price
—as he believed there was a greater likelihood of combination than
competition amongst them. He knew this was no reason why they
should fix the price too low, but he thought it was a consideration
which should lead them to vote for the proposition of the gentleman
from Pennsylvania.
The original motion was put, and negatived, 34 to 31; and then Mr.
Gallatin's, to fill the blank with $45,606, was put, and carried.
Mr. W. Smith moved to fill the next blank, for the subsistence of non-
commissioned officers and privates, with $369,282, which was
calculating the rations at 30 cents each.
The question was put, and negatived, 33 to 30.
Mr. Gallatin then moved to have the blank filled with $246,188,
which was calculating the rations at 20 cents each.
Mr. Dayton hoped that the sum named would not be agreed to; if it
were, he believed that the soldiers of the Army would not be
subsisted. He was satisfied that gentlemen who proposed and
advocated so scanty and inadequate sums had the same views as he
had; but he was, nevertheless, convinced, that so far from
promoting economy, they would eventually produce profusion.
Mr. Dayton concluded with saying, that he did not wish to appropriate
lavishly, but his sole aim was to avoid any of those serious
consequences which would inevitably flow from an ill-judged
parsimony; and he should sit down and console himself under any
event, with the reflection, that he had discharged his duty.
Mr. W. Smith moved to fill the blank with $360,000, which was
carried, 34 to 31.
On motion of Mr. W. Smith, the blank for forage was filled with
$16,592, and that for clothing was filled with $70,000, without
debate. He proposed to fill the blank for providing horses for cavalry,
with $7,500; when
Mr. Blount observed, that he thought it unnecessary to provide for
the purchase of horses, when they had resolved upon reducing the
number of troops.
Mr. Gallatin said he would just notice, that when the full number of
horses was kept up, the appropriations for clothing were the same
as now, and those for horses were less. The former estimate was
$6,000 for horses; now, $7,500; so that the more they reduce the
Army, the greater was the expense.
Mr. Macon believed, there were as many horses now in the service as
would complete two companies, and they could not, with any
propriety, calculate upon one-half dying. He moved to strike out the
item altogether.
The motion was put and negatived, 33 to 26.
Mr. Havens said, he did not vote for striking out the item altogether,
as he supposed some money would be wanted, but could not think
so much as had been mentioned was necessary.
The motion for $7,509 was put and carried, 34 to 31.
On motion of Mr. W. Smith, the blank for bounty was filled with
$10,000, and that for Hospital Department with $30,000, without
objection. He also proposed to fill the blank for the Ordnance
Department with $48,907, when
Mr. Gallatin said, that this sum was $11,000 more than the former
estimate; $1,000 of which was owing to an increase of rent. The
other additional item of $10,000 was for contingent expenses; but,
as they had a distinct head for contingent expenses he thought that
the contingencies would be best, all of them, placed under that
head. He therefore moved to have the blank filled with $38,907.
Mr. Williams proposed $40,000, which was carried.
Mr. W. Smith proposed to fill the blank for the Indian Department
with $70,000.
Mr. Gallatin said, it would be recollected that they had already made
two appropriations under this head; the one for establishing trading-
houses with the Indian tribes, the other for carrying into effect
several treaties. On inquiry what reason there was for this
appropriation, he could only find one, viz: that a treaty was expected
to be held in Georgia, at which 3,000 Indians were to be present. He
had supposed this expense was to have been borne by Georgia, but
it was alleged that a part of it would fall on the United States.
The motion was put and negatived, 33 to 26; when
Mr. W. Smith proposed $60,000. He would mention, that the
Secretary of War had been called upon to give a reason why so large
a sum should be appropriated; when they were told of the treaty
which the gentleman from Pennsylvania had mentioned, and that it
would be necessary to have a large store for the purpose of feeding
and clothing the Indians who attended it. The motion was then put
and carried, 31 to 28.
Mr. W. Smith moved to fill the blank for the Quartermaster's
Department with $250,000.
Mr. Gallatin said, it would be remembered that in the estimate at the
opening of the session, this item was calculated at $200,000. The
reason given for this advance, was, that the expense of removing
stores, ordnance, &c., to new posts, would be very considerable;
but, it would be recollected, that $200,000 only were appropriated
for that purpose in the time of war, when the Army was liable to be
removed very often. The present estimate was for a Peace
Establishment, when their men, once removed to the new posts,
would be stationed; and the appropriation, instead of for 6,000 men,
was now only for 3,000. He moved to insert $200,000, instead of
$250,000.
Mr. Blount said, he supposed the taking possession of the posts was
contemplated when the first estimate was made. It was then known
the British had stipulated to surrender them on the 1st of June.
Mr. W. Smith said, it was not certain when the first estimate was
made, whether that House would have ratified the treaty; and, if not
ratified, the posts would not have been got. The increased
calculation was owing to the expense in transporting ordnance,
stores, &c., to the posts.
Mr. Isaac Smith said, it would require more cannon for one of those
posts, than were required by all the Army.
Mr. Blount said, they had had sufficient proof to lead them to
believe, that the President did not think that House had the power
mentioned by the gentleman from South Carolina, and, therefore, he
doubted not but the first estimate was made with reference to the
expense of taking possession of the posts.
The motion for $250,000 was put and negatived, 31 to 26; when
$200,000 was put and carried.
Mr. W. Smith, moved to fill the blank for contingencies of the War
