2025 INSC 467

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

EXTRAORDINARY CIVIL JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 9975 OF 2025

(DIARY NO. 8323 OF 2025)

Rajiv Ghosh ……Petitioner

Versus

Satya Naryan Jaiswal ……..Respondent

ORDER

1. Delay condoned in filing Special Leave Petition.

2. This petition arises from the judgment and order passed by the High
Court at Calcutta (Civil Appellate Jurisdiction) dated 14.11.2024 in FAT 7 of
2024 with IA No. CAN 1 of 2024 by which the appeal filed by the petitioner-
herein came to be dismissed thereby affirming the judgment and decree of
eviction passed by the Vth Bench, City Civil Court at Calcutta, District
Calcutta dated 2nd December 2023 in title suit no. 1068 of 2021.

3. For the sake of convenience, the petitioner-herein shall be referred to as

original defendant and the respondent-herein shall be referred to as original
plaintiff.

4. It appears from the materials on record that the plaintiff is the lawful
owner of the suit premises in which the defendant claims to be the lawful
Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by
CHANDRESH
Date: 2025.04.10
18:13:57 IST
Reason: 1
tenant. The plaintiff instituted title suit no. 1068 of 2021 for recovery of
possession and mesne profits against the defendant. The father of the
defendant, Late Ranjan Ghosh was a regular tenant under the plaintiff in
respect of the suit premises at a monthly rent of Rs. 1700 including
corporation taxes.

5. Ranjan Ghosh, the original tenant passed away on 13.07.2016. It

appears that the defendant being the son of Ranjan Ghosh was residing in
the suit premises up to the date of demise of his father.

6. The plaintiff served a notice dated 20th July 2018 to the defendant
informing him that since the original regular tenant, Ranjan Ghosh passed
away on 13.07.2016 and the defendant being the son of the regular tenant
who at the time of demise of the regular tenant was residing in the
scheduled property he can at best take the benefit of his statutory right of
inherited tenancy up to 5 years from the date of death of his father, Ranjan
Ghosh on 13.07.2016.

7. The notice further informed the defendant that he cannot be regarded as

tenant within Section 2(g) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997.

8. The said notice was received by the defendant on 21.07.2018, however,

the defendant failed to give any satisfactory reply.

9. In such circumstances referred to above, the plaintiff had to institute the

title suit for recovery of the possession. The defendant filed his written
statement and in the same he is said to have admitted few facts arising

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thereof. The defendant in his written statement admitted the following
claims of the plaintiff.
a) the defendant unequivocally admitted in paragraph no. 10(a) of his
written statement that Ranjan Ghosh was the sole tenant in respect of
the suit property. The said Ranjan Ghosh passed away in 13.07.2016
leaving behind the defendant as his heir and legal representative.
b) The defendant admitted that the plaintiff is the owner of the
scheduled property and the rent was paid till May 2021 to the
plaintiff.

10. In view of the aforesaid admissions made by the defendant in his

written statement, the plaintiff preferred an application before the trial
court under Order XII Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code and prayed for a
decree upon admission.

11. The application filed by the plaintiff under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC
was opposed by the defendant by filing reply which reads thus:
“1. That the said application is neither maintainable in law nor on
facts and the same is bad, frivolous, vexatious, baseless,
unfounded and misconceived as such the said application is liable
to be rejected with cost to the defendant.
2. That there is no admission in the pleadings on behalf of the
defendant, C.P. Code does not define the expression "admission"
Section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act defines admission as a
statement made in the oral, documentary or electronic form
suggesting an inference to a fact in issue or relevant fact. Section
23 of the Indian Evidence Act lists the circumstances under which
an admission will be relevant in civil cases. However, the proviso
to the Section states that the Court has discretionary power to
require the alleged admitted, facts to be proven by means other
than such admission. It is pertinent to note that the Rule provides
that Court "may" pass a judgment or order based on the
admission. Thus, it is clear that the legislative intent is to confer a
discretionary power of the Court and judgment based on
admission cannot be clarified as a matter of right. The legislative
intent is further clarified by the proviso to Order 6 Rule 5. The

