Land and Racial Segregation in Colonial Zimbabwe

The Rhodesian Responsible government party which replaced the chartered company in

October 1923 originated as a farmers’ party. The company lost its position as a result of its

failure to adequately protect and represent the interests of all sectors of the electorate.

The settler community was divided into 5 major communities of which the comparatively

small agricultural and mining groups developed into major political factions. The white

labour class contributed substantially to the course of events in 1920 and 1922. The mining

sector most influential in 1899 had declined in numerical and political influence by 1922.

By 1923 the agricultural community formed the largest group in the electorate. Discontent

before 1907 was led by members of the commercial community who were most affected by

the economic depressions. They were supported by the white farming community. From 1907

political agitation was led by representatives of the farming community. The settlers were

united against the company. However, conflict between mining and farming interests was the

more tense dominated events in the country. The expectations of both the company and the

settlers in the 1890s had been that Rhodesian’s future would be based on the mining industry.

This sector was favoured by legislation and other benefits at the expense of the rest of the

community.

The promotion of land settlement by the company from 1904 resulted in increasing number

of white farmers who assisted the development of farming associations and the emotions of

the Rhodesian Agricultural Unions (RAU).

Land Apportionment Act was not the only legislation that alienated land in southern

Rhodesia. (1894, 1914 reserve commission, 1925 land commission). It was however, felt that

the 1914 reserves commission had not allocated enough land to Africans and the Morris

Carter commission gave more land to the Africans. In principle even the 1923 constitution of
the responsible government still on the principle that land was available for everybody to

purchase.

After the establishment of the responsible government the settlers had more leverage to deal

with the land issue and to intensify segregationist policies. In 1925 the Morris Carter Land

Commission was set up. The 1925 Morris Carter Land Commission, the first major

commission by the settler government since gaining self-government status in 1923, made

recommendations which had a far-reaching impact in the country.

The government appointed the Morris Carter Commission to investigate the land question

and suggest how it could be solved. The commission recommended the division of land

between races and suggested that ‘an estimated 6, 851, 876 acres of the un-alienated land be

assigned to Africans as Native Purchase Areas, that 17, 423, 815 acres be reserved for future

purchase by Europeans.’

@@@@@@@@@@@@

Most of the commission’s recommendations were incorporated into the 1930 Land

Apportionment Act (LAA) whose main provision was that, ‘there should be separate areas in

which Europeans and Natives should have the right to acquire and hold land.’

Historians have described it differently. Machingaidze has described it as the “magna carta,”

the cornerstone of the settlers’ society while Palmer described it as “the most contentious

piece of legislation ever passed by a Rhodesian government.” Moore has used it to discuss

“racialized dispossession,” whereas Alexander has emphasized the concept of “unsettled

land” in Zimbabwe.
The Act effectively expunged the 1898 Order-in-Council which had hitherto allowed

Africans to purchase land anywhere in the country. It created the Native Land Board (NLB)

which dealt with the alienation of land and the settlement of Africans in Purchase Areas.

@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@

The act therefore legalised racial segregation on land in the colony making purchase areas ‘a

real quid pro quo’ for the Africans’ loss of rights to purchase land elsewhere in the country.

Cheater argues that, ‘the black freehold areas were originally created as a political sop

{something done to appease or bribe someone} to advanced natives for the loss of their rights

to buy non-reserve land anywhere in the colony of Southern Rhodesia.’ This emergent

African Middle class desired to have a measure of privacy and separateness from other

Africans in the reserves. No such concession was, however, made in South Africa after the

1913 Land Act.

As a result of the Act, Africans lost their right to purchase land anywhere else in the country

apart from the Purchase Areas.

LAA began to be felt after the second world war after the strategic resettlement of second

world war soldiers. The boom in the African population put pressure on the authorities to

move the Africans to designated reserves. LAA only set aside land for Africans to purchase

and by the 1930s many Africans had bought their farms. Ranger argues that even the Ndebele

did not immediately go to the Gwaai and Shangani reserves after their creation.

The LAA divided a country which a total of 96,2 million acres into two. 49.1 mil acres to

Europeans and 21.1 to Africans and 7.5 mil acres set aside for Native Purchase Areas.

