Bombay Good Sonu - Kumar - Dharmendra - Sah - Vs - State - of - Maharashtra - On - 31 - January - 2025
Bombay Good Sonu - Kumar - Dharmendra - Sah - Vs - State - of - Maharashtra - On - 31 - January - 2025
2025:BHC-AS:4688
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WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP
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WRIT PETITION NO.5254 OF 2024
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INTERIM APPLICATION NO.5017 OF 2024
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WRIT PETITION NO.5270 OF 2024
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WRIT PETITION NO.5588 OF 2024
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WRIT PETITION NO.5590 OF 2024
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WRIT PETITION NO.5694 OF 2024
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WRIT PETITION NO.5845 OF 2024
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WRIT PETITION NO.5874 OF 2024
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WRIT PETITION NO.6000 OF 2024
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WRIT PETITION NO.6115 OF 2024
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WRIT PETITION NO.6223 OF 2024
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WRIT PETITION NO.6229 OF 2024
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WRIT PETITION NO.6663 OF 2024
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Deshmane(PS)
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WRIT PETITION (ST) NO.19741 OF 2024
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WRIT PETITION (ST) NO.19845 OF 2024
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WRIT PETITION (ST) NO.20923 OF 2024
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WRIT PETITION (ST) NO.20933 OF 2024
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WRIT PETITION (ST) NO.20938 OF 2024
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WRIT PETITION (ST) NO.20996 OF 2024
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WRIT PETITION (ST) NO.21638 OF 2024
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WRIT PETITION (ST) NO.22085 OF 2024
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INTERIM APPLICATION (ST) NO.26922 OF 2024
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WRIT PETITION (ST) NO.22085 OF 2024
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2 / 91
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WRIT PETITION NO.284 OF 2025
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WRIT PETITION NO.336 OF 2025
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WRIT PETITION NO.337 OF 2025
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WRIT PETITION NO.395 OF 2025
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WRIT PETITION NO.5257 OF 2024
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WRIT PETITION NO.5263 OF 2024
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[SR. NO.925]
Adv.Rishi Bhuta a/w Adv.Vivek Pandey, Adv.Neha Patil, Adv.K.R.Shah, Adv.Ashish Dubey,
Adv.Ujjwal Gandhi, Adv.Ankita Bamboli, Adv.Saakshi Jha, Adv.Prateek Dutta, Adv.Bhavi
Kapoor, Adv.Vaishnavi Javehri and Adv.Parth Govilkar-Advocates for Petitioner.
Dr.Birendra Saraf-Advocate General a/w Mr.H.S.Ven
Prosecutor,Smt.M.M.Deshmukh-APP, Smt.M.H.Mhatre-APP, for Respondents-State.
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[SR.NO.903]
WRIT PETITION NO.5254 OF 2024
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO.5017 OF 2024
Mr.Binod Agarwal (In-person) present in Court for Petitioner/ Applicant.
Dr.Birendra Saraf-Advocate General a/w Mr.H.S.Venegavkar- Public Prosecutor and
Smt.M.M.Deshmukh-APP for Respondent-State.
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[SR. NO.904]
WRIT PETITION NO.5270 OF 2024
Adv.Niranjan Mundargi i/b. Adv.Vinay J. Bhanushali, Advocate for Petitioner.
Dr.Birendra Saraf-Advocate General a/w Mr.H.S.Venegavkar- Public Prosecutor,
Smt.M.M.Deshmukh-APP, Mr.S.R.Agarkar-APP for Respondents-State.
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[SR.NO.905]
WRIT PETITION NO.5588 OF 2024
Adv.C.J.Joveson i/b. Adv.Simran Patil, Advocate for Petitioner.
Dr.Birendra Saraf-Advocate General a/w Mr.H.S.Venegavkar- Public Prosecutor,
Smt.M.M.Deshmukh-APP and Mr.B.V.Holambe-Patil-APP for Respondents-State.
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[SR.NO.906]
WRIT PETITION NO.5590 OF 2024
Adv.Vaibhav Jagtap-Advocate for Petitioner.
Dr.Birendra Saraf-Advocate General a/w Mr.H.S.Venegavkar- Public Prosecutor and
Smt.M.M.Deshmukh-APP for Respondent-State.
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[SR.NO.907]
WRIT PETITION NO.5694 OF 2024
Adv.Kamlesh Mahadev Satre, Advocate for Petitioner.
Adv.Aruna S. Pai, Advocate for Respondent No.1-Union of India.
Dr.Birendra Saraf-Advocate General a/w Mr.H.S.Venegavkar- Public Prosecutor,
Smt.M.M.Deshmukh-APP, Smt.M.H.Mhatre-APP, for Respondent No.2-State.
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[SR.NO.908]
WRIT PETITION NO.5845 OF 2024
Adv.Ujjwal Gandhi a/w Adv.Saakshi Jha, Adv.Prateek Dutta, Adv.Bhavi Kapoor-Advocates for
Petitioner.
Dr.Birendra Saraf-Advocate General a/w Mr.H.S.Venegavkar- Public Prosecutor and
Smt.M.M.Deshmukh-APP for Respondents-State.
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[SR.NO.909]
WRIT PETITION NO.5874 OF 2024
Adv.Anil S. Kamble - Advocate for Petitioner.
Dr.Birendra Saraf-Advocate General a/w Mr.H.S.Venegavkar- Public Prosecutor,
Smt.M.M.Deshmukh and Smt.M.H.Mhatre-APP for Respondent-State.
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[SR.NO.910]
WRIT PETITION NO.6000 OF 2024
Mr.Sudeep Pasbola-Senior Advocate a/w Mr.Ayush Pasbola-Advocate for Petitioner.
Dr.Birendra Saraf-Advocate General a/w Mr.H.S.Venegavkar- Public Prosecutor,
Smt.M.M.Deshmukh and Mr.S.R.Agarkar-APP for Respondent-State.
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[SR.NO.911]
WRIT PETITION NO.6115 OF 2024
Adv.Amit Singh-Advocate for Petitioner.
Dr.Birendra Saraf-Advocate General a/w Mr.H.S.Venegavkar- Public Prosecutor,
Smt.M.M.Deshmukh and Mr.Y.M.Nakhwa-APP for Respondents-State.
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[SR.NO.912]
WRIT PETITION NO.6223 OF 2024
Adv.Ayaz Khan-Advocate for Petitioner.
Dr.Birendra Saraf-Advocate General a/w Mr.H.S.Venegavkar- Public Prosecutor,
Smt.M.M.Deshmukh and Smt.M.H.Mhatre-APP for Respondent-State.
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[SR.NO.913]
WRIT PETITION NO.6229 OF 2024
Adv.Zehra Charania-Advocate for Petitioner.
Dr.Birendra Saraf-Advocate General a/w Mr.H.S.Ven
Prosecutor,Smt.M.M.Deshmukh-APP for Respondent-State.
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[SR.NO.914]
WRIT PETITION NO.6663 OF 2024
Adv.Suyash Nitin Khose a/w Mr.Mangesh Kusurkar, Mr.Abhishek Nandimath-Advocates for
Petitioner.
Dr.Birendra Saraf-Advocate General a/w Mr.H.S.Ven
Prosecutor,Smt.M.M.Deshmukh-APP, Mr.B.V.Holambe-Patil-APP, for Respondent-State.
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[SR.NO.915]
WRIT PETITION (ST) NO.19741 OF 2024
WITH
WRIT PETITION (ST) NO.19845 OF 2024
Adv.Taraq Sayed-Advocate for Petitioner.
Dr.Birendra Saraf-Advocate General a/w Mr.H.S.Ven
Prosecutor,Smt.M.M.Deshmukh-APP, Mr.Arfan Sait-APP, for Respondents-State.
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[SR.NO.916]
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[SR.NO.923]
WRIT PETITION (ST) NO.24115 OF 2024
Adv.Ujjwal Gandhi a/w Adv.Saakshi Jha, Adv.Prateek Dutta, Adv.Bhavi Kapoor-Advocates for
Petitioner.
Dr.Birendra Saraf-Advocate General a/w Mr.H.S.Ven
[SR.NO.932]
WRIT PETITION NO.336 OF 2025
Adv.Ali Kaashif Khan Deshmukh a/w Adv.Snigdha Khandelwal, Adv.Hitanshi Gajaria and
Adv.Zainabh Burmawala, Adv.Shirish Shigwan-Advocates for Petitioner.
Dr.Birendra Saraf-Advocate General a/w Mr.H.S.Ven
Prosecutor,Smt.M.M.Deshmukh-APP,for Respondents-State.
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[SR.NO.933]
WRIT PETITION NO.337 OF 2025
Adv.S.R.Mishra-Advocate for Petitioner.
Dr.Birendra Saraf-Advocate General a/w Mr.H.S.Ven
Prosecutor,Smt.M.M.Deshmukh-APP, Smt.M.H.Mhatre-APP, for Respondents-State.
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[SR.NO.934]
WRIT PETITION NO.395 OF 2025
Adv.Anil S. Kamble-Advocate for Petitioner.
Dr.Birendra Saraf-Advocate General a/w Mr.H.S.Ven
Prosecutor,Smt.M.M.Deshmukh-APP, Mr.Y.M.Nakhwa-APP, for Respondent-State.
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[SR.NO.935]
WRIT PETITION NO.5257 OF 2024
Adv.Ujjwal Gandhi a/w Adv.Saakshi Jha, Adv.Prateek Dutta, Adv.Bhavi Kapoor-Advocates for
Petitioner.
Dr.Birendra Saraf-Advocate General a/w Mr.H.S.Ven
Prosecutor,Smt.M.M.Deshmukh-APP,for Respondents-State.
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[SR.NO.936]
JUDGMENT :
1. All these Petitions raise a common legal issue regarding interpretation of Section 50 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, 'Cr.P.C.'). In some of the Petitions, the interpretation of
Sections 41 & 41A of Cr.P.C. is also necessary. The common contention in all these Petitions is the
alleged violation of these provisions rendering the Petitioners' continued detention in
WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt custody as illegal detention. The Petitioners are seeking their release
on this ground. The facts pertaining to these Petitions individually are obviously different and,
therefore, before considering the fact situation in each of these Petitions separately, we thought it fit
to consider the interpretation of these provisions. Subject to such interpretation, an individual
Petition from this group can be decided separately. To afford an opportunity to the counsel
appearing for both the sides, we have listed these matters together.
2. We have heard respective learned counsel for the Petitioners as well as a Petitioner appearing as
party in-person, in various Petitions. On the other hand, learned Advocate General Dr. Birendra
Saraf, Learned Public Prosecutor Mr. Venegavkar, Learned counsel Ms. Nitee Punde and learned
counsel Mrs.Aruna Pai appeared for the Respondents.
3. Learned Advocate General put forth the perspective on the issue on behalf of the State of
Maharashtra. Mrs. Aruna Pai and Ms. Nitee Punde, appeared on behalf of the respective
investigating agencies.
WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt
4. After hearing both the sides extensively, we have formed an opinion that these issues require
serious consideration by a Larger Bench. There are two main contingencies in which the issues can
be referred to a Larger Bench. The first contingency is - if there is a difference of opinion of the
Coordinate Benches of equal strength, then the matters, for that issue, can be referred to a Larger
Bench. Similarly, when a Bench is of the opinion that the issues can be more advantageously decided
by a Larger Bench; in that case also the issues can be referred for consideration to a Larger Bench.
Rule 8 of Chapter I of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules 1960 reads thus :
" CHAPTER I JURISDICTION OF SINGLE JUDGES AND BENCHES OF THE HIGH COURT
8. Reference to two or more Judges.--If it shall appear to any Judge, either on the application of a
party or otherwise, that an appeal or matter can be more advantageously heard by a Bench of two or
more Judges, he may report to that effect to the Chief Justice who shall make such order thereon as
he shall think fit."
WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt
5. This particular Rule 8 is interpreted by different Benches of this Court to support our view that in
the above two contingencies the matters can be referred to a Larger Bench. A reference can be made
to the order passed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Prajith Thayyil Kallil Vs. State of
Maharashtra in Anticipatory Bail Application No.161/2022 and connected matters decided on
5.5.20221. The discussion on this point can be found from paragraphs-15 to 21 from the reported
judgment. This reasoning was based on two more judgments; the first one was of a Full Bench of
this Court in the case of Anant H. Ulhalkar Vs. Chief Election Commissioner2, and the other was the
order passed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Jalgaon Janta Sahakari Bank Ltd. Vs.
Joint Commissioner of Sales Tax and Another3.
We are relying on these judgments and orders to adopt the course of referring the issues before us to
a Larger Bench. In the following discussion, we are expressing our disagreement and difference of
opinion on certain views expressed by the coordinate 1 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 1051 2 2017(1)
Mh.L.J. 431 3 Dated 25.11.2021 passed in OS W.P.No.2935/2018 [Division Bench of this Court]
WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt Benches; and on certain issues we find that the issues lack clarity all
throughout the State of Maharashtra about the necessary procedure and requirements for arrest
and, therefore, we are of the opinion that the issues can be decided by a Larger Bench so that there is
an authoritative pronouncement on all the issues, which would be binding on all the concerned
parties.
6. As the legal issues were argued and debated before us, it became more and more apparent that,
there is a total confusion and lack of clarity; particularly in the minds of the investigating agencies.
The arrested accused are approaching various Courts viz. the Magistrate Courts, Sessions Courts
and the High Court. Even before the High Court, some applications are filed before the learned
Single Judge taking up bail applications and some matters are filed before the Division Bench
seeking writ of habeas corpus and seeking exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. Hence, there is a lack of clarity even in respect of the Forums which can grant
such a relief. In some cases, this has given rise to unhealthy practices of choosing a Forum for the
same relief. The same issues, simultaneously, are being WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt contested
before the different forums and, therefore, there is a serious possibility of conflict of decisions by
different Courts across the State. There is also confusion about the cut-off date and the date from
which certain provisions are treated as mandatory provisions. In some of the cases, due to lack of
awareness on the part of the investigating agencies, the accused are claiming benefits even in the
most serious or heinous crimes like, rape, murder, offences under the Protection of Children from
Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act), the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999
(MCOCA), the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) etc..
7. During the arguments made by both the parties, it was realized that the decisions on these issues
will affect substantial majority of the cases, if not all the cases, wherein the accused are arrested till
date.
8. During the arguments, it was emphatically submitted by different counsel for the Petitioners that
there is total lack of uniformity in respect of the procedure followed at the time of obtaining the first
remand of the arrested accused. There are no WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt clear Rules or
Regulations regarding necessity to give a copy of the remand report to the accused or his Advocate.
Though learned Public Prosecutor Shri Venegavkar submitted that in Mumbai and in other Districts
of the State of Maharashtra the practice of giving a copy of the first remand report to the accused is
followed. This claim was seriously disputed by learned counsel Shri Mor. He submitted that he
appears in the Magistrate Courts in Mumbai and such practice is not followed. All these issues
involving the liberty of citizens require serious consideration.
9. There cannot be two opinions regarding the necessity to make any arrested person aware as to
why he is arrested. The questions which are raised before us are the requirements under Section 50
of Cr.P.C. as to whether this communication has to be in writing or oral communication is sufficient.
The other issue is about necessity of issuing notice under Section 41A of Cr.P.C.. SUBMISSIONS ON
BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
10. The arguments were opened by learned counsel Shri Rishi Bhuta appearing for the Petitioner in
Criminal Writ Petition [Stamp] No.24338/2024. Very briefly the facts of the case were,
WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt that, on 11.5.2023 an accused was apprehended carrying the
contraband. The FIR under provisions of the NDPS Act was lodged and during investigation the
name of the Petitioner Vicky surfaced. He was arrested on 28.9.2024. Before that, his anticipatory
bail application was rejected in March, 2024. Now the Petitioner is claiming that the grounds of
arrest were not given to him in writing at the time of arrest and, therefore, his detention is illegal.
His Bail Application on merits was rejected by the Special Court in November, 2024. He did not
prefer any Bail Application before the High Court on merits; instead, he has preferred Criminal Writ
Petition (Stamp) No.24338/2024 claiming his release for violation of the mandatory provisions of
Section 50 of Cr.P.C. and Section 52 of the NDPS Act. His first remand was obtained on 29.9.2024.
The main submission of Shri Bhuta was in respect of non-compliance of Section 50 of Cr.P.C.. He
has relied on various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and different Division Benches of
this Court.
11. The arguments of all the learned counsel for both the sides revolve around these very judgments.
These judgments are as WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt follows :
i. Pankaj Bansal Vs. Union of India and others4 ii. Ram Kishor Arora Vs. Directorate
of Enforcement5 iii. Prabir Purkayastha Vs. State (NCT of Delhi)6 € A Division Bench
of this High Court has granted relief to the accused in the following cases.
i. Mahesh Pandurang Naik Vs. State of Maharashtra and another7 ii. Manulla
Kanchwala Vs. State of Maharashtra8 iii. Nisha Gaikwad and others Vs. State of
Maharashtra9 iv. Jahir Sukha Khan Vs. State of Maharashtra10 v. Sachin Nimbalkar
Vs. State of Maharashtra11 vi. Shrawan Joshi Vs. Union of India12 € Another
Division Bench of this Court gave relief to the accused in the following cases :
i. Bharat Chaudhary Vs. State of Maharashtra and others13 ii. Hanuman Choudhary
Vs. State of Maharashtra14 4 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1244 5 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1682
6 2024 SCC OnLine SC 934 7 Decided on 18.7.2024 in W.P. [St.] No.13835/2024
[Division Bench of this Court] 8 Decided on 14.8.2024 in W.P. No.3276/2024
[Division Bench of this Court] 9 Decided on 15.10.2024 in W.P. [St.] No.19472/2024
[Division Bench of this Court] 10 Decided on 16.10.2024 in W.P. [St.]
No.18225/2024 [Division Bench of this Court] 11 Decided on 23.10.2024 in W.P.[St.]
No.17029/2024 [Division Bench of this Court] 12 Decided on 25.11.2024 in W.P. [St.]
No.21016/2024 [Division Bench of this Court] 13 Decided on 25.10.2024 in W.P.
No.3604/2024 [Division Bench of this Court] 14 Decided on 25.10.2024 in W.P. [St.]
No.17755/2024 [Division Bench of this Court] WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt
12. Out of these cases, in Nisha Gaikwad's case, the offences were under Sections 364-A and 389 of
IPC. In Jahir Khan's case, the offence was under Section 395 of IPC. In Sachin Nimbalkar's case the
offence was mainly under Section 302 of IPC. In the cases of Bharat Chaudhary, Hanuman
Choudhary and Shrawan Joshi the offences were under the NDPS Act. In all these cases, the
Petitioners therein were released on the ground of non-compliance of Section 50 of Cr.P.C..
13. Shri Bhuta submitted that the ratio of Pankaj Bansal and Prabir Purkayastha apply to the cases
involving even serious, grave and heinous offences because Section 50 of Cr.P.C. flows from Articles
21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. If there is violation of the fundamental rights of the arrested
accused, then, irrespective of the gravity of the offences he must get benefit of non-compliance of the
mandatory requirements of giving grounds of arrest in writing under Section 50 of Cr.P.C.. Shri
Bhuta submitted that at the most the investigating agency has 24 hours to give the grounds of arrest
in writing if the ratio of Ram Kishor Arora's case is applied. He submitted that the jurisdiction to
release the arrested WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt accused on such consideration can be exercised
by all the Courts including the Courts of Magistrate, Session and the High Court.
14. Shri Bhuta made his submissions in respect of the different view taken by the same Division
Bench which decided Mahesh Naik's case. The different view was expressed in a judgment dated
25.11.2024 passed in Criminal Writ Petition No.3533/2024 in the case of Mihir Rajesh Shah Vs.
State of Maharashtra15. In the said case also, the arguments were advanced by Shri Bhuta. On that
occasion, the same Division Bench which had decided Mahesh Naik's case; took a different view and
had made an exception in refusing relief to the Petitioner in that case. Shri Bhuta submitted that the
consideration in Mihir Shah's case was in respect of the circumstances in which he was apprehended
and that the said ratio will not affect the ratio taken in all the other cases by the two different
Division Benches of this Court in the aforementioned cases.
15. Learned Counsel Mr. C.J. Joveson in Criminal Writ Petition No.5588/2024 relied on certain
observations from Pankaj 15 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 3660 WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt Bansal's
case to support the same submissions made by Shri Rishi Bhuta. In this case the offence was under
Section 302 of IPC.
16. Learned Senior Counsel Shri Pasbola was representing the Petitioners, who were involved in the
offences under Section 420 of IPC. The Petitioners were the bank officers. He submitted that
irrespective of the gravity of the offences, the mandate of Section 50 of Cr.P.C. must be followed.
Only when the accused is caught red-handed while committing the offence or soon thereafter the
discretion may lie with the Court to consider that fact and deny him the benefit of his release.
17. Learned counsel Shri Niranjan Mundargi submitted that the language of Section 50 of Cr.P.C.
does not leave any scope to consider the circumstances in which the accused is arrested and, in all
cases, the mandatory provision of Section 50 of Cr.PC. of giving grounds of arrest in writing has to
be followed. He submitted that, in future, there can be corrective measures viz. recording video at
the time of giving grounds of arrest in writing; which would conclusively establish that such
requirement is followed and there would not be any dispute about compliance of Section 50 of
Cr.P.C..
WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt
18. Learned counsel Shri Satish Mishra supported the submissions of Shri Bhuta.
19. Learned counsel Shri Manoj Goud appeared in Criminal Writ Petition (Stamp) No.24461/2024.
He submitted that the same Division Bench that had decided Mihir Shah's case against the accused,
vide a subsequent order in the case of Amit Giridhar Lalge Vs. The State of Maharashtra and
another 16 had directed release of the Petitioner in that case for non-compliance of Section 50 of
Cr.P.C.. In that case, it was observed that Section 47 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita
(BNSS) was pari materia with Section 50 of Cr.P.C.. Shri Goud submitted that in the case of Amit
Lalge the allegations were that the Petitioner therein by using his authority had wrongly approved
and disbursed tax refund to sixteen taxpayers who were not eligible to get it. Shri Goud, therefore,
submitted that even after Mihir Shah's judgment , the Division Bench had granted relief to the
accused in a serious case involving huge amount of money, for non-compliance of Section 50 of
Cr.P.C..
20. Learned Counsel Shri Ganesh Gole addressed another 16 Decided on 28.11.2024 in Criminal
W.P. No.4487/2024 [Division Bench of this Court] WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt issue. He
supported all these submissions and further added that if the accused is released on these grounds
he can be re-arrested only if further material is found out, necessitating his arrest. And at that time,
there has to be due compliance of the procedure.
21. Learned counsel Shri Gaware-Patil referred to Sections 50 and 50-A of Cr.P.C. and supported the
submissions in favour of the accused.
22. Learned Senior Counsel Shri Amit Desai concluded the debate on behalf of the Petitioners by
making his own submissions. He submitted that all these judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court deal with the facet of fundamental rights under Articles 21 & 22 of Constitution of India.
Therefore, if there is a breach of these rights by the investigating authorities, the question of
prejudice caused to the accused does not arise. All these violations in respect of the fundamental
rights, must uniformly and without exception lead to release of the accused. The only concession in
these cases is that compliance of Section 50 of Cr.P.C. by giving grounds of arrest in writing is made
mandatory by Pankaj Bansal's case from the date of that judgment. He submitted that in
WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt a given case the victim may claim prejudice caused by release of the
accused but the victim's right is limited only for fair investigation. The victim cannot have any say in
the arrest and custody of the accused in any case. It is purely the discretion of the investigating
officer. He submitted that, in case the accused is released on these grounds; suitable conditions can
be imposed on the accused so that the victims are sufficiently protected and the accused does not
commit any crime in future. He submitted that after the accused is released for non-compliance of
Section 50 of Cr.P.C. he cannot be re-arrested as it would be violation of Article 21 of the
Constitution of India. That would open flood-gates for litigation in cases where the accused are
already released for such non-compliance of Section 50 of Cr.P.C.. Learned Senior Counsel made
submissions regarding provisions of Sections 41 & 41A of Cr.P.C.. According to him, for the offence
punishable upto seven years the notice under Section 41A of Cr.P.C. is mandatory before arrest. He
referred to the circulars issued by the High Court and Director General of Police, Maharashtra State.
One of them was a notification dated 21.10.2023 issued by the Registrar General of this Court
bearing WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt No.Rule/Misc - 01/2023. The notification dated 21.10.2023
reads thus :
In exercise of the powers conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and
all other enabling powers and in compliance of the directions issued by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court of India vide order dated 31.07.2023 passed in Criminal Appeal No.
2207 of 2023, titled as Md. Asfak Alam Vs. The State of Jharkhand & Anr. 2023 SCC
Online SC 892, the Hon'ble the Chief Justice is pleased to direct that :
1. The police shall not automatically arrest when a case under Section 498-A IPC is
registered. The Police shall first satisfy themselves about the necessity for arrest
under the parameters laid down in Arnesh Kumar Vs. State of Bihar and Anr.
2. All police officers shall be provided with a check list containing specified sub-clauses under
Section 41(1)(b)(ii);
3. The police officer shall forward the check list duly filled and furnish the reasons and materials
which necessitated the arrest, while forwarding / producing the accused before the Magistrate for
further detention;
4. The Magistrate while authorizing detention of the accused shall peruse the report furnished by
the police officer in terms aforesaid and only after recording its satisfaction, the Magistrate will
authorize detention;
6. Notice of appearance in terms of Section 41-A CrPC be served on the accused within two weeks
from the date of institution of the case, which may be extended by the Superintendent of Police of
the District for the reasons to be recorded in writing;
7. Failure to comply with the directions aforesaid shall apart from rendering the police officers
concerned liable for departmental action, they shall also be liable to be punished for contempt of
court to be instituted before the High Court of Bombay.
9. The directions as aforesaid shall not only apply to the case under Section 498-A IPC or Section 4
of the Dowry Prohibition Act, but also such cases where offence is punishable with imprisonment for
a terms which may be less than seven years or which may extend to seven years, whether with or
without fine.
However, in view of Supreme Court's Judgment dated 07th August 2023, in Criminal Appeal Nos.
2284-2285 of 2023 in the matter of V. Senthil Balaji Vs. The State Represented by Deputy Director
and Ors., Section 41A of CrPC shall have no application to an arrest made under the Prevention of
Money Laundering Act, 2002.
WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt
23. The other circular is in the nature of Director General's Standing Order No.3/2022 dated
20.7.2022. There is a reference to certain judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. These are the
directions to the various police officers issued by the Director General of Police, Maharashtra State
asking the police officers to follow those judgments. Shri Desai submitted that if there is violation of
the fundamental rights; the question of prejudice to the accused does not arise and the mandatory
provisions flowing from the Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India will have to be strictly
followed.
24. Mr. Binod Agarwal appears as a party in-person and submitted that the ratio of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Arnesh Kumar Vs. State of Bihar17 and Satendra Kumar Antil Vs.
Central Bureau of Investigation and another18, is that the issuance of notice under Section 41-A of
Cr.P.C. is necessary in all cases including where the punishment is only upto seven years. 17 (2014)
8 SCC 273 18 (2022) 10 SCC 51 WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt SUBMISSIONS OF LEARNED
ADVOCATE GENERAL :
25. The learned Advocate General submitted that Section 50 of Cr.P.C. flows from
Article 22(1) which is discussed in the aforementioned Supreme Court cases. He
submitted that the investigating agency has at least 24 hours with them to furnish the
grounds of arrest in writing to the arrested accused, as is held in the case of Ram
Kishor Arora. He submitted that if the remand report is given to the accused and his
Advocate within 24 hours at the time of the first remand, it is the sufficient
requirement of giving the grounds of arrest in writing to the accused under Section
50 of Cr.P.C.. He submitted that depending on the circumstances, if those
circumstances show that the grounds were within the accused's knowledge, then,
there was no necessity to give him grounds of arrest because no prejudice would be
caused to him.
The necessity to communicate the grounds of arrest is with a purpose that the accused should be
aware as to why he is arrested but when he is already aware that he is arrested because of his acts
and the circumstances in which he is arrested; then obviously it is not necessary to complete the
formality of giving grounds of arrest WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt in writing. He submitted that,
for example, an accused is caught in the act of committing an offence like murder, in that case it
would be totally illogical to expect the investigating agency to write down the grounds of arrest and
hand them over to him. The circumstances can be tested by the Court granting first remand as to
whether it was necessary to give grounds of arrest in writing. He submitted that the proper Forum to
raise this issue of release of the accused for non-compliance of Section 50 of Cr.P.C. would be that of
the Magistrate's Court before whom the accused is produced on the first occasion for the first
remand. It was for the accused to raise this ground at the first available opportunity and, therefore,
he can not be left to raise this issue at his wish in any other forum at a later point of time. He cannot
raise this issue even before the High Court or before any other Court in bail applications or similar
applications if he had not raised this issue at the first instance before the learned Magistrate. He
further submitted that in cases where the accused had preferred Anticipatory Bail Applications
showing that they were contested and decided and after that if he is arrested then obviously he
would know why he is being arrested.
26. Learned Advocate General relied on the case of Prashant Kumar Brahmabhatt Vs. State of
Maharashtra 20 decided by the same Division Bench deciding the case of Mahesh Naik. But, on this
occasion the arrested accused was not directed to be released because the Petitioner in that case had
preferred Anticipatory Bail Application under Section 438 of Cr.P.C. and, therefore, it was held that
he was aware of the grounds of arrest when he had approached the Court for anticipatory bail. In
that case, it was held that it was not necessary to give the grounds of arrest to the accused.
27. The learned Advocate General referred to the order passed in the case of Danish Rafiq
Fansophkar Vs. State of Maharashtra21. In that case, the Petitioner was caught with the 19 AIR 1969
SUPREME COURT 1014 20 Decided on 24.10.2024 in Writ Petition (Stamp) No.18663/2024
(Division Bench of this Court] 21 Decided on 16.10.2024 in Criminal Writ Petition (Stamp)
No.19471/2024 (Division Bench of this Court] WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt contraband. His
search had led to seizure of the contraband. The station diary entry mentioned that the Petitioner
was informed about the grounds of arrest. It was observed that in a peculiar case like that, where the
Petitioner was conscious of the fact as to why his arrest was being effected, since his search led to
seizure of contraband from him and even if the formal grounds of arrest were not communicated to
him, the Court did not find any flaw in the action on the part of the investigating agency; and hence
he was not released.
28. Learned Advocate General submitted that the law laid down in Mihir Shah's case is correct and
it should be followed in all other cases. He tried to reconcile the ratio in Mihir Shah with Mahesh
Naik's case and submitted that in a given case depending on the circumstances, the Court has
discretion to deny such a relief even if there is alleged non-compliance of Section 50 of Cr.P.C..
29. He submitted that the purpose to furnish grounds of arrest is to enable the accused to effectively
defend himself at the stage of remand itself. According to him, giving a copy of the
WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt remand report would be sufficient compliance of the requirement of
giving the grounds of arrest in writing. Section 50 does not speak about the particular form or
format in which the grounds of arrest are required to be given. He invited our attention to the
specific language of Articles 21 & 22 of the Constitution of India in comparison with Section 50 of
Cr.P.C. as well as in comparison to the language of Section 19 of PMLA and Section 43-B of UAPA.
He further submitted that for the purpose of applying the ratio and thereby holding that if the
requirement to give grounds of arrest in writing are to be considered, then it has to be from the date
of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Prabir Purkayastha which was decided on
15.5.2024, in any case the cut off date cannot be prior to the date of Pankaj Bansal's judgment which
was decided on 3.10.2023.
30. The other main submission made by the learned Advocate General was that even if the accused
is released on some procedural lapses on the part of the investigating agency, there is no bar for
re-arresting the accused. In fact in such cases, the accused will have to be re-arrested after
complying with the WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt procedural requirements which were not
complied with. He submitted that if such course of action is not taken, the accused may abscond by
taking advantage of these technical lapses and the victim may suffer irreparably. The investigation
will not progress, causing miscarriage of justice. In some cases the accused may even leave the
country and may not be available again. In short, the entire society will be affected if the accused is
given benefit of technical lapses on the part of the investigating agency; if they are not allowed to be
corrected subsequently. He submitted that there is no statutory embargo in rearresting the accused
who is released because of non-supply of grounds of arrest in writing.
