Here is a longer, in-depth academic summary of Bertus de Villiers’ “Directive Principles of
State Policy and Fundamental Rights: The Indian Experience”, with clear paragraph breaks,
preserved subsectioning, and bold formatting for emphasis of core arguments and
terminology:
Introduction
The article begins by situating its inquiry in the context of South Africa's constitutional
transition, particularly regarding how socio-economic rights might be entrenched in a future
Bill of Rights. While there is general agreement among political actors on the inclusion of a
justiciable Bill of Rights, disagreement persists on how to give legal form to social, economic,
and cultural rights. Some socio-economic rights, such as freedom of contract or property rights,
have already achieved consensus. However, other rights—like the right to work, access to
adequate nutrition, or a decent standard of living—are more controversial due to their
programmatic nature, requiring state intervention and resource allocation.
This brings attention to the Indian constitutional model, where Directive Principles of State
Policy (DPSPs) provide a non-justiciable framework for social and economic transformation,
in tandem with justiciable Fundamental Rights. The ANC’s constitutional proposals have
highlighted this Indian dual-structure, alongside examples from Ireland and Namibia, as an
important point of reference. De Villiers proposes that India’s experience offers useful insights
for countries like South Africa, aiming to combine individual freedoms with socio-economic
justice in a constitutional framework.
1. Background to Directive Principles of State Policy
The inclusion of both Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles in the Indian
Constitution is deeply rooted in the country’s struggle for independence and its social justice
aspirations. Even during colonial rule, Indian leaders—especially through the Indian National
Congress—articulated a vision for rights that combined freedom from British domination with
a strong social and economic policy agenda.
The Indian DPSPs draw inspiration from ancient traditions, notably Raja Dharma, which
emphasized the moral and social duties of rulers towards the poor and the weak. The Irish
Constitution, however, was the primary modern influence, providing the Indian drafters with a
model for embedding socio-economic obligations of the state in a non-enforceable but
constitutionally authoritative form.
The founding vision was to harmonize liberty and justice—to ensure that individual rights
would not obstruct social transformation. Nehru and other leaders emphasized that political
independence would be meaningless without ending exploitation, class privileges, and
systemic inequality. This led to the inclusion of two distinct constitutional chapters:
● Fundamental Rights: enforceable in courts, focusing on individual liberty and
protection from state overreach.
● Directive Principles: not enforceable by courts, but fundamental to the governance
of the state, requiring active policy measures for welfare and development.
A key insight is that these two parts were not designed to represent a simple division between
first-generation (civil-political) and second-generation (socio-economic) rights. In fact, the
Fundamental Rights chapter contains several socio-economic and cultural rights as well,
such as property rights, educational freedoms, and labor protections. Thus, the Indian
Constitution blurs rigid generational distinctions and instead frames the entire rights
discourse within a comprehensive political project.
The Constituent Assembly’s Advisory Committee made it clear that DPSPs, though
non-justiciable, were foundational to lawmaking and governance. Critics within the
Assembly had differing views—some objected to their inclusion in the Constitution due to their
programmatic nature, while others wanted them placed in an appendix. Ultimately, the
consensus was that DPSPs were constitutional mandates, reflecting the moral and
developmental commitments of a democratic state.
In sum, the directive principles:
● Guide governance at all levels;
● Inspire legislation and administrative action;
● Provide a constitutional moral compass for social change;
● Are interpreted by courts to expand the meaning and purpose of Fundamental
Rights, even though they are not themselves enforceable in courts.
2. Scope and Clauses of Directive Principles of State Policy
The Directive Principles, enshrined in Part IV of the Indian Constitution, are explicitly
declared non-enforceable in courts (Article 37), but are nevertheless fundamental to the
governance of the country. Their non-justiciability has led some scholars, like Seervai, to
call them “rhetorical hopes” rather than concrete legal obligations. Still, the judiciary has
increasingly interpreted them as constitutional values, influencing both legislation and the
application of Fundamental Rights.
The scope of the DPSPs is vast, covering virtually every aspect of social, economic, and
cultural policy. The principles can be grouped into five major categories:
1. Socialist Principles
These principles reflect the Constitution’s commitment to equity and justice in the
socio-economic realm. They require the state to:
● Ensure equitable distribution of resources;
● Avoid concentration of wealth;
● Guarantee equal pay for equal work;
● Protect labor rights and child welfare;
● Secure the right to work, education, and public assistance for the needy;
● Ensure just working conditions and living wages for all.