The rest remained unassaigned, tsetse infested and not suitable for agricultural use.
Around this time most Africans were settled in areas designated for Europeans but had

remained unoccupied.

The period after the second world saw a large number of whites beginning to settle on the

land. From 1949 Africans began to be removed from these European areas.(eg Rosdel in

Kwekwe). African population had doubled by 1940 and NCs were reporting cases of

overcrowding and overstocking so to solve this problem the government provided additional

land in 1948. This proved to be inadequate as most of the land continued to be unoccupied.

Overpopulation had a severe impact on the environment this was a crisis which was at the

centre of the LAA. Godfrey Huggins who came to power introduced the policy of separate

development (the so called raider and horse partnership).

The LAA as an act did could not be implemented without thorough planning. Statistics on

population and stock could not be accurate so to an extent the government began to institute

certain measures to control the chaos. The process of centralisation preceded the LAA after

1930 putting people into central zones and grazing areas so as to monitor soil degradation and

also to deal with the issue of destocking. The ‘excess’ land was to be taken by Europeans.

Africans began to feel the pinch of the LAA which led to the formation of Trade Unions and

the emergence of largely nationalist parties to agitate to reform southern Rhodesia. The

southern Rhodesia Trade Union under Nyandoro attacked the LAA. In Salisbury the city

youth league succeeded in marrying the rural grievances and those of urban dwellers.
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@

In 1951 the colonial administration enacted the Land Husbandry Act. Its bill had been

proposed in 1948 with the aim of making sure that Africans were transformed into producers

within the reserves available to them. But this was in fact a time bomb which ignited African

despondence and agitation.

One of the objectives of the act was to divide Africans into farmers and workers. Farmers

were to stay in the reserves. The carrying capacity of the reserves was to be monitored. A

family was to have an arable plot sufficient for producing for the family (subsistence

farming) and enough to get a small surplus for sale. Families were also to keep a small head

of livestock to avoid overstocking.

The colonial administration did not want to give excess land to Africans as a result the plots

of land became increasingly inadequate for families to produce even for their own

subsistence. This was designed to push Africans into working for the settlers. The act also

deprived working people their land rights as demanded that farmers stay in the reserves.

According to Bhebhe this affected more than 30 000 Africans leading to the growing number

of landless Africans.

The most affected provinces were Mat South, and Southern Mashonaland Areas. The colonial

administration also implemented massive destocking in the reserves which flared the anger of

Africans whose livelihoods were centred on the keeping of large herds of cattle.

The LHA affected the economic security of the Africans......the cattle of the Africans. The

NLHA was designed to create a detribalised Africans yet in the urban areas did not want to

see the entry of Africans into the urban areas, wages continued to be very low. Nationalists

used these grievances for recruitment.

Resistance among Africans began to be manifested in more overt ways. A number of people

were driven to join the nationalist parties which were emerging.

Local resistance became rampant in reserves. Africans began to refuse to take orders and also

engaged in sabotage activities eg dynamiting dip tanks, refusal to make contour ridges

(madiro farming) an act which was directly against the NLHA, they also refused to dip cattle.

The hunger for land and impoverishment of the peasants through the implementation of the

NLHA forced the rural masses to look up to emerging nationalist parties for solutions.

Africans complained about the unfairness in the manner in which the NC applied destocking.

For example Africans in Matopo complained that the NC slashed down the number of cattle

to required figure per household irrespective of the fact that those who had the smallest

numbers of cattle were being adversely affected.

Land Reform in the Twenty Years After Independence

Land has been a source of political conflict in Zimbabwe since colonization, when the
country was known as Rhodesia, both within indigenous black communities and especially
between white settlers and the black rural communities. Under British colonial rule and under
the white minority government that in 1965 unilaterally declared its independence from
Britain, white Rhodesians seized control of the vast majority of good agricultural land,
leaving black peasants to scrape a living from marginal "tribal reserves."

