See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.
net/publication/346609630
Beyond the End of History and the Chinese Century: An Analysis of the post-
COVID-19 World Order
Article · December 2020
CITATIONS READS
0 660
2 authors, including:
Farah Adeed
University of Management and Technology (Pakistan)
4 PUBLICATIONS 0 CITATIONS
SEE PROFILE
Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:
The People Vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save View project
Islam, Secularism, and Liberal Democracy: Toward a Democratic Theory for Muslim Societies: Book Review View project
All content following this page was uploaded by Farah Adeed on 03 December 2020.
The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.
I
R
S www.irss.academyirmbr.com December 2020
S International Review of Social Sciences Vol. 8 Issue.12
Beyond the End of History and the Chinese Century:
An Analysis of the post-COVID-19 World Order
FARAH ADEED
Lecturer, Department of International Relations
University of Management and Technology, Sialkot Campus-Pakistan
Email: [email protected]
SALEHA ANWAR
Research Scholar, University of the Punjab, Lahore-Pakistan
Email: [email protected]
Abstract
This paper argues that COVID-19 is not an aberration as claimed and predicted by some scholars.
COVID-19 only aggravated the crises and challenges the US and China are currently facing, it did not
cause them. We point out that Francis Fukuyama’s the end of history, Joseph Nye’s American century is
not over, and Joseph E. Stiglitz’s the Chinese Century are over-simplified versions of complex ideological
and political processes. Alternatively, the paper argues that America is facing three interlinked crises; 1)
Legitimacy crisis 2) Economic stagnation 3) Diminishing soft power. China, on the other hand, is facing
three eminent challenges: 1) Ideological 2) Political 3) Cultural. We conclude that the world is likely to
move towards regionalism and more autocratic rules because of increasing complexity and the rise of
ideational politics, not because of COVID-19. In the future, regional (and ideological) blocs like the
European Union, OIC, and Shanghai Cooperation Organization are likely to replace the existing global
institutions.
Keywords: Post-COVID-19 World Order, Authoritarian capitalism, China’s century, Regionalism,
Autocratic Rule.
Introduction
The world has been hard hit by COVID-19 (Coronavirus disease) since the end of December 2019. The
novel virus originated from Wuhan, a city in the Hubei Province of China, spread across the world. It
affected economics, politics, and culture. The education system also experienced some drastic changes as
traditional classes transformed into online (digital) classrooms.
Different states responded to the COVID-19 outbreak differently. Some states like China and Pakistan
successfully contained its spread and reopened businesses. However, countries like Spain, India, and
America had to face unprecedented challenges as the number of COVID-19 positive cases went up to
millions. According to the World Economic Forum Report, the US economy has been experiencing the
worst setbacks since the Great Depression. The report points out that the US GDP rate fell down from a
relatively higher rate to 32.9% annualized rate. Resultantly, unemployment at mass level is anticipated.
Similarly, India recorded its lowest GDP rate back in 1992 as 1.1% but the country is now expected to have
1.9% in 2020-21. The virus has repeatedly led to the four percent loss to India‘s GDP (Kumar and Patnaik,
2020). Due to its impact on the economy and politics, it has become imperative to assess the nature and
dynamics of the post-COVID-19 world order. For example; will democracy vanish? Will the world move
towards autocratic rule? Is China going to replace the US?
ISSN 2309-0081 Adeed & Anwar (2020) 30
I
R
S www.irss.academyirmbr.com December 2020
S International Review of Social Sciences Vol. 8 Issue.12
This paper does not attempt to assess the relationship between the regime type and response to contain the
virus. The present study is a qualitative analysis of the post-Corona world order while looking at the pre-
COVID-19 world. The study challenges the prevailing dominant ideas about the future of China in an
attempt to offer an alternative explanation. We establish an argument that the world was already on its way
to enter into a post-democratic era due to various reasons including economic stagnation and the fall of
American soft power. However, America‘s failure to lead the world does not automatically offer a place to
China to become the 21st century superpower rather, we argue, China itself is facing some serious
challenges like the absence of an ideological narrative and the required amount of soft power to lead the
world. More importantly, China wants to dominate the world, not to lead it.
In the end, we see a multi-polar world with the rise of autocratic regimes and authoritarian capitalism. This
has never been in the past. The post-COVID-19 world is a new challenge for democrats and socialists to
create an egalitarian society.
