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Thomas Metzinger & Jennifer M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND.
Thomas Metzinger & Jennifer M. Windt (Eds).

Open MIND

Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group

 To our partners, Stefan Pitz and Anja Krug-Metzinger,

and to all the students and scholars of philosophy and cognitive science

who do not have easy access to scientific literature.

Imprint

© 2015 by MIND Group, Frankfurt am Main

Philosophisches Seminar / Gutenberg Research College

Jakob Welder-Weg, 18
Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
D-55099 Mainz

Production: Satzweiss.com Print Web Software GmbH, Saarbrücken

ISBN: 978-3-95857-102-0

All rights reserved.

www.open-mind.net
 www.open-mind.net

Table of Contents
 www.open-mind.net

0 About this collection - Introduction to Introspection and Intuition - A Reply

the Open MIND project to Maximilian H. Engel
Thomas Metzinger Tim Bayne

What Does It Mean to Have an Open 4 Meaning, Context, and Background

Mind? Christian Beyer
Thomas Metzinger & Jennifer M. Windt
Grasping Meaning - A Commentary on
1 Beyond Componential Constitution in Christian Beyer
the Brain - Starburst Amacrine Cells and Anita Pacholik-Żuromska
Enabling Constraints
Michael L. Anderson Self-identification, Intersubjectivity,
and the Background of Intentionality -
Carving the Brain at its Joints - A Reply to Anita Pacholik-Żuromska
Commentary on Michael L. Anderson Christian Beyer
Axel Kohler
5 The Puzzle of Perceptual Precision
Functional Attributions and Ned Block
Functional Architecture - A Reply to
Axel Kohler Phenomenal Precision and Some
Michael L. Anderson Possible Pitfalls - A Commentary on Ned
Block
2 What a Theory of Knowledge-how Sascha Benjamin Fink
Should Explain - A Framework for
Practical Knowledge beyond Intellectualism 6 Rules: The Basis of Morality… ?
and Anti-Intellectualism Paul M. Churchland
Andreas Bartels & Mark May
Applied Metascience of Neuroethics -
The Semantic Reading of A Commentary on Paul M. Churchland
Propositionality and Its Relation to Hannes Boelsen
Cognitive-Representational
Explanations - A Commentary on A Skeptical Note on Bibliometrics -
Andreas Bartels & Mark May A Reply to Boelsen
Ramiro Glauer Paul M. Churchland

Preparing the Ground for an 7 Embodied Prediction

Empirical Theory of Knowing-how - A Andy Clark
Reply to Ramiro Glauer
Andreas Bartels & Mark May Extending the Explanandum for
Predictive Processing - A Commentary
3 Introspective Insecurity on Andy Clark
Tim Bayne Michael Madary

“I just knew that!”: Intuitions as Predicting Peace - The End of the

Scaffolded or Freestanding Representation Wars-A Reply to Michael
Judgements - A Commentary on Tim Madary
Bayne Andy Clark
Maximilian H. Engel
8 Levels
Carl F. Craver
 www.open-mind.net

Mechanistic Emergence: Different 12 On the Eve of Artificial Minds

Properties, Different Levels, Same Chris Eliasmith
Thing! - A Commentary on Carl F. Craver
Denis C. Martin Future Games - A Commentary on Chris
Eliasmith
Mechanisms and Emergence - A Reply Daniela Hill
to Denis C. Martin
Carl F. Craver Mind Games - A Reply to Daniela Hill
Chris Eliasmith
9 Mental States as Emergent Properties
- From Walking to Consciousness 13 Can We Be Epigenetically Proactive?
Holk Cruse & Malte Schilling Kathinka Evers

The “Bottom-Up” Approach to Should we be Epigenetically

Mental Life - A Commentary on Holk Proactive? - A Commentary on Kathinka
Cruse & Malte Schilling Evers
Aaron Gutknecht Stephan Schleim

The Bottom-up Approach: Benefits Understanding Epigenetic Proaction -

and Limits - A Reply to Aaron Gutknecht A Reply to Stephan Schleim
Holk Cruse & Malte Schilling Kathinka Evers

10 Why and How Does Consciousness 14 The Paradigmatic Body - Embodied

Seem the Way it Seems? Simulation, Intersubjectivity, the Bodily
Daniel C. Dennett Self, and Language
Vittorio Gallese & Valentina Cuccio
Qualia Explained Away - A Commentary
on Daniel Dennett Multisensory Spatial Mechanisms of
David H. Baßler the Bodily Self and Social Cognition -
A Commentary on Vittorio Gallese and
How our Belief in Qualia Evolved, and Valentina Cuccio
why we Care so much - A Reply to Christian Pfeiffer
David H. Baßler
Daniel C. Dennett Can Experiential Ownership Violate
the Immunity Principle? - A Reply to
11 The Heterogeneity of Experiential Oliver Haug & Marius F. Jung
Imagination Vittorio Gallese & Valentina Cuccio
Jérôme Dokic & Margherita Arcangeli
15 All the Self We Need
Imagination and Experience - A Philip Gerrans
Commentary on Jérôme Dokic and
Margherita Arcangeli Memory for Prediction Error
Anne-Sophie Brüggen Minimization: From Depersonalization
to the Delusion of Non-Existence - A
The Importance of Being Neutral: Commentary on Philip Gerrans
More on the Phenomenology and Ying-Tung Lin
Metaphysics of Imagination - A Reply
to Anne-Sophie Brüggen Metamisery and Bodily Inexistence -
Jérôme Dokic & Margherita Arcangeli A Reply to Ying-Tung Lin
Philip Gerrans
 www.open-mind.net

16 Visual Adaptation to a Remapped From Explanatory Ambition to

Spectrum - Lessons for Enactive Theories Explanatory Power - A Commentary on
of Color Perception and Constancy, the Jakob Hohwy
Effect of Color on Aesthetic Judgments, and Dominic L. Harkness
the Memory Color Effect
Rick Grush & Liberty Jaswal & Justin The Diversity of Bayesian Explanation
Knoepfler & Amanda Brovold - A Reply to Dominic L. Harkness
Jakob Hohwy
What Can Sensorimotor Enactivism
Learn from Studies on Phenomenal 20 Millikan’s Teleosemantics and
Adaptation in Atypical Perceptual Communicative Agency
Conditions? - A Commentary on Rick Pierre Jacob
Grush and Colleagues
Aleksandra Mroczko-Wąsowicz Communicative Agency and Ad
Hominem Arguments in Social
Phenomenology, Methodology, and Epistemology - A Commentary on Pierre
Advancing the Debate - A Reply to Jacob
Aleksandra Mroczko-Wasowicz Marius F. Jung
Rick Grush
Assessing a Speaker's Reliability Falls
17 An Information-Based Approach to short of Providing an Argument - A
Consciousness: Mental State Decoding Reply to Marius F. Jung
John-Dylan Haynes Pierre Jacob

What’s up with Prefrontal Cortex? - 21 Wild Systems Theory as a 21st

A Commentary on John-Dylan Haynes Century Coherence Framework for
Caspar Schwiedrzik Cognitive Science
J. Scott Jordan & Brian Day
Can synchronization explain
representational content? - A reply to Thickening Descriptions with Views
Caspar Schwiedrzik from Pragmatism and Anthropology -
John-Dylan Haynes A Commentary on Scott Jordan and Brian
Day
18 Beyond Illusions - On the Limitations of Saskia Nagel
Perceiving Relational Properties
Heiko Hecht After Naturalism: Wild Systems
Theory and the Turn To Holism - A
The Illusion of the Given and its Role Reply to Saskia Nagel
in Vision Research - A Commentary on J. Scott Jordan & Brian Day
Heiko Hecht
Axel Kohler 22 The Crack of Dawn - Perceptual
Functions and Neural Mechanisms that
Manifest Illusions - A Reply to Axel Mark the Transition from Unconscious
Kohler Processing to Conscious Vision
Heiko Hecht Victor Lamme

19 The Neural Organ Explains the Mind Consciousness as Inference in Time -

Jakob Hohwy A Commentary on Victor Lamme
Lucia Melloni
 www.open-mind.net

Predictive Coding is Unconscious, so Multiplicity Needs Coherence –

that Consciousness Happens now - A Towards a Unifying Framework for
Reply to Lucia Melloni Social Understanding - A Commentary
Victor Lamme on Albert Newen
Lisa Quadt
23 Vestibular Contributions to the Sense
of Body, Self, and Others 27 Concept Pluralism, Direct Perception,
Bigna Lenggenhager & Christophe Lopez and the Fragility of Presence
Alva Noë
Perspectival Structure and Vestibular
Processing - A Commentary on Bigna The Fragile Nature of the Social Mind
Lenggenhager & Christophe Lopez - A Commentary on Alva Noë
Adrian Alsmith Miriam Kyselo

Vestibular Sense and Perspectival Beyond Agency - A Reply to Miriam

Experience - A Reply to Adrian Alsmith Kyselo
Bigna Lenggenhager & Christophe Lopez Alva Noë

24 Self-as-Subject and Experiential 28 How Does Mind Matter? - Solving the

Ownership Content Causation Problem
Caleb Liang Gerard O’Brien

Are there Counterexamples to the Does Resemblance Really Matter? - A

Immunity Principle? Some Commentary on Gerard O’Brien
Restrictions and Clarifications - A Anne-Kathrin Koch
Commentary on Caleb Liang
Oliver Haug & Marius F. Jung Rehabilitating Resemblance Redux -
A Reply to Anne-Kathrin Koch
Can Experiential Ownership Violate Gerard O’Brien
the Immunity Principle? - A Reply to
Oliver Haug & Marius F. Jung 29 Conscious Intentions - The Social
Caleb Liang Creation Myth
Elisabeth Pacherie
25 Mathematical Cognition - A Case of
Enculturation Conscious Intentions: Do We Need a
Richard Menary Creation Myth? - A Commentary on
Elisabeth Pacherie
Enriching the Notion of Andrea R. Dreßing
Enculturation: Cognitive Integration,
Predictive Processing, and the Case of The Causal Role(s) of Intentions - A
Reading Acquisition - A Commentary on Reply to Andrea Dreßing
Richard Menary Elisabeth Pacherie
Regina E. Fabry
30 Naturalizing Metaethics
26 Understanding Others - The Person Jesse Prinz
Model Theory
Albert Newen Conceptualizing Metaethics - A
Commentary on Prinz
Yann Wilhelm
 www.open-mind.net

Should Metaethical Naturalists 34 Bridging the Objective/Subjective

Abandon De Dicto Internalism and Divide - Towards a Meta-Perspective of
Cognitivism? - A Reply to Yann Wilhelm Science and Experience
Jesse Prinz Jonathan Schooler

31 The Representational Structure of Bridging the Gap - A Commentary on

Feelings Jonathan Schooler
Joëlle Proust Verena Gottschling

The Extension of the Indicator- Stepping Back and Adding

Function of Feelings - A Commentary on Perspective - Reply to Gottschling
Joëlle Proust Jonathan Schooler
Iuliia Pliushch
35 The Cybernetic Bayesian Brain - From
Feelings as Evaluative Indicators - A Interoceptive Inference to Sensorimotor
Reply to Iuliia Pliushch Contingencies
Joëlle Proust Anil K. Seth

32 The Avatars in the Machine - Dreaming Perceptual Presence in the Kuhnian-

as a Simulation of Social Reality Popperian Bayesian Brain - A
Antti Revonsuo & Jarno Tuominen & Katja Commentary on Anil K. Seth
Valli Wanja Wiese

The Multifunctionality of Dreaming Inference to the Best Prediction - A

and the Oblivious Avatar - A Reply to Wanja Wiese
Commentary on Revonsuo & Colleagues Anil K. Seth
Martin Dresler
36 The Ongoing Search for the Neuronal
The Simulation Theories of Dreaming: Correlate of Consciousness
How to Make Theoretical Progress in Wolf Singer
Dream Science - A Reply to Martin
Dresler It’s not Just About the Contents:
Antti Revonsuo & Jarno Tuominen & Katja Searching for a Neural Correlate of a
Valli State of Consciousness - A Commentary
on Wolf Singer
33 Davidson on Believers - Can Non- Valdas Noreika
Linguistic Creatures Have Propositional
Attitudes? State or Content of Consciousness? -
Adina Roskies A Reply to Valdas Noreika
Wolf Singer
Crediting Animals with the Ability to
Think: On the Role of Language in 37 Dreamless Sleep, the Embodied Mind,
Cognition - A Commentary on Adina and Consciousness - The Relevance of a
Roskies Classical Indian Debate to Cognitive
Ulrike Pompe-Alama Science
Evan Thompson
Thought, Language, and Inner Speech
- A Reply to Ulrike Pompe-Alama 38 What is the State-of-the-Art on Lucid
Adina Roskies Dreaming? - Recent Advances and
Questions for Future Research
Ursula Voss & Allan Hobson
 www.open-mind.net

Insight: What Is It, Exactly? - A

Commentary on Ursula Voss and Allan
Hobson
Lana Kühle

Reflections on Insight - A Reply to Lana

Kühle
Ursula Voss

39 Representationalisms, Subjective
Character, and Self-Acquaintance
Kenneth Williford

Explaining Subjective Character:

Representation, Reflexivity, or
Integration? - A Commentary on Kenneth
Williford
Tobias Schlicht

Individuation, Integration, and the

Phenomenological Subject - A Reply to
Tobias Schlicht
Kenneth Williford
About this Collection
Introduction to the Open MIND Project

Thomas Metzinger

Author

Thomas Metzinger
metzinger @ uni-mainz.de
Johannes Gutenberg-Universität
Mainz, Germany

1 What is this?

This is an edited collection of 39 original papers cognition. They come from various disciplines
and as many commentaries and replies. The tar- such as philosophy, psychology, cognitive science,
get papers and replies were written by senior and neuroscience.
members of the MIND Group, while all comment- Over the past decade, the MIND Group has
aries were written by junior group members. All cooperated with a number of institutions, such as
papers and commentaries have undergone a rigor- the Frankfurt Institute for Advanced Studies, the
ous process of anonymous peer review, during Meditationszentrum Beatenberg, the Wis-
which the junior members of the MIND Group senschaftskolleg zu Berlin, and the ICI Kultur-
acted as reviewers. The final versions of all the labor Berlin. I first founded the group at the Jo-
target articles, commentaries and replies have un- hannes Gutenberg-Universität in Mainz in 2003,
dergone additional editorial review. but soon had to relocate it to Frankfurt am Main,
Besides offering a cross-section of ongoing, where we meet twice a year. Meetings typically
cutting-edge research in philosophy and cognitive involve two or three public lectures at the Johann
science, this collection is also intended to be a free Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, delivered by highly
electronic resource for teaching. It therefore also prominent guests, most of whom are now authors
contains a selection of online supporting materi- of the target papers in this collection and senior
als, pointers to video and audio files and to addi- members of the group. In addition, our invited
tional free material supplied by the 92 authors speakers offer extended, closed workshops, where
represented in this volume. We will add more advanced students have the opportunity to give
multimedia material, a searchable literature data- short mock-lectures in English.
base, and tools to work with the online version in This format was inspired by a question
the future. All contributions to this collection are which kept confronting me in my teaching:
strictly open access. They can be downloaded, namely why are there so many excellent, smart
printed, and reproduced by anyone. young philosophers in Germany, who nevertheless
are—and often remain—almost completely invis-
2 What is the MIND Group? ible on the international stage? More than half a
century after World War II, only three or four
The MIND Group is an independent, interna- German universities rank among the top 100. The
tional body of early-stage researchers, which I established philosophical community is still
founded in 2003. It is formed of young philosoph- largely disconnected from many of the latest and
ers and scientists with a strong interest in ques- most exciting developments in modern philosophy
tions concerning the mind, consciousness, and of mind. One result of my thinking about this
Metzinger, T. (2015). About this collection - Introduction to the Open MIND project.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 0(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958571037 1|3
 www.open-mind.net

problem was that this lack of integration into the only from textbooks, university classes, and re-
global research context was caused, in part, by search articles. For this reason, the MIND Group
the language barrier. The biggest psychological meetings have provided a protected space for pro-
obstacles for many young German philosophers moting supportive and collegial interactions
seem to be, quite simply, to prepare a talk in between senior and junior group members. In par-
English; find the courage to travel to an interna- ticular, the meetings of the MIND Group have
tional conference in another country; and actually helped establish and cement collaborations both
present their work there. One of the things we among junior members and between junior and
practice at MIND Group meetings is to prepare senior members. In some cases this has led to re-
them for this. search visits, joint research projects, or long-term
The MIND Group sees itself as part of a mentoring relationships. One motivation for
larger process of exploring and developing new founding the group, after all, was to smooth the
formats for promoting junior researchers in philo- path from university studies to being a profes-
sophy of mind and cognitive science. One of the sional academic for advanced students and young
basic ideas behind the formation of the group was researchers.
to create a platform for people with one system-
atic focus in philosophy (typically analytic philo- 3 Why did we do this?
sophy of mind or ethics) and another in empirical
research (typically cognitive science or neuros- We wanted to make a contribution by offering a
cience). One of our aims has been to build an freely available resource to others. When we first
evolving network of researchers. By incorporating started thinking about what to do for the 20th
most recent empirical findings as well as sophist- meeting of the MIND Group, we knew we wanted
icated conceptual work, we seek to integrate these it to be something special, some way of sharing
different approaches in order to foster the devel- with the interested academic public some of the
opment of more advanced theories of the mind. expertise and collegial atmosphere we had built
One major purpose of the group is to help bridge up over more than 10 years of working together.
the gap between the sciences and the humanities. Initially we considered inviting everyone to a big
This not only includes going beyond old-school four-day conference at an attractive location. But
analytic philosophy or pure armchair phenomeno- then we decided that we would do something
logy by cultivating a new, type of interdisciplinar- more substantial and innovative - rather than cre-
ity, which is “dyed-in-the-wool” in a positive ating a transient event and an enormous CO2
sense. It also involves experimenting with new footprint. We wanted to create a resource of last-
formats for doing research, for example, by parti- ing value that will subsist for years to come, and
cipating in silent meditation retreats and trying most importantly something that really is access-
to combine a systematic, formal practice of in- ible for everybody—not only for people in affluent
vestigating the structure of our own minds from parts of the world, like ourselves. There seemed
the first-person perspective with proper scientific no better way to do this than by providing a
meetings, during which we discuss third-person large, open-access collected edition showcasing the
criteria for ascribing mental states to a given type work of our senior and junior members.
of system. It quickly became clear that because of the
In addition to bridging geographical and scope of the project, and also because we had spe-
disciplinary gaps, the MIND Group also aims to cific ideas about how it should be realized, this
bridge conventional gaps produced by institution- was going to be an experiment in autonomous
alized hierarchies in academia. If you will, this is open-access publishing. The MIND Group is an
simply the academic variant of the generation independent body, and apart from evening lec-
gap: Few things are more intimidating to young tures by our invited speakers, its meetings are not
researchers than being confronted, at a confer- open to the public. One goal of the Open MIND
ence, with criticism from a researcher who has project was to first publish our scientific work
long been one of their intellectual heroes, known without the support of a publisher, who would
Metzinger, T. (2015). About this collection - Introduction to the Open MIND project.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 0(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958571037 2|3
 www.open-mind.net

eventually sell our own intellectual property back itorial (through implementing a common publica-
to us and our peers and simultaneously make it tion project), and philosophical and scientific
inaccessible to students in Brazil, India or China (through writing commentaries and replies).
by locking it behind a paywall. We wanted to see Throughout this process, we were often surprised
if we could successfully establish a professional and impressed by the results—and we hope that
form of quality control via a systematic, journal- you will be, too.
independent peer review process—and also if we
could make it happen faster than existing and es- 4 Who did this?
tablished institutions of academic publishing. We
gave authors a deadline of 1st March 2014, and Many people have made this contribution possible
planned to publish the entire collection (including and many hours of unpaid work have gone into it.
commentaries and replies) on January 15th 2015. Here are the most important supporters.
We knew that these two pillars—speed and qual-
ity control—would be crucial to the success of the 4.1 The editors
project. Academics are sometimes reluctant to
publish their work in edited collections that often As founder and director of the MIND group, I
only appear years after the manuscripts have consider myself to be neither a junior nor a senior
been submitted. We suspected that we would member. Therefore, I have not contributed a tar-
only succeed in obtaining state-of-the-art research get paper or a commentary. If anything, my con-
papers if we could guarantee that the research tribution lies in the choice and selection of au-
discussed within them would not be out-of-date thors and in the work, together with my collabor-
by the time the collection went online. ator Jennifer Windt, of bringing this project to
This publication format is also novel in an- completion.
other sense. Because a selected subset of junior
group members acted as reviewers and comment- 4.2 Financial funding
ators, the whole publication project is itself an at-
tempt to develop a new format for promoting ju- All in all it has cost about € 241.000, to realize
nior researchers, for developing their academic this project. First and foremost, the Barbara
skills, and for creating a new type of interaction Wengeler-Stiftung needs to be mentioned: not
between senior and junior group members. Many only has it supported the current project with €
of the reviewers and commentators in this edited 80,000, but over the years it has enabled the
volume have never actively participated in any MIND Group to stay independent, and to realize
scientific review process before, and, for many a long series of fruitful meetings, during times
their commentary is their first ever publication. when it was difficult to get support elsewhere. It
Throughout the project, all junior members were has also supported some members by providing
able to play different roles: they acted as review- PhD and travel grants and by offering the annual
ers, trying to improve and constructively criticize € 10,000 Barbara Wengeler-Prize, awarded at our
the target articles submitted by senior group meetings in Frankfurt. The Gutenberg Research
members and commentaries submitted by their College and the Vokswagen-Stiftung have gener-
peers. Sometimes, reviewers were asked to go ously supported the project by providing two ed-
back and revise their reviews—and sometimes itorial staff positions for David Baßler, Daniela
their reviews also led to the rejection of target pa- Hill, and Dr. Ying-Tung Lin, and by awarding a
pers altogether. They also acted as authors; and five-year Research Fellowship, beginning in April
because their commentaries also went through a 2014, to me, Thomas Metzinger. This work was
review process, they got to experience the review also partly supported by the European FP7 col-
process from the other side as well. laborative project VERE (contract no. 257695).
This collection, therefore, is the result of a
three-layered interaction between junior and
senior members: personal (through meetings), ed-
Metzinger, T. (2015). About this collection - Introduction to the Open MIND project.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 0(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958571037 3|3
What Does it Mean to Have an Open
Mind?
Thomas Metzinger & Jennifer M. Windt

Authors

Thomas Metzinger
metzinger @ uni-mainz.de
Johannes Gutenberg-Universität
Mainz, Germany

Jennifer M. Windt
jennifer.windt @ monash.edu
Monash University
Melbourne, Australia

1 Instead of an introduction

In our discussions leading up to the Open personal favorites seemed to flow naturally out
MIND collection’s going online, we thought long of the editing process, this strategy quickly
and hard about how exactly to showcase the struck us as being at odds with the motivations
vast material in this collection and the ideas driving the collection. Using the editors’ intro-
and motivations behind the project in our edit- duction to create a personal best-of list would
ors’ introduction. We first thought about using have been highly selective and biased by our
the introduction to briefly summarize the take- own personal research interests and styles in a
home message of every single target article, way that we felt would contradict our own ideal
commentary and reply, as is customary in intro- of open mindedness.1
ductions to edited collections. This struck us, These considerations naturally gave rise to
however, as being both unwieldy and redund- a more difficult and more profound question:
ant: It would have entailed summarizing and What exactly do we mean by open mindedness,
commenting on a total of 117 texts. More im- not just in general, but in the context of inter-
portantly, due to the online format of the collec- disciplinary research on the mind? The strategy
tion (including in-text search functions) and the of using the contributions to the Open MIND
inclusion of abstracts and keywords in the pa- collection as a foil for the more general aca-
pers themselves, the authors have already demic variant of open mindedness was tempt-
provided concise introductions to their own ing. But we quickly realized that this approach
texts. Retracing their steps in an editorial intro- would again strike many readers (as well as,
duction would not have added to the value and perhaps, some of our own authors) as highly
usability of the collection. idiosyncratic and perhaps even arbitrary or self-
We then considered using the introduction important.2
to create our own personal best-of-Open-MIND 1 In fact, for this reason, we intentionally omit any references to the
list, discussing what we take to be the very best contributions to Open MIND in this introduction.
2 This is not, of course, to deny that we take “Open MINDedness” (as
ideas and most valuable insights in every single broadly practiced in the context of this collection) to be an example of
article, or perhaps even focusing on the contri- “open mindedness” as a more general epistemic stance. And we are cer-
butions that we personally take to be the most tainly proud enough of what we like to think of as our little star-collec-
tion to allow ourselves at least a few words on why we think this is the
theoretically important. Though our own list of case. To begin with, on many levels, Open MIND was an exercise in edit-