2. Gandhian Principles
Based on Mahatma Gandhi’s ideals, these include:
● Strengthening village panchayats (self-governance at the grassroots);
● Protecting marginalized communities, including Scheduled Castes and Tribes;
● Promoting cottage and village industries;
● Enforcing prohibition of intoxicants for public health;
● Ensuring the separation of judiciary and executive;
● Preserving indigenous cattle breeds and preventing cow slaughter.
3. General Welfare Principles
These are broader welfare goals such as:
● Providing free and compulsory education to all children up to age 14;
● Improving nutrition, public health, and living standards;
● Promoting scientific agriculture and animal husbandry;
● Introducing a uniform civil code for national integration;
● Ensuring equal access to justice and legal aid.
4. International Principles
The Constitution directs the state to promote:
● Peaceful international relations;
● Respect for international law and treaties;
● Dispute resolution through arbitration.
5. Environmental Principles
Later additions require the state to:
● Protect and improve the environment;
● Safeguard forests and wildlife.
These directives are used by the judiciary in interpreting laws. Where multiple interpretations
are possible, the courts prefer the one that aligns with the directive principles, thus giving
them legal weight through interpretive methods. Many welfare laws—on land reform, labor
regulation, education, and animal protection—are rooted in DPSPs. However, the practical
implementation of these principles has been uneven due to political constraints, bureaucratic
inefficiencies, and resource limitations.
Still, as de Villiers notes, the directive principles have shaped the moral vision of
governance, becoming a benchmark for evaluating state performance. Their enduring
importance lies in providing a constitutional language of obligation, even if courts cannot
compel action directly.
Certainly. Here's a more elaborated, academically detailed version of Section 3 onwards from
Bertus de Villiers' article, "Directive Principles of State Policy and Fundamental Rights: The
Indian Experience." All arguments have been expanded for clarity, with bold formatting and
paragraph structure for ease of reading:
---
3. Relationship Between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles
The relationship between Fundamental Rights (FRs) and Directive Principles of State Policy
(DPSPs) has been the central constitutional debate in India since independence. Although both
are foundational to the Indian Constitution, their enforceability, legal standing, and operational
logic differ significantly. FRs, enshrined in Part III, are justiciable and enforceable through the
courts, while DPSPs, outlined in Part IV, are non-justiciable but considered fundamental to
governance.
This tension has provoked multiple phases of judicial interpretation, each reflecting different
philosophical, political, and socio-economic pressures. De Villiers identifies three key phases in
the constitutional journey: a period of rigid supremacy of Fundamental Rights, followed by an
era of harmonization, and most recently, a transformative turn where courts have increasingly
elevated the role of DPSPs in shaping Indian constitutionalism.
---
3.1 Fundamental Rights as Supreme (Phase One)
In the initial years following the Constitution's promulgation, the Indian judiciary adopted a literal
and hierarchical interpretation, where Fundamental Rights were seen as legally superior to
DPSPs. Courts ruled that in any case of conflict, FRs would prevail, since they are legally
enforceable, while DPSPs are not.
A landmark case reflecting this stance is State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan (1951). The
case challenged a policy that reserved college admissions for different communities in an
attempt to uplift backward classes, as per DPSPs. The Supreme Court struck down the policy,
holding that Article 15 of the FRs, which guarantees non-discrimination, could not be overridden
by a non-justiciable directive principle, even if it served the goals of social justice.
The Court stated:
> "The Directive Principles of State Policy, which by Article 37 are expressly made
unenforceable by a court, cannot override the provisions found in Part III (Fundamental Rights)
which are enforceable."
A similar interpretation was followed in M.H. Quareshi v. State of Bihar (1958). Here, the
petitioners contested laws prohibiting the slaughter of certain cattle breeds, arguing that the
laws infringed upon their right to conduct business under Article 19(1)(g). The state justified the
law based on Article 48, a directive principle mandating the preservation of cattle. The court
again sided with the Fundamental Right, stating that directive principles cannot be enforced at
the cost of infringing a Fundamental Right.
Thus, the first phase can be characterized by:
A legal hierarchy, where FRs supersede DPSPs;
DPSPs being viewed as moral obligations or policy guides, not as binding norms;
The court’s reluctance to allow socio-economic legislation to infringe on individual liberties, even
if well-intentioned;
A sense that constitutional liberalism, rooted in the protection of individual rights, must not be
diluted by state-centered developmentalism.