After “The End of History”
The post-Cold war decade was dominated by two competing versions about the future of the world. Francis
Fukuyama claimed in 1992 that the western-style liberal democracy was the ultimate form of government
humans could ever form. Samuel P. Huntington (1993) countered Fukuyama and maintained that the future
conflict between the states would not be because of economic interests but due to civilizational differences.
Other scholars in the decade of the 1990s, either agreed with these two scholars or elaborated their
viewpoints while explaining new developments.
Fukuyama marked the assumed completion of human political evolution as the end of history. He chiefly
relied upon two arguments to defend his thesis; a) only democracy can satisfy human desire for dignity and
recognition; b) liberal-democratic capitalism is the only available option to achieve economic development
and national prestige. However, Professor Fukuyama not only overrated democracy but also discredited
cyclical theories (Irwin, 1997) despite their profound impact on the development of political theory.
Modernization theorists argued that economic changes as a result of the global capitalist model would
create some particular cultural changes which could ultimately lead to the transformation of authoritarian
regimes to the democratic ones (Huntington, 1984; Fukuyama, 1992; Rustow, 1968). Collectively, these
theories proposed what was called a transition paradigm. However, Thomas Carothers (2002) challenged
the key assumptions of the paradigm and argued that not all countries follow the same pattern of political
evolution. In other words, Carothers challenged the fallacy of unique universalism on empirical grounds
(through the examples of Taiwan, South Korea, and Mexico), and discarded its paradigmatic preeminence.
On practical grounds, the rise of authoritarian regimes across the world and their ability to accumulate both
hard and soft powers to lead the less developed countries have raised several other questions (Foa, 2018).
Foa notes that ―non-Western media organizations such as Al Jazeera have surpassed Western media in their
home regions in terms of viewership, while CCTV and RT (formerly Russia Today) have launched English,
Arabic, and Spanish channels aimed at reaching audiences in Europe, North America, Latin America, and
the Middle East‖. In terms of economy, non-democratic regimes had a share of 12 percent in global GDP in
1990 but now it has been increased to 33 percent. The International Monetary Fund has projected that it
will increase in the next five years.
Similarly, de-consolidation of developed democracies and a strong shift in public opinion from pro-
democracy to pro-dictatorship in the US has generated a new set of questions for political scientists
working in the field of democratic theory (Foa and Mounk, 2017). One in sixteen Americans supported a
military rule back in 1995 but the results of a nationwide poll in 2011 are quite striking. One in six
Americans now favored military rule due to the abysmal state of affairs. Similarly, 34 percent of young
Americans supported a strong leader‘s rule in 1995 but the number increased to 44 percent when asked in
2011. The data validates the hypothesis that a large number of Americans do not have enough confidence
ISSN 2309-0081 Adeed & Anwar (2020) 31
I
R
S www.irss.academyirmbr.com December 2020
S International Review of Social Sciences Vol. 8 Issue.12
in their political system due to various reasons ranging from a stagnant economic model to the rise of
racism (Mounk, 2018).
The major political blow to the western scholarship on the future of the world is neither due to the failure of
the non-western countries to democratize nor is it about the failing economic model at home. The primary
challenge is the rise of China. The complication increased as Huntington‘s thesis that an Islamic-Confucian
alliance may challenge the West in the twenty-first century (Huntington, 1993) seems to be coming true
with China‘s increasing influence in the Muslim world.
To regenerate an end of history-like thesis, Joseph Nye, an American political scientist, wrote Is the
American Century Over? (2015) and attempted to expel the impression if China could replace the US in the
near future. Nye carefully analyzes China‘s economic, military, and soft power. He concludes that, ―China
still lags far behind the United States in all three dimensions of power.‖ Nye boldly maintained that China
lacks both will and capabilities to replace the current superpower of the power.
Meanwhile, there has been considerable work on the emergence of China as an economic work with the
potential to disrupt the global world order being led by the US. The collective thesis of a few scholars was
the emergence of a China‘s Century (Stiglitz, 2015; Shenkar, 2006; Brahm, 2001). The main arguments
relied either on economic aspects or technological advancements. There has been no serious scholarly
attempt to look at China‘s role as a world leader with exceptional economic might.
Francis Fukuyama‘s end history, Joseph Nye‘s insistence that the American century is not over, and
Stiglitz‘s the Chinese Century demand us to look at evidence with the fresh eye. The COVID-19 and its
wide-ranging impact on global economy has further necessitated such an academic endeavor.