31. The learned Advocate General referred to the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in the
case of Kavita Manikikar Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and another 22 in which even after
directing release of the Petitioner therein for non-compliance of Section 46(4) of Cr.P.C., the
Division Bench further observed that the investigating agency was not precluded from arresting the
Petitioner if the investigation so warranted after following due 22 Decided on 10.5.2018 in Writ
Petition No.1142/2018 (Division Bench of this Court) WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt procedure of
law.
32. Learned Advocate General advanced his separate arguments on Sections 41 & 41A of Cr.P.C.. He
submitted that the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar and Satendra Kumar
Antil clearly lay down that the provisions of Sections 41 & 41A of Cr.P.C. will have to be followed. He
submitted that Section 41 provides a check-list which the investigating officer has to prepare in
writing before arresting a person who is accused to have committed an offence punishable upto
seven years and there is a proviso to Section 41(1)(b)(ii) which mentions that a police officer in all
cases where the arrest of a person is not required under the provisions of this sub-section, must
record the reasons in writing for not making the arrest. Section 41A refers to the provisions of
sub-section (1) of Section 41 of Cr.P.C. and mentions that in all cases where the arrest of a person is
not required under Section 41(1), a notice is required to be issued. He submitted that therefore
Section 41A covers the offences not only where the punishment is more than seven years but also the
offences where the punishment is upto seven years and in such cases only when the
WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt arrest is not necessary, the police officer is duty bound to issue a
notice. But when a police officer wants to arrest a person who has allegedly committed the offence
punishable upto seven years he has to prepare a check-list provided in Section 41(1)(b) of Cr.P.C.
and that check-list will have to be considered by the Magistrate granting remand. Apart from that,
there is no embargo for the investigating agency to arrest any person if in its opinion the arrest is
necessary.
33. Learned Advocate General referred to the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in the case
of Abhijit Arjun Padale Vs. State of Maharashtra and others 23. In that case the offence for which
the Petitioner was arrested was under Sections 384 and 506 of IPC. The maximum punishment
under section 384 of IPC was extending upto three years. A contention was raised that the notice
under Section 41A of Cr.P.C. was not served on the Petitioner and, therefore, he was entitled to be
released. In paragraph-8 of the said judgment, it was observed that the offence alleged against the
Petitioner was not punishable with imprisonment of more than 23 Decided on 22.8.2024 in Writ
Petition No.1197/2022 (Division Bench of this Court).
WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt seven years and as such the notice under Section 41A of Cr.P.C. ought
to have been served on the Petitioner. As it was not served, the Petitioner in that case was directed
to be released on bail. Learned Advocate General submitted that for the offences punishable upto
seven years also when the opinion of the Police Officer is that the arrest of the accused is necessary,
service of notice under Section 41A is not necessary. The only requirement is to prepare a check-list
under Section 41(b)(ii) before the arrest of the accused, and therefore, it is necessary that this
position is clarified by an authoritative pronouncement.
34. Learned Advocate General also referred to the order of another Division Bench of this Court in
the case of Bhairaram Saraswat Vs. State of Maharashtra24. In that case the Petitioner was accused
of the offence punishable under Section 420 read with 34 of IPC, which is punishable upto seven
years imprisonment. The contention was that the Petitioner was not served with the mandatory
notice under Section 41A, according to the Petitioner. In that case, the Division Bench expressed
doubt as to whether 24 Decided on 5.4.2024 in Criminal Writ Petition (St.) No.7551/2024 (Division
Bench of this Court).
WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt Section 41-A notice was served and the Petitioner was released on
interim cash bail. The Petition was kept pending. He submitted that this order would also indicate
that for the offence punishable upto seven years, the notice under Section 41A was necessary.
According to learned Advocate General this interpretation is not correct based on bare reading of
Sections 41 & 41A of Cr.P.C.. He submitted that the specific directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the cases of Arnesh Kumar and Satendra Kumar Antil are very clear that the provisions of
Sections 41 & 41A will have to be followed strictly and, therefore, reading something into these
provisions would be against the directions issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in both these cases.
35. Learned counsel Mrs. Pai appeared for NCB in Criminal Writ Petition No5694/2024. She relied
on the observations of a Single Judge Bench of the High Court of Karntaka in the case of John Moses
D @ Madan Kumar s/o John Devamani Vs. State of Karnataka25. She submitted that this judgment
has laid down that the interpretation of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court 25 Decided on
28.11.2024 in Writ Petition No.22042/2024 [Single Bench of Karnataka High Court]
WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt in the case of Pankaj Bansal and Prabir Purkayastha cannot be
stretched to the offences under IPC or any other penal law. It was further held that if the arrest is
under the PMLA or UAPA then the directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in those cases would
become applicable. It was further observed that what was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
those judgments was considered qua the facts in the case at hand and those observations would not
become applicable to the offences under Karnataka Control of Organised Crime Act, 2000 (KCOCA)
or the IPC or any arrest under any penal law.
36. Learned counsel Ms. Nitee Punde appearing for the CG- ST Authorities in Criminal Writ Petition
(Stamp) No.24115/2024 referred to Section 69 of the CGST Act, 2017. She invited our attention to
Sections 69 and 132 of the said Act. In such cases the arrest is effected only after preliminary
investigation and, therefore, the accused is aware about the offence and hence furnishing separate
grounds of arrest, according to her, was not necessary.
37. In rejoinder on behalf of the Petitioners, learned Senior Counsel Shri Amit Desai submitted that
the remand report is submitted for the purpose of asking for remand from the Magistrate and
satisfying the Magistrate for necessity of police custody or judicial custody remand. The grounds of
arrest are different for these considerations. The grounds of arrest are required to be given
separately. They cannot be equated with the remand report. The Cr.P.C. does not mention or define
the 'remand application'. However, Cr.P.C. refers to the phrase 'grounds of arrest'. There is no
uniformity about the format of remand report or necessity to give a copy of the remand report to the
accused. Therefore, that would be left to the arbitrary exercise on the part of the investigating
agency to perform their duty if grounds of arrest in writing are to be equated with the remand
report. Some directions are required to be given to ensure compliance of the Statutory and
Constitutional mandate. He submitted that floodgates opening for litigation on the ground of
non-supply of grounds of arrest is no reason to deny benefit to the arrested accused who are not
given grounds of arrest WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt in writing. He submitted that re-arrest of the
accused after release on procedural lapses, violates Article 21 of the Constitution of India and,
therefore, is not permissible. The State should not be given a second chance to perform their duty, if
they fail to protect the fundamental rights of a citizen while effecting arrest. Breach of fundamental
rights is more important than consideration of possible prejudice to the accused. The Courts are
required to see the breach as alleged by the accused and not the prejudice which is likely to be
caused to the accused.
38. Before discussing the reasons of our conclusion, it is necessary to refer to certain provisions
which are the subject matter of this entire discussion. The relevant provisions are thus :
21. Protection of life and personal liberty. -- No person shall be deprived of his life or
personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.
(1) No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may
be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by,
a legal practitioner of his choice. (2) Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be
produced before the nearest magistrate within a WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt period of
twenty-four hours of such arrest excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of
arrest to the court of the magistrate and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said
period without the authority of a magistrate.
(a) to any person who for the time being is an enemy alien; or
(b) to any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention.
(4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a longer
period than three months unless-
(a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who are, or have been, or are qualified to be appointed
as, Judges of a High Court has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that
there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention:
Provided that nothing in this sub-clause shall authorise the detention of any person
beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament under
sub-clause (b) of clause (7); or
(b) such person is detained in accordance with the provision of any law made by
Parliament under sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause (7).
(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law
providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as
may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made
and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the
order. (6) Nothing in clause (5) shall require the authority making any such order as
is referred to in that clause to disclose facts which such authority considers to be
(a) the circumstances under which, and the class or classes of cases in which, a
person may be detained for a period longer than three months under any law
providing for preventive detention WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt without obtaining
the opinion of an Advisory Board in accordance with the provisions of sub- clause (a)
of clause (4);
(b) the maximum period for which any person may in any class or classes of cases be
detained under any law providing for preventive detention; and
41.When police may arrest without warrant (1) Any police officer may without an
order from a Magistrate and without a warrant, arrest any person--
(b) against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received,
or a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed a cognizable offence punishable with
imprisonment for a term which may be less than seven years or which may extend to seven years
whether with or without fine, if the following conditions are satisfied, namely:--
(i) the police officer has reason to believe on the basis of such complaint, information,
or suspicion that such person has committed the said offence;
(c) to prevent such person from causing the evidence of the offence to disappear or
tampering with such evidence in any manner; or
(d) to prevent such person from making any inducement, threat or promise to any
person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing
such facts to WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt the Court or to the police officer; or
(e) as unless such person is arrested, his presence in the Court whenever required
cannot be ensured, and the police officer shall record while making such arrest, his
reasons in writing.
[Provided that a police officer shall, in all cases where the arrest of a person is not required under
the provisions of this sub-section, record the reasons in writing for not making the arrest.] (ba)
against whom credible information has been received that he has committed a cognizable offence
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to more than seven years whether with
or without fine or with death sentence and the police officer has reason to believe on the basis of
that information that such person has committed the said offence;
(c) who has been proclaimed as an offender either under this Code or by order of the State
Government; or
(d) in whose possession anything is found which may reasonably be suspected to be stolen property
and who may reasonably be suspected of having committed an offence with reference to such thing;
or
(e) who obstructs a police officer while in the execution of his duty, or who has escaped, or attempts
to escape, from lawful custody; or
(f) who is reasonably suspected of being a deserter from any of the Armed Forces of the Union; or
(g) who has been concerned in, or against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible
information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists, of his having been concerned in,
any act committed at any place out of India which, if committed in India, would have been
punishable as an offence, and for which he is, under any law relating to extradition, or otherwise,
liable to be apprehended or detained in custody in India; or
(h) who, being a released convict, commits a breach of any rule made under sub-section (5) of
section 356; or WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt
(i) for whose arrest any requisition, whether written or oral, has been received from another police
officer, provided that the requisition specifies the person to be arrested and the offence or other
cause for which the arrest is to be made and it appears therefrom that the person might lawfully be
arrested without a warrant by the officer who issued the requisition. (2) Subject to the provisions of
section 42, no person concerned in a non-cognizable offence or against whom a complaint has been
made or credible information has been received or reasonable suspicion exists of his having so
concerned, shall be arrested except under a warrant or order of a Magistrate.
............
41A. Notice of appearance before police officer (1) The police officer shall, in all cases where the
arrest of a person is not required under the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 41, issue a notice
directing the person against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information
has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed a cognizable offence, to
appear before him or at such other place as may be specified in the notice.
(2) Where such a notice is issued to any person, it shall be the duty of that person to comply with the
terms of the notice. (3) Where such person complies and continues to comply with the notice, he
shall not be arrested in respect of the offence referred to in the notice unless, for reasons to be
recorded, the police officer is of the opinion that he ought to be arrested. (4) Where such person, at
any time, fails to comply with the terms of the notice or is unwilling to identify himself, the police
officer may, subject to such orders as may have been passed by a competent Court in this behalf,
arrest him for the offence mentioned in the notice.