---
3.2 Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles as Complementary (Phase Two)
Over time, criticism emerged that the rigid prioritization of Fundamental Rights over DPSPs
undermined the Constitution’s transformative vision. This led to a second phase, where the
judiciary began reconciling and harmonizing both parts of the Constitution. The shift was driven
by:
The realization that socio-economic goals required affirmative state action;
Increasing awareness that rights without socio-economic foundations are hollow;
The Preamble’s commitment to justice—social, economic, and political, which cannot be fulfilled
without DPSPs.
In Chandra Bhawan Boarding and Lodging v. State of Mysore (1970), the petitioner argued that
minimum wage legislation interfered with their freedom to conduct business. The court
disagreed, asserting that:
> "Freedom to trade does not mean freedom to exploit."
The judiciary declared that FRs and DPSPs are not antagonistic, but instead complement and
supplement each other. It held that the Directive Principles enable the realization of true
equality, and that constitutional provisions must be interpreted in a manner that advances the
larger goals of justice.
This approach was further developed in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)—a
constitutional benchmark. The case challenged constitutional amendments that attempted to
curtail property rights and enable land reforms. While the Supreme Court upheld the ‘basic
structure doctrine’, stating that the Constitution’s core could not be destroyed, it acknowledged
the centrality of DPSPs in achieving national development.
The judgment emphasized that:
DPSPs lay down the path of progress, while FRs define the boundaries;
Social and economic justice, as envisaged by DPSPs, are intrinsic to the basic structure;
The court’s role is to interpret both harmoniously, rather than in conflict.
This phase signaled a pragmatic constitutionalism, where the interests of the individual and the
needs of the collective were balanced through a purposive interpretation of the Constitution.
---
3.3 Directive Principles as the Spirit of the Constitution (Phase Three)
The third and current phase is marked by a judicial transformation, where the Directive
Principles have come to be seen as central to the Constitution’s moral and political vision.
Courts have begun interpreting Fundamental Rights expansively, using DPSPs as interpretive
tools to broaden their meaning and legitimize socio-economic legislation.
The landmark case Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) catalyzed this shift. The court ruled
that the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 must be interpreted broadly,
encompassing dignity, livelihood, and procedural fairness—ideas closely aligned with several
DPSPs. The decision opened the door for the judiciary to integrate socio-economic
considerations into rights jurisprudence.
Another milestone was Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980), which challenged constitutional
amendments that gave absolute priority to DPSPs over FRs (via Article 31C). The court
declared that while DPSPs are crucial, they cannot override the Fundamental Rights to equality
and freedom. However, it also ruled that both Parts III and IV are equally essential and together
form the “conscience” and “core” of the Constitution.
In the words of the court:
> "The goals set out in Part IV (Directive Principles) have to be achieved without the abrogation
of the means provided by Part III (Fundamental Rights)."
Yet, a conflicting ruling emerged in Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Co. v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd.
(1983), where the court appeared to restore Article 31C to give certain DPSPs precedence over
FRs. This inconsistency in judicial reasoning was addressed in State of Tamil Nadu v. Abu
Kavier Bai (1984), where the court reaffirmed that FRs and DPSPs must be harmonized, and
that a reasonable nexus must exist between legislation and directive goals.
Since the 1980s, the Supreme Court has taken a more activist stance, using DPSPs to:
Expand the content of Article 21 (Right to Life), including rights to education, shelter, health, and
environment;
Justify positive state action in welfare schemes;
Guide policy mandates through Public Interest Litigation (PIL);
Strengthen legal aid, labor protections, and child welfare policies.
This phase embodies the philosophy that constitutional justice demands more than negative
liberty—it requires positive empowerment. The court’s role has evolved from passive interpreter
to active guarantor of constitutional ideals, where DPSPs are not optional policy goals but
fundamental instruments of socio-economic justice.
Conclusion
Bertus de Villiers’ analysis of the Indian constitutional experience shows how a dual structure
of Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles can be used to balance individual freedom
with collective justice. Though non-justiciable, DPSPs are essential to India’s
socio-economic transformation. Over time, the judiciary evolved from seeing them as
ideals to recognizing them as tools for interpreting and extending rights.
India’s model demonstrates that constitutional design can accommodate both liberty and
developmental obligations, offering valuable lessons to countries like South Africa that are
wrestling with similar challenges. The Indian experience reminds us that the legitimacy of a
constitution lies not only in protecting individual rights, but also in guiding the moral and
developmental trajectory of the state.
Let me know if you’d like this summary as a formatted PDF or converted into slides, a
comparison with another country, or adapted into a different writing style.