Pre-COVID-19 world: America, a failing Empire?
A quick look at the pre-COVID-19 can help us understand the future of democracy in a more nuanced and
historicized manner. The dawn of the 21st century introduced several new political processes leading to
some expected and unexpected outcomes like the reversal of Hungarian democracy. Hungary was once
considered as a consolidated democracy with strong institutions, a competitive party system, a vibrant civil
society, and free and diverse media‖ but as the global political order fumbled, Hungarian democracy
experienced an unprecedented decay. Similarly, Bolivia, Philippines, Turkey, and Venezuela also moved
from (transitionary) democracy into ―competitive authoritarian regimes‖ (Levitsky and Way, 2010). .
The international community—the consolidated ideological and economic power of Europe and America---
focused on democratization in the 1990s, and opposed any alternative. The environment was ―uniquely
hostile to full-scale dictatorship‖. Therefore, post-communist regimes like Benin, Haiti, Madagascar, Mali,
Albania, Cambodia, North Macedonia, and Romania either partially democratized or adopted a hybrid
political system (Levitsky and Way, 2010). .
Russia aggressively opposes liberal democracy and has an ambitious ideological vision to counter the
western influence. Russia not only opposes the US interventionist approach but also challenges when and
where it stands in its way to achieve its foreign policy goals. China is also on its way to be counted as a
global power through its economic influence while creating and sponsoring alternative international
(financial) institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Bank and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
Long before the spread of the COVID-19, the US had abandoned the world order founded and developed
on the tenets of Wilsonian idealism in the 20 th century. Barak Obama and Donald Trump did not take part
in pro-democracy campaigns to safeguard democratic institutions from Honduras to Hungary to the
Philippines.
ISSN 2309-0081 Adeed & Anwar (2020) 32
I
R
S www.irss.academyirmbr.com December 2020
S International Review of Social Sciences Vol. 8 Issue.12
How much Corona will alter the global order?
Some scholars and several political commentators have argued that the world after the COVID-19 shall not
be the same. Henry Kissinger (2020) argued that ‗the reality is that the world will never be the same after
the coronavirus‖. The main focus remained on an intriguing question; how does a country (authoritarian or
democratic) respond to the COVID-19? The supposed success or failure to contain the spread of the virus
was tantamount to the success of failure of the political system (ideology) a country is following.
There is an ideological insecurity prevailing among the western scholarship that China may present its
success against the COVID-19 outbreak to expand its autocratic model of governance (Schmemann, 2020).
The debate has been reduced from China vs. America to democracy vs. authoritarianism. There is
voluminous literature available on these subjects; the state-capacity determines the nature and scope of the
governmental response to a crisis (Besley and Persson, 2009; 2010; Fukuyama, 2011; 2015; Johnson and
Koyama, 2017; Migdal, 1988). The question is why the US or Spain fail to effectively combat the COVID-
19 despite the fact that these countries experienced 20% larger decline in geographic mobility as compared
to China and Russia (Frey, Chen and Presidente, 2020). Scholars hold that the decision making process in
democracies is inherently complex (Fukuyama, 2011; 2015; March and Olsen 1984; Olson, 1982),
therefore autocratic regimes generally tend to be quick in problem-solving.
Due to three interlinked reasons, we argue that the COVID-19 is neither about democracy vs. autocratic
rules nor it is going to alter the basis of the current international system. First, generally, people do not start
questioning the basis of a political system during the time of crisis. However, if the system is already shaky
and based upon a contestable political philosophy, it is likely to shamble. Second, a system loses its
credibility if all the states with similar systems (here meaning liberal democracies) behave in the same way.
In the present context, the US did not effectively contained the virus but, at the same time, New Zeeland
did it. In such scenarios, citizens tend to question the administrative skills of their rulers, not the legitimacy
of the system. Third, there are unlikely to be mass demands for replacing democracies with authoritarian
regimes because of the fact that economic impacts are shared, not limited to any one state. Apart from a few
exceptions, economies of democracies as well as autocratic regimes have been hard hit by COVID-19.
America’s Crises
Fukuyama and Nye were so sure about the supremacy of the US that they did not explore the nature of the
challenges the country is facing. We argue that America is facing three interlinked crises; 1) legitimacy
crisis 2) Economic stagnation 3) Diminishing soft power. The COVID-19 outbreak did not originate these
challenges rather it only fastened the pace. These challenges are seriously diminishing America‘s ability
and will to lead the world.
