Research memo

Tehran Is Exposed: A Unique Opportunity

to Confront the Iranian Nuclear Threat
By Gen. (Res.) Amir Eshel and Dr. Eyal Hulata
April 23, 2025
The Islamic Republic of Iran has never been so vulnerable. Israel must take advantage of this window of opportunity
to defuse the nuclear threat from Tehran.
The October 7 massacre set off a multifront war that enabled Israel to break the “ring of fire” that Iran’s clerical
regime spent decades putting in place around the Jewish state. Hezbollah to the north posed the greatest threat
with its arsenal of nearly 200,000 rockets and missiles. Israeli forces smashed Hezbollah. Under Bashar al-Assad,
Syria hosted Iran-backed militias from across the region. The Assad regime collapsed. Palestinian terrorists in
Gaza led by Hamas landed a traumatizing blow on October 7, but Israel has battered them to the point where
they are barely effective. Yemen’s Houthi rebels struck cargo ships in the Red Sea but inflicted minimal damage on
Israel. The United States is now hammering the Houthis in a military operation designed to cut the terror group
down to size. Twice, Tehran itself targeted Israel with barrages of missiles and drones numbering in the hundreds.
The effort failed. When Israel retaliated, Iran’s air defenses proved impotent. Indeed, now the country’s strategic air
defense has been heavily degraded.
Tehran’s ring of fire was supposed to deter Israel from striking decisive blows against the regime and its nuclear
program. And that strategy was effective; for years, many in Israel were indeed hesitant to preempt the threat.
Hoping other solutions were available, Israel hesitated to strike even though the destruction of the country remains
the clerical regime’s ultimate goal. But now the calculus has changed. Israel’s fear of preemption is gone. It is time
for Israel to rapidly increase the pressure on Tehran, so it must either shut down every pathway to nuclear weapons
or endure withering pressure — including the threat of devastating strikes on the regime’s leadership and nuclear
assets — that may also bring down the Islamic Republic.
To compensate for its vulnerability, Tehran has recently accelerated its pursuit of nuclear weapons. The U.S.
intelligence community has concluded that “a secret team of the country’s scientists is exploring a faster, if cruder,
approach to developing an atomic weapon if Tehran’s leadership decides to race for a bomb.”1 This is not an isolated
development — the regime’s nuclear program has marched forward consistently over the past four years. As of
February 2025, Tehran has approximately 275 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent purity, an increase of
92.5 kilograms from November 2024.2 It would need only “a week or a little more” to enrich enough 90 percent

1. David Sanger and Julian Barnes, “Iran Is Developing Plans for Faster, Cruder Weapon, U.S. Concludes,” The New York Times, February
3, 2025. (https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/03/us/politics/iran-nuclear-weapon.html)
2. Stephanie Liechtenstein, “Iran accelerates production of near weapons-grade uranium, IAEA says, as tensions with US ratchet up,” Associated
Press, February 26, 2025. (https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-weapons-grade-uranium-trump-0b11a99a7364f9a43e1c83b220114d45)