An end to white minority rule came after a protracted war of liberation in which land was a
major issue, but was ultimately negotiated through talks brokered by the British government
that led to a settlement known as the Lancaster House Agreement, and then to elections in
1980. Robert Mugabe, leader of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
(Zanu-PF), the dominant liberation movement, won a resounding victory.

However, the new government was bound by "sunset clauses" in the Lancaster House
Agreement that gave special protections to white Zimbabweans for the first ten years of
independence. These included provisions that the new government would not engage in any
compulsory land acquisition and that when land was acquired the government would "pay
promptly adequate compensation" for the property.

Land distribution would take place in terms of "willing buyer, willing seller." (From 1985,
every vendor of land was required to obtain from the government a "certificate of no present
interest" in the acquisition of the land concerned before going ahead with the sale.)
Released from the constraints of the Lancaster House Agreement in 1990, the Zanu-PF
government amended the provisions of the constitution concerning property rights.
Compulsory acquisition of land for redistribution and resettlement became possible. In 1992,
the Land Acquisition Act also gave the government strengthened powers to acquire land for
resettlement, subject to the payment of "fair" compensation fixed by a committee of six
persons using set (nonmarket) guidelines, including powers to limit the size of farms and
introduce a land tax.

A 1994 land tenure commission also recommended that the best way to achieve vital
redistribution was through a land tax, though no tax was in fact put in place. Despite the new
laws, the government land acquisition and resettlement in practice slowed down.

In the first decade of independence, the government acquired 40 percent of the target of eight
million hectares, resettling more than 50,000 families on more than three million hectares. By
the end of the second decade of independence, the pace of land reform had declined. Less
than one million hectares was acquired for distribution during the 1990s and fewer than
20,000 families resettled.

Budgetary allocations showed that land acquisition was not a government priority during
these years. By the end of what became known as "phase one" of the land reform and
resettlement program in 1997, the government had resettled 71,000 families (against a target
of 162,000) on almost 3.5 million hectares of land. Only 19 percent of this was classed as
prime land, the rest was either marginal, or unsuitable for grazing or cultivation. About 400
black elite farmers were leasing 400,000 hectares of state land, and about 350 black people
had bought their farms.

There were positive and sustainable results from the resettlement process, though problems
beset the resettled communities who lacked infrastructure and support networks, whether
governmental or from their previous communities. Moreover, population density in the
"communal areas," the former tribal reserves, actually increased. More than one million
families still eked out an existence on sixteen million hectares of poor land. Despite wealth in
one sector of the economy, Zimbabwe remained one of the most unequal countries in the
world.

By 1999, eleven million hectares of the richest land were still in the hands of about 4,500
commercial farmers, the great majority of them white. Moreover, some farms purchased for
redistribution had in fact been given to government ministers and other senior officials rather
than to the landless peasantry. Most rural black Zimbabweans continued to suffer immense
poverty.

By late 1997 and 1998, much larger scale occupations were taking place. But, despite
occasional saber-rattling by the government, white farmers were mostly left undisturbed;
several became prominent supporters of Zanu-PF.

The conflict over land was related to growing tension between the government and veterans
of the liberation war. In 1980, there were about 60,000 men and women who had been
guerrilla members of the two liberation armies, Zanla (affiliated with Zanu) and Zipra
(affliated with Zapu). About 20,000 were integrated into the national army; the remainder
were demobilized and awarded a small pension, but given little other assistance to help them
in starting a new life.
In April 1989, the Zimbabwe Liberation War Veterans' Association (WVA) was formed,
bringing together excombatants from both Zanla and Zipra to lobby for increased government
assistance.

In the wake of a growing confrontation between the British and other donors and the
Zimbabwean government over the financing of land transfers, and the November 1997
government notice of compulsory acquisition of 1,471 farms (about 3.9 million hectares), an
international donors' conference on land reform and resettlement was held in September
1998.

This forum aimed to build a consensus among various stakeholders in land reform. A set of
principles was adopted to govern "phase two" of land resettlement in Zimbabwe, including
respect for a legal process, transparency, poverty reduction, affordability, and consistency
with Zimbabwe's wider economic interests. A technical committee worked on finalizing the
details of the new system. Nevertheless, relations between the donors and the government
broke down.