Metzinger, T. & Windt, J. M. (2015). What Does it Mean to Have an Open Mind?
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 0(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958571044 1 | 27
 www.open-mind.net

So we decided to use our editors’ introduc- ness has an ethical dimension as well: It implies
tion to do something more humble and, in a sensitivity to normative issues, including ones of
way, more classically philosophical. Here, we an anthropological, sociocultural, and political
want to briefly address a deeper and more diffi- kind. By bringing these different strands of
cult problem: that of what genuine open ideas together and creating a big (and admit-
mindedness really is and how it can contribute tedly still sketchy) picture of what open
to the Mind Sciences. The material in the col- mindedness might mean in the interdisciplinary
lection speaks for itself. Here, and in contrast to Mind Sciences, we hope to begin a conversation
the vast collection that is Open MIND, we want on how an open minded attitude and a charit-
to be concise. We want to point to a broader able culture of collaboration can be cultivated
context for a particular way of thinking about in the future. This is very much intended as an
the mind. And we want to introduce an idea, invitation to further think about and develop
namely that of what open mindedness could this topic. We hope our readers join us in this
mean in the context of the contemporary, inter- endeavor.
disciplinary Mind Sciences. This variant of open
mindedness is characterized by epistemic humil- 2 Open mindedness as an epistemic
ity, intellectual honesty and a new culture of stance
charity. It also has a pragmatic dimension: open
mindedness of this kind is research generating Open mindedness is not a theoretical position
and fosters an environment of sincere and con- but an epistemic practice. Clearly, there are
structive interdisciplinary collaboration. It is many different kinds of open mindedness, and
also profoundly inspired by the classical ideals the precise way of characterizing the relevant
of philosophy as a pursuit of genuine insight kind of open mindedness will depend on the
and rational inquiry, the importance of a crit- subject matter in question, or, more simply, on
ical and in a certain sense non-judgmental atti- what it is that one is open minded about. Yet
tude, and the deep relationship between wisdom as a first pass at a definition we might say that
and skepticism as an epistemic practice. And fi- open mindedness, in its most general sense, is
nally, and again very classically, open minded- characterized by epistemic humility and adher-
ence to a general ideal of intellectual honesty.
orial open mindedness. The authors and commentators asked to contrib-
ute to this collection were explicitly encouraged to discuss any topic they This is true for open mindedness in general, but
themselves thought to be relevant. The only restriction, in terms of con- also for the specific variants we are interested in
tent, was that the target articles fall within the scope of the Mind Sci-
ences. We also tried to foster a particular type of intellectual atmosphere
here, namely open mindedness in academic re-
by encouraging authors, commentators and reviewers to be consistently search, including interdisciplinary scientific dis-
constructive and charitable. Our hope was that this approach would
bring out the best in our contributors in the different stages of the pro-
course on the mind.
ject. In many cases, we explicitly encouraged our authors to write in a Whatever else it may be, open mindedness
way that would be accessible to readers from different academic back- is also an attitude that is now shared by a grow-
grounds and to take different disciplinary perspectives into account. Gen-
erally, the publication of academic articles always involves a process of ing number of researchers in philosophy of
give and take between authors, editors, and reviewers. And we strongly mind, cognitive science, neuroscience and artifi-
felt that it would be a good indicator of the success of our collection if at
the end of the day, our authors were themselves happy and proud of cial intelligence (AI). We are all interested in
their contributions. This entailed carefully calibrating our own roles as the deep structure of the human mind and of
editors and in many cases leaving the final decision to our authors. Fi-
nally, and perhaps most importantly, our choice of the title Open MIND
conscious experience, but we also recognize how
also reflects the that by introducing a two-way interaction between senior far we are still away from a unified theoretical
target authors and junior commentators through the commentaries and model that would satisfy philosophers and sci-
replies, we wanted to help our junior group members and commentators
enter into a discussion with more senior and prominent representatives of entists alike, a model that is conceptually con-
the field. All of these points – as well as the free availability of the Open vincing and able to integrate all existing data
MIND collection to students and researchers from anywhere in the world,
free of charge – exemplify theoretical and practical dimensions of what and make use of different methods at the same
we consider to be academic open mindedness. In addition, many of the time. We do not want to fool ourselves. Al-
papers published here explore new ways of thinking, in the broadest
sense, about the mind and new and innovative ways of driving forward
though great progress has been made during the
research. last five decades, it is not at all clear which
Metzinger, T. & Windt, J. M. (2015). What Does it Mean to Have an Open Mind?
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 0(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958571044 2 | 27
 www.open-mind.net

combination of methods and which type of the- mindedness of the epistemically fruitful type
oretical approach will generate the final break- will often be more about asking better questions
through or even facilitate epistemic progress. than about committing to specific answers. It
We, meaning researchers of different stripes and will involve an attitude of willingness to ques-
from different disciplines comprising the Mind tion or even reject one’s own prior commit-
Sciences, including the authors contributing to ments. It will be inherently critical (cf. Lambie
this collection, are all in the same boat: We 2014). And it will, perhaps, have more to do
share a common epistemic goal, and we find with striving for genuine understanding than
ourselves in a major historical transition. Pro- with the search for truth and knowledge (Taylor
gress in the empirical sciences of the human 2014). One core idea of the great philosopher of
mind is certainly impressive and is continuously science Karl Popper, which is now reappearing
gaining momentum, generating large amounts of in the latest mathematical theories of brain
new and sometimes surprising data. At the functioning, was that we are always in contact
same time, exciting new approaches in formal with reality at exactly the moment at which we
modeling and philosophical meta-theory are in- falsify a hypothesis: The moment of failure is
creasingly opening up new perspectives. Yet it exactly the moment at which we touch the
is not at all clear that we are already asking the world.4 Similarly, the best scientific theories will
right kinds of questions and exactly what com- be those that most easily lend themselves to
bination of conceptual and empirical tools will falsification. For this reason, open mindedness
do the trick. Seeing this fact clearly has already involves, among other things, endorsing very
begun to change our attitude. Researchers from specific theoretical positions purely for the sake
different disciplines are listening and talking to of epistemic progress, rather than for the sake
each other in new ways. Developing news forms of being right, advancing one’s career, publish-
of interdisciplinary collaboration3 is an integral ing in a high-impact journal, and so on. Open
part of this process. “Having an open mind” mindedness is not so much about the specific
also refers to a kind of scientific practice that content of a belief, be it personal or theoretical,
involves honestly listening to representatives of but about the way in which it is held.
exactly those approaches and academic discip- Open mindedly searching for the right
lines you may not have expected to make a con- kind of question is a good first-order approxim-
tribution. ation to the specific type of attitude we are try-
At the same time, open mindedness, un- ing to describe. Another way to characterize the
derstood as a fruitful and research generating epistemic stance one might call “open minded-
epistemic practice, should be clearly distin- ness” is to say that it is an interdisciplinary
guished from arbitrariness, indecisiveness, lack variant of the principle of charity. It is not just
of specificity, and, especially in the context of that philosophers should be empirically in-
philosophy, lack of conceptual precision. Open formed or that neuroscientists should listen
mindedness is not just any kind of openness, carefully to constructive attempts at conceptual
and it is different from simply being non-com- or methodological clarification. We need to de-
mittal or from hedging. The challenge is to de- velop a new culture of charity, and this will re-
velop an understanding of open mindedness quire new and sustainable forms of interdiscip-
that is guided by theoretical considerations and linary cooperation. In philosophy, the “principle
empirical research findings alike. Ideally, this
account of open mindedness should also suggest 4 Here is what he said about the fundamental principle of any ideolo-
gical form of rationalism turned weltanschauung: “Uncritical or com-
specific strategies for cultivating forms of sin- prehensive rationalism can be described as the attitude of the person
cere interdisciplinary collaboration, sharpening who says ‘I am not prepared to accept anything that cannot be de-
fended by means of argument or experience’ . . . Now it is easy to see
the underlying conceptual issues, and develop- that this principle of an uncritical rationalism is inconsistent; for
ing precise predictions for future research. Open since it cannot, in its turn, be supported by argument or by experi-
ence, it implies that it should itself be discarded”. (cited from Popper
2013, p. 435; originally in Popper 1945/2003; see Metzinger 2013c for
3 And the same is true, of course, for intradisciplinary collaboration. a popular discussion).

Metzinger, T. & Windt, J. M. (2015). What Does it Mean to Have an Open Mind?
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 0(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958571044 3 | 27
 www.open-mind.net

of charity” has long been recognized and invest- some might think, there might be no single au-
igated as reading others’ statements according thoritative or right way of doing philosophy,
to their best, strongest possible interpretation, and there may be no clean way to distinguish
that is, to never attribute irrationality, false- philosophy from the empirical sciences. Open
hoods or fallacies without necessity. But we also mindedness of the constructive kind will not
all know how hard this can be. Agreement waste time by worrying too much about discip-
should be optimized and as each other’s inter- linary demarcation criteria or mere labels, but
preters, we should always, when possible, prefer will also be open towards different methods and
the most coherent reading in order to maximize approaches within individual disciplines. Put
the truth or rationality of what another re- differently, it may turn out to be less important
searcher (or philosopher) says. We now need an whether a given question or position is philo-
interdisciplinary variant of this principle, and sophical (in the sense, perhaps, of being of a
not only in bridging the gulf between the hu- purely conceptual nature) or empirical than
manities and the so-called hard sciences of the whether it genuinely helps advance the overall
mind, but also in organizing novel and more ef- debate. Open mindedness thus clearly also has
ficient forms of cooperation. This point applies an inherently pragmatic dimension. When this
not only to the relationship between disciplines, kind of tolerance of ambiguity, for instance to-
but also to that between different generations of wards disciplinary borders, but also towards dif-
researchers. An optimization problem has to be ferent (and, ideally, complementary research
solved: What is the best way of pooling intellec- methods) is paired with conceptual clarity and
tual resources and of efficiently structuring re- precision, it can be turned into a driving force
search? Therefore, a second step in approximat- for research. This balancing act is what aca-
ing the undogmatic attitude to which we refer demic open mindedness, or so we claim, is all
in the title of this collection is to characterize it about.
as an openness to the possibility that, for mind
and consciousness, there may be no such thing 3 Open mindedness and the
as a single dominating discipline, no Leitwis- phenomenology of (un)certainty
senschaft, as we say in German. Rather, not
only the connectivity between already existing Having an open mind involves, among other
research programs has to be strengthened, but things, a specific way of being noncommittal
the overall pattern of scientific practice will with respect to the truth of a proposition. As
have to be given a new internal structure as pointed out earlier, this is not the same as
well. What is needed is a new and, as we will hedging: one can investigate and even defend
argue later, genuinely philosophical way of the truth of a proposition or the adequacy of a
thinking. given theoretical-conceptual or empirical model
A genuine receptiveness to new or unex- while at the same time acknowledging that it
pected ideas and disciplinary perspectives also might be false. In the history of the philosophy
presupposes a certain set of abilities. One of of science, this continued openness to the falsifi-
them is tolerance of ambiguity: to not only tol- ability of a scientific hypothesis, often associ-
erate transient cognitive, conceptual and theor- ated with attempts to bring about specific ways
etical inconsistencies between disciplines or gen- of establishing and testing its falsity, is com-
erations, but to view certain kinds of ambiguity monly regarded as a marker of good scientific
as actually desirable, as a source of progress. practice. It is the core of intellectual honesty.
Again, the challenge will be to distinguish pro- As Russell tells us, “intellectual integrity [is] the
ductive types of ambiguity from ones that are habit of deciding vexed questions in accordance
overly cautious or vague, thus hampering real with the evidence, or of leaving them undecided
progress. The same is true, of course, within where the evidence is inconclusive” (2009, p.
academic disciplines themselves. Academic dis- 579). The moment at which we give up this
ciplines are not natural kinds. Contrary to what openness, we lapse into dogmatism. The real
Metzinger, T. & Windt, J. M. (2015). What Does it Mean to Have an Open Mind?
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 0(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958571044 4 | 27
 www.open-mind.net

danger, says Russell, is never the content of a If this is right, there is another reason to
doctrine, be it religious or political, but always be interested in open mindedness in the present
“the way in which the doctrine is held” (Russell context. This is that open mindedness, as an
2009, p. 582). Of course, this connection epistemic practice and mental attitude, is itself
between wisdom and the recognition of not- a potential target for interdisciplinary con-
knowing is much older (Ryan 2014). In the Gor- sciousness research. Philosophy of mind in par-
gias, Socrates explicitly claims that he is happy ticular can contribute by laying the theoretical-
to be refuted if he is wrong. In fact, he claims conceptual groundwork for the further empirical
he would rather be refuted than to refute investigation of open mindedness in academic
someone else because it is better to be delivered life and proposing points of contact with psy-
from harm oneself than to deliver someone else chology and cognitive neuroscience. To make
from harm. And in the Apology (21d), after be- this inner connection more clearly visible, let us
ing accused of blasphemy and of corrupting the briefly sketch the outlines of such an account.
youths of Athens, Socrates famously said before Where might one begin investigating
the tribunal of 501 Athenians: “I neither know open mindedness as a mental state? At the
nor think that I know”. outset, it stands to reason that the relevant
This is not the place to enter into a dis- form of open mindedness has precursors in the
cussion of open mindedness in the context of history of philosophy and might also be inter-
philosophy of science or of the history of estingly related to current debates on philo-
philosophical theorizing about wisdom. Be- sophical methodology. After all, the principles
cause we are interested in open mindedness in of epistemic humility, intellectual honesty,
the context of the interdisciplinary Mind Sci- charitability, and searching for more accurate
ences, we do, however, want to draw attention questions while cultivating a productive form
to a related point: open mindedness as an epi- of tolerance of ambiguity are deeply rooted in
stemic practice involves a specific kind of the history of philosophy. On a systematic and
mental attitude and is closely related to cer- more general level, one would expect philo-
tain kinds of phenomenal states. Cultivating sophy, as the discipline traditionally most con-
the relevant kinds of phenomenal mental cerned with the status of knowledge and truth
states and epistemic feelings makes a real dif- and the practice of inquiry itself, to be able
ference, or so we suspect, for scientific re- contribute to an analysis of what open
search by facilitating the development of a re- mindedness really is. Based on these consider-
search climate that is conducive to construct- ations, let us have a short look at four main
ive and genuinely fruitful discourse and new questions: One, what is the relationship
forms of collaboration. This is an empirical between open mindedness and intuitions?
prediction, which might be false. For now, our Two, what is the relationship between open
claim simply is that exactly the kind of open mindedness and the tradition of philosophical
mindedness described here is needed to even skepticism? Three, what would answers to the
begin investigating its truth. If at the end of first two questions tell us about the relation-
the day, this strategy should turn out to fail – ship between open mindedness and the al-
that is, if there turn out to be good empirical legedly most pressing problem for interdiscip-
reasons for rejecting the claim that there actu- linary consciousness research, the subjectivity
ally are specific phenomenological profiles and of phenomenal mental states? Might we even
mental attitudes that decisively facilitate pro- use the analysis of open mindedness to formu-
gress in interdisciplinary research on the mind late principles for the investigation of phe-
– this would be a valuable insight. But this in- nomenal states and the status of first-person
sight about the value of open mindedness in data? And four, how can open mindedness as
scientific discourse itself depends on an initial an epistemic stance be related to ethical and
willingness to cultivate exactly the kind of practical and questions? In particular, how
epistemic practice in question. can it contribute to normative issues related
Metzinger, T. & Windt, J. M. (2015). What Does it Mean to Have an Open Mind?
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 0(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958571044 5 | 27
 www.open-mind.net

to neurotechnological interventions in the hu- involving vignettes inspired by well-known

man brain, and on how to cultivate new forms philosophical thought experiments; for discus-
of interdisciplinarity? sion, see Knobe & Nichols 2008; Alexander
2012; for a general introduction to intuitions in
3.1 Intuitions and the phenomenology of philosophy, see Pust 2014), offers a new, empir-
certainty ically based method for collecting intuitions.
According to some experimental philosophers
The concept of intuition has a long philosoph- (for discussion and further references, see Alex-
ical history and is also firmly rooted in every- ander & Weinberg 2007), these results even cast
day language and folk psychology.5 Intuition, in doubt on the reliability of intuitions as a mark
everyday language, refers to immediate and dir- of philosophical expertise more generally.
ect insight independent of reflection or instinct- Here, we would like to propose a definition
ively grasping or sensing a matter of fact. In the of intuitions that is compatible with the histor-
history of philosophy, the concept of intuition ical literature on intuitions as well as phe-
often has dual epistemic and experiential read- nomenologically and empirically plausible. De-
ings, and this is true for the traditions of ration- parting from our brief remarks on the history of
alism and empiricism alike. In the Rules for the intuitions in philosophy, we might say that intu-
Direction of the Mind (Rule 3), Descartes de- itions are the “phenomenal signature of know-
scribes intuitions as an immediate, effortless ing”, a seemingly direct and effortless way of
and indubitable kind of seeing with the mind, perceiving or seeing with one’s mind independ-
which is even more reliable than deduction. In ently of a prior process of reflection. This ana-
his Essay Concerning Human Understanding logy between intuiting and perceiving provides
(IV.II.I), Locke tells us that intuition involves a an entry-point, or so we claim, for a naturalized
direct perception of ideas that is, once more, concept of intuition. But it also suggests a po-
the basis of all forms of knowledge. The close tentially dangerous equivocation between the
relationship between intuitions and sensory per- phenomenological and the epistemological read-
ception, and especially seeing, is already evident ings of the concepts of intuition. If the phe-
in the Latin verb intueri, which means to look nomenology of intuiting is indeed similar to
and observe, but also to examine or consider. that of perceiving in virtue of its effortless and
The central underlying element is the immedi- seemingly direct experiential quality, then this
acy and directness of perception, which is im- immediately invites the problem that the phe-
ported into the concept of intuition via an im- nomenology of intuiting and perceiving can be
plicit analogy between the phenomenology of deceptive: what seems, subjectively, to be a case
sensory perception and genuine insight in an of veridical perception can always turn out to
epistemic sense. be a hallucination or an illusion (for an intro-
At the same time, the epistemic status of duction to the problem of perception, see Crane
intuitions as well as different ways of defining 2014), or a nocturnal dream (see Windt & Met-
the concept of intuition are a matter of contro- zinger 2007; Metzinger 2013a; Windt 2015).
versy in the current debate on philosophical Similarly, what seems to bear the marks of
methodology. The debate on intuitions stands genuine insight can always turn out to be an
at the center of the confrontation between clas- epistemic illusion.6
sical (and allegedly intuition-based; see for in- If intuitions are indeed mental states char-
stance Cappelen 2012 for a critical discussion) acterized by a specific phenomenology, this sug-
conceptual analysis conducted in the proverbial gests that the attempt to simultaneously char-
philosophical armchair and recent claims that
6 For a striking case study of two patients who experienced strong feel-
experimental philosophy, mostly by collecting ings of subjective certainty, including religious beliefs, during epi-
layperson’s responses to questionnaires (often leptic seizures, see Picard (2013). This is all the more interesting as
these beliefs contradicted the patients’ longstanding convictions, but
5 This section draws on arguments first presented in Metzinger & still, subjectively, seemed entirely convincing to them during the
Windt (2014). seizures themselves.

Metzinger, T. & Windt, J. M. (2015). What Does it Mean to Have an Open Mind?
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 0(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958571044 6 | 27
 www.open-mind.net

acterize them as involving genuine insight and ness, no intuitions existed on our planet. Pa-
as the basis of knowledge rests on what else- tients in coma or human beings in unconscious,
where we call the “E-error”: a category mistake dreamless deep sleep have no intuitions in the
in which we ascribe epistemic properties to sense intended here. At the same time, intu-
something that does not possess them (Met- itions likely have a long evolutionary history:
zinger & Windt 2014, p. 287). If our account of There must have been a point in time in which
intuitions is on the right track, then intuitions the first intuition appeared in the mind of some
are dangerous, because in virtue of their phe- conscious organism and this specific type of in-
nomenology and of their possessing an occur- ner state then propagated itself across thou-
rent conscious character of “insight”, they pre- sands of generations while its functional profile
dispose us to believe certain propositions merely became ever more differentiated. Plausibly, one
on the basis of seemingly “understanding” could describe the having of intuitions as an
them. The phenomenology of intuitions is such ability – a mental ability that was adaptive and
that it immediately and effortlessly creates a was acquired gradually.
bias towards accepting the truth of propositions If one takes the phenomenal character of
that we simply know or feel to be true, while intuitions seriously, this ability clearly seems to
simultaneously preventing us from seeking fur- be an epistemic ability: Prima facie, to have an
ther justification because these truths also seem intuition means to have the subjective experi-
unconstructed, indubitable, and self-evident. If ence of knowing something, directly and imme-
so, then one of the factors underlying intuitions diately, without necessarily being able to ex-
and intuitive plausibility is that because of their press this knowledge linguistically or to provide
phenomenal character, they prevent an open an epistemic justification. Typically, inner ex-
minded assessment. Intuitions turn us into inner perience seems to present knowledge to the sub-
dogmatists. And this is true not only for indi- ject of experience, even if one does not know
vidual propositions held to be intuitively true, how and why one possesses this knowledge. In-
but also for the continued adherence to theoret- tuitions are the phenomenal signature of know-
ical claims about the status of intuitions as a ing, a seemingly direct form of ”seeing” the
guide to or even basis of knowledge and genuine truth with one’s own mind. The E- error then
insight. The phenomenal character of intuitions consists in confusing the phenomenal character
even predisposes us towards certain meta-theor- a conscious state with its epistemic status.
etical intuitions about the general epistemic “Epistemicity”, the phenomenal quality of
status of intuitions, and we can see the marks of “knowingness”, or the feeling of being a know-
this throughout the history of philosophy as ing self, as such is only a phenomenal quality,
well as in the contemporary debate (e.g., Bealer just as redness, greenness or sweetness are. The
1998; Chudnoff 2013). The analysis of intuitions well-known philosophical problem is that the
clearly should not itself be driven by intuitions. phenomenological and epistemological readings
Instead, the analysis of intuitions is a prime ex- can always come apart, because what phe-
ample of where an open mind is needed. nomenologically appears as a kind of perception
Our own account starts out from the as- could really be a hallucination or an illusion.
sumptions that intuitions are a specific class of Subjectively indistinguishable mental states do
phenomenal states. Human beings can direct not necessarily have the same epistemic status.
their introspective attention towards the con- Trivially, the difference between veridical per-
tent of these states and, at least partly and un- ception and hallucination (in the philosophical
der certain conditions, report about it. Many sense; see Macpherson 2013; Crane 2014;) is not
higher animals very likely also possess intuitions available on the level of subjective experience it-
even if they are not able to directly attend to or self, and therefore the confusion between phe-
verbally report their intentional contents. Before nomenal character and epistemic content is nat-
the evolution of biological nervous systems and urally grounded in the transparent phenomeno-
before the emergence of phenomenal conscious- logy, the seeming directness and immediacy of
Metzinger, T. & Windt, J. M. (2015). What Does it Mean to Have an Open Mind?
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 0(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958571044 7 | 27
 www.open-mind.net

sensory perception. The same is true for the cording to my own subjective experience I
phenomenology of intuition. Conflating epi- simply know that I know and the possibility of
stemic status and phenomenal character be- error and falsehood it is not given on the level
comes particularly dangerous if it is imported of conscious experience itself. From the fact
into theoretical debates, and if the phenomenal that a conscious perception instantiates the
quality in question is that of “epistemicity”, of phenomenal quality of “greenness” it does not
direct and non-inferential knowing itself. The follow that the underlying process or even the
important lesson is that as phenomenal states, perceptual object are green. Analogously, the
such states are neither necessarily veridical nor same is true for the “phenomenal signature of
necessarily non-veridical, because experience as knowing” that characterizes intuitions.
such is not knowledge. As inner experiences Intuitiveness is a property of theoretical
they possess no intentional properties and can- claims or arguments, relative to a class of rep-
not be semantically evaluated by concepts like resentational systems exhibiting a specific func-
“truth” or “reference”. Phenomenal transpar- tional architecture. Conscious human beings are
ency is not epistemic transparency. one example of such a class. The brains of hu-
Many, but not all, of our philosophically man beings are naturally evolved information-
relevant intuitions are characterized by an addi- processing systems, and when engaging in expli-
tional element of certainty, of just knowing that cit, high-level cognition they use specific repres-
one knows. Here, the phenomenal signature of entational formats and employ characteristic
knowledge does not only refer to the content of styles of processing. Whenever we try to com-
what is seemingly known in a direct, and non- prehend a certain theory, an argument or a spe-
inferential manner, but to our higher-order, cific philosophical claim, our brains construct
subjectively experienced knowledge itself. This an internal model of this theory, argument, or
means that the phenomenal character of ”epi- claim (Johnson-Laird 1983, 2008; Knauff 2009).
stemicity” that accompanies and tags the re- This mostly automatic process of constructing
spective mental content as an instance of know- mental models of theories possesses a phe-
ing has itself become transparent. Its represent- nomenology of its own: some theories just “feel
ational character is not introspectively available right” because they elicit subtle visceral and
anymore: the fact that epistemicity is itself the emotional responses, some claims “come easily”,
content of a non-conceptual mental representa- they are sound and healthy, and some argu-
tion, that it is internally constructed and always ments (including implicit assumptions they
contains the possibility of misrepresentation, is make in their premises) seem “just plain nat-
veiled by an experience of immediacy. Transpar- ural”. Some forms of skepticism appear
ency is a special form of darkness. Something “healthy” to us, others do not – there seems to
constructed is experienced as a datum, as some- be a deep connection between sanity and
thing given. Therefore, in stable intuition states reason.
we not only experience the first-order content as There may be two overarching reasons for
directly given, but the epistemicity of the state this well-known fact. First, theories that are in-
itself. Let us call such states intuitions of cer- tuitively plausible exhibit a high degree of
tainty. Referring to G. E. Moore7 one might say “goodness of fit“ in regard to our network of ex-
that the phenomenal signature of knowing has plicit prior convictions and, more generally, by
itself become diaphanous or transparent: ac- optimally satisfying the constraints provided by
our conscious and unconscious models of reality
7 In The Refutation of Idealism, G. E. Moore wrote: “The term ‘blue’
is easy enough to distinguish, but the other element which I have as a whole. These microfunctional constraints
called ‘consciousness’ - that which a sensation of blue has in common implicitly represent both the totality of the
with a sensation of green – is extremely difficult to fix… And in gen-
eral, that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact seems to knowledge we have acquired during our lifetime,
escape us; it seems, if I may use a metaphor, to be transparent – we as well as certain assumptions about the causal
look through it and see nothing but the blue; we may be convinced
that there is something, but what it is no philosopher, I think, has
deep structure of the world that proved func-
yet clearly recognized.” (1903, p. 446) tionally adequate for our biological ancestors.
Metzinger, T. & Windt, J. M. (2015). What Does it Mean to Have an Open Mind?
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 0(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958571044 8 | 27
 www.open-mind.net