Department with $30,000; which was carried without opposition. He
then proposed to fill the blank for the defence and protection of the
frontiers with $150,000.
Mr. Gallatin said, he certainly wished the frontier to be protected, but
he could not think so large a sum necessary for that purpose. The
sum last year appropriated was $130,000; and now we had peace
with the Indians, which was secured not only by a treaty with them,
but by treaties with Great Britain and Spain, he could not account for
an increased expense.
The motion for $150,000 was put and negatived; $130,000 was then
proposed and carried, 34 to 33.
Mr. W. Smith proposed to fill the next blank, for the completion of the
fortifications, &c., at West Point, with $20,000.
Mr. Nicholas inquired if there was any law on this head?
Mr. W. Smith said, there was an act to authorize a provision for this
purpose, but that act had expired. He believed, however, it might
properly come in there. This expense, he was told, was necessary to
make the posts tenable, and that if no money was expended, the
fortifications would be lost. He believed this item might properly be
considered as a part of the Military Establishment.
Mr. Nicholas said, he did not object to the propriety of the expense,
but to the manner of introducing it. It would apply to New York as
well as West Point. He considered the admission of West Point as the
admission of a principle to which all the surplus appropriations might
be applied. All the fortifications, he said, were in the power of the
Executive; but, as they had had a committee appointed on the
business, whose report they had considered, he thought they should
act consistently. He therefore moved to strike out the clause.
Mr. Williams hoped this item would not be struck out, and that the
President would be enabled to extend aid to the fortifications at New
York; if not, the works would go to decay.
Mr. Van Cortlandt said, that fortifications ought to be attended to,
and that he should vote for them.
Mr. Giles hoped the motion would prevail. There had been a
committee most of the session, to consider the subject of
fortifications. If these fortifications stood in need of repair, the
President should have given the information to that committee. He
thought the item improper in the present bill.
Mr. Gallatin believed the gentlemen from Virginia were mistaken. The
committee which had been appointed was to consider the
fortifications of our harbors only. The works at West Point were of a
different description, and the estimate included not only the
completing of the fortifications, but the building and repairs of
barracks and stores which had been destroyed. The present item
could not extend to fortifications in general, as had been
apprehended; for, though the Secretary of the department does not
confine the money appropriated to one object, to that particular
purpose, yet, he cannot expend it on any object which was not
contained in the act of appropriation. He moved to add, "magazines,
store-houses, and barracks." Agreed to, and also the sum.
Mr. W. Smith then moved to fill the blank for the fortification of forts
and harbors with $50,000.
Mr. Gallatin said, this item he should move to strike out. A committee
had been appointed, and had reported on this subject, and that it
was not necessary to attend to it at present, as there was a surplus
of $23,000 unexpended. If they were to agree to the present sum, it
would be appropriating an additional sum of $50,000 for the same
object; he hoped, therefore, that it would be struck out.
Mr. W. Lyman was in favor of striking it out.
Mr. Williams hoped it would be agreed to, on the ground of the
necessity of some attention being paid to the works at New York.
Mr. Dayton was in favor of striking out this item altogether, as there
really was not money to spare for objects not essential. If any
particular harbor had been, or could be mentioned, the committee
might better be enabled to judge whether it would be fit, at this
time, pressed as they were for resources, to make an appropriation
for fortifying it, and how much. But, as he knew of none, and
believed there were no such, he should certainly be opposed to
appropriating a single shilling for this purpose. He meant not to say,
that there were not ports in the United States which might be
advantageously fortified, but only, that this country was not yet in a
situation to justify their encountering such an expense, especially as
it did not appear to be immediately necessary.
The motion for striking out was put, and carried.
Mr. W. Smith moved to fill the blank for the pay of officers, seamen,
and marines, with $113,025.
Mr. Nicholas hoped this item would be struck out. It was certainly an
expense for which there was no occasion. He did not wish to see
men raised when they could be of no service. The frigates, he said,
could not be fit for service before the next session. He hoped,
therefore, no opposition would be made to the striking out of the
clause.
Mr. W. Smith said, they had authorized by law the building of three
frigates, and it was wished that they should go into service the
present year. If the whole sum was not appropriated, there would
certainly be a necessity for a part of it.
Mr. Nicholas moved to strike out the item as it stood, and insert, "the
pay of the captains of three frigates."
Mr. Macon believed these were the only officers at present appointed.
Mr. Havens wished gentlemen to say why these captains should be
paid at all. He believed that building of ships was not their business,
and that these places were at present mere sinecures. He should
therefore vote against the amendment.
Mr. W. Smith said, it would be necessary to add subsistence as well
as pay of three captains, and moved to fill the blank with five
thousand dollars; which, after a few observations, was agreed to.
On motion of Mr. W. Smith, the blank for military pensions was filled,
without opposition, with $114,259.
The committee then rose and the House entered upon the
consideration of the amendments which had been made, when all
were agree to, except that relative to the subsistence of the non-
commissioned officers and privates.[81]