In the face of the challenge represented by the MDC and other increasingly outspoken critics
of his government, President Mugabe and Zanu-PF responded on two fronts. On the one
hand, the government revived the call for radical land redistribution to fulfill the promises
made at independence, giving official blessing to a new wave of land occupations led by
members of the War Veterans Association that had rapidly accelerated following the
referendum result.

Zanu-PF campaigned for the June 2000 parliamentary elections on the slogan "Land is the
Economy; the Economy is Land."

The Land Acquisition Act was further amended in May 2000, using the power given to the
president to enact six month temporary legislation under the Presidential Powers (Temporary
Measures) Act of 1986

Fast Track Land Reform

Zimbabwe’s Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP) formally began with the Land
Acquisition Act of 2002. The Program, that effectively co-opted the farm occupations since
1998, redistributed land from white-owned farms and estates, as well as state lands, to more
than 150,000 farmers under two models, A1 and A2. The A1 model allocated small plots for
growing crops and grazing land to landless and poor farmers, while the A2 model allocated
farms to new black commercial farmers who had the skills and resources to farm profitably,
reinvest and raise agricultural productivity. The number of large capitalist farms, mainly
white owned, fell by around 75%, while there was a 16% drop in the number of large foreign
and domestically owned agro-estates (Moyo 2011).

There were two models for resettlement under the fast track program: model A1, "the
decongestion model for the generality of landless people with a villagized and a self-
contained variant," to benefit 160,000 beneficiaries from among the poor; and model A2,
aimed at creating a cadre of 51,000 small- to medium-scale black indigenous commercial
farmers.
Twenty percent of all resettlement plots under the model A1 pattern were officially reserved
for war veterans, repeating a commitment made by the government since the early 1990s.

Until recently, the FTLRP generated heated debates that polarised opinion between those
who were in favour of redressing the colonial racial distribution of land in favour of black
farmers and those who were against this objective as well as the way it was done (Cliffe et al.
2013)

The Zimbabwean government formally announced the "fast track" resettlement program in
July 2000, stating that it would acquire more than 3,000 farms for redistribution. Between
June 2000 and February 2001, a national total of 2,706 farms, covering more than six million
hectares, were gazetted (listed in the official government journal) for compulsory
acquisition.

According to the Commercial Farmers' Union (CFU), which represents the large-scale
commercial farming sector in Zimbabwe, more than 1,600 commercial farms were occupied
by settlers led by war veterans in the course of 2000, though others have questioned the
number, and some were occupied only for a short period. Not all of these occupations were
accompanied by violence.

In April 2001, the objectives of the land reform and resettlement program were, among other
things, said to be to acquire not less than 8.3 million hectares from the large scale commercial
farming sector for redistribution (an increase from the five million hectares stated in 1998). In
October 2001, the government announced that it intended to list for acquisition 4,558 farms,
covering 8.8 million hectares.

By the end of 2001, about 250 farmers out of the CFU's total membership of 3,500 had left
their farms over the previous year, and the Ministry of Land, Agriculture and Rural
Resettlement had recorded that 114,830 households had physically moved and resettled on
4.37 million hectares.

There was no formal process, for example, to ensure that people from a communal area who
have a historical claim get precedence in settling on that land. Rather, the fast track process
has brought people who otherwise have no connection with each other together in new
settlements. The government has not engaged in any speedy process to guarantee security of
tenure on land allocated for resettlement: settlers on A1 model farms are in theory being
issued temporary occupation licenses, expected to be converted in time into proper
leases. Moreover, in practice farms have been occupied even when they have not been listed
under any of the set legal procedures; though this process seems to have slowed in the last
quarter of 2001.

Since the introduction of the fast track process, government policy and stated aims in relation
to redistribution and land occupations have repeatedly changed.