Theories that immediately feel good because error generated by the flow of “hypotheses” ori-
they are characterized by a high degree of intu- ginating in its current model of reality, then the
itiveness maximize a specific kind of internal process that creates what today we call our
harmony. What we introspectively detect is a deepest “theoretical intuitions” may also be de-
high degree of consistency, but in a non-lin- scribed as the continuous attempt at reducing
guistic, subsymbolic medium. Therefore we variational free energy. While, on a more ab-
could also replace the term “intuitiveness” by a stract level, this process can be seen as minimiz-
notion like “intuitive soundness” or “introspect- ing representational complexity while simultan-
ively detected consistency or goodness of fit” eously maximizing the evidence for the overall
(relative to a preexisting model of reality). In model, it is at the same time a physical process
principle it should be possible to spell out this that is not guided by abstract rationality con-
point on a mathematical level, by describing the straints, but simply one that optimizes meta-
underlying neural computations and their prop- bolic and statistical efficiency at the same time
erties in a connectionist framework, or by utiliz- (Sengupta et al. 2013; Friston 2010; Hohwy
ing the conceptual tools provided by dynamical 2013).
systems theory or predictive coding. We need an open mind, because many of
A second perspective might be to look at the best future theories about the human mind
intuitions not from a representationalist, but and conscious experience may just “not com-
from biophysical point of view. We are embod- pute“ for beings like us. However, what does or
ied beings, and there are different levels of em- does not compute is, in part, a contingent fact
bodiment. Computational, but also thermody- determined by the functional architecture of our
namical imperatives guide the self-organization brain, shaped by millions of years of biological
of representational states in our brains. One evolution on this planet, as well as––to a much
major causal factor underlying the conscious ex- lesser degree––by our individual cognitive his-
perience of “intuitive soundness“ might simply tory and a given cultural/linguistic context. The
be the amount of energy it takes to activate and phenomenology of intuitive soundness––the fact
sustain a mental model of a given theory, plus that some arguments seem “just natural”––is a
the amount of energy it would take to perman- biological phenomenon, with a short cultural
ently integrate it into our pre-existing model of history supporting it as well. However, the inner
reality. Our mental space of intuitive plausibil- landscape of our space of intuitive plausibility is
ity can in principle be described as an energy not only contingent on our evolutionary history
landscape: claims that “come easily“ do so be- and on certain physical and functional proper-
cause they allow us to reach a stable state ties of our brains––it was also optimized for
quickly and easily, theories that “feel good“ are functional adequacy only. It serves to sustain an
theories that can be appropriated without a organism’s coherence and physical existence,
high demand of energy. Theories that don’t feel but this does not mean that the content of intu-
good have the opposite characteristics: they itions is epistemically justified in any way. This
“don’t add up”, they “just don’t compute”, be- is especially true because the evolved functional
cause they endanger our internal harmony and adequacy of intuitions applies to everyday ac-
functional coherence, and it would take a lot of tion in practical contexts—not to abstract re-
energy to permanently integrate them into our flection in theoretical ones or cognitive environ-
overall mental model of reality. They are costly. ments. This is why searching for a comprehens-
However, in a biophysical system like the hu- ive theory of the conscious mind presents such a
man brain there may well be a direct connec- major challenge to our intellectual honesty: It
tion between thermodynamic efficiency and re- demands that we investigate a claim even if it
duction of complexity on the level of informa- contradicts our deepest intuitions, something
tion processing. If biological self-organization in that somehow is “just too radical”, way too
the human brain takes place in a way that con- costly, painful or even self-damaging, and seems
tinuously attempts to minimize the prediction to cry out for a more moderate, weaker version
Metzinger, T. & Windt, J. M. (2015). What Does it Mean to Have an Open Mind?
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 0(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958571044 9 | 27
 www.open-mind.net

because it just “doesn’t compute”. In this view, its best, has often been deeply constructive
any philosophical methodology that just tries to and enabled genuine progress.
make our “deepest intuitions“ explicit in a con- The philosophical tradition that has per-
ceptually coherent manner appears as a rather haps been most concerned with cultivating a
trivial enterprise. If our claims here are correct, skeptical attitude and with uncertainty and
then intuition-mongering may even border on not-knowing as a mental state, at least in
intellectual dishonesty. At best, it just charts Western philosophy, is Pyrrhonian skepticism.
our intuition space; at worst, it confuses failures Here, we want to tentatively suggest that it is
of imagination with insights into conceptual ne- quite instructive to trace many of the aspects
cessity (“philosopher’s syndrome”, according to that we claim characterize open mindedness
Dennett 1991, p. 401). all the way back to the Pyrrhonian skeptics.
This claim might strike some as surprising,
3.2 Suspending judgment, inner quietude, because Pyrrhonian skepticism, which was one
and the phenomenology of uncertainty of the two major schools of skepticism in an-
tiquity, is often seen as a particularly radical
If intuitions can be described as creating a and excessive kind of skepticism (Hume’s En-
transparent inner bias and perhaps even in- quiry Concerning Human Understanding is a
volving an inner form of dogmatism, then good example). It is fair to say that in con-
might we make progress on understanding temporary philosophy, Pyrrhonian skeptics are
open mindedness as a mental state by looking an endangered species (for an introduction,
to cases characterized by the phenomenal sig- see Fogelin 1994; Sinnott-Armstrong 2004; es-
nature of not knowing and of uncertainty? pecially Stroud 2004; Fogelin 2004), with the
The philosophical tradition of skepticism tradition often being regarded as a bit of a
seems to be a promising place to look. Skepti- historical oddity. This is fueled by what little
cism comes in many different strengths and is known of its founding father, Pyrrho of Elis
flavors (see Landesman 2002 for a compre- (c. 360 to c. 270 BCE). Most of this is anec-
hensive introduction), but what is distinctive dotal, as Pyrrho wrote nothing himself (Bett
about philosophical skepticism is perhaps best 2014). Diogenes, for instance, tells us that
captured by the meaning of the original Greek Pyrrho
term, where skeptic (related to the Greek verb
sképtomai) refers, quite simply, “to one who led a life consistent with this doctrine, go-
inquires into the truth of things or wishes to ing out of his way for nothing, taking no
gain knowledge about some subject matter” precaution, but facing all risks as they
(Landesman & Meeks 2002, p. 1). Skeptical came, whether carts, precipices, dogs, or
inquiry, in the philosophical sense, is not so what not, and, generally, leaving nothing
much concerned with the truth of particular to the arbitrage of his sense; but he was
beliefs or theoretical claims as with the pos- kept out of harm’s way by his friends, who
sibility of knowledge and certainty in a more […] used to follow close after him. (1943,
fundamental sense. It also does not always 9.62)
aim at denying the truth of our most basic be-
liefs by construing outlandish skeptical hypo- Pyrrho did not return the favor, reportedly
theses such as the Cartesian evil genius hypo- passing by an acquaintance who had fallen into
thesis. Generally, skeptical arguments cast a slough without offering him any help (ibid.,
doubts on commonly (and often implicitly and 9.63). Clearly, this is a far cry from the con-
unreflectively) accepted means for attaining structive and research generating type of open
knowledge—and in doing so often give rise to mindedness we hope to promote here.
new and fruitful discussions on how our epi- A more thoughtful and differentiated ac-
stemic practices might be improved. Through- count can be found in Sextus Empiricus’s
out the history of philosophy, skepticism, at (1987) definition of skepticism, which he uses to
Metzinger, T. & Windt, J. M. (2015). What Does it Mean to Have an Open Mind?
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 0(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958571044 10 | 27
 www.open-mind.net

refer only to Pyrrhonian skepticism.8 According matism: they quickly and effortlessly create an
to Sextus, inner bias towards a given theoretical position,
while at the same time making it seem so in-
Skepticism is an ability, or mental atti- dubitable and certain as to prevent further crit-
tude, which opposes appearances to judg- ical inquiry. Even though the terminology is, of
ments in any way whatsoever, with the course, different, the Pyrrhonian attitude of
result that, owing to the equipollence of anti-dogmatism presents itself as an antidote to
the objects and reasons thus opposed, we exactly the type of uncritically judgmental atti-
are brought firstly to a state of mental tude that is the hallmark of intuitions.
suspense and next to a state of „unper- Second, the Pyrrhonian skeptic, in his
turbedness“ or quietude. (1987, Chapter 4) quest for “quietude in respect of matters of
opinion and moderate feeling in respect of
Clearly, there is at least a superficial similarity things unavoidable” (Sextus 1987, 12.25), makes
between Sextus’s claim that skepticism is an use of stereotyped tropes or modes of argument.
ability and our description of open mindedness The tropes are all very similar in structure, in-
as an epistemic practice. Here, we briefly review volving a series of contrasts between opposing
the most important characteristics of statements with the aim of resulting in irresolv-
Pyrrhonian skepticism and argue that there in- able disagreement and inducing a suspension of
deed exist a number of insightful parallels to judgment. True to the characterization of the
open mindedness as an epistemic practice. Pyrrhonian skeptic as one who inquires, “the
A first point is that from the perspective modes […] were not designed to inhibit reason-
of Pyrrhonian skepticism, dogmatism is the end ing. Rather, they were designed to assist the
of reasoning and the opposite of philosophical Pyrrhonian in continuing to inquire by shielding
reflection. At the same time, the anti-dogmat- her from the disquieting state of dogmatism”
ism of the Pyrrhonian skeptics did not prevent (Klein 2014). As Sextus (1987, 7.13) tells us,
them from giving“ assent to the feelings which the Pyrrhonian, when entering into a debate
are the necessary results of sense-impressions” with the Dogmatist, does not assert his argu-
(1987, 7.13). The Pyrrhonian skeptics merely ments in the manner of claiming their truth; in-
withheld assent to “the non-evident objects of stead, he asserts them provisionally and only for
scientific inquiry” (ibid., 7.13). As an early form the sake of argument, enabling him to practice
of what we call academic open mindedness, epoché, or to bracket his assumptions about ex-
Pyrrhonian skepticism was directed, first and actly the kinds of propositions involved in the
foremost, “against the dogmas of ‘Professors’— tropes. The tropes, then, are not just a strategy
not the beliefs of common people pursuing the for convincing one’s opponent, but a specific
honest (or, for that matter, not so honest) busi- way of cultivating this more general kind of epi-
ness of daily life. The Pyrrhonian skeptic leaves stemic attitude:
common beliefs, unpretentiously held, alone”
(Fogelin 2004, p. 163). Like piano exercises for the fingers that
This suggests that if we want to contrast would result in semi-automatic responses
the cultivation of an anti-dogmatic mindset to the printed notes on a sheet of music,
with intuitions, this point should be applied not the modes were mental exercises that
to intuitions and feelings of certainty in general, would result in semi-automatic responses
but to philosophical intuitions in particular. to claims being made by the dogmatists—
Philosophical intuitions, in virtue of their dis- those who assented to the non-evident.
tinctive phenomenal character, involve a specific (Klein 2014)
and often highly specialized form of inner dog-
We certainly do not mean to suggest that we
8 Sextus distinguishes three types of philosophical systems: dogmatists, or
those who claim to have discovered the truth; academics, who deny that
should all become Pyrrhonian skeptics by for-
the truth can be apprehended; and Skeptics, who continue to inquire. mulating modernized versions of the tropes. We
Metzinger, T. & Windt, J. M. (2015). What Does it Mean to Have an Open Mind?
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 0(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958571044 11 | 27
 www.open-mind.net

only want to point out that the naturalistic belief (Clifford 1877/1999; Chignell 2010) and of
strategy of preparing and then handing over belief formation. There is clearly a social (Gold-
questions to scientific research can be viewed as man 2010) and perhaps even interdisciplinary
fulfilling a similar function of cultivating the dimension of epistemology, both in a theoretical
epistemic virtues of open mindedness. This in and in practical sense. As is the case for the
itself, of course, is nothing new. A similar idea dialectical confrontation between the
can be found, for example, in Russell’s claim Pyrrhonian and the Dogmatist, progress (in the
that, sense of suspension of judgment) will often res-
ult from confronting one’s own convictions with
as soon as definite knowledge concerning those held by others, as well as from confronting
any subject becomes possible, this subject them with real-world counterexamples.9 By con-
ceases to be called philosophy, and be- trast, accumulating evidence suggests that
comes a separate science. […] those ques- merely simulating this process by charting one’s
tions which are already capable of definite own intuitive responses to carefully calibrated
answers are placed in the sciences, while thought experiments is not nearly as effective,
those only to which, at present, no definite but is actually often quite misleading (Gendler
answer can be given, remain to form the & Hawthorne 2010; Alexander 2012; Dennett
residue which is called philosophy. (Russell 2013). Doing, as the Pyrrhonian skeptics real-
1912/1999, p. 112) ized, is better than merely imagining.
Fourth, ataraxia, or quietude, according to
Following Russell, philosophy itself is a specific Sextus, automatically and effortlessly follows on
variant of cultivating what, earlier, we called a the cusp of the suspense of judgment. This un-
tolerance of ambiguity, and its value is “to be intentional character of quietude is important,
sought largely in its very uncertainty” (1912, because it means not only that quietude cannot
113). The Pyrrhonian tropes are just one ex- be actively brought about, but also that it is
ample from the history of philosophy of how a found in a place quite different from where one
particular style of argumentation can be used was looking for it:
not just to generate particular insights, but also
to promote a style of thinking. Analogously, one the Skeptics were in hopes of gaining
of the reasons why interdisciplinary collabora- quietude by means of a decision regarding
tion and data-driven arguments in philosophy the disparity of the objects of sense and of
are valuable may be that they are a way of thought, and being unable to effect this
practicing and cultivating open mindedness. In- they suspended judgment; and they found
terdisciplinary research projects don’t just pro- that quietude, as if by chance, followed
duce new data, but leave their marks on minds upon their suspense, even as a shadow fol-
of the researchers involved as well. lows its substance. (Sextus Empiricus
Third, the suspension of judgment, which 1987, 12.29)
is the outcome and in some sense aim of the
modes, is described, by Sextus, as a state of This mental quietude may well be the phenom-
mental rest and as an “untroubled and tranquil enal signature of not knowing and of uncer-
condition of the soul” (1987, 4. 10). It also, tainty; and it may be intimately related to the
however, has a normative dimension, involving ability to formulate a question or identify a
the claim that if there is irresolvable disagree- problem while refraining from giving a solution.
ment between two opposing positions, one What we can see now, especially by con-
should refrain from adopting either of them. trasting this point with what we said about in-
In the ambiguity between these two read- tuitions earlier, is how mental quietude might
ings, there is a nice point of contact between
open mindedness as a mental state and some- 9 This reliance on actual cases of disagreement, rather than on hypo-
thetical scenarios and thought experiments, is also one of the differ-
thing that today, one might call the ethics of ences between Pyrrhonian and Cartesian skepticism.

Metzinger, T. & Windt, J. M. (2015). What Does it Mean to Have an Open Mind?
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 0(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958571044 12 | 27
 www.open-mind.net

be turned into a target for consciousness re- to make recommendations for investigating phe-
search in its own right, perhaps even forming a nomenal states and tackling the problem of sub-
new branch of the psychology or cognitive neur- jectivity? In contemporary philosophy of mind,
oscience of interdisciplinarity. In particular, the the problem of subjectivity is often taken to be
mental state cultivated by the Pyrrhonian skep- the main conceptual and methodological
tics is diametrically opposed to that involved in obstacle for a true science of the mind. Can the
intuitions. Both are phenomenal states only, first-person perspective be naturalized? What,
and as such have no intrinsic epistemic warrant. exactly, is the place of subjectivity in the sci-
However, where intuitions block further inquiry, entific world-view? And is there really some-
mental quietude and the phenomenology of un- thing like “first-person data” that can—and
certainty promote it. The skeptic aims, in a perhaps must—enter the process of constructing
sense, at a state in which inquiry has become a truly comprehensive theory of the conscious
permanent. mind? Questions of this kind are good examples
However, where intuitions and intuitive of high-level theoretical issues that require the
plausibility come to us naturally and effort- epistemic virtues associated with an open mind.
lessly, open mindedness, the suspension of judg- Even the editors of this collection have a tend-
ment and the tolerance of ambiguity are the ency to disagree on this question—and we hope
result of careful cultivation, long-term practice that this disagreement is of a constructive sort.
and sustained effort. From a purely evolutionary One of us (TM) thinks that a greater
perspective, uncertainty and a non-judgmental practical openness to so-called “first-person
attitude are costly and perhaps even dangerous, methods” on the side of researchers in philo-
because they do not motivate action in the sophy and cognitive science alike might poten-
same immediate, quick and unreflected way as tially possess great heuristic fecundity and
intuitions. If on encountering a bear in the wil- would, perhaps dramatically, improve the qual-
derness you take too much time to contemplate ity and efficiency of research. At the same time
the nature of the threat (or to question your in- he holds that there simply are no “first-person
tuitive assessment that the bear is indeed a data” in any strict or conceptually more rigor-
threat), you might be eaten before you come to ous sense. Seriously assuming the existence of
a conclusion. Cleary, introducing the such data rests on an extended usage of a
Pyrrhonian spirit to such practical, everyday concept that is only well defined in another
situations is absurd and perhaps even un- (namely, scientific) context. First, the whole
healthy. However, in the context of philosoph- concept of a “first-person perspective” is just a
ical and scientific inquiry, cultivating vulnerabil- visuo-grammatical metaphor, without a theory
ity of the epistemic type (cf. Chinnery 2014) to back it up – and currently we simply don’t
might be a strength and might help prepare the know what that could be, “a” first-person per-
ground for genuine collaboration and fruitful spective (for a first conceptual differentiation,
discourse. But we can now also understand why see Metzinger 2003, 2004; Blanke & Metzinger
even in science, open mindedness is so frustrat- 2009). Second, „data“ are something that is ex-
ingly difficult to sustain: Mental quietude is not tracted from the physical world by technical
a state of passivity or mental inertia. It is a measuring devices, in a public procedure, which
mental habit that requires constant alertness is well-defined and well-understood, replicable,
and a lifetime of practice. and improvable; and which is necessarily inter-
subjective. But in introspecting our own minds
3.3 Acknowledging the problem of we never have any truly direct or immediate ac-
subjectivity cess to a mysterious class of “subjective facts” –
all we have are neural correlates and publicly
If open mindedness indeed draws from the same observable reports (which need not be verbal).
ideals as are rooted in Pyrrhonian skepticism, Therefore, speaking of “first-person data” rests
how can we put these insights to work in order on an extended usage of a concept which is only
Metzinger, T. & Windt, J. M. (2015). What Does it Mean to Have an Open Mind?
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 0(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958571044 13 | 27
 www.open-mind.net

well-defined in another context of application, conveying or recording certain relevant informa-

rhetorically exploiting a fallacy of equivocation. tion about a specific experience. They are not
“Data” are typically (though not always) mere opinions about what it is typically like to
gathered with the help of technical measuring have a certain kind of experience. They also
devices (and not individual brains) and by should not be confused with attempts to gener-
groups of people who mutually control and cri- alize from one’s case to what it is typically like
ticize each other’s methods of data gathering to undergo a given experience, or with the prac-
(namely, by large scientific communities). In tice, occasionally found in academic philosophy
particular, data are gathered in the context of of mind, of relying on intuitive judgments or
rational theories aiming at ever better predic- thought experiments to reach general conclu-
tions, theories that – as opposed to phenomeno- sions about the necessary or even typical char-
logical reports - are capable of falsification. acteristics of given types of experience.
To be sure, autophenomenological reports, First-person reports, construed as sincere
theory-contaminated as they may be, them- descriptions of specific experiences, form the
selves are highly valuable and can certainly be data-base of scientific consciousness research.
treated as data. But the experience “itself” can- They can be gathered with the help of public
not. However, given this perspective, having an methods such as standardized interview tech-
open mind means acknowledging the additional niques or questionnaires, and the data obtained
fact that, for various reasons, this cannot be the from these reports are open to intersubjective
whole story. If for reasons of intellectual honesty validation (e.g., with the help of independent
we do not to want to deny that what is some- raters, different methods of statistical analysis
times called “first-person methods” could have and of scoring the content of reports, and so
an enormous potential on our way towards a on). At the same time, this strategy only works
rigorous, empirically based theory of the human before a background of trust that first-person
mind – what exactly about these methods is it reports can, when gathered under sufficiently
that generates the extra epistemic value? And ideal reporting conditions, be regarded as trust-
why is it that exactly such methods have played worthy with respect to the experience they pur-
such a central role in all cultures and in almost port to describe. Indeed, assuming at least a
all ancient philosophical traditions of mankind? subgroup of first-person reports to be trust-
It is not only Asian systems of philosophy for worthy is a necessary condition of possibility for
which this obviously true. At the very beginning scientific consciousness research, and for meth-
of Western philosophy, Cicero, in the Tuscu- odological reasons (see Windt 2013, 2015).10
lanae disputationes (1971, II 5), defined philo- Much of the serious work, in this view,
sophy itself as cultura animi, as taking care of will consist in identifying and improving the ap-
and cultivating the soul. propriate conditions under which maximally ac-
Another one of us (JW) thinks that first- curate experience reports can be obtained. Seen
person data exist, and that for a true science of in this manner, the trustworthiness of first-per-
the mind, of consciousness and of subjectivity it son reports becomes, to a considerable degree, a
is important to acknowledge their existence. methodological problem for empirical research,
First-person data are not, however, to be found
in observing conscious experience—insofar JW 10 Clearly, this is not to say that such reports, or the data obtained
from their analysis, are trustworthy with respect, for instance, to the
and TM are in perfect agreement—but in de- neural underpinnings of the respective experiences. We should not
scribing and more properly reporting it. A first expect them to be. Moreover, because this type of information can-
not be gleaned, for instance, from neuroimaging data, first-person
step towards seeing why this is the case is to data obtained from the analysis of experience reports necessarily
clearly distinguish first-person reports from gen- complements such kinds of third-person data. As dream researchers
Tore Nielsen & Philippe Stenstrom (2005, p. 1289) put it, “In an era
eral opinions, convictions or even intuitions of high-resolution brain imaging, similarly high-resolution reports of
about experience. First-person reports, in this dream imagery may be needed”. Again, a true science of conscious-
view, are the product of (verbal or non-verbal) ness will draw from different methodologies and different ways of
measuring experience and will strive to integrate different types of
behaviors conducted with the sincere intent of data.