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proviso provides that even, where a fact has been admitted by an
admission, the Court has discretionary power to require the
admitted fact to be proved by any other means.
3. That the defendant states that there are material issues
involved in the instant suit which are very much triable therefore,
the Ld. Court should not, proceed with the passing, a decree under
Order 12 Rule 6 of C.P.Code. In order to fair disposal of the instant
suit, the instant suit needed to be decided by a full fledged trial
and an opportunity to be given the defendant to lead evidence for
the interest of justice, therefore, the said application is liable to be
rejected in limine.
4. With reference to the statements made in paragraph Nos. 1, 2
and 3 of the said application, the defendant denies the same save
and except what are matters of record and calls, upon the plaintiff
to strictest proof thereof.
5. With reference to the statements made in paragraph Nos. 5 and
6 of the said application, the defendant denies the same save and
except what are matters of record and calls upon the plaintiff to
strictest proof thereof. The defendant states that by his Written
Statement, filed in Court has been categorically challenged the
allegations made by the Plaintiff which is required to be proved by
way of an evidence by the parties of this suit.
6. With reference to the statements made in paragraph No. 7 of the
said application, the defendant denies the same save and except
what are matters of record.
7. With reference to the statements made in paragraph No. 8 of the
said application, the defendant denies the same.
8. With reference to the statements made in paragraph No. 9 of the
said application, the defendant denies the same save and except
what are matters of record and calls upon the plaintiff to strictest
proof thereof.
9. With reference to the statements made in paragraphs No. 10, 11
and 12 of the said application, the defendant denies the same. The
defendant denies that he admitted anything in his pleadings that
the defendant is a trespasser as alleged, on the other hand, he
categorically stated that he is a tenant in respect of the suit
premises and he paid rent to the plaintiff in respect of the suit
premises. Moreover, the defendant filed an application u/s 7(1) &
7(2) of the W.B.P.T. Act before this Ld. Court for payment of current
rent as well as arrears rent if any due and payable and those

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 applications are pending before this Ld. Court. The defendant
states that the facts of this case as made out in the plaint should
be considered by this Ld. Court as a whole for the interest of
justice because the cause of action of this suit arose on the bundle
of facts. The defendant never admitted in pleadings that he is
enjoying the suit premises as trespassed. Therefore, without
taking an evidence, the instant suit cannot be adjudicated
properly, therefore the said application is liable to be rejected with
cost.
It is prayed that the said application be rejected with cost.”

12. The trial court adjudicated the application and ultimately decreed the
suit having regard to the specific admissions made by the defendant.

13. The defendant being dissatisfied with the decree passed by the trial
court based on admissions challenged the same before the High Court by
filing FAT No. 7 of 2024. The High Court dismissed the FAT holding as
under:
“12. According to the said clause, the dependent heir of the
original tenant, unless she is the widow of the original tenant, is
entitled to carry on as a tenant [coming within the definition of
“tenant” as defined in Section 2(g)] to continue in such capacity for
a period of 5 years from the demise of the original tenant
13. Hence, although the defendant has not pleaded in the Written
statement that he was a dependent of the: original tenant, which
should have further cut short his period of tenancy, even
proceeding on the premise that the defendant was a dependent,
he, being the Son of the original tenant, would be :entitled to
sustain his tenancy in such capacity only up to the, expiry of a
period- of 5 years from the demise of the original tenant.
14. From the pleadings in the written statement, it is evident that
the said period was already over at the time of institution of the
suit, since the original tenant, his father Ranjan Ghosh, met his
demise on July 13, 2016.
15. It is further admitted in the written statement that the
landlord/plaintiff, quite rightly, stopped accepting rent, from the
defendant after May, 2021 i.e. after the expiry of the said period