New legislation has been brought in to supplement the original laws providing for the fast
track program and to legalize processes that were formally illegal at the time they were
begun. The Rural Land Occupiers (Protection from Eviction) Act of June 2001 protected
from eviction for a period of twelve months (originally six months) those who had occupied
land up to February 2001 without following the proper procedures, and suspended the
application of court orders for eviction. In November 2001, the late President Mugabe used
his "presidential powers" to amend the Land Acquisition Act, with retroactive effect to May
2000. The new provisions mean that ownership of designated land is transferred immediately,
irrespective of any court challenge, to the acquiring authority and serves as a ninety-day
eviction notice for the previous owner (penalties for noncompliance include imprisonment for
up to two years). At any time after the serving of a "section 8" notice under the amended act,
the government has the right to stop farming operations on the farm affected. In November
2001, the minister of lands, agriculture and rural resettlement launched regulations limiting
maximum farm sizes to units ranging from 250-400 hectares in the main arable areas and
2,000 hectares in the grazing areas.

The Commercial Farmers' Union adopted a two-track approach in responding to the fast track
land reform process and land occupations. On the one hand, the union has challenged the new
laws and policies in the courts. In December 2000, the CFU was successful in obtaining an
interdict from the Zimbabwe Supreme Court barring further land acquisitions on the grounds
that the fast track program was unconstitutional, because it was being carried out in a violent
and haphazard manner. The government criticized the courts generally for standing in the
way of land reform and has repeatedly failed to abide by court orders; including this one. In
November 2001, the same court overturned the interdict, on the grounds that the government
now had a lawful program of land reform. The judgment accepted the government's argument
that new legislation had retroactively legalized occupations that had been carried out in
violation of what were then the legal procedures.

More importantly, the major beneficiaries of the land reform were peasants who now have
access to better-quality land and natural resources that were previously enclosed and enjoyed
by a few whites under the bi-modal agrarian structure inherited from colonialism, that is,
white commercial farmers and agro-industrial estates on the one hand and small-scale black
commercial farmers and black peasant families on the other. As noted by Moyo, Fast track
land redistribution undermined the underlying logic of settler-colonial agrarian relations
founded on racial monopoly control over land that deprived peasants of land based social
reproduction and compelled cheap agrarian labour supplies. Redistribution reversed racial
patterns of land ownership and broadened access to land across the ethnically diverse
provinces, while replacing most private agricultural property rights with land user rights on
public property. (Moyo 2011a, 944)

Problems Caused by a Disorderly Process

Because the "fast track" process of resettlement is being carried out so rapidly, short-
circuiting legal procedures, it appears that many of those who have moved to new plots or
those who might otherwise do so, are worried about the lack of certainty that their title will be
secure. As noted by UNDP, "apart from discouraging settlers from taking up plots allocated
to them, this is likely to defeat the productivity goals of the resettlement programme as a
whole."52 Others who wanted land told Human Rights Watch that they had not taken up the
opportunity because they did not have the resources to cultivate the land and there was no
government support to assist new settlers. The absence of legal security and government
assistance could leave them vulnerable to hunger and displacement.

A war veteran who was given a piece of land described to Human Rights Watch how he
found that the same land had been reallocated to different people in subsequent weeks when
he tried to go back to his plot. He had been given no written proof that the land was allocated
to him. He lamented, "I felt angry because I felt there was some kind of disorder and there
was no proper responsibility for the exercise."53

In many cases the people being resettled are also told not to erect permanent shelters. There is
a high turnover in new settler populations, with people coming and leaving resettled areas
after varying periods of time.

You will see a certain plot being pegged ten times to different people When they bring the
first lot, they will stay about five or six weeks, then they leave on the war veterans' tractor,
then they come back with some old and some new.54

Farmers who are members of the Commercial Farmers' Union have also reported conflict
between different groups of settlers, caused by the lack of certainty in the process.55