Metzinger, T. & Windt, J. M. (2015). What Does it Mean to Have an Open Mind?
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 0(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958571044 14 | 27
 www.open-mind.net

not a principled philosophical or conceptual experience rather than carefully observing and
one, and the contribution of philosophy consists, describing what it is like to have particular ex-
at best, in showing why this is the case (again, periences). We might even say that this strategy
see Windt 2013; for critical discussion, see So- of stepping back from one’s own convictions
lomonova et al. 2014). By contrast, principled about experience and formulating questions
distrust in the trustworthiness of first-person re- about the phenomenal character or the sub-
ports, or even the attempt to investigate the jectivity of experience is in keeping with the
phenomenology of experience independently of Pyrrhonian spirit: both are directed at academic
first-person reports, is an obstacle to a true sci- disputes and assume commonplace experience
ence of consciousness. or individual experience reports to be trust-
While we, the editors, may disagree on the worthy, and both strive towards a confrontation
trustworthiness and epistemic status of first- of theoretical statements with real-world
person reports or even on the existence of first- counterexamples, with the aim of ultimately
person data in a strict sense, we certainly agree giving rise to more sophisticated theories.
about the need for taking our own inner experi- The issue of subjectivity is an excellent ex-
ence seriously, and we also agree that the epi- ample of a persevering problem that comes in
stemic stance we call “open mindedness” may many different guises and reappears on many
well include the need for cultivating our famili- different levels. Perhaps there really is some-
arity with our own subjective experience. In this thing about the conscious mind that cannot be
respect, our accounts may well be complement- explained reductively, even in principle. But
ary. Readers familiar with contemplative tradi- searching for a maximally parsimonious sci-
tions may also have noted that there is a sur- entific explanation is a rational research heur-
prisingly direct and often quite literal corres- istic, and not an ideology. It should never be a
pondence between many classical notions such substitute for religion, and as such it carries it
as “withholding judgment”, “mental quietude”, with it no immediate metaphysical commit-
or “ataraxia” and the practical instructions ments. To have an open mind is an epistemic
given by meditation teachers around the world, stance, which means that epistemic progress is
from different periods and different non-West- what counts in the end. Many of the authors in
ern systems of philosophy. These notions are this collection, including the editors, are
not only theoretical concepts – they draw our staunch methodological naturalists, because
attention to the fact that there is more than they view philosophy and science as engaged in
one type of epistemic practice, and that open essentially the same enterprise, pursuing similar
mindedness may be what connects them (Met- ends and using similar methods. If it could be
zinger 2013c). On a more theoretical level, to shown, however, and more precisely than ever
have an open mind again means to acknowledge before in the history of philosophy and science,
(and not repress) the fact that there may actu- that there are strictly irreducible aspects of the
ally be a deep, unresolved ambiguity here. And human mind, then most of them would be satis-
it involves cultivating not only a particular atti- fied with this result, because they would now
tude towards one’s beliefs, but also towards one- have what they wanted all along: epistemic pro-
self as a believer. gress.
A similar tolerance of ambiguity is at play
in the attitude of lending equal credence to re- 3.4 Sensitivity to ethical issues
ports from different subjects, acknowledging
inter- and intrasubjective variation in experi- Having an open mind means to never lose sight
ence, and, ultimately, trying to integrate these of the bigger picture and to be continuously
reports into a maximally large data-base while aware that our research is embedded in a wider
resisting the pull of generalizing from one’s own context. In what follows, we will very briefly
case or engaging in armchair phenomenology draw attention to three examples of what we
(where this involves pumping intuitions about mean by the “bigger picture” and the “wider
Metzinger, T. & Windt, J. M. (2015). What Does it Mean to Have an Open Mind?
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 0(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958571044 15 | 27
 www.open-mind.net

context”: ethical, anthropological, and sociocul- combination with constantly improving brain-
tural issues; globalization and transcultural computer interfaces, virtual reality technology
philosophy; and what we provisionally call “the also possesses, however, the potential for milit-
sapiential dimension” – getting philosophy back ary applications, for example via virtual or ro-
into philosophy.11 Let us begin with the ethical botic re-embodiment. New ways of causally
ramifications of the type of work presented in coupling the human-self-model with avatars and
this collection. surrogate bodies in virtual reality will not only
New theories lead to new technologies and have clinical benefits in the medical treatment
new potentials for action. Gradually, they also of patients and, perhaps, in rehabilitation pro-
change the image of man, a fact which may in grams for prisoners, it also opens the door to
turn have major social and cultural con- new forms of consumer manipulation and poten-
sequences. Having an open mind means being tially unexpected psychological side-effects (e.g.,
sensitive to normative issues and ethical aspects Blascovich & Bailenson 2011).
of research in philosophy of mind and cognitive A second example for the social and polit-
science. It also means acknowledging the fact ical dimension of new action potentials for inter-
that the human mind is a culturally embedded vening in the brain is provided by new develop-
phenomenon and that what we come to believe ments in pharmaceutical cognitive enhancement
about it will eventually change not only so- (Merkel et al. 2007; Metzinger & Hildt 2011).
ciocultural practice, but our own minds as well. Cognitive enhancement is a molecular-level tech-
Such “Soft Issues” are not empirically tractable, nology, which aims at optimizing a specific class
at least not in any direct manner (Metzinger of information-processing functions: cognitive
2000, pp. 6-10; Metzinger 2009). Here, perhaps functions, physically realized by the human
even more so than elsewhere, the challenge is to brain. The human brain, however, is also embod-
formulate the right kinds of questions in a rigor- ied as well as embedded in a dense network of
ous, precise, and fully intelligible manner. It environmental interactions, many of which are of
would certainly be misleading to conclude from a distinctly cultural and social nature. And it
the fact that these questions are difficult that not only possesses a long evolutionary history,
they are not relevant. but also changes over an individual’s life-span.
Theoretical innovation leads to technolo- Here, the central philosophical problem is that
gical innovation, necessitating careful and reflec- normative elements are already built into the
ted risk assessment. For example, modern vir- concept itself. In bioethics, the term “enhance-
tual reality technology not only enables the con- ment” is “usually used […] to characterize inter-
crete realization of a large number of new ex- ventions designed to improve human form or
perimental paradigms, but has also provided us functioning beyond what is necessary to sustain
with many novel and philosophically relevant or restore good health” (Jüngst 1998, p. 29). As
insights into the multimodal bodily foundations opposed to medical treatments or therapies, en-
of selfhood and subjectivity (Blanke 2012; hancements modify physical or mental character-
Blanke & Metzinger 2009; Metzinger 2014). In istics in healthy individuals, just like cosmetic
11 Again, this comes back to the classical idea of wisdom as not surgery does. In psychopharmacological enhance-
only knowing how to live well, but also succeeding at doing so ment, psychoactive drugs that have been devised
(Ryan 2014). There is also a clear connection between open
mindedness as an epistemic practice and its ethical dimension. As
as a therapy for specified diseases are typically
Russell (1912/1999, p. 116) puts it, “The mind which has become used off-label or illicitly by normal, healthy indi-
accustomed to the freedom and impartiality of philosophic con- viduals in order to modify brain functioning. In
templation will preserve something of the same freedom and im -
partiality in the world of action and emotion. […] The impartial- the future, how exactly can we benefit from sci-
ity which, in contemplation, is the unalloyed desire for truth, is entific progress, for example by influencing and
the very same quality of mind which, in action, is justice, and in
emotion is that universal love which can be given to all, and not constructively interacting with the ever-develop-
only to those who are judged useful or admirable”. The true value ing neuronal architecture of our brains on a mo-
of philosophy lies not just in its effects on our thoughts, but on
our lives, on our actions; “it makes us citizens of the universe”
lecular level, while not leaving the social context
(ibid., p. 116). out of consideration?
Metzinger, T. & Windt, J. M. (2015). What Does it Mean to Have an Open Mind?
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 0(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958571044 16 | 27
 www.open-mind.net

Who counts as a “healthy individual”? tain new norms become accepted in societal
The trivial point is that concepts like “normal practice. The scientific process, say, of optimiz-
mental functioning” or, say, “normal age-related ing textbook definitions, predictions, and thera-
cognitive decline” possess a statistical and a peutical success, therefore has a political dimen-
normative reading. The semantics of both types sion as well. It attempts to firmly ground theor-
of concepts change over time. For example, the etical entities such as “normal mental function-
statistical and descriptive features of “normal ing” or “normal age-related cognitive decline” in
mental functioning” or “normal age-related cog- empirical data, but it is also driven by indi-
nitive decline” change as science progresses, as vidual career interests, influenced by funding
the predictive success of our theories improves, agencies, media coverage, and so on.
and as textbook definitions are adapted. Our A third important example of how new
concepts become richer in content and more dif- ethical issues emerge is presented by the ques-
ferentiated. But if a specific society suddenly tion of animal consciousness and animal suffer-
has new tools and new potentials for action— ing. What is the ethics of creating suffering in
say, to alter certain cognitive functions in the non-human species in pursuit of uniquely hu-
elderly—then the statistical distribution of even man epistemic goals? Much recent research
those objective properties underlying a purely shows that many animals very likely are not
statistical notion of what is normal may also only conscious, but also self-conscious and able
change. Cognitive enhancement is a neurotech- to suffer (Brown 2015; Boly et al. 2013; Edel-
nology, and technologies change the objective man & Seth 2009; Seth et al. 2005). They rep-
world. Objective changes are subjectively per- resent a frustration of their own individual pref-
ceived and may lead to correlated shifts in value erences on the level of a consciously experienced
judgments. Concepts such as “healthy indi- self-model and thus own their sensory pain.
vidual,” “normal mental functioning” or “nor- They are also very likely unable to distance
mal age-related cognitive decline” always have themselves from negative emotions like fear,
not just a descriptive, but also a normative anxiety or depression. In the light of new and
reading, because they appear in statements better descriptive theories of consciousness, clas-
about what human beings should be like. Is it sical normative issues like animal ethics re-
really necessary to succumb to memory loss or a appear in new guise.
decreasing attention span after the age of 55? If Philosophical questions such as “What ex-
other options are actually on the table – does actly should count as an object of ethical con-
this turn passively succumbing to age-related sideration?” soon may also become relevant for
cognitive decline or certain, individually given the applied ethics of synthetic phenomenology,
limitations in high-level, abstract thought into a that is, for all research programs in artificial in-
form of unkemptness and dishevelment? telligence that risk or even directly intend the
In this example, the not-so-trivial chal- creation of phenomenal experience, of truly sub-
lenge lies in understanding the dynamic interac- jective, conscious states on non-biological hard-
tion between “normality” (in the descriptive ware. “Synthetic phenomenology” (synthetic
sense) and “normalization” (in the normative phenomenology (S)) is a concept first intro-
sense). The theoretical and social dynamics duced by J. Scott Jordan in 1998, explicitly par-
linking both concepts and their interpretation is alleling the idea of “synthetic biology”.12 The
highly complex. It involves scientific theories (in possibility of machine consciousness now is not
cognitive neuroscience, molecular neurobiology,
12 See Chrisley 2009, p. 68. SP encompasses a variety of different ap-
and psychopharmacology), applied philosophical proaches, methodologies, and disciplines, but what they all have in
ethics, changing cultural contexts, globalization, common is that they see SP as the construction or guided dynamical
self-organization of phenomenal states in artificial systems. They also
policy-making, as well as industrial lobbies try- share the deep-seated methodological intuition that any scientific ex-
ing to influence the historical change of our very planation of consciousness necessarily involves a systematic re-con-
own concepts and their meaning. Normalization struction of the target phenomenon. See Gamez (2008, pp. 887-910);
Holland & Goodman (2003); Holland et al. (2007); Chrisley &
is a complex sociocultural process by which cer- Parthemore (2007); Aleksander (2008) for a first overview.

Metzinger, T. & Windt, J. M. (2015). What Does it Mean to Have an Open Mind?
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 0(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958571044 17 | 27
 www.open-mind.net

only part of the “bigger picture” and the “wider important and highly controversial issues. We
context” mentioned above, but it also illustrates merely want to point out that having an open
how theoretical innovation may eventually lead mind also means cultivating a specific kind of
to technological innovation and require a careful sensitivity: a sensitivity for newly emerging eth-
assessment of possible risks. For example, the ical issues and for the obvious fact that the kind
Principle of Negative Synthetic Phenomenology of research we are all developing together does
(Metzinger 2013b, pp. 2-8) states an ethical not take place in a political, social or cultural
norm, which demands that, in artificial systems, vacuum, but also needs a self-critical sense of
we should not risk the unexpected emergence of responsibility to global society as a whole. New
conscious states belonging to the phenomenolo- conceptual bridges have to be built between ar-
gical category of “suffering” or even aim at the tificial intelligence, cognitive neuroscience,
direct creation of states that would increase the philosophy of mind and ethics. Once more, a
overall amount of suffering in the universe. But first and important step may be to carefully
how exactly are we to unpack the logical details consider the questions themselves, rather than
of this normative proposal? How does one ap- rushing into an answer or attempting to quickly
proach these types of questions in a rational implement mere technocratic solutions. Ulti-
and data-driven manner? Machine conscious- mately, all of these questions have a lot to do
ness, just like VR-technology, pharmaceutical with the classical philosophical problem of what
enhancement, and animal suffering is just yet a good life is.
another example of a topic where a lack of ima-
gination might prove dangerous and where an 4 Globalization and intercultural
open-minded approach is pertinent. philosophy
Perhaps one central aspect of this problem
is that in an increasing number of cases we will There is not only an ethics of science, there is
not only have to ask “What is a good action?”, also an ethics of globalization. It has to do with
but also “What is a good state of conscious- fairness and, for example, the willingness of the
ness?” Opening, cultivating and further devel- rich to relinquish some of their sovereignty for
oping one’s own mind clearly is in the spirit of the benefits of cooperation. Of course, there are
not only Cicero, Plato, and the Ancients – sys- technical issues behind philosophical notions
tematically increasing our own mental such as “global fairness”. But many would agree
autonomy seems to be a common ideal shared that we should distribute resources in a way
by many of mankind’s philosophical traditions. that helps the worst-off, and that the only way
However, the boundary conditions for this old of justifying giving more to those members of
philosophical project are beginning to change humanity who are already well off is if this
because the tools for manipulating or even cul- demonstrably improves the position of those in
tivating our own minds are constantly becoming the poorest and most dangerous parts of the
better, and exactly as a result of interdisciplin- world as well. Such debates apply to the global-
ary, empirical work in the Mind Sciences. If we ization of science and philosophy as well. In this
arrive at a comprehensive theory of conscious- context, it is interesting (and sobering) to note
ness, and if we develop ever more sophisticated how academic philosophy is one of those discip-
tools to alter the contents of subjective experi- lines in which the basic idea of making scholarly
ence, we will have to think hard about what a work available free of charge and free of usage
good state of consciousness is. There is no way restrictions online is most underdeveloped in
around it: as parts of neurotechnology lead to comparison to other fields of research. It is also
consciousness technology, new normative issues sobering to note that academic philosophy, pos-
arise and classical philosophical questions re- sibly more than other academic disciplines, con-
appear in new guise (Metzinger 2009). tinues to be dominated by white, Western (and
As editors of this collection, we do not mostly Anglo-Saxon) males. This is not just re-
want to take a specific position on any of these flected in philosophy departments themselves,
Metzinger, T. & Windt, J. M. (2015). What Does it Mean to Have an Open Mind?
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 0(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958571044 18 | 27
 www.open-mind.net

but also in well-known and widely consulted is not only that taxpayers should have access to
ranking systems, which are almost exclusively the results of all publicly funded work. A more
focused on Anglo-Saxon departments. We could central point is that, given globalization, we
do much better here, and in all of these re- now need a much more transcultural type of
spects. Of course, many of us have long realized philosophy. In order to realize this goal, one of
this, and we realize we are preaching to the the things we urgently need is to experiment
choir. What is needed now are viable ways of with is different formats of open access publish-
changing this situation. ing. In this way, we could finally create a uni-
Because of the nature of the Open MIND fied public sphere for research – a “global work-
collection, we want to focus on one single aspect space” for the science and philosophy of all hu-
here. One might argue that the current sub- mankind. Clearly, this in itself is not sufficient,
scription-based publishing system, which com- but is only a very first, necessary step.13 Still,
prises nearly all of the top-ranked journals that the historical transition we are all undergoing
especially young researchers strive to have on together is one where having an open mind
their CVs, is inherently conservative and, given clearly means publishing open access whenever
the context of academic globalization plus the possible – which in no way excludes addition-
urgent need for strengthening deeper forms of ally using, and paying for, traditional dissemin-
intercultural exchange, potentially leads to a ation formats as well. But in creating human-
“global closed-mindedness”, to a narrowing of ity’s global workspace, as Steven Harnad (2007)
intellectual and scholarly life. Typically, public- puts it, it now simply has become “… unethical
ally funded academics will be involved on differ- for the publishing tail to be allowed to continue
ent levels and in different stages of the publica- to wag the research dog.”
tion process, not only as authors, but also as re- “Intercultural philosophy” may sound
viewers, members on editorial boards, editors, good – but what does it really mean? Philo-
and so on. Indeed, these types of participation sophy was born at different places and at differ-
are awarded and often expected by hiring com- ent times, for example in India, in China, and
mittees. Yet, despite all of the hours of free in Europe. Philosophical thinking evolved in dif-
labor (from the perspective of the publishing ferent cultural contexts that were often quite in-
houses), the scientific publications that flow out dependent of each other and sometimes re-
of this process are often locked behind a pay- mained largely isolated for many centuries.
wall, giving authors only limited rights to dis- Globalization now forces us to face the need for
tribute their own research. More innovative creating novel forms of communication between
journals give authors the opportunity to publish philosophers as well as new forms of coopera-
their papers open access—in return for a hefty tion between different traditions and cultures.
publication fee that, once more, is most likely to Yet, this development is also an opportunity.
be funded by rich universities in affluent coun- The idea of “intercultural philosophy” certainly
tries. Again, we can, and should, do much bet- is not new, and there are many different ways of
ter. spelling it out. Here, we will confine us to point
Through their work, scientists and philo- out that, in our view, intercultural philosophy
sophers continuously produce knowledge and
new intellectual property. However, there is not 13 And new questions continuously arise. Is it, for instance, unethical to
publish one’s research in scientific journals or books that are not
only knowledge production, but also knowledge open access and therefore systematically exclude a large majority of
consumption – and the overall process has an students and researchers from the less affluent part of the world? If
you answer affirmatively to this question: Would you also say that it
economical basis. How should such goods be is unethical to consume research published in books or journals that
justly distributed? Who can participate in the are not open access? And do you think it is, in terms of civil dis -
obedience, permissible to disregard copyrights (and authors’ rights to
process of producing and consuming them? The royalties) to make such research, either your own or even that of oth-
world continues to be divided into “haves” and ers, openly available? This is just a small selection of potentially dif-
“have nots” when it comes to accessing the ficult questions facing today’s scholars and researchers. And people
are already acting upon their answers (see, for instance, Ludlow
fruits of the intellectual labor of humankind. It 2013).