Tehran Is Exposed: A Unique Opportunity to Confront the Iranian Nuclear Threat 1

pure uranium for a proper device, then CIA Director William Burns said in October 2024.3 Iran also continues
to develop ballistic missiles capable of delivering a warhead to Israel or even Europe. Some of these missiles have
recently been transferred to Iraq for use by Iran-backed militias.
Tehran has accelerated its nuclear program with little fear of consequences because the United States spent four
years pursuing a policy of so-called “de-escalation.” In practice, this meant that Tehran escalated while Washington
remained passive. The regime even sought to assassinate Donald Trump as he campaigned for a second term in
the White House. Once in office, Trump put back in place his policy of “maximum pressure” on Tehran. New
economic sanctions are having an impact, while those already on the books are likely to be enforced much more
vigorously. Waves of U.S. airstrikes against the Houthis have signaled Washington will respond to force with force.
Nevertheless, Trump has made clear that what he wants is a deal, not a war. Talks have already begun in Oman. Yet
though Trump has declared that he is not seeking a temporary agreement that merely pauses Iran’s pursuit of the
bomb, like the 2015 deal that President Barack Obama approved, in reality, it seems this might not be the case. The
demand for “full dismantlement” of Iran’s program that Trump’s national security adviser articulated was the correct
approach.4 Unfortunately, based on recent reporting, it seems that Special Envoy Steve Witkoff ’s negotiating approach
is quite different.5 If the reporting is true, one should expect a much weaker stance by the U.S. administration that leads
to yet another temporary agreement that does not resolve the problem but just further delays it. If past is precedent,
Tehran will use any given opportunity to squeeze concessions from the United States, as it did with Obama and his
secretary of state, John Kerry, in an attempt to drag out negotiations beyond the “snapback” deadline for reimposing
UN sanctions and eventually trade as little nuclear rollback as possible for the most achievable sanctions’ relief.
Should that occur, and if Tehran does not shut down its nuclear weapons program, it is just a matter of time before
decisive military action will be necessary. For Israel, a nuclear-armed Iran ruled by a Shiite extremist poses an
existential threat. Israel is prepared to protect itself with force if that becomes necessary to remove that threat.
By all accounts, Israel’s strong preference is to see the success of America’s coercive diplomacy, whose potential
becomes clear if we look more closely at the turmoil inside Iran.

The Supreme Leader’s Unpleasant Options

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei spent the past four years avoiding high-risk decisions. He did not initiate a dash for
a nuclear bomb. But he also did not consummate nuclear negotiations with the Biden administration for a return
to the 2015 nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). His suppression
of domestic protests against the regime remained brutal but claimed fewer lives than in previous years. Khamenei
was able to thread this needle because the U.S. policy of “de-escalation” never forced him to confront the weakness
of his own position. Khamenei oversaw the acceleration of his regime’s nuclear program while continuing to fund,
train, and equip Hamas and other proxies in the ring of fire. President Joe Biden’s policy of de-escalation failed
either to resolve the nuclear problem or to diminish Iran's regional aggression.
The Trump administration quickly set a new course for U.S. policy. On February 4, the White House issued National
Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2), which reinstated the policy of “maximum pressure” that Trump

3. Olivia Victoria Gazis, “CIA director warns ‘misjudgments’ could further escalate conflict in Middle East,” CBS News, October 8, 2024.
(https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cia-director-william-burns-warns-misjudgments-could-escalate-conflict-israel-hamas-lebanon)
4. Emily Mae Czachor, “Trump administration is seeking ‘full dismantlement’ of Iran’s nuclear program, Waltz says,” CBS News, March
23, 2025. (https://www.cbsnews.com/news/mike-waltz-national-security-adviser-iran-nuclear-program-face-the-nation)
5. Josh Dawsey, Michael Gordon, and Laurence Norman, “Witkoff Says U.S. Open to Compromise Ahead of Iran Nuclear Talks,” The Wall
Street Journal, April 11, 2025. (https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/steve-witkoff-interview-iran-nuclear-talks-e41e0114)