Many rural black Zimbabweans expressed a profound disapproval of the manner in which
government is carrying out land reform, in particular the lack of clear criteria for the
allocation of land and the lack of structured support for new settlers. "This issue of land, we
are not saying people should not be given land, of course they should; but it should be done
in a proper way. Some people can just go and settle at a place where there are no facilities
like water, schools, clinics, sanitation...And the loss of jobs brings hunger to the farming
areas, since the workers aren't buying from the small-scale farmers either."56 A UNDP
technical team considering the fast track land reform program in late 2001 noted that "the
provision of roads, schools, clinics and boreholes, etc. was lagging far behind settler
emplacement," and that the provision of essential public infrastructure within a reasonable
timeframe "will be impossible on the Government's past track record and its current
implementation capacity."57 Therefore, the team concluded that

the current scope of the Fast Track is not implementable on a sustainable basis unless (a) the
settlement timetable is substantially adjusted; (b) there is a considerable infusion of resources
to finance the necessary infrastructure and support services; and (c) there is a stronger basis
for optimism on the part of settlers about their future leading them to form viable community
organizations aimed at ensuring the sustainability of new settlements.58

One women's rights activist commented that the fast track process meant that, "You are just
moving poverty from one location to another."59

Uncertainty has been exacerbated by the rule that land in the communal area be given up
when fast-track land is taken: land in communal areas is allocated for cultivation and
occupation by traditional leaders, with no absolute ownership; if the person to whom the land
is allocated is not present, he forfeits his right to hold it. Giving up communal land without
secure tenure elsewhere may leave one displaced and without any access to land. People
respond with pragmatic interim arrangements.

I will give up claims to my land in the communal area by letting my son inherit it. I can't give
up my communal area, that's taboo. I will pretend I have.60

As a consequence of the perceived lack of security of tenure and of support for new settlers,
some of those who might otherwise want land are reluctant to come forward. One councilor
described to Human Rights Watch how he was having difficulty filling up his quota:
They asked councilors to give the names of people to be resettled, in my ward I was asked to
get ten names. I will hold a meeting to ask who wants to be resettled. I hold a meeting with
people in the ward every two months. I've asked two times now for names, but I only got one
name, though there are about 400 people at each meeting, and 934 homesteads in my ward,
with an average five people per homestead. We were given no forms, we just had to give the
names. People don't want to move because they have no money or resources-it's expensive to
move to a new place, you need more than land only.61

Therefore, "you get people who are being pushed onto the farms. If they were not pushed
they would not have gone."62

In some areas, occupiers of land are being paid in order to overcome their reluctance to move.
In the Marondera area, for example, a farm foreman told human rights researchers,
confirming similar reports, that:

The squatters are paid, yes...Soldiers are coming to the farm, and the deputy police
commissioner. He's the one who wants this farm. There are big people who employ the
squatters to harass the farmers and us, who work for him. They come in groups of 200 or 150
when they see the tractors in the field. They harass us, and chase us. [Q: How do you know?]
I hear from the war vet that he [the police officer] wants the farm. He has a white Toyota
Hilux twin cab, and we see him driving here on the weekends. [Q: How can you tell that he's
paying the squatters money?] I develop a friendship with them, and they tell us. [Name
deleted], he is employed as the base commander. He got paid Z$2,000 to Z$2,500 for each
shack that gets built. There's no floor in the shacks, just walls. No one is supposed to live
there, it's just to show that the land is occupied.63

Many people in communal areas reported that those from their area that had gone to the fast
track resettlement areas had left their families behind, or the families had returned even if the
men had stayed on the new plots. Children who had moved to new areas were missing classes
because they sometimes faced walks of twenty-five kilometers or more to school. Even those
who have remained have faced problems in securing education for their children, since many
teachers have been driven away from their schools by Zanu-PF militia on suspicion of being
MDC supporters.

Assessment of the level of satisfaction of those resettled under the fast track program with
their land is difficult, since access to those areas for outsiders is regulated by militia
supporting the ruling party and often led by war veterans, and thus hard to achieve. Some
journalists and NGO workers have been assaulted or narrowly escaped assault by these
militia on trying to visit resettled farms.64 Undoubtedly, there are people who want land and
have the skills and resources to farm who have taken the opportunity presented by the fast
track program to obtain a plot. However, problems faced by families resettled during earlier
land reform programs do raise concerns about the sustainability of the fast track process.
There is a danger that the effect of the unplanned relocations of communal area residents can
in some cases be their further impoverishment.