Legitimacy Crisis
The US is facing a serious legitimacy crisis due to its inability to address issues ranging from the rise of far-
right politics to the unprecedented price hike. Historically, the world leaders or superpowers base their
legitimacy from the models of governance practicing at home. As far as the US is concerned, the trust in the
government institutions and their commitment to upgrade the lives of Americans have fallen from 75
percent in the 1960s to 17 percent in 2020 (Pew Research Centre, 20120. Similarly, in the time of COVID-
19, Gallup (2020) found that nearly 30 percent of Americans did not trust what their government told them.
From a foreign policy standpoint, the US is steadily losing its credibility and legitimacy in the Muslim
world. There is a predominant scholarly view that the opposition to secularism in the Muslim world is a
result of America‘s expansionist foreign policy. In the case of Pakistan, there is a strong perception that the
US never wants a western-style democracy to be institutionalized in counties like ours since it may not
allow it to pursue its vested strategic interests. America‘s policy to use and abandon is proving
Huntington‘s thesis right that the Muslim world and Confucius civilization may get united to challenge the
Western preeminence.
ISSN 2309-0081 Adeed & Anwar (2020) 33
I
R
S www.irss.academyirmbr.com December 2020
S International Review of Social Sciences Vol. 8 Issue.12
Economic Stagnation
The World War II (Sep 1, 1939 – Sep 2, 1945) marked the beginning of a new era where the world came to
know about an American dream. The American dream included a set of ideals embedded in American
socio-economic model; everyone having equal opportunities and a right to grow and prosper. The dream
attracted intelligent men and women from across the world who decided to leave for the land of
opportunities (Guest, 2016). The attraction America offered was chiefly due to the rise of its economy.
During the two decades after the World War II, American economy grew an average pace of 4 percent per
year. So was the case in other western economies. In the case of America, the life standard doubled from
1935 to 1960, and again doubled from 1960 to 1985 (Atkinson and Morello, 2014; Mounk,
2019). However, since after the end of the Cold War, it has either been flat or deteriorating.
Economic deterioration is the root cause of America‘s current identity crisis. The anti-immigrant attitude is
a manifestation of the country‘s failing economy. In other words, the American dream which was founded
on an expanding and powerful economic model is losing both its credibility and impact because of its
inability to sustain the growth rate it had promised.
As mentioned earlier, the autocratic regimes are not outperforming the liberal capitalist countries. The data
shows that there is a consistent rise in attainment of economic growth and well-being at the part of the
autocratic regimes like China and Russia.
Diminishing Soft Power
Joseph Nye made another claim in 1990 the US despite some weaknesses has the potential and will to lead
the world. He developed a new concept of soft power to theorize his prediction of America‘s leadership
rule in the 21st century. Nye defined this new concept as ―to get others to do what they otherwise would
not‖. America‘s soft power, argued Nye, rested into three broad categories; cultural, ideological, and
institutional. His main thesis was not different from the orientalists who fall into the seductive trap of a
―false universalism‖ and commit a ―unique founding conditions‖ (Fred and Mehden, 1986; Hashemi,
2009).
Nye‘s idea of American soft power seems to be diminishing due to two factors; America‘s expansionist
foreign policy and the rise of populist politics at home. Frist, with the advent of social media, it is not
possible to smartly use sharp power and manipulate mass psychology at large. It may still work but it is not
as effective as it was in 1990s. The myth behind the America‘s struggle to hold human rights and liberal
values in Iraq and Afghanistan are no longer hidden. The use of liberalism and democracy as covers to
pursue strategic and economic interests have ‗exposed‘ the reality behind America‘s soft power. Second,
America is losing its democratic character to interests groups. Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page (2016)
collected some data and analyzed as to who rules in the US. They carefully studied as to how the Congress
acted on 1,779 policy issues over the period of two decades. The result showed that influence of the
economic elites and narrow interests groups in policy related matters. Gilens and Page concluded that ―in
the United States the majority does not rule‖. America‘s ideological or institutional power is no longer in
placed.
China’s Challenges
The dominant perception, as mentioned above, that China is to replace the US in the coming years is
contestable on several accounts. However, the claim that China is facing issues at regional level are not
backed by some facts (Nathan and Scobell, 2012). On the contrary, we point out that China is facing three
challenges: 1) political 2) ideological 3) cultural. Without addressing these challenges, and carefully
overcoming the same, China is unlikely to become what the US has been since the end of the Cold War.