............
50. Person arrested to be informed of grounds of arrest and of right to bail (1) Every police officer or
other person arresting any person WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt without warrant shall forthwith
communicate to him full particulars of the offence for which he is arrested or other grounds for such
arrest.
(2) Where a police officer arrests without warrant any person other than a person accused of a
non-bailable offence, he shall inform the person arrested that he is entitled to be released on bail
and that he may arrange for sureties on his behalf. ............
50A. Obligation of person making arrest to inform about the arrest, etc., to a nominated person. --
(1) Every police officer or other person making any arrest under this Code shall forthwith give the
information regarding such arrest and place where the arrested person is being held to any of his
friends, relatives or such other persons as may be disclosed or nominated by the arrested person for
the purpose of giving such information.
(2) The police officer shall inform the arrested person of his rights under sub-section (1) as soon as
he is brought to the police station.
(3) An entry of the fact as to who has been informed of the arrest of such person shall be made in a
book to be kept in the police station in such form as may be prescribed in this behalf by the State
Government.
(4) It shall be the duty of the Magistrate before whom such arrested person is produced, to satisfy
himself that the requirements of sub-section (2) and sub-section (3) have been complied with in
respect of such arrested person.] ******** ◦ Section 19 of PMLA Act :
19. Power to arrest (1) If the Director, Deputy Director, Assistant Director or any
other officer authorised in this behalf by the Central Government by general or
special order, has on the basis of material in his possession, reason to believe (that
reason for such belief to be recorded in writing) that any person has been guilty of an
offence punishable under this Act, he may arrest such person and shall, as soon as
may be, inform him of the grounds for such arrest.
(2) The Director, Deputy Director, Assistant Director or any WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt other
officer shall, immediately after arrest of such person under sub-section (1), forward a copy of the
order alongwith the material in his possession, referred to in that sub-section, to the Adjudicating
Authority in a sealed envelope, in the manner, as may be prescribed and such Adjudicating
Authority shall keep such order and material for such period, as may be prescribed.
(3) Every person arrested under sub-section (1) shall, within twenty-four hours, be taken to a
[Special Court or] Judicial Magistrate or a Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, having
jurisdiction:
Provided that the period of twenty-four hours shall exclude the time necessary for the
journey from the place of arrest to the [Special Court or] Magistrate's Court. *******
◦ Section 43B of UAPA :
43B. Procedure of arrest, seizure etc. (1) Any officer arresting a person under section
43A shall, as soon as may be, inform him of the grounds for such arrest. (2) Every
person arrested and article seized under section 43A shall be forwarded without
unnecessary delay to the officer- in-charge of the nearest police station. (3) The
authority or officer to whom any person or article is forwarded under sub-section (2)
shall, with all convenient dispatch, take such measures as may be necessary in
accordance with the provisions of the Code.
*******
39. As submitted by the learned Advocate General, in a given case viz., apprehending the accused
while he is in the act of committing serious offence like murder or soon thereafter; it would not be
possible for the police officers to write down the grounds of WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt arrest
and handing over them to the accused. It would be equally difficult to serve grounds of arrest when
an absconding accused or a proclaimed offender is arrested from a place which is not easily
accessible. The circumstances of arrest in such cases would be important. However, if Section 50 is
to be held mandatory to mean that the grounds of arrest must be given in writing then such
requirement must apply to all the cases, or the arrest made under all the circumstances without
exception, irrespective of the gravity or seriousness of the crime. Section 50 does not qualify its
applicability to the circumstances in which the arrest is effected or the gravity of the offence. The
Cr.P.C. itself takes note of different degree of gravity of offences. Depending on that differentiation,
the offences are made bailable or non-bailable, cognizable or non- cognizable and takes note of
different punishments provided for different offences. For example, Section 41 differentiates
between the offences which are punishable upto seven years and the other offences punishable with
more than seven years. But such differentiation is conspicuously absent in Section 50 of Cr.P.C. It is
not possible to read something more in Section 50 than the clear WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt
expressions of that particular Section. Therefore, we are unable to agree with the submissions of
learned Advocate General that the Court has discretion to see the circumstances in which the
accused is arrested.
40. We are unable to agree with the submissions of the learned Advocate General that if the accused
has applied for anticipatory bail and after due consideration of arguments of both the sides and the
material produced, it is rejected; then if he is arrested, in that case the grounds of arrest are not
required to be served on him as he is aware as to why he is arrested. That would carve out an unfair
category of the accused who exercise their statutory remedy of applying for anticipatory bail under
Section 438 of Cr.P.C.. They would be deprived of the compliance of requirement or necessity
enjoined on the investigating officers to furnish the grounds of arrest. To that extent we do not agree
with the view expressed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Prashantkumar
Brahmabhatt wherein it was held that since at the stage of anticipatory bail application the material
against the accused was considered then there was no necessity to furnish
WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt grounds of arrest. In that case relief of anticipatory bail was sought.
The grounds taken for that relief would reflect that the Applicant was aware of the accusations
levelled against him and what were the grounds which necessitated his arrest. In that case, it was
held that the Petitioner had knowledge about the grounds and, therefore, no prejudice was caused to
him; and he was not directed to be released, though the grounds of arrest were not served on him.
In fact, this particular view expressed in Prashantkumar Brahmabhatt was in direct contrast to the
discussion and reasons mentioned in Mahesh Naik's case by the Division Bench. In Mahesh Naik's
case also the same argument was noted in Paragraph-7. The learned APP had submitted that since
the accused therein had filed anticipatory bail application, he was expected to know the reasons for
his arrest. Therefore, this issue of filing anticipatory bail application was specifically raised in that
case, which did not find favour for deciding that Petition directing the Petitioner's release. Thus,
there is already a conflict of opinion on that particular issue.
In our opinion, whether the accused had preferred WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt anticipatory bail
application or not should not make a difference and it would be the duty of the investigating agency
to communicate to the accused as to why he is arrested. Having said this, the core question remains
as to what should be the mode of communication, whether the grounds of arrest have to be given in
writing or it is sufficient compliance if the accused is orally communicated forthwith of full
particulars of the offence for which he is arrested or other grounds for such arrest.
41. The bare reading of Section 50 does not lay down that this requirement of communicating
forthwith has to be in writing. As discussed earlier, under some circumstances, it would not be
possible to prepare the grounds of arrest in writing and serving them on the accused. The word
'forthwith' will also have to be construed accordingly.
42. The next issue would be the effect of the aforementioned Apex Court judgments on Section 50 of
Cr.P.C. and as to whether the ratio of those Supreme Court judgments would mean that the accused
should be given the grounds of arrest in writing as a requirement of Section 50 of Cr.P.C.. On this
issue, we are inclined WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt to agree with the observations of the learned
Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court in the case of John Moses D and, therefore, we are taking
a different view from the view expressed in Mahesh Naik and other cases, referred to hereinabove,
which require that the grounds of arrest have to be served on the accused in writing at the time of
his arrest within the meaning of Section 50 of Cr.P.C..
43. Section 50A of Cr.P.C. also provides safeguards against the arbitrary arrest and keeping the
accused in custody arbitrarily. It is the duty cast on the police officer making arrest to forthwith give
information regarding such arrest and the place where he is held, to his friends, relatives or other
persons as disclosed or nominated by the arrested person and it is the duty of the police officer to
inform the arrested person of his rights under Section 50A of Cr.P.C.. The Police Officers are also
required to make an entry to that effect in a book kept for that purpose at the police station. And it is
the duty of the Magistrate to satisfy himself that all these requirements are complied with. In the
entire scheme of Section 50A the wordings used is 'forthwith give the information' (emphasis
supplied). Section 50 and Section 50A will have to be read WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt together.
There is no doubt that the accused must be told why he is being arrested and the particulars of the
offence, but if he is clearly informed about it, then whether it is further required that such
information must be provided in writing, is the question.
44. It is our firm opinion that it is important to communicate forthwith to the arrested accused as to
why he is arrested. We are also of the opinion that a copy of the remand report, particularly at the
time of obtaining first remand, must be given to the accused or his Advocate so that they can resist
grant of remand on the very first occasion. It is necessary that some rules are framed or provision is
made to ensure fair opportunity to the accused to resist his custody on the very first occasion when
he is produced before the Magistrate.
45. The question would arise whether at the time of arrest the grounds of arrest must be given in
writing or oral communication forthwith would be sufficient. We are inclined to refer this issue to a
Larger Bench for consideration.
46. The Division Bench of this court in the case of Mahesh WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt Naik has
referred to the Judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The first judgment which needs to be
discussed is Pankaj Bansal's judgment. In Paragraph-16 of the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court observed that the only issue for consideration was whether the arrest of those Appellants
under Section 19 of PMLA was valid and lawful and whether the impugned orders of remand passed
by the Additional Sessions Judge, Panchkula were valid. It was further observed that in that context,
mere passing of an order of remand would not be sufficient in itself to validate their arrest if such
arrests were not in conformity with the requirements of Section 19 of PMLA. In this background, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court considered various other cases, including a Three Judge Bench judgment of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary Vs. Union of India 26 and the
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of V. Senthil Balaji Vs. State27.
In Paragraph-35, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that no consistent and uniform practice
seemed to be followed by ED in respect of furnishing grounds of arrest in writing to the 26 (2023) 12
SCC 1 27 (2024) 3 SCC 51 WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt arrested person, as written copies of the
grounds of arrest are furnished to arrested persons in certain parts of the country but in other areas,
that practice is not followed and the grounds of arrest are either read out to them or allowed to be
read by them. Paragraphs-38, 39 & 42 lay down the ratio of this judgment which read thus :
"38. In this regard, we may note that Article 22(1) of the Constitution provides, inter
alia, that no person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being
informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest. This being the
fundamental right guaranteed to the arrested person, the mode of conveying
information of the grounds of arrest must necessarily be meaningful so as to serve the
intended purpose. It may be noted that Section 45 PMLA enables the person arrested
under Section 19 thereof to seek release on bail but it postulates that unless the twin
conditions prescribed thereunder are satisfied, such a person would not be entitled to
grant of bail. The twin conditions set out in the provision are that, firstly, the Court
must be satisfied, after giving an opportunity to the Public Prosecutor to oppose the
application for release, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the arrested
person is not guilty of the offence and, secondly, that he is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail. To meet this requirement, it would be essential for the arrested
person to WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt be aware of the grounds on which the
authorized officer arrested him/her under Section 19 and the basis for the officer's
"reason to believe" that he/she is guilty of an offence punishable under the Act of
2002. It is only if the arrested person has knowledge of these facts that he/she would
be in a position to plead and prove before the Special Court that there are grounds to
believe that he/she is not guilty of such offence, so as to avail the relief of bail.
Therefore, communication of the grounds of arrest, as mandated by Article 22(1) of
the Constitution and Section 19 of the Act of 2002, is meant to serve this higher
purpose and must be given due importance.