In older resettlement areas, some of the land allocated has been abandoned or not fully
utilized, due to lack of resources such as fertilizer or tractors, and in particular lack of access
to credit. Assessments of the programs of land redistribution undertaken during the 1980s
noted positive and sustainable results, benefiting some of the poorest people, increasing their
incomes, and providing access to education and health services. However, they also noted
that some areas remained without schools within walking distance or water supplies more
than a decade after resettlement, as well as underutilization of land by new settlers, and
recommended that these problems be addressed as the land reform program was
continued.65 At the Musasa resettlement scheme close to Harare, settled in 1986, for example,
several household heads told Human Rights Watch that they were only able to plow a small
proportion of the twelve acres allocated to them, for lack of resources. "People were very
happy back in 1986, but now there are mixed feelings. The problem is just the question of
inputs."66 As a result, "out of twelve acres I am only using four acres because of lack of
access to resources."67

Interviews with some newly settled villagers confirm that, because of the hasty nature of the
fast track program, there is a danger that this pattern is now being repeated: one commented
to Human Rights Watch that she had no idea how she would get the implements and other
resources to farm her piece of land, she would just hope that some help would come.68 A
retired school teacher from the same district said, "In this country it's very hard to get
employment, but if they just get dumped on a piece of land that is worse."69

Women and men interviewed from a resettlement scheme of the 1980s also disapproved of
the fast track program, due in part to their feeling that the process was not fair, but also
because of the adverse consequences for themselves. Some of their sons had taken the
opportunity to take land on neighboring commercial farms, but this unregulated process was
seen to generate problems rather than benefits for the existing community.

This is a different administrative arrangement. It is jambanja [confusion, nonsense]. I did not

attend the meeting. I am not part of those meetings. Some women went who wanted to hold
land for their children...It [fast track] created lots of problems for people. There was cattle-
thieving. The children who have gone into fast track no longer go to school. Some of them
were employed in town but now they have no money. Crops left drying on drying trays are
being stolen...In here it's clear-cut that the jambanja people stay there so there's no mixing.
Conflict can arise with illegal hunting. In this village there is a policy because we think the
way it is done, they were not properly settled. So we think if they go, they must go with their
whole families, so we don't have security problems.70

The fast track resettlement program was also seen to endanger food security for the rural
population. An agricultural extension officer commented: "I don't think the land invasions are
there to promote production, because when you invade you are disrupting production," and
complained that the unregulated movement of animals to the new areas spreads
diseases.71 Meanwhile, "the war veterans on the farms in this area that are settled are just
drinking beer and causing trouble, while they are waiting for the seeds, fertilizer, and tractors
that have been promised."72

In many cases, farm workers and farm owners said war veterans were occupying commercial
farm land without using it, other than to harvest crops and kill and eat livestock already on
the farm. "On some farms they are planting maize and sunflowers and beans, but on the farm
where I work they are just sitting there causing problems. Sometimes they stop the workers
going to work; sometimes they are killing cattle to feed themselves."73 Farm workers and
peasant farmers from communal areas repeatedly expressed to Human Rights Watch their
dismay at the wastage caused by occupations of efficiently run commercial farms, when there
was unused land that could be allocated to new settlers instead.
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) warned in December 2001 that "the already
tight food situation has deteriorated as a result of reduced cereal production and general
economic decline...705,000 in rural areas are at risk of food shortages. In addition, 250,000
people in urban areas are experiencing food difficulties due to a sharp increase in food prices,
while some 30,000 farm workers have lost their jobs and are left without means of
assistance."74 The Commercial Farmers' Union estimated that close to 250,000 head of cattle
(nearly 20 percent of the national commercial herd) had been forcibly "destocked" by late
2001, and that over 1.6 million hectares of grazing land had been burnt out, while commercial
maize planting was down to 45,000 hectares from 150,000 hectares in the 1999/2000 season.
Export crops such as tobacco were similarly affected.75 Inflation topped 100 percent per
annum in November 2001.76 These problems have exacerbated food shortages already
generated by a period of drought. The first consignment of donated maize arrived in
Zimbabwe, usually a maize exporter, in January 2002, and the World Food Programme began
emergency food distribution in February 2002.77