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of five years from the death of the original landlord.
16. Hence, the pleadings in the written statement comprise of
sufficient ingredients to bring the defendant within the fold of
Section 2(g) of the 1997 Act.
17. It may be clarified here that, it is well-settled that law of legal
'arguments need not be pleaded in the pleadings, either by way of
a plaint or a written statement.
18. As such, the defendant need not have specifically pleaded,
the applicability of Section 2(g) of the 1997 Act for the purpose of
the pleading to acquire the Character of an admission, for the
purpose of Order XII Rule 6 of the Code. It would suffice, as in the
present case, if the necessary factual ingredients to satisfy
Section 2(g) are pleaded in the written statement, for it to be
deemed to be an admission that the defendant comes within the
purview of Section. 2(g).
19.That is precisely the case here.
20. In the event the defendant comes within Section 2(g) of the
1997 Act, nothing remains to be adjudicated further in the. suit,
since the defendant is automatically relegated to the status of a
trespasser, and the plaintiff immediately becomes entitled to get a
decree for eviction in the absence of any further of independent
right having been claimed by the defendant.
21.The defendant, in the written statement, claims entirely
through his father, the original tenant. The pleading as to there
being a talk of a fresh tenancy being granted in favour of the
defendant is neither here nor there since even the said pleading
does not tantamount to-establish that a new tenancy has already
been created in favour of the defendant, in which case, the
outcome of the litigation might have been otherwise.
22. As such, the learned Trial Judge was fully justified in
resorting to Section 2(g) of the 1997 Act, read with Order XII Rule
6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to come to the finding that the
plaintiff automatically gets entitled to a decree for eviction by way
of a judgment on admission.
23. In such view of the matter, we do not find any justification to
interfere with the impugned judgment and decree.
24. Accordingly, FAT 7 of 2024 is dismissed on contest, thereby
affirming the judgment and decree dated December 2, 2023
passed by the learned Judge, Fifth Bench, City Civil Court at
Calcutta, District- Calcutta in Title Suit No. 1068 of 2021.

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 25.There will be no order as to costs.
26. Keeping in view the pendency of the appeal till now, the
defendant/appellant is granted a further period of three months
to vacate the premises in favour of the plaintiff/respondent. The
pending execution n case shall remain stayed for such period.
27. In the event the defendant/appellant does not vacate the
premises within the said period, of three months from this date,
the plaintiff/decree holder will be at liberty to proceed with the
execution case and the same will be expedited by the executing
court.
28. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
29. A formal decree be drawn up accordingly.”

14. In such circumstances referred to above, the defendant is here before

this Court with the present petition.

15. We heard Mr. Ramnath Jha, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the petitioner.

16. Section 2(g) of the 1997 Act reads thus:

"2. Definitions." In this Act, unless there is anything, repugnant in
the subject or context,
(g) "tenant" means any person by whom or on whose account or
behalf the rent of any premises is or, but for a special contract,
would be payable, and includes, any person continuing in
possession after termination of his tenancy and, in the event of
death of any tenant, also includes, for a period not exceeding five
years from the date of death of such tenant or from the date of
coming into force of this Act, whichever is later, his spouse, son,
daughter, parent and the widow of his predeceased son, who
were ordinarily living with the tenant up to the date of death of
the tenant as the members of his family and were dependent on
him and who do not own or occupy any residential premises, and
in respect of premises let out for non-residential purpose his
spouse, sort, daughter and parent who were ordinarily living with
the tenant up to the date of his death as members of his family,

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 and were dependent on him or a person authorised by the tenant
who is in possession of such premises but shall not include any
person, against whom any decree or order for eviction has been
made by a Court of competent jurisdiction:
Provided that the time-limit of five years shall not apply to the
spouse of the tenant who was ordinarily living with the tenant up
to his death as a member of his family and was dependent on
him and who does not own of occupy any residential premises:
Provided further that the son, daughter, parent or the widow of
the predeceased son of the tenant who was ordinarily residing
with the tenant in the said premises up to the date of death of the
tenant as a member of his family and was dependent on him and
who does not own or occupy any residential premises, shall have
a right of preference for tenancy, in a fresh agreement in respect
of such premises on condition of payment of fair rent. This proviso
shall apply mutatis mutandis to premises let out for non-
residential purpose."

17. Thus, the plain reading of Section 2(g) referred to above would indicate
that the dependent heir of the original tenant unless she is the widow of the
original tenant would be entitled to carry on as a tenant [coming within the
definition of “tenant” as defined under Section 2(g)] in such capacity for a
period of 5 years from the demise of the original tenant.