39. We may also note that the language of Section 19 PMLA puts it beyond doubt that
the authorized officer has to record in writing the reasons for forming the belief that
the person proposed to be arrested is guilty of an offence punishable under the Act of
2002. Section 19(2) requires the authorized officer to forward a copy of the arrest
order along with the material in his possession, referred to in Section 19(1), to the
Adjudicating Authority in a sealed envelope. Though it is not necessary for the
arrested person to be supplied with all the material that is forwarded to the
Adjudicating Authority Under Section 19(2), he/she has a constitutional and
statutory right to be 'informed' of the grounds of arrest, which are compulsorily
recorded in writing by the authorized officer in keeping with the mandate of Section
19(1) PMLA. As already noted hereinbefore, it seems that the mode of informing this
to the persons arrested is left to the option of the ED's WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt
authorised officers in different parts of the country, i.e., to either furnish such
grounds of arrest in writing or to allow such grounds to be read by the arrested
person or be read over and explained to such person.
xxxxxxx xxxxxxx
42. That being so, there is no valid reason as to why a copy of such written grounds of
arrest should not be furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course and
without exception. There are two primary reasons as to why this would be the
advisable course of action to be followed as a matter of principle. Firstly, in the event
such grounds of arrest are orally read out to the arrested person or read by such
person with nothing further and this fact is disputed in a given case, it may boil down
to the word of the arrested person against the word of the authorized officer as to
whether or not there is due and proper compliance in this regard. In the case on
hand, that is the situation insofar as Basant Bansal is concerned. Though ED claims
that witnesses were present and certified that the grounds of arrest were read out and
explained to him in Hindi, that is neither here nor there as he did not sign the
document. Non-compliance in this regard would entail release of the arrested person
straightaway, as held in V. Senthil Balaji Vs. State (2024) 3 SCC 51. Such a precarious
situation is easily avoided and the consequence thereof can be obviated very simply
by furnishing the written grounds of arrest, as recorded by the authorized officer in
terms of Section 19(1) WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt PMLA, to the arrested person
under due acknowledgment, instead of leaving it to the debatable ipse dixit of the
authorized officer."
In Paragraph-43, it is observed that conveying the information regarding grounds of arrest was not
only to apprise the arrested person as to why he/she was being arrested but also to enable such
person to seek legal counsel and thereafter present a case before the Court under Section 45 to seek
release on bail. . In Paragraph-45, it was observed thus :
"45. On the above analysis, to give true meaning and purpose to the constitutional
and the statutory mandate of Section 19(1) of the Act of 2002 of informing the
arrested person of the grounds of arrest, we hold that it would be necessary,
henceforth, that a copy of such written grounds of arrest is furnished to the arrested
person as a matter of course and without exception. ........"
Thus, it can be seen that this judgment exclusively deals with the provisions of the PMLA Act in
terms of arrest and necessity to furnish the grounds of arrest in writing. Reference is also made to
Section 45 of the PMLA Act where the twin conditions for grant of bail as referred to in
Paragraph-38 are required to be considered.
WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt
47. After Pankaj Bansal's case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the words and phrases 'as
soon as may be' in the case of Ram Kishor Arora. In Paragraph-22, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
observed thus :
possible and within reasonably convenient and requisite time of twenty-four hours of
his arrest, that would be sufficient compliance of not only Section 19 of PMLA but
also of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India."
The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in this case, also observed that Pankaj Bansal's judgment itself
mentions that those directions would apply prospectively and from the date of Pankaj Bansal's case.
A specific reference was made to Section 19 of PMLA.
48. Another important judgment in this context is in the case of Prabir Purkayastha. The brief facts
of this case are that in connection with FIR No.224/2023 dated 17.8.2023 registered at PS Special
Cell, Lodhi Colony, New Delhi, the residential and official WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt premises
of the Appellant in that case, and one company were raided. The offences applied were punishable
under Sections 13, 16, 17, 18, 22-C of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (for short,
'UAPA') read with Sections 153-A, 120-B of IPC. The Appellant therein was arrested in connection
with that FIR on 3.10.2023. He was produced in the Court of Additional Sessions Judge-02, Patiala
House Courts, New Delhi on 4.10.2023 sometime before 6.00 a.m.. It was argued on behalf of the
Appellant that the grounds of arrest were conveyed to the Advocate for the Appellant well after 7.00
a.m.. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while deciding this case extensively referred to the ratio of Pankaj
Bansal's case. Section 19 of PMLA and Sections 43A, 43B & 43C of UAPA were quoted and
considered. In Paragraph-16, it was observed that there was no significant difference in the language
employed in Section 19(1) of PMLA & Section 43B(1) of the UAPA. It was observed that the
provision regarding the communication of the grounds of arrest to a person arrested contained in
Section 43B(1) of UAPA were verbatim as that in Section 19(1) of the PMLA. It was observed that
both the provisions find their source in Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India. It was further
observed that applying the golden Rules of interpretation, the provisions which lay down a very
important Constitutional safeguard WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt to a person arrested on charges
of committing an offence either under the PMLA or under the UAPA, have to be uniformly
construed and applied. Paragraphs-18 & 19 of the said judgment, in this context, are important
which read thus :
"18. We may note that the modified application of Section 167 Code of Criminal
Procedure is also common to both the statutes. Thus, we have no hesitation in
holding that the interpretation of statutory mandate laid down by this Court in the
case of Pankaj Bansal on the aspect of informing the arrested person the grounds of
arrest in writing has to be applied pari passu to a person arrested in a case registered
under the provisions of the UAPA.
19. Resultantly, there is no doubt in the mind of the Court that any person arrested
for allegation of commission of offences under the provisions of UAPA or for that
matter any other offence(s) has a fundamental and a statutory right to be informed
about the grounds of arrest in writing and a copy of such written grounds of arrest
have to be furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course and without
exception at the earliest. The purpose of informing to the arrested person the grounds
of arrest is salutary and sacrosanct inasmuch as, this information would be the only
effective means for the arrested person to consult his Advocate; oppose
WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt the police custody remand and to seek bail. Any other
interpretation would tantamount to diluting the sanctity of the fundamental right
guaranteed Under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India."
In Paragraph-21, it was further observed that mere filing of the charge-sheet would not validate the
illegality and the unconstitutionality committed at the time of arresting the accused and the grant of
initial police custody remand to the accused.
In Paragraph-29, it was further observed that the requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest
or the grounds of detention in writing to a person arrested in connection with an offence or a person
placed under preventive detention cannot be breached under any situation and non-compliance of
this constitutional requirement would lead to custody being rendered illegal. It was further observed
that the copy of the FIR was provided to the learned Advocate for the Applicant for the first time on
5.10.2023 and till the time of being deprived of liberty, no communication had been made to the
Appellant therein regarding the grounds on which he was arrested.
WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt In Paragraph-37, it was explained that the reasons for arrest were
formal in nature; whereas the grounds of arrest would be personal in nature and specific to the
person arrested. . In Paragraph-49 it was observed thus :
"49. From the detailed analysis made above, there is no hesitation in the mind of the Court to reach
to a conclusion that the copy of the remand application in the purported exercise of communication
of the grounds of arrest in writing was not provided to the Appellant - Accused Appellant or his
counsel before passing of the order of remand dated 4th October, 2023 which vitiates the arrest and
subsequent remand of the Appellant." Thus, it can be seen that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had
specifically considered the provisions of arrest under Sections 43A, 43B and 43C of the UAPA in
comparison with the similar provisions under PMLA; and in Paragraph-49 it was also observed that
copy of the remand application was not provided to the arrested Appellant in that case before
passing of the remand order. The Hon'ble Supreme Court specifically considered the provisions of
arrest under PMLA and UAPA. The discussion was in respect of procedure
WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt of arrest under UAPA. The investigating agency was exercising the
power under UAPA. Therefore, the procedure to effect arrest under UAPA was required to be
followed notwithstanding the fact that even offences under IPC formed part of that case. The special
power and procedure under UAPA was considered. In the cases involving offences only under IPC,
the power and procedure for arrest under Cr.P.C. will have to be seen. Even under Section 5 of
Cr.P.C.. when a special statute operates for a particular procedure then the procedure under that
Special Statute will have to operate. Hence to effect arrest involving the offences under UAPA, the
procedure for arrest under UAPA would apply notwithstanding the fact that some of the IPC
Sections are also applied. In that context, the observations of Prabir Purkayastha's case will have to
be seen. Hence even if some provisions of IPC are applied since the procedure for arrest is exercised
under UAPA in that case, that procedure will prevail over Cr.P.C.. But if the offence is only under
IPC, then the procedure under Cr.P.C. is applicable.
49. In Mahesh Naik's case the Division Bench of this Court relied on the judgment in Prabir
Purkayastha to observe that even WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt for the offences only under IPC, the
requirement of giving grounds of arrest in writing had to be followed. In this context, it would be
advantageous to refer to the judgment of a Single Judge Bench of the High Court of Karnataka in the
case of John Moses D.. In this case the notice under Section 41A of Cr.P.C. was issued to the
Petitioner. When he appeared before the investigating officer he was arrested. The contention was
raised on his behalf that the notice of arrest would not suffice and what should be made known to
the Petitioner was the grounds of arrest.
The High Court of Karnataka considered the judgments of Pankaj Bansal, Prabir Purkayastha and
also the judgment in the case of Arvind Kejriwal Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation 28. The learned
Judge had considered this issue in the context of offences under the Indian Penal Code and the
Karnataka Control of Organized Crimes Act, 2000 (KCOCA). In Paragraph-11 of this case, it was
observed that in all those cases the Apex Court was considering the purport and importance of the
UAPA and PMLA. In Paragraph-13 onwards, the Karnataka High Court considered as to whether
interpretation 28 Decided on 12.7.2024 in Criminal Appeal No.2493/2024 [Hon'ble Supreme Court]
WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt of the Apex Court should be stretched to the offences under the IPC
or any other Penal Law for that matter. After that Section 50 of Cr.P.C. was quoted and various other
judgments were considered. The important observations are made in Paragraphs-15 & 16, which
read thus :
"15. The Police Stations, in the country are close to 20,000, arrests happen day in and
day out. If grounds of arrest is to be informed, as is held by the Apex Court in
PANKAJ BANSAL, PRABIR PURKAYASTHA and ARVIND KEJRIWAL in every
arrest on any cognizable offence, it would undoubtedly open a Pandora's box, of
interpretation of what could be the grounds of arrest, and mushroom huge litigation
before the constitutional Courts.
16. The Apex Court holds it mandatory in the aforesaid three cases, owing to the fact
that enlargement of an accused for the offences under the UAPA and PMLA on grant
of bail, is extremely limited. The burden to prove that he is not guilty begins at the
threshold. It is in fact a reverse burden on the accused. It is, therefore, in such cases
the grounds of arrest should be informed to the accused. In the case, before the Apex
Court, the arrest memo did not contain any grounds of arrest and it was blatant
violation of the statute and the Constitution. Therefore, interpretation that has stood
the test of time, qua Section 50 of the WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt Cr.P.C., of
information of grounds of arrest to the accused is what is required to be followed
even in the case at hand as the offences are under the IPC and KCOCA, both of them
would not mandate divergence of grounds of arrest except as found in Section 50 of
Cr.P.C. What is informed to the petitioner in the case at hand is information of arrest.