Wednesday Evening, June 1.

Mr. J. Smith, from the committee appointed to wait upon the
President of the United States, to notify him of the intention of both
Houses to adjourn on this day, reported his approbation thereof.
The business before the House being finished, a message was sent
to the Senate, to inform them that the House was ready to adjourn.
Whereupon, after waiting some time to receive any answer that
might be sent thereto, without receiving any—
The Speaker adjourned the House until the first Monday in December
next.
INDEX TO VOL. I
Acts of Congress.—Propriety of limiting the period of their operation,
note, 82;
safe-keeping of, 129.

Adams, John, elected Vice President in 1789, 10;

voted for as President in 1789, 10;
in 1793, 385;
addresses the Senate on taking the chair as Vice President, 11;
Vice President U. S., 441, 520.

Address, Inaugural.—Washington, 12.

Address of the Friends in Pennsylvania, &c., urging the

discontinuance of the Slave Trade, 201.

Address of House to President.—In committee, on answer to the

President's Address;
clause respecting the Western expedition against the Indians
under consideration, 256;
alarm occasioned by the Greek treaty, 256;
secret articles thus early, 256;
sufferings of the people of Georgia, 286.

Encouraging navigation considered, 257;

too early for the House to commit itself, 257;
mode of expression might conduce to the exclusion of foreign
bottoms, 257;
expressions of the President, 257;
amendment proposed, 257;
exclusion ruinous to Southern States, 257;
the words of the report and amendment, 257;
not be hasty to declare all exports shall be in American bottoms,
257;
tonnage duties paid in Georgia, 257;
a substitute proposed, 258;
 no reason to think the House will be committed by adopting the
Address, 258;
two modes of answering the Address, 258;
amendment lost, 258.