ISSN 2309-0081 Adeed & Anwar (2020) 34
I
R
S www.irss.academyirmbr.com December 2020
S International Review of Social Sciences Vol. 8 Issue.12
Ideological
The primary challenge to the Chinese political leadership is neither about economy nor about military
power. The absence of an ideology to be exported to the world or at least to its economic and strategic
partners is what can possibly haunt China while pursuing its desire to become a world leader. Although
Confucianism is at the heart of China‘s culture but it has no defined political parameters to be adopted to
develop a political system. Huntington noted decades ago that ―Confucian heritage, with its emphasis on
authority, order, hierarchy, and supremacy of collectivity over the individual creates obstacles to
democratization.‖ Huntington‘s intellectual orientation demanded him to look into China‘s history and
determine it ―deemed fit for democracy‖. However, such an expectation not only generates a new type of
essentialism but also obstacle real understanding of the given society and its civilizational background.
Essentialism does not work well to explain the rise or fall of nations. But there are a few settled principles
in political theory and one of the core principles is that authoritarianism, in its direct or indirect forms,
cannot be treated as a legitimate political ideology. In the case of China, there is an absence of alternatives
to Locke’s consent, Rousseau’s popular sovereignty, and Mill’s individual liberty. Without practically
challenging Fukuyama‘s the end of history China continues to face a serious ideological challenge to
become a superpower in the 21st century.
Political
America sought legitimacy for its economic model by introducing a coherent political system based on the
tenets of liberal democracy. China, on the other hand, is using its economic power to seek legitimacy for its
political model. This can potentially be counterproductive in the long run due to three reasons: a) after
achieving some material growth people generally tend to demand rights and freedoms (Russell, 1938); b)
the Chinese system does not politically accommodate cultural/ideological diversity; c) lack of transparency
and information.
Theoretically, the Chinese constitution ensures freedom to its citizens. However, Cybersecurity Law
prohibits the use of the internet to ―endanger the sovereignty, overturn the socialist system, incite
separatism, break national unity, advocate terrorism or extremism, advocate ethnic hatred and ethnic
discrimination, . . . [and] create or disseminate false information to disrupt the economic or social order‖
(Nathan, 2015). Under this law, dissenting voices are targeted and often made political prisoners for racing
their disagreement with the officials in power.
Moreover, China has a unique approach, in contradiction with that of the US, that it promotes economic
cooperation between and among states that the growth of one party automatically bears fruits for the other.
In other words, China has introduced a unique state of state capitalism where the economy is defined only
in win-win terms. However, the Chinese model is unlikely to sustain international pressure, a critique of the
global civil society, and regional civil rights movements due to the reasons mentioned above. For example,
there is a strong perception that the state favors some domestic firms, particularly the high-tech industry, to
compete with the MNCs (Sutherland 2003). This is not what may appeal to the investors or the companies
to operate in the Chinese system which lacks transparency (Froese et al., 2019).
Cultural
To avoid any conceptual and methodological ambiguity, a few points demand clarity. Culture is a complex
entity. There are various reasons behind this complexity; a) culture is not static; b) there is nothing like a
national culture with similar shades in far-flung areas; c) culture is changing with varying degrees and
scope (Kiogora, 2015). Therefore, there cannot be a unified Chinese culture to be treated as one entity but
there is a broad context in which various sub-cultures operate and evolve and that is a social setting
predominantly influenced by Confucius philosophy (Latham, 200).
ISSN 2309-0081 Adeed & Anwar (2020) 35
I
R
S www.irss.academyirmbr.com December 2020
S International Review of Social Sciences Vol. 8 Issue.12
The US-led Globalization impacted various cultures, markets, and politics. However, closed societies like
Russia and China were in a position to resist the change and oppose any attempt to liberalize their social
systems. China has been working on improving its soft power resources to seek external legitimacy. It has
established international standard universities, laboratories, and some exchange programs to let foreigners
come in and interact with Chinese for exporting its local culture. However, soft power does not increase in
an overtly state-controlled public sphere with limited freedoms. For example, there is no Facebook and
Twitter in China for the lay public, and it makes them a community from another world. Resultantly,
Chinese culture has lost the basic tenets every pluralist society carries; the ability to accept, assimilate and
absorb. Hence, there is a strong perception that as China is growing economically, it is likely to oppose
democratization, liberal values, and freedoms across the world (Pillsbury, 2015).