Metzinger, T. & Windt, J. M. (2015). What Does it Mean to Have an Open Mind?
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 0(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958571044 19 | 27
 www.open-mind.net

should not be a new academic discipline, but 5 The sapiential dimension

that it is, again, an attitude, an increasingly im-
portant form of epistemic practice. Thanks to the internet and major technological
From the perspective of the history of advances, modern academic life is unfolding at a
ideas, it is noteworthy that Pyrrhonian skepti- greater speed than ever before. It has also be-
cism plausibly has a strong (and entirely mu- come more competitive than it ever was in the
tual) intercultural dimension as well. The prac- past. This development bears the promise of
tice of using standardized arguments involving progress; but it also poses a very real risk. As
opposing statements to cultivate positionless- universities are replacing tenure-track lines with
ness, suspension of judgment and epoché can be adjunct teachers, an increasing number of bril-
found in the Indian tradition as well, for in- liant young academics are now competing for
stance in the Madhyamaka tradition and in scarce resources in a globalized academic envir-
Nagarjuna’s writings. Textual evidence suggests onment, and acceleration as well as increased
that not only might Pyrrho himself have been social pressure are beginning to have psycholo-
inspired by ideas he came into contact with in gical effects on the individual researcher. A re-
India, but also that later, Sextus’s version of cent surge in the detection of fraud and sci-
Pyrrhonian skepticism might have shaped entific misconduct may be a sign of underlying
Nagarjuna’s Middle Way (Dreyfus & Garfield counterproductive incentives that have begun to
2010; Geldsetzer 2010; Kuzminski 2008). Having influence scientists world-wide. According to a
an open mind, in this sense, involves not only report in the journal Nature, published retrac-
bridging disciplinary cultures, but also integrat- tions in scientific journals have increased around
ing different research traditions from different 1,200% over the past decade, even though the
cultures and different periods and looking for number of published papers had gone up by
their common sources. only 44% (Van Noorden 2011). A detailed re-
Obviously, the open-minded “pooling of in- view of all 2,047 biomedical and life-science re-
tellectual resources” that was already mentioned search articles indexed by PubMed as retracted
above must increasingly also include philosoph- by May 3, 2012 revealed that only 21.3% of re-
ers not only from Europe or the Anglo-Saxon tractions were attributable to error (Fang et al.
world. From a traditional Western perspective, 2012). In contrast, 67.4% of retractions were at-
epistemic humility also means acknowledging tributable to misconduct, including fraud or
that other philosophical traditions may long ago suspected fraud (43.4%), duplicate publication
have had deep insights into theoretical problems (14.2%), and plagiarism (9.8%). It is also pos-
that still trouble us today, even if their know- sible, however, that the rising number of retrac-
ledge is not presented in a format and termino- tions is caused by a growing propensity to re-
logy that we are used to or can easily under- tract flawed and fraudulent papers and does not
stand. It would be intellectually dishonest to as- in fact involve a substantial increase in the pre-
sume that the style of thought developed in valence of misconduct (Fanelli 2013). These
Anglo-Saxon analytical philosophy is the only numbers might therefore also suggest an in-
way of being intellectually honest. And obvi- creasing willingness to retract faulty publica-
ously, if, as we do, one calls for an expansion of tions – or they might be artefacts of an in-
the principle of charity into interdisciplinary creased availability of data on such retractions.
discourse, then one should also accept that the We do not know what the final interpretation of
same principle applies to intercultural collabora- such data should be. But we do regard them as
tion. If there is a culture of charity, then it must one potential indicator of overheated competi-
be a global culture of charity – including open tion turned counterproductive.
access publishing and global fairness in the dis- In philosophy, there is also a high pressure
tribution of academic goods. Today, even more for specialization, and this historical develop-
so than in the past, this is another reading of ment presents a major problem. One classical
what it means to have an open mind. model of what philosophy is says that philo-
Metzinger, T. & Windt, J. M. (2015). What Does it Mean to Have an Open Mind?
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 0(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958571044 20 | 27
 www.open-mind.net

sopher are “specialists for the general”, who are be accumulated in an incremental and system-
concerned with integrating the knowledge of atic way, but wisdom has to do with synthesiz-
their time into an overarching conceptual ing very different kinds of knowledge in ways
model. As one German idealist philosopher put that are practically relevant, for example with
it, philosophy “is its own time comprehended in respect to knowing what a good life is and, im-
thought”.14 Today, the realization of this vision portantly, also with being successful at living a
has long become an impossible task for even the good life (Ryan 2014). This in turn may include
greatest scholar. The sheer number of publica- actively minimizing the number of unjustified
tions in any given, specialized area of research - beliefs one has and continuously maximizing the
like embodied cognition, self-consciousness, or coherence between one’s beliefs, values, and
the evolution of culture and complex societies - one’s actions. Perhaps, wisdom can also be
has become so large that it is extremely difficult characterized by a sustained striving for accur-
for any ambitious young philosopher to even get acy and for the possession of a wide variety of
an overview of the field. At the research fron- epistemically justified beliefs on a wide variety
tier, great progress has been made in the fine- of relevant subjects – with one such subject be-
grained differentiation of research questions, ing the deep structure of the human mind itself.
while conceptual precision, argumentational Tackling this problem may involve a commit-
density, and the general speed with which of ment to a deeper form of rationality that in-
technical debates are conducted is continuously cludes not only epistemic humility, but
rising. This historical shift has become particu- heightened sensitivity towards moral issues and
larly obvious in philosophy of mind. In the age one’s limitations in both fields. Whatever your
of cognitive neuroscience and Bayesian modeling personal definition of “wisdom” may be, we
“raising one’s own age to the level of thought”, hope that the contributions in this collection
as Hegel put it, simply has become an im- demonstrate how deeply relevant current work
possible task. On the other hand, philosophers in the Mind Sciences could be precisely for a re-
of mind are not embedded journalists of the newed, secularized understanding of what we
neuroscience industry. A philosopher’s task mean by the sapiential dimension.
today clearly goes far beyond offering methodo- It now has become dramatically obvious
logical criticism plus a bit of applied ethics. that something has been lost along the way.
Philosophers should not confine themselves to Academic life has become distinctly unphilo-
laying and clarifying some conceptual founda- sophical. Professionalization, acceleration, and
tions or just developing a local, domain-specific excessive competition have led us into a form of
“conceptual commentary” on the general way in academic life that now very rarely can be de-
which the empirical Mind Sciences change our scribed as a good life. First, it seems safe to say
perspective on reality and the human mind’s that many of the best and leading researchers
position in it. In the future, philosophers must are not very successful at living a good life –
more actively introduce their own epistemic tar- even if they are philosophers who, at least at
gets into the overall process as well. Failure to the beginning of their careers, may have had a
do is to exercise a counterproductive sort of epi- great interest in exactly what a “good” life in
stemic humility—and runs the risk of letting the philosophical sense might be. Second, over-
academic philosophy slip into irrelevance. heated competition increasingly draws people
Having an open mind also means that into the field who are predominantly interested
there are no taboo topics. At the outset, philo- in competition and professional success per se,
sophy was the “love of wisdom” and, as every- and not so much in the growth of knowledge, let
body knows, knowledge and wisdom are not the alone wisdom. But intellectual superiority and
same thing. Knowledge is something that can intellectual honesty are different things, just as
knowledge and wisdom are. In academic philo-
14 Hegel, in the preface to the Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed.
Allen W. Wood, trans. H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
sophy, the sapiential dimension, in which theor-
University Press, 1991. etical insight and practical know-how are deeply
Metzinger, T. & Windt, J. M. (2015). What Does it Mean to Have an Open Mind?
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 0(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958571044 21 | 27
 www.open-mind.net

interwoven, has now been lost almost com- is rational and intellectually honest. Obviously,
pletely, and one aspect of what it means to have what we call the “sapiential dimension” here is
an open mind – as opposed to just being profes- something that has nothing to do with any kind
sional, knowledgeable, and smart – is to be of theology or organized religion. And we sus-
aware of this fact and to be ready to face it. pect that the real value of what was called
We, the editors, do not know exactly what “first-person methods” above may lie not in
philosophy really is – but we are convinced that supporting dubious metaphysical arguments,
whatever it is, it is deeply connected with a but exactly in their potential for reintroducing
particular kind of attitude that reaches back all the sapiential dimension into academic philo-
the way to the skeptical tradition, East and sophy. But we also want to point out that this
West. Philosophy at its best is not just purely could simply be empirically false and that to
academic or technical: it is also a practice, a have an open mind does not mean to have an-
way of life, and these theoretical and practical swers. Sometimes it is enough to remain with
dimensions are not completely independent of the question, to simply see it for what it is and
each other. This is what we mean when we say face the facts. There is an absolutely real and
that academic philosophy would greatly profit serious problem here – and we think that it
from a sapiential dimension. And if we are right might be exactly philosophy of mind and mod-
to say that philosophy is, among other things, ern cognitive neuroscience that could, and per-
an epistemic practice, a particular style of haps should, make the major, decisive contribu-
thinking resulting from the cultivation of an tion. As we already said when sketching the
open minded attitude (and one that is skeptical, problem of subjectivity: To have an open mind
we might add, in the most constructive sense), means to acknowledge (and not repress) the fact
then this also suggests a new reading of what it that there may actually be a set of deeper
means to say that philosophy has an important metatheoretical ambiguities here. Having an
role to play in the Mind Sciences. Asking for an open mind can also consist in admitting the ex-
interaction between cognitive neuroscience and istence of a problem – and that is all we want
philosophy as disciplines is one thing – but ask- to do here.
ing for the introduction of a particular way of
thinking and a particular type of collaborative 6 Developing new forms of
practice – a more genuinely philosophical atti- interdiscplinarity
tude – into scientific research is another. We
hope that by now it is clear that we, the edit- Taking empirical constraints into account has be-
ors, think philosophy can contribute to the come absolutely central in current philosophy of
Mind Sciences in both respects, as an academic mind. However, there are different models of what
discipline and as an epistemic practice. Still, good interdisciplinary practice is and how empir-
what we have been discussing here under the ical constraints are to be satisfied or integrated.
heading of open mindedness is first and fore- Interdisciplinary philosophy of mind does not
most an example of philosophy as an epistemic simply consist in turning away from old-school
practice—and as such it can be quite independ- armchair philosophy, which sometimes took intu-
ent of philosophy as an academic discipline. itions as input to philosophical work. And it
Therefore, we think that an important goal is to would be false to say that “pure” philosophy has
put philosophy, in this practical and classical no place in the newly unfolding scheme of things
sense, back into philosophy in the academic – there is clearly relevant and highly valuable
sense as well. work that has only a small empirical component,
This might well be the biggest challenge or perhaps even none at all. One aspect of the
for the future. And we openly admit that we Open MIND approach is that young philosophers
have no ready-made answer to the question of should increasingly become active as experi-
how to re-introduce the sapiential dimension menters themselves, for instance by proposing epi-
into modern academic philosophy, in a way that stemic targets and novel experimental designs to
Metzinger, T. & Windt, J. M. (2015). What Does it Mean to Have an Open Mind?
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 0(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958571044 22 | 27
 www.open-mind.net

empirical researchers and even by joining their they made analytical philosophy one of the
colleagues from different disciplines to work on strongest intellectual currents of the 20th century.
shared research projects. Another aspect, as But we are now slowly moving from thought ex-
already noted earlier, is that our point about the periments to real experiments. And while it is
extended principle of charity applies not only to clear that an open-minded philosophy of mind
the relationship between disciplines, but also to should not be strictly or exclusively data-driven,
that between different generations of researchers. it is equally true that it should be both empiric-
We are learning as we go along. Perhaps ally informed and informative, guided (but not
most centrally and most obviously, to have an constrained) by empirical data and theoretical-
open mind means to acknowledge the fact there conceptual considerations alike.
has long been an “interdisciplinary turn” in philo- In the end, there is a sociological aspect to
sophy of mind, but that the real task consists in the current transition in our understanding of
creatively testing out and developing entirely new what good philosophy amounts to as well. Max
types of interdisciplinary cooperation. For ex- Planck, the German theoretical physicist who ori-
ample, it is important to preserve a critical spirit ginated quantum theory and won the Nobel Prize
and an openly inquisitive mindset – interdisciplin- in Physics in 1918, famously said: “A new sci-
arity must never be purely decorative, a fashion- entific truth does not triumph by convincing its
able necessity, or reduced to a rhetorical element opponents and making them see the light, but
in edifying Sunday speeches. Along the way, we rather because its opponents eventually die, and a
will also need a new understanding of progress, of new generation grows up that is familiar with it”
acceptable forms of inquiry and methods, as well (1948). As the editors of a collection promoting,
as new measures of success, for instance concern- among other things, senior-junior interaction, we
ing novel forms of collaboration and publication think this may be a bit too pessimistic—and once
formats that are still under the radar of institu- more, we leave it to our readers to decide how
tionalized impact factors. successful this interaction was here. One of our
To give a second example, the newly experiences with the MIND Group is, however,
emerged discipline of neuroethics is an important that there is a difference between what one might
and innovative form of interdisciplinary philo- call “junior mentoring” and “senior mentoring”.
sophy, but it should never indirectly contribute to Junior researchers need friends in neighboring dis-
moral hypocrisy, ultimately being a fig leaf used ciplines whom they can trust and ask about liter-
by others to cover the failure to directly and ature, current trends, and technical issues that
open-mindedly address the political issues in- are hard to understand. Our experience is that in-
volved. If interdisciplinarity becomes merely stra- terdisciplinary exchange works best in excellent
tegic (e.g., in dealing with funding agencies) or is young people who are not yet on the job market,
really guided by off-topic motives, then it loses its and in non-competitive situations in which at
systematic force and becomes counterproductive best no holders of academic resources are present,
and stale. Interdisciplinary philosophy of mind is such as senior researchers who have grants, post-
not simply about being empirically informed, or doc positions, etc. to give away. Good and estab-
about introducing strong and fine-grained “bot- lished systems of senior-junior-mentoring already
tom-up constraints” in the formation of new the- exist, but we believe that given the current situ-
ories about mind and consciousness. It may actu- ation, junior-junior-mentoring is an important re-
ally be about the emergence a new type of re- source to be developed as well. For this reason, in
searcher. We like the idea of “dyed-in-the-wool in- the Open MIND project, we installed a form of
terdisciplinarity”, where “dyed-in-the-wool” is not junior-junior mentoring during the anonymous
used in a pejorative sense but indicates that peer review process for commentaries. And while
young philosophers have learned how to think in a replies can be seen as a form of senior-junior
way that transgresses boundaries between discip- mentoring, there was also, covertly in the form of
lines, naturally and effortlessly. Intuition-based target article reviews, a phase of junior-senior
approaches were the classical approaches, and mentoring, in which some of our junior members
Metzinger, T. & Windt, J. M. (2015). What Does it Mean to Have an Open Mind?
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 0(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958571044 23 | 27
 www.open-mind.net

not only wrote their first reviews ever, but now, References
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Beyond Componential Constitution in
the Brain
Starburst Amacrine Cells and Enabling Constraints

Michael L. Anderson

Componential mechanism (Craver 2008) is an increasingly influential framework Author

for understanding the norms of good explanation in neuroscience and beyond.
Componential mechanism “construes explanation as a matter of decomposing sys-
Michael L. Anderson
tems into their parts and showing how those parts are organized together in such
michael.anderson @ fandm.edu
a way as to exhibit the explanandum phenomenon” (Craver 2008, p. 109). Al-
though this clearly describes some instances of successful explanation, I argue Franklin & Marshall College
here that as currently formulated the framework is too narrow to capture the full Lancaster, PA, U.S.A.
range of good mechanistic explanations in the neurosciences. The centerpiece of
this essay is a case study of Starburst Amacrine Cells—a type of motion-sensitive Commentator
cell in mammalian retina—for which function emerges from structure in a way that
appears to violate the conditions specified by componential mechanism as cur- Axel Kohler
rently conceived. I argue that the case of Starburst Amacrine Cells should move axelkohler @ web.de
us to replace the notion of mechanistic componential constitution with a more Universität Osnabrück
general notion of enabling constraint. Introducing enabling constraints as a con- Osnabrück, Germany
ceptual tool will allow us to capture and appropriately characterize a wider class
of structure-function relationships in the brain and elsewhere. Editors
Keywords
Thomas Metzinger
Componential constitution | Constitution | Constraint | Enabling constraint | Ex-
metzinger @ uni-mainz.de
planation | Functional levels | Levels | Mechanisms | Mechanistic explanation |
Neuroscientific explanation | Spatial levels | Starburst amacrine cells | Structure Johannes Gutenberg-Universität
function mapping Mainz, Germany

Jennifer M. Windt
jennifer.windt @ monash.edu
Monash University
Melbourne, Australia

1 Introduction

How, in the brain or any other system, does and showing how those parts are organized to-
specific function arise from underlying struc- gether in such a way as to exhibit the explanan-
ture? The question is a general one, and also in dum phenomenon” (Craver 2008, p. 109; see
some sense a vague one, for it asks simultan- also Craver this collection). This is an attractive
eously about how structures shape events—gen- idea as it is expressed, but what I hope to illus-
erate causes—and also about what kinds of ex- trate here is that the leading formalizations of
planations one should aim for in neuroscience. this general idea (Craver 2008; Craver &
Here I will focus on the second question in the Bechtel 2007) place overly restrictive conditions
hope of partially illuminating the first. One in- on good mechanistic explanation. In what fol-
creasingly influential class of answers to this lows, I lay out the norms of mechanistic explan-
second question “construes explanation as a ation, as developed by Craver and Bechtel, and
matter of decomposing systems into their parts describe some cases that their model nicely cap-
Anderson, M. L. (2015). Beyond Componential Constitution in the Brain - Starburst Amacrine Cells and Enabling Constraints.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 1(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570429 1 | 13
 www.open-mind.net

tures. I then introduce the case of Starburst In levels of mechanisms, an item X is at a

Amacrine Cells (SACs)—a type of motion-sens- lower level than an item S if and only if X
itive cell in mammalian retina. In SACs, and in is a component in the mechanism for some
the functionally coupled direction-selective gan- activity ψ of S. X is a component in a
glion cells, the function-structure relationship is mechanism if and only if it is one of the
hard to capture within the Craver/Bechtel entities or activities organized such that S
mechanistic framework. I argue that we can bet- ψ’s. For that is what mechanisms are:
ter capture such cases by replacing the notion of they are entities and activities organized
mechanistic componential constitution with the such that they exhibit a phenomenon. Sci-
more general notion of enabling constraints. entists discover lower levels by decompos-
ing the behavior of a mechanism into the
2 The requirements of mechanistic behaviors of its component parts, decom-
explanation posing the behaviors of the parts into the
behaviors of their parts, and so on. (2007,
Craver (2008) sharply distinguishes between pp. 548–549)1
two traditions of understanding scientific ex-
planation: reductive explanation and systems As already noted, S is the system that ψs, or
explanation. According to Craver, the first that exhibits phenomenon. It is, for instance,
tradition accepts a version of the covering law the car (S) that accelerates ( ψ), and to ex -
model of explanation (Hempel 1965) whereby plain car acceleration will require identifying
one explains regularities at a given level of or- the components {X} that matter to S ψ-ing.
ganization by showing how these regularities To identify these components and their organ-
(the laws describing events and their rela- ization is to explicate the mechanism M that
tions) can be derived from theories holding at accounts for S ψ-ing. The target of mechan -
lower levels. Put differently, one explains a istic explanations of this sort is ψ: “mechan -
phenomenon of interest by showing how it is istic explanations are framed by the explanan-
to be expected based on the laws governing dum phenomenon” (Craver 2008, p. 121) and
activity at lower levels of organization. This “[t]he explanandum of a mechanistic explana-
tradition is reductive because when such ex- tion is a phenomenon, typically some behavior
planations are successful, one can strictly of a mechanism as a whole” (Craver 2008, p.
speaking do without the higher-level laws. 139).
However convenient they may be for under- In mechanistic explanation, a given X is a
standing or predicting higher-level phenom- component of the mechanism M if and only if it
ena, the higher-level laws do not add, capture, is one of the entities organized such that S ex-
or explain any facts that are not already con- hibits some phenomenon ψ. So the engine, the
tained in the lower-level laws. The lower-level accelerator, and the gas tank, but not the mud-
laws are scientifically sufficient. flaps or the windshield wipers are components
In contrast, in the systems tradition, a of M that explain the car accelerating, even
phenomenon of interest ψ exhibited by a sys - though these are all parts of the car S. In an
tem S is explained by identifying a set of com-
ponent parts {X} and showing how they are 1 There is a terminological issue that needs to be raised at the outset to
avoid confusion. Craver & Bechtel (2007; Craver 2008) usually, but not
organized such that S ψs. A systems explana- always, use S to refer to a mechanism. In contrast, I will always use S to
tion is similar to reductive explanation in that refer to the system or entity exhibiting the explanandum phenomenon ψ,
and I introduce the symbol M to refer to the responsible mechanism. I
it too relies on the identification of levels of do this because M and S are clearly not identical. Moreover, they are (or
organization, since it requires identifying the at least appear to me) to be distinguished in this passage, at least on one
reading. I think it is unfortunate that neither Craver nor Bechtel form-
parts of the system S, but, as I note below, it ally and consistently distinguish the system S and the mechanism M in
does not aim thereby at the reduction or ex- their analysis, for reasons that will become clear at the end of this sec-
planatory absorption of one level by another. tion. Here I’ll attempt to faithfully capture the essence of the Craver–
Bechtel mechanistic framework, were it to have included this important
Craver & Bechtel write: distinction.

Anderson, M. L. (2015). Beyond Componential Constitution in the Brain - Starburst Amacrine Cells and Enabling Constraints.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 1(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570429 2 | 13
 www.open-mind.net

ideal explanation, the mechanism defined by the and Bechtel, functional levels and spatial
parts {X} will contain all and only the compon- levels generally align.
ents relevant to S ψ-ing (see Craver 2008 for a Thus, although componential mechanistic
discussion of constitutive relevance in this con- explanations are not reductive, they generally
text). To identify the parts of M is thus to spe- are what one would call “bottom-up”, or per-
cify both a hierarchical and a functional rela- haps better in this context, “level-restricted”:
tionship between M and its parts, and between one explains the phenomenon ψ in S by refer-
M and S. ence to entities and relations at a lower level of
But although mechanistic explanation in- organization, but never the reverse. In compon-
volves essential reference to hierarchical rela- ential explanations of this sort, the intrinsic
tionships between levels of organization, it is properties of and interactions between the
not thereby a species of reductive explanation mechanism’s components account for a system’s
because in a successful systems explanation actions (where “intrinsic” means that such
nothing is rendered inessential or redundant. properties—such as the charge of an ion—are
The phenomenon ψ is neither derived nor deriv- either basic to the entity or accounted for by
able from laws governing the parts of M; rather, reference to entities and properties at a still
the parts {X} and their relationships simply are lower level of organization). Good mechanistic
M, and together explain why S ψs. The explan- explanations on this view will not include refer-
atory relationship is not rational derivation, but ences to unanalyzed properties of the whole S
functional composition: M is physically and or M, its “shape” or overall organization, as the
functionally constituted by its parts, and S ψs relations between the components {X} at the
in virtue of that constitution. lower level will already account for (in fact con-
stitute) these.
Mechanistic explanations are constitutive This account of mechanistic explanation
or componential explanations: they explain seems to me a clear and, indeed, compelling
the behavior of the mechanism as a whole model of one kind of explanatory practice in the
in terms of the organized activities and in- neurosciences. To satisfy the norms of mechan-
teractions of its components. Components istic explanation, one must:
are the entities in a mechanism—what are
commonly called ‘parts’. (Craver 2008, p.
128)2 1. Identify the phenomenon of interest ψ
2. Identify the system S that ψs
Given all this we can add one more criterion 3. Identify the relevant spatial sub-parts {X} of
for a given X being a part of the mechanism M (and their relevant intrinsic properties)
M: each X must be not just a functional but 4. Describe how the parts {X} are organized
also a spatial sub-part of M. As a component such that S ψs
of M, X will be at a lower level than M, and
smaller than M: “[b]ecause mechanisms are At least prima facie, a number of instances of
collections of components and their activities, successful (albeit incomplete) explanatory mod-
no component can be larger than the mechan- els in the neurosciences appear to neatly fit this
ism as a whole, and so levels of mechanisms description. Craver (2008) extensively discusses
are ordered by size” (Craver & Bechtel 2007, the mechanistic model of the action potential.
pp. 549–550). Craver and Bechtel conclude: Briefly, following the steps above:
“[m]ost fundamentally, levels of mechanisms
are a species of compositional, or part-whole 1. The phenomenon ψ is the action potential,
relations” (Craver & Bechtel 2007, p. 550). In which consists of the rapid depolarization of
the overall framework developed by Craver neural cells from a resting membrane poten-
2 Note that within this framework “componential mechanism”, “con-
tial of approximately –70mV toward (and in
stitutive mechanism”, and “compositional mechanism” are synonymous. many cases significantly exceeding) 0mV; an
Anderson, M. L. (2015). Beyond Componential Constitution in the Brain - Starburst Amacrine Cells and Enabling Constraints.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 1(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570429 3 | 13
 www.open-mind.net

equally rapid repolarization; a period of hy- erties, actions, and interactions of M’s spatial
perpolarization, where the cell overshoots the sub-parts together comprise the mechanism that
normal resting potential; and a gradual re- allows S to ψ and thus explain how S ψs. One
turn to the resting equilibrium (note that as can likewise plausibly sketch the mechanisms that
even this simplified sketch illustrates, ψ will account for spatial long-term memory (e.g., the
often be in and of itself complex, with many ability of an animal to return to some location in
aspects that any adequate model must cap- its environment) in terms of long-term potenti-
ture). ation of synapses in the hippocampus (Craver
2. The system S that ψs is the neuron. 2008), although it is worth noting that a more
3. The parts in virtue of which S ψs include ele- complete account of the functions of hippocampus
ments of the cell and its surrounding ionic will have some of the features I describe in 3 and
milieu: positively charged K+ and Na+ ions; 4 (Buckner 2010; Anderson 2015). Still, the fact
gated, ion-specific membrane channels; and that some explanations in neuroscience are like
the Na+/K+ pump. this is not under significant dispute.
4. Finally, the organization that explains ψ in - But this brings us to the question of why
cludes the following: The resting potential I have distinguished M and S in my treat-
is in fact an equilibrium between two op- ment. Because Craver (2008) does not form-
posing forces: a chemical concentration ally distinguish these, he is never led to ask
gradient that pushes Na+ into the cell and what the precise relationship is (or could be)
K+ out of it, and an electrical gradient between M and S (and between their respect-
that pushes K+ into the cell, each main- ive parts). In fact, for Craver the symbol S
tained by the selective permeability of the usually (but not always) refers to what I have
cell to Na+ and K+. Na+ channels change been calling M, and he frames his analysis of
their conformation in response to current mechanistic composition entirely in terms of ψ
flow (they are voltage-gated) such that they and its mechanism. When he does mention the
open to allow Na+ to flow into the cell. As larger system it is generally to emphasize the
Na+ flows into the cell this reduces the fact that not every part of a system S is relev-
electrostatic pressure on K+, and opens ant to the mechanism in virtue of which it ψs.
voltage-gated K+ channels, allowing K+ to So what might the committed mechanist say
flow out of the cell. The net effect is to about the relationships between S, M and
push the cell initially toward the electro- {X}? One possibility is: all the parts {X} of
chemical balance point for Na+, which is M will be on a lower level than S. That would
about +55mV. However, as the membrane be in keeping with the level-restricted charac-
potential drops, the Na+ channels close, ter of the framework, and its characteristic
thus slowing and eventually stopping the alignment between spatial and functional
depolarization. The diffusion of K+ out of levels. It is certainly a feature of all the ex-
the cell combines with the activity of the amples discussed in its support, including the
Na+/K+ pump to repolarize the cell, which model of the action potential outlined above.
however overshoots the resting potential A slightly stronger possibility would be: all
due to the fact that the K+ channels close the parts {X} of M will be spatial sub-parts of
later than the Na+ channels, thus allowing S. I don’t think anyone would or should en-
K+ to diffuse out of the cell for an extra dorse this stronger condition, but seeing why
millisecond or so during which the cell is will be instructive, and will lead us to the
hyper-polarized. reasons to reject the weaker formulation as
well.3
Obviously, this remains a sketch (see Craver 3 On my reading, the framework developed in (Craver 2008) implicitly as-
2008) or any basic neuroscience textbook for sumes the weaker condition, although most likely not the stronger one.
more detail), but it illustrates the main elements But for my purposes here it is not crucial to pin this down. If the frame-
work does assume the weaker condition, what follows should be read as
of a mechanistic explanation. The intrinsic prop- arguing (contra this model) that there are systems for which functional