Answer to the Presidents Speech, debated, 532;

note, 532;
the House should not bow so much to the President as to approve
of his proceedings without knowing what they were, 532;
he says his policy in regard to foreign nations is founded in justice;
we intend to convey a general sentiment of approbation, 532;
the amendment proposes substantial approbation, 532;
the distinction is trifling, 532;
the mission of Mr. Jay should not be approved till we know his
instructions, 532;
better withdraw the motion than to bring it forward at such an
expense of temper, 533;
motion withdrawn, 533;
amendment moved relating to self-created societies, 533;
an excitable expression, 533;
self-created societies of the country, 533;
as improper to pass a vote of censure as one of approbation, 534;
the conduct of these people had tended to blow the insurrection,
534;
objected that these societies will acquire importance by a vote of
censure, 534;
amendment of no weight, 535;
leave the societies to their own conscience, 535;
this declaration from the House will tend to discourage Democratic
Societies, 535;
persons most violent against the excise laws had been equally so
against the insurgents, 535;
the President did not want them to intermeddle with the societies,
536;
the societies had produced Western insurrection, 536;
the effects of the societies, 536;
 the societies composed of patriots, 537;
amendment can answer no purpose but that of disturbing the
public peace, 538;
the evils arose from the excise laws, not from Democratic
Societies, 538;
the Democratic Societies in a great measure originated the late
disturbances, 539;
misinformation existed, 540;
amendment lost, 540.

Answer to President's Message to 1st Session of 4th Congress,

considered in the Senate, 594;
nothing should be contained in it such as to force the Senate to
precipitate decisions, 594;
note, 594;
two clauses objectionable; our situation is not in every way
auspicious, 594;
nothing reasonably objectionable, 594;
some members could not vote for the Address without palpable
inconsistency, 595;
every article of the Treaty objectionable, 595;
the term "firm" applied to the Executive improper, 595;
the ratification of the Treaty in all its aspects is advisable, 595;
the objections considered, 595;
the clauses record a fact, 596;
further consideration of the objections, 596.

Answer to President's Speech, 1st Session of 4th Congress,

considered in the House, 605;
practice of addresses disapproved, 605;
practice coeval with the constitution, 605;
moved to strike out certain words, 606;
clause goes too far, 606;
the confidence of a part of the people was diminished, 607;
motion denies confidence of the House and the public in the
President, 607;
 such a thing was once supposed impossible, 607;
what are the facts? 607;
defence of the President, 608;
recommitted, 608.

African Slaves.—Motion to bring in a bill relative to their importation,

84.
See Duties on Imports and Slavery.

Algerine War, report of the committee on, 475;

resolution to build four ships of forty-four, and two of twenty guns
considered, 475;
cannot be done in a year, 475;
two points to be considered—do the Algerines act from their own
impulse in this matter? if so, they can be bought, 475;
if excited by Britain, they cannot be bought, 475;
there is danger of a British war from fitting out the ships, 475;
the combined powers would regard their equipment as an
opportunity to pick a quarrel, 475;
the ships would be too small to be important in Europe, 475;
British would attempt to search them, hence a quarrel, 475;
bribery alone can purchase security from the Algerines, 476;
not a match for the Algerines, 476;
harbors for American ships in Europe, 476;
views on the subject, 476;
no security if we buy a peace, 477;
an armament urged, 477;
Britain is the cause, Algiers the instrument, 477;
this expedient unlikely to answer the purpose, 477;
competency of the ships examined, 478;
the charge against Britain unfounded, 478;
this country not in a state for war, 478;
note, 478;
six vessels sufficient, 479;
the bill regarded as affording protection to commerce against the
Algerines, and as the foundation of a permanent Naval
Establishment, 480;
various objections urged to this view, 480;
the question is simply whether our commerce requires protection
against the Algerines, and whether this is the best course to protect
it, 482;
these points considered, 482;
objections to the bill reviewed, 482;
argument against a Naval Establishment considered, 482;
passage of the bill, 482.

Allegiance, Foreign.—See remarks of Madison and Jackson, 97 and

98.