Post-COVID-19 World Order: A renewed old world?
Democracy was already not the only desirable system in the world and COVID-19 has also reinforced such
observations. Professor Nye‘s insistence that the American century is not over has no longer any relevance
as the rise of identity politics within the US, Donald Trump‘s retreat from the global leadership, and acute
economic stagnation have further been confirmed by the COVID-19 outbreak. The post-COVID-19 world
may be the beginning of the post-America world.
The myth of a unipolar world---a political order developed and led by the US--- is no longer in place. There
are growing economies, regional alliances, and, above all, a constant decline in American soft power. The
country is no longer in a position to lead the world because it lacks; a) economic resources; b) soft power;
c) political will. On the other hand, autocratic regimes have introduced a new successful economic model
i.e. authoritarian capitalism. Russia, China, and their allies are now attracting public imagination due to
their increasing economic power and cultural harmony. However, these autocratic regimes are inherently
anti-participatory political systems which means the flow of information is highly controlled and individual
freedoms are given in line with the collectively defined political goals. In other words, when individual
freedom is considered as an obstacle to achieve the collective goal, it is immediately withdrawn. So, in the
age of social media and advanced technology, people will ultimately debate freedom. This is the first global
challenge any anti-America autocratic regimes has to deal with.
Despite all challenges, China has both potential and a strong will to dominate the world. China‘s political
rationality has been manifested through its foreign policy. It attempts to dominate the world by replacing
the US but it does not want to lead it. Precisely, China does not want to claim the responsibility of its
allies. Unlike the US, it has an agenda to grow economically on equal terms without becoming a constant
liability for each other. Most of the states from the developing world are likely to be part of this new
scheme for two reasons. First, the Chinese model ensures economic growth that is necessary to stay in
power in autocratic regimes. Second, when China does not offer aid as much as the USA has had, by
design, it does not pose any threat to the host‘s sovereignty.
China‘s challenges, America‘s crises, and the demands of the developing world suggest us to the beginning
of a world having multiple power centers, and regionally powerful organization. The time for the
international organization is almost up now.
Conclusion
COVID-19 has hit the world in an unprecedented way. Many experts have rightly assessed its implications
on the economy, politics, and society. Unless a vaccine is readily available in the market, international
travel, trade, and interaction will continue to follow additional protocols for safety and continuity.
However, the COVID-19 pandemic has not caused the end of the democratic political order nor it marks the
beginning of the Chinese century. It has only intensified the pace of international compartmentalization
where America is facing some serious crises and showing reluctance to lead the world from the front.
ISSN 2309-0081 Adeed & Anwar (2020) 36
I
R
S www.irss.academyirmbr.com December 2020
S International Review of Social Sciences Vol. 8 Issue.12
Similarly, China, despite its economic might, is facing challenges on cultural and ideological fronts.
Therefore, the post-COVID-19 world order is going to be different from what was a pre-COVID-19
international scenario. However, the COVID-19 is not the sole reason behind the making of a new, multi-
polar world.
References
Atkinson, A. B., & Morelli, S. (2014). Chartbook of economic inequality. ECINEQ WP, 324.
Besley, T., & Persson, T. (2009). The origins of state capacity: Property rights, taxation, and politics.
American economic review, 99(4), 1218-44.
Brahm, L. J. (Ed.). (2001). China's century: the awakening of the next economic powerhouse. John Wiley
& Sons Inc.
Carothers, T. (2002). The end of the transition paradigm. Journal of democracy, 13(1), 5-21.
Foa, R. S. (2018). Modernization and authoritarianism. Journal of Democracy, 29(3), 129-140.
Foa, R., & Mounk, Y. (2017). The end of the consolidation paradigm. Journal of Democracy
Francis, F. (1992). The end of history and the last man. Op. cit, 49-50.
Fred, R., & Der Mehden, V. (1986). Religion and modernization in Southeast Asia. Syracuse University
Press.
Frey, C. B., Chen, C., & Presidente, G. (2020). Democracy, Culture, and Contagion: Political Regimes and
Countries Responsiveness to Covid-19. Covid Economics, 18, 1-20.