18. In the case on hand, the defendant is the son of the original tenant. It is
not in dispute that he claims his right to continue as a tenant in the suit
premises through his father i.e. the original tenant.

19. Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC reads thus:

6. Judgment on admissions.—(1) Where admissions of fact have
been made either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or
in writing, the Court may at any stage of the suit, either on the
application of any party or of its own motion and without waiting
for the determination of any other question between the parties,
make such order or give such judgment as it may think fit, having
regard to such admissions.

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 (2) Whenever a judgment is pronounced under sub-rule (1) a
decree shall be drawn up in accordance with the judgment and
the decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was
pronounced.

LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
20. By the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, the following
changes had been effected:
(1) Original Rule 6 had been substituted and redrafted into sub-rule (1) and
(2) Sub-rule (2) had been newly inserted,

OBJECT OF AMENDMENTS
21. Rule 6, as originally enacted, enabled a court to pronounce judgment or
admission “either in pleading or otherwise”. It read thus:
“6. Judgment on admissions.— Any party may, at any stage of a
suit. where admissions of facts have been made, either on
pleadings or otherwise, apply to the Court for such judgment or
order as upon such admissions he may be entitled to, without
waiting for the determination of any other question between the
parties and the Court may upon such application make such order
or give such judgment, as the Court may think just.”

22. The Law Commission considered the provision. With a view to clarify the
position as to admission and also to empower the court to pronounce a
judgment: suo motu and to draw a decree on such judgment, recommended
to modify the rule. It stated:
“Where a claim is admitted, a court has jurisdiction under Order
XII Rule 6 to enter a judgment for the plaintiff, and to pass a
decree on the admitted claim (with liberty to the plaintiff to
proceed with the suit in the ordinary way as to the remainder of
the claim).
The object of the rule is to enable a party to obtain speedy
judgment, at least to the extent of the relief to which, according to
the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled.
The rule has been held to be wide enough to cover oral

9
 admissions. The use of the words ‘or otherwise’ in Rule 6, without
the words ‘in writing’ which are used in Rule 1 of Order XII,
shows that a judgment may be given even on an oral admission.
It is desirable to codify this interpretation.
It may be noted that under the present rule, a judgment on
admission can be passed only on an application. According to a
local amendment. the Court may, on the application of any party
or of its own motion, make such order or give such judgment. This
is a useful amendment, and should be adopted.
In our view, it is also desirable to provide that a decree shall
follow or » judgment on admissions.” (See: Law Commission’s
Fifty-fourth Report, p. 145)

23. In Statement of Objects and Reasons, it had been stated:

“Clause 65, sub-clause (ii)- Under Rule 6, where a claim is
admitted, the Court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the
plaintiff and to pass a decree on the admitted claim. The object of
the rule is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment at least to
the extent of relief to which, according to the admission of the
defendant, the plaintiff is entitled. The rule is wide enough to
cover oral admissions. The rule is being amended to clarify that
oral admissions are also covered by the rule” (See: Notes on
Clauses, Gazette of India, dt. 08-04-1974, Pt. II, S.2, Extra., p.
316)
24. Rule 6(1) empowers the court to pronounce a judgment upon
admissions made by parties without waiting for the determination of other
questions.
25. Rule 6(2) states that a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with the
judgment.
26. The primary object underlying Rule 6 is to enable a party to obtain
speedy judgment at least to the extent of admission. Where a plaintiff
claims a particular relief or reliefs against a defendant and the defendant
makes a plain admission, the former is entitled to the relief or reliefs
admitted by the latter. [See: Uttam Singh v. United Bank of India, (2000) 7
SCC 120]

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27. As observed in the Statement of Objects and Reasons for amending
Rule 6, “where a claim is admitted, the court has jurisdiction to enter a
judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on admitted claim. The object
of the Rule is to enable the party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the
extent of the relief to which according to the admission of the defendant, the
plaintiff is entitled.”

28. The provisions of Rule 6 are enabling, discretionary and permissive.

They are not mandatory, obligatory or peremptory. This is also clear from
the use of the word “may” in the rule.

29. The powers conferred on the court by this rule are untrammeled and
cannot be crystallized into any rigid rule of universal application. They can
be exercised keeping in view and having regard to the facts and varying
circumstances of each case.