Amendments to the Constitution.—Application of the Legislature of

Virginia for a convention to consider defects, and report
amendments, 47;
debate, 47;
this application should remain on the files until proper number of
applicants come forward, 47;
any subject can be referred to a committee, 47;
the propriety of committing it doubtful, 47;
Congress has no deliberative power on this occasion, 48;
the application of a State should be respected and regarded, 48;
it should be entered at large on the files of the journal, 48;
so ordered, 48.

Proper mode of amending considered, 133;

proposition to insert after the words "We the people," in the first
paragraph, a brief clause, 133;
not the proper mode of amending the constitution, 133;
it should be done by supplement, 133;
moved to amend by a resolution declaring, "That the following
articles be proposed as amendments," &c., 133;
form of less importance than substance, but there is a neatness
and propriety here in incorporating articles, 134;
method proposed by the resolution incompatible with the
constitution, which requires amendments to form a part of the
constitution, 134;
all amendments should stand separate from the constitution—see
precedents, 134;
supplementary form most desirable, 134;
by incorporation the original instrument may be entirely gone,
135;
can the mode make any possible difference, 135;
how can amendments be incorporated, 135;
report of committee founded on recommendation of State
conventions, 135;
the original constitution should remain inviolate, and not be
patched from time to time like Joseph's coat, 136;
magna charta never altered by incorporation of amendments, 136;
arguments for incorporation considered, 136;
motion lost, 137;
see note, 137.

Freedom of conscience considered, 137;

proposition to insert the words, "no religion shall be established by
law, nor shall the equal rights of conscience be infringed," 137;
the words liable to a wrong construction—have a tendency to
abolish religion altogether, 137;
amendment unnecessary—Congress no authority to make religious
establishments, 137;
many sects think they are not well secured, and the effect of
amendment will be conciliatory for the new government, 137;
some States had desired it, 137;
reason thereof, 137;
experience of Rhode Island, 137;
apprehensions of the people, 138;
result, 138.

Right of instruction considered.—On a motion to insert the words,

"to instruct their representatives," an amendment proposed, 138;
arguments against the right, 138;
 its propriety in this country, 139;
if our constituents have a constitutional right to instruct, we are
bound to obey, 139;
the words are calculated to mislead by conveying the idea to the
people that they have a right to instruct, 139;
duty of a representative, 139;
dangerous tendency of the doctrine, 140;
what may be the consequence of binding a man to vote according
to the will of others in all cases, 140;
arguments in favor, 140; this amendment is of a doubtful nature,
and will have a tendency to prejudice
the whole system, 141;
if sovereignty resides with the whole people, they cannot, in
detached bodies, contravene an act established by the whole, 141;
the clause would not bind representatives, 141;
it will operate inconveniently to the more distant States, 141;
under its adoption, one member as good as many, 141;
no law of the House would be of force if a majority were
instructed against it, 141; subversive of the principles of
the constitution, 141;
must members violate the constitution if instructed, 142;
objections further considered, 142;
no instruction should have binding force, 143;
right of State Legislature to instruct the House opposed, 143;
absolute necessity of adopting the amendment, 143;
no right of obligation claimed for instructions heretofore, 144;
constitutions of several States recognize the right, 144;
motion lost, 144;
another motion, 144.

Amendments proposed in the Senate relative to the judiciary power

of the United States, 445;
do. passed in Senate, 446.

