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The Structure of
Sociological
Theory
The Structure of
Sociological
Theory

Jonathan H. Turner
Uni versity of California, Riverside

Rawat Publications
Jaipur
 30!
TUh
ISBN 81-7033-042-4 (hardcover)
ISBN 81-7033-266-4 (paperback)

© The Dorsey Press, 1987

This edition is published by arrangement with The Dorsey Press.

Reprinted, 2004

Published by
Prem Rawat for Rawat Publications
Satyam Apts., Sector 3, Jawahar Nagar, Jaipur - 302 004 (India)
Phone: 0141 265 1748 / 7006 Fax: 0141 265 1748
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To my wife: Sandy, Alexandra, Alex,
A. R. or whatever you are calling
yourself these days
 Preface

In 1971, I began the first edition of The Structure of Sociological Theory.

In these 15 years, theoretical sociology has changed. The most important
of these changes is the gradual breakdown of intellectual barriers among
theoretical perspectives, or “paradigms” as some like to label them. In
1971, it made sense to have separate sections on functional, conflict,
exchange, and interactionist theory. It still makes sense, but less so. And
[ hope that, in the future, these barriers will be a thing of the past. For
the present, however, I have retained these four schools of thought and
added one more; structural theorizing. But there are some major changes
in the way that I treated these five perspectives. Let me enumerate.
First, I have added more European theory. Certainly one big change
in the 1980s is the prominence of such German theorists as Jurgen Ha-
bermas and Niklas Luhmann and the rise of the British theorist Anthony
Giddens. Theory today is truly international, and Americans no longer
dominate as they once did when functional theorizing reigned supreme.
Second, I have sought to emphasize the convergence of various theor-
ists and perspectives. There has been considerable borrowing, which, 15
years ago, scholars were less inclined to do. Today, theory is more eclectic,
and this is all to the good.
Third, I have completely rewritten every chapter. I had no intention
of doing so, but I got involved. In a real sense, this is a new book, but I
have retained the old title. Moreover, I have tried to write in a more
informal style, which, I hope, is appreciated.
Fourth, I have provided in Chapter 1 a much more extensive review
of theory building in sociology. I am no longer content to crudely group
theorists into perspectives without exploring the underlying philosophical
positions of various theoretical strategies.
vii
viii PREFACE

Fifth, my own biases are more evident than in previous editions,

although I still try to be balanced and fair. Let me summarize my position
simply: sociology can be a “natural science”; it can develop abstract the-
oretical principles and models about generic properties of the universe.
Many disagree with me, and I try very hard to let these critics of my
position have their say in the chapters to follow. At the same time, I am
out to demonstrate the viability of my position.
Certain features of the book remain the same, however. The most
important is that analysis is detailed. I do not water down the theories.
I have sought to simplify and clarify, but not to trivialize. In my view,
too many theory books oversimplify to the point of making theories vac-
uous. In contrast, this is a book about the structure of sociological theory,
not the surface contours. Moreover, even though I offer my opinion, I try
to analyze theoretical perspectives in their own terms. I have not distorted
for my own rhetorical purposes; indeed, I have gone out of my way to
present theories in their best light.
Finally, I should indicate that this is a much more complete book
than its predecessors. I have worked very hard to make it both compre-
hensive and detailed. Indeed, I spent more time on this project than I
ever envisioned. I hope that readers find my effort worthwhile.

Jonathan H. Turner

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I wish to thank the Academic Senate of the University of California,
Riverside, for providing support for this and all my previous research.
Also, I must thank my typist of 15 years, Clara Dean, who corrects my
spelling, catches all my referencing mistakes, and reads my horrible
handwriting.
J.H.T.
 Contents

i. The Nature of Sociological Theorizing 1

Is a Science of Society Possible? 1
The Elements of Theory 4
Concepts: The Basic Building Blocks of Theory. 5 Variables as
an Important Type of Concept. 7 Theoretical Statements and
Formats. 7
An Assessment of Theoretical Approaches 21
Abstractness and Scope of Various Theoretical Schemes. 21
Relative Merits of Diverse Theoretical Approaches. 24
The State of Sociological Theory 29
Prevailing Theoretical Schemes in Sociology. 29 Enduring
Controversies in Sociological Theorizing. 30
Theoretical Perspectives in Sociology 32

Part One
Functional Theorizing

The Emergence of Functionalism 37

Functionalism and the Organismic Analogy 38
The Organicism of Auguste Comte (1798-1857). 39 The
Analytical Functionalism of Herbert Spencer (1820-1903). 41
Functionalism and Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) 45
Functionalism and the Anthropological Tradition 47
The Functionalism of A. R. Radcliffe-Brown (1881-1955). 48 The
Functionalism of Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942). 50
Functionalism and the Ghost of Max Weber 52
The Emergence of Functionalism: An Overview 54
CONTENTS

The Analytical Functionalism of Talcott Parsons 57

The Structure of Social Action 58
The Social System 62
The Transition to Functional Imperativism 68
The Informational Hierarchy of Control 70
Generalized Media of Exchange 73
Parsons on Social Change 74
Parsons on “The Human Condition” 76
Criticisms of Parsonian Functionalism 78
Criticisms of Parsons’s Substantive Image of Society. 78 The
Logical Criticisms of Requisite Functionalism. 80
Talcott Parsons: An Overview 85

The Empirical Functionalism of 87

Robert K. Merton
Theories of the Middle Range 87
Merton’s Paradigm for Functional Analysis 90
A Protocol for Executing Functional Analysis 94
Illustrating Merton’s Functional Strategy 96

The Systems Functionalism of Niklas Luhmann 102

Luhmann’s ‘General Systems’ Approach 103
System and Environment. 103 Dimensions of the Environment.
104 Types of Social Systems. 105 System Differentiation,
Integration, and Conflict. 106 Communications Media,
Reflexivity, and Self-Thematization. 109 Luhmann’s Basic
Approach. 111
Luhmann’s Conception of Social Evolution 112
The Underlying Mechanisms of Evolution. 112 Evolution and
Social Differentiation. 113
The Functional Differentiation of Society 117
Politics as a Social System. 117 The Autonomy of the Legal
System. 120 The Economy as a Social System. 121
Systems Functionalism: An Assessment of Luhmann’s
Alternative 124

Part Two
Conflict Theory

The Origins of Conflict and Critical Theorizing 129

The Conflict Alternative 129
Karl Marx (1818-1883) and the Origins of Conflict and Critical
Theory 132
 CONTENTS xi

Critical Strains in Marx’s Thought. 132 Positivistic Strains in

Marx’s Thought. 134
Georg Simmel and Conflict Theorizing 138
Functional Strains in Simmel’s Thought. 138 Simmel’s Implicit
Attack on Marx’s Emancipatory Project. 144
Max Weber’s (1864-1920) Theory of Conflict 146
Positivistic Strains in Weber’s Thought. 146 Weber’s Pessimism
and the Dilemma for Critical Theorists. 149
The Proliferation of Conflict Sociology 150

The Dialectical Conflict Theory of 151

Ralf Dahrendorf
Dahrendorf’s Image of the Social Order 152
Criticisms of the Dialectical Conflict Model 155
Problems in the Causal Analysis. 155 Methodological Problems.
161
From Utopia to Where? A Concluding Comment 162

The Conflict \Functionalism of Lewis A. Coser 165

Images of Social Organization 166
Propositions on Conflict Processes 168
The Causes of Conflict. 169 The Violence of Conflict. 170 The
Duration of Conflict. 172 The Functions of Social Conflict. 173
Coser’s Functional Approach: An Assessment 176
Redirecting Conflict Theory: Overcoming Unresolved Issues 177
What is Conflict? 177 Conflict among or between What? 180
Escape from Functionalism? 181

The Critical Theorizing of Jurgen Habermas 184

Early Critical Theory: Lukacs, Horkheimer, Adorno 186
The Critical Approach of Jurgen Habermas 189
The Central Problem of Critical Theory. 189 Habermas’s
Analysis of ‘““The Public Sphere”. 190 The Critique of Science.
191 Legitimation Crises in Society. 194 Early Analyses of Speech
and Interaction. 196 Habermas’s Reconceptualization of Social
Evolution. 199 The Theory of Communicative Action. 201
An Assessment of Habermas’s Critical Theory and Project 208
Evaluating Habermas’s Conception of Action. 209 Habermas’s
Conception of Interaction. 209 Habermas’s Macrosociology:
System and Lifeworld. 210 Habermas’s View of Evolution. 211

Part Three
Exchange Theory

10. Early Forms of Exchange Theorizing 215

Utilitarianism: The Legacy of Classical Economics 215
Exchange Theory in Anthropology 217
 CONTENTS

Sir James Frazer (1854-1941). 217 Bronislaw Malinowski and

Nonmaterial Exchange. 219 Marcel Mauss and the Emergence of
Exchange Structuralism. 221 Claude Lévi-Strauss and
Structuralism. 222
Psychological Behaviorism and Exchange Theory 225
The Sociological Tradition and Exchange Theory 228
Marx’s Theory of Exchange and Conflict. 229 Georg Simmel’s
Exchange Theory. 230
Modern Exchange Theory: A Preview 233

11. The Exchange Behaviorism of George C. Homans 234

The Early Inductive Strategy 235
The Addition of a Deductive Strategy 239
The Exchange Model 240
Sources of Homans’s Psychological Exchange Perspective. 240
The Basic Concepts. 243 Elementary Principles of Social
Behavior. 244 Homans’s Construction of Deductive Systems. 245
Criticisms of Homans’s Strategy and Exchange Theory 249
The Issues of Rationality. 249 The Issue of Tautology. 250 The
Issue of Reductionism. 251
Homans’s Image of Society 255

12. The Structural Exchange Theory of 261

Peter M. Blau
Blau’s Theoretical Strategy 262
Basic Exchange Principles 263
Basic Exchange Processes in Social Life 266
Elementary Systems of Exchange. 266 Exchange Systems and
Macrostructure. 274
The Organizational Basis of Society 280
The Unresolved Issue: Micro versus Macro Analysis 284
13. The Exchange Network Theory of 287
Richard Emerson
Emerson’s Exchange Network Approach 289
The Overall Strategy. 289 The Basic Exchange Concepts. 291
The Basic Exchange Processes. 293 The Basic Exchange
Propositions. 294 Structure, Networks, and Exchange. 296
Exchange Network Analysis: A Concluding Comment 304

Part Four
Interactionist Theory
14, Early Interactionism and Phenomenology 309
Early American Insights 309
William James (1842-1910) and the Concept of “Self”. 310
Self
and Social Process: Charles Horton Cooley. 311 Pragmatism
and
 CONTENTS xiii

Thinking: The Contribution of John Dewey (1859-1952). 311

Main Currents of Thought in America: Pragmatism, Darwinism,
and Behaviorism. 312 George Herbert Mead’s Synthesis. 313
Conceptualizing Structure and Role. 318 Robert Park and Role
Theory. 318 Jacob Moreno and Role Theory. 319 Ralph Linton
and Role Theory. 320
Early European Insights 320
Georg Simmel and “Sociation”’. 321
Emile Durkheim’s Metamorphosis. 322 Max Weber and “Social
Action”. 323 European Phenomenology. 323
Modern Interactionism: A Review 331

15. The Symbolic Interactionism of Herbert Blumer 333

and Manford Kuhn
Symbolic Interactionism: Points of Convergence 334
Humans as Symbol Users. 334 Symbolic Communication. 335
Interaction and Role-Taking. 335 Interaction, Humans, and
Society. 336
Areas of Disagreement and Controversy 337
The Nature of the Individual. 337 The Nature of Interaction.
338 The Nature of Social Organization. 340 The Nature of
Methods. 341 The Nature and Possibilities of Sociological
Theory. 346 The Chicago and Iowa Schools: An Overview. 349
Symbolic Interactionism: A Concluding Comment 349

16. Structural Role Theory 353

The Conceptual Thrust of Structural Role Theory 354
Images of Society and the Individual 355
The Nature of Social Organization. 355 The Nature of the
Individual. 357 The Articulation between the Individual and
Society. 358
Problems and Issues in Building Role Theory 363
Constructing Propositions. 363 Methodological Implications. 364

17. The Process Role Theory of Ralph H. Turner 369

The Critique of Structural Theory 369
Interaction and Roles 371
The Role-Making Process. 371 The “Folk Norm of Consistency”
372 The Tentative Nature of Interaction. 372 The Process of
Role Verification. 373 Self-Conceptions and Role. 373
The Strategy for Building Role Theory 374
The Concepts of Role Theory. 374 Sorting Out Tendencies. 375
Generating and Organizing Empirical Propositions. 379
Developing Explanatory Propositions. 384
xiv CONTENTS

Process Role Theory: A Brief Assessment of Turner’s

Approach 387

18. The Ethnomethodological Challenge 389

The Origins of Ethnomethodology 390
Blumer’s [nteractionism and Ethnomethodology. 390 Goffman’s
Dramaturgical Analysis and Ethnomethodology. 391 Alfred
Schutz, Phenomenology, and Ethnomethodology. 392
The Nature of Ethnomethodology 392
Metaphysics or Methodology? 392 Concepts and Principles of
Ethnomethodology. 394 Varieties of Ethnomethodological
Inquiry. 398
New Paradigm or Important Supplement? 403

Part Five
Structural Theory

19. The Origins of Structural Theorizing 407

The Idea of Social Structure 407
Karl Marx and Structural Analysis 408
The Structural Analysis of Herbert Spencer 410
Spencer’s Macrostructuralism. 410 Spencer’s Microstructuralism.
412
The Structuralism of Emile Durkheim 413
Max Weber and Structural Analysis 416
Georg Simmel’s Structural Approach 417
Interactionism and Microstructuralism 418
G. H. Mead’s Behavioristic Structuralism. 419 Alfred Schutz. 420
Modern Structural Analysis 420
Appendix: The Structuralism of Claude Lévi-Strauss 421

20. The Macrostructuralism of Peter M. Blau 425

Blau’s Theoretical Strategy 425
Blau’s Theory of Macrostructure 429
Macrostructuralism: An Assessment 433

21. The Microstructuralism of Randall Collins 435

The Micro and Macro Realms 435
Interaction Ritual Chains 439
Conflict Sociology 441
Talk and Ritual. 442 Deference and Demeanor. 445 Class
Cultures. 446 Sexual Stratification. 449 Age Stratification. 450
Organizational Processes. 451 The State and Economy. 451
Microstructuralism: An Assessment 453
 CONTENTS xv

pt. The Structuration Theory of Anthony Giddens 456

The Critique of Social Theory 456
Rejecting Naturalism and Positivism. 456 Obviating Sociological
Dualisms. 458 The Critique of Functionalism and Evolutionism.
458 The Limits of Interactionism. 459 The Critique of
Structuralism. 460
The “Theory of Structuration” 460
Reconceptualizing Structure and Social System. 461
Reconceptualizing Institutions. 464 Structural Principles, Sets,
and Properties. 466 Structural Contradiction. 467 Agents,
Agency, and Action. 468 Routinization and Regionalization of
Interaction. 471
The Theory of Structuration: A Summary and Assessment 474

Name Index i

Subject Index vii

List of Figures
1-1 Different Ways of Creating Knowledge
1-2 The Elements of Theory in Sociology
1-3 Types of Analytical Schemes
1-4 Types of Propositional Schemes
1-5 Types of Modeling Schemes
1-6 Variations in Types of Theoretical Formats
1-7 Relations among Theoretical Approaches and Potential
for Building Theory
The Units of Voluntaristic Action
Parsons’ Conception of Action, Interaction, and
Institutionalization
Parsons’ Early Conception of Integration among
Systems of Action
Parsons’ Mechanism-Equilibrium Functional Analysis
Parsons’ Functional Imperativism or Requisite
Functionalism
Parsons’ Functional Imperativist View of Social
Systems
Parsons’ Cybernetic Hierarchy of Control
The Subsystems of the Human Condition
Merton’s Net Functional Balance Analysis
The Dialectical Causal Imagery
Overall Causal Imagery of Conflict Theory
Types of Knowledge, Interests, Media (and Functional
Needs)
Homans’s Image of Social Organization
Blau’s Image of Social Organization
Unilateral Monopoly
Unilateral Monopoly and Division of Labor
Closed Social Relations: Circle and Network
Intracategory Monopoly
Social Stratification Patterns
Network Centrality
The Causal Imagery of Role Theory
Blau’s Functional Imagery
Micro and Macro: Time, Space, and Number
Social Structure, Social System, and the Modalities of
Connection
The Dynamics of Agency
Key Elements of “Structuration Theory”

xvi
 LIST OF TABLES xvii

List of Tables
2-1 Requisites of System Levels 51
6-1 Marx’s Key Propositions 136
6-2 Simmel’s Propositions on Conflict Intensity 141
6-3 Simmel’s Propositions on the Functions of Conflict for
the Respective Parties 142
6-4 Simmel’s Propositions on the Functions of Conflict for
the Systemic Whole 143
Weber’s Propositions on Inequality and Conflict 148
Dahrendorf’s Abstract Propositions 159
Coser’s Propositions on the Causes of Conflict 169
Coser’s Propositions on the Violence of Conflict 171
Coser’s Propositions on the Duration of Conflict 172
Coser’s Propositions on the Functions of Conflict for
the Respective Parties 174
Coser’s. Propositions on the Functions of Conflict for
the Social Whole 175
Georg Simmel’s Exchange Principles 232
Homans’s Exchange Principles 246
Blau’s Implicit Exchange Principles 264
Blau’s Conditions for the Differentiation of Power in
Social Exchange 268
Blau’s Principles of Exchange Conflict 273
The Operant Propositions and Initial Corollaries 295
{The Initial Theorems 296
Convergence and Divergence in the Chicago and Iowa
Schools of Symbolic Interactionism 300
Others and Role Merger in One Situation 381
Others, Person, and Role in Multiple Settings 382
Individual Efforts at Role Merger 383
A Revised List of Blau’s “Axioms” 431
A Revised List of Blau’s Basic Theorems 431
Key Propositions on the Conditions Producing Talk
and Conversation 443
Key Propositions on the Conditions Producing Ritual
Activity 445
Key Propositions on Deference and Demeanor 447
Key Propositions on Class Cultures 448
Key Propositions on Sex Stratification 449
Key Propositions on Age Stratification 450
Key Propositions on Organizations 452
Key Propositions on the State, Economy, and Ideology 453
The Typology of Institutions 465
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 J . CHAPTERD

Pte. tne Natimeg. |

______ Sociological Theorizing _—_—__

IS A SCIENCE OF SOCIETY POSSIBLE?

The goal of sociology is to gain knowledge about the nature of human
organization. With such knowledge, it is possible to interpret social events
in ways that allow for an understanding of how and why these events
occur. Yet, I must caution at the very outset that there is widespread
disagreement in sociology about the proper way to develop knowledge
about the human universe. More than any other social science, sociologists
disagree on such fundamental issues as what kind of knowledge is possible,
what procedures should be followed in developing this knowledge, what
it is we should try to develop knowledge about, and what uses should be
made of the knowledge that we generate.
In the last few hundred years, a set of procedures called science has
gained ascendance in many disciplines as the best way to accumulate
knowledge of all phenomena in the universe. But such has not always
been the case, and even today, when science pervades every aspect of our
lives and our ways of looking at the world, there is still disagreement in
sociology over just what kind of science, if any, sociology can be. The
titular founder of sociology, Auguste Comte, recognized in the early 1800s
that the status of a “science of society” was precarious.! To defend sociology
from its many critics and to legitimate his claims that the emergence of

‘Auguste Comte, System of Positive Philosophy, vol. 1 (Paris: Bachelier, 1830). Subse-
quent portions were published between 1831-42. For a more detailed analysis of Comte’s
thought, see my and Leonard Beeghley’s, The Emergence of Sociological Theory (Homewood,
Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1981), Chapter 2.
2 CHAPTER 1 / THE NATURE OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIZING

FIGURE 1-1 Different Ways of Creating Knowledge

Is knowledge to
be empirical?

Yes No

Ideologies; or Religions; or
beliefs that state beliefs that state
Yes
the way the world the dictates of
should be supernatural forces
Is knowledge to :
be evaluative? Science; or the Logics; or the
belief that all rious systems of
knowledge is to je onin ,oak
No
reflect the actual ona te of
operation of the calculation
empirical world

sociology as a science was now possible, he posited a “law of the three

stages.” In the religious stage, interpretations of events are initially pro-
vided by religious beliefs or by reference to the activities of sacred and
supernatural forces. Out of religion comes a metaphysical stage in which
logic, mathematics, and other formal systems of reason came to dominate
how events were interpreted. And out of these gains in formal reasoning
in the metaphysical stage emerges the possibility for “positivism” or a
scientific stage, where formal statements are critically examined against
carefully collected facts. Comte argued that the accumulation of knowledge
about each domain of the universe—the physical, chemical, biological, and
finally, the social—passed successively through these three stages. Patterns
of human organization were to be the last such domain to move into the
positive stage; and in 1830, he trumpeted the call for the use of science
to develop knowledge about human affairs.
I mention Comte’s advocacy because the issues that he raised still
haunt sociology today. More than 150 years after Comte pronounced so-
ciology as in the positive phase, he is denounced in many quarters as
naive and just plain wrong. True, his point of view has many supporters,
including me, but his faith that there could be a “natural science of society”
is hardly shared by ali.
One way to gain some perspective on the question of sociology as a
Science 1s to examine Figure 1-1, where I have summarized the kinds of
belief systems that have been used to interpret events and to generate

"I have Ill:

(Glencoe, taken
Freethis phrasewhy
Pres f. A. R. Radcliffe-Brown’s,, A Natural Science of Society
 IS A SCIENCE OF SOCIETY POSSIBLE? 3

knowledge about human affairs.? The typology asks two basic questions:
(1) is the search for knowledge to be evaluative or neutral? and (2) is the
knowledge developed to pertain to actual empirical events and processes
or is it to be about nonempirical realities? In other words, should knowl-
edge tell us what should be or what is? and should it make reference to
the observable world or to other, less observable realms? If knowledge is
to tell us what should exist (and by implication, what should not occur)
in the empirical world, then it is ideological knowledge. If it informs us
about what should be but does not pertain to observable events, then the
knowledge is religious or about forces and beings in another realm of
existence. If knowledge is neither empirical nor evaluative, then it is a
formal system of logic, such as mathematics. And if it is about empirical
events and nonevaluative, then it is science.
I concede that this typology is crude, but it makes the essential point:
There are different ways to look at, interpret, and develop knowledge
about the world. Science is only one way. It is based upon the presumption
that knowledge can be value free, that it can explain the actual workings
of the empirical world, and that it can be revised on the basis of careful
observations of empirical events. These characteristics distinguish science
from other beliefs about how we should generate understanding and in-
sight.4 However, even this portrayal of science is questioned by many who
would regard it as rather idealized. For these critics, values always figure
into what we study. The empirical world is not “just there”; rather it is
filtered through concepts and presuppositions. And rarely are facts dis-
passionately collected to test theories.
And so, I must caution again. Many people, including a large number
of philosophers of science and professional sociologists, would question
my portrayal of scientific activity. For example, some would argue that
science is highly ideological because in depicting what is, it implicitly says

3] am borrowing the general idea from Talcott Parsons’, The Social System (New York:
Free Press, 1951). For another version of this typology, see my The Science of Human
Organization (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1985), Chapter 2.
“Among several fine introductory works on the nature of scientific theory, the discussion
in this chapter draws heavily upon Paul Davidson Reynolds’ excellent A Primer in Theory
Construction (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971). For excellent introductory works, see Ar-
thur L. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World,
1968), pp. 3-56; Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Harper &
Row, 1959); David Willer and Murray Webster, Jr., “Theoretical Concepts and Observables,”
American Sociological Review 35 (August 1970), pp. 748-57; Hans Zetterberg, On Theory
and Verification in Sociology, 3d ed. (Totowa, N.J.. Bedminister Press, 1965); Jerald Hage,
Techniques and Problems of Theory Construction in Sociology (New York: John Wiley &
Sons, 1972); Walter L. Wallace, The Logic of Science in Sociology (Chicago: Aldine Pub-
lishing, 1971); Robert Dubin, Theory Building (New York: Free Press, 1969); Jack Gibbs,
Sociological Theory Construction (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press, 1972); Herbert M. Blalock,
Jr., Theory Construction: From Verbal to Mathematical Formulations (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969); Nicholas C. Mullins, The Art of Theory: Construction and Use
(New York: Harper & Row, 1971).
 IZING
4 CHAPTER 1 / THE NATURE OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEOR

that present conditions in society must always be the way things are. In
so doing, science is an ideology supporting the status quo.° It makes the
present seem invariant and lawlike, thereby arresting our imagination
about other possibilities for the organization of humans in society. But
these kinds of criticisms anticipate what will come in later chapters. For
the present, I simply want to emphasize that if we follow Comte’s “law
of the three stages” or the simple typology in Figure 1-1, others will
disagree with the conclusion that sociology can be a science that is easily
distinguished from other forms of knowledge.®
The fact that there is disagreement over sociology’s status as a science
makes a review of sociological theory highly problematic, for the vehicle
for developing scientific knowledge is theory. Scientific theory provides
an interpretation of events, but this interpretation must be constantly
checked and rechecked against the empirical facts. Yet, if the whole en-
terprise of science is questioned, then sociological theories that tell us
how and why events occur will be very diverse. Depending upon what
kind of science, if any, that sociology is considered to be, our theories
will vary. Some theories will look like those that Auguste Comte envi-
sioned—that is, very much like those in the natural sciences. Other the-
oretical approaches will be very different because they are formulated by
those who have serious reservations about a social science that fits neatly
into the lower left box in Figure 1-1.
These considerations present me with very real problems in defining
theory in sociology, but undaunted, let me try to present a minimal por-
trayal of what I think all sociological theories have in common. Then, we
can return to the controversial issues that divide theorists and that make
for different kinds of theoretical activity in sociology.

THE ELEMENTS OF THEORY

Theory is a mental activity. As I have already indicated, it is a process
of developing ideas that can allow us to explain how and why events occur.

‘See Chapter 9 on critical theory for the details of this argument.

; *For example, there is a growing conviction among some sociologists that science is much
like any other thought system in that it is devoted to sustaining a particular vision, among
a community of individuals called scientists, of what is “really real.” Science simply provides
one interesting way of constructing and maintaining a vision of reality, but there are
other,
equally valid views among different communities of individuals. Obviously, I do
not accept
this argument, but I will explore it in more detail in various chapters. For
some interesting
pre wr of the issues, see Edward A. Tiryakian, “Existential Phenomenology and the
oa ee a radition,” American Sociological Review 30 (October 1965), pp. 674-88; J. C.
romane Typification, Typologies, and Sociological Theory,” Social Forces 48 (Septem-
je ser), oe. 1; Alfred Schutz, “Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences,”
poe of Philosophy 51 (April 1954), pp. 257-73; Harold Garfinkel, Studies in Ethno-
ethodology (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967); George Psathas, “Ethnomethods
and Phenomenology,” Social Research 35 (September 1968), pp. 500-520;
Don H. Zim-
Hews ma Melvin Pollner, “The Everyday World as a Phenomenon,” in
Understanding
+3 — ife, ed. J. D. Douglas (Chicago: Aldine Publishing,
wer merman and D. Lawrence Wieder, “Ethnomethodology 1970), pp. 80-103; and Don
and the Problem of Order,”
in Understanding Everyday Life, ed. J. D. Douglas, pp. 285-95.
.
 THE ELEMENTS OF THEORY 5

Theory is constructed with several basic elements or building blocks: (1)

concepts, (2) variables, (3) statements, and (4) formats. Although there
are many divergent claims about what theory is or should be, these four
elements are common to all of them. Let me examine each of these ele-
ments in more detail.

Concepts: The Basic Building Blocks of Theory

Theories are built from concepts. Most generally, concepts denote phe-
nomena; in so doing, they isolate features of the world that are considered,
for the moment at hand, important. For example, notions of atoms, pro-
tons, neutrons, and the like are concepts, pointing to and isolating phe-
nomena for certain analytical purposes. Familiar sociological -concepts
would include group, formal organization, power, stratification, interac-
tion, norm, role, status, and socialization. Each term is a concept that
embraces aspects of the social world that are considered essential for a
particular purpose.
Concepts are constructed from definitions. A definition is a system
of terms, such as the sentences of a language, the symbols of logic, or the
notation of mathematics, that inform investigators as to the phenomenon
denoted by a concept. For example, the concept conflict only has meaning
when it is defined. One possible definition might be: Conflict is interaction
among social units in which one unit seeks to prevent the other from
realizing its goals. Such a definition allows us to visualize the phenomenon
that is denoted by the concept. It enables all investigators to “see the
same thing” and to understand what it is that is being studied.
Thus, concepts that are useful in building theory have a special char-
acteristic: they strive to communicate a uniform meaning to all those who
use them. However, since concepts are frequently expressed with the words
of everyday language, it is difficult to avoid words that connote varied
meanings—and hence point to different phenomena—for varying groups
of scientists. It is for this reason that many concepts in science are ex-
pressed in technical or more “neutral” languages, such as the symbols of
mathematics. In sociology, expression of concepts in such special lan-
guages is sometimes not only impossible but also undesirable. Hence, the
verbal symbols used to develop a concept must be defined as precisely as
possible in order that they point to the same phenomena for all inves-
tigators.’? Although perfect consensus may never be attained with con-
ventional language, a body of theory rests on the premise that scholars
will do their best to define concepts unambiguously.
I should stress that the concepts of theory reveal a special charac-
teristic: abstractness.* Some concepts pertain to concrete phenomena at

7For more detailed work on concept formation, see Carl G. Hempel, Fundamentals of
Concept Formation in Empirical Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952).
*For a useful and insightful critique of sociology’s inability to generate abstract concepts
and theory, see David and Judith Willer, Systematic Empiricism: Critique of a Pseudoscience
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973).
 IZING
6 CHAPTER 1 / THE NATURE OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEOR

specific times and locations. Other more abstract concepts point to phe-
nomena that are not related to concrete times or locations. For example,
in the context of small-group research, concrete concepts would refer to
the persistent interactions of particular individuals, whereas an abstract
conceptualization of such phenomena would refer to those general prop-
erties of face-to-face groups, which are not tied to particular individuals
interacting at a specified time and location. Whereas abstract concepts
are not tied to a specific context, concrete concepts are. In building theory,
abstract concepts are crucial, although we will see shortly that theorists
disagree considerably on this issue.
Abstractness poses a problem: how do we attach abstract concepts to
the ongoing, everyday world of events? While it is essential that some of
the concepts of theory transcend specific times and places, it is equally
- critical that there be procedures for making these abstract concepts rel-
evant to observable situations and occurrences. After all, the utility of an
abstract concept can only be demonstrated when the concept is brought
to bear on some specific empirical problem encountered by investigators;
otherwise, concepts remain detached from the very processes they are
supposed to help investigators understand. Just how to actach concepts
to empirical processes, or the workings of the real world, is an area of
great controversy in sociology. Some argue for very formal procedures for
attaching concepts to empirical events. Those of this persuasion argue
that abstract concepts should be accompanied by a series of statements
known as operational definitions, which are sets of procedural instructions
telling investigators how to go about discerning phenomena in the real
world that are denoted by an abstract concept. Others argue that the
nature of our concepts in sociology precludes such formalistic exercises.
At best, concepts can be only sensitizing devices that must change with
alterations of social reality; and so, we can only intuitively and provi-
sionally apply abstract concepts to the actual flow of events. To emulate
the natural sciences in an effort to develop formal operations for attaching
concepts to reality is to ignore the fact that social reality is changeable;
it does not reveal invariant properties like the other domains of the uni-
verse.® And thus, to think that abstract concepts denote enduring and
invariant properties of the social universe and to presume, therefore, that
the concept itself will never need to be changed is, at best, naive.'°

; = ed of this line of argument see Herbert Blumer, Symbolic Interaction: Per-

N . Palas Method (Englewood Cliffs, N..l.: Prentice-Hall, 1969); or Anthony Giddens,
ew Mules of Sociological Method (New ‘Yérk: Basic Books, 1977).
10

Sociolays Te ee see Jonathan H. Turner, “Toward a Social Physics: Reducing

1979-80), pp mre Inhibitions,” Humboldt Journal of Social Relations 7 (Fall/Winter
(1981): “Som p ~ ; Returning to Social Physics,” Perspectives in Social Theory, vol. 2,
» Some Problematic Trends in Sociological Theorizing,” The Wisconsin Sociologist
15 (Spring/Summer 1978)
T a . p . 80-88; d S S
poe 7 v. fe re
(New York: Columbia University Dene, 180050 ie ae
 THE ELEMENTS OF THEORY 7

And so the debate rages, taking many different turns. I need not go
into detail here, since these issues will be brought out again and again as
I move into the substance of sociological theory in subsequent chapters.
For the present, I only want to draw the approximate lines of battle.

Variables as an Important Type of Concept

When used to build theory, two general types of concepts can be distin-
guished: (1) those that simply label phenomena and (2) those that refer
to phenomena that differ in degree.'! Concepts that merely label phe-
nomena would include such commonly employed abstractions as dog, cat,
group, social class, and star. When stated in this way, none of these
concepts reveal the ways in which the phenomena they denote vary in
terms of properties such as size, weight, density, velocity, cohesiveness,
or any of the many criteria used to inform investigators about differences
in degree among phenomena.
Those who believe, as I do, that sociology can be like other sciences
prefer concepts that are translated into variables—that is, into states that
vary. We want to know the variable properties—size, degree, intensity,
amount, and so forth—of events denoted by a concept. For example, to
note that an aggregate of people is a group does not indicate what type
of group it is or how it compares with other groups in terms of such
criteria as size, differentiation, and cohesiveness. And so for some, the
concepts of scientific theory should denote the variable features of the
world. To understand events requires that we visualize how variation in
one phenomenon is related to variation in another. Others, who are less
enamored by efforts to make sociology a natural science, are less com-
pulsive about translating concepts into variables. They are far more in-
terested in whether or not concepts sensitize and alert investigators to
important processes than they are in converting each concept into a met-
ric that varies in some measurable way. They are not, of course, against
the conversion of ideas into variables, but they are cautious about efforts
to translate each and every concept into a metric.

Theoretical Statements and Formats

To be useful, the concepts of theory must be connected to each other.
Such connections among concepts constitute theoretical statements. These
statements specify the way in which events denoted by concepts are

“Reynolds, Primer in Theory Construction, p. 57; see also Stinchcombe, Constructing

Social Theories, pp. 38-47 for a discussion of how concepts not only point to variable
properties of phenomena but also to the interaction effects of interrelated phenomena. For
an interesting discussion of the importance of variable concepts and for guidelines on how
to use them, see Hage, Techniques and Problems of Theory Construction.
6 CHAPTER 1 / THE NATURE OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIZING

FIGURE 1-2 The Elements of Theory in Sociology

Meta-theoretical schemes

/Analytical schemes

Definitions —» Concepts —> Statements —+s» Formats

™« Propositional schemes

Modeling schemes

interrelated, and at the same time, they provide an interpretation of how

and why events should be connected to each other. When these theoretical
statements are grouped together, they constitute what I term a theoretical
format. I use the word format because it is general and can describe many
different ways to organize theoretical statements. Indeed, in sociological
theory, there is relatively little consensus over just how to organize
theoretical statements into a format. And in fact, much of the theoretical
controversy in sociology revolves around differences over the best way to
develop theoretical statements and to group them together into a format.
Depending on one’s views about what kind of science, if any, sociology
can be, the structure of theoretical statements and their organization into
formats differs dramatically. Let me review the range of opinion on the
matter. :
I think that there are four basic approaches in sociological theory for
generating theoretical statements and formats: (1) meta-theoretical
schemes, (2) analytical schemes, (3) propositional schemes, and (4) mod-
eling schemes. Figure 1-2 summarizes the relations among these schemes
and the basic elements of theory. Concepts are constructed from defini-
tions; theoretical statements link concepts together; and statements are
organized into four basic types of formats. However, these four formats
can be executed in a variety of ways, and so in reality, there are more
than just four strategies for developing theoretical statements and for-
mats. Moreover, these various strategies are not always mutually exclu-
sive, for in executing one of them, we are often led to another as a kind
of “next step” in building theory. Yet—and this is a point that I think is
crucial—these various approaches are often viewed as antagonistic; and
the proponents of each strategy have spilled a great deal of ink sustaining
the antagonism. Moreover, even within a particular type of format there
is constant battle over the best way to develop theory. For me, this
ac-
rimony represents a great tragedy because in a mature science—which,
sad to say, sociology is not—these approaches are viewed as highly com-
patible. Before pursuing this point further, I will
delineate in more detail
each of these approaches.
 THE ELEMENTS OF THEORY g

Meta-theoretical schemes. This kind of theoretical activity is

more comprehensive than ordinary theory. Meta-theoretical schemes are
not, by themselves, theories that explain specific classes of events; rather,
they explicate the basic issues that a theory must address. In many so-
ciological circles, meta-theory is considered an essential prerequisite to
adequate theory building, even though the dictionary definition of “meta”
emphasizes “occurring later” and “in succession” to previous activities.!°
Furthermore, in most other sciences, meta-theoretical reflection has oc-
curred after a body-of formal theoretical statements has been developed.
It is typically after a science has used a number of theoretical statements
and formats successfully that scholars begin to ask: What are the under-
lying assumptions about the universe contained in these statements? What
strategies are demanded by, or precluded from, these statements and their
organization into formats? What kind of knowledge is generated by these
statements and formats, and conversely, what is ignored? In sociological
theory, however, advocates of meta-theory usually emphasize that we
cannot develop theory until we have resolved these more fundamental
epistemological and metaphysical questions.
My opinion is that such meta-theorizing has put the cart before the
horse, but I emphasize that my opinion is probably in the minority among
social theorists. For those who emphasize meta-theory, several prelimi-
nary issues must be resolved. These include: (1) What is the basic nature
of human activity about which we must develop theory? For example,
what is the basic nature of human beings? What is the fundamental nature
of society? What is the fundamental nature of the bonds that connect
people to each other and to society? (2) What is the appropriate way to
develop theory, and what kind of theory is possible? For instance, can
we build highly formal systems of abstract laws, as in physics, or must
we be content with general concepts that simply sensitize and orient us
to important processes? Can we rigorously test theories with precise mea-
surement procedures, or must we use theories as interpretative frame-
works that cannot be tested by the same procedures, as in the natural
sciences? (3) What is the critical problem on which social theory should
concentrate? For instance, should we examine the processes of social
integration, or must we concentrate on social conflict? Should we focus
on the nature of social action among individuals, or is the major question
one of structures of organization? Should we stress the power of ideas,
like values and beliefs, or must we focus on the material conditions of
people’s existence?
A great deal of what is defined as sociological theory involves trying
to answer these questions. The old philosophical debates—idealism versus

12For a forceful and scholarly advocacy of this point, see Jeffrey C. Alexander, Theoretical
Logic in Sociology, 4 vols. (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1982-1984).
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, Mass.: G & C Merriman, 1976).
10 CHAPTER 1 / THE NATURE OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIZING

materialism, induction versus deduction, causation versus association,

subjectivism versus objectivism, and so on—are reevoked and analyzed
with respect to social reality. At times, meta-theorizing has been true to
the meaning of meta and has involved a reanalysis of previous scholars’
ideas in light of these philosophical issues.* The favorite targets of such
analyses are Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Emile Durkheim, and in recent
decades, Talcott Parsons (the subject of Chapter 3). The idea behind
reanalysis is to summarize the metaphysical and epistemological as-
sumptions of the scholars’ work and to show where the schemes went
wrong and where they still have utility. Furthermore, on the basis of this
assessment, there are some recommendations in reanalyses as to how we
should go about building theory and about what this theory should be.
In my view, such reanalysis can be useful when it stimulates actual
theory—that is, efforts to explain social events. However, my sense is that
meta-theorizing often gets bogged down in weighty philosophical matters
and immobilizes theory building. The enduring philosophical questions
persist, I would imagine, because they are not resolvable. My feeling is
that one just must take a stand on the issues and see what kinds of insights
can be generated. But meta-theory often stymies as much as stimulates
theoretical activity because it embroils theorists in inherently unresolv-
able and always debatable controversies. Of course, my opinion is not
shared by others, and for our present purposes, the more important con-
clusion is that a great deal of sociological theory is, in fact, meta-theo-
retical activity.