30. If the court is of the opinion that it is not safe to pass a judgment on
admissions, or that a case involves questions which cannot be appropriately
dealt with and decided on the basis of admission, it may, in exercise of its
discretion, refuse to pass a judgment and may insist upon clear proof of
even admitted facts.

31. To make order or to pronounce judgment on admission is at the

discretion of the court. First, the word “may” is used in Rule 6 and not the
word “shall” which prima facie shows that the provision is an enabling one.
Rule 6 of Order 12 must be read with Rule 5 of Order 8 which is identical to
the Proviso to Section 58 of the Evidence Act. Reading all the relevant

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provisions together, it is manifest that the court is not bound to grant relief
to the plaintiff only on the basis of admission of the defendant. (See: Sher
Bahadur v. Mohd. Amin, AIR 1929 Lah 569)

32. In the leading decision of Throp v. Holdsworth, Jessel, reported in

(1876)3 Ch D 637 (640) M.R. said: “This rule enables the plaintiff or the
defendant to get rid of so much of the action, as to which there is no
controversy.”

33. In Uttam Singh (Supra) the plaintiff bank filed a suit for recovery of a
large sum of money against the defendant. It also filed an application under
Order 12, Rule 6 for judgment upon admission in respect of part of claim.
The application was allowed and a decree was passed. An appeal against
the decree was also dismissed by the High Court. The defendant
approached this Court. It was contended before this Court by the defendant
that (i) Rule 6 of Order 12 covers only those admissions made in pleadings;
(ii) the effect of the admissions can only be considered at the trial of the
suit; and (iii) the provision of Order 12, Rule 6 must be read along with the
provisions of Order 8 and the court should call upon the plaintiff to prove
its case independent of so called admissions.

34. Negativing the contentions and referring to the object of Order 12,
Rule 6, the Court observed that “where a claim is admitted, the court has
jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on
admitted claim. The scope of Rule 6 should not be narrowed down where a
party applying for judgment is entitled to succeed on a plain admission of the
opposite party. The admission by the defendant was clear, unambiguous,

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unequivocal and unconditional. The courts below were, therefore, right in
decreeing the suit of the plaintiff.”

35. The words “or otherwise” are wide enough to include all cases of
admissions made in the pleadings or de hors the pleadings. Under Rule 6,
as originally enacted, it was held that the words “or otherwise” without the
words “in writing” used in Rule 1 showed that a judgment could be given
upon oral or verbal admission also. [See: Beeny, re, (1894) 1 Ch D 499] The
Amendment Act of 1976, however, made the position clear stating that such
admissions may be “in the pleading or otherwise” and “whether orally or in
writing”. Thus, after the amendment in Rule 6, the admissions are not
confined to Rule 1 or Rule 4 of Order 6, but are of general application. Such
admissions may be express or implied (constructive); may be in writing or
oral; or may be before the institution of the suit, after the suit is brought or
during the pendency of proceedings.

36. A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court very correctly laid down the
following interpretation of the provision of O. 12, R. 6, CPC, in the decision
of ITDC Limited v. Chander Pal Sood and Son, reported in (2000) 84 DLT
337 (DB): (2000 AIHC 1990):
“Order 12, R. 6 of Code gives a very wide discretion to the Court.
Under this rule the Court may at any stage of the suit either on
the application of any party or of its own motion and without
determination of any other question between the parties can make
such order giving such judgment as it may think fit on the basis of
admission of a fact made in the pleadings or otherwise whether
orally or in writing.”

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37. The use of the expression ‘otherwise’ in the aforesaid context came to be
interpreted by the High Court. Considering the expression the Court
interpreted the said word by stating that it permits the Court to pass
judgment on the basis of the statement made by the parties not only on the
pleadings but also dehors the pleadings i.e. either in any document or even
in the statement recorded in the Court. If one of the parties' statement is
recorded under O. 10, Rr. 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the same
is also a statement which elucidates matters in controversy. Any admission
in such statement is relevant not only for the purpose of finding out the real
dispute between the parties but also to ascertain as to whether or not any
dispute or controversy exists between the parties. Admission if any is made
by a party in the statement recorded, would be conclusive against him and
the Court can proceed to pass judgment on the basis of the admission made
therein.