Ames, Fisher, Representative from Massachusetts, 21, 175, 255, 315,

388, 527, 637;
 on duty on molasses, 30;
on duty on hemp and cordage, 37;
moves duty on barley and lime, 38;
remarks on tonnage duties, 48;
remarks on tonnage duties, 54; on the scale of duties on imports,
59, 62, 65;
would make no bargain or compromise relative to duties on
imports, 69;
further remarks, 70, 71;
opposes the motion to lay duty on African slaves, 74;
thinks a limitation of the impost bill injurious to public credit, 79;
further remarks, 80, 84; on the admission of Rhode Island, 101;
on the President's power to remove officers, 106;
on the organization of the Treasury Department, 110;
on the compensation of the Vice President, 122;
on the right of instructions, 143;
on the location of the seat of government, 158;
further remarks, 160;
on manner the Secretary of the Treasury shall make his report,
177;
on the discrimination between foreign and domestic debts, 195;
on discrimination of public creditors, 215;
moves to strike out "Potomac," and insert Germantown as seat of
Government, 249;
on excise officers, 271;
further, 272;
on the commitment of the bill for a Bank of the United States,
273;
do. speech on the bank, 278;
on report of Secretary at War, 317;
on the bill for the encouragement of the Cod Fisheries, 353;
on attendance of Secretary of War, 391, 392;
on discharging Committee on defeat of St. Clair, 393;
on petition of Warner Mifflin, 397;
on official conduct of Secretary of Treasury, 436;
on the commerce of the United States, 468;
 on fighting the Algerines, 477;
in favor of taxing salt, 506;
urges duties on manufactured tobacco and refined sugar, 507;
on the advance of money to France, 514;
on an increase of the army, 515;
on raising a force for protection of S. W. frontier, 517;
on the President's speech, 532;
on resolutions of thanks to General Wayne, 545;
on the renunciation of nobility for citizenship, 562;
on reference of letter of Secretary of War, 568, 569;
on the execution of the British treaty, 743.

Amy Dardin's horse, claim for, 763;

note, 763.

Apportionment Bill, see Ratio of Representation;

veto of, 374;
action of the House on, 374.

Appropriations.—Bill for the appropriations for 1792 considered, 330;

various amendments proposed, 330;
bill recommitted, 330.

The Right of Congress to withhold appropriations from existing

establishments considered, 625;
note, 625;
moved to strike out all appropriated for the officers of the mint,
625;
such motion cannot regularly be brought forward, 626;
the bill is conformed to the state of the public engagements, 626;
an investigation should be made on an independent footing, 626;
a discretionary power in the House to appropriate or not, 626;
when legal establishments are made, neither branch has a right to
withhold its assent to appropriations conformable to the public
engagements, 626;
illustration, 626;
 the House is not to pass an appropriation bill as a matter of
course, 627;
amendment agreed to, 627;
in the House, moved to strike out all appropriated to the mint, 627;
motion to strike out an appropriation for the purpose of bringing
the policy of a law into discussion, is repugnant to legislative duties,
627;
doctrine of discretionary power not correct, 627;
no appropriation should obtain sanction unless the House were
convinced of the propriety of the law, 627;
otherwise the House becomes a mere office for registering edicts,
628;
House has no right to obstruct the operation of the laws while
they exist, 628;
otherwise, the House has a right to refuse an appropriation to pay
a just debt, 628;
a constitutional view, 628;
mode of getting rid of an establishment by refusing appropriations
not the constitutional one, 628;
expenditure of Washington's administration, note 629.

The bill providing appropriations for military, &c. establishments

considered, 763;
debate on the value of rations and the amount appropriated, 764;
the army had been reduced, but not the expenses, 764;
various sums proposed for the gross amount for different objects,
765;
other items considered, 766;
note 767.

Armstrong James, votes for, as Vice President, in 1789, 10.

Armstrong James, Representative from Pennsylvania, 455, 528.

Army, Memorial of Officers of, 397.

Army, Reduction of—Resolution for the appointment of a committee
to bring in a bill for the reduction of the United States Military
Establishment considered, 398;
reasons and necessity of the motion, 398;
expenses, charges, and increase of the War Department, 398;
note, 398;
the protection of the frontiers considered if the army is disbanded,
399;
amount of reduction suggested, 399;
expense of militia expeditions, 399;
improper time to disband the army when negotiations of peace
are going on, 399;
been warring with our finances to keep up an army, 400;
dangerous so suddenly to alter the system, 400;
strange statements of members considered, 400;
referred to Committee of the Whole, 401;
calculations examined, 401;
circumstances requiring a force, 401;
history of the frontier wars, 402;
superiority of regular troops over militia shown, 402;
case of Major Adair, 402;
successes of Clark and Sevier, 402;
improper to take militia to fight Indians, 403.