Analytical schemes. Much theoretical activity in sociology con-

sists of concepts organized into a typology or classification scheme. Each
concept denotes a basic property of the social universe; and then the
concepts themselves are organized in a typology.’® For example, an an-
alytical scheme might assert that “action” is a critical property of the
universe; then, it would classify action as one of four types. In turn, social
structures might be classified in terms of the prevailing type of action
among its participants. To take another example from functional analysis,
which Iwill turn to in the next chapter, a social system might be visualized
as having to meet four basic needs to persist (the number of needs could
be one, two, three, or a dozen, depending upon the theorist). Structures
and processes are then classified in terms of which needs they meet.
There are many different varieties of analytical schemes, but they
share an emphasis on typologizing. The concepts of the scheme chop up

‘ Riconageervl work is more in this tradition. See also Richard Minch, Theory of Action:
econstructing the Contributions of Talcott Parsons, Emile Durkheim, and MaxWeber
Eeehten Poe 1982). I have translated
the German title and emphasized this work
cause it will soon be out in an English
translation.
1
re 3ae Parsons’ ; work is; of this? nature, as we will see in the next chapter.
See also
 THE ELEMENTS OF THEORY 11

the universe; then, the ordering of the concepts into a typology gives the
social world a sense of order. Explanation of an empirical event comes
whenever a place in the classificatory scheme can be found for the em-
pirical event. For example, if one is using an “action theoretical frame-
work” with four types of action, explanation occurs when behavior can
be classified as one of these four types. I have oversimplified here, but
the general point is, I think, correct: analytical schemes explain empirical
events by finding their niche in a typology.
There are, however, wide variations in the nature of the typologies
in analytical schemes. I think that there are two basic types: naturalistic/
positivistic schemes, which try to develop a tightly woven system of cat-
egories that is presumed to capture the way in which the invariant prop-
erties of the universe are ordered!*; and descriptive/sensitizing schemes,
which are more loosely assembled congeries of concepts intended only
to sensitize and orient researchers to certain critical processes.!’
Figure 1-3 summarizes these two types of analytical approaches. Natur-
alistic/positivistic schemes assume that there are timeless and universal
processes in the social universe, much as there are in the physical and
biological realms. The goal is to create an abstract conceptual typology
that is isomorphic with these timeless processes. In contrast, déscriptive/
sensitizing schemes are typically more skeptical about the timeless quality
of social affairs. Instead, they argue that concepts and their linkages must
always be provisional and sensitizing because the nature of human activity
is to change those very arrangements denoted by the organization of
concepts into theoretical statements. Hence, except for certain very gen-
eral conceptual categories, the scheme must be flexible and capable of
being revised as circumstances in the empirical world change. At best,
then, explanation is simply rendering an interpretation of events by seeing
them as an instance or example of the provisional and sensitizing concepts
in the scheme.
Often it is argued that analytical schemes are a necessary prerequisite
for developing other forms of theory. Until one has a scheme that orga-
nizes the properties of the universe, it is difficult to develop propositions
and models about specific events. For without the general analytical
framework, it is asked by proponents of this view, how can a theorist or
researcher know what to examine?

Propositional schemes. A proposition is a theoretical statement

that specifies the connection between two or more variables. It tells us
how variation in one concept is accounted for by variation in another.
For example, the propositional statement, “group solidarity is a positive

1% Parsons’ and Minch’s work represent this approach.

“Anthony Giddens’ work represents this alternative. See his The Construction of Society
(Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1984). See also Chapter 22.
 THEORIZING
12 CHAPTER 1 / THE NATURE OF SOCIOLOGICAL

FIGURE 1-3 Typeseof Analytical Schemes

ietes e£6 eR
a
Naturalistic/Positivistic:

Abstract Abstract — Abstract

category 1 category 2 category 3
Explanation =
| ue | and finding the place
in the typology of
an empirical event
Abstract Abstract Abstract
category 4 category 5 category n

<=—-» =. Specify with concepts processes

that link clearly defined
conceptual categories

Sensitizing/Descriptive

Abstract
Abstract «————~> category 2
-~ category 1
7 alt pete ¥ Explanation =
Z interpreting events
Abstract” a=“ A by invoking various
category n =. Te Abstract combinations of
is _y category 3 categories
x Oe it -
Abstract
category 4

«——-+: Loose and flexible linkages

among sensitizing
conceptual. categories

function of external conflict with other groups,” says that as group conflict
increases so does the internal sense of solidarity among members of the
respective groups involved in the conflict. Thus, two properties of the
social universe denoted by variable concepts, “group solidarity” and “con-
flict,” are connected by the proposition that as one increases in value, so
does the other.
Propositional schemes vary perhaps the most of all theoretical ap-
proaches. They vary primarily along two dimensions: (1) the level of
abstraction and (2) the way propositions are organized into formats. Some
are highly abstract and contain concepts that do not denote any particular
case but all cases of a type (for example, group solidarity and conflict are
abstract because no particular empirical instance of conflict and solidarity
is addressed). In contrast, other propositional systems are tied to empirical
facts and simply summarize relations among events in a particular case
(for example, as World War II progressed, nationalism in America in-
 THE ELEMENTS OF THEORY 13

creased). Not only do propositional schemes vary in terms of abstractness

but also by virtue of how propositions are laced together into a format.
Some are woven together by very explicit rules; others are merely loose
bunches or congeries of propositions.
I think that by using these two dimensions, several different types of
propositional schemes can be isolated: (a) axiomatic formats, (b) formal
formats, and (c) various empirical formats. The first two—(a) and (b)—
are clearly theoretical formats, whereas some types of (c) are simply re-
search findings that test theories. But I emphasize, these more empirical
types of propositional schemes are often considered theory by practicing
sociologists, and so, I have included them for our discussion here.
(a) An axiomatic organization of theoretical statements involves the
following elements. First, it contains a set of concepts. Some of the con-
cepts are highly abstract; others, more concrete. Second, there is always
a set of existence statements that describe those types and classes of
situations in which the concepts and the propositions that incorporate
them apply. These existence statements make up what is usually called
the scope conditions of the theory. Third, and most nearly unique to the
axiomatic format, propositional statements are stated in a hierarchical
order. At the top of the hierarchy are axioms, or highly abstract state-
ments, from which all other theoretical statements are logically derived.
These latter statements are usually called theorems and are logically de-
rived in accordance with varying rules from the more abstract axioms.
The selection of axioms is, in reality, a somewhat arbitrary matter, but
usually they are selected with several criteria in mind. The axioms should
be consistent with one another, although they do not have to be logically
interrelated. The axioms should be highly abstract; they should state
relationships among abstract concepts. These relationships should be law-
like in that the more concrete theorems derived from them have not been
disproved by empirical investigation. And the axioms should have an
intuitive plausibility in that their truth appears to be self-evident.
The end result of tight conformity to axiomatic principles is an in-
ventory or set of interrelated propositions, each derivable from at least
one axiom and usually more abstract theorems. There are several advan-
tages to this form of theory construction. First, highly abstract concepts,
encompassing a broad range of related phenomena, can be employed.
These abstract concepts do not have to be directly measurable since they
are logically tied to more specific and measurable propositions that, when
empirically tested, can indirectly subject the more abstract propositions
and the axioms to empirical tests. Thus, by virtue of this logical inter-
relatedness of the propositions and axioms, research can be more efficient
since the failure to refute a particular proposition lends credence to other
propositions and to the axioms. Second, the use of a logical system to
derive propositions from abstract axioms can also generate additional
14 CHAPTER 1 / THE NATURE OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIZING

propositions that point to previously unknown or unanticipated relation-

ships among social phenomena.
But I emphasize that there are some fatal limitations on the use of
axiomatic theory in sociology. In terms of strict adherence to the rules
of deduction (the details of which are not critical for my purposes here),
most interesting concepts and propositions in sociology cannot be legit-
imately employed because the concepts are not stated with sufficient pre-
cision and because they cannot be incorporated into propositions that
state unambiguously the relationship between concepts. Axiomatic theory
also requires controls on all potential extraneous variables so that the
tight logical system of deduction from axiom to empirical reality is not
contaminated by extraneous factors. Sociologists can rarely create such
controls.!8 Thus, axiomatic theory can be used only when very precise
definitions of concepts exist, when concepts are organized into proposi-
tions using a precise calculus that specifies relations unambiguously, and
when the contaminating effects of extraneous variables are eliminated.
These limitations are often ignored in propositional theory building,
and the language of axiomatic theory is employed (axioms, theorems,
corollaries, and the like); but these efforts are, at best, pseudoaxiomatic
schemes.’ In fact, I think it is best to call them formal propositional
schemes”—the second type of proposition strategy listed earlier.
(b) Formal theories are, in essence, watered down versions of axio-
matic schemes. The idea is to develop highly abstract propositions that
are used to explain some empirical event. The propositions are usually
grouped together and seen as higher order laws; and the goal of explanation
is to see empirical events as an instance or example of this “covering
law.” Deductions from the law are made, but they are much looser, rarely
conforming to the strict rules of axiomatic theory. Moreover, there is a
recognition that extraneous variables can not always be excluded, and so,
the propositions usually have the disclaimer, “other things being equal.”
That is, if other forces do not impinge, then the relationship among
concepts in the proposition should hold true. For example, my earlier
example of the relationship between conflict and solidarity might be one
abstract proposition in a formal system. Thus, a. formal scheme might
say, “Other things being equal, group solidarity is a positive function of
conflict.” Then, we would use this law to explain some empirical event,
say, for instance, Werld War II (the conflict variable) and nationalism
in America (the solidarity variable). And we might find an exception to

poe more details of this argument, see Lee Freese, ‘Formal Theoriz
ing,” Annual Review
$ af em 6 (1980), pp. 187-212 and Herbert L. Costner and Robert K. Leik, “Deductions
des Ayr Theory,” American Sociological Review 29 (December 1964), pp. 19-35.
Theoryee,of tor example
Social , Peter
Structu Blau’s
re (New excellen
Yok: Ban t cle
Inequal ity
nen and Heterogeneity:
ity: A Primiti
imiti ve
See Freese.
 THE ELEMENTS OF THEORY 15

our rule or law, such as America’s involvement in the Vietnam War, that
contradicts the principle, forcing its revision or the recognition that “all
things were not equal.” In this case, we might revise the principle by
stating a condition under which it holds true: when parties to a conflict.
perceive the conflict as a threat to their welfare, then the level of solidarity
of groups is a positive function of their degree of conflict. Thus, the
Vietnam War did not produce internal solidarity in America because it
was not defined as a threat to the general welfare (whereas for the North
Vietnamese, it was a threat and produced solidarity).
The essential idea here is that in formal theory, an effort is made to
create abstract principles. These principles are often clustered together
to form a group of laws from which we make rather loose deductions to
explain empirical events. Much like axiomatic systems, formal systems
are hierarchical, but the restrictions of axiomatic theory are relaxed con-
siderably. Most propositional schemes in sociological. theorizing are,
therefore, of this formal type.
(c) Yet, much of what is defined as theory in sociology is more em-
pirical. These empirical formats consist of generalizations from specific
events in particular empirical contexts. For example Golden’s Law states
that ‘‘as industrialization increases, the level of literacy in the population
increases.” Such a proposition is not very abstract; it is filled with em-
pirical content—industrialization and literacy. Moreover, it is not about
a timeless process, since industrialization is only a few hundred years old
and literacy emerged, at best, only 15,000 years ago. There are many such
generalizations in sociology that are considered theoretical. They repre-
sent statements of empirical regularities that scholars think are important
to understand. Indeed, most substantive areas and subfields of sociology
are filled with these kinds of propositions.
Strictly speaking, however, these are not theoretical. They are too
tied to empirical contexts. In fact, they are generalizations that are in
need of a theory to explain them. Yet, I caution that my opinion about
such empirical generalizations is not shared by all.. And if we ask scholars _
working in substantive areas if their generalizations are theory, a good
many would answer affirmatively.
There are other kinds of empirical generalizations, however, that raise
fewer suspicions about their theoretical merits. These are often termed
middle-range theories, as we will see in Chapter 4, because they are more
abstract than a research finding and because their empirical content per-
tains to variables that are also found in other domains of social reality.’
For example, a series of middle-range propositions from the complex or-
ganization’s literature might be stated: ‘Increasing size of a bureaucratic

"See Chapter 4 on Robert K. Merton’s work. In particular, consult his Social Theory
and Social Structure (New York: Free Press, 1975).
16 CHAPTER 1 / THE NATURE OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIZING

organization is positively related to (a) increases in the complexity (dif-

ferentiation) of its structure, (b) increases in the reliance on formal rules
and regulations, (c) increases in the decentralization of authority, and (d)
increases in span of control for each center of authority.”* These prin-
ciples (the truth of which is not at issue here) are more abstract than
Golden’s Law because they denote a whole class of phenomena—organi-
zations. They also deal with more generic variables—size, differentiation,
centralization of power, spans of control, rules, and regulations—that have
existed in all times and all places. Moreover, these variables could be
stated more abstractly to apply to all organized social systems, not just
bureaucratic organizations. For instance, I can visualize a more abstract
law that states: “Increasing size of a social system is positively related to
(a) increases in levels of system differentiation, (b) increases in the cod-
ification of norms, (c) increases in the decentralization of power, and (d)
increases in the spans of control for each center of power.” Now, I am
not asserting that these propositions are true, but I see them as interesting
laws that can be tested out in many diverse empirical contexts, not just
bureaucratic organizations. The central point here is that some empirical
generalizations have :.ore theoretical potential than others. If their var-
iables are relatively abstract and if they pertain to basic and fundamental
properties of the social universe that exist in other substantive areas of
inquiry, then it is more reasonable, I believe, to consider them theoretical.
In sum, then, there are three basic kinds of propositional schemes:
axiomatic, formal, and various types of empirical generalizations. These
propositional schemes are summarized in Figure 1-4. Although axiomatic
formats are elegant and powerful, sociological variables and research typ-
ically cannot conform to their restrictions. Instead, we must rely upon
formal formats that generate propositions stating abstract relations among
variables and then make loosely structured “deductions” to specific em-
pirical cases. Finally, there are empirical formats that consist of gener-
alizations from particular substantive areas; and these are often consid-
ered theories of that area. Some of these theories are little more than
summaries of research findings that require a theory to explain them.
Others are more middle range and have more potential as theory because
they are more abstract and pertain to more generic classes of variables.

Modeling schemes. At times, it is useful to draw a picture of social

events. Some models are drawn with neutral languages, such as mathe-
matics in which the equation is presumed to map and represent
empirical

a e
wel ve tem this example from Peter M. Blau’s “Applications of aMacrosocio
net n Mathmatizche Analyse von Organisationsstrukktaren logical
nationale Wissenschaftliche Facnkonferenz, vol. und Prozessen (Inter-
5, March 1981).
 THE ELEMENTS OF THEORY 17

FIGURE 1-4 Types of Propositional Schemes

In as eee a
Axiomatic:

Axioms

”
:
o =
2 Theorems pits
c
~ ;
cUgy
o**y=
oO aS [© ie| -
g g 50 Explanation =
wake x= os j
Fe Propositions to G9 . neces begeah of .
| connect with data 2 Be ie = ed re
c ofE6 - :
= { ox abstract axioms
30) Ooo 8
. @no
2 Hypothesis ZEo
iT? oO 2 =
=
" aa

Empirical regularity

Formal:

Abstract formal
principles

2 { ee
7) ~

€ a S223
5 connect with data cSoa 9 subsumption of
2 t %25¢£ empirical regularity
%, ZEs6 under abstract
£ ' 35 Sa principle or
es Hypothesis 9% => principles
© 6% 2q
Oo } On ED
c o © ® 5

Empirical regularity

processes.” I prefer to visualize such equations as propositions (formal

statements of relations among variables) unless they can be used to gen-
erate a picture or some form of graphic representation of processes. There
is no clear consensus on what a model is, but in sociological theory, there
is a range of activity that involves representing concepts and their relations
as a “picture” that models what are considered the important elements

*Actually, these are typically “regression equations” and would not constitute modeling
as I think it should be defined. A series of differential equations, especially as they are
simulated or otherwise graphically represented, would constitute a model.
 IZING
18 CHAPTER 1 / THE NATURE OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEOR

e
a

FIGURE 1-4 (concluded)

Middle-range:

General statement of
scope conditions for
propositions
iti 4 825eC
can
' = = ;
Se 2 ! 1 £259 Explanation =
oa® ®6%6 _ ability to see
r Some effort to make oa sO specific empirical
oS oe
to abstract statemen ts ©Foes
Dd w P ? as one
regularity
28 5 + | S458 of a general class
as5 EMQs * — of regularities for
o5° Formal statement of ° go this type of
oc= empirical regularities =EUn phenomena
Eos 2% G2
a SBBE
Jo
Specific empirical
findings

Empirical generalization:

e More general state- -

26 ments of relations & Contain
23 among variables = ya :
a S ability to generalize
= 9 tal 3 beyond one specific
2s — A) research finding
Sc |. Specific research °
rn finding 2

of a social process. Perhaps I am being too restrictive here, but my purpose

is to distinguish an important type of theoretical activity.
A model, then, is a diagrammatic representation of social events. The
diagrammatic elements of any model include: (1) concepts that denote
and highlight certain features of the universe; (2) the arrangement of
these cofcepts in visual space so as to reflect the ordering of events in
the universe; and (3) symbols that mark the connections among concepts,
such as lines, arrows, vectors, and other ways that represent connections
among variables. The elements of a model may be weighted in some way
or they may be sequentially organized to express events over time or they
may represent complex patterns of relations, such as lag effects, threshold
effects, feedback loops, mutual interactions, cycles, and other potential
ways that properties of the universe affect each other.24
In sociology, I think that most diagrammatic models are constructed
to emphasize the causal connections among properties of the universe.

“A good example of such models is in my Societal Stratification. For example

s of more
ermapirical, yet still analytical, mod | , aed
York: McGraw-Hill, 1982). els, see Gerhard and Jean Lenski, Human Societies (New
 THE ELEMENTS OF THEORY 19

That is, they are designed to show how changes in the values of one set
of variables are related to changes in the values of other variables. Models
are typically constructed when there are numerous variables whose causal
interrelations an investigator wants to highlight.
With the issue far from clear, my sense is that sociologists generally
construct two different types of models, which I will term analytical models
and causal models. This distinction is, I admit, somewhat arbitrary, but
I think that it is a necessary one if we are to appreciate the kinds of
models that are constructed in sociology. The basis for making this dis-
tinction is twofold: First, some models are more abstract than others in
that the concepts in them are not tied to any particular case, whereas
other models reveal concepts that simply summarize statistically relations
among variables in a particular data set. Secondly, more abstract models
almost always reveal more complexity in their representation of causal
connections among variables. That is, one will find feedback loops, cycles,
mutual effects, and other connective representations that complicate the
causal connections among the variables in the model and make them
difficult to summarize with simple statistics. In contrast, the less abstract
models typically depict a clear causal sequence among empirical varia-
bles. They typically reveal independent variables that effect variation
in some dependent variable; and if the model is more complex, it might
also highlight intervening variables and perhaps even some interaction
effects among the variables.
Thus, analytical models are more abstract; they highlight more generic
properties of the universe; and they portray a complex set of connections
among variables. In contrast, causal models are more empirically grounded;
they are more likely to devote particular properties of a specific empirical
case; and they are likely to present a simple lineal view of causality. These
modeling strategies are summarized in Figure 1-5.
Causal models are typically drawn in order to provide a more detailed
interpretation of an empirical generalization. They are designed to sort
out the respective influences of variables, usually in some temporal se-
quence, as they operate on some dependent variable of interest. At times,
a causal model becomes a way of representing the elements of a middle-
range theory so as to connect these elements to the particulars of a specific
empirical context. For example, if we wanted to know why the size of a
bureaucratic organization is related to its complexity of structure in a
particular empirical case of a growing organization, we might translate
the more abstract variables of size and complexity into specific empirical
indicators and perhaps try to introduce other variables that also influence
the relationship between size and complexity in this empirical case. The

*The “path analysis” that was so popular in American sociology in the 1970s is a good
example of such modeling techniques.
 ICAL THEORIZING
20 CHAPTER 1 / THE NATURE OF SOCIOLOG

FIGURE 1-5 Types of Modeling Schemes

Analytical models:
v pares
pares2

| Explanation =
Abstract te danni ability to map crucial
property 1 ° danni
3 connections (perhaps
weighted) among basic
properties of a
+
specific class of
er 6) process or phenomenon
er 56)

<—> = Lines can be weighted and signed

Causal models:

Empirical
variable 1

Explanation =
tracing of causal connection:
among measured variables
accounting for variation in
the occurrence of interest

Empirical
variable 2

<—— = Lines usually state a statistical association among variables

causal model thus becomes a way to represent with more clarity the em
pirical association between size and complexity in a specific context.”
Analytical models are usually drawn to specify the relations amon,
more abstract and generic processes. Often they are used to delineate th
processes that operate to connect the concepts of an axiomatic, or mor
likely, a formal theory.2” For example, we might construct a model tha
tells us more about the processes that operate to generate the relationshij
between conflict and solidarity ot between size and differentiation it

*For an example of a model for these variables, see Peter M. Blau’s “A Formal Theor
of Differentiation in Organizations,” A American Sociological Review
: 35 (April 1970), pp. 201.
218. See also Chapter 12. s,”

"Ibid. is a good example.

 AN ASSESSMENT OF THEORETICAL APPROACHES 21

social systems. Additional concepts would be introduced and their weighted,

direct,.indirect, feedback, cyclical, lagged, and other patterns of effect on
each other would be diagramed. In this way, the analytical model tells us
more about how and why properties of the universe are connected. In
addition to specifying processes among formal propositions, analytical
models can be used to describe processes that connect variables in the
propositions of a middle-range theory. For example, we might use a model
to map out how organization size and complexity are connected by virtue
of other processes operating in an organization.
Of course, we can construct analytical models or causal models for
their own sake, without reference to an empirical generalization, a middle-
range theory, or a formal/axiomatic theory. We may simply prefer mod-
eling to propositional formats. One of the great advantages of modeling
is that it allows representation of complex relations among many variables
in a reasonably parsimonious fashion. To say the same thing as a model,
a propositional format might have to write complex equations or use many
words. Thus, by itself modeling represents a tool that many theorists
find preferable to alternative theoretical schemes.
In sum, then, I have isolated four general and a number of more
specific ways that sociologists organize concepts and theoretical state-
ments into formats. I believe that this description summarizes the range
of approaches, although we could, no doubt, quibble over the various
distinctions that I have drawn. But my purpose is not to draw finely tuned
distinctions nor enter a dialogue with philosophers of science. Rather, I
only want to provide a general perspective for understanding the diversity
of activities that sociologists call “theory.” We cannot understand the
structure of sociological theory without some sense for the underlying,
and typically unarticulated, theoretical schemes employed by individual
theorists. .
As I have mentioned frequently in this description of the elements
of theory, these various schemes are often interrelated. Moreover, I have
expressed, at least implicitly, personal biases in favor of some schemes.
Before closing this opening chapter and moving on to the actual substance
of sociological theory, therefore, I would like to explore the relative merits
of these theoretical approaches.

AN ASSESSMENT OF THEORETICAL APPROACHES

Abstractness and Scope of Various Theoretical Schemes

In Figure 1-6, I have arrayed the major types of approaches to building
theory along two dimensions: (1) their level of abstraction and (2): their
degree of scope. That is, how abstract are the concepts and statements
and how broad a range of phenomena do they encompass? The more the
concepts of a theoretical strategy are free of reference to any specific
 ICAL THEORIZING
22 CHAPTER 1 / THE NATURE OF SOCIOLOG

FIGURE 1-6 Variations in Types of Theoretical Formats

Ori e +
High Meta-
Axiomatic/ Analytical
formal schemes theory
schemes schemes

e
Analytical
models

Level of
abstraction
e

Middle-range
propositions

s e
Empirical Causal
generalization model
Low

Low High

Scope of substantive phenomena

empirical case, the higher is its level of abstraction; and the greater the
range of substantive phenomena encompassed by the concepts and state-
ments of an approach, the greater is its scope. Naturally, these are not
mutually exclusive, since the process of abstraction by its very nature
leads to the inclusion of more cases and, hence, increases the scope of
phenomena denoted by concepts. I can certainly be criticized for plotting
along nonexclusive dimensions, but my point in Figure 1-6 is not to create
an elegant typology. Rather, I simply want to communicate that abstract
schemes encompass more substantive phenomena in the social universe.
But I also want to emphasize that abstraction, per se, does not always
lead to the breadth of coverage. A theoretical format can be highly abstract
in that it contains no direct empirical referents, but it can denote only a
delimited range of phenomena. Thus, I think that axiomatic and formal
propositions tend to be highly abstract, but they typically pertain to a
limited range of phenomena. In contrast, analytical schemes and meta-
theory are no more abstract than formal or axiomatic theories, but they
usually contain more concepts and statements denoting a broader range
of social phenomena. And so, while I admit to an overlap in the dimensions
of Figure 1-6, the figure communicates my essential point: theoretical
 AN ASSESSMENT OF THEORETICAL APPROACHES 23

schemes vary primarily in terms of two interrelated dimensions, abstrac-

tion and scope. Some address a wide range of phenomena with abstract
concepts, others only a limited range with equally abstract concepts. Still
others are not abstract at all and are thereby limited in scope. And some
are more abstract and cover varying ranges of events.
My sense that, in terms of abstraction alone, the various approaches
cluster at four diverse levels. Empirical generalizations and causal models
are tied to specific empirical contexts. A generalization summarizes a
particular set of research findings, whereas a simple causal model typically
involves correlational statements linking empirically measured variables.
Middle-range propositions are more abstract because they seek to explain
events for a whole class of phenomena. Yet, the concepts of middle-range
theory reveal empirical content that limits their abstractness. An ana-
lytical model is generally more abstract than a middle-range theory be-
cause it introduces generic properties of the social universe to explain
some general class of empirical events. Axiomatic/formal propositional
schemes, analytical schemes, and meta-theory are even more abstract in
that they reveal no empirical content about specific times, places, and
contexts. They are usually about the basic and universal properties of
social organization, human action, or social interaction, without reference
to any particular pattern of organization, form of action, or context of
interaction. |
Of course, this is only a rough grouping. I am well aware that there
is variation, but I would submit that the relative position of these three
groupings in regard to their respective levels of abstraction is roughly
captured in Figure 1-6. For example, an axiomatic scheme may be some-
what less abstract than a meta-theory, but it is not likely to become less
abstract than an analytical model or a middle-range theory. What dis-
tinguishes theoretical approaches at any given level of abstraction is their
scope, or the range of phenomena covered by theoretical statements. The
scope of empirical generalizations tends to be limited since they emanate
from research findings that, by their nature, focus on a limited range of
phenomena (since, after all, there are only so many thing. that can be
studied in even the largest research project). Causal models often add
extra variables in an effort to explain more variance, and so they fre-
quently expand the scope somewhat of an empirical generalization. Middle-
range theories try to explain a whole class of phenomena—for example,
delinquency, revolutions, ethnic antagonism, and urbanization. They are,
therefore, broader in scope than empirical generalizations and causal
models, but the very goal of middle-range theory is to limit scope by trying
to explain only one class of events. Analytical models are usually broader
than middle-range theories, but they tend to be limited because they too
are about a specific range of phenomena—industrialization, ethnic rela-
tions, political centralization, differentiation in organizations, and similar
 24 CHAPTER 1 / THE NATURE OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIZING

topics. They are somewhat broader in scope because it is easier to include

more variables in a model than in a series of middle-range propositions.
Axiomatic/formal propositional schemes tend to be limited in range
because they focus on certain generic processes and ignore others. For
example, a formal theory might be about differentiation, consensus for-
mation, conflict, exchange, behavior, action, interaction, and similar basic
processes in the social universe. Although the proponents of these scheme
s
often claim that their propositions explain much more of reality,
it is
more reasonable to see these abstract propositions as pertaining
to only
a limited range of phenomena. Analytical schemes in sociolo
gical theory
tend to be all-encompassing, seeking to explain human action,
interaction,
and organization in one grand scheme. They are rarely
immodest efforts;
and although they differ rather dramatically in their
content, they are all
similar in their presumption that they encompass
all of the social universe
that needs to be explained. Meta-theories are very
broad but diffuse and
imprecise. They explicate all that needs to be
explained and present a
Philosophical justification for developing a particu
lar form of explanation.
But they tend to be rather grandiose; and
this fact makes them so broad
as to be somewhat vacuous.

Relative Merits of Diverse Theore

tical Approaches

theories to be proven wrong,

there is enormous disagreem
is that theories must be suffic ent. My sense
iently precise in the definitio
ns of concepts

A theory that, in principle

, cannot he proven wron
becomes a self-sustaining g is not very useful. It
ogma that is accepted on
allow for understanding of faith. A theory must
events, and hence, it must
the facts of the world. be tested against
If a theoreti
empirical tests, science has
advanced. When a theory
less possible line of inquir is rejected, then one
y will be required in search
of an answer to the
 AN ASSESSMENT OF THEORETICAL APPROACHES 25

question, Why? By successively eliminating incorrect statements, those

that survive attempts at refutation offer, for the present at least, the most
accurate picture of the real world. Although having one’s theory refuted
may cause professional stigma, refutations are crucial to theory building.
It is sornewhat disheartening, therefore, that some scientists appear to
live in fear of such refutation. For in the ideal scientific process, just the
opposite should be the case, as Kar] Popper has emphasized:
Refutations have often been regarded as establishing the failure of a sci-
entist, or at least-of his theory. It should be stressed that this is an inductive
error. Every refutation should be regarded as a great success; not merely as
a success of the scientist who refuted the theory, but also of the scientist who
created the refuted theory and who thus in the first instance suggested, if
only indirectly, the refuting experiment.”

Even statements that survive refutation and hence bring professional

prestige to their framers are never fully proven. It is always possible that
the next empirical test could disprove them. Yet, if statements consist-
ently survive empirical tests, they have high credibility and are likely to
be at the core of a theoretical body of knowledge. But as I have now
phrased the issue, many sociological theorists would disagree.
Thus, in my view, the best theoretical statements are those that are
highly abstract and, at the same time, are sufficiently precise so as to be
testable. Again, as I will document in the chapters to come, a majority
of social theorists disagree with me on this score. I have injected my
personal views because it is important to understand the biases with which
I approach the review and analyses of social theory. Moreover, these biases
are the central issue around which the debate over the best approach to
developing theory and knowledge rages. Since I have presented my biases,
let me elaborate on them by assessing the merits of various approaches
in terms of my prejudices.
From my point of view, empirical generalizations and causal models
of empirically operationalized variables are not theory at all. They are
useful summaries of data that need a theory to explain them. Some would
argue that theory can be built from such summaries of empirical regu-
larities. That is, we can induce from the facts the more general properties
that these facts illustrate. I doubt this, but many disagree. I grant that
familiarity with empirical regularities is crucial to developing more ab-
stract and comprehensive theoretical statements, but I doubt if this pro-
cess of mechanically raising the level of abstraction from empirical find-
ings will produce interesting theory. A much more creative leap of insight
is necessary, and so, I would not suggest that theory building begin with
a total immersion in the empirical facts. I suspect that once buried in the
facts, one rarely rises above them.

*Karl R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations (New York: Basic Books, 1962), p. 243.
26 CHAPTER 1 / THE NATURE OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIZING

At the other extreme, meta-theory is like empirical facts: interesting

but counterproductive. Many scholars feel just the opposite, however.
They argue that we must have meta-theory before we try to develop more
precise theoretical statements. My opinion is that this has rarely been
the case in science, primarily because meta-theory gets bogged down in
enduring philosophical issues. The result is that proponents of various
philosophical camps become so preoccupied with their debate (which by
its nature can never end) that they never get around to developing theory.
Analytical schemes often suffer from the same problems as meta-
theory. Naturalistic/positivistic schemes have, I am convinced, a tendency
to become overly concerned with their architectural majesty. In an effort
to construct an orderly scheme that mirrors at an abstract level the em-
pirical world in all its dimensions, naturalistic/positivistic schemes get
ever more complex; and as new elements are added to the scheme, efforts
to reconcile new portions with the old take precedence over making the
scheme testable. Moreover, the scheme as a whole is impossible to test
because relations among its elements cover such a broad range of phe-
nomena and are rarely stated with great precision. And when imprecision
is compounded by the abstractness, then empirical tests are infrequent
because it is not clear how to test any portion of the scheme. Yet, despite
these problems, creators of analytical schemes view them as a necessary
prerequisite for developing testable theoretical statements. In their view,
one needs to know what is important to tests; and only through an ordered
scheme is this possible.
In contrast, sensitizing/descriptive schemes are typically constructed
by those who reject a natural science or positivistic perspective on how
to accumulate knowledge. One can never have definitive tests of theo-
retical statements because all statements will eventually be wrong since
the social universe is constantly changing its fundamental nature. Thus,
one can only use a loose framework of concepts to interpret events and
to see if_they yield greater understanding of how and why these events
occur. Obviously, I do not agree with this kind of argument, although I
have found many of these sensitizing schemes very insightful. Yet, much
like naturalistic approaches, sensitizing schemes also become self-rein-
forcing because they are so loosely structured and so often vague (albeit
Suggestive and insightful) that the facts can always be bent to fit the
scheme. Hence, the scheme can never be refuted or, I suspect, revised on
the basis of actual empirical events.
This leaves us with axiomatic/formal propositional formats, analyt-
ical models, and middle-range prepositions. As I have already indicated,
axiomatic theorizing is, for the most part, impractical in sociology.
In my
view, formal theorizing is the most useful approach becaus
e it contains
abstract concepts that are linked with sufficient precision so as to be
testable. Analytical models can be highly insightful, but they are hard to
test as a whole. They contain too many concepts, and their linkages are
 AN ASSESSMENT OF THEORETICAL APPROACHES 27

too diverse to be directly tested. And so, it is reasonable to ask: in what

sense can they be useful for sociological theorizing? My view is that an
analytical model can best be used to specify the processes by which con-
cepts in a formal proposition are connected.” For example, if a proposition
states that the “degree of differentiation” is a function of “system size,”
the model can tell us why and how size and differentiation are connected.
That is, we can get a better sense for the underlying processes by which
size increases differentiation (and perhaps vice versa). Alternatively, an-
alytical models can also be a starting point for formal theorizing. By
isolating basic processes and mapping their interconnections, we can get
a sense for the important social processes about which we need to develop
formal propositions. And although the model as a whole cannot be easily
tested (because it is too complex to be subject to a definitive test), we
can decompose it into abstract propositional statements that are amenable
to definitive tests.
Middle-range propositions are, I feel, less useful as places to begin
theory building. They tend to be too filled with empirical content, much
of which does not pertain to the more basic, enduring, and generic features
of the social universe.*° For example, a “theory of ethnic antagonism” is
often difficult to translate into a more general proposition or model on
conflict. Moreover, scholars working at this middle range tend to become
increasingly empirical as they seek to devise ways to test their theories.
Their propositions become, I have found, ever more like empirical gen-
eralizations as more and more research content is added. There is no
logical reason why substantive and empirical referents cannot be taken
out of middle-range theories and the level of abstraction raised, but such
has infrequently occurred. The reason for this is that, because the gen-
eralizations are content filled and stated propositionally, they are readily
tested; and so, there is a bias to test the propositions as opposed to extract
their more generic content and create more abstract propositions.
In Figure 1-7, I have summarized these conclusions in the right col-
umn. Meta-theory, naturalistic analytical schemes, and sensitizing schemes
are interesting philosophy, but poor theory. Formal propositional state-
ments and analytical models offer the best place to begin theorizing, es-’
pecially if interplay between them is possible. Middle-range theories have
rarely realized their theoretical potential, tending to move toward em-
pirical generalizations as opposed to formal propositions. Causal models
and empirical generalizations are useful in that they give theorists some
sense of empirical regularities, but by themselves and without creative
leaps in scope and abstraction, they are not theoretical. They are usually
data in need of a theory.

*] have tried to illustrate this strategy in my Societal Stratification.

*] doubt if this was Merton’: intent when he formulated this idea, but my sense is that
his advocacy became a legitimation for asserting that empirical generalizations were “theory.”
 THEORIZING
28 CHAPTER 1 / THE NATURE OF SOCIOLOGICAL

for Building
FIGURE 1-7 Relations among Theoretical Approaches and Potential
Theory
TT ee ee
The Ideal Relationship Potential for Building
Scientific Theory

Meta-theory

Naturalistic analytical schemes Interesting philosophy

r---------— = Sensitizing analytical schemes

Axiomatic,
when possible «—-* Formal propositions
} Most likely to generate
testable theory
UL ——_—_— ——~-— + Analytical models |

‘ a Might generate theory if

more abstract

Causal models
Data in need of theoretical
in interpretation
Empirical generalizations

In the left column, I have presented my idealized view of the proper

place of each theoretical approach for generating knowledge.* If we begin
to accumulate bodies of formal laws, then it is desirable to extract out
the key concepts and look at these as the basic sensitizing and orienting
concepts of sociology (much as magnetism, gravity, relativity, and the
like were for early 20th-century physics). We may even want to construct
a formal analytical scheme and ponder on the meta-theoretical implica-
tions of these. In turn, such pondering can help reformulate or clarify
analytical schemes, which can perhaps help construct new, or reverse old,
formal propositions. But without a body of formal laws to pull meta-
theory and analytical schemes back into the domain of the testable, they
become hopelessly self-sustaining and detached from the very reality they
are supposed to help clarify.
For building theory, the most crucial interchange is, I believe, between
formal propositions and analytical models. There is a creative synergy
between translating propositions into models and vice versa. This is the

"I should emphasize

8 that this is n ot how thing
i s actually work; the diagram represe
my wish for how sociological theory should be developed. i ‘ rr
 THE STATE OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 29

level at which most theory should be couched. But as I will document in

the following chapters, a good many theorists clearly disagree.
Middle-range propositions can inspire analytical models that, in turn,
encourage the development of more abstract propositions. Such will be
the case, however, only if there already exists a body of useful abstract
propositions that can serve as an inducement to middle-range theorists
to raise the level of abstraction of their empirically laden statements.
Conversely, middle-range theories could potentially be one vehicle by which
more abstract propositions—such as on conflict processes—are attached
to specific empirical problems—such as ethnic conflict. Thus, middle-
range theories become part of the deductive calculus of a formal theoretical
system. And finally, the techniques of research generalizations and causal
modeling of empirical variables can help test the implication of formal
theories. They become the lowest order generalizations in the deductive
system of formal theory. They might also stimulate inductive efforts to
develop more abstract propositions of greater scope, but as I indicated
earlier, I have my doubts if this will occur.
Thus, in my view, there is no necessary conflict among these various
approaches to accumulating knowledge. But in actual fact, there is enor-
mous conflict among those, including me and almost all other theorists,
who claim that one of these activities is the most essential for developing
social theory. Much of the theoretical literature in sociology is consumed
with the debates among scholars working with one or the other of these
strategies. Indeed. I would imagine that my comments in this section are
just more fuel for a fire that shows little potential for extinguishing itself.