Anderson, M. L. (2015). Beyond Componential Constitution in the Brain - Starburst Amacrine Cells and Enabling Constraints.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 1(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570429 4 | 13
 www.open-mind.net

The immediate trouble with the stronger every X needs to be a spatial sub-part of S,
formulation is that it collides with a fact then there is little reason to suppose that each
noted by Craver (2008), but not otherwise dis- X needs to be on a lower level than S, either.
cussed: the mechanism that accounts for S ψ- Indeed, I claim that in fact for some systems
ing may contain parts that are extrinsic to S S the mechanism M will contain items that
(although not to M). For instance, in the are neither intrinsic to nor at a lower level
mechanism for the action potential, the Na + than S. For instance, I often use other people
and K+ ions that are clearly part of M are (at to help me remember things, in the easiest
least sometimes) extrinsic to S; and in embod- case by asking them to remind me at some fu-
ied accounts of some cognitive processes like ture time. In such a case, this other individual
mathematics, the mechanism that accounts for is arguably part of the mechanism responsible
a person (P) multiplying (ψm-ing) contains for my remembering, but is certainly not for
parts that are always extrinsic to P, such as that reason on a lower ontological level than I
pencil and paper (Clark 1997; see also this am, qua remembering system. Moreover, as I
collection). These entities would arguably not will argue when looking at the case discussed
be components of the systems that ψ, al - below, some relevant parts of M (and certainly
though they would be components of the M itself) are at a higher organizational level
mechanisms in virtue of which they ψ. At the than S. Now of course, Craver & Bechtel
very least, this suggests there are some details define the concept of lower level in terms of
yet to be worked out about the necessary being a part of the mechanism: “an item X is
physical relationships between M and S that at a lower level than an item S if and only if
implement the hierarchical and functional re- X is a component in the mechanism for some
lationships in virtue of which M can account activity ψ of S” (2007, p. 548). I agree that
for S ψ-ing. There will be (presumably rare) this holds for the constitutive relationship
cases in which M and S are identical; cases between mechanisms and their parts. But it
such as the accelerating car where M contains only holds for all systems S if we assume that
only parts of S; and cases such as the action all the parts of M are parts of S, and we have
potential where M and S cross-cut one an- seen that this is not always the case. Thus al-
other, sharing some but not all of their parts. 4 though I think that Craver correctly analyzes
There may also turn out to be cases in which the relationship between mechanisms and
they share no parts, perhaps because the parts their parts in terms of constitution, I argue
of M and the parts of S are individuated by that the more capacious notion of enabling
different criteria, or because S’s ability to ψ is constraint better captures the relationship
imposed by or inherited from an entirely ex- between mechanisms and the systems whose
trinsic mechanism (indeed I’ll discuss a poten- activities they enable.
tial instance of this class of cases later in the In any case, with this as background, I
paper). now turn to the case of the SAC. In 3, I de-
But distinguishing M and S in this way scribe what we know about how the mechan-
also allows one to ask whether all the parts of isms in virtue of which the cell operates, and
M need to be at a lower level than S. If not in 4 I discuss the implications of this case for
componential mechanistic explanation.
and spatial levels in fact dissociate. If it does not, then what follows
should be read simply as offering an account of some of the possible 3 Direction selectivity in SAC dendrites:
functional relationships between mechanisms and systems, an issue not
explored in the original analysis. Either path leads to the same recom- Beyond componential constitution
mended modification of the original model.
4 In the case of the action potential, one might mount the argument
that the system that ψs is strictly speaking S + {the nominally non- Starburst Amacrine Cells are axonless neurons
S parts of M}, including the surrounding extracellular fluid. That found in the retina of mammals and numerous
would make M part of S in this case, but it is not clear to me that
this move will be equally attractive in every such case, nor do I think
non-mammalian species. Their morphology is
the mechanist is forced to adopt this strategy. planar, with multiple dendrites arrayed, as the
Anderson, M. L. (2015). Beyond Componential Constitution in the Brain - Starburst Amacrine Cells and Enabling Constraints.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 1(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570429 5 | 13
 www.open-mind.net

name suggests, in a starburst pattern around apses between SACs and ganglion cells remain
the cell body (Figure 1). (Masland 2005).

Figure 2: Depiction of the SAC network in peripheral

retina. Calibration bar 50µm. Reprinted from Tauchi &
Masland (1984).
Figure 1: Micrograph of a Starburst Amacrine Cell. Cal-
ibration bar 50µm. Reprinted from Tauchi & Masland Functionally, SACs play an important role
(1984). in motion detection, and are part of the overall
network for multiple uses including optokinetic
SACs form dense, highly overlapping, co- eye movement and motion perception (Yoshida
fasciculating layers in the “on” and “off” levels et al. 2001). In fact, each dendrite of the SAC
of the inner synaptic layer of the retina, nestled acts independently of the others, and signals the
physically and functionally between bipolar cells presence of stimuli moving centrifugally, that is,
and direction-selective ganglion cells. Among from the cell body out in the direction of the
the most numerous neural cells found in the signaling dendrite (Euler et al. 2002; see Figure
mammalian retina, they represent a large pro- 3). Put differently, each SAC dendrite is a direc-
portion of the total neural volume in the eye; in tionally selective spatial sub-part of the overall
the rabbit retina, for example, as much as six cell, and this is the functional property that will
meters of SAC dendrites occupy each square interest us here. As with so much in the neuros-
millimeter of retinal surface—higher coverage ciences, the mechanism that explains this func-
than any other retinal cell by an order of mag- tion is complex and not fully understood. It is,
nitude (Masland 2005; Tauchi & Masland 1984; however, possible to offer a sketch of it.
see Figure 2). As mentioned above, SACs lie between bi-
SACs are interesting for multiple reas- polar cells and direction-selective ganglion cells.
ons. Despite lacking axons, they synthesize Bipolar cells thus mediate the initial stimulus
and release both excitatory and inhibitory such that a moving light causes them to fire in
neurotransmitters (ACh (acetylcholine) and turn as the stimulus moves across the retina.
GABA (-Aminobutyric acid)) from the distal The bipolar cells make excitatory synapses onto
regions of their dendrites. Both the role and the SAC dendrites.5 With these basic anatom-
relative proportion of excitatory and inhibit- ical facts in view, we can turn to describing
ory synaptic connections change over time.
Cholinergic synaptic connections between 5 In fact there are two classes of bipolar cells, “on” and “off”, function-
ally differentiated by their disposition to respond to stimulus onset
neighboring SACs disappear over develop- vs. stimulus offset—i.e., one responds to light and the other to dark
ment, and GABAergic connections between —and anatomically distinguished by whether they synapse onto the
“on” or “off” level of the inner synaptic layer (Figure 4). As the
SACs begin as excitatory but later become in- mechanisms for direction selectivity in SAC dendrites are the same
hibitory. However, excitatory cholinergic syn- regardless, I’ll ignore this detail in what follows.

Anderson, M. L. (2015). Beyond Componential Constitution in the Brain - Starburst Amacrine Cells and Enabling Constraints.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 1(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570429 6 | 13
 www.open-mind.net

three different aspects of the overall mechanism Another important part of the mechanism
for direction selectivity: wiring specificity for directional selectivity involves mutual inhibi-
between bipolar cells and the SAC dendrites; tion between neighboring SACs (Figure 5). As a
lateral inhibition between neighboring SACs; stimulus moves so as to stimulate the centrifu-
and active elements in the dendrites themselves. gal dendrite of SAC1 (in Figure 5A), reinforcing
inputs will cause the release of GABA onto the
centripetal dendrite of SAC0, such that even
when the light stimuli begins to excite the cent-
ripetal dendrite of SAC0, the leading inhibition
dominates the signal. Similarly, as the stimulus
moves to the centrifugal dendrite of SAC0, the
successive excitatory inputs from the bipolar
cells reinforce, and any inhibitory inputs from
the neighboring SAC2 come too late. Moreover,
SAC0 will largely inhibit SAC2’s response (Fig-
ure 5B; Lee & Zhou 2006). An important ele-
ment of this mechanism involves the relative
time-course of ACh and GABA: ACh response
from the bipolar cells ramps up and decays
fairly quickly, while GABA response is relat-
ively delayed and prolonged (Demb 2007). This
temporal asymmetry helps ensure that when in-
hibition leads it dominates, and vice-versa. The
distance between SACs also plays a role. The
Figure 3: Depiction of direction selectivity in SAC dend- likelihood of synaptic connections between the
rites. Reprinted from Masland (2005). distal portion of the dendrites of two SACs—
where inhibitory connections are most effective
First, the axonal projections of bipolar cells —depends on the distance between the cell bod-
largely preserve the topography of their inputs, ies. Cells that are very close together or very far
such that neighboring axons come from cells with apart will thus not mutually inhibit one another
neighboring inputs, and make neighboring syn- (Figure 5C).
apses onto post-synaptic cells. What this arrange- Finally, direction selectivity depends upon
ment means for SACs is that neighboring syn- properties of the dendrite itself. The dendrites
apses on the dendrite are likely to come from are electrically isolated from one another, as a
neighboring bipolar cells, so that when a moving result of both overall cell morphology and the
stimulus activates one cell, and then another im- low impedance of the cell body. The uneven dis-
mediately to its left (say), this will tend to activ- tribution of synaptic inputs and outputs also
ate a given synapse, and then another immedi- contributes: excitatory inputs from the bipolar
ately to its left. Thus, in the case where such a cells are distributed along the length of the
stimulus moves along the direction of a dendritic dendrite, but synaptic outputs are confined to
process, the successive excitatory inputs to that the distal ends (as implied by the two aspects of
dendrite will tend to reinforce (Demb 2007; Lee & the overall mechanism described above). A
Zhou 2006). This is an important part of the third, active aspect of the local dendritic por-
overall mechanism, but is not sufficient by itself tion of the mechanism appears to involve
to produce the observed directional selectivity, as voltage-gated calcium channels. These channels
these inputs would tend to reinforce even during lead to amplification of the ACh response bey-
centripetal motion, although this would result in ond what the passive reinforcement caused by
a weaker response at the distal process of the successive synaptic transmission from bipolar
dendrite (Hausselt et al. 2007). cells can account for (Hausselt et al. 2007).
Anderson, M. L. (2015). Beyond Componential Constitution in the Brain - Starburst Amacrine Cells and Enabling Constraints.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 1(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570429 7 | 13
 www.open-mind.net

as a result of the different temporal activation

profiles of GABA and ACh; the asymmetric dis-
tribution of input and output synapses; and the
relative spatial placement of the SACs. And
voltage-gated calcium channels in the dendrite
actively amplify the centrifugal signal. Although
this sketch leaves out many of the known de-
tails, and there remain many details still to be
worked out, I believe it is sufficient to warrant
the conclusion that this is (a) an instance of
mechanistic explanation that (b) does not have
the level-restricted character of the (canonical)
mechanistic explanations laid out above. I spell
out the reasons for this conclusion in the next
section.

4 Constitution and constraint

We can most readily see why this case repres-

ents an interesting challenge for componential
mechanism by fitting it to the four steps out-
lined in section 2, above.

1. Identify the phenomenon of interest ψ

2. Identify the system S that ψs
3. Identify the relevant spatial sub-parts {X} of
M (and their relevant intrinsic properties)
4. Describe how the parts {X} are organized
such that S ψs

The specific phenomenon of interest ψds is direc-

tion selectivity or, more precisely, the release of
neurotransmitter in and only in response to mo-
tion in a specific centrifugal direction. The sys-
tem Sds that exhibits ψds is the dendrite of the
SAC. It is also easy to say what the parts {Xds}
of the mechanism Mds are in virtue of which the
Figure 4: Schematic representation of the layered struc- dendrite ψ-dss, and how they are organized. I
ture and synaptic relationships between bipolar cells and have provided that sketch above. Finally, it
SACs. Reprinted from Yoshida et al. (2001). seems right to say, following Craver (2008), that
the relationship between Mds and its parts {Xds}
All of these elements combine to produce is one of componential constitution, such that
the direction selectivity of the SAC dendrite. all the parts {Xds} are at a lower level than Mds,
Bipolar cells successively synapse onto the and together constitute Mds. But now it gets in-
dendritic process, resulting in passive reinforce- teresting for componential mechanistic explana-
ment of excitatory input that preferentially pro- tion as currently developed. For only some of
motes neurotransmitter release in response to the parts of Mds—including the voltage gated
motion in the centrifugal direction. Surrounding calcium channels, and the input and output
SACs selectively inhibit centripetal excitation, synapses—are at a lower (spatial) level than the
Anderson, M. L. (2015). Beyond Componential Constitution in the Brain - Starburst Amacrine Cells and Enabling Constraints.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 1(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570429 8 | 13
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
[14] l e e n: leiten, führen.
[15] d ü ü r p l ü ü s t e r n: durchstöbern.
[16] s c h m ü ü s t e r n: lächeln.
[17] q u a u t: verdrießlich, böse.
[18] S a a b e l i g g e: Geschwätz.
[19] v e r t i g g e n: vertreiben.
[20] d e K ö l l e n: die Stirn.
[21] a f a n n e r s: oder anderswo.
[22] ' r v o r b e s t a u n e n: es bezeugen.
[23] m a n: doch, indeß, blos, nur, aber.
[24] l e e d e: führte.
[25] t o l u a w e t: verheißen, zugesagt, versprochen.
[26] W ü s t h e e t: Bewußtsein.
[27] v u l l d a u n: erfüllt, vollbracht.
[28] b e h ö f t: bedarf.
[29] n e t t: redlich, gutwillig.
[30] P i i n u n P l i i t e n: Schmerz und Beschädigungen.
[31] r ö ö k e l a u s: ruchlos.
[32] d e K u u l e n g r i ä w e r: der Todtengräber.
[33] ' t l e s t e B e d d e r e e ' t: das Grab bereitet.
[34] s a u j e e w e f r i s k: so leidlich frisch, munter.
[35] d u u k ' t: erlegen.
[36] S e e r: Weh, Gebrechen.
[37] ' n s t u u r e n D a g: ein schwerer Tag.
[38] ' n K n u a k e n f i l l e r: ein Knochenschinder; fig.: Strapatze,
schwere Arbeit.
[39] v e r g r e l l d: erboßt, wüthend.
[40] w i e r k i i k e n: umsehen, zusehen.
[41] b e t t: (bis) ein ander mal, nächstens.
[42] m ö ö t e n: entgegentreten, zurücktreiben, abwehren.
[43] f a a r t s: gleich.
[44] s c h n a w w e n: auffahren, unwillig anlassen.
[45] r a w a w w e n: lärmen.
[46] k ü ü r ' t: sprechen, schnacken.
[47] m a n g ' s e n s: manchmal, oft.
[48] h e e l: ganz.
[49] L i i f t u c h t: Leibzucht, Ruhestand.
[50] d a n n l a u t ' h e s i c k w a t m a u l e n: dann sehe er,
wie er fertig wird.
[51] b u a w e n: oben.
[52] f l i g g ' t: hilft, nützt.
[53] L u s s e n: Lust.
[54] b e ö w t: angeführt, betrogen.
[55] p r u s s e n: niesen.
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» 125, » 6 » » — » t ü s k e n n, lies: »t ü s k e n ' n«
» 127, » 4 » » — » k a n, lies: »k a n n«
Ü m m e s t a n d e, lies:
» 135, » 8 » Oben — »
»Ü m m e s t ä n d e«
der Noten von Oben statt a c h t e r s i c k n a, lies
» 139, » 4
»a c h t e r s i c k a n«
» 140, » 4 von Unten — statt ä u w e r, lies: »u ä w e r«
S c h w i i e n e, lies:
» 150, » 8 » » — »
»S c h w i i n e«
 »Uut der Sprauke, uut 'n
Liewent,
Sii dat Fruömde heel verbannt«