Cr.P.C. mandates that the accused should be informed of the grounds of arrest. In my
considered view, the information of grounds of arrest as is indicated to the petitioner
in the case at hand, would suffice and it would not vitiate the arrest and result in
enlargement on grant of bail or interim bail."
The learned Judge referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Haryana
Financial Corporation Vs. Jagdamba Oil Mills29 wherein it was observed that the Courts should not
place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact
situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are not to be read as
Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute. These observations must be read in the context in
which they appear. Finally, the learned Judge held that what would 29 (2002) 3 SCC 496
WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt unmistakably emerge is what was ingrained in the Cr.P.C., qua
Section 50 should necessarily be followed and the information of grounds of arrest in the manner in
which the Apex Court has held in Pankaj Bansal, Prabir Purkayastha or even Arvind Kejriwal would
not become applicable to the offence under the KCOCA or the IPC or any arrest under any penal law
except in cases of prevention of detention. It was also made clear that Section 50 of Cr.P.C. must
necessarily be followed and information or grounds of arrest must necessarily be indicated to every
accused who is to be arrested under the general law. If the arrest was under the PMLA or UAPA then
what was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in those cases would straight away become
applicable and non-divulgence would vitiate the arrest.
50. In the subsequent judgment of Arvind Kejriwal the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to the
judgment in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary. In Paragraph-23 it was observed that the PMLA,
a special legislation for the offence of money laundering creates a unique mechanism for
inquiry/investigation into the offence. An analogy cannot be drawn with the provisions of Cr.P.C.
It was further observed in Paragraph-41 that the power to arrest under Section 19(1) was not for the
purpose of investigation. Arrest can and should wait, and the power in terms of Section 19(1) of the
PMLA can be exercised only when the material with the designated officer enables them to form an
opinion, by recording reasons in writing that the arrestee is guilty.
In Paragraph-42, it was further elaborated that Section 439 of Cr.P.C. does not impose statutory
restrictions, except under Section 437(3) when applicable, on the court's power to grant bail.
Thus, the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court clearly show that there is a difference between
the provisions under Cr.P.C. and under the PMLA regarding the procedure for arresting a person. It
was observed that the provisions from PMLA and Cr.P.C. cannot be equated. Thus, in effect there
are sufficient indications that the observations in Pankaj Bansal's, case which are in relation to
PMLA, would not be applicable to the provisions of the Cr.P.C.. Prabir Purkayastha's case relied on
the observations in Pankaj Bansal and on the similarities between the PMLA and UAPA to apply the
ratio in Pankaj Bansal to the procedure to arrest under UAPA.
51. The Division Bench of this Court in Mahesh Naik's case has referred to the observations in
Paragraph-19 of Prabir Purkayastha's case to apply them to the offences under IPC. However, as
discussed earlier, there is a difference in the procedure to arrest under UAPA and under Cr.P.C..
52. The same Division Bench of this Court in the case of Mihir WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt Shah
however carved out an exception and even though the grounds of arrest were not furnished to the
arrested accused in that case in writing it was not held that the arrest was illegal. There is, thus,
direct conflict in the observations of the same Division Bench in the case of Mahesh Naik and Mihir
Shah. In the case of Mihir Shah one of the accused was caught with the car which had the struck a
motorcycle at a high speed. According to the prosecution case, the car was driven by Mihir Shah but
he left the car after some time and absconded. He was subsequently arrested. In that case it was held
that the accused Mihir Shah was aware as to why he was being arrested and, therefore, the grounds
of arrest not having been furnished in writing was not held to be a ground for declaring his arrest as
illegal. In that case it was observed that while focusing on the rights of the accused, the Courts
cannot lose sight of the victim. It was further observed that, for too long, the victims of crimes have
been the forgotten persons in a criminal justice system. Crime is not a problem of the victim, since
the victim did not create it. For considerable time, what the system offered to the victim was only
sympathy, but with the introduction WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt of discipline of 'victimology' the
concept has gained momentum and found its place in the existing Cr.P.C.. We fully agree with the
sentiments expressed and observations made by the Division Bench in the case of Mihir Shah. These
observations are in direct contrast/conflict with the ratio expressed by the Division Bench in the
case of Mahesh Naik and, therefore, there is a necessity to refer the issue to a Larger Bench. In our
opinion, Section 50 of Cr.P.C. has to operate uniformly in all cases because it does not leave scope
for discretion to the Court to consider the circumstances in which the accused is arrested or the
gravity of the offence.
53. In this context, it would be advantageous to reproduce the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in respect of rights of the victims vis-a-vis Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
54. It is well settled that Article 21 offers protection not only to the person who is being arrested but
also to the victim to live the life of dignity.
55. Therefore, in the heinous cases like those involving the offence of rape or heinous sexual assault
under POCSO and even WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt families of the victims of murder deserve
protection under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
56. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that right to life contained in Article 21 is also available to
the victims. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bodhisattwa Gautam Vs. Subhra Chakraborty
(Ms)30 has observed in the context of the offence of rape as follows :
"..... Rape is, therefore, the most hated crime. It is a crime against basic human rights
and is also violative of the victim's most cherished of the Fundamental Rights,
namely, the Right to Life contained in Article 21"
57. The accused has certain rights, as discussed earlier. Similarly the victims also have their own
rights. In cases involving heinous crimes like rape, murder, those under POCSO, MCOCA, NDPS,
the victims and even the society are the sufferer. The victims do not have any control over the
investigation and the investigating officers' efficiency or inefficiency. Therefore, if an accused is
released on the ground of non-furnishing of the grounds of arrest in writing if required under
Section 50 of Cr.P.C. that would cause 30 (1996) 1 SCC 490 WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt serious
prejudice to the victims. Such lapse can be attributed to various factors viz. inefficiency, lack of
awareness etc.. In that case, the consequences would be causing serious prejudice to the victims. In
a given case, the investigating agency may have material in their possession that propensity of the
accused indicated that he is likely to commit a similar offence, and that would be a serious threat to
the security and safety of the potential victims in the offences like rape, under POCSO etc.. If an
accused is released on that ground then there could be serious threat to the witnesses also.
Therefore, there is need to strike a balance between the rights of the victims and the rights of the
accused. There is also a possibility of destruction of evidence, threatening of witnesses etc.. Merely
imposing conditions in these cases may not suffice. On the other hand, when the bail applications
are considered, then looking at the background of the case, the Court would exercise jurisdiction in
bail matters taking into account all the factors including merits of the matter; which in the cases of
violation of alleged rights of the accused under Section 50 of Cr.P.C. would not be possible for the
Court to exercise.
WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt
58. In this context, we have seriously considered the arguments advanced by learned Advocate
General about re-arrest of the accused who is released with or without bail bonds on the ground of
alleged non-compliance of the provisions of Section 50 of Cr.P.C. for not giving the grounds of arrest
in writing. In this context, Shri Bhuta could not point out any embargo or bar upon such re-arrest.
Shri Amit Desai, however, submitted that once the accused is released on that ground, re-arrest
would violate the protection of the accused under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The State
should not be given a second chance. In this connection, we are inclined to agree with the learned
Advocate General that there is no bar in re-arresting the persons who are released for
non-furnishing the grounds of arrest in writing. What the accused are claiming in this situation, is
that, they were arrested in violation to the provisions of Cr.P.C. and it infringes their constitutional
right under Article 21 but if they are released on that ground and thereafter if the grounds of arrest
are supplied to them, they cannot have any grievance. The purpose behind these provisions is to
make the accused aware as to why he was arrested WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt and thereafter
enable him to defend himself. Leaving aside the issue whether such ground should be
communicated orally or should be given in writing for the time being; if on the ground of
non-communication they are released and if thereafter the grounds are furnished as per the
requirement; then the accused cannot have any grievance, that they were not aware as to why they
were arrested. From that point onward, the procedure for remand can be followed and the
shortcoming of non-compliance of the provision is wiped out. In that context, reference can be made
to the case of Kavita Manikikar. In that case, the Petitioner before the Court was a lady. She was
released because she was arrested after sun-set for breach of Section 46(4) of Cr.P.C. Having held
her arrest illegal, the Division Bench of this Court went on to observe that considering the
seriousness of the allegations, she could be re- arrested after following due procedure of law. The
same course can be adopted in the cases where the investigating agency wants to re-arrest the
accused if they are released for non-compliance of Section 50 of Cr.P.C..
59. As discussed earlier, the cases of Pankaj Bansal, Ram WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt Kishor
Arora and Prabir Purkayastha deal with the provisions of PMLA and UAPA specifically as
mentioned earlier. As against that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Arnesh Kumar and
Satendra Kumar Antil extensively dealt with the issue and procedure of arrest of persons under
Cr.P.C. and the safeguards provided under Cr.P.C..
60. As we have discussed earlier, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had considered the provisions of
PMLA and UAPA in the aforementioned judgments of Pankaj Bansal, Prabir Purkayastha, Ram
Kishor Arora and Arvind Kejariwal. The question of necessity to arrest and power to arrest and the
safeguards while effecting that arrest specifically fell for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of Arnesh Kumar. In that case, Paragraphs-5 & 6 of the said judgment, are very
important, which are as follows :
"5. Arrest brings humiliation, curtails freedom and cast scars forever. Law makers
know it so also the police. There is a battle between the law makers and the police
and it seems that police has not learnt its lesson; the lesson implicit and embodied in
CrPC. It has not come out of its colonial image despite six decades of Independence,
it is largely considered as a tool of harassment, oppression and
WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt surely not considered a friend of public. The need for
caution in exercising the drastic power of arrest has been emphasized time and again
by Courts but has not yielded desired result. Power to arrest greatly contributes to its
arrogance so also the failure of the Magistracy to check it. Not only this, the power of
arrest is one of the lucrative sources of police corruption. The attitude to arrest first
and then proceed with the rest is despicable. It has become a handy tool to the police
officers who lack sensitivity or act with oblique motive.
Thus, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering the comprehensive measures as far as the arrest
under Cr.P.C. was concerned. The safeguards were considered and there was a reference made to
Sections 41 and 41A of Cr.P.C.. In this entire judgment, there is no reference made or requirement
noted that the grounds of arrest were required to be furnished in writing to the accused at the time
of his arrest.
WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt
61. The Hon'ble Supreme Court followed Arnesh Kumar's judgment in the case of Satendra Kumar
Antil. In addition, various other provisions under CrP.C. were considered viz., Section 167 read with
57 and 60-A of Cr.P.C. and all the provisions for bail. Certain directions were issued. Even in this
judgment there was no requirement laid down that the grounds of arrest had to be furnished in
writing to the accused at the time of his arrest. These two judgments are directly on the subject of
arrest of persons under Cr.P.C..