2 Tehran Is Exposed: A Unique Opportunity to Confront the Iranian Nuclear Threat

pursued from mid-2018 until the end of his first term. That policy yielded a spike in inflation and three years of
negative GDP growth for Iran.6 Plunging oil revenues forced Tehran to impose an austerity agenda, including
sharp cuts to gasoline subsidies. Mass protests erupted in late 2019, which the regime was able to suppress only by
gunning down hundreds of demonstrators — as many as 1,500, according to a Reuters investigation.7
Khamenei did not panic. Instead, he chose to run out the clock on maximum pressure, with Trump facing
reelection less than a year later. The gamble worked. De-escalation replaced maximum pressure. The recession
ended. And exports of crude oil rose substantially, replenishing hard currency reserves. But this did not
mean that all was calm in the Islamic Republic. New demonstrations erupted when a young woman, Mahsa
Amini, died in police custody after being detained for an alleged violation of the country’s Islamic dress code.
Hundreds died during the crackdown on protests, and a wave of regime poisonings targeted girls’ schools
across the country.
Within days of Trump reinstating his maximum pressure policy, the Iranian rial plunged to a new low, trading at
over 900,000 to the dollar, compared with less than 700,000 when Americans went to the polls in November 2024.8
By mid-March, a dollar bought more than 1 million rials — more than a 20-fold increase since Trump first took
office in 2017.9 The regime also continues to deal with the fallout of an energy crisis that began in December 2024,
with blackouts increasingly common across the nation. President Masoud Pezeshkian has offered little consolation.
“We must apologize to the people that we are in a situation where they have to bear the brunt,” he said.10
Wave after wave of protests has engulfed Iran over the past decade. It would be a gamble for Khamenei to
remain passive as maximum pressure sets in, hoping his security forces can handle the fallout as domestic
unrest continues to challenge the regime. Hopefully, as Khamenei weighs his options, he realizes that the
cost of his nuclear ambitions has become prohibitive. Yet he may prefer to take a major risk to compensate
for the current weakness of the regime and dash to build a nuclear device. Reportedly, his ultra-conservative
supporters favor this option. They believe this would force the West to become far more cautious and
perhaps chill their support for anti-regime protests. An atomic weapon would also serve as a powerful
deterrent against military strikes on Iran. The regime may believe it can dash for the bomb in secret.
However, if the effort is exposed, it could provoke large-scale military action against Iran, threatening the
regime’s survival.
The time is approaching when Khamenei — or possibly a successor — must choose one of the options the regime
has spent years trying to avoid.

6. Saeed Ghasseminejad, “Inflation in Iran Reaches 23-year Peak,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, August 13, 2019. (https://
www.fdd.org/analysis/2019/08/13/inflation-in-iran-reaches-23-year-peak); Saeed Ghasseminejad and Richard Goldberg, “The Impact of
Sanctions Two Years After U.S. Withdrawal From the Nuclear Deal,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, May 6, 2020. (https://www.
fdd.org/analysis/2020/05/06/sanctions-impact-two-years-after-jcpoa-withdrawal)
7. “Special Report: Iran’s leader ordered crackdown on unrest – ‘Do whatever it takes to end it,’” Reuters, December 23, 2019. (https://
www.reuters.com/article/world/special-report-irans-leader-ordered-crackdown-on-unrest-do-whatever-it-take-idUSKBN1YR0QO)
8. “Iran currency plunges to record lows amid escalating U.S. tensions,” Reuters, February 8, 2025. (https://www.reuters.com/markets/
currencies/iran-currency-plunges-record-lows-amid-escalating-us-tensions-2025-02-08)
9. “Iran’s currency falls to one million per dollar after Trump threat,” Iran International, March 18, 2025. (https://www.iranintl.com/
en/202503183157); Saeed Ghasseminejad, “Cratering Economy Drives Iranian Rial to All-Time Low,” Foundation for Defense of
Democracies, June 24, 2020. (https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2020/06/24/iranian-rial-driven-to-all-time-low)
10. Farnaz Fassihi and Leily Nikounazar, “Iran’s Energy Crisis Hits ‘Dire’ Point as Industries Are Forced to Shut Down,” The New York
Times, December 21, 2024. (https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/21/world/middleeast/iran-economy-energy-crisis.html)