THE STATE OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

Prevailing Theoretical Schemes in Sociology

The comments above express my opinions, but they have also summarized
the state of sociological theorizing. Most theory in sociology is of two
basic types: analytical schemes and loose systems of formal propositions.
There is some analytical modeling at a general theoretical level; but it is
usually part of a system of propositions or general analytical scheme. In
specific substantive subfields, there is considerable modeling and middle-
range theorizing. Yet, I cannot cover in this volume all of these theories
of various subfields. Moreover, much of this work is insufficiently abstract
to be true theory; rather, most of it represents a series of summaries of
the empirical generalizations that need theoretical explanation. At the
other extreme, I will not analyze any of the meta-theoretical schemes that
can be found in the theoretical literature. I tind these too philosophical
to constitute interesting theory. However, if meta-theoretical consider-
ations are part of a general analytical scheme or system of formal
30 CHAPTER 1 / THE NATURE OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIZING

of their
propositions, then I will explore these considerations in light
implications for the theoretical scheme.
Thus, in the pages to follow, the core structure of sociological theory
revolves around analytical schemes and formal propositional systems. At
times, analytical models and meta-theoretical issues are part of these
analytical and propositional schemes, but the essence of sociological the-
ory today is a series of naturalistic analytical schemes, sensitizing ana-
lytical schemes, and variously structured systems of abstract formal
propositions.

Enduring Controversies in Sociological Theorizing

In addition to this diversity of schemes employed by various theorists,
there is enormous controversy over a number of substantive and strategic
issues. Some of this controversy reflects the implicit assumptions of the
schemes, per se, but even more if it is the result of different preferences
among individual theorists. Let me review some of these controversies,
because they will surface again and again in subsequent chapters.

Can sociology be a science? This issue will always confront us

in a review of sociological theories. The basic line of argument is: Can
sociology be like the other natural sciences, or is there something unique
about human affairs?* If the social universe is considered to be like other
realms, such as that analyzed by physics or biology, then theory tends
toward propositional and naturalistic analytical schemes. If human action,
interaction, and organization are seen as fundamentally different and as
not amenable to analysis with the procedures of natural science, then
sensitizing analytical schemes are most likely to be used.
This issue is probably the most divisive in sociological theorizing. At
present, I would guess that sociological theorists are about equally split,
although I suspect that the natural science advocates have lost ground in
recent years to those who do not feel that the theoretical procedures of
the other sciences are relevant to human beings. I consider this trend
unfortunate, but obviously my feelings are not shared by a growing ma-
jority of theorists.

Should sociological theory be micro or macro?. This question

addresses the issue of whether sociological theory ‘should be about the
micro actions and interactions of individuals or the macro social struc-
tures that such actions and interactions create.*® Should we study and

*See notes 9 and 10 for examples of the two sides on this issue.
“This has reemerged as a major issue in sociological theory. For some recent commen-
pdt na perso and A. V. Cicourel, eds., Advances in Social Theory and
& Kegan ik 9a), an Integration of Micro- and Macro-sociologies (Boston: Routledge
g aul, 1); Jonathan H. Turner, “Theoretical Strategies for Linking Micro and
Macro Processes: Y a
Socic!ogical Review 14,
no. 1 (1983), pp.Foo" erage of Seven Approaches,” Western
 THE STATE OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 31

theorize about people in concrete settings, or should we stand back and

look at the institutional complexes of society? Micro theorists typically
accuse macro theorists of reifying social structure—that is, of making a
reality out of a concept. They see social structure as nothing more than
the micro processes of action and interaction among individuals. In their
defense, macro theorists see micro theorists as never seeing the forest
through the trees. Micro theorists, they argue, are so busy studying in-
teraction, they fail to see that such interaction is constrained by the
structures of society.
There have been many conceptual efforts to resolve this debate by
developing approaches that address both micro and macro processes.*4
‘But these efforts typically generate further controversy, as the synthes-
izing scheme is seen by its critics as having a micro or macro bias. Pro-
_ ponents of micro, macro, or synthetic efforts tend to employ all the ap-
proaches outlined earlier. Yet, I sense that those with a micro bias tend
to use sensitizing analytical schemes, whereas those theorists who focus
on macro structural processes tend to employ formal propositional schemes
and naturalistic analytical schemes. Yet, there are so many exceptions to
this generalization that I hesitate to make it. But there is at least a slight
tendency along these lines.

Is sociology a paradigmatic science? This issue is less burning

than the other two that I have mentioned above. But it is an issue when
organizing a discussion of various theoretical approaches. Some argue that
sociological theory can be divided into several paradigms that hold dif-
ferent views of reality and advocate varying theoretical as well as research
strategies.
My feeling is that the concept of paradigm is too strong. As employed
by its most visible exponent, Thomas Kuhn,’ I suspect that no theoretical
approach is sufficiently coherent, precise, and established as to constitute
a paradigm of abstract concepts and laws as well as verified research
findings. If anything, sociology is pre-paradigmatic.
Moreover, I think that the concept of paradigm has been so overused
that it has lost any meaning, at least for me. Rather, I think that, at best,
sociology has a series of perspectives or orientations that guide theoretical
activity, but these perspectives do not constitute, in my view, paradigms
in the same sense as this term has been employed in the natural sciences.

“For examples, see Giddens, The Constitution of Society, and Randall Collins, Conflict
Sociology (New York: Academic Press, 1975). As we wili see shortly, many specific per-
spectives besides these two examples try to provide a reconciliation of micro- and
macroprocesses.
*T he best of these arguments is George Ritzer’s Sociology: A Multiple Paradigm Science
(Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1975).
*Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1962, 1970).
32 CHAPTER 1 / THE NATURE OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIZING

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES IN SOCIOLOGY

In my view, much of what is labeled sociological theory is, in reality, only
a loose clustering of implicit assumptions, some basic concepts, and var-
ious kinds of theoretical statements and formats. But none of these is
dominant or sufficiently precise to constitute a paradigm. Sometimes as-
sumptions are stated explicitly and serve to inspire abstract theoretical
statements containing well-defined concepts, but most sociological theory
constitutes a verbal “image of society” rather than a rigorously con-
structed set of theoretical statements organized into a logically coherent
format. Thus, a great deal of “theory” is really a general perspective or
orientation for looking at various features of the social world.
The fact that there are many such perspectives in sociology presents
me with a problem of exposition. This is compounded when we recognize
that the perspectives blend into one another, sometimes rendering it dif-
ficult to analyze them separately. My solution to this dilemma is to limit
arbitrarily the number of perspectives covered and, at the same time, to
act as if they were separable. Accordingly, in the sections to follow, I will
analyze five general sociological perspectives or orientations: (1) func-
tional theorizing, (2) conflict theorizing, (3) exchange theorizing, (4) in-
teractionist theorizing, and (5) structuralist theorizing. These general per-
spectives do not constitute paradigms because the various theorists working
within these traditions often disagree over the best strategy, over whether
sociology can be a science, and over whether or not the micro, macro, or
some combination of the two should be emphasized. Indeed, the debates
within orientations are frequently far more acrimonious than those be-
tween orientations.
I will focus on these perspectives for a number of reasons: (1) They
are the most general perspectives in sociology and underlie most specific
perspectives in the field. (2) These perspectives are also the most wide-
spread and influential—the subjects of much analytical elaboration and,
of course, criticism. (3) Each of these perspectives, at various times, has
been proclaimed by its more exuberant proponents as the only one that
could take sociology out of its theoretical difficulties. Therefore, each must
be considered in a book attempting to assess the structure of sociological
theorizing.
For each of these perspectives, I will examine its emergence and then
its dominant contemporary practitioners. In so doing, I will emphasize a
number of key topics: (1) the assumptions about the nature of the social
world that a perspective, and its advocates, hold; (2) the theory-building
strategy typically advocated by those working with a perspective; (3) the
image of social processes that a perspective reveals; (4) the key concepts
and propositions developed within the perspective; and (5) the types of
theoretical statements generated within a perspective.
 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES IN SOCIOLOGY 33

In sum, I think that it is safe to say that sociological theorizing is in

its intellectual infancy. Yet, my review of its major orientations will dem-
onstrate that theory in sociology has great potential for developing useful
knowledge about the social universe.
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 PART ONE

Functional Theorizing

2. The Emergence of Functionalism

3. The Analytical Functionalism of
Talcott Parsons
4. The Empirical Functionalism of
Robert K. Merton
5. The Systems Functionalism of
Niklas Luhmann

35
 The Emergence
of Functionalism_

Even today, I think it is fair to conclude that classical economic ideas

dominate sociological theory and social thought in general.! From this
economic perspective, humans are seen as rational beings who try to
maximize their gains and minimize their losses. And I suspect that many
still view social life as a kind of marketplace where people buy and sell
their qualities in hopes of making a psychic profit. Indeed, social life is
a competitive game of people rationally pursuing their interests, with
social order somehow emerging out of these clashes of self-interest.
This view of humans is frequently termed utilitarianism because there
is the assumption that actors are rational and that they try to maximize
their “utilities” or rewards and gratifications. Adam Smith is most com-
monly assuciated with this perspective because he was the first to con-
ceptualize analytically the dynamics of competitive markets and because
he postulated an “invisible hand of order” as emerging from open com-
petition in free markets.? Although utilitarianism pervades much of our
thinking today, it was even more dominant in the last century. And just
as sociology today must overcome the limitations of this narrow view of
humans and social organization, so it had to confront utilitarianism in
the last century. In fact, I do not think it an exaggeration to say that

1As I will outline later, exchange theory typically begins with these assumptions. But it
also penetrates other perspectives, as we will come to see.
2Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (London:
Davis, 1805; originally published in 1776). Only volume 1 contains these extreme statements.
Subsequent portions of the book are quite sociological in nature.

37
38 CHAPTER 2 / THE EMERGENCE OF FUNCTIONALISM

sociology’s first theoretical perspective—functionalism—emerged as a re-

action against utilitarianism. In questioning utilitarianism, sociology pur-
sued an alternative, organicism.

FUNCTIONALISM AND THE ORGANISMIC ANALOGY

In early 19th-century sociology, humans no longer were viewed as rational
and calculating entrepreneurs in a free, open, unregulated, and competitive
marketplace. Nor was the doctrine of the “invisible hand of order” con-
sidered a very adequate explanation of how social organization could emerge
out of free and unbridled competition among individuals. Although util-
itarianism remained a prominent social doctrine for the entire 19th cen-
tury, the first generation of French sociologists had ceased to accept the
assumption that social order would automatically be forthcoming if only
free competition among individuals was left intact.
The disenchantment with utilitarianism was aided in France, and to
a lesser extent in all of continental Europe, by the disruptive social changes
wrought by industrialization and urbanization. Coupled with the political
instability of the late 18th century, as revealed most dramatically by the
violent French Revolution, early 19th-century social thinkers in France
displayed a profound concern with the problems of maintaining the social
order. Although each phrased the question somewhat differently, I think
it fair to conclude that all social thinkers asked similar questions: Why
and how is society possible? What holds society together? What makes
societies change??
Whether in France or elsewhere in Europe, the answers to these fun-
damental questions were shaped by events occurring in the biological
sciences. It was in the 19th century that biological discoveries were to
alter significantly the social and intellectual climate of the times. For
example, as many of the mysteries of the human body were being dis-
covered, the last vestiges of mysticism surrounding the body’s functioning
were being laid to rest. The diversity of the animal species was finally
being systematically recorded under the long-standing classification pro-
cedures outlined by the Swedish biologist Carolus Linnaeus. And most
importantly, conceptions of evolution, culminating in the theories of Wal-
lace and Darwin, were stimulating great intellectual and social contro-
versy. Since it was in this social and intellectual milieu that sociology as
a self-conscious discipline was bern, it is not surprising that conceptions
of social order were influenced by a preoccupation with biology.

3 : rom et
“ sai — Smith, had originally posed the question that all French thinkers were
to ask: as societies become more complex and differentiated, and as actors live in different
worlds, what “force” can hold the social fabric together?
 FUNCTIONALISM AND THE ORGANISMIC ANALOGY 39

The Organicism of Auguste Comte (1798-1857)

Auguste Comte is usually credited as being the founder of sociology. Phi-
losophizing about humans and society had, of course, long been a preoc-
cupation of lay people and scholars alike, but it was Comte who advocated
a “science of society” and coined the term sociology. And although Comte’s
work was soon to fall into neglect and obscurity and he was to live out
his later years in frustration and bitterness, his work profoundly influ-
enced social thought. I think it regrettable that few recognize this influ-
ence, even today. Yet, despite Comte’s current obscurity, I mark the emer-
gence of the functionalist perspective with his work.’
Like most French thinkers of his time, Comte was preoccupied with
propagating order and harmony out of the chaos created by the French
Revolution. He attacked the individualism of utilitarran doctrines so
prominent in England and carried forward Rousseau’s and Saint-Simon’s
desire to develop a “collective philosophy”—one that would provide the
principles for creating social consensus. In so doing, however, he artic-
ulated the principles of science as they should be applied to society.
Comte felt that human evolution in the 19th century had reached the wy |)
“positive stage” in which empirical knowledge could be used to understand
the social world and to create a better society. Comte thus became an
advocate the-application
.of of the scientific method to the study
of so-
ciety—a strategy that, in deference to
Comte, is
still termed positivism in
the social sciences. This application of the scientific method was to give
birth to a new science, sociology.
Comte’s entire intellectual life represented an attempt to legitimate
sociology. His efforts on this score went so far as to construct a “hierarchy
of the sciences,” with sociology as the ‘‘queen”’ of the sciences. Although
this hierarchy allowed Comte to assert the importance of sociology and
thereby separate it from social philosophy, his most important tactic for
legitimating sociology was to borrow terms and concepts from the highly
respected biological sciences. Sociology was thus initiated and justified
by appeals to the biological sciences—a fact that will help explain why
functionalism was sociology’s first and, until the 1970s, most dominant
theoretical orientation.
Comte saw the affinity between sociology and biology to reside in
their common concern with organic bodies. This affinity led him to divide
sociology into social “statics,” or morphology, and “dynamics,” or social
growth and progress. But Comte was convinced that although “Biology
has hitherto been the guide and preparation for Sociology ... Sociology
will in the future ... (provide) the ultimate systematization of Biology.”

‘Auguste Comte, The Course of Positive Philosophy (1830-1842). References are to the
more commonly used edition that Harriet Martineau condensed and translated, The Positive
Philosophy of Auguste Comte, vols. 1, 2, and 3 (London: Bell & Sons, 1898, originally
published in 1854).
40 CHAPTER 2 / THE EMERGENCE OF FUNCTIONALISM

biology,
Comte visualized that with initial borrowing of concepts from
es, the
and later with the development of positivism in the social scienc
first
principles of sociology would inform biology. Thus, sociology must
recognize the correspondence between the individual organism in biology
and the social organism in sociology:
We have thus established a true correspondence between the Statistical
Analysis of the Social Organism in Sociology, and that of the Individual
Organism in Biology ... If we take the best ascertained points in Biology,
we may decompose structure anatomically into elements, tissues, and organs.
We have the same things in the Social Organism; and may even use the same
names.®

Comte then began to make clear analogies between specific types of

social structures and the biological concepts:

I shall treat the Social Organism as definitely composed of the Families

which are the true elements or cells, next the Classes or Castes which are its
proper tissues, and lastly, of the cities and Communes which are in real
organs.®

Most of Comte’s organismic analogies came in his later works, which

were highly flawed.” And so, I would be remiss if I left Comte at this
point, for he was much more than a simple-minded organicist. My main
concern is, of course, with functionalism, but let me pause for a closer
look at Comte’s positivism, which contains the basic tenets of the abstract
propositional approach that I outlined in the last chapter as well as a
critique of both causal and functional analysis. Comte preferred the name
social physics over the current name of our discipline—sociology.? He
wanted to mold sociology after Newtonian physics in which abstract the-
oretical principles are used to interpret empirical events. Contrary to
many contemporary critics of positivism, who use the term positivism as
an epithet for raw empiricism, Comte argued:

The next great hindrance to the use of observation is empiricism which

is introduced into it by those who, in the name of impartiality, would interdict
the use of any theory whatever ... No real observation of any kind of phe-
nomena is possible, except as far as it is first directed, and finally interpreted,
by some theory.®

; *Auguste Comte, System of Positive Polity or Treatise on Sociology (London: Burt Frank-
lin, 1875, originally published 1851), pp. 239-40.
*Ibid., pp. 241-42.
"By the time he wrote Positive Polity in 1851, Comte was, in a very real sense, a broken
intellectual. Far more important, I feel, is the first work on Positive Philosophy.
‘
a3 was forced to abandon his preferred name because the Belgian statistician Adol
, phe
Quete et,had already usurped the label for his statistical analyses.
*Positive Philosophy, vol. 1. p. 2.
 FUNCTIONALISM AND THE ORGANISMIC ANALOGY 41

What was such theory to look like? His answer is, I think, very im-
portant because he warned against the very functional analysis that he
helped initiate in his later works, while he cautioned against excessive
concern with the causal modeling so prominent in contemporary sociol-
ogy. As he stressed:
The first characteristic of Positive Philosophy is that it regards all phe-
nomena as subject to invariable natural Jaws. Our business is,—seeing how
or vain any research into what are called causes, whether first or final,—to pursue
an accurate discovery of these laws, with a view to reducing them to the
smallest possible number.”

In this passage, “final causes” is Comte’s term for functions. We

should not, he argued, analyze processes in terms of their consequences,
nor should we search for their origins, as “first causes.’ Rather,
Our real business is to analyze accurately the circumstances of phenomena,
and to connect them by the natural relations of succession and resemblance.
The best illustration of this is the case of the doctrine of Gravitation."

Thus, I think it fair to say that Comte’s view of positivism rejected

the functionalism and the more extreme organicism that was to emerge
in the later decades of the 19th century. Indeed, Emile Durkheim was to
“turn Comte on his head” and stress that the very essence of adequate
scientific explanation was causal and functional analysis.!* I can only
imagine how Comte would turn over in his grave if he had known what
Durkheim did to his views. Yet, despite his eloquent advocacy for a social
physics modeled after the natural sciences, Comte did reintroduce organic
analogies into sociological inquiry, and he did see sociology as closely
allied with the biological sciences.!? And so, we must conclude that it was
with Comte that functional theory begins.
In the period between Comte’s decline and Durkheim’s ascendance
as the most forceful advocate of functionalism, Herbert Spencer was to
codify functional analysis into a more explicit theoretical strategy. Let
me now turn to a brief review of Spencer’s contribution.

The Analytical Functionalism of Herbert Spencer

(1820-1903)
Herbert Spencer is a stigmatized figure in contemporary sociology. I think
that this is a great tragedy because much contemporary theorizing owes

Tbid., p. 5.
“Jbid., p. 6.
2Emile Durkheim, The Rules of the Sociological Method (New York: Free Press, 1938;
originally published in 1895).
“Organicism was not original with Comte, of course. Plato and other more distant
thinkers had also made organismic analogies; Comte simply reintroduced this idea.
42 CHAPTER 2 / THE EMERGENCE OF FUNCTIONALISM

r’s
an unacknowledged debt to Spencer.'* Moreover, analyses of Spence
work tend to focus on the weakest portion of his sociology, its function-
alism. But unlike Durkheim two decades later, the anthropological func-
tionalists of the early decades of this century, or the modern functionalists
of the contemporary era, Spencer’s functional analysis was comparatively
recessive. Yet, in what may seem like a contradiction, Spencer anticipated
in those few pages devoted to functional analysis all of the main features
of modern functionalism.
Like many contemporary functionalists, Spencer saw the universe as
divided into realms or domains. For Spencer, these basic realms are the
inorganic (physical, chemical), the organic (biological, psychological), and
superorganic (sociological).!* His great philosophical project was to gen-
erate a series of abstract principles or laws—what he termed the first or
cardinal principles—that could explain all of these realms.'* Needless to
say, he was a bit over-ambitious on this score, but the general idea was
to explain social processes with abstract laws or principles. The content
of these principles borrows from the physics of his time, not the biology.
Yet, it is his biological analogizing for which we most remember Spencer;
and when making these analogies, he introduced analytical functionalism.
But I emphasize again that Spencer saw both the organic and superorganic
realms as obeying the same abstract laws, or first principles. Indeed, his
organicism is secondary to his effort at making deductions from his ab-
stract first principles.’
Spencer published his monumental Principles of Biology before his
first sociological works.'® As a consequence, I think, he wanted to dem-
onstrate that both organic and superorganic bodies reveal “parallels in
principles of organization” that could be deduced from the first principles.
And so, it is not surprising that he compared societies and organisms in
terms of their similarity and dissimilarity. Among the points of similarity
he emphasized:

“See my Herbert Spencer: Toward a Renewed Appreciation (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage
Publications, 1985) for a more detailed presentation of this line of argument.
*Herbert Spencer, The Principles of Sociology (1874-1896). This work has been reissued
in varying volume numbers. References in this chapter are to the three-volume edition (the
third edition) issued by D. Appleton and Company, New York, in 1898. In reading this long
work, it is much more critical to note the parts (numbered I through VII) than the volumes,
since pagination can vary with editions.
“These are contained in his First Principles (New York: A. C. B 5 ot
published in 1862). _ . C. Burt, 1880, originally
"For a more detailed analyses of these, see my and Leonard Beeghley’s Emergenc
e of
Sociological Theory (Homewood, IIL: Dorsey Press, 1981), pp. 67-76; 106-7.
‘Herbert Spencer, The Principles of Biology (New York: D. Appleto
n, 1864-1867).
See my Herbert Spencer: Toward a Renewed Appreciation, Chapter
4. See also his
Principles of Sociology, vol. I, part II, pp. 449-57. The bulk of Spencer’s organicism is on
these few pages of » work
) that . sSpans more than 2,000 pages, and vet, is this i
remember about Spencer. an ee
 FUNCTIONALISM AND THE ORGANISMIC ANALOGY 43

1. As organic and superorganic bodies increase in size, they increase

in structure. That is, they become more complex and differentiated.
2. Such differentiation of structures is accompanied by differentia-
tion of functions. Each differentiated structure comes to serve dis-
tinctive functions for sustaining the “life” of the systemic whole.
3. Differentiated structures and functions require in both organic and
superorganic bodies integration through mutual dependence. Each
structure can be sustained only through its dependence upon others
for vital substances.
4. Each differentiated structure in both organic and super-organic
bodies is, to a degree, a systemic whole by itself (i.e., organs are
composed of cells and societies of groupings of individuals), and
thus, the larger whole is always influenced by the systemic pro-
cesses of its constituent parts.
5. The structures of organic and superorganic bodies can “‘live on”
for a while after the destruction of the systemic whole.

These points ae ahiahity between organism and society, Spencer

argued, must be qualified for their points of “extreme unlikeness.”:?°
1. There are great differences in the degree of connectedness of the
parts, or structures, in organic and social wholes. In superorganic
wholes, there is less direct and continuous physical contact and
more dispersion of parts than in organic bodies.
2. There are differences in the modes of contact between organic and
superorganic systems: In the superorganic, there is much more
reliance upon symbols than in the organic.?!
3. There are differences in the levels of consciousness and voluntar-
ism of parts in organic and superorganic bodies. All units in society
are conscious, goal seeking, and reflective, whereas only one unit
can potentially be so in organic bodies.
As Spencer continued to analogize the points of similarity between
organicism and societies, he began to develop what I call requisite func-
tionalism. That is, organic and superorganic bodies reveal certain uni-
versal requisites that must be fulfilled in order for them to adapt to an
environment. Moreover, these same requisites exist for all organic and
superorganic systems. Let me quote Spencer on this point:
Close study of the facts shows us another striking parallelism. Organs in
animals and organs in societies have internal arrangements framed on the
same principle.

”Principles of Sociology, part II, pp. 451-62.

"Spencer’s theory of symbolism is commonly ignored by contemporary sociologists who
simply accept Durkheim’s critique. Part I of Principles contains a very sophisticated analysis
of symbols.
44 CHAPTER 2 / THE EMERGENCE OF FUNCTIONALISM

Differing from one another as the viscera of a living creature do in many

ces
respects, they have several traits in common. Each viscus contains applian
ls on which to
for conveying nutriment to its parts, for bringing it materia
operate, for carrying away the product, for draining off waste matters; as also
for regulating its activity.”

It is not hard to see the seeds of an argument for universal functional

requisites in this passage. Indeed, on the next page from this quote, Spen-
cer argued that “it is the same for society” and proceeded to list the basic
functional requisites of societies. For example, each superorganic body

has a set of agencies which bring the raw material . . .; it has an apparatus
of major and minor channels through which the necessities of life are drafted
out of the general stocks circulating through the kingdom . .; it has appliances
... for bringing those impulses by which the industry of the place is excited
or checked; it has local controlling powers, political and ecclesiastical, by
which order is maintained and healthful action furthered.

Even though these universal requisites are not as clearly separated

as they were to become in modern functional approaches, the logic of the
analysis is clear. First, there are certain universal needs or requisites that
structures function to meet. These revolve around (a) securing and cir-
culating resources, (b) producing usable substances, and (c) regulating and
integrating internal activities through power and symbols. Second, each
system level—group, community, region, or whole society—reveals a sim-
ilar set of needs. Third, the important dynamics of any empirical system
revolve around processes that function to meet these universal requisites.
Fourth, the level of adaptation of a social unit to its environment is
determined by the extent to which it meets these functional requisites.
Thus, by recognizing that certain basic or universal needs must be
met, analysis of organic and superorganic systems is simplified. One ex-
amines processes with respect to needs for integrating differentiated parts,
needs for sustaining the parts of the system, needs for producing and
distributing information and substances, and needs for political regulation
and control. In simple systems, these needs are met by each element of
the system; but when structures begin to grow and become more complex,
they are met by distinctive types of structures that specialize in meeting
one of these general classes of functions. And as societies become highly
complex, then structures become even more specialized and meet only
specific subclasses of these general functional needs.
The logic behind this form of requisite functionalism guided much of
Spencer’s substantive analysis. And it is the essence of functional analysis
today. The list of basic needs to be met varies among theorists, but the
mode of the analysis remains the same: examine specific types of social

™Principles of Sociology, p. 477.

 FUNCTIONALISM AND EMILE DURKHEIM (1858-1917) 45

processes and structures in terms of the needs or requisites that they

meet.

FUNCTIONALISM AND EMILE DURKHEIM

(1858-1917)
As the inheritor of a long French tradition of social thought, especially
Comte’s organicisni, we should not be surprised that Emile Durkheim’s
early works were heavily infused with organismic terminology. Although
his major work, The Division of Labor in Society, was sharply critical of
Herbert Spencer, many of Durkheim’s formulations were clearly influ-
enced by the 19th-century intellectual preoccupation with biology.”* Aside
from the extensive use of biologically inspired terms, Durkheim’s basic
assumptions reflected those of the organicists: (1) Society was to be viewed
as an entity in itself that could be distinguished from and was not reducible
to its constituent parts. In conceiving of society as a reality, sui generis,
Durkheim in effect gave analytical priority to the social whole. (2) Al-
though such an emphasis by itself did not necessarily reflect organismic
inclinations, Durkheim, in giving causal priority to the whole, viewed
system parts as fulfilling basic functions, needs, or requisites of that whole.
(3) The frequent use of the notion “functional needs” is buttressed by
Durkheim’s conceptualization of social systems in terms of “normal” and
“pathological” states. Such formulations, at the very least, connote the
view that social systems have needs that must be fulfilled if “abnormal”
states are to be avoided. (4) In viewing systems as normal and pathological,
as well as in terms of functions, there is the additional implication that
systems have equilibrium points around which normal functioning occurs.
Durkheim recognized all of these dangers and explicitly tried to deal
with several of them. First, he was clearly aware of the dangers of teleo-
logical analysis—of implying that some future consequence of an event
causes that very event to occur. Thus, he warned that the causes of a
phenomenon must be distinguished from the ends it serves:

When, then, the explanation of a social phenomenon is undertaken, we

must seek separately the efficient cause which produces it and the function
it fulfills. We use the word “function” in preference to “end” or “purpose,”
precisely because social phenomena do not generally exist for the useful results
they produce.”

2B mile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (New York: Macmillan, 1933, orig-
inally published in 1893). Durkheim tended to ignore the fact that Spencer wore several
intellectual hats. He reacted to Spencer’s advocacy of utilitarianism, seemingly ignoring the
similarity between Spencer’s organismic analogy and his own organic formulations as well
as the close correspondence between their theories of symbols.
“Emile Durkheim, The Rules of the Sociological Method, p. 96.
46 CHAPTER 2 / THE EMERGENCE OF FUNCTIONALISM

Thus, despite giving analytical priority to the whole and viewing parts
as having consequences for certain normal states and hence meeting sys-
tem requisites, Durkheim remained aware of the dangers of asserting that
all systems have “purpose” and that the need to maintain the whole causes
the existence of its constituent parts. Yet, Durkheim’s insistence that the
function of a part for the social whole always be examined sometimes led
him, and certainly many of his followers, into questionable teleological
reasoning. For example, even when distinguishing cause and function in
his major methodological statement, he leaves room for an illegitimate
teleological interpretation: “Consequently, to explain a social fact it is
not enough to show the cause on which it depends; we must also, at least
in most cases, show its function in the establishment of social order.”
In this summary phrase, I think that the words “in the establishment
of” could connote that the existence of system parts can be explained
only by the whole, or social order, that they function to maintain. From
this view, it is only a short step to outright teleology: the social fact in
question is caused by the needs of the social order that the fact fulfills.
Such theoretical statements do not necessarily have to be illegitimate, for
it is conceivable that a social system could be programmed to meet certain
needs or designated ends and thereby have the capacity to cause variations
in cultural items or “social facts” in order to meet these needs or ends.
But if such a system is being described by an analyst, it is necessary to
document how the system is programmed and how it operates to cause
variations in social facts to meet needs or ends. As the above quotation
illustrates, Durkheim did not have this kind of system in mind when he
formulated his particular brand of functional analysis; thus, he did not
wish to state his arguments teleologically.
Despite his warnings to the contrary, Durkheim appears to have taken
this short step into teleological reasoning in his substantive works. In his
first major work on the division of labor, Durkheim went to great lengths
to distinguish between cause (increased population and moral density)
and function (integration of society).
However, the causal statements often become fused with functional
statements. The argument is, generally, like this: population density in-
creases moral density (rates of contact and interaction); moral density
leads to competition, which threatens the social order; in turn, compe-
tition for resources results in the specialization of tasks; and specialization
creates pressures for mutual interdependence and increased willingness
to accept the morality of mutual obligation. This transition to a new
social order is not made consciously, or by “unconscious wisdom”; yet,
the division of labor is necessary to restore the order that “unbridled

*Tbid., p. 97.
 FUNCTIONALISM AND THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL TRADITION 47

‘competition might otherwise destroy.’ Hence, the impression is left that

the threat or the need for social order causes the division of labor. Such
reasoning can be construed as an illegitimate teleology, since the conse-
quence or result of the division of labor—social order—is the implied cause
of it. At the very least, then, cause and function are not kept as analytically
separate as Durkheim so often insisted.
In sum, then, despite Durkheim’s warnings about illegitimate teleol-
ogy, he often appears to waver on the brink of the very traps he wished
to avoid. I suspect that the reason for this failing can probably be traced
to the organismic assumptions built into his form of sociological analysis.
In taking a strong sociologistic position on the question of emergent prop-
erties—that is, on the irreducibility of the whole to its individual parts—
Durkheim separated sociology from the utilitarianism as well as naive
psychology and anthropology of his day.?” However, in supplementing this
emphasis on the social whole with organismic assumptions of function,
requisite, need, and normality/pathology, Durkheim helped weld orga-
nismic principles to, sociological theory for nearly three quarters of a
century. The brilliance of his analysis of substantive topics, as well as the
suggestive features of his analytical work, made a functional mode of
analysis highly appealing to subsequent generations of sociologists and
anthropologists.

FUNCTIONALISM AND THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL

TRADITION
I think that functionalism might have died with Durkheim except for the
fact that anthropologists began to find it an appealing way to analyze
simple societies. Indeed, functionalism as a well-articulated conceptual
perspective was perpetuated in the first half of the 20th century by the
writings of two anthropologists, Bronislaw Malinowski and A. R. Rad-
cliffe-Brown”8. Each of these thinkers was heavily influenced by the or-
ganicism of Durkheim, as well as by their own field studies among prim-
itive societies. Despite the similarities in their intellectual backgrounds,

*Ibid., p. 35. For a more detailed analysis, see my and Alexandra Maryanski’s Func-
tionalism (Menlo Park, Calif.: Benjamin-Cummings, 1978). See also Percy S. Cohen, Modern
Social Theory (New York: Basic Books, 1968), pp. 35-37.
27Robert A. Nisbet, Emile Durkheim (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp.
9-102.
For basic references on Malinowski’s functionalism, see his “Anthropology,” Encyclo-
pedia Britannica, supplementary vol. 1 (London and New York, 1936); A Scientific Theory
of Culture (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944); and Magic, Science, and
Religion and Other Essays (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1948). For basic references on A, R.
Radcliffe-Brown’s functionalism, see his ‘““Structure-and Function in Primitive Society,”
American Anthropologist 37 (July-September 1935), pp. 58-72; Structure and Function in
Primitive Society (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1952); and The Andaman Islanders (Glencoe,
Ill.: Free Press, 1948). See also Turner and Maryanski, Functionalism.
48 CHAPTER 2 / THE EMERGENCE OF FUNCTIONALISM

owski and Rad-

however, the conceptual perspectives developed by Malin
.
cliffe-Brown reveal a considerable number of dissimilarities

The Functionalism of A. R. Radcliffe-Brown

(1881-1955)
Recognizing that “the concept of function applied to human societies is
based on an analogy between social life and organic life” and that “the
first systematic formulation of the concept as applying to the strictly
scientific study of society was performed by Durkheim,” Radcliffe-Brown
tried to indicate how some of the problems of organismic analogizing
might be overcome.” For him, the most serious problem with function-
alism was the tendency for analysis to appear teleological. Noting that
Durkheim’s definition of function pertained to the way in which a part
fulfills system needs, Radcliffe-Brown emphasized that, in order to avoid
the teleological implications of such analysis, it would be necessary to
“substitute for the term ‘needs’ the term ‘necessary condition of exist-
ence.’” In doing so, he felt that no universal human or societal needs
would be postulated; rather, the question of which conditions were nec-
essary for survival would be an empirical one, an issue that would have
to be discovered for each given social system. Furthermore, in recognizing
the diversity of conditions necessary for the survival of different systems,
analysis would avoid asserting that every item of a culture must have a
function and that items in different cultures must have the same function.
Once the dangers of illegitimate teleology were recognized, functional
or, to use his term, structural analysis could legitimately proceed from
several assumptions: (1) One necessary condition for survival of a society
is minimal integration of its parts; (2) The term function refers to those
processes that maintain this necessary integration or solidarity; (3) Thus,
in each society structural features can be shown to contribute to the
maintenance of necessary solidarity. In such an analytical approach, social
structure and the conditions necessary for its survival are irreducible. In
a vein similar to that of Durkheim, Radcliffe-Brown saw society as a
reality in and of itself. For this reason he was usually led to visualize
cultural items, such as kinship rules and religious rituals, as explicable in
terms of social structure—particularly its need for solidarity and integra-
tion. For example, in analyzing a lineage system, Radcliffe-Brown would
first assume that some minimal degree of solidarity must exist in the
system. Processes associated with lineage systems would then be assessed
in terms of their consequences for maintaining this solidarity. The con-
clusion was that lineage systems provided a systematic way of adjudicating

*Radcliffe-Brown, “Structure and Function in Primitive Society,” p. 68. This statement

is, of course, ; incorrect, ,s since the organis mic analogy was far more developed in Spencer's
ismi
work. ‘ "
 FUNCTIONALISM AND THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL TRADITION 49

conflict in societies where families owned land, because such a system

specified who had the right to land and through which side of the family
it would always pass. In doing so, the integration of the economic system—
landed estates owned by families—is explained.*°
I believe that this form of analysis poses a number of problems that
continue to haunt functional theorists. Although Radcliffe-Brown ad-
mitted that ‘functional unity [integration] of a social system is, of course,
a hypothesis,” he failed to specify the analytical criteria for assessing just
how much or how little functional unity is necessary for system survival,
to say nothing of specifying the operations necessary for testing this
hypothesis. As subsequent commentators were to discover, without some
analytical criteria for determining what is and what is not minimal fnc-
tional integration and societal survival, the hypothesis cannot be tested,
even in principle. Thus, what is typically done is to assume that the
existing system is minimally integrated and surviving because it exists
and persists. Without carefully documenting how various cultural items
promote instances both of integration and malintegration of the social
whole, such a strategy can reduce the hypothesis of functional unity to a
tautology: if one can find a system to study, then it must be minimally
integrated; therefore, lineages that are a part of that system must promote
this integration. To discover the contrary would be difficult, since the
system, by virtue of being a system, is already composed of integrated
parts, such as a lineage system. I see a non sequitur in such reasoning,
since it is quite possible to view a cultural item like a lineage system as
having both integrative and malintegrative (and other) consequences for
the social whole. In his actual ethnographic descriptions, Radcliffe-Brown
often slips inadvertently into a pattern of circular reasoning: the fact of
a system’s existence requires that its existing parts, such as a lineage
system, be viewed as contributing to the system’s existence. Assuming
integration and then assessing the contribution of individual parts to the
integrated whole leads to an additional analytical problem. Such a mode
of analysis implies that the causes of a particular structure—for example,
lineages—lie in the system’s needs for integration, which is, I think, most
likely an illegitimate teleology.
Radcliffe-Brown would, of course, have denied my conclusions. His
awareness of the dangers of illegitimate teleology would have seemingly
eliminated the implication that the needs of a system cause the emergence
of its parts. And his repeated assertions that the notion of function “does
not require the dogmatic assertion that everything in the life of every
community has a function” should have led to a rejection of tautological

*Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function in Primitive Society, pp. 31-50. For a sec-
ondary analysis of this example, see Arthur L. Stinchcumbe, ‘“Specious Generality and
Functional Theory,” American Sociological Review 26 (December 1961), pp. 929-30.
50 CHAPTER 2 / THE EMERGENCE OF FUNCTIONALISM

Radcliffe-
reasoning.*! However, I think that much like Durkheim, what
the concrete
Brown asserted analytically was frequently not practiced in
red
empirical analysis of societies. Such lapses were not intended but appea
and
to be difficult to avoid when functional needs, functional integration,
equilibrium are operating assumptions.”
Thus, while Radcliffe-Brown displayed an admirable awareness of the
dangers of organicism—especially of the problem of illegitimate teleology
and the hypothetical nature of notions of solidarity—he all too often slipped
into a pattern of questionable teleological reasoning. Forgetting that in-
tegration was only a working hypothesis, he opened his analysis to prob-
lems of tautology. Such problems were persistent in Durkheim’s analysis;
and despite his attempts to the contrary, their spectre haunted even Rad-
cliffe-Brown’s insightful essays and ethnographies.