62. The next question which requires consideration is regarding necessity to issue a notice under
Section 41A of Cr.P.C. before effecting arrest. The arguments are advanced that the notice under
Section 41A is necessary before effecting arrest in all cases and definitely for the cases involving
offences punishable upto seven years under Section 41A of Cr.P.C..
63. As mentioned earlier, the Division Bench in the case of Abhijit Arjun Padale has taken a view in
the case involving offence under Section 384 and 506 of IPC, where the punishment is less
WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt than seven years it was necessary to issue a notice under Section 41A
of Cr.P.C. and arrest effected without issuance of such notice was held to be illegal. A reference was
made to the judgment of Arnesh Kumar by the Division Bench while deciding case of Abhijit Padale.
In this context, it is necessary to reproduce Paragraphs-11 and 12 of Arnesh Kumar, which read as
under :
"11. Our endeavour in this judgment is to ensure that police officers do not arrest
accused unnecessarily and Magistrate do not authorise detention casually and
mechanically. In order to ensure what we have observed above, we give the following
direction:
11.1. All the State Governments to instruct its police officers not to automatically
arrest when a case Under Section 498-A IPC is registered but to satisfy themselves
about the necessity for arrest under the parameters laid down above flowing from
Section 41 CrPC;
11.2. All police officers be provided with a check list containing specified sub-clauses
Under Section 41(1)(b)(ii);
11.3. The police officer shall forward the check list duly filled and furnish the reasons
and materials which necessitated the arrest, while forwarding/producing the accused
before the Magistrate for further detention;
WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt 11.4. The Magistrate while authorising detention of the accused shall
peruse the report furnished by the police officer in terms aforesaid and only after recording its
satisfaction, the Magistrate will authorise detention;
11.5. The decision not to arrest an accused, be forwarded to the Magistrate within two weeks from
the date of the institution of the case with a copy to the Magistrate which may be extended by the
Superintendent of police of the district for the reasons to be recorded in writing;
11.6. Notice of appearance in terms of Section 41A CrPC be served on the accused within two weeks
from the date of institution of the case, which may be extended by the Superintendent of Police of
the district for the reasons to be recorded in writing;
11.7. Failure to comply with the directions aforesaid shall apart from rendering the police officers
concerned liable for departmental action, they shall also be liable to be punished for contempt of
court to be instituted before the High Court having territorial jurisdiction.
11.8. Authorising detention without recording reasons as aforesaid by the judicial Magistrate
concerned shall be liable for departmental action by the appropriate High Court.
12. We hasten to add that the directions aforesaid shall not only apply to the cases Under Section
498-A WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt IPC or Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the case in
hand, but also such cases where offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be
less than seven years or which may extend to seven years; whether with or without fine."
64. Arnesh Kumar's judgment was followed in Satendra Kumar Antil's case. Paragraphs-11 and 12
from the judgment of Arnesh Kumar were specifically quoted in Satendra Kumar Antil's case.
Paragraph-11 of Arnesh Kumar judgment lays down the guidelines and requirements which are to be
followed by the police officers and the Magistrates. There is a reference to Section 41(1)(b)(ii) and
the check-list provided under that provision. Paragraph-11.6 mentions that notice of appearance in
terms of Section 41A be served on the accused within two weeks from the date of institution of the
case. The question is whether the notice is required to be issued under Section 41-A where the police
officers want to arrest the accused. There is a check list provided under Section 41(1)(b)
(ii) of Cr.P.C. when the police officer has reason to believe on the basis of the complaint, information
or suspicion that the person has committed the offence. Section 41(1)(b) refers to the offences
WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt where the punishment may extend upto seven years with or without
fine. Section 41(1)(b)(i) requires that the police officer has to have reason to believe that such person
has committed an offence and then he has to prepare the check-list mentioned in Section 41(1)(b)(ii)
of Cr.p.C. as to the reasons in writing for making such arrest. The check-list includes necessity to
prevent such person from committing any further offence, for proper investigation, for preventing
destruction of evidence, for preventing the accused to make any inducement to the witnesses and to
ensure his presence in the Court. There is an important proviso under Section 41(1)(b)(ii), which
reads thus :
"Provided that a police officer shall, in all cases where the arrest of a person is not
required under the provisions of this sub-section, record the reasons in writing, for
not making the arrest."
This would mean that even when the police officer is of the opinion that the arrest of a person is not
required he has to record the reasons in writing for not making the arrest. After this proviso, Section
41(1)(ba) upto 41(1)(i) lay down the different WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt categories where such
check list is not mentioned. In other words for the offences punishable for more than seven years
and other circumstances where the offender is a proclaimed offender etc., preparation of check list is
not necessary. Thus, Section 41(1) differentiates between the offence punishable upto seven years
and the offences which are punishable for more than seven years. As a safeguard, wherever the
arrest is necessary for the offences punishable upto 7 years, the police officer has to prepare a check
list in writing as to why the arrest is necessary.
Section 41A on the other hand refers to all cases. It does not make any distinction between the
offences punishable upto seven years or the offences punishable for more than seven years.
Sub-section 1 of Section 41A starts with the following words :
"The police officer shall, in all cases where the arrest of a person is not required
under the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 41, issue a notice ........"
[Emphasis supplied].
The Section is very clear and it applies where the arrest of a person is 'not' required. Only in those
cases the notice under WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt Section 41A is required to be issued to a
person against whom a reasonable complaint is made or credible information is received or a
reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed a cognizable offence; then the police officer has to
issue a notice calling upon such a person to appear before such police officer. Therefore, this
requirement of issuance of notice is applicable where a reasonable suspicion exists or credible
information is available against such person and yet the police officer does not want to arrest him
then it is the duty of the police officer to issue a notice to him. This provisions serves two purposes,
first it prevents unnecessary arrests and secondly it aids in proper investigation. Therefore, this
provision cannot be stretched to mean that in all cases including the offences punishable upto seven
years, the notice has to be issued if the police officers want to arrest a person. Hence it cannot be
said that serving of notice is a precondition of arrest of an accused even if the police officer is of the
opinion that the arrest is required. On the contrary, such interpretation would defeat the clear
language of Section 41A of Cr.P.C.. The safeguard is preparation of checklist if the offence is
punishable upto seven WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt years.
65. In fact, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgments of Arnesh Kumar and Santendra Kumar
Antil have repeatedly held that the provisions of Sections 41 & 41A are required to be complied when
the police officer wants to arrest a person. That also means even for offences which are punishable
for more than seven years, the police officers do not have to arrest the accused when his arrest is not
necessary. In that case, the police officer has to issue a notice to such person under Section 41A of
Cr.P.C. asking him to appear before him. Sub-section (3) of Section 41A further provides that if such
person complies with the notice then he shall not be arrested unless the reasons to be recorded that
the police officer is of the opinion that he ought to be arrested. Again in this situation the police
officer is given an option to arrest such person but he has to record his reasons for such an arrest.
Therefore in our opinion it is not the requirement of law where the police officers want to arrest a
person, they have to give notice under Section 41A of Cr.P.C. to the accused. In fact when the arrest
of a person is not required, only then the notice is required to WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt be
issued. If it is to be held that in all cases before arrest and in particular in the cases involving
offences upto seven years, the notice is required to be issued under Section 41A of Cr.P.C. then it
could be argued that once notice is issued it would mean that the police officers did not want to
arrest the accused which would run contrary to the express provision of Section 41A of Cr.P.C..
The accused person on receiving such a notice, can easily destroy the evidence, abscond or leave the
country. It defeats the purpose of effective investigation. This may affect the cases where the
offences are upto seven years of punishment viz. the offences under Section 420 of IPC or under
Section 406 of IPC involving cheating or misappropriation of huge amounts wherein many persons
are cheated. This may affect the investor's rights under the MPID Act. If the accused is given
sufficient time before arrest, he can destroy the evidence or dispose of the property. In case of even
serious offences like MCOCA he is likely to threaten the witnesses and in the cases of NDPS, the
main offenders may get a hint. The investigation in all such cases will be seriously affected. These
are the illustrative examples and certainly are not exhaustive list of WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt
offences where the investigation will be seriously hampered. Therefore, we record our difference of
opinion in respect of the ratio of the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Abhijit
Padale.
66. Based on the above discussion, in our opinion the proper course for us is to refer these
important questions for consideration to a Larger Bench. The questions are formulated as follows :
(1) Whether the ratio of the decisions in Pankaj Bansal Vs. Union of India 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 1244, Ram Kishor Arora Vs. Enforcement Directorate 2023 SCC OnLine
1682, Prabir Purkayastha Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) 2024 SCC OnLine 934, are
applicable to Section 50 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and involving the
offences under the other statutes than Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 &
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 ?
(2) Whether Section 50 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 mandates the
furnishing of the grounds of arrest in writing to the accused ?
[ii] Whether the Court has discretion to consider such necessity depending on the gravity of the
offence or circumstances in which the accused is arrested ? [iii] Whether, in the given cases, the
Court can consider the prejudice caused to the accused for not furnishing the grounds of arrest in
writing ?
[iv] Before which forum the arrested person can raise his grievance for his release on this ground ?
Whether it can be Magistrate's Court granting remand, Sessions Court, Single Judge of this Court
exercising jurisdiction in bail matters or before the Division Bench exercising powers under Article
226 of the Constitution of India ?
[v] For implementation of this mandate, what should be the cut off date ? Whether it should be from
the date of the decision in Pankaj Bansal Vs. Union of India WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt 2023
SCC OnLine SC 1244 or from the date of decision in Prabir Purkayastha Vs. State (NCT of Delhi)
2024 SCC OnLine 934 or from the date of decision in Mahesh Pandurang Naik Vs. State of
Maharashtra and another decided on 18.7.2024 in Criminal Writ Petition [Stamp] No.13835/2024.
(4) If it is held that oral communication under Section 50 of the Cr.P.C. is sufficient, then whether it
can be communicated within 24 hours of the arrest or at the time of first Remand or it has to be at
the time of arrest.
(5) If a person is released for non-compliance of Section 50 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,
can he be arrested again after following due procedure after his release ?
(6) Whether the notice under Section 41A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is required to be
given before arrest in all cases and in particular in the cases where the offence is punishable upto
seven years, when the arrest of an accused is necessary ?
WP-ST-24338-24-GROUP.odt
67. Apart from these questions formulated for consideration of a Larger Bench, we are of the
opinion that some clear and definite guidelines are required to be issued to the Courts of
Magistrates and to the investigating agencies to follow the procedure of giving a remand report
sufficiently in advance to the arrested accused before his first remand application is considered by
the appropriate Court.
68. The Registry is directed to place this order before the Hon'ble The Chief Justice for
consideration for placing it before a Larger Bench consisting of three or more Judges. The Registry
shall take such steps at the earliest considering that the issue raised in these Petitions is in respect of
alleged illegal detention of large number of arrested accused.
Deshmane (PS)
PRADIPKUMAR PRAKASHRAO
PRAKASHRAO DESHMANE
DESHMANE
Date:
2025.01.31
12:18:18 +0530