Tehran Is Exposed: A Unique Opportunity to Confront the Iranian Nuclear Threat 3

The Choices Facing Israel and the West
Despite the bruising setbacks of the past year, Iran and its proxies will slowly recover if they do not face
sustained pressure. For the United States, Israel, and the pragmatic regimes of the Arab world, Iran’s weakened
state offers great opportunity, but passivity would let it slip away and yield great danger. Since 1979, the
Islamic Republic of Iran has systematically sought to destabilize Arab governments that oppose the spread of
its brand of Islamic extremism. Lethal antisemitism is an intrinsic part of that doctrine, crafted by Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini, the first supreme leader. For Khomeini and his successors, the destruction of Israel and
the Jewish people is a central objective, not a rhetorical flourish. It surprised no one in Israel that the regime
lavished praise on Hamas for the October 7 massacre.
The United States and Europe have ample cause for concern even if Israel and the Arab states have the most to
fear from a nuclear-armed Iran. If Tehran were to have atomic weapons, it would trigger a nuclear arms race, with
Arab states insisting they must have their own deterrent. Already weak, the global nonproliferation regime could
collapse. So, it is not only Tehran that is facing difficult choices.
The Trump administration has initially chosen the path of maximum pressure, at least in principle. Meanwhile,
many veterans of the Biden and Obama administrations and many leaders in Europe would still prefer to avoid
confrontation and revive a deal resembling the JCPOA. It may be that Trump’s actual policy is to follow that less
demanding path, seeking only a temporary deal. For precisely that reason, an imperative third option for Israel is
to resort to military force now when Iran is weakest.
Avoiding confrontation is certainly the path of least resistance. Tehran has welcomed negotiations if Washington
relaxes pressure to reward it for coming to the table. Apparently, the Trump administration is willing to play along
for now. It is far too early to know if and how these negotiations will end, but even if a return to the JCPOA were
possible, the deal’s last restrictions would expire in 2030, allowing the regime to expand its nuclear program from
that point forward without fear of consequences. A temporary but updated deal could delay those expirations, but
that would simply give the regime time to recover its strength before the next showdown.
So far, the White House has opted instead for maximum pressure coupled with diplomacy. This policy will be most
effective if European governments form a coalition with the United States as they did prior to the JCPOA. There
is little chance that Russia or China would cooperate as each did during the early years of Obama’s presidency.
Yet Russia is consumed by its war against Ukraine, and China is edging toward a tariff war with the United States,
while its economy remains heavily dependent on exports.
More important than multilateralism is clarity about what kind of deal the West is seeking to extract from
Tehran. Unlike the JCPOA, a new agreement should ideally totally and permanently eliminate Iran’s ability
to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium. There is no economic need for these activities. They are simply
a means of producing fissile materials for nuclear weapons. There must also ideally be full exposure of Iran’s
past nuclear weaponization efforts, leading to a ban on any such activity. Limits on Iran’s arsenal of ballistic
and cruise missiles will also be necessary since they are the preferred means of delivering nuclear weapons.
Strict monitoring, verification, and enforcement provisions, unlike those in the JCPOA, will be essential to
give teeth to the agreement.11

11. For a detailed analysis of the provisions necessary to ensure Iranian disarmament, see: Orde Kittrie, Andrea Stricker, and Behnam
Ben Taleblu, “Iran’s Nuclear Disarmament: The Only Deal That Protects U.S. and Allied Security,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies,
March 14, 2025. (https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/03/14/irans-nuclear-disarmament)

4 Tehran Is Exposed: A Unique Opportunity to Confront the Iranian Nuclear Threat

An agreement that meets this high standard would be far preferable to military action and the risks of war.
Yet to ensure Tehran accepts such an agreement, it must face an overwhelming and credible military threat.
Such a threat has indeed been mounting, with two U.S. carrier strike groups now stationed in Iran’s vicinity
and with B-2 bombers now parked on Diego Garcia. Iran is now negotiating under the shadow of this
unveiled American threat.
Broadly speaking, military action against Iran could take two forms: a preventive strike or a punitive strike.
Preventive strikes would be launched if Iran proves uncooperative in negotiations but before it dashes for a bomb.
The logic of a preventive strike is that waiting until Iran has initiated its nuclear breakout creates the risk of missing
the opportunity to attack at all — either because Iran will catch the West by surprise or because the conditions that
would have enabled a successful strike no longer exist.
There is no single facility whose destruction would disable the Iranian nuclear program. Several key targets are
deep underground and hard to strike. Therefore, a preventive strike should target a variety of sites and assets
— from facilities and infrastructure to materials and personnel — that Iran needs to obtain a nuclear weapon.
Cumulatively, these strikes should leave Iran incapable of a nuclear weapons breakout and in need of massive
investment to recover. The attack should be carried out only when the probability of success is high to prevent Iran
from exploiting the strike as a pretext for a nuclear breakout.
A punitive attack could be launched after Iran decides to dash toward a bomb. Its goal would be both to
prevent Iran from succeeding in building a nuclear weapon and, not less importantly, to weaken the regime
politically and economically by striking a wide range of non-nuclear assets. The strikes should leave the regime
with neither a bomb nor the ability to function. It should put other rulers on notice that the cost of nuclear
proliferation far exceeds the benefits.
Whether preventive or punitive, the threat of military action must be credible, feasible, and ready to execute on
short notice. Even by itself, Israel has sufficient capabilities to damage Iran’s nuclear program unilaterally. Before
the crippling of Hezbollah and Hamas, Iran might have hoped to deter Israel by threatening to initiate a multifront
war in response to any attack. Tehran’s arsenal of missiles and drones has also lost much of its deterrent effect
thanks to its poor performance over the past year. Nevertheless, a joint strike on Iran by multiple Western nations
would still be preferable to unilateral Israeli action. Other countries, especially the United States, have unique
capabilities that could maximize the impact of an attack. That said, Israel’s allies may choose to abstain from
entering a war but share capabilities that increase the effectiveness of a unilateral Israeli strike.