The Functionalism of Bronislaw Malinowski

(1884-1942)
I think that functionalism would have ended with Radcliffe-Brown be-
cause it had very little to offer sociologists attempting to study complex
societies. Both Durkheim and Radcliffe-Brown posited one basic societal
need—integration—and then analyzed system parts in terms of how they
meet this need. For sociologists who are concerned with differentiated
societies, this is likely to become a rather mechanical task. Moreover, it
does not allow for analysis of those aspects of a system part that are not
involved in meeting the need for integration.
It was Bronislaw Malinowski’s functionalism that was to remove these
restrictions; by reintroducing Spencer’s approach, it offered a way for
modern sociologists to employ functional analysis.** Malinowski’s scheme
reintroduced two important ideas from Spencer: (1) the notion of system
levels and (2) the concept of different and multiple system needs at each
level. In making these two additions, Malinowski made functional analysis
more appealing to 20th-century sociological theorists.
In Malinowski’s scheme, there are three system levels: the biological,
the social structural, and the symbolic.** At each of these levels, one can

See for example, Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function in Primitive Society.

, 2A perceptive critic of an early draft of this manuscript provided an interesting way to
visualize the problems of tautology:
When do you have a surviving social system?
When certain survival requisites are met.
How do you know when certain surviva! requisites are met?
When you have a surviving social system.
-*Don Martindale, The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1960), p. 459.
“Bronislaw Malinowski, A Scientific Theory of Culture and Other Essays (London:
= pee Press, 1964), pp. 71-125; see also Turner and Maryanski, Functionalism,
pp. 44-57.
 SS Seere va’
Vids.

FUNCTIONALISM AND THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL TRADITION 51

SS AE ES TS TA A SS AS GES, RRR EK UNE ARE ELE A a

TABLE 2-1 Requisites of System Levels

Cultural (Symbolic) System Level

1. Requisites for systems of symbols that provide information necessary to adjust to
the environment.
2. Requisites for systems of symbols that provide a sense of control over people’s
destiny and over chance events.
3. Requisites for systems of symbols that provide members of a society with a sense
of a ‘‘communal rhythm’ in their daily lives and activities.
Structural (Instrumental) System Level
1. The requisite for production and distribution of consumer goods.
2. The requisite for social control of behavior and its regulation.
3. The requisite for education of people in traditions and skills.
4. The requisite for organization and execution of authority relations.

discern basic needs or survival requisites that must be met if biological

health, social-structural integrity, and cultural unity are to exist. More-
over, these system levels constitute a hierarchy, with biological systems
at the bottom, social/structural arrangements next, and symbolic systems
at the highest level. Malinowski stressed that the way in which needs are
met at one system level sets constraints on how they are met at the next —
level in the hierarchy. Yet, he did not advocate a reductionism of any
sort; indeed, he thought that each system level reveals its own distinctive
requisites and processes meeting these needs. Additionally, he argued that
the important system levels for sociological or anthropological analysis
are the structural and symbolic. And in this actual discussion, it is the
social-structural level that receives the most attention. In Table 2-1, the
requisites or needs of the two most sociologically relevant system levels
are listed.
In analyzing the structural system level, Malinowski stressed that
institutional analysis is necessary. For Malinowski, institutions are the
general and relatively stable ways in which activities are organized.to
meet critical requisites. All institutions, he felt, have certain universal
properties or “elements” that can be listed and then used as dimensions
for comparing different institutions. These universal elements are:

1. Personnel: Who and how many people participate in the institution?

2. Charter: What is the purpose of the institution; what are its avowed
goals?
3. Norms: What are the key norms that regulate and organize conduct?
4. Material apparatus: What is the nature of tools and facilities used
to organize and regulate conduct in pursuit of goals?
aon. Activity: How are tasks and activities divided? Who does what?

6. Function: What requisite does a pattern of institutional

activity meet?
52 CHAPTER 2 / THE EMERGENCE OF FUNCTIONALISM

Malinowski
By describing each institution along these six dimensions,
tick for com-
believed that he had provided a common analytical yards
societies. He
paring patterns of social organization within and between
ns as they
even went so far as to construct a list of universal institutio
resolve not just structural but also biological and symbolic requisites.
In sum, I think that Malinowski’s functional approach opened new
possibilities for sociologists who had long forgotten Spencer’s similar ar-
guments. He suggested to sociologists that attention to system levels is
critical in analyzing requisites; he argued that there are universal requi-
sites for each system level; he forcefully emphasized that the structural
level is the essence of sociological analysis; and much like Spencer before
him and Talcott Parsons a decade later (see next chapter), he posited —
four universal functional needs at this level—economic adaptation, polit-
ical authority, educational socialization, and social control—which were
to be prominent in subsequent functional schemes. Moreover, he provided
a clear method for analyzing institutions as they operate to meet func-
tional requisites. It is fair to say, therefore, that Malinowski drew the
rough contours for modern sociological functionalism.

FUNCTIONALISM AND THE GHOST OF MAX WEBER

I would be remiss if I did not address the impact of Max Weber on
sociological theory. During the latter 19th century and into the early part
of this century, Weber developed a particular approach for sociological
analysis. His approach in a wide range of substantive areas—economic
sociology, stratification, complex organizations, sociology of religion, au-
thority and social change, for example—still guides modern research and
theory in these areas. In the development of general theoretical orien-
tations, however, Weber’s influence has been less direct. Although his
impact-on some perspectives is clear, I think that his influence on func-
tionalism is less evident. »nd yet, because several contemporary func-
tionalists were so important in initially exposing American scholars to
Weber’s thought, I consider it unlikely that these functionalists’ theoriz-
ing was not influenced by the power of his approach.
What, then, has been Weber’s impact on the emergence of function-
alism? Generally, I see two aspects of Weber’s work as having had an
important influence: (1) his substantive vision of “social action” and (2)
his strategy for analyzing social structures. Weber argued that sociology
must understand social phenomena on two levels, at the “level of mean-
ing” of the actors themselves and at the level of collective action among
groupings of actors. Weber’s substantive view of the world and his strategy
for analyzing its features were thus influenced by these dual concerns. In
many ways, Weber viewed two realities—that of the subjective meanings
 FUNCTIONALISM AND THE GHOST OF MAX WEBER 53

of actions and that of the emergent regularities of social institutions.

Much functionalism similarly addresses this dualism: How do the sub-
jective states of actors influence emergent patterns of social organization
and vice versa?
As I will discuss shortly, Talcott Parsons, in particular, labeled his
functionalism action theory, and his early theoretical scheme was devoted
to analyzing the basic components and processes of the subjective pro-
cesses of individual actors. But, much like Weber, Parsons and other
functionalists were to move to a more macroscopic concern with emergent
patterns of collective action.
| This shift from the micro to macro represents only part of the We-
berian analytical strategy. One of the most enduring analytical legacies
of Weber is his strategy for constructing ‘ideal types.” For Weber, an
ideal type represented a category system for “analytically accentuating”
the important features of social phenomena. Ideal types are abstractions
from empirical reality, and their purpose is to highlight certain common
features among similar processes and structures. Moreover, they can be
used to compare and contrast empirical events in different contexts by
providing a common analytical yardstick. By noting the respective de-
viations of two or more concrete, empirical situations from the ideal type,
it is possible to compare these two situations and thus better understand
them. And thus, for virtually all phenomena studied by Weber—religion,
organizations, power, and the like—he constructed an ideal type in order
to visualize its structure and functioning. In many ways, I think that the
ideal-type strategy corresponds to taxonomic procedures for categorizing
species and for describing somatic structures and processes in the bio-
logical science. I see it as encouraging a concern with conceptual schemes
and categories rather than propositions and laws. And so, although We-
ber’s work is devoid of the extensive organismic imagery of Durkheim’s
or Spencer’s, the concern with categorization of different social structures
is, I believe, highly compatible with the organismic reasoning of early
functionalism. Thus, it is not surprising that contemporary functionalists
borrowed the substantive vision of the world implied by the concepts of
structure and function as well as Weber’s use of the taxonomic approach
for studying structures and processes.
For functionalists in general and Talcott Parsons in particular, the
construction of conceptual schemes remains an important activity. Func-
tionalists elaborately categorize the social world in order to emphasize
the importance of some structures and processes for maintaining the social
system. For example, much like Weber before him, Parsons first developed

8% or basic references on Weber, see his The Theory of Social and Economic Organization
(New York: Free Press, 1947); “Social Action and its Types” in Theories of Society, ed.
Talcott Parsons et al. (New York: Free Press, 1961); Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds..
From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958).
54 CHAPTER 2 / THE EMERGENCE OF FUNCTIONALISM

a category system for individual social action and then elaborated this
initial system of categories into an incredibly complex, analytical edifice
of concepts. What is important to recognize is that this strategy of de-
veloping category systems first and then propositions about the relation-
ships. among categorized phenomena lies at the heart of contemporary
functionalism. This emphasis on category systems is, no doubt, one of
the subtle ways that Weber’s ideal-type strategy continues to influence
functional theorizing in sociology.

THE EMERGENCE OF FUNCTIONALISM:

AN OVERVIEW
With its roots in the organicism of the early 19th century, functionalism
is the oldest and, until recent decades, the dominant conceptual per-
spective in sociology. The organicism of Comte and later that of Spencer
and Durkheim clearly influenced the first functional anthropologists—
Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown—who, in turn, with Durkheim’s timeless
analysis, helped shape the more modern functional perspectives. Coupled
with Weber’s emphasis on social taxonomies, or ideal types, of both sub-
jective meaning and social structure, a strategy for studying the properties
of the “‘social organism” similarly began to shape contemporary
functionalism.
In emphasizing the contribution of sociocultural items to the main-
tenance of a more inclusive systemic whole, early functional theorists
often conceptualized social needs or requisites. The most extensive for-
mulations of this position were of Malinowski, in which institutional
arrangements meet one of various levels of needs or requisites: biological,
structural, and symbolic. For Emile Durkheim and A. R. Radcliffe-Brown,
it was important to analyze sepurately the causes and functions of a
sociocultural item, since the causes of an item could be unrelated to its
function in the systemic whole. In their analyses of actual phenomena,
however, both Durkheim and Radcliffe-Brown lapsed into assertions that
the need for integration caused a particular event—for example, the emer-
gence of a particular type of lineage system or the division of labor.
I see their tendency to blur the distinction between cause and function
as generating two related problems in the analyses of Durkheim and Rad-
cliffe-Brown: (1) tautology and (2) illegitimate teleology. To say that
a
structural item, such as the division of labor, emerges because of the need
for social integration is a teleological assertion, for an end state (social
integration) is presumed to cause: the event (the division of labor), which
brings about this very end state. Such a statement is not necessar
ily
illegitimate, since indeed, the social world is rife with systemic
wholes
that initiate and regulate the very structures and processes maintain
ing
them. However, to assert that the need for integration is the cause
of the
division of labor is probably an illegitimate teleology: To make
the te-
 THE EMERGENCE OF FUNCTIONALISM: AN OVERVIEW 55

leology legitimate would require some documentation of the causal chain

of events through which needs for integration operate to produce a di-
vision of labor. Without such documentation, the statement is vague and
theoretically vacuous. Assumptions about and taxonomies of system needs
and requisites also create problems of tautology. For unless clear-cut and
independent criteria can be established to determine when a system req-
uisite is fulfilled or not fulfilled theoretical statements become circular: a
surviving system is meeting its survival needs; the system under study is
surviving; a sociocultural item is a part of this system; therefore, it is
likely that this item is meeting the system’s needs. Such statements are
true by definition, since no independent criteria exist for assessing when
a requisite is met and whether a given item meets these criteria. To stretch
Durkheim’s analysis for purposes of illustration, without clear criteria for
determining what constitutes integration and what levels of it denote a
surviving system, the statement that the division of labor meets an ex-
isting system’s needs for integration must be true by definition, since the
system exists and is\therefore surviving and the division of labor is its
most conspicuous integrative structure.
In looking back 6n the theoretical efforts of early functionalists, then,
I would see the legacy of their work as follows:
1. The social world was viewed in systemic terms. For the most part,
such systems were considered to have needs and requisites that
had to be met to assure survival.
2. Despite their concern with evolution, thinkers tended to view sys-
tems with needs and requisites as having normal and pathological
states—thus connoting system equilibrium and homeostasis.
3. When viewed as a system, the social world was seen as composed
of mutually interrelated parts; the analysis of these interrelated
parts focused on how they fulfilled requisites of systemic wholes
and, hence, maintained system normality or equilibrium.
4. By typically viewing interrelated parts in relation to the mainte-
nance of a systemic whole, causal analysis frequently became vague,
lapsing into tautologies and illegitimate teleologies.
Much of contemporary functionalism has attempted to incorporate
the suggestiveness of early functional analysis—especially the conception
of system as composed of interrelated parts.** At the same time, current
forms of functional theorizing have tried to cope with the analytical prob-
lem of teleology and tautology, which Durkheim and Radcliffe-Brown so

*For a more thorough analysis of the historical legacy of functionalism, see Don Mar-
tindale’s The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory and his “Limits of and Alternatives
to Functionalism in Sociology,” in Functionalism in the Social Sciences, American Academy
of Political and Social Science Monograph, no. 5 (Philadelphia, 1965), pp. 144-62; see also
in this monograph, Ivan Whitaker, “The Nature and Value of Functionalism in Sociology,”
pp. 127-43.
56 CHAPTER 2 / THE EMERGENCE OF FUNCTIONALISM

unsuccessfully tried to avoid. In borrowing the 19th-century organicism

and in exploiting conceptually the utility of viewing system parts as having
implications for the operation of systemic wholes, modern functionalism
provided early sociological theorizing with a unified conceptual perspective.
Moreover, in developing a concern with conceptual schemes as op-
posed to systems of propositions, functional theory often appeared to
order the complexities of social structures and processes. Yet, the ade-
quacy of this perspective has increasingly been called into question in
recent decades. For, as I will emphasize throughout this book, this ques-
tioning has often led to excessively polemical and counterproductive de-
bates in sociology. On the positive side, however, the controversy over
functional theorizing has also stimulated attempts to expand upon old
conceptual perspectives and to develop new perspectives as alternatives
to what are perceived to be the inadequacies of functionalism. But for
the present, let me concentrate on a detailed overview of contemporary
functional theorizing.
__._ The Analytical Functionalism
__
of Talcott Parsons

Talcott Parsons was probably the most dominant theorist of his time. It
is unlikely, I suspect, that any one theoretical approach will so dominate
sociological theory again. For in the years between 1950 and the late 1970s,
Parsonian functionalism was clearly the focal point around which theo- |
retical controversy raged. Even those who despised Parsons’ functional
approach could not ignore it; and even now, several years after his death
and well over a decade since its period of dominance, Parsonian func-
tionalism is still the subject of controversy.! To appreciate Parsons’
achievement, I think it best to start at the beginning in 1937 when he
published his first major work, The Structure of Social Action,? and then,
I will trace the continuity of the scheme as it evolved over the next four
decades.°

1Although few appear to agree with all aspects of Parsonian theory, rarely has anyone
quarreled with the assertion that he has-been the dominant sociological figure of this century.
For documentation of Parsons’ influence, see Robert W. Friedrichs, A Sociology of Sociology
(New York: Free Press, 1970); and Alvin W. Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western
Sociology (New York: Basic Books, 1970).
2Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937); the
most recent paperback edition (New York: Free Press, 1968) will be used in subsequent
footnotes.
3]t has been emphasized again and again that such continuity does not exist in Parsons’
work. For the most often quoted source of this position, see Joseph F. Scott, ‘““The Changing
Foundations of the Parsonian Action Scheme,” American Sociological Review 28 (October
1969), pp. 716-35. This position is held to be incorrect in the analysis to follow. In addition
to the present discussion, see also Jonathan H. Turner and Leonard Beeghley, “Current
Folklore in the Criticisms of Parsonian Action Theory,” Sociological Inquiry 44 (Winter
1974). See also Parsons’ reply and comments on this article, ibid. For more recent comments

57
 OF TALCOTT PARSONS
58 CHAPTER 3 / THE ANALYTICAL FUNCTIONALISM

THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION

re-
In The Structure of Social Action, Parsons advocated an “analytical
a
alism” in building sociological theory. Theory in sociology must utilize
of
limited number of important concepts that “adequately ‘grasp’ aspects
the external world ... These concepts do not correspond to concrete
phenomena, but to elements in them which are analytically separable from
other elements.’ Thus, first of all, theory must involve the development
of concepts that abstract from empirical reality, in all its diversity and
confusion, common analytical elements. In this way, concepts will isolate
phenomena from their embeddedness in the complex relations that go to
make up social reality.
The unique feature of Parsons’ analytical realism is the insistence on
how these abstract concepts are to be employed in sociological analysis.
Parsons did not advocate the immediate incorporation of these concepts
into theoretical statements but rather their use to develop a “generalized
system of concepts.” This use of abstract concepts would involve their
ordering into a coherent whole that would reflect the important features
of the “real world.’’ What is sought is an organization of concepts into
analytical systems that grasp the salient and systemic features of the
universe without being overwhelmed by empirical details. This emphasis
upon systems of categories represents Parsons’ application of Max We-
ber’s ideal-type strategy for analytically accentuating salient features of
the world. Thus, much like Weber’s work, Parsons believed that theory
should initially resemble an elaborate classification and categorization of
social phenomena that reflects significant features in the organization of
these social phenomena. In the terms of my discussion in Chapter 1,
Parsons sought to develop a naturalistic/positivistic conceptual scheme.
For in Parsons’ view, the empirical world does reveal fundamental prop-
erties that can be isolated and studied by a classificatory conceptual scheme.
My sense is that Parsons had more than classification in mind. How-
ever, he was advocating the priority of developing systems of concepts
over systems of abstract propositions. Concepts in theory should not be
incorporated into propositions prematurely. They must first be ordered
into analytical systems that are isomorphic with the systemic coherence
of reality; then, if one is so inclined, operational definitions can be devised
and the concepts can be incorporated into true theoretical statements.
Thus, only after systemic coherence among abstract concepts has been
achieved is it fruitful to begin the job of constructing true theory. Parsons’

ce pelea | Si! te See

on this issue, see Dean Robert Gerstein, “A Note on the Continuity of Parsonian Action
Theory,’ Sociological Inquiry 46 (Winter 1976); Richard Minch, “Talcott Parsons and the
Theory of Action I: The Structure of the Kantian Lore” and “Talcott Parsons and the
Theory of Action II: The Continuity of the Development,” both in American Journal of
Sociology 86 (December 1981) and 87 (February 1982), respectively, pp. 709-739, 771-826.
‘Parsons, Structure of Social Action. p. 730.
 THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION 59

subsequent theoretical and substantive work makes sense, I feel, only after
this classificatory strategy is comprehended. For indeed, throughout his
intellectual career—from The Structure of Social Action to his recent
death—Parsons adhered to this strategy for building sociological theory.
Parsons’ strategy for theory building maintains a clear-cut ontological
position: the social universe displays systemic features that must be cap-
tured by a parallel ordering of abstract concepts. Curiously, the substan-
tive implications of this strategy for viewing the world as composed of
systems were recessive in The Structure of Social Action. Much more
conspicuous were assumptions about the “voluntaristic” nature of the
social world.
The “voluntaristic theory of action” represented for Parsons a syn-
thesis of the useful assumptions and concepts of utilitarianism, positivism,
and idealism. In reviewing the thought of classical economists, Parsons
noted the excessiveness of their utilitarianism: unregulated and atomistic
actors in a free and competitive marketplace rationally attempting to
choose those behaviors that will maximize their profits in their trans-
actions with others. Such a formulation of the social order presented for
Parsons a number of critical problems: Do humans always behave ra-
tionally? Are they indeed free and unregulated? How is order possible in
an unregulated and competitive system? Yet, Parsons saw as fruitful sev-
eral features of utilitarian thought, especially the concern with actors as
seeking goals and the emphasis on the choice-making capacities of human
beings who weigh alternative lines of action. Stated in this minimal form,
Parsons felt that the utilitarian heritage could indeed continue to inform
sociological theorizing. In a similar critical stance, Parsons rejected the
extreme formulations of radical positivists, who tended to view the social
world in terms of observable cause-and-effect relationships among phys-
ical phenomena. In so doing, he felt, they ignored the complex symbolic
functionings of the human mind. Furthermore, Parsons saw the emphasis
on observable cause-and-effect relationships as too easily encouraging a
sequence of infinite reductionism: groups were reduced to the causal re-
lationships of their individual members; individuals were reducible to the
cause-and-effect relationships of their physiological processes; these were
reducible to physicochemical relationships, and so on, down to the most

®See ibid., especially pp. 3-43, 727-76. For an excellent secondary analysis of Parsons’
position and why it does not appeal to the critics, see Enno Schwanenberg, “The Two
Problems of Order in Parsons’ Theory: An Analysis from Within,” Social Forces 49 (June
1971), pp. 569-81.
*For a more recent analysis of Parsons’ work in relation to the issues he raised in The
Structure of Social Action, see Leon Mayhew, “In Defense of Modernity: Talcott Parsons
and the Utilitarian Tradition,” American Journal of Sociology 89 (May 1984), pp. 1273-
1306; and Jeffrey C. Alexander, “Formal and Substantive Voluntarism in the Work of Talcott
Parsons: A Theoretical Reinterpretation,” American Sociological Review 43 (Winter 1978),
pp. 177-98.
 T PARSONS
60 CHAPTER 3 / THE ANALYTICAL FUNCTIONALISM OF TALCOT

basic cause-and-effect connections among particles of physical matter.

Nevertheless, despite these extremes, radical positivism draws attention
to the physical parameters of social life and to the deterministic impact
of these parameters on much—but, of course, not all—social organization.
Finally, in assessing idealism, Parsons saw as useful their conceptions of
‘Gdeas” as circumscribing both individual and social processes, although
all too frequently these ideas are seen as detached from the ongoing social
life they were supposed to regulate.
I cannot possibly communicate the depth of scholarship in Parsons’
analysis of these traditions. More important than the details of his anal-
ysis is the weaving of selected concepts from each of these traditions into
a voluntaristic theory of action.’ For it is at this starting point that, in
accordance with his theory-building strategy, Parsons began to construct
a functional theory of social organization. In this initial formulation, he
conceptualizes voluntarism as the subjective decision-making processes
of individual actors, but he views such decisions as the partial outcome
of certain kinds of constraints, both normative and situational. Volun-
taristic action therefore involves these basic elements: (1) Actors who, at
this point in Parsons’ thinking, are individual persons. (2) Actors are
viewed as goal seeking. (3) Actors are also in possession of alternative
means to achieve the goals. (4) Actors are confronted with a variety of
situational conditions, such as their own biological makeup and heredity
as well as various external ecological constraints, that influence the se-
lection of goals and means. (5) Actors are seen to be governed by values,
norms, and other ideas in that these ideas influence what is considered
a goal and what means are selected to achieve it. (6) Action involves
actors making subjective decisions about the means to achieve goals, all
of which are constrained by ideas and situational conditions.
Figure 3-1 represents this conceptualization of voluntarism. The pro-
cesses diagramed are often termed the unit act, with social action in-
volving a succession of such unit acts by one or more actors. I believe
that Parsons chose to focus on such basic units of action for at least two
reasons. First, he felt it necessary to synthesize the historical legacy of
social thought about the most basic social process and to dissect it into

"Recently, there has been considerable debate and acrimony over “de- Parsonizing” Weber
and Durkheim. The presumption is that Parsons gave a distorted portrayal of these and
other figures and it is necessary to reexamine their works in an effort to remove Parsons’
interpretation from them. This plea ignores two facts: (1) Parsons never maintained that
he was summarizing works; instead he was using works and selectively borrowing concepts
to build a theory of action. (2) All sociologists can read these classic thinkers for themselves
and derive their own interpretations; there is no reason that they should be overly influenced
by Parsons. For the relevant articles, see Jere Cohen, Lawrence E. Hazelrigg, and Whitney
Pope, De-Parsonizing Weber: A Critique of Parsons’ Interpretation of Weber’s Sociology,”
American Sociological Review 40 (April 1975), pp. 229-41; and Whitney Pope, Jere
Cohen
and Lawrence Hazelrigg, “On the Divergence of Weber and Durkheim: A Critique of Parsons
Convergence Thesis,” American Sociological Review 40 (August 1975), pp. 417-27.
 THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION 61

a a ote

FIGURE 3-1 The Units of Voluntaristic Action

Norms, values, and other “ideas”

Means,
aaa ae

Means»

Actor
Means3 Goals

Means,
a

Situational conditions

its most elementary components. Second, given his position on what the-
ory should be, the first analytical task in the development of sociological
theory is to isolate conceptually the systemic features of the most basic
unit from which more complex processes and structures are built.
Once these basic tasks were completed, I think Parsons began to ask:
how are unit acts connected to each other, and how can this connectedness
be conceptually represented? Indeed, near the end of The Structure of
Social Action, he recognized that “any atomistic system that deals only
with properties identifiable in the unit act ... will of necessity fail to
treat these latter elements adequately and be indeterminate as applied to
complex systems’ However, only the barest hints of what was to come
were evident in those closing pages.
Yet, perhaps only through the wisdom of hindsight, Parsons did offer
several clues about the features of these more complex systems. Most
notable, near the close of this first work, he emphasized that “the concept
of action points again to the organic property of action systems” [em-
phasis added].’ Buttressed by his strategy for building theory—that is, the
development of systems of concepts that mirror reality—it is clear that
he intended to develop a conceptual scheme that would capture the sys-
temic essence of social reality.
By 1945, eight years after he published The Structure of Social Action,
Parsons became more explicit about the form this analysis should take:

®Parsons, Structure of Social Action, pp. 748-49.

Ibid, p. 745.
 T PARSONS
62 CHAPTER 3 / THE ANALYTICAL FUNCTIONALISM OF TALCOT

FIGURE 3-2 Parsons’ Conception of Action, Interaction, and Institutionalization

Types of action ———> Interactions ——> Institutionalization ———» Social system

;
Modes of orientatio n——+ fe)
among fe)f
oriented interaction status, roles,
(1) Motivational (1) Instrumental actors iaetaied
a. Cognitive
b. Cathectic (2) Expressive
c. Evaluative
(3) Moral
(2) Value
a. Cognitive
b. Appreciative
c. Moral

“The structure of social systems cannot be derived directly from the actor-
situation frame of reference. It requires functional analysis of the
complications introduced by the interaction of a plurality of actors.”
More significantly, this functional analysis should allow notions of needs
to enter: “The functional needs of social integration and the conditions
necessary for the functioning of a plurality of actors as a ‘unit’ system
sufficiently well integrated to exist as such impose others.”"! Starting from
these assumptions, which bear a close resemblance to those of Spencer,
Durkheim, Radcliffe-Brown, and Malinowski, Parsons began to develop
a complex functional scheme. Let me now attempt to reconstruct this
transition from voluntaristic unit acts to a functional scheme emphasizing
the systemic properties of action.

THE SOCIAL SYSTEM

In Figure 3-2, I have summarized the transition from unit acts to social
system.” This transition occupies the early parts of Parsons’ next sig-
nificant work, The Social System. Drawing inspiration from Max We-
ber’s typological approach to this same topic,’4 Parsons views actors as
“oriented” to situations in terms of motives (needs and readiness to mo-
bilize energy) and values (conceptions about what is appropriate). There
are three types of motives: (1) cognitive (need for information), (2) cath-
ectic (need for emotional attachment), and (3) evaluative (need for as-
sessment). And, there are three correspunding types of values: (1) cog-
nitive (evaluation in terms of objective standards), (2) appreciative

Talcott Parsons, “The Present Position and Prospect of Systemic Theory in Sociology
,”
Essays in Sociological Theory (New York:-Free Press, 1949), p. 229.
7
"Ibid.
“See also my “The Concept of ‘Action’ in Sociological Analysis” in Analytical and
Sociological Theories of Action, ed., G. Seeba3 and Raimo Toumea (Dordrecht, Holland:
Reidel, 1985). ,
"Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: Free Press, 1951).

Press, 1968), pp.

1 _ Weber, Economy and Society, vol. 1 (Totowa, N.J.: Bedminister
 THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 63

(evaluation in terms of aesthetic standards), and (3) moral (evaluation in

terms of absolute rightness and wrongness). Parsons called these modes
of orientation. Although I often find this discussion vague, the general
idea seems to be that the relative salience of these motives and values for
any actor creates a composite type of action, which can be one of three
types: (1) instrumental (action oriented to realize explicit goals effi-
ciently), (2) expressive (action directed at realizing emotional satisfac-
tions), and (3) moral (action concerned with realizing standards of right
and wrong). That is, depending upon which modes of motivational and
value orientation are strongest, an actor will act in one of these basic
ways. For example, if cognitive motives are strong and cognitive values
most salient, their action will be primarily instrumental, although it will
also have expressive and moral content. Thus, the various combinations
and permutations of the modes of orientation—that is, motives and val-
ues—produce action geared in one of these general directions.
Thus, “unit acts” involve motivational and value orientations and
have a general direction as a consequence of what combination of values
and motives prevails for an actor. Thus far, Parsons only elaborated upon
his conceptualization of the unit act. Here is the critical next step, which,
as I mentioned earlier, was only hinted at in the closing pages of The
Structure of Social Action.
As variously oriented actors (in terms of their configuration of mo-
tivational and value orientations) interact, they come to develop agree-
ments and sustain patterns of interaction, which become “institution-
alized.’’ Such institutionalized patterns can be, in Parsons’ view,
conceptualized as a social system. Such a system represents an emergent
phenomenon that requires its own conceptual edifice. The normative or-
ganization of status-roles becomes Parsons’ key to this conceptualization;
that is, the subject matter of sociology is the organization of status, roles,
and norms. Yet, Parsons recognizes that the actors who are incumbent
in such status-roles are motivationally and value oriented; and thus, as
he does for patterns of interaction, the task now becomes one of concep-
tualizing these dimensions of action in systemic terms. The result is the
conceptualization of action as composed of three “interpenetrating action
systems”: the cultural, the social, and the personality. That is, the or-
ganization of unit acts into social systems requires a parallel concep-
tualization of motives and values that become, respectively, the person-
ality and cultural systems. The goal of action theory now becomes
understanding how institutionalized patterns of interaction (the social
system) are circumscribed by complexes of values, beliefs, norms, and
other ideas (the cultural system) and by configurations of motives and
role-playing skills (the personality system). Later, Parsons adds the or-
ganismic (subsequently called behavioral) system, but let me not get ahead
of the story. For at this stage of conceptualization, analyzing social sys-
tems involves developing a system of concepts that, first of all, captures
 OF TALCOTT PARSONS
64 CHAPTER 3 / THE ANALYTICAL FUNCTIONALISM

second, points
the systemic features of society at all its diverse levels and,
social systems,
to the modes of articulation among personality systems,
and cultural patterns.
To capture conceptually the systemic features of culture, social sys-
s
tem, and personality, Parsons wastes little time in introducing notion
of functional requisites for each of these basic components of action. Such
requisites pertain not only to the internal problems of the action com-
ponents but also to their articulation with one another. Following both
Durkheim’s and Radcliffe-Brown’s lead, he views integration within and
among the action systems as a basic survival requisite. Since the social
system is his major topic, Parsons is concerned with the integration within
the social system itself and between the social system and the cultural
patterns, on the one hand, and between the social system and the per-
sonality system, on the other. In order for such integration to occur, at
least two functional requisites must be met:

1. A social system must have “a sufficient proportion of its compo-

nent actors adequately motivated to act in accordance with the
requirements of its role system”
2. Social systems must avoid “commitment to cultural patterns which
either fail to define a minimum of order or which place impossible
demands on people and thereby generate deviance and conflict.”

Parsons made explicit the incorporation of requisites, which in later

works are expanded and made even more prominent. He then attempts
to develop a conceptual scheme that reflects the systemic interconnect-
edness of social systems, although he later returns to the integrative prob-
lems posed by the articulation of culture and personality with the social
system. Crucial to this conceptualization of the social system is the con-
cept of institutionalization, which refers to relatively stable patterns of
interaction among actors in statuses. Such patterns are normatively reg-
ulated and infused with cultural patterns. This infusing of values can
occur in two ways. First, norms regulating role behaviors can reflect the
general values and beliefs of culture. Second, cultural values and other
patterns can become internalized in the personality system and, hence,
affect that system’s need structure, which in turn determines an actor’s
willingness to enact roles in the social system.
. Parsons views institutionalization as both a process and a structure.
It is significant that he initially discusses the process of institutionali-
zation and only then refers to it as astructure—a fact that is often ignored
by critics who contend that action theory is overly structural. Let me
emphasize the point again by reference to Figure 3-2. As a process, in-

Talcott Parsons, The Social System, p. 27.

‘*Ibid., pp. 27-28.
 THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 65

stitutionalization can be portrayed in the following terms: (1) Actors who

are variously oriented enter into situations where they must interact. (2)
The way actors are oriented is a reflection of their need structure and
how this need structure has been altered by the internalization of cultural
patterns. (3) Through specific interaction processes—which are not clearly
indicated, but which by implication include role taking, role bargaining,
and exchange—norms emerge while actors adjust their orientations to each
other. (4) Such norms emerge as a way of adjusting the orientations of
actors to each other, but at the same time, they are circumscribed by
general cultural patterns. (5) In turn, these norms regulate subsequent
interaction, giving it stability. It is through such a process that institu-
tionalized patterns are created, maintained, or altered. —
As interactions become institutionalized, a social system can be said
to exist, as I have indicated in Figure 3-2. Parsons has typically been
concerned with whole societies, but a social system is not necessarily a
whole society. Indeed, any organized pattern of interaction, whether a
micro or macro form,is termed a social system. When focusing on total
societies or large parts of them, Parsons frequently refers to the constit-
uent social systems as subsystems of these larger systemic wholes.
In sum, then, institutionalization is the process through which social
structure is built up and maintained. Institutionalized clusters of roles—
or, to phrase it differently, stabilized patterns of interaction—comprise a
social system. When the given social system is large and is composed of
many interrelated institutions, these institutions are typically viewed as
subsystems. A total society may be defined as one large system composed
of interrelated institutions. At all times, for analytical purposes, it is
necessary to remember that a social system is circumscribed by cultural
patterns and infused with personality systems.
In his commitment to the development of concepts that reflected the
properties of all action systems, Parsons was led to a set of concepts
denoting some of the variable properties of these systems. Termed pattern
variables, they allow for the categorization of the modes of orientation
in personality systems, the value patterns of culture, and the normative
requirements in social systems. The variables are phrased in terms of
polar dichotomies that, depending upon the system under analysis, allow
for a rough categorization of decisions by actors, the value orientations
of culture, or the normative demands on status roles.
1. Affectivity-affective neutrality concerns the amount of emotion or
affect that is appropriate in a given interaction situation. Should
a great deal or little affect be expressed?
2. Diffuseness-specificity denotes the issue of how far-reaching ob-
ligations in an interaction situation are to be. Should the obliga-
tions be narrow and specific, or should they be extensive and diffuse?
3. Universalism-particularism points to the problem of whether evai-
uation and judgment of others in an interaction situation is to
 TT PARSONS
66 CHAPTER 3 / THE ANALYTICAL FUNCTIONALISM OF TALCO

apply to all actors or should all actors be assessed in terms of the

same standards?
4. Achievement-ascription deals with the issue of how to assess an
actor, whether in terms of performance or on the basis of inborn
qualities, such as sex, age, race, and family status. Should an actor
treat another on the basis of achievements or ascriptive qualities
that are unrelated to performance?
5. Self-collectivity denotes the extent to which action is to be oriented
to self-interest and individual goals or to group interests and goals.
Should actors consider their personal or self-related goals over
those of the group or large collectivity in which they are involved?"”

Some of these concepts, such as self-collectivity, have been dropped

from the action scheme, but others, such as universalism-particularism,
have assumed greater importance. But I believe that the intent of the
pattern variables has remained the same: to categorize dichotomies of
decisions, normative demands, and value orientations. However, in The
Social System, Parsons is inclined to view them as value orientations that
circumscribe the norms of the social system and the decisions of the
personality system. Thus, the structure of the personality and social sys-
tems is a reflection of the dominant patterns of value orientations in
culture. This implicit emphasis on the impact of cultural patterns on
regulating and controlling other systems of action was to become more
explicit in later work, as I will discuss shortly.
For the present, however, it is evident that by 1951, Parsons had
already woven a complex conceptual system that emphasizes the process
of institutionalization of interaction into stabilized patterns called social
systems, which are penetrated by personality and circumscribed by cul-
ture. The profile of institutionalized norms, of decisions by actors in roles,
and of cultural value orientations can be typified in terms of concepts—
the pattern variables—that capture the variable properties in each of these
components of action.
. Having built this analytical edifice, Parsons returns to a question first
raised in The Structure of Social Action, which guided all his subsequent
theoretical formulations: How do social systems survive? More specifi-
cally, why do institutionalized patterns of interaction persist? I think that
it is clear now such questions raise the issue of system imperatives or
requisites. For Parsons is asking how systems resolve their integrative
problems. The answer to this question is provided by the elaboration of
additional concepts that point to the ways that personality systems and

, :
ete pattern variables were developed in collaboration with Edward Shils and were
oe ry in Toward a General Theory of Action (New York: Harper & Row, 1951).
+a “ , 20% “caycnlg Again, Parsons’ debt to Max Weber's concern with constructing
ypes can be seen in his presentation of the pattern variables.
 THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 67

FIGURE 3-3 Parsons’ Early Conception of Integration among Systems of

Action

Cultural <—_——

Maclie (a) Ideas as source

Internalization (b) Ideas as constraint
of values through
socialization system (a) Mechanisms of
socialization
(b) Mechanisms of
social control

Personality

culture are integrated into the social system, thereby providing assurance
of some degree of normative coherence and a minimal amount of com-
mitment by actors to conform to norms and play roles. In developing
concepts of this kind, Parsons begins to stress the equilibrating tendencies
of social systems, which, I believe, was a fatal mistake. For as I will discuss
shortly, Parsons left himself open here to severe criticism. But for the
moment, let me concentrate on his argument. I have diagrammatically
represented his reasoning in Figure 3-3. Now, I will fill in the details.
Just how are personality systems integrated into the social system,
thereby promoting equilibrium? At the most abstract level, Parsons con-
ceptualizes two mechanisms that integrate the personality into the social
system: (1) mechanisms of socialization and (2) mechanisms of social
control. It is through the operation of these mechanisms that personality
systems become structured such that they are compatible with the struc-
ture of social systems. Let me elaborate on each of these mechanisms.
1. In abstract terms, mechanisms of socialization are seen by
Parsons as the means through which cultural patterns—values, beliefs,
language, and other symbols—are internalized into the personality
system, thereby circumscribing its need structure. It is through this
process that actors are made willing to deposit motivational energy
in roles (thereby willing to conform to norms) and are given the
interpersonal and other skills necessary for playing roles. Another
function of socialization mechanisms is to provide stable and secure
interpersonal ties that alleviate much of the strain, anxiety, and ten-
sion associated with acquiring proper motives and skills.
2. Mechanisms of social control involve those ways in which sta-
tus-roles are organized in social systems to reduce strain and deviance.
There are numerous specific control mechanisms, including (a)
 M OF TALCOTT PARSONS
68 CHAPTER 3 / THE ANALYTICAL FUNCTIONALIS

clear and
institutionalization, which makes role expectations
adictory ex-
unambiguous while segregating in time and space contr
actors sub-
pectations; (b) interpersonal sanctions and gestures, which
in
tly employ to mutually sanction conformity; (c) ritual activities,
which actors act out symbolically sources of strain that could prove
-
disruptive while they reinforce dominant cultural patterns; (d) safety
valve structures, in which pervasive deviant propensities are segre-
gated in time and space from normal institutional patterns; (e) rein-
tegration structures, which are specifically charged with coping with
the bringing back into line deviant tendencies; and, finally, (f) the
institutionalization into some sectors of a system the capacity to use
force and coercion.
These two mechanisms are thus viewed as resolving one of the most
persistent integrative problems facing social systems. The other major
integrative problem facing social systems concerns how cultural patterns
contribute to the maintenance of social order and equilibrium. Again at
the most abstract level, Parsons visualizes two ways in which this occurs.
(1) Some components of culture, such as language, are basic resources
necessary for interaction to occur. Without symbolic resources, commu-
nication and hence interaction would not be possible. Thus, by providing
common resources for all actors, interaction is made possible by culture.
(2) A related but still separable influence of culture on interaction is
exerted through the substance of ideas contained in cultural patterns
(values, beliefs, ideology, and so forth). These ideas can provide actors
with common viewpoints, personal ontologies, or, to borrow from W. I.
Thomas, a common “definition of the situation.’”’ These common mean-
ings allow interaction to proceed smoothly with minimal disruption.
Naturally, Parsons acknowledges that the mechanisms of socializa-
tion and social control are not always successful, hence allowing deviance
and social change to occur. But it is clear that the concepts developed in
The Social System weigh analysis in the direction of looking for processes
that maintain the integration and, by implication, the equilibrium of
social systems. In Figure 3-4, I have summarized the logic of Parsons’
functionalism at this stage in the elaboration of his conceptual scheme.
I see subsequent developments in Parsons’ action theory as an attempt
to expand upon the basic analytical scheme of The Social System that is
summarized in Figures 3-2, 3-3, and 3-4 while trying to accommodate
some of the critics’ charges of a static and conservative conceptual bias
(see later section). I do not imagine that the many critics of Parsons will
ever be silenced, but some interesting elaborations of the scheme occurred
in the quarter century following Parsons’ first explicitly functional work.
Let me now turn to these.