'T is mi al sint 'ner Riige van Jahren sau af un an düür'n Kopp e

dwaalet[1], wat dach wual an'tleste uut uuser gooen, aulen,
plattdüütsken Sprauke un Wiise weeren schiöle, de dach alle Beede
sau leige[2] nich sind, dat me se sick to schiämen hewwe, un daar
de grundgeleerde graute Schoolmester F r i e d r. G e d i c k e to
Berlin vor langen Jahren al van schreif: »Ach wöör 'n uuse Lüüe
dach bi'n Plattdüütsken bliiwen! etc.« Deswiegen heb 'k't auck nich
lauten konnt, in düssen Bööksken allerhande Saaken düür to
niemen, daar ick van wünske, dat se, sau Gatt un de Lüüe willt, 'r
Aart[3] to bidriägen müügen, dat de aule Bedriif un aparte de
deftige[4], trüühartige plattdüütske Sprauke nich heel unner de
Fööte kweimen, un fange miine Wäärde met 'n Capittel vor Alle, dat
het vor Buur un Börgersmann an.
Mogten de Landlüüe un Alle, den 't süß to kümmt, dach eere
aule ehrlicke Moorsprauke nich heel verläugnen willen un fliitig gooe
plattdüütske Bööker liäsen, dann schollen se wual insehnen, dat se 'r
bieter anne dääen bi eerer angebuarenen natüürlicken Prauterigge
to bliiwen, as sick'r met to elennigen[5], Hauge un Platt un auck
wual gaar annere uutländske Tuutertaaterigge düür'n Eene to
quaasken[6], dat 'ne vorwahr sau wunnerlick n lut[7], dat 'r 'n anner
ehrlick Minske de'r 't Anlustern[8] van het, siin Schmüüstern[9] nich
bi lauten kann un dat se sick faaken[10] sülw's auck wual nich
verstahet un sick alle in Eene hen fraugen miötet: Wat siäest du
daar? Wo hett dat? Wat verstehst du unner de niggelken[11]
Wäärde? u. s. w. Ick rieke[12], 't schiöle auck na wual wier in
Upnahme kuomen, just sau goot as unner de Vorneimen hüüt to
Daage de aulen Mooden nich sawual in 'n Tüüge alleine, as auck in
'n Huusgeraae, Stöölen, Schäppen, Schreenen etc. wier vor'n Dag
kuomet. Dann wann me de Afbeldungen van de hunnertjährsken
Antke-Aulen süht un de jetzige Kleidaage 'r tiigen hält, kümmt 't
baule nett[13] uäwereens wier uut un söck ault Huusingedöönte[14]
werd upstunds uut allen Hööken[15] un Rumpelkaamern nau e socht
un sau unwiise düür betaalt, dat 'k mi wual wünsken mogte, dat'k 'r
man 'n Paar Heu-Balkens van vull liggen harre; dann woll 'k vorwahr
wual 'n riiken Keerl weeren un den besten Buuren fraugen: Wat wullt
du vor diine Stiie[16] hebben. — Dat heetet se den R o k o k k o -
G e s c h m a c k. — Wann me se dann in eere aulen Dragt, man[17]
sünner Puuderköppe un Zöppe in der Nacken, de se sick dach
schiämet, in de aultfränksken Fuulstööle[18] sitten süht un häär't se
daarbi, d a s zarte zimperzierliche Hochteutsch
sprieken, dann fallet eene de Aarm's an'n Liiwe daal, dat me nich
weet, wat me 'r to seggen schall. 'T liik't[19] miiner Seele auck nett
tohaupe, a s F u u s t u p ' t A u g e u n R ü ü t e r u p d e
S u u g e n; dann schall de Rokokko vullstännig sien, sau häärt'r,
schlau mi de Donner! auck' ne riekene Schnuut' vull echt ault
Plattdüütsk to, süß is un blift 't alldach man 'ne halfböördige[20]
Geckerigge.
Ick, vor miinen Kopp, kann nich anners ordeelen, as dat 't
Plattdüütske 'ne leeflicke, trüühartige, bidoon'ske[21] Sprauke vor
alle dejenigen sii un bliiwen miöte, de se recht binnen hewwet un
begriipet; de sick auck jüst in eerer aulen, reggenen Natüürlickheet
un unverfälskeden Wiise, un anners nich, vor de ehrlicken Düütsken
up 'n Besten schicket; un dat heb't 'r upstunds mehr klooke Lüüe
insehnen, deswiegen giewet 'r sick de Gelehrden auck met Macht
anto, dat se se geeren wier up de aulen Hacken bringen willt. Dat is
na miinen Begriepe auck nütte[22] un goot, dann ick mot liike uut[23]
seggen, dat 'n Buuren dat Nauaapen un aparte de hüütige
wunnerlicke, verfumfeyede[24] Mengel-Küürerigge nich 't minnste
kledt.
 Sau vertellde mi kortens 'n Buure, d e ' t i n ' n K o p p e
h a r r, a s d e G a u s i n ' n K n e e un bi Geliegenheet auck
geeren grätts'k doonen[25] mogte, dann he was 'r hauge anne un
was Kierken-Pr'viiser[A] de Geschichte van Münchhuusen, as he es
uäwer'n Schnei reit, de sau hauge fallen was, dat alle Hüüser 'r
unner begraawen wöören, up half Hauge un half Platt... Dat hedde
sau: »Münchhausen gunk es in 'n Winter uff Reesen, as 'n gewaltig
hoger Schnei gefallen was, dann her[26] was von 'n guter Freund to
'n'r freundschaftliken Supfen inviteert, nett as ich heute auck bei Sie.
Her reit un gallopierte alle in eine hin vuörwes, abers her kunnte
unnerweggens gaaraus keen Dorf un auck nich es ein enkelt Haus
andreffen, daar her inkehren dääte. Anzuletzte sag her 'n Paul[27]
aus den Schneie kiiken; solcher Paul was abers nin Paul, sondern 'n
Kirchzurm. Her steig von siiner Miären ab un gedachte, daar kannst
du se wual 'n Bisken an binden. Solches daat her un legte sick'r
nebens daal un vertiärde sein Fruhstuck. Man mit des funk das Pierd
an to strunssen, dat der Schnei anfung ßu schmelten un der schmolt
sau lange, bis der Heer von Münchhausen, de über das Essent und
Drinkent ingeduuselt was — dann her soff sehr, as Sie wisse wol
bekannt sein wird — unter bei die Kirchen achter die Geerkaamer[28]
bes uff die Grund daalgesacket was un uff die kalten Steene lag. Als
her ufwachte, reibte her sich die Augen un sochte sein Ferrt, man als
her die Miäre buawen an 'n Kirchzurm hangen sach, besunnte her
sich nich lange, zaug 'ne geladene Scheetbestollen aus 'r Tasken un
schaut met'n Schnappe das Ferrt 'n Halfter bei'n Koppe ab, daß es
an de Grund daal störten mußte, un daar bleibte her mit seiner
Miären beliggen, bis der Schnei zuhaufe geschmolten was, daß her
fortan reiten konnte. Sein Ferrt dat was so'n kiddelig Aus[29], dat
sich nich gerne uffsteigen ließ und sich jümmeran eerst uff die
Achterbeene[30] stellen däät, wenn her uffsitzen woll. Dann mußte
her es allemal erst gute Woorte geben un sagen: Tüs, tüs[31],
Wittfoot! stelle dir man nich so nabel an, züüf[32] doch 'n Bisken un
gönne mich doch den Verwank[33], daß ich 'r eerst uff n komme, un
wann her 'r dann anzuletzste uff n saß un 's wollte sich noch nich
ßugeben, dann daskete[34] her es seinen Branntwiens-Buddel
schwisken die Ohren kaput; man wann her dann herneigest 'n
Tag[35] aus der Pullen duuen wollte, fung her ganz röökelause met
das arme Ferrt an ßu schelten, daß her nu keinen Schluck mehr
hatte un dann kiddelde her es met die langen Spuaren so
unbarmhartig in de Ribben, daß es, will ick Sie versiekern, vor
Straffe abers auch so lange in eenen Galoppe laufen mußte, bis her
an 'n Werthshaus kam, daar her stille höölt un seine Gallen mit 'n
farssen Drunke daal[36] spolde etc.«
Nu segget es uprichtig, wo lu't[37] Ju dat? Man se kiönet 't hen
un wier nau na bieter, aparte wann se 'r auck na uutländske
Bröckskes met tüsken[38] raaket un dann versteht me 't eerst recht
nich.
A jas! a jas![39] is dat auck wat vor 'n ächten Düütsken? Bliiwet
dach Düütske un vor Allen bi Juuer gooen aulen, ehrlicken
plattdüütsken Moor-Sprauke[40]; dat annre, un aparte de uutländske
Niggelaut[41], kledt Ju nich un häärt'r auck nich to, wann Ji den
trühartigen Buuren nich stump[42] verläugnen willt.
»'n Aape is un blift 'n Aape, un drööge he auck siidene
Schliepkleer un goldene Kiien un Spangen.«
»Sett't me 'ne Pogge auck up 'n golden'n Stool,
Se sprinkt alldach wier in den Pool.« —
Willet mi abers daaranne nich misverstaunen; dann geeren bin
'k't Ju günn't, dat Ji allens Nigge, dat Ji vor goot erkinnet un dat Ju,
wann Ji't eerst met Verstande uutprobeert hewwet, to Passe kümmt,
auck anniemet. De Welt rägt sick in allen Deelen, se will vuörwes un
se mot auck wiider; man daarbi kann't alldach goot bestaunen, dat Ji
Aaperigge un unkledsaame Bibärigheeden[43] achter lautet, de Ju
antleste de Köppe verdregget.
De Kierkenp'rviiser was alldach 'n allerwelts Keerl un satt aller
Schnurren vull un konn 'ne ganze Sellskup alleine met siine
schnaaksken Tuäge[44] upmuntern. Wann he half beschonken[45]
was, schüddede he se een na'n anner'n uut'r Mowwen un kwam 'r
alle sau putzig[46] met vor'n Dag, dat me alle wisse weg[47] in
stännigen Lachen bleif.
Wer in uuser Giigend bekannt is, weet dat se hier Schwartbraud
backet, dat de Uutlänners Pumpernikkel heetet, daar de
Buurenwichter de schäunen, schneihaagelwitten Tiäne van hebbet
un dat in allen Weltdeelen van de Vorneimen met Lickemündkes as
de söötesten Kooken gieten un sagaar van Ossenbrügge in
bleckernen Kistens na Engeland, Brasilgen, Amerika, na de
Hanaakenvölker u. s. w. schicket werd. Sau'n Braud, dat uut
gruawen Roggenmiäle backet werd, daar se hen un wier, aparte in
düüren Tiien, auck wual Haawern- un Tiecke-Baunen-Miäl[48] to
settet, is wual twee, dree Foote lank un breet, un 'n Foot of
annerthalf dicke un wegt insgmeen vertig bes füftig Pund. Wann 't
ordentlick gaar uut e backet is, heft 't elendige harte Kosten un is
nietske[49] ungemackelk to schnieen, dat'r vorwahr wual 'n reselut
Mest[50] un'n farssen Keerl[51] achter häärt, wann 'r 'n Palten[52] af
e kläwt weeren schall. Nu is't de Moode bi'n Buuren, dat, wann se
an'n Disk gaaet, unners dat Lütke-Maaged vorbiäet, — daar bito et
de schnoopsken Fierken-Suugen auck wual es 'n Holsketrett in de
Ribben gift un 'r Schwö, schwö! bi seggt, — dat graute Maaged de
Beckens vull schleit[53], un de Moor 't Fleesk indellt, de graute
Knecht dat Braud vorschniien mot. De settet dann den lüchtern[54]
Foot up 'n Kloß, nimmt dat Braud up't Knee, legt 'r sick met 'r Bost
tiigen, packet dat schaarpe, bree Mest n twas un wisse[55] met'r
Fuust un ritt met aller Macht van 'n büütersten Ende bes na'r Bost to
düür dat Braud, dat he'r glatte, talldicke[56] Schniien van krigt un
stiönet un seggt 'r he! bi, as wann he 'ne hunnert Punds Ramme to
regeeren harr. De Moor sitt allewisseweg, 't Becken up de Knee, bi 'n
Potte un frägt 'n biilings[57]: Himmännken, is't Becken liig? Auleed,
lüstet[58] di na wat? Geerd, schall 'k'r di na wat in doonen? bes't het:
Jau, ick woll 'r na wual 'n Schlart[59] in hewwen, sauwiit as't
schieterig wiesen is; ick auck; vor mi auck na 'n paar Schnuut' vull;
bes se alle vulldaun[60] sind; de Leste krigt't Sööteste, 't
Pottschräpsel, met in 'n Kaup, dann de Buuren lautet niks
ümmekuomen, un dann mag in unseligen[61] Hüüsern de Suuge
wual driisten wier n kuomen un den Pott ungestraffet vordan reggen
licken ... Schwiinefoot's lütke Stöfferken faund es wat in siinen
Mööskenschaarte, dat he nig kinnede. He lööp'r met na der
Inschläunersken[62] un fröög wat dat wual wööre; man de harr't to
drocke[63], as dat se tokiiken konn un siä, 't si wual aart Anback.
Moor siä de Junge, heft Anback auck Fööte? Man dau wöörd he
anschnawwed met »Jackhals, halt 't Muul! Anback schmeckt sööte.«
Dann, mende de goothartede Junge, moste he 't wual der aulen
Bessemoor[64] bringen, de he geeren alle 't Sööteste un
Lickmäutigste[65] tohiegede. He packede 't met spitzige Finger an un
taug 'r 'ne breetpanzede[66], schmoorde Ütze[67] bi 'n Achterbeenen
uut.
Wann de Lustigmaaker an den Veerhachtiidts-Gasteriggen[68] bi
miinen siäligen Vaar to Diske satt un de schmööen Priemtroggens[69]
un Krintenstuuten in Kurreln[70] schneit, föllt em allemal in, dat siin
Antkevaar[71], es 'n Knecht hatt harr, de up 'ne wunnerlicke Wiise
van'r Welt kuomen wööre. De Knecht harr auck es 'n hartkösterig[72]
Braut anschniien wollt un'r siin Mest nütte to wettet[73] un den Foot
up'n Fäskegrund[74] vor 'n Kohstalle settet hatt. As he follt harr', dat
de Koste unwiise hart si, harr' he'r bi in de Fuust e spigget, dat he
farsse ansetten woll; man he harr'r auck met Ens sauviele achter
daunen, dat he sick faarts bi 'n eersten Tuage sülwest in eenen
Rattse[75] midden met düür schniien harre, sau dat de buäweste End
van 'n Knechte, met 'n Meste in der eenen un met'r Braud-Schniien
in der annern Hand, voruäwer in den Kohstall stärtet un de Eesend
up'r Diälen liggen bliiwen wööre. Sintdessen wööre 'r Befell e
kuomen, dat de Braudschniiers jedesmal 'n hölten Brett vor de Bost
setten schiölen, dat'r söck Unglücke nich wier vorkuome.
De wiise Köster woll't em abers siin Liewe nich recht to gläuwen
un siä: Nu lüüg Du un de Düüwel! Man wat'n Buuren van siinen
Vorfahren vertellt is, dat lät he sick nich baule uutseggen un dann
tiärgeden[76] sick de Beeden, bes miin siälge Vaader 'n
toproostede[77], un 'n met'n sööten Drunke 't Muul stoppede. Dat
harr he in siinen jungen Jahren in 'n Klub to Minden leert, waar
damauliger Tiidt de gooe Bruuk was un auck nau na wual sienen
mag, dat, wann sick 'n Paar in der Sellskup vertöörenden un nich
naulauten wollen sick to kibbelkawweln[78], de Presidente 't Glas
nam un Proost! siä. Wann se dann na nin Gemack haulen wollen,
wöören se'r tohaupe uut e daunen.

Wer ichtens tüsken den Buuren waaget un 'r in Verkehr met

staunen heft, de schall wual baule to der Insicht kuomen sien, dat
de Landmann faarts 'n bieter Totrüwwen to Denjenigen faatet, daar
he sick up siine gewuohnde Wiise met behebben kann. Un wo
maanig Verhältniß in der Welt is'r nich na bewennt, dat 't goot is,
wann me sick met allen Lüüen faarts stellen, un se met'n Mundvull
Wäärde, daar se nich lange bi to booksteveeren un to jahnen
bruuket, totrüwwesk un bidoonsk e maaken kann. —
Dat 't vorwahr allmanngsens auck mislick is, wann Männer
deren Beroop 't met sick brinkt, dat se met 'n Landmanne ümme
gaunen miötet, nich saviel Platt verstaaet, dat se sick verständlick
maaken kiönet, daar dann leider Gattes allerhande Vorfälle uut
entstaunen kiönet, de auck wual es leige uutloopet, kiöne Ji uut
düsser wahren Begiiwenheet afniemen.
'N Buuren Schniider harr van den vielen Krummsitten, dat he
kortens daun n harr, dann't gönk na Wihnachten to, dat he viel to
doonen harr, saune unwiise Hartliiwigkeit e kriegen, dat'r vor alle
Gewalt Nicks mehr rissen[79] woll un he gaar nich mehr achter der
Nauteln sitten konn. An'tleste, as he sick vor Wehdaage un Kniipen
in'n Kalduunen stump[80] nich mehr redden konn un alle in eene hen
joolde as 'n Meybolze, siä siine Aulske, de 'ne al lange vergiiflick
allerhande Huusmiddel, as Waarmölge[81], Tuunrööwen, Siemesbliär,
Liinölge, un sagaar Piipenlüllsel[82] in e giewen harr: Ick haule'r vor,
Jan-Hierm, dat du dach man na'n Dokter löppst un läst di wat
upschriiwen, ehr dat du stump[83] van Unner to gehst.
Jan-Hierm nam den Raut an un as he bi 'n Dokter kwam,
klaagede he em siine graute Naut un Unsachtigheet; man de mende,
dat woll he na wual ens wier läs stuackern. Ich werde Euch Etwas
aufsetzen, das laßt Euch auf der Apotheke geben und handelt genau
nach der Vorschrift, wie es auf der Signatur zu lesen seyn wird. Ihr
könnt doch lesen, sonst will ich Euch sagen, daß Ihr von der Mixtur,
die Ihr bekommen werdet, alle zwei Stunden einen Eßlöffel voll
nehmen und damit fortfahren sollt, bis Wirkung erfolgt. Seyd mäßig
im Essen und haltet Euch warm. Nehmt allenfalls auch ein Pfund
P f l a u m e n mit, die machen Euch inwendig geschmeidig und helfen
der Medizin in ihrer Wirkung nach. Habt Ihr mich wohl verstanden,
so gehet mit Gott, ich hoffe dies Mittel werde Euch Erleichterung
verschaffen; sollte es aber nicht der Fall seyn, so kommt nur wieder,
dann werde ich Euch noch etwas Kräftigeres verordnen, denn ich
kenne Eure Natur noch nicht genau.
Ganz goot, Heer Dokter, ick bedanke mi auck eerst, siä de
Schniider; wann Se es wat to neggen hebbt, dann günnen Se mi
dach auck es wat, ick will't Se jüst sau goot maaken, as de beste
Arrewant van Pariis (arrivant de Paris), un gönk na'r Apteeken un
lööt sick siine Meddeziin torechte röören. As de Pillendregger en
afferriget harr, lööp he na'n Huäcker un födderde sick 'n Pund
F l o o m e n[84], dann dat harr he uut 'n Dokter siine Wäärde
verstaunen un konn't je auck nich to bieter wieten, dat de Dokter 'r
P r u u m e n[85] met e ment harr, as he siä, die machen Euch
inwendig geschmeidig; daar moste he dach absluut wual Schmier af
Fett unner verstaunen hebben, dann dat glitt goot un wat is 'r wual
schmieriger un schmiidigender als Schwiinefloomen?
As he wier inne was, nam he faarts 'n grauten Liepel vull van
der Meddeziin in, man de gönk em twas[86] düür'n Hals un he
vertröck 't Gesichte, as wann he Raamenroot[87] in't Muul kriigen
harre, man he fratt'r auck gliiks dat heele Pund Floomen achter nau.
As he dat 'n Praus[88] bi sick hatt harr, fönk't em an to ramenten in'n
Liiwe, as wann he'r 'n ganz Regement Poggen inne harre un met ens
gaf sick de Natuur läs, dat he anners nich 'n wende, as de Dokter
harrt 'r up an e leggt, dat he sick faarts ganz weg lasseeren schiöle;
man 's annern Muarens was he wier up de aulen Hacken, dann he
harr 'r Luft na kriigen un mende, dat si dann dach 'n heelen Meister
van 'n Dokter, as 'r in ganz Engeland wual nin Bietern to fiinen
sienen mogde. He lööt de Meddeziin staunen un dachte, de kanst'e
in Fall der Naut, wann't di wual es wier sau tostäuten scholl, na wual
ens wier bruuken.
Kort 'r nau kwam den Schmedt in 'n Duarpe auck saune Plauge
up'n Balg. As den Schniider dat to Ahren kwam, siä he: Kasper, daar
will 'k di wual gawwe[89] wier met torechte helpen. Kumm man met
mi, ick hewwe na van der Meddeziin wat staunen, de mi de Dokter
lest up e settet heft, as ick't jüst sau harr as du't nu hest; daar will'k
di 'n Liep' vull[90] van doonen[91], mehr bruukest du nich; man du
most di auck 'n Pund Floomen haalen lauten, de schluckst du'r dann
faartsens achter in un dann schallt'r di uut gaunen as uut'r linnenen
Schatthuasen[92], segg'k di man.
De Schmedt dää as em de Schniider seggt harr, man de wöörd
na dat Middel sau unsachte un leige[93], dat se man Hals uäwer
Kopps na'n Dokter loopen mosten. As de kwam, fröög he: Aber mein
Gott! was geht hier vor, lieber Meister; was habt Ihr begonnen? Dau
anwerde de Schmedt, he harr' man eenen Liepel vull van de
Meddeziin nuamen, de lestens den Schniider faarts sau goot e
holpen hewwe un dat Pund Floomen harr he 'r auck achter up e
settet, man em wollt' aparte Nicks nich e helpen.
Was versteht Ihr unter Floomen, fröög de Dokter. De Schmedt
tröck sick 'n paar Mal un harr jüst na saviel Tiidt, dat he 'n Dokter
anwern konn: S c h w i i n e f e t t. Dau jappede he na ens un
Schnapps! was de leste Aum[94] 'r uute.
De Dokter schlöög de Hänne uäwer 'n Koppe tohaupe un rööp:
Wie ist's möglich! Wie hat der Schneider mich so mißverstehen
können, da ich ihm doch deutlich sagte, er möge sich ein Pfund
Pflaumen kaufen. Man de Schniider, de'r just up to kuomen was, as
de Schmedt verendede, moste sick na up't Meeste wünnern un as he
den Dokter den T'saamenhank uut'n Eene[95] settet un em seggt
harr dat he nich anners verstaunen hewwe, as dat he em Floomen
verorneert hewwe, un dat Dat, wat he Pflaumen nömmt harr, bi eer
Aart Lüüen P r u u m e n hedde, siä he: Nu kann me dach seh'n, dat
'n Schniider, vor sau licht me 'n auck hält, alldach na 'ne
taubästigere[96] Natuur n heft, as 'n Iisenfriäter van 'n Schmedt.
Düsse Dokter gönk in sick un leerde na up siinen aulen Dag
Plattdüütsk un bestönd'r auck uppe, dat alle siine Kinner 't auck
leeren mosten, dann he mende, me kiöne nich wieten, in wat vor
Ümmestände de in eeren Liiwen kuomen kiönen un sint dessen is
em sau'n bedrööwet Misverständniß auck nich wier vor e kuomen.
Leeret dach Alle Plattdüütsk, de Ji van 'n Buuren liiwen, of'r
tüsken wanken un waagen[97] miötet; dann daar vergiewe Ji Ju na
Nicks miie un kiönet 't met Rechte un gooen Gewieten auck wual
nich es verlangen, dat se Ju to Gefallen Haugdüütsk leeren schiölen,
daar 'n aparte van Natuur de Bill[98] nich na steht, un giiwen Ju 'r na
wual Geld to, wann se Ju nich es verstaunen konnt hebbet.
De siälige graute Twankmester, Keiser Napoligum, de
Förstenkinner böstede un Böstenbiiner förstede, konnt' je nich es
ree[99] kriigen, dat de Buuren met siine S'ldauten fransk sprööken,
un he most'r sick kristlick in e giiwen, dat wi vor as nau bi uuser
eerlicken plattdüütsken Moorsprauke bleiwen. Man wat se hebben
wollen, wüsten se alldach wual to kriigen un wollen 't Eene auck
wual baule begriip'lk maaken. Wann se tom Bispell 'n wacker Wicht
säugen, siäen se man »vor di vor mi« un faarts was de Putze ree;
abers't gaf hen un wier dach auck wual es 'n Misverstand.
Eenerwieges födderden se es soupe de poules. Man de Weert
de siinen schwarten Puudel, den he siine leewen Wüörmkes to'n
Vermaak[100] un vor Tiidtverdriif sau bito allerhande Kunststückskes
leert harr, vor 'n Düüwel nich geeren missen woll, mende, 't wööre'r
wual liike nau[101] un se schiölen't sau baule wual nich mierken,
wann se den aulen Spitz bi'n Hals kreigen un'r P u u d e l s u p p e n
van kuakeden. As se de Suppen vor sick harren, föngen se an to
tuutertaatern un to fuutern, dat de Aulske sau'n Eesen[102] un
Hartebiiten[103] kreig, dat se eeren Mann rööp un grein[104] un siä:
Wi aarmen, unglücksken Kinners, nu will't us grundlause leige
gaunen, dat wi de Keerels sau bedruagen hebbt; wel scholl sick daar
auck wual vor höt hebben, dat se söcke fiine Tungen harren, dat se't
faarts schmicken konnen, dat 't man 'ne Suppe van 'n witten Spitze
si; me scholl dach seggen, 'n Rüüe si 'n Rüüe un de schmickeden
wual sachte auck uäwer eene. Du most den Puudel auck man to'r
Läär[105] e giewen, sau nääe[106] du 'ne auck wual missen wullt, dat
de vergrelleden Kerrels sick man wier togiiewet, süß sin wi'r na wual
unglückelk met in 'n Huuse, dann se roopet ganz düütelk, dat 'k't
goot verstaunen kann:

Madame! bien vite, des épices à la soupe.

Verdammt! 'n witten Spitz in der Suppen.
Hola, vilain bougre d'hote, cela va sans dire:
Hallo, wi willt'n Buuren daut schlaun, dat Zankdier
point de repas sans beurre et fromage. Mort de m'amie!
. . . . . du Riepaus van 'n Buuren eegest wat in to Maarse un de
Moor miie.
de la vieille bière lucide encore et puis-ça de l'eau de vie.
Wi willt den Bäär de Ahren luusen un pisacken'n met
Luaaen[107] un Wiien[108].
Avez vous compris icelles?
Begriipe ji dat, ji Iisels?

Vor de Schniiders haule ick 't met 'n Dokter L . . . . . goot, dat se
meestig all tohaupe graute Leefhebbers van 'n Danssen sind; dann
van de Bucksprünge, de se daar bi maaken miötet, gaaet 'n de
tohaupe kniäeden Kalduunen af un an dach es wier uut'n Eene.

In der Rankordnunge kümmt № 6 de Baa'moor[109] vor. Daar

fällt mi auck wat bi in.
Miinen eersten Vadderstand[110] most' ick miinen F'rier[111] to
Gefallen doonen, de, as wi uut Franckriik wier trügge kuomen
wöören, gliiks, as Viele Annere auck, siine aule Bruut wier upsogte,
de em trüü e bliewen was, in 'r Wiil eer unnersdessen nin Anner'r
kuomen was.
Se kräupen auck baule bi eene, un as de eerste Junge kwam,
harr de F'rier de Leewde to mi, dat he mi to'n Vadder bidden lööt.
De Baa'moor siä mi de Frööde an, man ick was ganz unerfahren
unner söcke Saaken, dessenthalwen fröög ick dat aule Wiif, wat ick'r
eegentlick bi wahrtoniemen harre? Dau kreig ick to'r Antwoort: Dat
is sau lästig nich, Heer Lüütenant, un 'r sind nich sauviele
Ummestände bi, as de wat[112] wual meenet. Kuomen Se man 'n
Sönndaage Muaren bi[113] elwen Uhren na'r Kierken, dann willk'r mi
na inrichten dat 'ck'r 'n Trett eher met'n Kiinde un met'n
Steertvadder[114] auck bin un will Se vor der Klocktaarens-Düüren
afwachten. Den P'stooren hebb 'k all Bescheed to stüürt, dat'k
geeren 'n Kiind kasselt[115] hebben woll un 'n vorneimen Vadder
metbrachte; dann wann dat de Fall is, mot'k't em alltiidt tovüüren to
wieten doonen, dat he'r sick 'n bieten anners met siine Wäärde na
inrichten kann, as 't bi'n gemeenen Manne näudig is. De schall'r
dann auck wual to rechter Tiidt sienen. Dann triäe wi tohaupe in die
Kierken na'n Füntelsteene[116] un wann de P'stoor 't Teeken gift, dat
de hillige Handelunge läs gaunen schall, dooe ick Se dat Kiind up de
Aarm's, dat Se 't 'n P'stoor tohaulet. Man Se schiölet sick jau nich
verfehren[117] wann 't vellichte an to schreggen un to spalkern[118]
fänkt, wann't sick dat Suckerpüppken wual uut'n Munde mümmeln
mogte, of wann 'k em dat Müssken van den naakeden Koppe riite un
de P'stoor 'r em dat kaule Waater up güt, dann 'k hewwe faarts wual
mierket, dat 't 'n kritzigen, gnatzigen[119] Soldauten-Jungen is, daar
de Aulen na wat met to beliewen kriigen kiönet.
Man dat was 't eegentlick nich wat 'k geeren van den aulen
Wiiwe wieten woll, deswiegen fröög ick wiider, af ick nich auck Geld
wieten möste? Dat schiölet Se je wual sachte to bieter kinnen, siä de
riäterige Saabeltriine[120], dat de Geestlicken Nicks ümmesüß n
dooet un dat'r nin Minske sünner Betaalen up of van der Welt
kümmt. Ick dachte se scholl mi faarts düütlicker bescheen, wat ick to
offern harr, man daar woll se van sick sülwenst nich recht met vor 'n
Dag; deswiegen bat ick se, se mogte 't mi dach met'n paar Wäärden
Riige bi Riige toseggen, dann woll 'k 't mi upschriiwen, dat 'k 't nich
vergeite. Dau kreig ick abers wat to häären, dat 'k'r mi baule vor
verfehrt harre. Se un de P'stoor siä dat unnewietene[121] Wiif,
göngen in eenen Rank un dann de Köster un 't Aarmenbecken, un
wann'k eer un den P'stoor jedder'n wual 'n Spetzigesdaaler geiwe un
den Köster un 'n Aarmenbecken jidder 'n halwen Kroondaaler, dann
konn 'k'r wual sau schickelk met bestaunen, un dann kreige ick van
Uänern in'n Dööpelhuuse auck 'n lecker Schäulken Kaffe, daar nine
Sigurgen to wöören, met Suckerkringels un Krintenstuuten, saviel as
mi man lüstede, un wat 'k daar dann der jungen Kraummoor[122] vor
verehren woll, dat stönne ganz in miinen Gefallen.
Gatt's duusend Süüke! dacht ick in miinen Sinne, dat is de
Dokter schlau, dann dach wual 'ne uutverschiämde, inbellske[123]
aule Hexe van'r Baamoor, de wo nich mehr, to'm minnsten dach jüst
sau viel sien will, as de P'stoor. Man 't kostede mi alldach miin Geld,
nett[124] as se 't mi vor seggt harr, dann 'k woll mi van der
leigmuul'den Flaarschnuuten nich geeren wat nau driiwen lauten; un
't Leigeste was na buawen batt[125], dat 'k 't vor düsse eene
Keer[126] faarts sau goot inerichtet harr, dat de grappsgierige[127]
Draake mi nau den düssen, alle Niäsenlank in'n Huuse leig un mi to'n
Vadderstande näudigede, bes 'k'r dann dach an'tleste 'n resoluten
Grentel[128] vorschauf, dat se mi nich bett kuomen doste[129], dann
't aunde mi, dat se't'r nett up an e legt harr, dat se mi met anner
Lüüe Blaagen alle miine Kroondaalers afgäusken[130] woll, dat 'k to
leste man met'n Stanke rüümen[131] un met'n witten Stocke uut'n
Lanne loopen konnt harre.
Der Kraummoor gaf ick auck 't Eere[132] un luawede[133] bito
vor den Jungen bes 'n Uutspriöke[134] alle Jahr to Wihnachten 'n
K'rintenstuuten uut, daar 'n dicken Daaler in e backet sien schiöle,
daar ick auck eerlick Waart unner haulen hebbe; dann miin
Luatelwaart is alltiidt wiesen: M e t d e e l e n u n B a a t e g i e w e n
a a r m e t n i c h[135].
'N Schwiin knüffket[136] na wual, wann me
e m e n t m o d t o f v o r b i g e h t; man de unbeschufte[137] Junge
heft 't mi van siin Liewedaages nich es met 'n bittersten[138] Waarde
Dank e wüst. Je nu! Lat 'ne 'r met loopen; he schall de Welt na wual
es kennen leeren.