38. Rule 6 of Order XII, before the amendment, allowed judgment on

admission only on an application by a party. The Law Commission,
however, suggested that a judgment may be pronounced either on an
application by a party or even suo motu [See: Throp (supra)]

39. This rule authorizes the court to enter a judgment where a claim is
admitted and to pass a decree on such admitted claim. This can be done at
any stage. [See: Uttam Singh (supra)]. Thus, a plaintiff may move for
judgment upon admission by the defendant in his written statement at any
stage of the suit although he has joined issue on the defence.” [See: Brown
v. Pearson, (1882) 21 Ch D 716]. Likewise, a defendant may apply for
dismissal of the suit on the basis of admission by the plaintiff in rejoinder.

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40. The court may, in an appropriate case, give a judgment at an
interlocutory stage of the proceedings on admission by a party. [See: Balraj
Taneja v. Sunil Madan, (1999) 8 SCC 396]. But if the case involves
questions which cannot conveniently be disposed of at a motion stage, the
court may not give judgment at that stage. [See: Simla Wholesale Mart
(Supra)]

41. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 6 as inserted by the Code of Civil Procedure

(Amendment) Act, 1976 requires the court to draw up a decree in
accordance with the judgment on admission. Sub-rule (2) is thus
consequential and logical sequence to sub-rule (1).

42. Since the object of sub-rule (1) is to enable the plaintiff to get judgment
on admission of the defendant to the extent of such admission, he must get
the benefit thereof immediately without waiting for the determination of
“non-admitted claim”. Sub-rule (2) makes it imperative for the court to draw
up a decree in terms of judgment on admission which can be executed by
the plaintiff.” [See: Uttam Singh (supra)]. In such cases, there may be two
decrees; (i) in respect of admitted claim; and (ii) in respect of “non-admitted”
or contested claim. [See: Bai Chanchal v. United Bank of India, AIR 1971
SC 1081].

43. A decree under Rule 6 may be either preliminary or final. [See: Sivalinga
v. Narayani, AIR 1946 Mad 151]

44. We are of the view having regard to the clear and unequivocal admission
made by the defendant in his written statement, the High Court committed

15
no error much less any error of law in decreeing the suit applying Order XII
Rule 6 of the CPC.

45. At this stage we should take note of the submission canvassed by the
learned counsel that the petitioner is not governed by the provisions of the
West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 and therefore the entire
discussion as regards Section 2(g) of the Act, 1997 was unnecessary. In
other words, the attempt on the part of the learned counsel is to persuade
us to accept the argument that if Section 2(g) of the Act, 1997 is not
applicable then in such circumstances the petitioner has a right to continue
in occupation of the premises in question as the legal heir of the original
tenant.

46. We are afraid, we are not impressed with the submission canvassed by
the learned counsel as noted above. We take notice of the fact that this
point was never raised or argued before the High Court. We wonder if it was
at all argued even before the trial court. We called upon the learned counsel
to point out from the reply filed by the petitioner to the application filed by
the respondent under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC that this point was raised
before the High Court. There is nothing in the objections/reply of the
petitioner to indicate that such contention was ever raised. On the contrary,
para 9 of the reply filed by the petitioner-herein which we have incorporated
in para 11 of this order clinches the issue. In para 9 of the reply to the
application filed by the plaintiff under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC it is
stated thus:-
“Moreover, the defendant filed an application u/s 7(1) & 7(2)
of the W.B.P.T. Act before this Ld. Court for payment of

16
 current rent as well as arrears rent if any due and payable
and those applications are pending before this Ld. Court.”

If according to the petitioner the provisions of the Act, 1997 are not
applicable then what was the good reason for him to file the application
under Sections 7(1) & (2) of the Act, 1997 respectively.

47. In view of the aforesaid, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed.

48. Registry shall circulate one copy each of this order to all the High
Courts and the High Courts in turn shall circulate the order in their
respective District judiciary.

……………………………..J.
(J.B. PARDIWALA)

………………………………J.
(R. MAHADEVAN)

New Delhi
07.04.2025.

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