THE TRANSITION TO FUNCTIONAL IMPERATIVISM

In collaboration with Robert Bales and Edward Shils, Parsons published
Working Papers in the Theory of Action shortly after The Social System.
 THE TRANSITION TO FUNCTIONAL IMPERATIVISM 69

FIGURE 3-4 Parsons’ Mechanism-Equilibrium Functional Analysis

= eee a errs = aan a a Sel EE SOS
Deviations from such equilibrium
states activate

The
Specific General ech
structures ————————» mechanisms for ———————________» oT
are types of integrating oe
evsinatndiines social system
personality into
social systems,
thereby allowing
for

It was in this work that conceptions of functional imperatives came to

dominate the general theory of action;!8 and by 1956, with Parsons’ and
Neil Smelser’s publication of Economy and Society, the functions of struc-
tures for meeting system requisites were well institutionalized into action
theory.'® :
During this period, systems of action were conceptualized to have
four survival problems, or requisites: adaptation, goal attainment, inte-
gration, and latency. Adaptation involves the problem of securing from
the environment sufficient facilities and then distributing these facilities
throughout the system. Goal attainment refers to the problem of estab-
lishing priorities among system goals and mobilizing system resources for
their attainment. /ntegration denotes the problem of coordinating and
maintaining viable interrelationships among system units. Latency em-
braces two related problems: pattern maintenance and tension manage-
ment. Pattern maintenance pertains to the problem of how to insure that
actors in the social system display the appropriate characteristics (mo-
tives, needs, role-playing skills, and so forth). Tension management con-
cerns the problem of dealing with the internal tensions and strains of
actors in the social system.
All of these requisites were, I think, implicit in The Social System,
but they tended to be viewed under the general problem of integration.
In Parson’s discussion of integration within and between action systems,
problems of securing facilities (adaptation), allocation and goal seeking
(goal attainment), socialization and social control (latency) were

Talcott Parsons, Robert F. Bales, and Edward A. Shils, Working Papers in the Theory
of Action (Glencoe, IIl.: Free Press, 1953).
Talcott Parsons and Neil J. Smelser, Economy and Society (New York: Free Press,
1956). These requisites are the same as those enumerated by Malinowski. See previous
chapter, Table 2-1.
 OF TALCOTT PARSONS
70 CHAPTER 3 / THE ANALYTICAL FUNCTIONALISM

onalism
FIGURE 3-5 Parsons’ Functional Imperativism or Requisite Functi

The survival
Specific A universal capacity of
ao gai — toy i
the social
:

mee requl system

A, G,l,or L, y
which, in turn,
determines
es
a imeie|

conspicuous. Thus, in my opinion, the development of the four functional

requisites—abbreviated A, G, I, and L—is not so much a radical departure
from earlier works but an elaboration of concepts implicit in The Social
System.
With the introduction of A, G, I, L, however, I see a subtle shift away
from the analysis of structures to the analysis of functions. Structures
are now viewed explicitly in terms of their functional consequences for
meeting the four requisites. Interrelationships among specific structures
are now analyzed in terms of how their interchanges affect the requisites
that each must meet. This shift can be seen in Figure 3-5, especially if
compared to Figure 3-4.
As Parsons’ conceptual scheme became increasingly oriented to func-
tion, social systems are divided into sectors, each corresponding to a
functional requisite—that is, A, G, I, or L. In turn, any subsystem can be
divided into these four functional sectors. And then, each of these sub-
systems can be divided into four functional sectors, and so on. This process
of “functional sectorization,” if I can invent a word to describe it, is
illustrated for the adaptive requisite in Figure 3-6.
Of critical analytical importance in this scheme are the interchanges
among systems and subsystems. It is difficult to comprehend the func-
tioning of a designated social system without examining the interchanges
among its A, G, I, and L sectors, especially since these interchanges are
affected by exchanges among constituent subsystems and other systems
in the environment. In turn, the functioning of a designated subsystem
cannot be understood without examining internal interchanges among its
adaptive, goal attainment, integrative, and latency sectors, especially since
these interchanges are influenced by exchanges with other subsystems
and the more inclusive system of which it is a subsystem. Thus, at this
juncture, as important interchanges among the functional sectors of sys-
tems and subsystems are outlined, the Parsonian scheme now begins to
resemble an elaborate mapping operation.

THE INFORMATIONAL HIERARCHY OF CONTROL

Toward the end of the 1950s, Parsons turned attention toward interre-
lationships among (rather than within) what were then four distinct ac-
 THE INFORMATIONAL HIERARCHY OF CONTROL 71

FIGURE 3-6 Parsons’ Functional imperativist View of Social Systems

Adaptation Goal attainment

Latency Integration

tion systems: culture, social structure, personality, and organism. In many

ways, I think this concern represented an odyssey back to the analysis
of the basic components of the unit act outlined in The Structure of
Social Action. But now, each element of the unit act is a full-fledged
action system, each confronting four functional problems to resolve: ad-
aptation, goal attainment, integration, and latency. Furthermore, al-
though individual decision making is still a part of action as personalities
adjust to the normative demands of status-roles in the social system, the
analytical emphasis has shifted to the input-output connections among
the four action systems.
It is at this juncture that Parsons begins to visualize an overall action
system, with culture, social structure, personality, and organism comprising
its constituent subsystems.”° Each of these subsystems is seen as fulfilling

*Talcott Parsons, “An Approach to Psychological Theory in Terms of the Theory of

 OF TALCOTT PARSONS
72 CHAPTER 3 / THE ANALYTICAL FUNCTIONALISM

ll action system.
one of the four system requisites—A, G, I, L—of the overa
g the most con-
The organism is considered to be the subsystem havin
ately through
sequences for resolving adaptive problems since it is ultim
to the other
this system that environmental resources are made available
system, per-
action subsystems. As the goal-seeking and decision-making
ving goal-
sonality is considered to have primary consequences for resol
rat-
attainment problems. As an organized network of status-norms integ
ing the patterns of the cultural system and the needs of personality sys-
tems, the social system is viewed as the major integrative subsystem of
the general action system. As the repository of symbolic content of in-
teraction, the cultural system is considered to have primary consequences
for managing tensions of actors and assuring that the proper symbolic
resources are available to assure the maintenance of institutional patterns
(latency).
After viewing each action system as a subsystem of a more inclusive,
overall one, Parsons begins to explore the interrelations among the four
subsystems. What emerges is a hierarchy of informational controls, with
culture informationally circumscribing the social system, social structure
informationally regulating the personality system, and personality infor-
mationally regulating the organismic system. For example, cultural value
orientations would be seen as circumscribing or limiting the range of
variation in the norms of the social system; in turn, these norms, as
translated into expectations for actors playing roles, would be viewed as
limiting the kinds of motives and decision-making processes in personality
systems; these features of the personality system would then be seen as
circumscribing biochemical processes in the organism. Conversely, each
system in the hierarchy is also viewed as providing the “‘energic condi-
tions” necessary for action at the next higher system. That is, the or-
ganism provides the energy necessary for the personality system, the per-
sonality system provides the energic conditions for the social system, and
the organization of personality systems into a social system provides the
conditions necessary for a cultural system. Thus, the input-output rela-
tions among action systems are reciprocal, with systems exchanging in-
formation and energy. Systems high in information circumscribe the uti-
lization of energy at the next lower system level, while each lower system
provides the conditions and facilities necessary for action in the next
higher system. This scheme has been termed a cybernetic hierarchy of
control. I have diagramed it in Figure 3-7.

Action,” in Psychology: A Science, ed. S. Koch, vol. 3 (New York: McGraw-Hill. 1958). pp.
612-711. By 1961, these ideas were even more clearly formulated: see Talcott Parsons, “An
Outline of the Social System,” in Theories of Society, ed. T. Parsons, E. Shils, K. D. Naegele,
and J. R. Pitts (New York: Free Press, 1961), pp. 30-38. See also Jackson Toby, “Parsons”
Theory of Social Evolution,” Contemporary Sociology 1 (September 1972), pp. 395-401,
 GENERALIZED MEDIA OF EXCHANGE 73

SE ES RAT RIT PB DEES TELE DA DETE NRE ADE PP SE BID Ett EAN ECT

FIGURE 3-7 Parsons’ Cybernetic Hierarchy of Control

Overall System Interrelations among

function level system levels

Latency Cultural system Informational

controls
Integration Social system

Goal attainment Personality system

Adaptation Organismic system Energic

conditions

GENERALIZED MEDIA OF EXCHANGE

Until his death, Parsons maintained his interest in the intra- and inter-
systemic relationships of the four action systems. Although he was never
to develop the concepts fully, he had begun to view these relationships
in terms of generalized symbolic media of exchange.”! In any interchange,
generalized media are employed—for example, money is used in the econ-
omy to facilitate the buying and selling of goods. What typifies these
generalized media, such as money, is that they are really symbolic modes
of communication. The money is not worth much by itself; its value is
evident only in terms of what it says symbolically in an exchange
relationship.
Thus, what Parsons proposes is that the links among action com-
ponents are ultimately informational. This means that transactions are
mediated by symbols. Parsons’ emphasis on information is consistent with
the development of the idea of a cybernetic hierarchy of control. Infor-
mational exchanges, or cybernetic controls, are seen as operating in at
least three ways. First, the interchanges or exchanges among the four
subsystems of the overall action system are carried out by means of dif-
ferent types of symbolic media; that is, money, power, influence, or com-
mitments. Second, the interchanges within any of the four action systems
are also carried out by means of distinctive symbolic media. Finally, the
system requisites of adaptation (A), goal attainment (G), integration (I),
and latency (L) determine the type of generalized symbolic media used
in an inter- or intrasystemic exchange.

21Parsons’ writings on this topic are incomplete, but see his “On the Concept of Political
Power,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 107 (June 1963), pp. 232-62;
Talcott Parsons, “On the Concept of Influence,” Public Opinion Quarterly 27 (Spring 1963),
pp. 37-62; and Talcott Parsons, “Some Problems of General Theory,” in Theoretical So-
ciology: Perspectives and Developments, ed. J. C. McKinney and E. A. Tiryakian (New
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970), pp. 28-68. See also Talcott Parsons and Gerald M.
Platt, The American University (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1975).
 OF TALCOTT PARSONS
74 CHAPTER 3 / THE ANALYTICAL FUNCTIONALISM

money as the
Within the social system, the adaptive sector utilizes
attainment
medium of exchange with the other three sectors; the goal-
its principal
sector employs power—the capacity to induce conformity—as
m relies upon
medium of exchange; the integrative sector of a social syste
commit-
influence—the capacity to persuade; ard the latency sector uses
changes
ments—especially the capacity to be loyal. The analysis of inter
-
of specific structures within social systems should thus focus on the input
output exchanges utilizing different symbolic media.
Among the subsystems of the overall action system, a similar analysis
of the symbolic media used in exchanges should be undertaken, but Par-
sons never clearly described the nature of these media.”” What he appeared
to be approaching was a conceptual scheme for analyzing the basic types
of symbolic media, or information, linking systems in the cybernetic hi-
erarchy of control.”

PARSONS ON SOCIAL CHANGE

In the last decade of his career, Parsons became increasingly concerned
with social change. Built into the cybernetic hierarchy of control is a
conceptual scheme for classifying the locus of such social change. What
Parsons visualized was that the information-energic interchanges among
action systems provide the potential for change within or between the
action systems. One source of change may be excesses in either infor-
mation or energy in the exchange among action systems. In turn, these
excesses alter the informational or energic outputs across systems and
within any system. For example, excesses of motivation (energy) would
have consequences for the enactment of roles and perhaps ultimately for
the reorganization of these roles of the normative structure and eventually
of cultural value orientations.” Another source of change comes from an
insufficient supply of either energy or information, again causing external
and internal readjustments in the structure of action systems. For ex-
ample, value (informational) conflict would cause normative conflict (or
anomie), which, in turn, would have consequences for the personality and
organismic systems. Thus, inherent in the cybernetic hierarchy of control
are concepts that point to the sources of both stasis and change.”

a - first attempt at a statement, see Parsons, “Some Problems of General Theory,”

pp. 61-68.
For a more readable discussion of these generalized media, see T. S. Turner. “Parsons’
Concept of Generalized Media of Social Interaction and its Relevance for Social Anthro-
pology,” Sociological Inquiry 38 (Spring 1968), pp. 121-34.
*There are several bodies of empirical literature that bear on this example. McClelland’s
work on the achievement motive as initiating economic development in modernizing so-
cieties is perhaps the most conspicuous example; see David C. McClelland, The Achieving
Society (New York: Free Press, 1961).
2 For a fuller discussion,
: : .
see Alvin L. Jacobson, “Talcott Parsons: A Theoretical and
 PARSONS ON SOCIAL CHANGE 75

To augment this new macro emphasis on change, Parsons utilized

the action scheme to analyze social evolution in historical societies. In
this context, I think that the first line of The Structure of Social Action
is of interest: “Who now reads Spencer?” Parsons then answered the
question by delineating some of the reasons why Spencer’s evolutionary
doctrine had been so thoroughly rejected by 1937. Yet, after some 40 years,
Parsons chose to reexamine the issue of societal evolution that he had so
easily dismissed in the beginning. And in so doing, he reintroduced Spen-
cer’s and Durkheim’s evolutionary models back into functional theory.
In drawing heavily from Spencer’s and Durkheim’s insights into so-
cietal development,”* Parsons proposed that the processes of evolution
display the following elements:

1. Increasing differentiation of system units into patterns of func-

tional interdependence.
2. Establishment of new principles and mechanisms of integration
in differentiating systems.
3. Increasing adaptive capacity of differentiated systems in their
environments:

From the perspective of action theory, then, evolution involves: (a)

increasing differentiation of the personality, social, cultural, and orga-
nismic systems from one another; (b) increasing differentiation within
each of these four action subsystems; (c) escalating problems of integra-
tion and the emergence of new integrative structures; and (d) the up-
grading of the survival capacity of each action subsystem, as well as of
the overall action system, to its environment.
Parsons then embarked on an ambitious effort in two short volumes
to outline the pattern of evolution in historical systems through primitive,
intermediate, and modern stages.?’ In contrast with The Social System,
where he stressed the problem of integration between social systems and
personality, Parsons draws attention in his evolutionary model to the
inter- and intradifferentiation of the cultural and social systems and to
the resulting integrative problems. In fact, each stage of evolution is seen
as reflecting a new set of integrative problems between society and culture
as each of these systems has become more internally differentiated as well
as differentiated from the other. Thus, the concern with the issues of

Empirical Analysis of Social Change and Conflict,” in Institutions and Social Exchange:
The Sociologies of Talcott Parsons and George C. Homans, ed. H. Turk and R. L. Simpson
(Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970).
*See last chapter for references.
27Talcott Parsons, Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives and The Sys-
tem of Modern Societies (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966, 1971, respectively).
The general stages of development were first outlined in Talcott Parsons, “Evolutionary
Universals in Society,” American Sociological Review 29 (June 1964), pp. 339-57.
76 CHAPTER 3 / THE ANALYTICAL FUNCTIONALISM OF TALCOTT PARSONS

integration within and among action systems, so evident in earlier works,

was not abandoned but applied to the analysis of specific historical
processes.
Even though I think Parsons is vague about the causes of evolutionary
change, he sees evolution as guided by the cybernetic hierarchy of controls,
especially the informational component. In his documenting how inte-
grative problems of the differentiating social and cultural systems have
been resolved in the evolution of historical systems, the informational
hierarchy is regarded as crucial because the regulation of societal processes
of differentiation must be accompanied by legitimation from cultural pat-
terns (information). Without such informational control, movement to
the next stage of development in an evolutionary sequence will be inhibited.
Thus, I see the analysis of social change as an attempt to use the
analytical tools of the general theory of action to examine a specific pro-
cess, the historical development of human societies. What is of interest
in this effort is that Parsons developed many propositions about the
sequences of change and the processes that will inhibit or accelerate the
unfolding of these evolutionary sequences. It is of more than passing
interest that preliminary tests of these propositions indicate that, on the
whole, they have a great deal of empirical support.?8 But I must concede
that in many respects, Parsons’ discussion does not improve greatly upon
Spencer’s. In a sense, Parsons simply recapitulates Spencer’s analysis.

PARSONS ON “THE HUMAN CONDITION”

Again, in a way reminiscent of Spencer’s grand theory, Parsons attempted
to extend his analytical scheme to all aspects of the universe.2° In this
last conceptual addition, I find it ironic that as it came to a close, Parsons’
work increasingly resembled Spencer’s. Except for the opening line in The
Structure of Social Action—“who now reads Spencer?’’—Parsons ignored
him. Indeed, I am not sure that he even realized how closely his analyses
of societal evolution and his conceptualization of the “human condition”
resembled Spencer’s effort 100 years earlier. At any rate, I see this
last
effort as more philosophy than sociology. Yet, it represents the culmi-
nation of Parsons’ thought. Parsons began in 1937 with an analysis
of
the smallest and most elementary social unit, the act. He then
developed
4 requisite functionalism that embraced four action systems:
the social,
cultural, personality, and what he called the behavioral in
later years (he

*See Gary L. Buck and Alvin L. Jacobson, “Social

Evolution and Structural-Functional
Analysis: An Empirical Test,” American Sociological
Review 33 (June 1968). pp. 343-55;
A. L. Jacobson, “Talcott Parsons: Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis.”
*Talcott Parsons, Action Theory and The Human
Condition (New York: Free Press,
1978). See the last chapter and my analysis in “Parso
ns on the Human Condition,” Con-
temporary Sociology 9 (May 1980). pp. 380-83.
 PARSONS ON “THE HUMAN CONDITION" 77

FIGURE 3-8 The Subsystems of the Human Condition

|
|
|
|
|
|
|
i]
Physico-
Organic
chemical

|
|
behavioral | personality
|
|
|
i]
Acton
t
|
|
|
cultural social
{
|
|

had earlier called this the organismic). And finally, in this desire to un-
derstand basic parameters of the human condition, he viewed these four
action systems as only one subsystem within the larger system of the
universe. This vision is portrayed in Figure 3-8.
As can be seen in Figure 3-8, the universe is divided into four sub-
systems, each meeting one of the four requisites—-that is, A, G, I, or L.
The four action systems resolve integrative problems; the organic system
handles goal-attainment problems; the physicochemical copes with ad-
aptation problems; and the telic (“‘ultimate” problems of meaning and
cognition) deals with latency problems.
Each of these subsystems employs its own media for intra- and in-
tersubsystem activity. For the action subsystem, the distinctive medium
is symbolic meanings; for the telic, it is transcendental ordering; for the
organic, it is health; and for the physicochemical, it is empirical ordering
(lawlike relations of matter, energy, etc.). There are double interchanges
of these media among the four A, G, I, L sectors, with “products” and
“factors” being reciprocally exchanged. That is, each subsystem of the
 TT PARSONS
78 CHAPTER 3 / THE ANALYTICAL FUNCTIONALISM OF TALCO

a factor
universe transmits a product to the others, while it also provides
necessary for the operation of other subsystems. Let me illustrate with
the L (telic) and I (action) interchange. At the product level, the telic
system provides “definitions of human responsibility” to the action sub-
systems and receives “sentiments of justification” from the action sub-
system. At the factor level, the telic provides “categorical imperatives”
and receives “acceptance of moral obligations.” These double interchanges
are, of course, carried out with the distinctive media of the I and A
subsystems—that is, transcendental ordering and symbolic meaning,
respectively.
The end result of this analysis, is, I feel, a grand metaphysical vision
of the universe as it impinges upon human existence. It represents an
effort to categorize the universe in terms of systems, subsystems, system
requisites, generalized media, and exchanges involving these media. As
such, it is no longer sociology but philosophy, or at best, a grand meta-
theoretical vision. Parsons had indeed come a long way since the humble
unit act made its entrance in 1937.

CRITICISMS OF PARSONIAN FUNCTIONALISM

I cannot imagine a social theorist enduring more criticism than Talcott
Parsons received. With each step in the scheme’s elaboration, criticism
mounted and reached a peak in the late 1960s. And by the early 1970s,
these critiques had dislodged Parsonian theory from its once dominant
place. Many critiques were unfair, but there was also an element of truth
in each. Let me now extract this element with respect to (1) the sub-
stantive image of social organization and (2) the logic of his requisite
functionalism.

Criticisms of Parsons’ Substantive Image of Society

By the early 1960s, a number of critics had begun to question whether
Parsons’ emerging “system of concepts” corresponded to events in the
real world. I view such a line of criticism as significant because the Par-
sonian strategy assumes that it is necessary to elaborate a system of
concepts that adequately grasp salient features of the social world. As-
sertions that the maturing system of concepts inadequately mirrors fea-
tures of actual social systems represent a fundamental challenge to the
naturalistic and positivistic assumptions behind Parsons’ conceptual
scheme.
Ralf Dahrendorf, who is the subject of Chapter 7, codified this growing
body of criticism when he likened functionalism to a utopia.*° Much like

*Ralf Dahrendorf, “Out of Utopia: Toward a Reorientation of Sociological Analysis,”

 CRITICISMS OF PARSONIAN FUNCTIONALISM 79

prominent portrayals of social utopias of the past, Dahrendorf asserted,

Parsons’ concepts point to a world that (a) reveals no developmental
history, (b) evidences only consensus over values and norms, (c) displays
a high degree of integration among its components, and (d) reveals only
mechanisms that preserve the status quo. Such an image of society is
utopian because there appears little possibility that ubiquitous phenom-
ena like deviance, conflict, and change could ever occur.
The evidence marshaled by Dahrendorf to support these assertions
is, I feel, rather minimal and flimsy. Yet, I do not think it difficult to
visualize the source of the critics’ dismay. With the publication of The
Social System, the critics charge, Parsons becomes overly concerned with
the integration of social systems. In a vein similar to Radcliffe-Brown
and Durkheim, Parsons’ emphasis on integration involves a dispropor-
tionate concern with those processes in social systems that meet this need
for integration. In The Social System, this concern with integration is
evidenced by the tendency to assume, for analytical purposes, a system
that is in equilibrium. From this starting point, analysis must then focus
on the elaboration of concepts promoting integration and equilibrium.
For example, the extended discussion of institutionalization describes the
processes whereby structure is built up, with relatively scant mention of
concepts denoting the breakdown and change of institutionalized pat-
terns. To compound this omission, a discussion of how institutionalized
patterns are maintained by the mechanisms of socialization and social
control is launched. For the critics, too much emphasis is placed upon
how socialization assures the internalization of values and the alleviation
of strains among actors and how mechanisms of social control reduce the
potential for malintegration and deviance. When deviance and change are
discussed, the critics contend, they are viewed as residual or, in a way
reminiscent of Durkheim, as pathological. In fact, deviance, conflict, and
change are so alien to the scheme that the social equilibrium is considered
to constitute, in Parsons’ words, a “first law of social inertia.”
The subsequent expansion of concepts denoting four system requi-
sites—adaptation, goal attainment, integration, and latency—has further
horrified the critics. For now system processes become almost exclusively
viewed in terms of their consequences for meeting an extended list of
system needs. In all this concern for the consequences of processes for
meeting needs, how is it, the critics ask, that deviance, conflict, and change
are to be conceptualized’??! Are they merely pathological events that occur

American Journal of Sociology 64 (September 1958), pp. 115-27. This polemic echoed the
earlier assessments by others, including David Lockwood, “Some Remarks on “The Social
System,’” British Journal of Sociology 7 (June 1950), pp. 134-46; C. Wright Mills, The
Sociological Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 44-49; and Lewis
Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1956), pp. 1-10.
Leslie Sklair, “The Fate of the Functional Requisites in Parsonian Sociology,” British
Journal of Sociology 21 (March 1970), pp. 30-42.
 PARSONS
80 CHAPTER 3 / THE ANALYTICAL FUNCTIONALISM OF TALCOTT

Or, in reality,
on those rare occasions when system needs are not met?
which are
are not these phenomena pervasive features of social systems,
inadequately grasped by the proliferating system of concepts?
The elaboration of the informational hierarchy of control among the
not
overall systems of action and its use to analyze social change did
silence the critics because the only type of change that is conceptualized
is evolution, as opposed to revolution and other forms of violent disruption
to social systems. Much like Durkheim and Spencer, Parsons’ views change
as a “progressive” differentiation and integration, with the inexorable
progress of societal development delayed from time to time by a failure
to integrate the differentiating cultural and social systems.*?

The Logical Criticisms of Requisite Functionalism

The problems of illegitimate teleology and tautology have consumed a
considerable amount of the literature on functionalism.** For the most
part, this literature holds that since assumptions of needs and requisites
are so prominent in functional theorizing, theoretical statements will too
frequently lapse into illegitimate teleologies and tautologies. Typically,
conspicuous examples of the functional works of Durkheim, Radcliffe-
Brown, and Malinowski are cited to confirm the truth of this assertion,
but by implication, the efforts of contemporary functionalists are similarly

32Perhaps the most recent and scholarly attempt to document the reasons behind these
problems in Parsonian action theory is provided by Alvin Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of
Western Sociology (New York: Basic Books, 1970). However, John K. Rhoads, “On Gould-
ner’s Crisis of Western Sociology,” American Journal of Sociology 78 (July 1972), pp. 136-
54, emphasizes that Gouldner has perceived what-he wants to perceive in Parsons’ work,
ignoring those passages that would connote just the opposite of stasis, control, consensus,
and order. See also Rhoads, “Reply to Gouldner,” American Journal of Sociology 78 (May
1973), pp. 1493-96, which was written in response to Gouldner’s defense of his position
(Alvin Gouldner, “For Sociology: ‘Varieties of Political Expression’ Revisited,’ American
Journal of Saciology 78 [March 1973], pp. 1063-93, particularly pp. 1083-93).
For analyses of the logic of functionalist inquiry, see R. B. Braithwaite, Scientific
Explanation (New York: Harper & Row, 1953), Chapters 9 and 10; Carl G. Hempel, “The
Logic of Functional Analysis” in Symposium on Sociological Theory, ed. L. Gross (New
York: Harper & Row, 1959), pp. 271-307; Percy S. Cohen, Modern Social Theory (New
York: Basic Books, 1968), pp. 58-64; Francesca Cancian, “Functional Analysis of Change,”
American Sociological Review 25 (December 1960), pp. 818-27; S. F. Nadel, Foundations
of Social Anthropology (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951), pp. 373-78; Ernest Nagel,
Teleological Explanation and Teleological Systems,” in Readings in the Philosophy of
Science, ed. H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck (New York: Harper & Row, 1953), pp. 537-58; Phillip
Ronald Dore, “Function and Cause,” American Sociological Review 26 (December 1961),
pp. 843-53; Charles J. Erasmus, “Obviating the Functions of Functionalism,” Social Forces
45 (March 1967), pp. 319-28; Harry C. Bredemeier, “The Methodology of Functionalism,”
American Sociological Review 20 (April 1955), pp. 173-80; Bernard Barber, “Structural-
Functional Analysis: Some Problems and Misunderstandings,” American Sociological Re-
view 21 (April 1956), pp. 129-35; Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure
(Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957), pp. 44-61; Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social
Theories (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968), pp. 80-116; Hans Zetterberg, On
Theory and Verification in Sociology (Totowa, N.J.: Bedminister Press, 1965), pp. 74-79.
 CRITICISMS OF PARSONIAN FUNCTIONALISM 81

indicted—otherwise, the criticisms would not be worth the considerable

efforts devoted to making them. To the extent that this indirect indict-
ment of Parsons’ requisite functionalism can be sustained, I see it as a
serious criticism. For Parsons’ strategy for theory building has revolved
around the assumption that his system of concepts can generate testable
propositions that account for events in the empirical world. But if such
a conceptual system inspires illegitimate teleologies and tautologous prop-
ositions, then its utility as a strategy for building sociological theory can
be called into question.

The issue of teleology. Parsons always considered action to be

goal directed—whether it is a single unit act or the complex informational
and energic interchanges among the organismic, personality, social, and
cultural systems. Thus, Parsons’ conceptualization of goal attainment as
a basic system requisite would make inevitable teleological propositions,
since for Parsons much social action can only be understood in terms of
the ends it is designed to serve. I think that such propositions are often
vague, however, because assessing goal-attainment consequences fre-
quently is a way to obscure the specific causal chains whereby goal-
attainment sectors in a system activate processes to meet specified end
states. Yet, when looking closely at the Parsonian legacy, it is clear that
his many essays are vitally concerned with just how, and through what
processes, system processes are activated to meet goal states. For example,
Parsons’ various works on how political systems strive to legitimate them-
selves are filled with both analytical and descriptive accounts of how the
processes—such as patterns of socialization in educational and kinship
institutions—are activated to meet goal-attainment requisites.** While the
empirical adequacy of this discussion can be questioned, Parsons’ analysis
does not present illegitimate teleologies, for his work reveals a clear con-
cern for documenting the causal chains involved in activating processes
designed to meet various end states.
I think that it is the other three requisites—adaptation, integration,
and latency—that would seemingly pose a more serious problem of ille-
gitimate teleology. Critics would argue that to analyze structures and
processes in terms of their functions for these three system needs compels
analysts to state their propositions teleologically although the processes
so described may not be yoal directed or teleological. Logically, as several
commentators have pointed out, teleological phrasing of propositions in

“For example, see Talcott Parsons, “Authority, Legitimation and Political Action” in
Authority, ed. C. J. Friedrich (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1958); Parsons, “On
the Concept of Power”; and Talcott Parsons, ‘The Political Aspect of Structure and Process,”
in Varieties of Political Theory, ed. David Easton (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
1966).
 T PARSONS
82 CHAPTER 3 / THE ANALYTICAL FUNCTIONALISM OF TALCOT

the absence of clear-cut goal-attainment processes does not necessarily

make the proposition illegitimate, for at least two reasons.”

1. Nagel has argued that phrasing statements in a teleological

fashion is merely a shorthand way of stating the same causal rela-
tionship nonteleologically.** For example, to argue that the relief of
anxiety (an end state) is the “latency function” of religion (a present
phenomenon) can be rephrased nonteleologically without loss of as-
serted content: under conditions C,, C,, C3,..., C,, religion (concept
x) causes reduction of group anxiety (concept y). Such a form is quite
acceptable in that it involves existence and relational statements:
under C,, C,,..., C,, variations in x cause variations in y. However,
other authors have contended that such transposition is not always
possible because the existence statements so necessary to such con-
version are absent from the statements of functionalists such as Par-
sons. Without necessary existence statements, the assertion that the
function of religion is to reduce group anxiety really means: “The
latency needs of the group for low levels of anxiety cause the emer-
gence of religion.’”’ I see such statements as illegitimate teleologies
since little information is provided about the nature of the “latency
purposes” of a given system and the specific causal chains involved
in keeping the system in pursuit of its latency goals. Or, if teleology
is not intended, then I think that the statement is simplv vague,
offering none of the necessary information that would allow its con-
version to a nonteleological form. As Nadel was led to conclude: “To
pronounce at once upon the ultimate functions subserved by social
fact is to short-circuit explanation and reduce it to generalities which,
so prematurely stated, have little significance.”’*”
2. Perhaps the most significant defense of Parsons’ tendency to
phrase propositions teleologically comes from the fact that such prop-

**For basic references on the issue, consult G. Bergman, “Purpose, Function and Scientific
Explanation,” Acta Sociologica 5 (1962), pp. 225-28; J. Canfield, “Teleological Explanation
in Biology,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 14 (1964), pp. 285-95; K.
Deutsch, “Mechanism, Teleology and Mind,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
12 (1951), pp. 185-223; C. J. Ducasse, “Explanation, Mechanism, and Teleology,” in Read-
ings in Philosophical Analysis, ed. H. Feig] and W. Sellars (New York: D. Appleton, 1949);
D. Emmet, Function, Purpose and Powers (London: Routledge-Kegan, 1958); L. S. Fever,
“Causality in the Social Sciences,” Journal of Philosophy 51 (1954), pp. 191-208; W. W.
Isajiw, Causation and Functionalism in Sociology (New York: Shocken Books, 1968); A.
Kaplan, “Noncausal Explanation,” in Cause and Effect, ed. D. Lerner (New York: Free
Press, 1965); C. A. Mace, “Mechanical and Teleological Causation”: I. Scheffler, “Thoughts
on Teleology,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 9 (1958), pp. 265-84; P.
Sztompka, “Teleological Language in Sociology,” The Polish Sociological Bulletin (1969),
pp.an ag System and Function: Toward a Theory of Society (New York: Academic
ress, ,
*Nagel, ““Teleological Explanation and Teleological Systems.”
“Nadel, Foundations of Social Anthropology, p. 375.
 CRITICISMS OF PARSONIAN FUNCTIONALISM 83

ositions point to reverse causal chains that are typical of many social
phenomena. By emphasizing that the function served by a structure
in maintaining the needs of the whole could cause the emergence of
that structure, Parsons’ functional imperativism forces analysis to be
attuned to those causal processes involved in the initial selection,
from the infinite variety of possible social structures, of only certain
types of structures. The persistence over time of these selected struc-
tures can also be explained by the needs and/or equilibrium states of
the whole: those structures having consequences for meeting needs
and/or maintaining an equilibrium have a “selective advantage”’ over
those that do not. I do not think that such statements are illegitimate
teleologies, for it is quite possible for the systemic whole to exist prior
in time to the structures that emerge and persist to maintain that
whole. Furthermore, I do not think it necessary to impute purpose
to the systemic whole. Just as in the biophysical world, where ecol-
ogical and population balances are maintained by nonpurposive se-
lective processes (for example, predators increase until they eat them-
selves out of food and then decrease until the food supply regenerates
itself), so social wholes can maintain themselves in a state of equi-
librium or meet the imperatives necessary for survival.
This line of argument has led Stinchcombe to summarize:
Functional explanations are-thus complex forms of causal theories. They
involve causal connections among... variables as with a special causal prior-
ity of the consequences of activity in total explanation. There has been a
good deal of philosophical confusion about such explanations, mainly due to
the theorist’s lack of imagination in realizing the variety of reverse causal
processes which can select behavior or structures according to their
consequences.”

I see the above considerations leading to several tentative conclusions

about Parsons’ scheme and the issue of teleology: (1) The scheme has
always been teleological, from the initial conceptualization of unit acts
to the four-function paradigm embracing the concept of goal attainment.
(2) Contrary to the opinion of his detractors, most of Parsons’ theoretical
statements can be converted into nonteleological form, such that relevant
statements about the conditions under which x varies with y can be dis-
cerned. (3) Parsons’ work is replete with reverse causal chains in which
a systemic whole existing prior in time to the emergence of subsystems
causes the perpetuation of a subsystem because of its selective advantages
in meeting problems faced by the systemic whole.
Most of the criticisms outlining the dangers of illegitimate teleology
in functional theorizing have drawn examples from early functional

%Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories, pp. 87-93.

*Tbid., p. 100. .
 PARSONS
84 CHAPTER 3 / THE ANALYTICAL FUNCTIONALISM OF TALCOTT

anthropology, where I think that it is relatively casy to expose question-

able teleologies. But I do not see how Parsons’ notion of system requisites
has led him to this same trap, thus allowing the defenders of the action-
theoretic strategy to challenge the critics to find conspicuous instances
in Parsons’ work where there is an illegitimate teleology.

The issue of tautology. Parsons’ conceptualization of four system

requisites—adaptation, goal attainment, integration, and latency—is based
on the assumption that if these requisites are not met, the system’s sur-
vival is threatened. When employing this assumption, however, it is nec-
essary to know what level of failure in meeting each of these requisites
is necessary to pronounce a crisis of survival. How does one determine
when adaptive needs are not being met? Goal attainment needs? Inte-
grative requisites? And latency needs? Unless there is some way to de-
termine what constitutes the survival and nonsurvival of a system, I be-
lieve that propositions documenting the contribution of items for meeting
survival requisites become tautologous: the items meet survival needs of
the system because it exists and, therefore, must be surviving. Thus, to
phrase propositions with regard to system requisites of adaptation, goal
attainment, integration, and latency, Parsons must provide either of two
types of information: (1) evidence on a nonsurviving system where a
particular item did not exist; or (2) specific criteria as to what constitutes
survival and nonsurvival in various types and classes of social systems.
Without this kind of information, my sense is that propositions employing
notions of requisites are likely to be untestable, even in principle. There-
fore, I would not consider them very useful in building sociological theory.
And if Parsons’ scheme cannot be readily converted into nontautologous
propositions that can be tested, his conceptual approach can be ques-
tioned. Parsons argued that systems of concepts must precede systems of
propositions, but if the system of concepts is likely to generate tautologous
propositions, then what is its theoretical utility?