Jan, wult du düür de Welt,

most du di schmiigen un büügen.

[1] d w a a l e n: irren, umherirren.

[2] l e i g e: schlecht.
[3] A a r t: Etwas, einigermaaßen.
[4] d e f t i g: kräftig, stark, heftig.
[5] e l e n n i g e n: elend machen, abquälen.
[6] q u a a s k e n: läppisch, ungereimt reden.
[7] l u t: lautet.
[8] A n l u s t e r n: Anhören.
[9] S c h m ü ü s t e r n: Lächeln.
[10] f a a k e n: oft.
[11] n i g g e l k e n W ä ä r d e: sonderbaren Worten.
[12] I c k r i e k e: ich denke, halte dafür.
[13] n e t t: ganz, eben, genau, gerade.
[14] H u u s i n g e d ö ö n t e: Hausgeräth.
[15] H ö ö k e n: Ecken, Winkeln.
[16] S t i i e: Stätte, Bauergut.
[17] m a n: aber, doch.
[18] F u u l s t ö ö l e: Lehnstühle.
[19] ' t l i i k ' t: es paßt.
[20] h a l f b ö ö r d i g: unächt, verbastardet, unvollkommen.
[21] b i d o o n ' s k e: zutrauliche, anschmiegende.
[22] n ü t t e: nützlich.
[23] l i i k e u u t: gerade heraus.
[24] v e r f u m f e y e d e: vernachlässigte, verdorbene.
[25] g r ä t t s ' k d o o n e n: großthun, prahlen.
[26] Das gewohnte »h e« verleitet den Landmann, wenn er
hochdeutsch sprechen will, dazu, dem »e r« ein h vorzusetzen.
[27] P a u l: Pfahl.
[28] G e e r k a a m e r: (Geräthekammer) Sakristey.
[29] k i d d e l i g A u s: kitzliches Aas.
[30] A c h t e r b e e n e: Hinterbeine.
[31] T ü s , t ü s !: ruhig, stille, sachte!
[32] ( z ü ü f ) t ö ö f: warte.
[33] V e r w a n k: Gelegenheit.
[34] d a s k e t e: drosch.
[35] Ta g: Zug.
[36] d a a l: herunter.
[37] l u ' t: lautet.
[38] t ü s k e n: zwischen.
[39] A j a s , a j a s !: Pfui, Pfui!
[40] M o o r s p r a u k e: Muttersprache.
[41] N i g g e l a u t: das Neue, Ungewöhnliche.
[42] s t u m p: gänzlich.
[43] B i b ä r i g h e e d e n: Albernheiten, Fratzen.
[44] T u ä g e: Aufzüge.
[45] b e s c h o n k e n: berauscht, angetrunken.
[46] p u t z i g: schnurrig, lustig, possierlich.
[47] a l l e w i s s e w e g: in einem fort, beständig.
[48] T i e c k e b a u n e n M i ä l: Pferdebohnen-Mehl.
[49] n i e t s k e: sehr, tüchtig.
[50] M e s t: Messer.
[51] ' n f a r s s e n K e e r l: ein starker Kerl.
[52] ' n P a l t e n: ein Fetzen, Schnitte.
[53] d e B e c k e n s v u l l s c h l e i t: die Näpfe füllt.
[54] l ü c h t e r n: linken.
[55] ' n t w a s u n w i s s e: queer und fest.
[56] t a l l d i c k e: zolldicke.
[57] ' n b i i l i n g s: der Reihe nach.
[58] l ü s t e t: beliebt, gefällt.
[59] ' n S c h l a r t: ein Klacks, Haufen.
[60] v u l l d a u n: satt, gesättigt.
[61] u n s e l i g e n: schmutzigen.
[62] I n s c h l ä u n e r s k e: Aufgeberin.
[63] d r o c k ': eilig.
[64] B e s s e m o o r: Großmutter.
[65] L i c k m ä u t i g s t e: was weich, zum Lecken ist.
[66] b r e e t p a n z e d e: breitbauchige.
[67] Ü t z e: Kröte.
[68] V e e r h a c h t i i d d s G a s t e r i g g e n: vier hohen Festtags-
Schmäuse.
[69] P r i e ' m t ' r o g g e n s: Präbendebrod, eine Art weißes
Roggenbrod in Westphalen.
[70] K u r r e l n: Rollen, Scheiben.
[71] A n t k e v a a r: Urgroßvater.
[72] h a r t k ö s t e r i g: hart von Rinde.
[73] s i i n M e s t nütte to w e t t e t: sein Messer tüchtig
dazu geschärft.
[74] F ä s k e g r u n d: Riegel- (Gitter) Grund — (Faschinen).
[75] i n e e n e n R a t t s e: mit einem Risse.
[76] t i ä r g e d e n: zerrten, neckten.
[77] t o p r o o s t e d e: zutrank.
[78] k i b b e l k a w w e l n: widersprechen, zanken.
[79] r i s s e n: rutschen, fortgehen.
[80] s t u m p: durchaus, gar.
[81] W a a r m ö l g e: Wermuth.
[82] P i i p e n l ü l l s e l: Tabacks-Pfeifenjauche.
[83] s t u m p: ganz und gar.
[84] F l o o m e n: Schweinefett.
[85] P r u u m e n: Pflaumen, Zwetschen.
[86] t w a s: queer.
[87] R a a m e n r o o t: Ruß aus dem Schornstein.
[88] ' n P r a u s: eine Weile.
[89] g a w w e: geschwind.
[90] ' n L i e p ' v u l l: einen Löffel voll.
[91] d o o n e n: geben.
[92] S c h a t t h u a s e n: Strümpfe ohne Fußende.
[93] l e i g e: schlimm, elend.
[94] A u m: Athem.
[95] u u t ' n E e n e: aus einander.
[96] t a u b ä s t i g: zähe; eigentlich hart von Rinde.
[97] w a n k e n u n w a a g e n: verkehren.
[98] B i l l: Schnabel.
[99] r e e: fertig.
[100] s i i n e l e e w e n W ü ö r m k e s to'n V e r m a a k:
seinen lieben Kinderchen zum Vergnügen.
[101] ' t w ö ö r e ' r w u a l l i i k e n a u: es wäre wohl einerlei.
[102] E e s e n: Grauen, Furcht, Entsetzen.
[103] H a r t e b i i t e n: Gewissensangst.
[104] g r e i n: weinte.
[105] t o ' r L ä ä r g i e w e n: zum Besten geben.
[106] n ä ä e: ungern.
[107] L u a a e n: Loden, Zweige.
[108] W i i e n: Weiden.
[109] B a a ' m o o r: Hebamme.
[110] V a d d e r s t a n d: Gevatterstand.
[111] F ' r i e r: Fourier.
[112] a s d e w a t: als Einige.
[113] b i: gegen.
[114] S t e e r t v a d d e r: Nebenpathe.
[115] k a s s e l t: getauft.
[116] F ü n t e l s t e e n: Taufstein.
[117] v e r f e h r e n: erschrecken.
[118] s p a l k e r n: zappeln, trampeln.
[119] g n a t z i g: grämlich.
[120] d e riäterige S a a b e l t r i i n e: die rappelige
Schwätzerin, die geschwätzige Plaudertasche.
[121] u n n e w i e t e n: unbescheiden, zudringlich.
[122] K r a u m m o o r: Wöchnerin.
[123] i n b e l l s k e: eingebildete, stolze.
[124] n e t t: gerade.
[125] b u a w e n b a t t: überdem.
[126] v o r d ü s s e e e n e K e e r: mit diesem einen Male.
[127] g r a p p s g i e r i g e: habsüchtige.
[128] G r e n t e l: Riegel, Vorreiber.
[129] d o s t e: durfte.
[130] a f g ä u s k e n: ablocken, abzwacken; eigentlich: Jemandes
Gutmüthigkeit benutzen.
[131] m e t ' n S t a n k e r ü ü m e n: einen Quark zurücklassen,
kahl abziehen.
[132] ' t E e r e: das Ihrige.
[133] u u t l u a w e n: vermachen, zusagen.
[134] U u t s p r i ö c k e: Confirmation.
[135] a a r m e t n i c h: macht nicht arm.
[136] k n ü f f k e t: grunzt.
[137] u n b e s c h u f t: unmanierlich, unbehobelt.
[138] b i t t e r s t e n: geringsten, kleinsten.
[A] bi mi to Lanne is de Rankornunge ungefeer de Düsse:
1. de Heer B'stoor; 2. de Heer Vuaget; 3. de Schoolmester; 4. de
Kierken P'rviiser's; 5. de Unnervuaget, of de Twankmester, as se
'ne auck wual heetet; 6. de Baaemoor; 7. de Schniider; 8. de
Schwiinehee'r, met'n grauten Häären; 9. de Baartschräpper un
Haarkläuwer; 10. de Bittker; 11. de Nachtwiäker met'r Riätern.
 An miinen Landsmann N. N.
Eerste Breef.
As ick Ju vergaunen Meitiidt tospröök, leigen Ji mi an, dat 'k Ju
dach af un an es wier saunen aarigen Breef up Plattdüütsk to
schriiwen mogte, dann Juue Ölste harr 'sick an den vorrigen
elennige[1] ergetzet un 'r mächtige nau verlanget, dat 'k dach bi Tiidt
un Geliegenheet es wier 'n Paar Riige uut'r Fieren loopen lauten
mogte. Den Gefallen will 'k Ju geeren doonen, dann de eene Leefde
is wisse der Annern werth un wi sind je auck sin Liewe,[2] van
Schöölers Tiien an, dicke Fründe wiesen un de Ölste was aparte
alltiidt sau 'n leeflicken[3] Kinnergeck, dat 'k 't em nau na Dank weet,
wo he us jümmeran Allens geern to Willen dää, daar he van wüste,
dat 't us man ichtens[4] vergnöögen konn. Nu bin 'k 'r faarts'n
Sönndage Uänern[5] bi an e fangen un schicke Ju hier den eersten
Breef, daar, wann uuse leewe Herrgatt Liewen un Gesundheet lät, na
wual 'n Paar achter nau kuomen kiönet.
Bi der lesten Dansserigge, waar se sick alltohaupe sau elennige
goot[6] verlusteert harren un bes up den bedrööweden Hiilenkiiker[7]
van 'n Wichte, dat'r den ganzen uutspiirigen[8] Auwend in eene hen
sau betüntelt[9] un piilik[10] 'n hier satt, a s ' n e U u l e i n
S t i e r w e n s n ä ä e n , d a t v a n Te e w e s u n M e e w e s
N i c k s n w ü s t e un p’rfass nich uptodeggen was, me mogt’r auck
met anstellen wat me woll, sau seelenvergnööget wöören, — nu,
daar was et je auck schlichtens[11] up an e legt und en Jedereene
dröög’r je auck’t Siine geeren to bi, — menden de Fruuslüüe, daar
ick aparte van all’ miin Liewe lank geeren met schnacket un hanteert
hebbe, dat ick et Plattdüütske dann dach na nich heel verleert harre
un et duchte mi auck, as wann se miine Naaskerigge na wual sau
jeewe[12] geeren anlustern mogten.
Miin beste Vermaak harr’k alldach met Juuer Aulsken, dann d e
w a s den ganzen Auwend s a u k ü ü r s k , u n d h a r r ’ t a l l e i n
eene hen sau drock un hille[13], as 'ne Katte de
s i e w e n P ö t t e m e t e n s t o l i c k e n h e t. Se was alltiidt
all’n ranketank, beliewet Wicht, as wi na tohaupe in’n Kergissem[14]
wöören un et gefällt eene, wann me Söcke na der Hand es wier n
süht un sick uäwertüüget, dat de fröhlicke Sinn’r dach na sau wat
inne bekliiwen bliewen is. Mi is’t up’n Handvull Nooten sin Liewe
auck nich an e kuomen, wiete Ji wual, un ick gläuwe vorwahr, wann
wi auck de heele Nacht düür e daasket[15] un rawawwet[16] harren,
wi wöören’t aparte na nich mööe wooren. P u t z e n [ 1 7 ] u n
Kortswiile miötet 'r af un an driiwen weeren,
harr jener Mann wisse auck seggt, un harr siine
F r u w w e n m e t ’ r M e ß f u a r k e n k i d d e l t; man ganz s a u
b u t t s t r e i k e n w i d e n B a ß d a c h n i c h, dat schall us nin
Minske nauseggen; dann wann ick’r es Eenen tüsken schmeit,
wöören Ji’r auck faarts met allerhande aardige
Aepsen un Himphamperiggen[18] uut’r
Ö l g e m i ö l e n a c h t e r i n n e, dat’t alle man in eenen
Vergnöögen togaunen moste.
Wat harren sick de Wichter abers auck up e tämt un wacker
maaket[19]! S e s t ö ö k e n e e n e v o r w a h r i n d e A u g e n ,
a s W i h n a c h t s p u p p e n u n P a u s k e g g e r un s ä u g e n s e
nich alltohaupe uut, as wann se uut
H e n g e l s p ö t t e n d r u n k e n h a r r e n? Man d e f i i n e n
Stadtheerens wöören'r auck alle in eene hen
ümme to to klucken, as de Hahnens ümme de
L e g g e h ö ö n t k e s, un mi ducht de Aulen dääen'r auck wual sau
ganz unrecht nicht anne, wann se af un an es na der Jügde ümme
keiken, dann de is unerfahren un däärlik, un 't is wual 'n wahr
Luatelwaart[20], dat'r seggt: »W a n n d e V o s s a n f ä n k t t o
preddigen, mot me de Gauseküüken in Achte
n i e m e n .«
Abers 'r wöören auck sau'n Paar loorske S c h l e i s t e r s u n
B i s s e w e n t k e n[21][22] manken, de wual nich to biister viele[23]
met der gooen aulen Tiidt mehr in'n Sinne hebben mogten, a s d e
Koh na Büntke und de Bulle Joost hedde; dann
d e k e i k e n u u t h a u g e F e n s t e r s un harren sieker wual all
Husaaren in 'n Quarteere hatt, de eer ann're Tucht un Tüürlüüre[24]
leert harren. De hüütige Welt is nu eenmal nich anners, un me weet
leider wual, w o m e h r ' m e d e K a t t e n s t r i e p e t , w o
h ä u g e r s e d e n S t e e r t h ä l t. — Et is al goot, dat me de
Kinner wat leeren lät, man et docht in 't Geheel nich, wann me de
Wichter i n d e W e l t j a h n e n l ä t , a s i n ' n h a l l e n P o t t,
dat se to viele nigge Tenten sehet un hääret; dann weeret'r lichte
Allerhööntkes van, to'm Minnsten bliiwet se nich resolut un
natüürlick u n m e m o t ' r h e r n e i g e s t s a u s c h l i i e ,
schliie[25] met ümme gaun, as met'n Egge up'r
S c h w i n g e n. Na miinen butten Begriepe dooet de Aulen up 'n
Besten, w a n n s e e e r d e B r a u t l ä u p e n [ 2 6 ] b i T i i e n
aart häuger hanget un ninen Minsken wat up't
L i c k e b r e t t [ 2 7 ] l e g g e t, dann w a n n m e d e D ü ü f k e s
met Annisölge bestrickt, sind de Aarende'r auck
f a a r t s a c h t e r. D e R ü ü e n s d e ' n B r a a e n r u a c k e n
hebb't, will't 'ne auck geeren belicken. Waar
Knuäckskes sind de düüget, dar gift't auck
R ü ü e n s d e s e m ü ü g e t; seggt 'n ault Spreckwaart un d e ' t
Schmantpöttken[28] nich vor de Katten waaret,
w e r d b e s c h n o o p e t u n b e s c h l i c k e r t[29]; daarümme i s
e t v u l l b i e t e r v o r d e W i c h t e r, m e t ' r U u l e n t o
s i t t e n , a s m e t ' n J ä c k s t e r [ 3 0 ] t o w i p p e n. De wiisen
Aulen höölen'r al vor, m e m i ö t e d e Z i e g e n d e n S t e e r t
nich to lank wassen lauten un me kiöne ehr 'n
Pott vull Fläue hööen, as 'ne Bissewentke van
' n W i c h t e. Wann me se eerst waarschuwwen[31] mot un seggen:
»K ä t t k e n , h ö ö t d i i n e K l ä u n t k e s,« is't de meesten Tiidt al
to laate. S a u m e d e G ä u s e w u ö h n t , s a u g a a e t s e ,
un 'n Jäckster hüppelt, all waar he geht.
He-Ji dat vosshärige Aapengesichte van 'n Jungen auck wual 'n
Käären betüürt[32], de sick sau viele up siin Danssen inbell'de un sau
'n Narre was, dat he alle in eene hen vordanssen woll? He harr
achter auck na Platz e noog hatt un daar häärde he eegentlick auck
hen. D e t r a l t h a c k e d e A b e l h a n s h a s p e l d e s i c k u n
gönk spradden[33], as 'n Gaante[34], de 'n
L i e p e l i n ' n S t e e r t e h e f t, un woll dat graute Waart
jümmeran alleine föören un d a a r b i s c h n e i t h e a l l e w i s s e
w e g u p [ 3 5 ] d a t d e B a l k e n s k n a p p e d e n. Antleste
verdraut he mi dach, dann wann se 'n Menewett, oder 'n Schleifer
födderden, s p e e r d e s i c k d e l o o r s k e [ 3 6 ] J a n t k e v o r
a l l e n D ü ü r e n a s ' n S c h r u u t h a h n e un woll allemal 'n
Jägerschottsken, 'ne Hacke — se — se, 'n Radwasker un alle söcke
Knuackenfillers hebben, un d a a r g n e e s e d e [ 3 7 ] h e b i , a s
' n I i s e l d e ' n P u n d B r a u d k r i i g e n h a r r. Man i c k
s c h n e i t ' r e m b a u l e m e t ' r T w a s s a a g e n[38] düür un siä:
»Hanfentken! D i i n e U p t ü ä g e s i n d h i e r n i c h a n e
bracht, dann se klappet as 'n Kohdreck in 'n
G a a r e n k i e t e l; deswiegen raae ick di, m a a c k d i m a n n i c h
allstogröön, Du Eckeltiewe[39], süß mogten di
de Ziegen frieten.« Dat konn de Quieksteert[40]
an siin seere Been[41] biinen.
B u t t k e b i B u t t k e; dat het: 'n Jeder bi siines Gliiken; dann
Ordnunge regeert de Welt, de Knüppel de Hunde un de Kantschoo
de Russen. Waar Colonus Schwalenbierg vordansset, entfeerne sick
'n Jedder, de nich to 'n haugen Buurenstande häärt, s i ä ' k m a n ;
d a u w ö ö r e n s i i n e G ä r t e [ 4 2 ] b a u l e g a a r.
He mormelde na 'n Mundvull Wäärde in'n Baart un h a r r '
siinen Kraul[43] wual geeren na ens wier
b e g u n n e n, un mende, he wöör't wual aart fiiner gewuohnt, man
ick maakede em begriiplick, d a t ' t u p ' r B a ß v i o l e n [ 4 4 ] n i c h
f i i n e r ' n g ö n g e, aparte wann me'n Keerl vor sick hebbe as he,
d e v a n v o r n ' n I i s e l u n v a n a c h t e r ' n O s s e s i. Dat
schlauck he daal un schnupps was he beet un fönk an vor sick hen
to miimern[45], as wann he uäwerliä, wat bi söcke Ümmestände 't
Beste to doonen sii. Antleste, as he nau nich rissen[46] woll, siä 'k
em sachte in't Ahr: Du Schlunkenschleef[47] h e s t s i n L i e w e
na nin goot Gaaren spunnen un mendest, hier
w u a l d e J ä c k s t e r s u p ' n N e s t e t o f a n g e n, man
s ö c k e B i e t e n s i n d v o r d i i n e n B i l l n i c h w u o s s e n.
Wann du nu nich wenner uutneggest, w i l l ' k d i d e n S t e e r t
es upbiinen un di es 'n Käären kasterviolen[48],
dat du nich wieten schast, waar du henkruupen
w u l t. Dau mogte em dann dach bedünken, dat't wual't Klöökste
wööre, d a t h e s i c k m a n n i c h l ä n g e r t w a s b ä u m e n
lööte un den Düüwel man bi Tiien up'r Nacken
n e i m e , d a n n b e g i i g n e d e h e e m h e r n e i g e s t n i c h.
He schmeit den vössigen Kopp in de Nacken un siä met 'n
haufärrigen Gebähr, d a t e m j ü s t a n s t ö n d , a s w a n n ' n
Kaulhaase sick tiigen 'n Waarwulf steggert:
»Auck de Löwwen miötet sick vor de Müggen
w a a r e n . « D a t s c h l u t a s ' n e Ta n g e u p ' t F i e r k e n,
entmodde ick em un daarmet greip he na siinen Pollendeckel un
wiege was de aabele Praulhans, as wann he
w e g e p u u ß e t w ö ö r e. Söcke Lifflaffers[49], daar me wual van
seggen kann: »P u c h e r s un Praulers sind nine
F e c h t e r s,« süht me wual faaken, dann se bisset[50] allerweggens
herümme, daar se meenet dat 't wat to haseleeren giewe; me kann
se abers baule mööten; s e w i i r e t s i c k m e e s t i g m e t ' n
k o r t e n S t o c k e un me kann se baule sau tamm kriigen, dat me
se up de Hand setten un wegpuußen kann, as'n Flüüsen. Me het se
hier un daar met'n rechten Naamen: »K a p t e i n - M u u l e.« — Sau
geh't't, wann Gielgäuse[51] sick met Lüüen gemeen maaken will't,
daar se nich tüsken häärt un sick nich na regeeret —
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