Froese, F. J., Sutherland, D., Lee, J. Y., Liu, Y., & Pan, Y. (2019). Challenges for foreign companies in
China: implications for research and practice. Asian Business & Management, 18(4), 249-262.
Fukuyama, F. (2011). The origins of political order: From prehuman times to the French Revolution.
Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Fukuyama, F. (2015). Political order and political decay: From the industrial revolution to the
globalization of democracy. Macmillan.
Gallup Poll. (2020) Trust in Government Lacking on COVID-19's Frontlines: March 20, 2020: Retrieved
from https://news.gallup.com/opinion/gallup/296594/trust-government-lacking-frontlines-covid.aspx
Gest, J. (2016). The new minority: White working class politics in an age of immigration and inequality.
Oxford University Press.
Gilens, M., & Page, B. I. (2014). Testing theories of American politics: Elites, interest groups, and average
citizens. Perspectives on politics, 12(3), 564-581.
Hashemi, N. (2009). Islam, secularism, and liberal democracy: Toward a democratic theory for Muslim
societies. OUP USA.
Huntington, S. P. (1984). Will more countries become democratic?. Political Science Quarterly, 99(2),
193-218.
Huntington, S. P. (1993). The clash of civilizations. Foreign affairs, 72(3), 22-49.
Irwin, R. (1997). Toynbee and Ibn Khaldun. Middle Eastern Studies, 33(3), 461-479.
Johnson, N. D., & Koyama, M. (2017). States and economic growth: Capacity and constraints. Explorations
in Economic History, 64, 1-20.
Kiogora, D. (2015). Culture as a Static or Evolving Aspect of Society. Available at SSRN 2628045.
Kissinger, H. (2020). The Coronavirus pandemic will forever alter the world order. Wall Street
Journal, 3(4), 2020.
Kumar Das, D., & Patnaik, S. (2020). The Impact of COVID-19 in Indian Economy–An Empirical
Study. International Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology, 11(3).
Kumar Das, D., & Patnaik, S. (2020). The Impact of COVID-19 in Indian Economy–An Empirical
Study. International Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology, 11(3).
Latham, A. (2007). The Confucian Continuities of Chinese Geopolitical Discourse. Macalester
International, 18(1), 20.
Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A. (2010). Competitive authoritarianism: Hybrid regimes after the Cold War.
Cambridge University Press.
ISSN 2309-0081 Adeed & Anwar (2020) 37
I
R
S www.irss.academyirmbr.com December 2020
S International Review of Social Sciences Vol. 8 Issue.12
March, J. and Olsen, J.P. (1984). The new institutionalism: organizational factors in political life. The
American Political Science Review, 78(3), 734-749.
Migdal, J. S. (1988). Strong societies and weak states: state-society relations and state capabilities in the
Third World. Princeton University Press.
Mounk, Y. (2018). The people vs. democracy: Why our freedom is in danger and how to save it. Harvard
University Press.
Nathan and Scobell (2012) Scobell, China’s Search for Security: Columbia University Press
Nathan, A. J. (2015). China's challenge. Journal of Democracy, 26(1), 156-170.
Nye, J. S. (1990). Soft power. Foreign policy, (80), 153-171.
Olsen, M. (1982). The rise and decline of nations: economic growth, stagflation, and social rigidities. Yale
University Press.
Pew Research Centre. (2012). “Public Trust in Government: 1958-2019‖. April 11, 2019. Retrieved from
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2019/04/11/public-trust-in-government-1958-2019/
Pillsbury, M. (2015) The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the
Global Superpower: Henry Holt, New York, 2015.
Rustow, D. A. (1968). Modernization and comparative politics: prospects in research and
theory. Comparative Politics, 1(1), 37-51.
Schmemann, S. (2020) The Virus Comes for Democracy Strongmen think they know the cure for Covid-19.
Are they right?, New York Times, April 2.
Shenkar, O. (2006). The Chinese century: The rising Chinese economy and its impact on the global
economy, the balance of power, and your job. Pearson Education.
Stiglitz, J. E. (2015). The Chinese Century. Vanity Fair, 1.
Sutherland, D. (2003). China's large enterprises and the challenge of late industrialisation (Vol. 5).
Routledge.
World Economic Forum (2020). What to know about the report on America’s COVID-hit GDP: Retrieved
from https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/07/covid-19-coronavirus-usa-united-states-econamy-gdp-
decline/
ISSN 2309-0081 Adeed & Anwar (2020) 38
View publication stats