The theoretical utility of survival imperatives. Considering

the problems of tautology created by using the concept of requisites, I see
it reasonable to ask: what do requisites add to Parsons’ theoretical scheme
and to the analysis of specific events? For it seems to me that it is possible
to document the conditions under which events influence each other in
systemic wholes without dragging in notions of survival requisites. In fact,
my sense is that Parsons often appears to abandon reference to system
requisites when discussing concrese empirical events, causing me to won-
der why the requisites are retained in his more formal conceptual edifice.
My answer is that Parsons retained the requisites for strategic rea-
sons: to provide crude and rough criteria for distinguishing important
from unimportant social processes. Parsons’ entire intellectual career was
spent elaborating the complex systems of interrelationships among the
 TALCOTT PARSONS: AN OVERVIEW 85

basic unit acts he first described in The Structure of Social Action. The
more the system of concepts was brought to bear on increasingly complex
patterns or organization among unit acts, the more Parsons relied upon
the requisites to sort out what processes in these complex patterns will
help explain the most variance. Thus, Parsons’ imperatives constitute not
so much a metaphysical entity, but a methodological yardstick for dis-
tinguishing what is crucial from not crucial among the vast number of
potential processes in social systems. Despite the fact that Parsons was
unable to specify exact criteria for assessing whether adaptive, goal-
attainment, integrative, and latency needs are being met, he used these
somewhat vaguely conceptualized requisites to assess the theoretical sig-
nificance of concrete social phenomena. I am sure that Parsons implicitly
employed the requisites this way in his many essays, which even the critics
must admit are insightful. And perhaps this fact alone can justify use of
the requisites to assess social phenomena.
Furthermore, I can see that the requisites are particularly useful in
studying complex empirical systems, because in empirical systems it may
be possible to specify more precisely criteria necessary for their survival.
With these empirically based requisites as criteria, it may then be possible
to distinguish significant from less significant social processes in these
systems, thereby assuring more insightful explanations. It appears, then,
that despite some of the logical problems created by their retention, Par-
sons felt that the strategic value of the requisites in explaining social
processes more than compensates for the logical difficulties so frequently
stressed by the critics. Other functionalists agree, but I think that we
should maintain some skepticism here until functional analyses of em-
pirical events prove superior to less problematic alternatives.

TALCOTT PARSONS: AN OVERVIEW

As it has unfolded over the last decades, the theory of action reveals an
enormous amount of continuity—starting with the basic unit act and
proliferating into the cybernetic hierarchy of control among the systems
of action. Such continuity is the outgrowth of Parsons’ particular view
of how theory in sociology should be constructed, for he consistently
advocated the priority of systems of concepts over systems of propositions.
The latter can only be useful when the former task is sufficiently com-
pleted. This view, I emphasize, is shared by many, functionalists and
nonfunctionalists alike.
Yet the substantive vision of the world connoted by Parsons’ concepts
and the logical problems imputed to the scheme have stimulated wide-
spread criticism of his functional perspective. In fact, other forms of
sociological theorizing cannot be understood unless the revulsion to the
perspective is appreciated. As I will emphasize in subsequent chapters,
many other theoretical perspectives in sociology typically begin with a
86 CHAPTER 3 / THE ANALYTICAL FUNCTIONALISM OF TALCOTT PARSONS

rejection of Parsonian functionalism and then proceed to build what is

considered a more desirable alternative. In fact, Parsons appears to have
become “the straw man” of sociological theorizing. No theory in sociology
is considered adequate unless it has performed at least some portions of
a ritual rejection of Parsons’ analytical functionalism.
 CHAPTER 4

__. The Empirical Functionalism ___

___of Robert K. Merton

THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE RANGE

Just as Talcott Parsons was beginning to embrace a form of requisite
functionalism,’ Robert K. Mertor launched a critique of Parsons’ func-
tional strategy for building sociological theory.? At the heart of this crit-
icism was Merton’s contention that Parsons’ concern for developing an
all-encompassing system of concepts would prove both futile and sterile.
To-him, Parsons searched for ‘“‘a total system of sociological theory, in
which observations about every aspect of social behavior, organization,
and change promptly find their preordained place, has the same exhila-
rating challenge and the same small promise as those many all-encom-
passing philosophical systems which have fallen into deserved disuse.’

1As will be recalled, Parsons in 1945 began to conceptualize unit acts in systemic terms
and began to visualize such systems in terms of requisites. See Talcott Parsons, “The Present
Position and Prospects of Systemic Theory in Sociology,” in Essays in Sociological Theory
(Glencoe, IIl.: Free Press, 1949). Moreover, Merton may have introduced Parsons to func-
tional analysis, since Merton conducted a seminar at Harvard, where Parsons was a young
instructor, on functional theorists such as Malinowski. In fact, I suspect that Merton was
a functional theorist several years before Parsons made the conversion. Yet, from the be-
ginning Merton was a critic of the Parsonian approach.
2Robert K. Merton, “Discussion of Parsons’ “The Position of Sociological Theory’,”
American Sociological Review 13 (April 1948), pp. 164-68.
3Ibid. Most of Merton’s significant essays on functionalism have been included, and
frequently expanded upon, in Robert K. Merton, Social+-Theory and Social Structure (Glen-
coe, Ill.: Free Press, 1949). Quotation taken from page 45 of the 1968 edition of this classic
work. Most subsequent references will be made to the articles incorporated into this book.
For more recent essays on Merton’s work, see Lewis A. Coser, ed., The Idea of Social
Structure (New York: Free Press, 1975).

87
 ROBERT K. MERTON
88 CHAPTER 4 / THE EMPIRICAL FUNCTIONALISM OF

since the
For Merton, such grand theoretical schemes are premature
etion has
theoretical and empirical groundwork necessary for their compl
emerge without
not been performed. Just as Einsteinian theory did not
, so sociol-
a long cumulative research foundation and theoretical legacy
se “it has
ogical theory will have to wait for its Einstein, primarily becau
,
not yet found its Kepler—to say nothing of its Newton, Laplace, Gibbs
Maxwell or Planck.”
,
In the absence of this foundation, what passes for sociological theory
in Merton’s critical eye, consists of “general orientations toward data,
suggesting types of variables which theorists must somehow take into
account, rather than clearly formulated, verifiable statements of relation-
ships between specified variables.”® Strategies advocated by those such
as Parsons are not really theory, but philosophical systems, with “their
varied suggestiveness, their architectonic splendor, and their sterility.’
However, to pursue the opposite strategy of constructing inventories of
low-level empirical propositions will prove equally sterile, thus suggesting
to Merton the need for “theories of the middle range” in sociology. As I
emphasized in Chapter 1 (see Figure 1-1), such theories are not highly
abstract nor broad. And I am not as optimistic as Merton that they will
yield much theoretical payoff. Yet, despite my reservations, Merton’s ad-
vocacy has developed a wide following, and so, let me try to indicate what
made Merton’s middle-range strategy so appealing.
In Merton’s view, theories of the middle range offer more theoretical
promise than Parsons’ grand theory. They are couched at a lower level
of abstraction and reveal clearly defined and operationalized concepts that
are incorporated into statements of covariance for a limited range of
phenomena. Although middle-range theories are abstract, they are also
connected to the empirical world, thus encouraging the research so nec-
essary for the clarification of concepts and reformulation of theoretical
generalizations. Without this interplay between theory and research, Mer-
ton contended, theoretical schemes will remain suggestive congeries of
concepts, which are incapable of being refuted, while, on the other hand,
empirical research will remain unsystematic, disjointed, and of little utility
in expanding a body of sociological knowledge. Thus, by following a middle-
range strategy, the concepts and propositions of sociological theory will
become more tightly organized as theoretically focused empirical research
forces clarification, elaboration, and reformulation of the concepts and
propositions of each middle-range theory.
From this growing clarity in theories directed at a limited range of
phenomena and supported by empirical research can eventually come the

‘Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, p. 47.

5Ibid., p. 42.
8Tbid., p. 51.
 THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE RANGE 89

more encompassing theoretical schemes. In fact, for Merton, although it

is necessary to concentrate energies on the construction of limited theories
that inspire research, theorists must also be concerned with “consolidating
the special theories into a more general set of concepts and mutually
consistent propositicns.’”” The special theories of sociology must therefore
be formulated with an eye toward what they can offer more general so-
ciological theorizing. However, just how these middle-range theories should
be formulated to facilitate their eventual consolidation into a more general
theory poses a difficult analytical problem, for which Merton has a ready
solution: a form of functionalism should be utilized in formulating. the
theories of the middle range. Such functional theorizing is to take the
form of a paradigm that would allow for both the easy specification and
elaboration of relevant concepts, while encouraging systematic revision
_and reformulation as empirical findings would dictate. Conceived in this
way, functionalism became for Merton a method for building not only
theories of the middle range but also the grand theoretical schemes that
would someday subsume such theories of the middle range. Thus, in a
vein similar to Parsons, functionalism for Merton represents a strategy
for ordering concepts and for sorting out significant from insignificant
social processes. But, unlike Parsons’ strategy, Merton’s functional strat-
egy requires first the formulation of a body of middle-range theories. Only
when this groundwork has been laid should a functional protocol be used
to construct more abstract theoretical systems.
Merton’s functionalism has never become as dominant as did Par-
sons’. Yet, the middle-range strategy is currently the legitimating credo
for much theoretical activity. Indeed, as I have argued many times, Mer-
ton’s middle-range strategy encouraged the proliferation of what I have
called ‘theories of ______” (fill in the blank with any empirical topic).®
That is, empirical generalizations have been defended as theory, despite
the fact that they are not sufficiently abstract. Thus, sociology has spawned
a large number of theories about such specific empirical processes as
juvenile delinquency, family conflict, race relations, social mobility in
America, urbanization, and other empirical events. I am not sure if Merton
intended theories of the middle range to be so empirically grounded, but
this was the outcome of his advocacy. Virtually none of these theories
has been consolidated into more general and abstract propositions because
they are too empirical and, therefore, too tied to specific times, places,
and contexts. Thus, whereas Merton’s functionalism did not catch on,

™erton, Social Theory and Social Structure (1957), p. 10.

*See for examples my Societal Stratification: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Col-
umbia University Press, 1984), Chapter 1; “Returning to Social Physics,” Current Per-
spectives in Social Theory, vol. 2 (1981), pp. 187-208; “Toward a Social Physics,” H umboldt
Journal of Social Relations 7 (Spring, 1980), pp. 140-55; “Sociology as a Theory Building
Enterprise,” Pacific Sociological Review 22 (October, 1979), pp. 427-56; “In Defense of
Positivism,” Sociological Theory 3 (2, 1985).
 OF ROBERT K. MERTON
ay CHAPTER 4 / THE EMPIRICAL FUNCTIONALISM

s as to whether
his advocacy for middle-range theory did. I have my doubt
logists do not
this was for the good of sociological theory, but most socio
theory in research
share my reservations. Indeed, they see the grounding of
little more than
as a great virtue, whereas for me, these “theories of” are
set of prop-
statements of empirical regularity that need a more abstract
strategy for
ositions to explain them. And so the debate over the best
Merton’s
developing theory rages. My concern here, however, is with
ional
functionalism. And so, let me now turn to his paradigm for funct
analysis.

MERTON’S PARADIGM FOR

FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
As with most commentators on functional analysis, Merton begins his
discussion with a review of the mistakes of early functionalists, partic-
ularly the anthropologists Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown.® Generally,
Merton saw functional theorizing as potentially embracing three ques-
tionable postulates: (1) the functional unity of social systems, (2) the
functional universality of social items, and (3) the indispensability of
functional items for social systems.’°

The functional unity postulate. As we can recall from Chapter

2, Radcliffe-Brown, in following Durkheim’s lead, frequently transformed
the hypothesis that social systems reveal social integration into a nec-
essary requisite or need for social survival. Although it is difficult to argue
that human societies do not possess some degree of integration—otherwise
they would not be systems—Merton views the degree of integration in a
system as an issue to be empirically determined. To assume, however
subtly, that a high degree of functional unity must exist in a social system
is to define away the important theoretical and empirical questions: What
levels of integration exist for different systems? What various types of
integration can be discerned? Are varying degrees of integration evident
for different segments of a system? And, most importantly, what variety
of processes lead to different levels, forms, and types of integration for
different spheres of social systems? For Merton, to begin analysis with
the postulate of “functional unity” or integration of the social whole can
divert attention away from not only these questions but also from the
varied and “disparate consequences of a given social or cultural item
(usage, belief, behavior pattern, institutions) for diverse social groups and
for individual members of these groups.’

*Robert K. Merton, “Manifest and Latent Functions,” in Social Theory and Social
Structure (1968), pp. 74-91.
"See Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, pp. 45-61.
"Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (1968), pp. 81-82.
 MERTON'S PARADIGM FOR FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 91

I am sure that underlying this discussion of the functional unity is

an implicit criticism of Parsons’ early concern with social integration. As
I stressed in Chapter 3, Parsons first postulated only one requisité in his
early functional work: the need for integration.!? Later, this postulate was
to be expanded into three additional functional requisites for adaptation,
goal attainment, and latency. But Parsons’ functionalism appears to have
begun with the same concerns evident in Durkheim’s and Radcliffe-Brown’s
work, leading Merton to question the “‘heuristic value” of an assumption
that can divert attention away from important theoretical and empirical
questions. Thus, instead of the postulate of functional unity there should
be an emphasis on varying types, forms, levels, and spheres of social
integration and the varying consequences of the existence of items for
specified segments of social systems. In this way, Merton begins to direct
functional analysis away from concern with total systems toward an em-
phasis on how different patterns of social organization within more in-
clusive social systems are created, maintained, and changed not only by
the requisites of the total system but also by interaction among socio-
cultural items within systemic wholes.

The issue of functional universality. One result of an emphasis

on functional unity was that some early anthropologists assumed that if
a social item existed in an ongoing system, it must therefore have positive
consequences for the integration of the social system. This assumption
tended to result in tautologous statements: a system exists; an item is a
part of the system; therefore, the item is positively functional for the
maintenance of the system.
For Merton, if an examination of empirical systems is undertaken,
it is clear that there is a wider range of empirical possibilities. First, items
may be not only positively functional for a system or another system item
but also dysfunctional for either particular items or the systemic whole.
Second, some consequences, whether functional or dysfunctional, are in-
tended and recognized by system incumbents and are thus manifest,
whereas other consequences are not intended or recognized and are there-
fore latent. Thus, in contrast with the assertions of Malinowski and Rad-
cliffe-Brown, Merton proposes the analysis of diverse consequences or
functions of sociocultural items—whether positive or negative, manifest
or latent—‘“for individuals, for subgroups, and for the more inclusive social
structure and culture.”}* In turn, the analysis of varied consequences re-
quires the calculation of a “net balance of consequences” of items for
each other and more inclusive systems. In this way, Merton visualizes
contemporary functional thought as compensating for the excesses of

12See Parsons, “Present Position and Prospects of Systemic Theory” and Talcott Par-
sons, The Social System (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951).
Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (1968), p. 84.
 OF ROBERT K. MERTON
92 CHAPTER 4 / THE EMPIRICAL FUNCTIONALISM

consequences
earlier forms of analysis by focusing on the crucial types of
e, for the social
of sociocultural items for each other and, if the facts dictat
whole.

The issue of indispensability. Somewhat out of context and un-

al
fairly, I feel, Merton quotes Malinowski’s assertion that every cultur
item “fulfills some vital function, has some task to accomplish, represents
an indispensable part within a working whole’ as simply an extreme
statement of two interrelated issues in functional analysis: (1) Do social
systems have functional requisites or needs that must be fulfilled? (2) Are
there certain crucial structures that are indispensable for fulfilling these
functions?
In response to the first question, Merton provides a tentative yes, but
with an important qualification: the functional requisites must be estab-
lished empirically for specific systems. For actual groups or whole societies
it is possible to ascertain the “conditions necessary for their survival,”
and it is of theoretical importance to determine which structures, through
what specific processes, have consequences for these conditions. But to
assume a system of universal requisites—as Parsons does—adds little to
theoretical analysis, since to stress that certain functions must be met in
all systems simply leads observers to describe processes in social systems
that meet these requisites. Such descriptions, Merton contends, can be
done without the excess baggage of system requisites. It is more desirable
to describe cultural patterns and then assess their various consequences
in meeting the specific needs of different segments of concrete empirical
systems.
Merton’s answer to the second question is emphatic: empirical evi-
dence makes the assertion that only certain structures can fulfill system
requisites obviously false. Examination of the empirical world reveals
quite clearly that alternative structures can exist to fulfill basically the
same requisites in both similar and diverse systems. This fact leads Mer-
ton to postulate the importance in functional analysis of concern with
various types of “functional alternatives,” or “functional equivalents,”
and “functional substitutes” within social systems. In this way, functional
analysis would not view as indispensable the social items of a system and
thereby would avoid the tautologous trap of assuming that items must
exist to assure the continued existence of a system. Furthermore, in look-
ing for functional alternatives, analytical attention would be drawn to
questions about the range of items that could serve as functional equiv-
alents. If these questions are to be. answered adequately, analysts should
then determine why a particular item was selected from a range of possible

4 This quote is from an encyclopaedia article where Malinowski was arguing against
ethnocentrism. His more scholarly work (see Chapter 2) is much less extreme. See also my
and Alexandra Maryanski’s Functionalism (Menlo Park Calif.: Benjamin-Cummings, 1978).
 MERTON’'S PARADIGM FOR FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 93

alternatives, leading to questions about the “structural context” and

“structural limits” that might circumscribe the range of alternatives and
account for the emergence of one item over another. For Merton, ex-
amination of these interrelated questions would thus facilitate the sep-
arate analysis of the causes and consequences of structural items. By
asking why one particular structure instead of various alternatives had
emerged, analysts would not forget to document the specific processes
leading to an item’s emergence as separate from its functional conse-
quences. In this way, the danger of assuming that items must exist to
fulfill system needs would be avoided.
In looking back at Merton’s criticisms of traditional anthropological
reasoning and at some contemporary functionalists’ implications, I think
that much of his assessment of these three functional postulates involves
the destruction of “straw men.” Yet, in destroying these assumptions,
Merton was led to formulate alternative postulates that advocated a con-
cern for the multiple consequences of sociocultural items for each other
and for more inclusive social wholes, without a priori assumptions of
functional needs or imperatives. Rather, functional analysis must specify
(1) the social patterns under consideration, whether a systemic whole or
some subpart; (2) the various types of consequences of these patterns for
empirically established survival requisites; and (3) the processes whereby
some patterns rather than others come to exist and have the various
consequences for each other and for systemic wholes.
With this form of functional analysis, Merton has sought to provide
“the minimum set of concepts with which the sociologist must operate
in order to carry through an adequate functional analysis.’’'> In doing so,
Merton hopes that this strategy will allow sociological analysis to avoid
some of the mistaken postulates and assumptions of previous attempts
using a functional strategy. Although the functional imperativism of Par-
sons is only briefly assessed in Merton’s proposals, it appears that he is
stressing the need for an alternative form of functional analysis in which
there is less concern with total systems and abstract statements of system
requisites. Instead, to build theories of the middle range, it is necessary
to focus attention on the mutual and varied consequences of specified
system parts for each other and for systemic wholes. Although these parts
and systemic wholes have conditions necessary for their survival, these
conditions must be empirically established. For only through a clear un-
derstanding of the actual requisites of a concrete system can the needs
of social structures provide a useful set of criteria for assessing the con-
sequences, or functions, of social items. Furthermore, although the anal-
ysis of consequences of items is the unique feature of functional analysis,
it is also necessary to discover the causal processes that have resulted in

“Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (1968), p. 109.

 T K. MERTON
94 CHAPTER 4 / THE EMPIRICAL FUNCTIONALISM OF ROBER

other items
a particular item having a specified set of consequences for
anal-
and systemic wholes. To assure adherence to this form of structural
ting
ysis, Merton went so far as to outline a set of procedures for execu
the general guidelines of his functional orientation.

A PROTOCOL FOR EXECUTING

FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
To ascertain the causes and consequences of particular structures and
processes, Merton insists that functional analysis begins with “sheer de-
scription” of individual and group activities. In describing the patterns
of interaction and activity among units under investigation, it will be
possible to discern clearly the social items to be subjected to functional
analysis. Such descriptions can also provide a major clue to the functions
performed by such patterned activity. In order for these functions to
become more evident, however, additional steps are necessary.
The first of these steps is for investigators to indicate the principal
alternatives that are excluded by the dominance of a particular pattern.
Such description of the excluded alternatives provides an indication of
the structural context from which an observed pattern first emerged and
is now maintained—thereby offering further clues about the functions or
consequences the item might have for other items and perhaps for the
systemic whole. The second analytical step beyond sheer description in-
volves an assessment of the meaning, or mental and emotional signifi-
cance, of the activity for group members. Description of these meanings
may offer some indication of the motives behind the activities of the
individuals involved and thereby shed some tentative light on the manifest
functions of an activity. These descriptions require a third analytical step
of discerning some array of motives for conformity or for deviation among
participants, but these motives must not be confused with either the
objective description of the pattern or the subsequent assessment of the
functions served by the pattern. Yet, by understanding the configuration
of motives for conformity and deviation among actors, an assessment of
the psychological needs served (or not served) by a pattern can be under-
stood—offering an additional clue to the various functions of the pattern
under investigation.
But focusing on the meanings and motives of those involved in an
activity can skew analysis away from unintended or latent consequences
of the activity. Thus, a final analytical step involves the description of
how the patterns under investigation reveal regularities not recognized
by participants but appear to have consequences for both the individuals
involved and other central patterns or regularities in the system. In this
way, analysis will be attuned to the latent functions of an item.
By following each of these steps, Merton assumes that it will be pos-
sible to assess the net balance of consequences of the pattern under
 A PROTOCOL FOR EXECUTING FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 95

FIGURE 4-1 Merton's Net Functional Balance Analysis

Specified Empirically
Social structural empirical established
level part ——————______________» needs of
Consequences _ social context
for meeting

Assessment of net
balance of
consequences of the
item

Understanding of /
Psychological
Psychological “meaning” to—————————»
level individuals Consequences needs served
for meeting

investigation, as well as to determine some of the independent causes of

the item. These steps assure that a proper functional inquiry will ensue,
because postulates of functional unity, assumptions of survival requisites,
and convictions about indispensable parts do not precede the analysis of
social structures and processes. On the contrary, attention is drawn only
to observable patterns of activity, the structural context in which the
focal pattern emerged and persists in the face of potential alternatives,
the meaning of these patterns for actors involved, the actors’ motives for
conformity and deviation, and the implications of the particular pattern
for unrecognized needs of individuals and other items in the social system.
Thus, with this kind of .+eliminary work, functional analysis will avoid
the logical and empirical problems of previous forms of functionalism.
And, in this way, it can provide an understanding of the causes and
consequences of system parts for each other and for more inclusive system
units. I have diagramed the basic logic of this approach in Figure 4-1.
Looking at Figure 4-1, let me recapitulate the essential elements of
Merton’s strategy. First of all, only empirical units are to be analyzed,
and the part and the social context of the part must be clearly specified.
Then, the task is to establish the particular survival requisites of the
empirical system—that is, what is necessary for this particular empirical
system to survive. By assessing the functions or consequences of an item
meeting or not meeting these needs, insight into the nature of a part and
its social contexts can be achieved. In addition to this structural analysis
must come an analysis of the meaning for participants, particularly since
it reveals the psychological needs served or not served by participation

‘*Tbid., p. 136.
 K. MERTON
96 CHAPTER 4 / THE EMPIRICAL FUNCTIONALISM OF ROBERT

item
in a structure. In this way, the net balance of consequences of an
at diverse levels of social organization can be assessed.

ILLUSTRATING MERTON’S
FUNCTIONAL STRATEGY
Merton’s paradigm and protocol for constructing functional theories of
the middle range are remarkedly free of statements about individual and
system needs or requisites. In his protocol statements, Merton approaches ~
the question of the needs and requisites fulfilled by a particular item only
after description of (1) the item in question, (2) the structural context in
which the item survives, and (3) its meaning for the individuals involved.
With this information, it is then possible to establish both the manifest
and latent functions of an item, as well as the net balance of functions
and dysfunctions of the item for varied segments of a social system. Un-
fortunately, the implied sequencing of functional analysis is not always
performed by Merton, presumably for at least two reasons. First, in se-
lecting an established structure in a system for analysis, the investigator
usually assumes that the item persists because it is fulfilling some need.
As I will make evident, Merton begins (as opposed to concludes) with
this assumption in his analysis of political machines—thus leaving him
to conclude that “structure affects function and function affects struc-
ture.”” Wher description of items begins with an implicit assumption of
their functions for fulfilling needs, then I think that the descriptions will
be performed in ways assuring confirmation of this implicit assumption.
Second, in analyzing the structural context of an item and assessing why
it emerges and persists over alternative items, | believe it inevitable that
there will be preconceptions of the functions served by an item in order
to know why it fulfills a set of needs better than would various alternatives.
Otherwise, I do not see how it is possible to determine what potential
alternatives could exist to substitute for the present item.
For at least these two reasons, then, execution of Merton’s strategy
is difficult. Let me indicate how this is so by examining Merton’s illus-
tration of it. This illustration involves an analysis of American political
machines. Much like that of his anthropological straw men, such as Rad-
cliffe-Brown and Malinowski, Merton’s need to analyze separately the
causes and functions of structural items is not as evident in his actual
account of empirical events.
. Merton begins his analysis of American political machines with the
simple question: “How do they manage to continue in operation?” Fol-
lowing this interesting question is an assumption reminiscent of Mali-
nowski’s functional analysis:

"Tbid., p. 125.
 ILLUSTRATING MERTON’S FUNCTIONAL STRATEGY 97

Preceding from the functional view, therefore, that we should ordinarily

(not invariably) expect persistent social patterns and social structures to
perform positive functions which are at the time not fulfilled by other patterns
and structures, the thought occurs that perhaps this publicly maligned or-
ganization is, under present conditions, satisfying basic latent functions.
[Merton’s emphasis].'®

The fact that the word ordinarily is qualified by the parenthetical

phrase not invariably is perhaps enough for Merton to escape the change
of tautology: if an item persists in a surviving system, it must therefore
have positive functions. Yet, my sense is that Merton implicitly argues
that if an enduring item does not fulfill manifest functions, then it fulfills
latent functions. This leads me to recail Merton’s portrayal of Mali-
nowski’s dictum that ‘‘every custom, material object, idea and belief fulfills
some vital function, has some task to accomplish.” For Merton, this as-
sumption becomes translated into the dictum that social items that do
not fulfill manifest functions must, therefore, fulfill latent ones; and, as
is added in a footnote, if the item has dysfunctions for some segments of
the population, its persistence implies that it ordinarily must have positive
functions for meeting the needs of other segments.
In fairness to Merton’s suggestive analysis of political machines, I
emphasize that he offered it only as an illustration of the usefulness of
the distinction between manifest and latent functions. It was not intended
as a full explication of his functional paradigm or protocol, but only as
an example of how attention to latent functions can provide new insights
into the operation of political machines. However, it appears that Mer-
ton’s commitment to a clear protocol is not enough to preclude an in-
advertent lapse—so typical of earlier functionalists—into the postulates of
“universality of functions” and “functional indispensability.” Thus, Mer-
ton appears to begin his concrete analysis: with a set of postulates that
he earlier had gone to great lengths to discredit, resulting in this central
assumption:
The key structural function of the Boss is to organize, centralize and
maintain in good working condition “the scattered fragments of power” which
are at present dispersed through our political organization. By this central-
ization of political power, the boss can satisfy the needs of diverse subgroups
in the larger community which are not adequately satisfied by legally devised
and culturally approved social structures.’

For Merton, political machines emerge in the structural context of a

system in which power is decentralized to the extent that it cannot be
mobilized to meet the needs of significant population segments. The causal
processes by which machines arise in this power vacuum to pick up the

’Ibid., pp. 125-26.

*Ibid., p. 126.
 K. MERTON
98 CHAPTER 4 / THE EMPIRICAL FUNCTIONALISM OF ROBERT

“scattered fragments of power” involve a sequence of events in which

political machines are seen as able to satisfy the needs of diverse groups
more effectively than “legally devised and culturally approved social struc-
tures.” Logically, this form of analysis is not necessarily tautologous or
an illegitimate teleology—as some critics might charge—because Merton
appears to be asserting that political machines at one time had a selective
advantage over alternative structures in meeting needs of certain segments
in a system. This kind of reverse causal chain, to use Stinchcombe’s
term,” is a legitimate form of causal analysis, since system needs are seen
as existing prior in time to the events they cause—in this instance, the
emergence of political machines in the American social structure. Fur-
thermore, I do not think it necessary to impute purposes—although at
times purpose is certainly involved—to the segments of the system affected
by the machines. A political machine may be seen as a chance event that
had a selective advantage over alternatives in a spiraling process similar
to expansions and contradictions of predator populations that grow rap-
idly until they eat themselves out of prey. Clearly, the emergence of a
political machine is both a purposive and nonpurposive process in which
the machine meets the prior needs of a population, which has signaled
to the machine leaders or bosses the efficacy of their expanded pursuits
(purpose) in meeting its needs. Eventually, in a spiraling process of this —
nature, the original needs of the population, which caused the emergence
and expansion of political machines and big-city bosses, may recede in
causal significance, while the needs of the well-established political ma-
chine cause certain activities that have little consequence (or perhaps a
dysfunctional consequence) for the needs of the population.
This kind of causal argument appears to be Merton’s intent. Unfor-
tunately, I think that his overriding concern is with discerning the func-
tions of the political machines; consequently, he obscures the causal anal-
ysis, for, as he is prone to remark, ‘“‘Whatever its specific historical origins,
the political machine persists as an apparatus for satisfying unfulfilled
needs of diverse groups in the population.”’2! By bypassing these specific
causal chains involved in the emergence of American political machines,
Merton is left with the relatively simple and ad hoc task of cross-tabu-
lating the needs of a population and the activities of the political machine
that fulfill them.
For example, the political machine fulfills the needs of deprived classes
by providing vital services through the local neighborhood ward heeler,
including “food baskets and jobs, legal and extralegal advice, setting to
rights minor scrapes with the law, helping the bright poor boy to a political
scholarship in a local college, looking after the bereaved,” and so on. The

*Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories (New York: Hare: =

: rk: Harcourt, Brace &
World, 1968), p. 100.
"Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (1968). p. 127
 ILLUSTRATING MERTON’S FUNCTIONAL STRATEGY 99

political machine, according to Mei-va, can provide these services more

effectively than various alternatives, such as welfare agencies, settlement
houses, and legal aid clinics, because it offers these services in a personal
way through the neighborhood ward heeler with a minimum of questions,
red tape, and abuse to people’s self-respect. For other populations, such
as the business community, the political machines provide another set of
needed services—namely, political regulation and control of unbridled
competition among corporations and businesses without undue govern-
mental interference in the specific operations of economic enterprises. By
virtue of controlling various public agencies and bureaus, the big-city boss
can rationalize and organize relations among economic organizations while
preventing too much governmental scrutiny into their various illegal ac-
tivities. The political machine can perform this function more effectively
than legal governmental alternatives because it recognizes the need of
economic organizations for both regulation and noninterference in certain
activities. In contrast, legally constituted government agencies would rec-
ognize only the former need—thus giving the political machine a selective
advantage over legally constituted government. Similarly, the machine
can organize and rationalize illegal economic enterprises concerned with
providing illicit services, including gambling, drugs, and prostitution,
whereas legally constituted governmental agencies cannot condone, to say
nothing of organizing, this kind of prevalent activity. Thus, for both legal
and illegal businesses, the political machine provides protection by as-
suring a stable marketplace, high profits, and selective governmental reg-
ulation. Finally, for another population—notably, the deprived—the po-
litical machine provides opportunities for social mobility in a society
where monetary success is a strong cultural value but where actual op-
portunities for such success are closed to many deprived groups. Thus,
by opening the doors to social mobility for members of deprived groups
who do not have “legitimate” opportunities, the political machine meets
the needs of the deprived, while assuring itself of loyal, committed, and
grateful personnel.
I think that Merton’s functional explanation of the persistence of
political machines has considerable plausibility. For indeed, the existence
of political machines in America was correlated with a relatively ineffec-
tive federal establishment, deprived urban masses, high demand for illegal
services, and high degrees of economic competition. But I see most of
Merton’s account as statements of correlation, dressed in functional as-
sumptions about how the needs of diverse subgroups led to the emergence
and persistence of political machines. Statements of correlation are ob-
viously not causal statements. To the extent that it simply notes the
correlation between social needs and political machines, Merton’s analysis
will be of little utility in building theoretical statements of the form: under
C,, Co, Cy, ..., C,, x causes variation in y. There are many implied causal
chains in Merton’s analysis, but his failure to make them explicit detracts
100 CHAPTER 4 / THE EMPIRICAL FUNCTIONALISM OF ROBERT K. MERTON

from his analysis. As was emphasized in Chapter 2, Durkheim’s concrete

analysis of the division of labor lapsed into statements implying, at the
very least, that the “need for social order’ caused the division of labor.”
Without explicit statements or analytical models on how the need for
order caused the division of labor, the analysis constituted an illegitimate
teleology.
The difficulties that the founders of functionalism had in separating
cause and function are clearly recognized by Merton and, presumably,
was the impetus to his explicating a paradigm and protocol for functional
analysis. Yet, much like his predecessors, I see Merton as abandoning the
very protocol that would keep cause and function separated. Merton in-
dicates that the emergence and persistence of political machines occur in
response to needs, without documenting very precisely the causal chains
through which needs cause the emergence and persistence of an event.
I think that Merton also falls into the problem of tautology that he
imputed—incorrectly, I emphasize—to Malinowski’s functional analysis.
By assuming that “ordinarily” persistent structures serve positive func-
tions for meeting the needs of some population segment, Merton indicates
that if an item persists in an existing system, then it is functional (perhaps
only latently) for some groups. I find it is surprising that Merton falls
back onto this postulate, since he went to such great lengths to sound
the warning against it. Yet, Merton’s analysis of political machines does
not start with a description of the phenomenon, nor does he initially
address the structural context in which it exists. Rather, Merton begins
with the assumption that political machines exist to fulfill a function—if
not a manifest function, then a latent one.
This criticism of Merton’s analysis of a concrete phenomenon does
not mean that, with more specification of causal processes, charges of
tautology and illegitimate teleology could be avoided. Indeed, with more
specification of the historical origins of the political machines and of the
feedback processes between machines and the population segments they
serve, Merton’s account could be rephrased in less suspicious causal terms.
This fact leads to an important question: why did Merton fail to specify
the causal chains that would make less suspicious his propositions? One
answer is that Merton offered this account of political machines only as
an illustration of the utility in the concept of latent functions. As an
illustration, the account would naturally be brief and not involve a thor-
ough explication of the emergence of political machines in America. Mer-
ton’s awareness of the problems inherent in previous functional analysis
would lend credence to this argument, for how could he fall intc the very
traps that he sought to avoid?

— Durkheim, The Rules of the Sociological Method (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press. 1938).
p. 96.
 ILLUSTRATING MERTON’S FUNCTIONAL STRATEGY 101

However, Durkheim’s and Radcliffe-Brown’s similar failure to avoid

completely the logical problems they clearly understood raises the more
fundamental question: is there something about functional analysis that
encourages theorists to short-circuit causal explanation? I think that there
is something seductive about functional analysis that leads us consistently
into these problems. And thus, I would not recommend it as a mode of
theoretical explanation. Even as Merton tried to make functionalism more
empirical, he fell into the logical problems of illegitimate teleology and
tautology. Yet, even with these problems, there has been a revival of
functional analysis in recent years, and so despite my misgivings, many
theorists continue to use a functional approach. Let me now turn to the
most prominent of these “neofunctionalisms.”
 CHAPTER 5

____ The Systems Functionalism ___

sof Niklas Luhmann

As I have stressed in the preceding chapters, functionalism is a mode of

analysis that examines how structures and processes meet the needs of a
more inclusive social system. Talcott Parsons’ requisite functionalism, or
“action theory” as he preferred to call it, revolved around the elaboration
of an abstract system of categories. In contrast, Robert Merton’s more
empirically based strategy advocated a situation-specific assessment of
functional needs and the structures that meet these needs in a particular
empirical context. While all forms of functional analysis, whether Parsons’
or Merton’s, have become recessive in American theoretical circles,! func-
tionalism has, to my surprise, enjoyed a revival in Europe over the last
decade, especially in Germany.
There are several prominent European functional theorists,” but per-
haps the most prominent is the German social tneorist Niklas Luhmann.*
It is not surprising that, as a former student of Parsons’ in America,
Luhmann is highly analytical and abstract. Yet, he is very critical of

'There are some notable exceptions, for one still finds elements of Parsons in the work
of such scholars as Neil J. Smelser, Jeffrey Alexander, Dean Gerstein, Victor Lidz, Bernard
Barber, Adrian Hayes, and other Americans. Most of this work, however, is more empirical
and only selectively borrows from Parsons’s great conceptual edifice.
For example, the work of Richard Minch is very prominent in both Europe and America.
For a recently translated sample, see his Theory of Action: Reconstructing the Contributions
of Talcott Parsons, Emile Durkheim and Max Weber (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1986).
‘Luhmann has published extensively, but unfortunately most of his work is in German.
The only comprehensive sample of his work in English is his The Differentiation of Society,
trans. S. Holmes and C. Larmore (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982). The bulk
of this chapter borrows from chapters in this book.

102
 LUHMANN’S ‘GENERAL SYSTEMS’ APPROACH 103

Parsonian action theory because it increasingly became “overly concerned

with its own architecture.” That is, Parsons kept elaborating categories
and thereby created a complex analytical edifice that became ever more
divorced from empirical reality. But in contrast to Merton, Luhmann
does not retreat into a wholly empirical functionalism, where each sys-
tem’s varying needs must be empirically established in all their particulars.
Rather, his alternative is to construct an abstract conceptual scheme that
is “relatively simple” but that, at the same time, can be used in “highly
complex research programs” and guide the analysis of a wide diversity of
empirical events. he
As I will discuss, Luhmann has used his conceptual scheme to analyze
a variety of empirical processes, and although its architecture is not as
complex as Parsonian action theory, it nonetheless tends to bend empir-
ical reality to its purposes. Even so, I find it an intriguing approach that
documents the staying power of functional analysis in sociological theory.
In this chapter, therefore, my goal is to summarize the basic elements of
Luhmann’s functionalism and to ascertain the extent to which it offers
a viable alternative to earlier forms of functional analysis.