Improper to adopt the motion under the present circumstances of

the country, 404;
former law gave President power to exercise his discretion, 404;
have circumstances so changed as to render it proper for the
Legislature to interfere? 404;
the great object of the additional armament is peace, 404;
cannot rely upon the backwoods riflemen to turn out as often as
wanted, 404;
the President has practised economy in organizing the troops
voted for, 404.

The motion only goes to prevent the raising any more troops, it does
not disband a man, 405;
militia always more spirited soldiers, and fitter for fighting the
Indians than regulars, 405;
experience with militia, 405;
no peace can be obtained from the Indians unless dictated by
British agents in Canada, 406;
any immediate alteration of the system dangerous under present
circumstances, 406;
the spirit of the motion in regard to the prevention of standing
armies is good, 407;
the reduction of the military establishment will neither put an end
to the savage war, nor to the enormous expense, 407;
consider the state of the exposed parts of the Union, 407;
these people demand the protecting arm of Government, 408;
commenced wrong in warring with the Indians, 408;
if public officers have misapplied the public money, the
constitution pointed out a mode to punish them, 408;
the defence of the frontier is of superior concern to the
redemption of the public debt by savings to be made by a reduction
of the army, 408;
a particular plan is set in operation, and it should be tried, 409;
confidential communications referred to, 409;
this protection of the frontiers is a test of the Government, 409;
this Indian war differs from any other, 410;
not sufficient information respecting the prospect of peace to
warrant a reduction of the army, 410;
any abuses in the war establishment are insignificant, 410;
regular troops grow experienced, and by a line of forts trade can
be cultivated with the Indians, 411;
the most important question before the House—on its decision are
suspended the hopes of the people for peace and their fears of a
standing army, 411;
the principle of keeping up standing armies, though highly
obnoxious to the people, has not been equally so to the
Government, 411;
effects of standing armies, 411;
 much deliberation is not necessary to form an opinion of military
establishments, 411;
the arguments of the opponents lead to four points, 412;
these points considered, 412;
although a war establishment is objectionable, this system should
not be arrested at the moment of its efficiency, 414;
a standing army is impossible so long as this House holds the
purse-strings, 414;
motion lost, 415;
further considered, 416.

The Pay of Soldiers proposed to be increased from three to four

dollars per month, 459;
motion to add a fifth dollar, 459;
no proportion between the wages of ordinary labor and that of
military service, 459;
it was justly due, 460;
no reason for this increase of wages, 460;
better to increase the rations, 460;
six dollars had secured some of the most respectable kind of
people in Pennsylvania, 460;
further considerations offered, 461;
motions withdrawn, 461.

Bill to increase the Army, lost, 511;

bill to increase the military force and to encourage recruiting,
considered, 515;
principle of the bill wrong, 515;
is it proper to intrust the President with a discretionary power to
raise an army of ten thousand men owing to the particular state of
the country? 515;
if we have war, it is economy to be prepared beforehand, 515;
no danger to trust the President, 515;
the force can be discontinued at our pleasure, 515;
it would involve the country in useless expense, 515;
the interests of the country promoted by vesting the President
with this power, 515;
what would be the consequence if he cannot make preparation
when he sees the war approaching, 516;
no such immediate prospect of war as could induce the House to
violate the constitution, 516;
under the constitution one branch of the government raises an
army, and the other conducts it, 516;
it encroaches upon a salutary principle of the constitution, 516;
bill rejected, 516.

Amendments of the Senate, fixing the military establishment

considered, 759;
number of troops sufficient without this amendment, 759;
amendment to keep a larger number of troops, negatived, 759;
moved to retain the Major General, 759;
question debated, 760;
lost, 760.

Arts useful, to promote progress of, 259.

Ashe John Baptist, Representative from North Carolina, 239, 259, 317.

Assumption of State Debts.—See Treasury, Report of Secretary of.

Bailey Theodore, Representative from New York, 455,527, 604.

Baird David, Representative from Pennsylvania, 604.

Baldwin Abraham, Representative from Georgia, 42, 175, 255, 317,

388, 455, 527, 604;
on the practicability of collecting duties, 63;
on organization of Treasury Department, 93;
on the preparation of estimates by the Secretary of the Treasury,
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