Israel’s next steps

On both the diplomatic and military fronts, Israel must prepare for an effective pressure campaign against Iran.
Diplomatically, it must clearly convey to the United States and other allies the terms it considers acceptable for a
nuclear deal that puts an end to the Iranian threats. Israel must also remind the United States of the presidential
commitment embodied in the July 2022 The Jerusalem U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration, also
known as the Jerusalem Declaration, which stipulates that Israel has the right to defend itself by itself, should Israel
deem it necessary:
Consistent with the longstanding security relationship between the United States and Israel and the unshakeable
U.S. commitment to Israel’s security, and especially to the maintenance of its qualitative military edge, the
United States reiterates its steadfast commitment to preserve and strengthen Israel’s capability to deter its
enemies and to defend itself by itself against any threat or combination of threats. The United States further

Tehran Is Exposed: A Unique Opportunity to Confront the Iranian Nuclear Threat 5

 reiterates that these commitments are bipartisan and sacrosanct, and that they are not only moral commitments,
but also strategic commitments that are vitally important to the national security of the United States itself.
The United States stresses that integral to this pledge is the commitment never to allow Iran to acquire a nuclear
weapon, and that it is prepared to use all elements of its national power to ensure that outcome. The United
States further affirms the commitment to work together with other partners to confront Iran’s aggression
and destabilizing activities, whether advanced directly or through proxies and terrorist organizations such as
Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.12
Militarily, Israel will need to update its contingency plans and coordinate with allies to deal with the fallout of
military action, should it prove necessary. Bolstering air defenses and preparing retaliatory plans are paramount.
The U.S. military and the Israel Defense Forces are already tightening coordination and cooperation for joint
action in the event of a nuclear breakout.
Above all, Israel must make it clear that it will act independently to stop Iran from going nuclear and that it will
not refrain from attacking Iranian infrastructure, energy facilities, and government targets if push comes to shove.
There is no time to waste. Iran’s unprecedented vulnerability presents a historic opportunity that should not be
passed over. Iran should never have a nuclear bomb.

12. The Jerusalem U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration, Jerusalem, Israel, July 14, 2022. (https://il.usembassy.gov/the-
jerusalem-u-s-israel-strategic-partnership-joint-declaration)

6 Tehran Is Exposed: A Unique Opportunity to Confront the Iranian Nuclear Threat

Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD)
FDD is a Washington, DC-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Amir Eshel is a senior fellow at FDD. He is an accomplished fixed-wing and rotary-wing
pilot and commander who served in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) for more than 40 years, including
during the 1982 and 2006 Lebanon wars and the 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014 Gaza conflicts.

Eyal Hulata is a senior international fellow at FDD. From July 2021 to January 2023, Eyal served as
Israel’s national security advisor and head of Israel’s National Security Council, where he coordinated the
national effort on Iran, coordinated the maritime border agreement with Lebanon, and co-headed the
Strategic Consultation Group with his American counterpart, Jake Sullivan.

FDD values diversity of opinion and the independent views of its scholars, fellows, and board members. The views of the authors
do not necessarily reflect the views of FDD, its staff, or its advisors.

Tehran Is Exposed: A Unique Opportunity to Confront the Iranian Nuclear Threat 7