LUHMANN’S ‘GENERAL SYSTEMS’ APPROACH

System and Environment

Luhmann employs what he terms a general systems approach.® Such an
approach stresses the fact that human action becomes organized and
structured into systems. When the actions of several people become in-
terrelated, a social system can be said to exist.6 The basic mechanism by
which actions become interrelated so as to create social systems is com-
munication via symbolic codes, such as words and, as I will describe
shortly, other media. All social systems exist in multidimensional envi-
ronments, which pose potentially endless complexity with which a system
must deal. To exist in a complex environment, therefore, a social system
must develop mechanisms for reducing complexity, lest the system simply
merge with its environment. These mechanisms involve selecting ways
and means for reducing complexity. Such selection creates a houndary
between a system and its environment, thereby allowing it to sustain
patterns of interrelated actions. Selection involves a process of choosing
how to reduce the complexity of the environment.
The basic functional requisite in Luhmann’s analysis is thus “the
need to reduce the complexity of the environment in relation to a system

‘Ibid., p. 88.
6] should stress this is not an approach that most scholars, who view themselves as
general systems theorists, would recognize.
°This definition, it should be noted, is the same as Talcott Parsons’s. See Chapter 3.
 NN
104 CHAPTER 5 / THE SYSTEMS FUNCTIONALISM OF NIKLAS LUHMA

of interrelated actions.” I suspect that Luhmann would not accept this

translation of his ideas into the metaphor of traditional functionalism,
but in fact, this requisite pervades his analysis. All social processes are
analyzed with respect to their functions for reducing complexity vis-a-vis
an environment. Processes that function in this way are typically defined
as mechanisms in a manner reminiscent of Talcott Parsons’s early dis-
cussion in The Social System’ (see Chapter 3). Indeed, as I will document,
the bulk of Luhmann’s sociology revolves around discussions of such
mechanisms—differentiation, ideology, law, symbolic media, and other
critical elements of his scheme.

Dimensions of the Environment

There are three basic dimensions along which the complexity of the en-
vironment is reduced by these mechanisms: (1) a temporal dimension,
(2) a material dimension, and (3) a symbolic dimension. More than most
social theorists, Luhmann is concerned with time as a dimension of the
social universe. Time always presents a system with complexity because
it reaches into the past, because it embodies complex configurations of
acts in the present, and because it involves the vast horizons of the future.
Thus, a social system must develop mechanisms for reducing the com-
plexity of time. It must find a way to order this dimension by developing
procedures to orient actions to the past, present, and future.*®
Luhmann is also concerned with the material dimension of the en-
vironment—that is, with all of the possible relations among actions in
potentially limitless physical space. Luhmann always asks: What mech-
anisms are developed to order interrelated actions in physical space? What
is the structure and form of such ordering of relations?
Luhmann visualizes the third dimension of human systems as the
symbolic. Of all thecomplex symbols and their combinations that humans
can conceivably generate, what mechanisms operate to select some sym-
bols over others and to organize them in some ways as opposed to the
vast number of potential alternatives? What kinds of symbolic media are
selected and used by a social system to organize social actions?
Thus, the mechanisms of a social system that operate to reduce com-
plexity and thereby maintain a boundary between the system and the
environment function along three dimensions, the temporal, material, and
symbolic. The nature of a social system—its size, form, and differentia-
tion—will be reflected in the mechanisms that it uses to reduce complexity
along these dimensions. ’

"Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: Free Press, 1951).
*Luhmann, The Differentiation, Chapter 12.
 LUHMANN'S ‘GENERAL SYSTEMS’ APPROACH 105

Types of Social Systems

A social system exists any time the actions of individuals are ‘“meaning-
fully interrelated and interconnected,” thereby setting them off from the
temporal, material, and symbolic environment by virtue of the selection
of functional mechanisms. Out of such processes come three basic types
of social systems: (1) interaction systems, (2) organization systems, and
(3) societal systems.®

Interaction systems. An interaction system emerges when indi-

viduals are co-present and perceive each other. The very act of perception
is a selection mechanism that sorts from a much more complex environ-
ment, creating a boundary and setting people off as a system. Such systems
are elaborated by the use of language in face-to-face communication,
thereby reducing complexity even further along the temporal, material,
and symbolic dimensions. For example, Luhmann would ask: how does
the language and its organization into codes shape people’s perceptions
of time?; who is included in the conversation?; and what codes and agree-
ments guide conversation and other actions?
Interaction systems reveal certain inherent limitations and vulnera-
bilities, however. First, only one topic can be discussed at a time, lest the
system collapse as everyone tries to talk at once (which, of course, fre-
quently occurs). Second, the varying conversational resources of partic-
ipants often lead to competition over who is to talk, creating inequalities
and tensions that can potentially lead to conflict and system disintegra-
tion. Third, talk and conversation are time-consuming because they are
sequential; and as a result, an interaction system can never be very complex.
Thus, interaction systems are simple because they involve only those
who can be co-present, perceived, and talked to; they are vulnerable to
conflict and tension; and they consume a great deal of time. In order for
a social system to be larger and more complex, additional organizing
principles beyond perceptions of co-presence and sequential talk are
essential.

Organization systems. These systems coordinate the actions of

individuals with respect to specific conditions, such as work on a specific
task in exchange for a specific amount of money. They typically have
entry and exit rules (for example, come to work for this period of time
and leave with this much money); and their main function is to “stabilize
highly ‘artificial’ modes of behavior over a long stretch of time.” They
resolve the basic problem of reconciling the motivations and dispositions
of individuals and the need to get certain tasks done. An organization is
not dependent upon the moral commitment of individuals, nor does it

*Ibid., pp. 71-89.

106 CHAPTER 5 / THE SYSTEMS FUNCTIONALISM OF NIKLAS LUHMANN

require normative consensus. Rather, the entrance/exit rules specify tasks

in ways that allow individuals to do what is required without wholly
identifying with the organization.
Organization systems are thus essential to a complex social order.
They reduce environmental complexity by organizing people (1) in time
by generating entrance and exit rules and by ordering activities in the
present and future; (2) in space by creating a division of labor, which
authority coordinates; and (3) in symbolic terms by indicating what is
appropriate, what rules apply, and what media, such as money or pay,
are to guide action. In his delineation of organization systems, Luhmann
stresses that complex social orders do not require consensus over values,
beliefs, or norms to be sustained; they can operate quite effectively without
motivational commitments of actors. And in fact, their very strength—
flexibility and adaptability to changing environmental conditions—de-
pends upon delimited and situational commitments of actors, along with
neutral media of communication, such as money.!°

Societal systems. These systems cut across interaction and or-

ganization systems. A societal system is a “comprehensive system of all
reciprocally accessible communication actions.’ Historically, societal
systems have been limited by geopolitical considerations, but today
Luhmann sees a trend toward one world society. I find Luhmann’s dis-
cussion on the societal system rather vague, but the general idea can be
inferred from his analysis of more specific topics. Let me summarize:
Societal systems use highly generalized communication codes, such as
money and power, to reduce the complexity of the environment. In so
doing, they set broad limits on how and where actions are to be inter-
related into interaction and organization systems. They also organize the
way time is perceived and how actions are oriented to the past, present,
and future.

System Differentiation, Integration, and Conflict

These three systems—interaction, organization, and societal—cannot be
totally separated, since “all social action obviously takes place in society
and is ultimately possible only in the form of interaction.” Indeed, in
very simple societies, they are fused together; but as societies become
larger and more complex, these systems become clearly differentiated from
each other and irreducible to one another. Organizations become dis-
tinctive with respect to (1) their functional domains (government, law,

In making this assertion, Luhmann directly attacks Parsons. See Luhmann. The Dif-
ferentiation, Chapter 3.
“Ibid., p. 73.
'"Tbid., p. 79.
 LUHMANN'S ‘GENERAL SYSTEMS’ APPROACH 107

education, economy, religion, science), (2) their entrance/exit rules, and

(3) their reliance upon distinctive media of communication (money, truth,
power, love, etc.). As a consequence, they cannot be reduced to a societal
system. Interaction systems follow their own laws, for rarely do people
in their conversations strictly follow the guidelines of organizations and
society.
In fact, the differentiation of these systems poses a number of prob-
lems for the more inclusive system. First, there is the problem of what
Luhmann calls “bottlenecks.” Interaction systems are slow, sequentially
organized patterns of talk, and they follow their own dynamics as people
use their resources in conversations. As a result, they often prevent or-
ganizations from operating at high levels of efficiency. As people interact,
they develop informal agreements and take their time, with the specific
tasks of the organization going un- or underperformed. Similarly, as or-
ganization systems develop their own structure and programs, their in-
terests often collide, and they become “bottlenecks” to action require-
ments at the societal level. Second, there is the problem of conflict in
differentiated systems. Interactants may disagree on topics; they may
become jealous or envious of those with conversational resources. And
since interaction systems are small, they cannot become sufficiently com-
plex “to consign marginals to their borders or to otherwise segregate
them.” At the organizational level, diverse organizations can pursue their
interests in ways that are disruptive to both the organizatio and
n the
more inclusive societal system. |
Yet, countervailing these disruptive tendencies are processes that
function to maintain social integration. One critical set of processes is
the “nesting” of system levels inside each other. Actions within an in-
teractive system are often nested within an organization system; and
organizational actions are conducted within a societal system. Hence, the
broader, more inclusive system can operate to promote integration in two
ways: (1) it provides the temporal, material; and social premises for the
selection of actions; and (2) it imposes an order or structure on the prox-
imate environment around any of its subsystems. For example, an or-
ganizational system distributes people in space and in an authority hi-
erarchy; it orients them to time; it specifies the relevant communication
codes; and it orders the proximate environment (other people, groupings,
offices, etc.) of any interaction system. Similarly, the functional division
of a society into politics, education, law, economy, family, religion, and
science determines the substance of an organization’s action, while it
orders the proximate environment of any particular organization. For
example, societal differentiation of a distinctive economy delimits what
any economic organization can do. Thus, a corporation in a capitalist
economy will use money as its distinctive communications media; it will
articulate with other organizations in terms of market relations; it will
organize its workers into bureaucratic organizations with distinctive
108 CHAPTER 5 / THE SYSTEMS FUNCTIONALISM OF NIKLAS LUHMANN

entrance and exit rules (“work for money’’); and it will be oriented to the
future, with the past as only a collapsed framework to guide present ac-
tivity in the pursuit of future outcomes (such as profits and promotions).
In addition to these nesting processes, integration is promoted by the
deflection of people’s activities across different organizations in diverse
functional domains. When there are many organizations in a society, none
consumes an individual’s sense of identity and self since people’s energies
are dispersed across several organization systems. As a consequence of
their piecemeal involvement, members are unlikely to be emotionally drawn
into conflict among organization systems; and when individual members
cannot be pulled emotionally into a conflict, its intensity and potential
for social disruption is lessened. Moreover, because interaction systems
are distinct from the more inclusive organization, any conflict between
organizations is often seen by the rank and file as distant and remote to
their interests and concerns; it is something ‘‘out there” in the environ-
ment of their interaction systems, and hence, it is not very involving.
Yet another source of conflict mitigation is the entrance/exit rules of
an organization. As these become elaborated into hierarchies, offices, es-
tablished procedures, salary scales, and the like, they reduce the relevance
of members’ conflicts outside the organization—for example, their race
and religion. Such outside conflicts are separated from those within the
organization, and as a result, their salience in the broader societal system
is reduced.
And finally, once differentiation of organizations is an established
mechanism in a society, then specific social control organizations—law,
police, courts—can be easily created to mitigate and resolve conflicts. That
is, the generation of distinct organizations that are functionally specific
represents a new “‘social technology”; and once this technology has been
used in one context, it can be applied to additional contexts. Thus, the
integrative problems created by the differentiation and proliferation of
organizations creates the very conditions that can resolve these prob-
lems—the capacity to create organizations to mediate among organizations.
And so, while differentiation of three system levels creates problems
of integration and conditions conducive to conflict, it also produces coun-
tervailing forces for integration. In making this argument, Luhmann em-
phasizes that in complex systems, order is not sustained by consensus on
common values, beliefs, and norms. On the contrary, there is likely to be
considerable disagreement over these, except perhaps at the most abstract
level. I think that this is an important contribution of Luhmann’s soci-
ology, for it distinguishes his theoretical approach from Talcott Parsons,
who, I think, overstressed the need for value consensus in complex social
systems. Additionally, Luhmann stresses that individuals’ moral and emo-
tional attachment to the social fabric is not essential for social integration.
To seek a romantic return to a cohesive community, as Emile Durkheim,
 LUHMANN’S ‘GENERAL SYSTEMS’ APPROACH 109

Marx, and others have, is impossible in most spheres of a complex society."

And rather than viewing this fact as a pathological state—as concepts like
alienation, egoism, and anomie connote—the impersonality and neutrality
of many encounters in complex systems can be seen as normal and ana-
lyzed less evaluatively. Moreover, people’s lack of emotional embedded-
ness in complex systems gives them more freedom, more options, and
more flexibility.'4 It also liberates them from the constraints of tradition,
the restrictions of dependency on others, and the indignities of surveil-
lance by the powerful that are so typical of less complex societies.

Communications Media, Reflexivity,

and Self-Thematization
Luhmann’s system theory stresses the relation of a system to its envi-
ronment and the mechanisms used to reduce the complexity of it. All
social systems are based upon communication among actors as they align
their respective modes of conduct. Because action systems are built from
communication, Luhmann devotes considerable attention to communi-
cations theory, as he defines it.!® In this discussion, he stresses that human
communications become reflexive and that this reflexiveness leads to self-
thematization. Luhmann thus develops a communications theory revolv-
ing around communication codes and media as well as reflexiveness and
self-thematization. Below, ! briefly explore each of these elements in his
theory.

Communication and codes. Luhmann waxes philosophically and

metaphorically about these concepts, but in the end he concludes that
communication occurs in terms of symbols that signal actors’ lines of
behavior; and such symbols constitute a code with several properties.'®
First, the organization of symbols into a code guides the selection of
alternatives that reduce the complexity of the environment. For example,
when someone in an interaction system says that they want to talk about
a particular topic, these symbols operate as a code that reduces the com-
plexity of the system in an environment (its members will now discuss
this topic and not all the potential alternatives). Secondly, codes are
binary and dialectical in that their symbols imply their opposite. For
example, the linguistic code, “be a good boy,” also implicitly signals its
opposite—that is, what is not good and what is not male. As Luhmann

18$ee Chapter 2 on Durkheim and Chapter 6 on Marx.

“Here, Luhmann takes a page from Georg Simmel’s The Philosophy of Money, trans.
T. Bettomore and D. Frisby (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978).
This theory, like his general systems theory, is not very much like what most com-
munications theorists actually do.
1%See Luhmann, The Differentiation, p. 169.
110 CHAPTER 5 / THE SYSTEMS FUNCTIONALISM OF NIKLAS LUHMANN

notes, “language makes negative copies available” by its very nature. Third,
in implying their opposite, codes create the potential for the opposite
action—for instance, “to be a bad boy.” In human codes, then, the very
process of selecting lines of action and in reducing complexity with a code
also expands potential options (to do just the opposite or some variant
of the opposite). This fact makes the human system highly flexible, be-
cause the communications codes used to organize the system and reduce
complexity also contain implicit messages about alternatives.

Communications media. Communication codes function to sta-

bilize system responses to the environment (while implying alternative
responses). Codes can organize communication into distinctive media that
further orders system responses. As a society differentiates into functional
domains, distinctive media are used to organize the resources of systems
in each domain.” For example, the economy uses money as its media of
communication, which guides interactions within and among economic
organizations. And so, in an economy, re.ations among organizations are
conducted in terms of money (buying and selling in markets), and in-
traorganizational relations among workers are guided by entrance/exit
rules structured by money (pay for work at specified times and places).
Similarly, power is the distinctive communications media of the political
domain; love is the media of the family; truth, the media of science; and
so on for other functional domains.'®
There are several critical generalizations implicit in Luhmann’s anal-
ysis of communications media. First, the differentiation of social systems
into functional domains cannot occur without the development of a dis-
tinctive media of communication for that domain. Second, media reduce
complexity because they limit the range of action in a system. (For ex-
ample, love as a medium limits the kinds of relations that are possible in
a family system.)'® Third, even in reducing complexity, media imply their
opposite and thus expand potential options, giving systems flexibility (for
instance, money for work implies its opposite, work without pay; and the
use of power implies its opposite, lack of compliance to political decisions).

Reflexivity and self-thematization. The use of media allows for

reflexivity, or the capacity to examine the process of action as a part of
the action itself. With communications media structuring action, it be-
comes possible to use these media to think about or reflect upon action.
Social units can use money to make money; they employ power to decide

; "Obviously, Luhmann is borrowing Parsons’ idea about generalized media. See Chapter

'*Much like Parsons, this analysis of communications media is never fully explicated or
systematically discussed for all functional domains. ;
19 We will
: see shortly,. , . :
however, that money is the sole exception here.
 LUHMANN’S GENERAL SYSTEMS’ APPROACH 111

how power is to be exercised; they can analyze love to decide what is true
love; they can use truth to specify the procedures to get at truth; and so
on. Luhmann sees this reflexivity as a mechanism that facilitates adap-
tation of a system to its environment. It does so by ordering responses
and reducing complexity, on the one hand, while it provides a system
with the capacity to think about new options for action, on the other.
For example, it becomes possible to mobilize power to think about new
and more adaptive ways to exercise power in political decisions, as is the
case when a society’s political elite create a constitutional system based
on a separation of powers.
As communications media are used reflexively, they allow for what
Luhmann terms self-thematization. Using media, a system can come to
conceptualize itself and relations with the environment in terms of a
“perspective” or “theme.” Such self-thematization reduces complexity. by
providing guidelines about how to deal with the temporal, material, and
symbolic dimensions of the environment. It becomes possible to have a
guiding perspective on how to orient to time, to organize people in space,
and to order symbols \into codes. For example, money and its reflexive
use for self-thematization in a capitalist economy create a concern with
the future, an emphasis on rational organization of people, and a set of
codes emphasizing impersonal exchanges of services and commodities.
The consequence of these self-thematizations is for economic organiza-
tions to reduce the complexity of their environments and, thereby, to
coordinate social action more effectively.

Luhmann’s Basic Approach

In sum, Luhmann’s general systems approach revolves around the system-
environment distinction. Systems need to reduce the complexity of their
environments in terms of their perceptions about time, their organization
of actors in space, and their use of symbols. Processes that reduce com-
plexity are conceptualized as functional mechanisms. There are three
types of systems: interaction, organization, and societal. All system pro-
cesses occur through communications that can develop into distinctive
media and allow for reflexivity and self-thematization in a system.
This is, I feel, a fair summary of Luhmann’s general systems approach.
He uses these concepts as a kind of metaphor for the analysis of specific
empirical topics. Yet, as a metaphor, I find his analysis rather vague and
imprecise. Seemingly, in reacting against the restrictive architecture of
Parsonian action theory, Luhmann has created an imprecise set of con-
cepts with which to analyze social phenomena. Much of this vagueness
remains even as Luhmann addresses particular empirical phenomena. But
still he is able to develop stimulating insights.
I will now turn to Luhmann’s actual analysis of social processes in
order to illustrate how he employs this general systems scheme. Virtually
 N
112 CHAPTER 5 / THE SYSTEMS FUNCTIONALISM OF NIKLAS LUHMAN

all of his work with this scheme has been on the related processes of social
evolution and societal differentiation, especially of organization systems
in the political, legal, and economic domains of a society.

LUHMANN’S CONCEPTION OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION

Since Luhmann’s substantive discussions are cast into an evolutionary
framework, I think it wise to begin by extracting from his diverse writings
the key elements of this evolutionary approach. Like other evolutionary
theorists, Luhmann views evolution as the process of increasing differ-
entiation of a system in relation to its environment.” Such increased
differentiation allows a system to develop more flexible relations to its
environment and, as a result, to increase its level of adaptation. As systems
differentiate, however, there is the problem of integrating diverse sub-
systems; and as a consequence, new kinds of mechanisms emerge to sus-
tain the integration of the overall system. But unlike most evolutionary
theorists, Luhmann uses this general image of evolution in a way that
adds several new twists to previous evolutionary approaches.

The Underlying Mechanisms of Evolution

Luhmann is highly critical of the way traditional theory has analyzed the
process of social differentiation.”! First, traditional theories—from Marx
and Durkheim to Parsons—all imply that there are limits as to how divided
a system can be, and so, they all postulate an end to the process, which,
in Luhmann’s view, is little more than an evaluative utopia. Second,
traditional theories overstress the importance of value consensus as an
integrating mechanism in differentiated systems. Third, these theories
see many processes, such as crime, conflict, dissensus over values, and
impersonality, as deviant or pathological; however, they are, in fact, in-
evitable in differentiated systems. Fourth, previous theories have great
difficulty handling the persistence of social stratification, viewing it as a
source of evil or as a perpetual conflict-producing mechanism.
Luhmann’s alternative to these evolutionary models is to use his sys-
tems theory to redirect the analysis of social differentiation. Like most
functionalists, he analogizes to biology, but not to the physiology of an
organism; rather, his analogies are to the processes delineated in the the-
ory of evolution. Thus, he argues for an emphasis of those processes that
produce (1) variation, (2) selection, and (3) stabilization of traits in societal

This is essentially Parsons’ definition (see Chapter 3). It was Spencer’s and Durkheim's
as well (see Chapter 2).
*“Luhmann, The Differentiation, pp. 255-57.
 LUHMANN’S CONCEPTION OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION 113

systems.” The reasoning here is that sociocultural evolution is like other

forms of biological evolution. Social systems have mechanisms that are
the functional equivalents of those in biological evolution. These mech-
anisms generate variation in the structure of social systems, select those
variations that facilitate adaptation of a system, and stabilize these adap-
tive structures.”
Luhmann argues that the “mechanism for variation” inheres in the
process of communication and in the formation of codes and media. Since
all symbols imply their opposite, there is always the opportunity to act
in new ways (a kind of “symbolic mutation’). The very nature of com-
munication permits alternatives, and at times, people act in terms of these
alternatives, thereby producing new variations. Indeed, compared to the
process of biological mutation, the capacity of human systems for vari-
ation is much greater than in biological systems.
The “mechanism for selection” can be found in what Luhmann va-
guely terms communicative success. I find his discussion here rather im-
precise, to say the least, but the general idea is that certain new forms
of communication facilitate increased adjustment to an environment by
reducing its complexity while allowing for more flexible responses to the
environment. For example, the creation of money as a media greatly fa-
cilitated adaptation of systems and subsystems to the environment, as
did the development of centralized power to coordinate activity in sys-
tems. And, because they facilitated survival and adaptation, they were
retained in the structure of the social organism.
The “stabilization mechanism”’ resides in the very process of system
formation. That is, new communication codes and‘media are used to order
social actions among subsystems, and in so doing, they create structures,
such as political systems and economic orders, that regularize for a time
the use of the new communications media. For example, once money is
used, it creates an economic order revolving around markets and exchange
that, in turn, feeds back and encourages the extension of money as a
media of communication. It is out of this reciprocity that some degree of
continuity and stability in the economic system ensues.

Evolution and Social Differentiation

For Luhmann, sociocultural evolution involves differentiation in seven
senses.

“1 uhmani’s interpretation of the synthetic theory of evolution in biology is, at best,

loose and inexact. Again, it is more metaphorical than precise.
*Luhmann, The Differentiation, p. 265. Luhmann seems completely unaware that Her-
hert Spencer in his The Principles of Sociology (New York: D. Appleton, 1885; originally
oublished in 1874) performed a similar, and more detailed, analysis 100 years ago.
114 CHAPTER 5 / THE SYSTEMS FUNCTIONALISM OF NIKLAS LUHMANN

1. Evolution is the increasing differentiation of interaction, or-

ganization, and societal systems from each other. That is, interaction
systems increasingly become distinct from organization systems,
which, in turn, are more clearly separated from societal systems. Al-
though these system levels are nested in each other, they also operate
in terms of their unique dynamics.
2. Evolution involves the internal differentiation of these three
types of systems. Diverse interaction systems multiply and become
different from each other (for example, compare conversations at work,
a party, home, and a funeral). Organization systems increase in num-
ber and specialize in different activities (compare economic with po-
litical organizations; or contrast different types of economic organi-
zations, such as manufacturing and retail organizations). And the
societal system becomes differentiated from the organization and in-
teraction systems that comprise it. Moreover, there is an evolutionary
trend, Luhmann claims, toward only one world society.
3. Evolution involves the increasing differentiation of societal
systems into functional domains, such as economy, polity, law, reli-
gion, family, science, and education. Organization subsystems within
these domains are specialized to deal with a limited range of envi-
ronmental contingencies, and in being specialized, they can better
deal with them. The overall result for a societal system is increased
adaptability and flexibility in its environment.
4. Functional differentiation is accompanied by (and is the result
of) the increasing use of distinctive media of communication. For
example, organization systems in the economy employ money; those
in the polity or government exercise power; those in science depend
upon truth; and those in the family domain use love.
5. There is a clear differentiation during evolution among the
person, roles, programs, and values. The individual is an entity sep-
arated from any roles and organizations in which to participate. One
plays many roles, and each involves only a segment or part of a per-
son’s personality and sense of self; and in fact, many roles are played
with little or no investment of oneself in them. Moreover, most roles
persist whether or not any one individual plays them, thereby em-
phasizing their separation from the person. Such roles are increasingly
grouped together into an ever-increasing diversity of what Luhmann
calls programs (work, family, play, politics, consumption, etc.) that
typically exist inside different kinds of organization systems operating
in a distinctive functional domain. Additionally, these roles can be
shufHed around into new programs, emphasizing the separation of
roles and programs. Finally, societal values become increasingly ab-
stract and general, with the result that they do not pertain to any
one functional domain, program, role, or individual.2* They exist as

z. ‘ Z h ; :
Luhmann is borrowing here from Emile Durkheim's analysis in The Division of Labor
24 . :
 LUHMANN’S CONCEPTION OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION 115

very general criteria that can be selectively invoked to help organize

roles into programs or to mobilize individuals to play roles; however,
their application to roles and programs is made possible by additional
mechanisms such as ideologies, laws, technologies, and norms. For by
themselves, societal values are too general and abstract for individuals
to use in concrete situations. Indeed, one of the most conspicuous
features of highly differentiated systems is the evolution of mecha-
nisms to attach abstract values to concrete roles and programs.
6. Evolution involves the movement through three distinctive
forms of differentiation: (1) segmentation, (2) stratification, and (3)
functional differentiation.”® That is, the five processes outlined above
have operated historically to create, Luhmann believes, only three
distinctive forms of differentiation. When the simplest societies in-
itially differentiate, they do so segmentally in that they create like
and equal subsystems that operate very much like the ones from which
they emerged. For example, as it initially differentiates, a traditional
society will create new lineages, or new villages, that duplicate pre-
vious lineages and villages. But segmentation limits a society’s com-
plexity and, hence, its capacity to adapt to its environment. And so,
alternative forms of differentiation are selected for during sociocul-
tural evolution. Further differentiation creates stratified systems where
subsystems vary in terms of their power, wealth, and other resources.
These subsystems are ordered hierarchically, and this new form of
structure allows for more complex relations with an environment but
imposes limitations on how complex the system can become. For as
long as the hierarchical order must be maintained, the options of any
subsystem are limited by its place in the hierarchy.”* Thus, pressures
build for a third form of differentiation, the functional. Here, com-
munication processes are organized around the specific function to
be performed for the societal system. Such a system creates inequal-
ities because some functions have more priority for the system (e.g.,
economics over religion). This inequality is, however, fundamentally
different from that in hierarchically ordered or stratified systems. In
a functionally differentiated society, the other subsystems are part of
the environment of any given subsystem—for example, organizations
in the polity, law, education, religions, science, and family domains
are part of the environment of the economy. And although the econ-
omy may have functional priority in the society, it treats and responds
to the other subsystems in its environment as equals. Thus, inequality
in functionally differentiated societies does not create a rigid hierarchy

in Society (New York: Free Press, 1949; originally published in 1893) as well as Talcott
Parsons’ discussion of “value generalization.” See Chapter 3
*Iuhmann, The Differentiation, pp. 229-54.
*Ibid., p. 235.
116 CHAPTER 5 / THE SYSTEMS FUNCTIONALISM OF NIKLAS LUHMANN

of subsystems; and as a consequence, it allows for more autonomy of

each subsystem, which, in turn, gives them more flexibility in dealing
with their respective environments.”’ The overall consequence of such
subsystem autonomy is increased flexibility of the societal system to
adjust and adapt to its environment.
7. Evolutionary differentiation increases the complexity of a sys-
tem and its relationship with the environment. In so doing, it escalates
the risks, as Luhmann terms the matter, of making incorrect and
maladaptive decisions about how to relate to an environment. For
with increased complexity, there is an expanded set of options for a
system, but there is a corresponding chance that the selection of
options will be dysfunctional for a system’s relationship to an envi-
ronment. For example, any organization in the economy must make
decisions about its actions, but there are increased alternatives and
escalated unknowns, resulting in expanded risks. In Luhmann’s view,
the ever-increasing risk level that accompanies evolutionary differ-
entiation must be accompanied by mechanisms to reduce risk, or at
least by the perception or sense that risk has been reduced. Thus,
evolution always involves an increase in the number and complexity
of risk-reducing mechanisms. Such mechanisms also decrease the
complexity of a system’s environment because they select some op-
tions over others. For example, a conservative political ideology is a
risk-reducing mechanism because it selects some options from more
general values and ignores others. In essence, an ideology assures
decision makers that the risks are reduced by accepting the goals of
the ideology.”8
Before proceeding further, let me now summarize these elements of
Luhmann’s view of evolution in terms of how they change a society’s and
its constituent subsystem’s relation to the temporal, material, and sym-
bolic dimensions of the environment. Temporally, Luhmann argues that
social evolution and differentiation lead to efforts at developing a chron-
ological metric, or a standardized way to measure time (clocks, for ex-
ample). Equally fundamental is a shift in people’s perspective from the
past to the future. The past becomes highly generalized and lacks specific
dictates of what should be done in the present and the future. For as
systems become more complex, the past cannot serve as a guide to the
present or future because there are too many potentially new contingencies
and options. The present sees time as ever more scarce and in short supply;
and thus, people become more oriented to the future and the consequences
of their present actions. Materially, social differentiation involves: (1) the
increasing separation of interaction, organization, and societal systems:

“I am not asserting, of course, that this assertion by Luhmann is true.

*Luhmann, The Differentiation, p. 151.
 THE FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION OF SOCIETY 117

(2) the compartmentalization of organization systems into functional do-

mains; (3) the growing separation of person, role, program, and values;
and (4) the movement toward functional differentiation away from seg-
mentation and stratification. And symbolically, communication codes be-
come more complex and organized as distinctive media for a particular
functional domain. Moreover, they increasingly function as risk-reducing
mechanisms for a universe filled with contingency and uncertainty.
It is with this overall view of sociocultural evolution and differentia-
tion that Luhmann has approached the study of specific organizational
systems. As he has consistently argued, an analytical framework is only
as good as the insights into empirical processes that it can generate. I
find Luhmann’s framework much more complex than he contends such
a framework should be, and I see it as more metaphorical than analytical.”
However, it has allowed him to analyze political, legal, and economic
processes in functionally differentiated societies in a very intriguing way.

THE FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION OF SOCIETY

J

Politics as a Social System

As societies grow more complex, new structures for reducing complexity
emerge. Old processes such as appeals to traditional truths, mutual sym-
pathy, exchange, and barter become ever more inadequate. A system,
Luhmann argues, that reaches this point of differentiation must develop
the “capacity to make binding decisions.” Such capacity is generated out
of the problems of increased complexity, but it also becomes an important
condition for further differentiation.
In order to make binding decisions, a distinctive media of commu-
nication must be used: power.®° Power is defined by Luhmann as “the
possibility of having one’s own decisions select alternatives or reduce
complexity for others.” Thus, whenever one social unit selects alternatives
of action for other units, power is being employed as the media of
communication.
The use of power to make binding decisions functions to resolve con-
flicts, to mitigate tensions, and to coordinate activities in complex sys-
tems. Societies that can develop political systems capable of performing
these functions are better able to deal with their environments. Several
conditions, Luhmann believes, facilitate the development of this func-
tional capacity. First, there must be time to make decisions; and the less
time an emerging political system is allowed, the more difficulty it will
have in becoming autonomous. Second, the emerging political system

*Indeed, my discussion has simplified it considerably.

*Tuhmann, The Differentiation, p. 151.
118 CHAPTER 5 / THE SYSTEMS FUNCTIONALISM OF NIKLAS LUHMANN

must not confront a single power block in its environment, such as a

powerful church. Rather, it requires an environment of multiple subsys-
tems whose power is more equally balanced. And so, the more the power
in the political subsystem’s environment is concentrated, the more dif-
ficult is its emergence as an autonomous subsystem. Third, the political
system must stabilize its relations with other subsystems in the environ-
ment in two distinctive ways: (1) at the level of diffuse legitimacy so that
its decisions are accepted as its proper function; and (2) at the level of
daily transactions among individuals and subsystems.*! That is, the greater
the problems of a political system in gaining diffuse support for its right
to make decisions for other subsystems and the less salient the decisions
of the political system for the day-to-day activities, transactions, and
routines of system units, then the greater will be its problems in developing
into an autonomous subsystem.
Thus, to the extent that a political system has time to develop pro-
cedures for making decisions, confront multiple sources of mitigated power,
and achieve diffuse legitimacy as well as relevance for specific transac-
tions, then the more it can develop into an autonomous system and the
greater will be a society’s capacity to adjust to its environment. In so
developing, the political system must achieve what Luhmann calls struc-
tural abstraction, or the capacity to (1) absorb multiple problems, dilem-
mas, and issues from a wide range of system units and (2) make binding
decisions for each of these. Luhmann sees the political system as ‘‘ab-
sorbing” the problems of its environment and making them internal to
the political system. Several variables, he argues, determine the extent to
which the political system can perform this function: (1) the degree to
which conflicts are defined as political (instead of moral, personal, etc.)
and therefore in need of a binding decision, (2) the degree of adminis-
trative capacity of the political system to coordinate activities of system
units, and (3) the degree of structural differentiation within the political
system itself.
This last variable is the most crucial in Luhmann’s view. In response
to environmental complexity and the need to absorb and deal with prob-
lems in this environment, the political system must differentiate along
three lines: (1) the creation of a stable bureaucratic administration that
executes decisions, (2) the evolution of a separate arena for politics and
the emergence of political parties, and (3) the designation of the public
as a relevant concern in making binding decisions. Such internal differ-
entiation increases the capacity of the political system to absorb and deal
with a wide variety of problems; atid as a consequence, it allows for greater
complexity in the societal system.
This increased complexity of the political and societal systems also
increases the risks of making binding decisions that are maladaptive. For

“Tbid., pp. 143-44.

 THE FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION OF SOCIETY 119

as complexity increases, there are always unknown contingencies. There-

fore, political systems not only develop mechanisms such as internal dif-
ferentiation for dealing with complexity, but they also develop mecha-
nisms for reducing risk or the perception of risk. One mechanism is the
growing reflexiveness of the political process—that is, its increased re-
flection upon itself. Such reflection is built into the nature of party politics
where the manner and substance of political decisions are analyzed and
debated. Another mechanism is what Luhmann calls the positivation of
law, or the creationof a separate legal system that makes “laws about
how to make laws” (more on this shortly in the next section). Yet another
mechanism is ideology or symbolic codes that select which values are
relevant for a particular set of decisions. A related mechanism is the
development of a political code that typifies and categorizes political de-
cisions into a simple typology.*? For example, the distinction between
progressive and conservative politics is, Luhmann argues, an important
political code in differentiated societies. Such a code is obviously very
general, but this is its virtue because it allows very diverse political acts
and decisions to be categorized and interpreted with a simple dichotomy,
thereby giving political action a sense of order and reducing perceptions
of risk. Luhmann goes so far as to indicate that it is a system’s capacity
to develop a political code more than consensus of values that leads to
social order. For in interpreting actions in terms of the code, a common
perspective is maintained, but it is a perspective based upon differences—
progressive versus conservative—rather than commonality and consensus.
Thus, complex social orders are sustained by their very capacity to create
generalized and binary categories for interpreting events rather than by
value consensus.
Still another mechanism for reducing risks is arbitrary decision mak-
ing by elites. However, although such a solution achieves order, it un-
dermines the legitimacy of the political system in the long run because
system units come to resent and to resist arbitrary decision making. And
a final mechanism is invocation of a traditional moral code (for example,
fundamentalistic religious values) that, in Luhmann’s terms, “remoral-
izes” the political process. But when such remoralization occurs, the po-
litical system must dedifferentiate because strict adherence to a simple
moral code precludes the capacity to deal with complexity (an example
of this process would be Iran’s return to a theocracy from its previously
more complex political system).
In sum, then, I think it fair to say that Luhmann uses his conceptual
metaphor to analyze insightfully specific institutional processes, such as
government. Yet, he does not use his scheme in a rigorous deductive sense,
but much like Parsons before him, he employs the framework as a means

*Tbid., pp. 168-89.

120 CHAPTER 5 / THE SYSTEMS FUNCTIONALISM OF NIKLAS LUHMANN

for denoting and highlighting particular social phenomena. Although I

think that much of his analysis of political system differentiation is “old
wine in new bottles,” there is a shift in emphasis and, as a result, some
intriguing but imprecise insights. In a similar vein, Luhmann analyzes
the differentiation of the legal system and the economy.

The Autonomy of the Legal System

As I discussed earlier, Luhmann visualizes social evolution as involving
a separation of persons, roles, programs, and values. For him, differen-
tiation of structure occurs at the level of roles and programs. Conse-
quently, there is the problem of how to integrate values and persons into
roles organized into programs within organization systems. The func-
tional mechanism for mobilizing and coordinating individuals to play roles
is law, whereas the mechanism for making values relevant to programs
is ideology.*? Thus, because law regulates and coordinates people’s par-
ticipation in roles and programs and because social differentiation must
always occur at the roles level, it becomes a critical subsystem if a society
is to differentiate and evolve. That is, a society cannot become complex
without the emergence of an autonomous legal system to specify rights,
duties, and obligations of people playing roles.*4
A certain degree of political differentiation must precede legal differ-
entiation, since there must be a set of structures to make decisions and
enforce them. But political processes often impede legal autonomy, as is
the case when political elites have used the law for their own narrow
purposes. For legal autonomy to emerge, therefore, political development
is not enough. Two additional conditions are necessary: (1) “the invo-
cation of sovereignty,” or references by system units to legal codes that
justify their communications and actions; and (2) “lawmaking sover-
eignty,” or the capacity of organizations in the legal system to decide just
what the law will be.
If these two conditions are met, then the legal system can become
increasingly reflexive. It can become a topic to itself, creating bodies of
procedural and administrative law to regulate the enactment and enforce-
ment of law. In turn, such procedural laws can themselves be the subject
of scrutiny. Without this reflexive quality, the legal system cannot be
sufficiently flexible to. change in accordance with shifting events in its
environment. Such fiexibility is essential because only through the law
can people’s actions be tied to the roles that are being differentiated. For
example, without what Luhmann ralls the “positivization of law” or its

%8Tbid., pp. 90-137.

“This is essentially the same conclusion Parsons reached in his description of evoitition
in Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives'and The System of Modern So-
cieties (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966 and 1971, respectively).
 THE FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION OF SOCIETY 121

capacity to change itself in response to altered circumstances, new laws

and agencies (e.g., workers’ compensation, binding arbitration of labor-
management disputes, minimum wages, health and safety) could not be
created to regulate people’s involvement in roles (in this case, work roles
in a differentiating economy).
Thus, positivization of the law is a critical condition for societal
differentiation. It reduces complexity by specifying relations of actors to
roles and relegating cooperation among social system units. But it reduces
complexity in a manner that presents options for change under new cir-
cumstances; and thus, it becomes a condition for the further differentia-
tion of other functional domains, such as the economic.

The Economy as a Social System

I think that Luhmann defines the economy in a needlessly elliptical way.
For Luhmann, the economy has the function of “deferring a decision
about the satisfaction of needs while providing a guarantee that they will
be satisfied and so utilizing the time thus acquired.”** The general idea
seems to be that economic activity—production and distribution of goods
and services—functions to satisfy basic or primary needs for food, clothing,
and shelter as well as derived or secondary needs for less basic goods and
services. But it does so in a way not fully appreciated in economic analysis:
it restructures humans’ orientation to time because economic action is
oriented to the satisfaction of future needs. Present economic activity is
typically-directed at future consumption; and so when a person works and
a corporation acts in a market, they are doing so to guarantee that their
future will be unproblematic.
I think that Luhmann’s definition of the economic subsystem is less
critical than his analysis of the processes leading to the creation of an
autonomous economic system in society. In traditional and undifferen-
tiated societies, Luhmann argues, only small-scale solutions are possible
with respect to doing something in the present to satisfy future needs.
One solution is stockpiling of goods, with provisions for the redistribution
of stocks to societal members or trade with other societies.** Another
solution is mutual assistance agreements among individuals, kin groups,
or villages. But such patterns of economic organization are very limited
because they merge familial, political, religious, and community activity.
Only with the differentiation of distinctly economic roles can more com-
plexity and flexibility be structured into economic action. The first key
differentiation along these lines is the development of markets with dis-
tinctive roles for buyers and sellers.

%*]uhmann, The Differentiation, p. 194.

*Tbid., p. 197.
122 CHAPTER 5 / THE SYSTEMS FUNCTIONALISM OF NIKLAS LUHMANN

A market performs several crucial functions. First, it sets equivalences

or the respective values of goods and services. Second, it neutralizes the
relevance of other roles—for instance, the familial, religious, and political
roles of parties in an exchange. Value is established in terms of the qual-
ities of respective goods, not the positions or characteristics of the buyers
and sellers.” Third, markets inevitably generate pressures for a new media
of communication that is not tied to other functional subsystems. This
media is money, and it allows for quick assessments of equivalences and
value in terms of an agreed-upon metric. In sum, then, markets create
the conditions for the differentiation of distinctly economic roles, for their
separation and insulation from other societal roles, and for the creation
of a uniquely economic media of communication.
Money is a very unusual media, Luhmann believes, because it “trans-
fers complexity.” Unlike other media, money is distinctive because it does
not reduce complexity in the environment. For example, the media of
power is used to make decisions that direct activity, thereby reducing the
complexity of the environment. The media of truth in science is designed
to simplify the understanding of a complex universe. And the media of
love in the family circumscribes the actions and types of relations among
kindred, and in so doing, it reduces complexity. In contrast, money is a
neutral vehicle that can always be used to buy and sell many different
things. It does not limit; in fact, it opens options and creates new op-
portunities. For example, to accept money for a good or for one’s work
does not reduce the seller’s or worker’s options. The money can be used
in many different ways, thereby preserving and even increasing the com-
plexity of the environment. Money thus sets the stage—indeed it en-
courages—further internal differentiation in the economic subsystem of
a society.
In addition to transferring complexity, Luhmann sees money as dra-
matically altering the time dimension of the environment. Money is a
liquid resource that is always “usable in the future.’”” When we have money,
it can be used at some future date—whether the next minute or the fol-
lowing year. Money thus collapses time, since it is to be used in the future,
hence making the past irrelevant; and the present is defined in terms of
what will be done with money in the future. However, this collapsing of
time can only come about if (1) money does not inflate over time and (2)
it is universally used as the media of exchange (that is, barter, mutual
assistance, and other traditional forms of exchange do not still prevail).**
Like all media of communication, money is reflexive. It becomes a
goal of reflection, debate, and action itself. We can buy and sell money
in markets; we can invest money to make more money; or we can condemn

*Luhmann fails to cite the earlier work of Georg Simmel on these matters. See Simmel's
The Philosophy of Money.
*Luhmann, The Differentiation, p. 207.
 THE FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION OF SOCIETY 123

money as the root of evil or praise it as a goal that is worth pursuing; we

can hoard it in banks or we can spread it around in consumptive activity.
This reflexive quality of money, coupled with its capacity to transfer
complexity and reorient actors to time, is what allows money to become
an ever more dominant media of communication in complex societies.
Indeed, the economy becomes the primary subsystem of complex societies
because its media encourages constant increases in complexity and growth
in the economic system. As a consequence, the economy becomes a prom-
inent subsystem in the environment of other functional subsystems—that
is, science, polity, family, religion, and education. In fact, it becomes
something that must always be dealt with by these other subsystems.
This growing complexity of the economic subsystem increases the
risks in human conduct. The potential for making a mistake in providing
for a person’s future needs or a corporation’s profits increases because
the number of unknown contingencies dramatically multiplies. Such es-
calated risks generate pressures, Luhmann argues, for their reduction
through the emergence of specific mechanisms. The most important of
these mechanisms is the tripart internal differentiation of the economy
around (1) households, (2) firms, and (3) markets.®® There is a “structural
selection” for this division, Luhmann believes, because these are struc-
turally and functionally different. Households are segmental systems
(structurally the same) and are the primary consumption units. Firms are
structurally diverse and the primary productive units. And markets are
not so much a unit as a set of processes for distributing goods and services.
Luhmann is a bit vague on this point, but it seems that there is strength
in this correspondence of basically different structures with major eco-
nomic functions. Households are segmented structurally and are func-
tionally oriented to consumption; firms are highly differentiated struc-
turally and are functionally geared to production; and markets are
processually differentiated in terms of their function to distribute different
types of goods and services. Such differentiation reduces complexity, but
at the same time, it also allows for flexibility: households can change
consumption patterns, firms can alter production, and markets can ex-
pand or contract. And since they are separated from each other, each has
the capacity to change and redirect its actions, independent of the other.
It is this flexibility that allows the economic system to become so prom-
inent in modern industrial societies.
Yet, Luhmann warns, the very complexity of the economy and its
importance for other subsystems create pressures for other risk-reducing
mechanisms. One of these is intervention by government so that power
is used to make binding decisions on production, consumption, and dis-
tribution as well as on the availability of money as a media of

*[bid., p. 216.
124 CHAPTER 5 / THE SYSTEMS FUNCTIONALISM OF NIKLAS LUHMANN

communication. The extensive use of this mechanism, Luhmann believes,

reduces risk and complexity in the economy at the expense of its capacity
to meet needs in the future and to make flexible adjustments to the
environment.

SYSTEMS FUNCTIONALISM: AN ASSESSMENT OF

LUHMANN’S ALTERNATIVE
I think the critical questions in assessing Lunmann’s functionalism are:
Does it avoid the problems of functional analysis that I have outlined in
previous chapters? And does it add any new insights into the dynamics
of social systems? Let me begin with the first question.
It seems to me that Luhmann simply ignores the problems of func-
tional analysis. He assumes functional needs and imperatives for reducing
complexity and for adaptation to the environment. Then, he simply as-
serts that mechanisms emerge to meet these needs. I feel there is much
here that is illegitimately teleological: system needs miraculously produce
the structures to meet these needs; or in other words, effects produce
causes. Luhmann does invoke a “social selection” argument in that pres-
sures for adaptation and for reducing complexity create “selection pres-
sures” for some of those system mechanisms that will reduce complexity
and increase adaptation. But for any given mechanism, these selection
processes are rarely articulated. For example, if “positive law” has selec-
tive advantages, then what exactly were the selection pressures for its
emergence?; what happened historically to societies that did and did not
develop positive law?; and what are the reasons why they did or did not?
Without answers to such questions, the theoretical explanation of an event
is an illegitimate teleology. Effects produce the things that cause these
effects.
More problematic, I think, is the view of explanation in Luhmann’s
approach: develop a conceptual scheme of categories and use these cat-
egories to describe social events. For me, Luhmann ends up simply de-
scribing with new words what has occurred historically without really
explaining how and why these events occurred (except to state that they
met system needs or requisites). For example, to assert that ideologies
meet the need to attach values to roles and programs in complex societies
simply says that ideologies become prominent in complex societies. But
it does not explain how and why this occurs.
Additionally, in an effort to avoid the complex architecture of Par-
sons’ analytical scheme, Luhmann constructs a very loose, metaphorical,
and frequently vague alternative. Even more than is the case with Parsons.
I suspect, one must internalize the scheme and use it as a general and
sensitizing metaphor for interpreting events. As a result, one does not
explain by deduction, but by intuition. One senses that this or that process
is a “mechanism” that “serves this or that function.” Explanation be-
 SYSTEMS FUNCTIONALISM: AN ASSESSMENT OF LUHMANN’S ALTERNATIVE 125

comes a matter of negotiating the right intuition among communities of

Luhmann scholars who have internalized and who accept his concepts,
categories, and metaphors.
Moreover, how would one ever refute Luhmann’s scheme? When cat-
egories are vague and imprecise, when they are often metaphorical, and
when explanation is by intuitive use of the scheme, could one ever con-
struct a “test” of the scheme that might throw its utility into doubt? I
sense that any such effort would be rejected by adherents to Luhmann’s
approach as “an incorrect interpretation of what he really meant.” Thus,
the scheme will always remain intact; and all assaults on its virtue will
be defined away. 7
_ In light of these problems, what does the scheme offer to sociological
theorizing? I think that as explanation of events it has little to offer
cumulative theory, but much like Parsons’ scheme, it is often used to
produce rich and robust substantive insights. Probably the most useful
portions of the scheme are (1) the implicit attack on the evaluative sub-
stance of much evolutionary thinking, (2) the recognition that complex
social systems are integrated in ways other than value consensus, and (3)
the emphasis that social processes operate along temporal, material, and
symbolic dimensions. In these areas, there are many interesting gener-
alizations to be developed. None of them needs the systems and functional
trappings of Luhmann’s scheme. One can, for example, analyze entrance/
exit rules independently of viewing them as mechanisms for reducing
complexity in organization systems. Or one can examine the effects of
money on cognitive orientations to time without all of the jargon about
system adaptation.
Thus, the scheme does produce insights that alternative theoretical
approaches have not generated. And so, if one finds Luhmann’s functional
metaphors useful, I see little wrong in using them to isolate interesting
social processes. But once this is done, the system’s jargon and its func-
tional trappings should be abandoned. Then, the process can be examined
in ways that can yield testable propositions. Unfortunately, once com-
mitted to a system’s functional scheme, it is typically difficult to abandon
it. As a result, the scheme becomes a grand, self-reinforcing world view;
and explanation becomes the intuitive use of the scheme to interpret and
describe events.
Thus, Luhmann’s systems functionalism is very much like other func-
tionalisms. It is intriguing and seductive. But it can only explain by ca-
tegorizing events as an instance of this or that element in the scheme.
However, the scheme itself can never be tested against the facts of the
empirical world. And so, it is interesting metaphysics but poor theory.
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 PART TWO

Conflict Theory

The Origins of Conflict and

Critical Theorizing
The Dialectical Conflict Theory of
Ralf Dahrendorf
The Conflict Functionalism of
Lewis A. Coser
The Critical Theorizing of
Jurgen Habermas

127
at a
 . CHAPTER 6 ae

___ The Origins of Conflict

______and Critical Theorizing

THE CONFLICT ALTERNATIVE

During the 1950s, as the essentials of the Parsonian scheme were un-
folding, one body of criticism was taking on a clear focus. Functional
theory in sociology, especially the Parsonian variety, was seen as under-
emphasizing the conflictual nature of social reality. Soon, attacks along
these lines became ceremonial rituals for sociologists who sought theo-
retical redemption for past sins and who now held that conflict theory
was to carry sociology out of its theoretical morass.
David Lockwood argued as early as 1956 that in continually assuming
for analytical purposes a system in equilibrium, Parsons had created a_
fictionalized conception of the social world.! From this world of fantasy,
as Lockwood phrased the matter, it was inevitable that analysis would
emphasize mechanisms that maintained social order rather than those
that systematically generated disorder and change. Furthermore, by as-
suming order and equilibrium, the ubiquitous phenomena of instability,
disorder, and conflict too easily became viewed as deviant, abnormal, and
pathological. For, in reality, Lockwood insisted, there are mechanisms in
societies that make conflict inevitable and inexorable. For example, power
differentials assure that some groups will exploit others and constitute a
built-in source of tension and conflict in social systems. Additionally, the
existence of scarce resources in societies will inevitably generate fights

'\David Lockwood, “Some Remarks on ‘The Social System,’ ” British Journal of Sociology
7 (June 1956), pp. 134-46.

129
130 CHAPTER 6 / THE ORIGINS OF CONFLICT AND CRITICAL THEORIZING

over the distribution of these resources. And finally, the fact that different
interest groups pursue different goals and hence vie with one another
assures that conflict will erupt. These forces, Lockwood contended, rep-
resent mechanisms of social disorder that should be as analytically sig-
nificant to the understanding of social systems as Parsons’s mechanisms
of socialization and social control.
As I noted in Chapter 3, Ralf Dahrendorf crystallized this line of
argument toward the end of the decade by comparing functional theory
to a utopia.? Utopias usually have few historical antecedents—much like
Parsons’s hypothesized equilibrium, utopias display universal consensus
on prevailing values and institutional arrangements—in a vein remarkably
similar to Parsons’s concept of institutionalization; and utopias always
display processes that operate to maintain existing arrangements—much
like the mechanisms of Parsons’s social system. Hence, utopias and the
social world when viewed from a functional perspective do not change
very much, since they do not concern themselves with history, dissension
over values, and conflict in institutional arrangements.
At the same time, another body of conflict criticism was emerging.
This criticism was mounted against all positivistic social science, espe-
cially the functional variety but also any system of theory that proclaimed
itself as objective and neutral.’ All theory that seeks to understand the
social world without also exposing the patterns of oppression and dom-
ination is, in effect, an ideology supporting the status quo. For in studying
the world “‘as it is,” there is an implicit assumption that this is how the
social order must be. Theoretical knowledge cannot, therefore, merely
describe events. It must expose exploitive social arrangements and, at the
same time, suggest alternative ways to organize humans in less oppressive
ways. Social theory cannot be neutral; rather, it must be emancipatory.
To some extent, the critiques of Parsonian functionalism and posi-
tivism owe their inspiration to what I see as contradictory strains in the
work of Karl Marx. Those who were to criticize Parsons for his failure
to examine conflict tended to accept the positivistic strains in Marx and
to propose a conflict sociology that tried to develop abstract propositions
explaining the conflictual nature of social reality.4 In contrast, those who

Ralf Dahrendorf, “Out of Utopia: Toward a Reorientation of Sociological Analysis,”

American Journal of Sociology 744 (September 1958), pp. 115-27.
5Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960) and Negations
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1969; originally published 1965); Theodore Adorno. Negative Di-
alectics (New York: Seaburg Press, 1973):-Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory (New York:
Herder and Herder, 1972); Trent Schroyer, “Toward a Critical Theory for Advanced In-
dustrial Society,” in Recent Sociology, ed. H. P. Dreitzer (New York: Macmillan. 1970): and
The Critique of Domination: The Origins and Development of Critical Theory (New York:
George Braziller Inc., 1973); Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interest (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1971).
‘For a diverse sampling of these efforts, see William Gamson, The Strategy of Social
Protest (Homewood, IIl.: Dorsey Press, 1975); Louis Kriesberg, The Sociology of Social
 THE CONFLICT ALTERNATIVE 131

criticized positivism in general drew inspiration from the more moralistic

and antiscience portions in Marx and, surprisingly, have not been so
hostile to Parsons or functionalism in general.
But I hasten to add that Marx was not the only source of inspiration
for this emerging range of alternatives. The other prominent German
sociologists of the late 19th and early 20th centuries—Max Weber and
Georg Simmel—were also decisive in the development of the various con-
flict sociologies. Simmel was to inspire a more positivistic and functional
view of conflict processes than Marx; and his criticisms of Marx’s analysis
of capitalism have influenced critical theorists who dislike positivism and-
who emphasize that social theory must be emancipatory. Similarly, Max
Weber was to stimulate both the positivistic and critical versions of con-
flict theorizing. For positivistically inclined theorists, his analysis of strat-
ification has provided a crucial corrective for errors in Marx’s analysis of
class conflict. And for critical theorists, his historical and evolutionary
account of the rise of capitalism and his pessimistic assessment of the
process of rationalization in the modern world have forced a reassessment
of Marx’s naive faith in the coming emancipation of humans.
Thus, out of this ferment among the three great German sociologists—
Marx, Weber, and Simmel—emerged a variety of approaches that share
little else in common than their use of the works of Marx, Simmel, and

Conflict (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973); Anthony Oberschall, Social Conflict
and Social Movements (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973); Robin M. Williams,
Jr., Mutual Accommodation: Ethnic Conflict and Cooperation (Minneapolis, Minn.: Uni-
versity of Minnesota Press, 1977); Randall Collins, Conflict Sociology (New York: Academic
Press, 1975); Ted Gurr, “Sources of Rebellion in Western Societies: Some Quantitative
Evidence,” The Annals 391 (September 1970), pp. 128-44; A. L. Jacobson, “Intrasocietal
Conflict: A Preliminary Test of a Structural Level Theory,” Comparative Political Studies
6 (1973), pp. 62-83; David Snyder, “Institutional Setting and Industrial Conflict,” American
Sociological Review 40 (June 1975), pp. 259-78; David Britt and Omer R. Galle, “Industrial
Conflict and Unionization,” American Sociological Review 37 (February 1972), pp. 46-57;
E. McNeil, ed., The Nature of Human Conflict (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965);
Jessie Bernard, American Community Behavior (New York: Dryden Press, 1949), ‘““Where
is the Modern Sociology of Conflict?” American Journal of Sociology 56 (1950), pp. 111-
16, and “Parties and Issues in Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 1 (June 1957), pp.
111-21; Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper &
Row, 1962); Thomas Carver, “The Basis of Social Conflict,” American Journal of Sociology
13 (1908), pp. 628-37; James Coleman, Community Conflict (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957);
James C. Davies, “Toward A Theory of Revolution,” American Journal of Sociology 27
(1962), pp. 5-19; Charles P. Loomis, “In Praise of Conflict and Its Resolution,” American
Sociological Review 32 (December 1967), pp. 875-90; Raymond Mack and Richard C. Snyder,
“The Analysis of Social Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 1 (June 1957), pp. 388-
97; John S. Patterson, Conflict in Nature and Life (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts,
1883); Anatol Rapoport, Fights, Games and Debates (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Mich-
igan Press, 1960); Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
Univ. Press, 1960); Pitirim Sorokin, ‘“Solidary, Antagonistic, and Mixed Systems of Inter-
action,” in Society, Culture, and Personality (New York: Harper & Row, 1947); Nicholas
S. Timasheff, War and Revolution (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965); Robin M. Williams,
Jr., The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions (New York: Social Science Research Council,
1947); and Clinton F. Fink, “Some Conceptual Difficulties in the Theory of Social Conflict,”
Journal of Conflict Resolution 12 (December 1968), pp. 429-31.
132 CHAPTER 6 / THE ORIGINS OF CONFLICT AND CRITICAL THEORIZING

Weber to analyze elements of inequality, power, domination, and conflict

in human societies. I have grouped this diverse range of approaches under
the rubric of conflict theory, but I do so only with the important quali-
fication that this label embraces very different types of theoretical activ-
ity—ranging from dialectical and functional theories of conflict processes
to more encompassing philosophical schemes about the state of human
oppression and domination in the modern world. My purpose in this
chapter, therefore, is to examine the origins of this eclectic mix of ap-
proaches by summarizing the diverse strains in the work of Marx, Simmel,
and Weber that have been used to build these very different types of
conflict theorizing.

KARL MARX (1818-1883) AND THE ORIGINS OF

CONFLICT AND CRITICAL THEORY
As with any scholar whose work evolves over time, there are contradic-
tions and inconsistencies in Marx’s ideas. I do not see this as a cause for
great dismay, as many commentators have. Indeed, any creative scholar’s
thought will change and evolve over time. And thus, Marx and Friedrich
Engels’s first work, The German Ideology,’ is vastly different from Marx’s
later works, such as Capital.* In between these early and late works is
Marx’s and Engels’s The Communist Manifesto.’ There are, of course,
other important works to consider, but I feel that these have been the
most influential in the development of critical theory, which stresses the
emancipatory themes in Marx’s thought, and dialectical conflict theory,
which has followed the more positivistic hints in Marx’s work.

Critical Strains in Marx’s Thought

In 1846, Marx and Engels completed The German Ideology, which was
initially turned down by the publisher.’ Much of this work is an attack
on the “Young Hegelians,” who were advocates of the German philosopher
Georg Hegel, and is of little interest today. Yet, in this attack are certain
basic ideas that, I feel, have served as the impetus behind “critical theory,”
or the view that social theory must be critical of oppressive arrangements
and propose emancipatory alternatives. This theme exists, of course, in
all of Marx’s work, but it is in this first statement by Marx that the key
elements of contemporary critical theory are most evident.

*Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology (New York: International Pub-
lishers, 1947; originally written in 1846).
*Karl Marx, Capital: A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production, vol. 1 (New York:
International Publishers, 1967; originally published in 1867).
"Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (New York: International
Publishers, 1971; originally published in 1848).
*Marx and Engels, The German Ideology.
KARL MARX (1818-1883) AND THE ORIGINS OF CONFLICT AND CRITICAL THEORY 133

Marx criticized the Young Hegelians severely because he had once

been one of them and was now making an irrevocable break with them.
He saw the Hegelians as hopeless idealists, in the philosophical sense.
That is, they saw the world as reflective of ideas, with the dynamics of
social life revolving around consciousness and other cognitive processes
by which “‘ideal essences” work their magic on humans. Marx saw this
emphasis on the “reality of ideas” as nothing more than a conservative
ideology that supports people’s oppression by the material forces of their
existence. His alternative was “‘to stand Hegel on his head,” but in this
early work, there is still an emphasis on the relation between conscious-
ness and self-reflection, on the one hand, and social reality, on the other.
This dualism becomes central to contemporary critical theory.
Marx saw humans as being unique by virtue of their conscious aware-
ness of themselves and their situation. They are capable of self-reflection
and, hence, assessment of their positions in society. Such consciousness
arises out of people’s daily existence and is not a realm of ideas that is
somehow independent of the material world, as much German philosophy
argued. For Marx, people produce their ideas and conceptions of the world
in light of the social structures in which they are born, raised, and live.
The essence of people’s lives is the process of production, since for
Marx, human “life involves before anything else eating and drinking, a
habitation, clothing, and many other material things.”® To meet these
contingencies of life, production is necessary, but as production satisfies
one set of needs, new needs arise and encourage alterations in the ways
that productive activity is organized. The elaboration of productive ac-
tivity creates a division of labor, which, in the end, is alienating because
it increasingly deprives humans of their capacity to determine their pro-
ductive activities. Moreover, as people work, they are exploited in ways
that generate private property and capital for those who enslave them.
Thus, as people work as alienated cogs in the division of labor, they
produce that which enslaves them: private property and profits for those
who control the modes and means of production. Marx provided a more
detailed discussion of the evolution of productive forces to this capitalist
stage, but for mv purposes, his analysis of consciousness is more
important.’°
Marx argued that the capacity to use language, to think, and to analyze
allows humans to alter their environment. People do not merely have to
react to their material conditions in some mechanical way; they can also
use their capacities for thought and reflection to construct new material
conditions and corresponding social relations. Indeed, the course of history

*Tbid., p. 15.
10Indeed, Marx was as much an evolutionist as any functionalist, and in fact, there is
much functional reasoning in his arguments. For illustrations, see Arthur L. Stinchcombe.
Constructing Social Theories (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968).
134 CHAPTER 6 / THE ORIGINS OF CONFLICT AND CRITICAL THEORIZING

involved such processes as people actively restructured the material con-

ditions of their existence. The goal of social theory, Marx implicitly ar-
gues, is to use humans’ unique facility to expose those oppressive social
relations and to propose alternatives. Marx’s entire career was devoted
to this goal; and it is this emancipatory aspect of Marx’s thought that
forms the foundation for critical theory, which I will examine in Chapter
9.

Positivistic Strains in Marx’s Thought

In developing this emancipatory project, Marx produced a formal theory
of conflict and change, which he might disavow as a positivistic theory
but which has been used nonetheless in developing contemporary conflict
theory. In elaborating his model of revolutionary class conflict and social
change, Marx delineated an image of social organization that still influ-
ences a major portion of contemporary sociological theory. Marx began
with a simple—and I think simplistic—assumption: Economic organiza-
tion, especially the ownership of property, determines the organization
of the rest of a society. The class structure and institutional arrangements,
as well as cultural values, beliefs, religious dogmas, and other idea systems
are ultimately a reflection of the economic base of a society. He then
added another assumption: Inherent in the economic organization of any
society—save the ultimate communistic society—are forces inevitably gen-
erating revolutionary class conflict. Such revolutionary class conflict is
seen as dialectical and conceptualized as occurring in epochs, with suc-
cessive bases of economic organization sowing the seeds of their own
destruction through the polarization of classes and subsequent overthrow
of the dominant by the subjugated class. Hence, a third assumption: con-
flict is bipolar, with exploited classes under conditions created by the
economy becoming aware of their true interests and eventually forming
a revolutionary political organization that stands against the dominant,
property-holding class.
I see the criticisms that can be leveled against these assumptions as
self-evident: (1) societies are more than mere reflections of economic
organization and patterns of property ownership; (2) social conflict is
rarely bipolarized across an entire society; (3) interests in a society do
not always cohere around social class; (4) power relations in a society are
not always direct reflections of ownership of property; and (5) conflict
does not always cause social change, dialectical or otherwise. In addition
to a whole series of incorrect predictions—such as the formation of the
modern proletariat into a revolutionary class during the present “capi-
talistic” epoch, the subsequent overthrow of capitalist economic systems,
and the formation of a communist society—the wisdom of following Marx's
lead can, I believe, be seriously questioned.
KARL MARX (1818-1883) AND THE ORIGINS OF CONFLICT AND CRITICAL THEORY 135

With abstraction above the specifics of Marx’s economic determinism

and excessive polemics, however, I and other theorists see a set of as-
sumptions that directly challenge those imputed to functionalism and that
can serve as an intellectual springboard for a conflict alternative in so-
ciological theorizing:
1. While social relationships display systemic features, these rela-
tionships are rife with conflicting interests.
2. This fact reveals that social systems systematically generate conflict.
3. Conflict is therefore an inevitable and pervasive feature of social
systems.
4. Such conflict tends to be manifested in the opposition of interests.
5. Conflict most frequently occurs over the distribution of scarce re-
sources, most notably power and material wealth.
6. Conflict is the major source of change in social systems.
In addition to these assumptions, I think that the form and substance
of Marx’s causal analysis has been equally influential in the development
of modern conflict theory. This analysis takes the general form of assum- .
ing that conflict is an inevitable and inexorable force in social systems
and is activated under certain specified conditions. Some of these con-
ditions are viewed as allowing for the transformation of latent class in-
terests (lying in a state of “false consciousness’) into manifest class in-
terests (“class consciousness’), which, under additional conditions, lead
to the polarization of society into classes joined in conflict. Thus, for
Marx, there is a series of conditions that are cast into the role of inter-
vening variables that accelerate or retard the inevitable transformation
of class interests into revolutionary class conflict.
In addition to the form of the argument (which I will discuss more
thoroughly in the next chapter), the substance of the Marxian model is
of great importance in understanding modern sociological theory. Con-
trary to most contemporary Marxist theorists, I believe that this sub-
stantive contribution can best be seen if the propositions of his theoretical
scheme are stated in a highly abstract form and divorced from his polemics
and rhetoric about social class and revolution. I admit that much of the
flavor of Marx’s analysis is lost in such an exercise, but the indebtedness
of modern sociological theory to Marxian propositions becomes more ev-
ident.!! I have summarized these abstract propositions in Table 6-1.
In Table 6-1, Marx’s assumptions about the nature of the social world
and the key causal connections in this world are stated propositionally.
For it is in a propositional form that Marx’s contribution to conflict theory
has been most frequently used by contemporary theorists (see following

“For criticism of my efforts along these lines, see Richard P. Abbelbaum, “Marx’s Theory
of the Falling Rate of Profit: Towards a Dialectical Analysis of Structural Socia) Change,”
American Sociological Review 43 (February 1978), pp. 64-73.
136 CHAPTER 6 / THE ORIGINS OF CONFLICT AND CRITICAL THEORIZING

NN EE

TABLE 6-1 Marx's Key Propositions

|. The more unequal is the distribution of scarce resources in a system, the

greater is the conflict of interest between dominant and subordinate segments
in a system.
. The more subordinate segments become aware of their true collective interests,
the more likely are they to question the legitimacy of the existing pattern of
distribution of scarce resources.
A. The more social changes wrought by dominant segments disrupt existing
relations among subordinates, the more likely are the latter to become aware
of their true interests.
B. The more practices of dominant segments create alienative dispositions
among subordinates, the more likely are the latter to become aware of their
true collective interests.
C. The more members of subordinate segments can communicate their
grievances to each other, the more likely they are to become aware of their
true collective interests.
1. The more ecological concentration of members of subordinate groups,
the more likely communication of grievances.
2. The more the educational opportunities of subordinate group members,
the more diverse the means of their communication, and the more likely
they are to communicate their grievances.
D. The more subordinate segments can develop unifying ideologies, the more
likely they are to become aware of their true collective interests.
1. The greater the capacity to recruit or generate ideological spokespeople,
the more likely ideological unification.
2. The less the ability of dominant groups to regulate the socialization
processes and communication networks in a system, the more likely
ideological unification.
lll. The more subordinate segments of a system are aware of their collective
interests and the greater is their questioning of the legitimacy of the distribution
of scarce resources, the more likely are they to join overt conflict against
dominant segments of a system.
A. The less the ability of dominant groups to make manifest their collective
interests, the more likely subordinate groups are to join in conflict.
B. The more the deprivations of subordinates move from an absolute to relative
basis, the more likely they are to join in conflict.
C. The greater the ability of subordinate groups to develop a political leadership
structure, the more likely they are to join in conflict.
IV. The greater is the ideological unification of members of subordinate segments
of a system and the more developed is their political leadership structure, the
more likely are dominant and subjugated segments of a system to become
polarized.
V. The more polarized are the dominant and subjugated, the more violent is their
conflict.
VI. The more violent is the conflict, the greater is the structural change of the
system and the greater is the redistribution of scarce resources.

chapters 7, 8, and 9). In Proposition I of Table 6-1, the degree of inequality

in the distribution of resources is held by Marx to influence the extent
to which segments of a social system will reveal conflicts of interest.
Proposition II then documents some of the conditions that would make
KARL MARX (1818-1883) AND THE ORIGINS OF CONFLICT AND CRITICAL THEORY 137

members of deprived or subordinate segments of a population aware of

their conflict of interest with those holding the largest share of scarce
resources. For once segments of a population become aware of their true
interests, they will begin to question the legitimacy of a system in which
they come out on the short end of the distribution of scarce resources.
Propositions II-A, B, C, and D deal, respectively, with the disruption in
the social situation of deprived populations, the amount of alienation
people feel as a result of their situation, the capacity of members of de-
prived segments to communicate with each other, and their ability to
develop a unifying ideology that codifies their true interests. Marx sees
these conditions as factors that increase and heighten awareness of sub-
ordinates’ collective interests and, hence, decrease their willingness to
accept as legitimate the right of superordinates to command a dispro-
portionate share of resources.
In turn, some of these forces heightening awareness are influenced
by such structural conditions as ecological concentration (II-C-1), edu-
cational opportunities (II-C-2), the availability of ideological spokespeo-
ple (II-D-1), and the control of socialization processes and communi-
cation networks by superordinates (II-D-2). In Proposition III, Marx
hypothesizes that the increasing awareness by deprived classes of their
true interests and the resulting questioning of the legitimacy of the dis-
tribution of resources serve to increase the likelihood that the disadvan-
taged strata will begin to organize collectively their opposition against
the dominant segments of a system. This organization is seen as especially
likely under several conditions: the more disorganized the dominant seg-
ments with respect to understanding their true interests (III-A), the more
the subordinates’ deprivations escalate as they begin to compare their
situation with that of the privileged (III-B), and the more the ease with
which the deprived can develop political leadership to carry out the or-
ganizational tasks of mobilizing subordinates (III-C). In Proposition IV,
Marx emphasizes that once deprived groups possess a unifying ideology
and political leadership, their true interests begin to take on clear focus
and their opposition to superordinates begins to increase. As polarization
increases, the less possibility there is for reconciliation, compromise, or
mild conflict, since now the deprived are sufficiently alienated, organized,
and unified to press for a complete change in the pattern of resource
distribution (V)—thus making violent confrontation the only way to over-
come the inevitable resistance of superordinates. Finally (VI), Marx notes
that the more violent the conflict, the greater is the change in patterns
of organization in a system, especially its distribution of scarce resources.
Thus, for those who have tried to use these ideas to build positivistic
theory, I see the Marxian legacy as consisting of a set of conflict-oriented
assumptions, a particular form of causal analysis that stresses the im-
portance of intervening conditions for accelerating or retarding inexorable
conflict processes, and a series of abstract propositions. My sympathies
138 CHAPTER 6 / THE ORIGINS OF CONFLICT AND CRITICAL THEORIZING

reside with the more positivistic approach in Marx’s work, but there are
many who would disagree. Indeed, I would guess that most contemporary
Marxists disavow positivism and the search for universal and timeless
laws of human organization. And they certainly do not condone my and
others’ efforts to translate Marx’s ideas into the language of positivism
(as I did in Table 6-1). Such is clearly the case, as I will document in
Chapter 9, for most critical theorists, but it is also true for the vast
majority of Marxist sociologists. But in terms of actual theory develop-
ment, I think that the more positivistic efforts to translate Marx’s ideas
have been more dominant than the work of Marxists and critical theorists.
And even the most prominent critical theorist, Jurgen Habermas, who is
the topic of Chapter 9, has increasingly sought to make such theory more
objective. All this will become more evident, I think, as we proceed into
the next chapters. But for the present, let me return to examining the
origins of contemporary conflict theory.

GEORG SIMMEL AND CONFLICT THEORIZING

Functional Strains in Simmel’s Thought

Georg Simmel was committed to developing a body of theoretical state-
ments that captured the form of basic social processes, an approach he
labeled formal sociology. Primarily on the basis of his own observations,
he sought to abstract the essential properties from processes and events
in a wide variety of empirical contexts. In doing so, Simmel hoped to
develop abstract statements that depicted the most fundamental social
processes of social organization. Nowhere is his genius in such activity
more evident than in a short essay on conflict, which serves as a major
source of insight for contemporary conflict theory in sociology.'”
Much like Marx, Simmel viewed conflict as ubiquitous and inevitable
in society. Unlike Marx, however, he did not view social structure as a
domination and subjugation, but rather as an inseparable mingling as-
sociative and dissociative processes, which are separable only in analysis:

The structure may be sui generis, its motivation and form being wholly
self-consistent, and only in order to be able to describe and understand it,
do we put it together, post factum, out of two tendencies, one monistic, the
other antagonistic.”

'2A]l subsequent references to this work are taken from Georg Simmel. Conflict and the
Web of Group Affiliation, trans. K. H. Wolff (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956).
'3]bid., p. 23. However, with his typical caution, Simmel warns: “This fact should not
lead us to overlook the numerous cases in which contradictory tendencies really co-exist in
separation and can thus be recognized at any moment in the over-all situation” (pp. 23-
24).
 GEORG SIMMEL AND CONFLICT THEORIZING 139

Part of the reason for this emphasis, I think, lies in Simmel’s “or-
ganismic”’ view of the social world. In displaying formal properties, social
processes evidence a systemic character—a notion apparently derived from
the organismic doctrines dominating the sociology of his time. This subtle
organicism led Simniel to seek out the consequences of conflict for social
continuity rather than change:
Conflict is thus designed to resolve dualisms; it is a way of achieving some
kind of unity, even if it be through the annihilation of one of the conflicting
parties. This is roughly parallel to the fact that it is the most violent symptom
of a disease which represents the effort of the organism to free itself of
disturbances and damages caused by them. [Italics added. ]'*

In apparent contradiction to the harmony implied by this organicism,

Simmel postulated an innate “hostile impulse” or a “‘need for hating and
fighting” among the units of organic wholes, although this instinct is
mixed with others for love and affection and is circumscribed by the force
of social relationships. Therefore, Simmel viewed conflict as a reflection
not only of conflicts of interest but also of hostile instincts. Such instincts
can be exacerbated by conflicts of interest or mitigated by harmonious
relations as well as by instincts for love. But in the end, Simmel still
viewed one of the ultimate sources of conflict to lie in the innate biological
makeup of human actors.
In what I see as an effort to reconcile his assumptions about the
nature of the social organism with notions of hating and fighting instincts,
Simmel devoted considerable effort to analyzing the positive consequences
of conflict for the maintenance of social wholes and their subunits. In
this way, hostile impulses were seen not so much as a contradiction or
cancer to the organic whole but as one of many processes maintaining
the “body social.” Thus, although Simmel recognized that an overly co-
operative, consensual, and integrated society would show “no life process,”
his analysis of conflict is still loaded in the direction of how conflict
promotes solidarity and unification. :
It is this aspect of Simmel’s work on conflict that reveals an image
of social organization decidedly different from that emphasized by Marx:
1. Social relationships occur within systemic contexts that can only
by typified as an organic intermingling of associative and disso-
ciative processes.
2. Such processes are a reflection of both the instinctual impulses of
actors and the imperatives dictated by various types of social
relationships.
3. Conflict processes are therefore a ubiquitous feature of social sys-
tems, but they do not necessarily, in all cases, lead to breakdown
of the system and/or to social change.

‘Ibid, p. 13.
140 CHAPTER 6 / THE ORIGINS OF CONFLICT AND CRITICAL THEORIZING

4. In fact, conflict is one of the principal processes operating to pre-

serve the social whole and/or some of its subparts.

These assumptions are reflected in a large number of specific prop-

ositions, which Simmel apparently developed from direct observations of
events occurring around him and from readings of historical accounts of
conflict.® In these propositions, Simmel views conflict as a variable that
manifests different states of intensity or violence. The polar ends of this
variable continuum are “competition” and the “fight.”” Competition in-
volves the more regulated and parallel strivings of parties toward a mu-
tually exclusive end, and fight denotes the less regulated and more direct
combative activities of parties against each other.'* Although he does not
elaborate extensively on the variable properties of conflict or consistently
employ his labels, Simmel’s distinctions have inspired a long debate among
contemporary sociologists on what is and what is not conflict.'7 My sense
is that this debate has often degenerated into terminological quibbling,
but at its heart is the important issue of clarifying the concepts to be
employed in propositions on conflict processes—a theoretical issue that
Simmel clearly recognized as crucial.
Simmel’s organicism probably was critical in forcing this concep-
tualization of conflict as a variable phenomenon. Unlike Marx, who saw
conflict as ultimately becoming violent and revolutionary and leading to
the structural change of the system, Simmel was quite often led to the
analysis of the opposite phenomena—less intense and violent conflicts
that promoted the solidarity, integration, and orderly change of the sys-
tem.'® Yet, within the apparent constraints of his subtle organicism, Sim-
mel enumerated a number of suggestive propositions on the intensity of
conflict, that is, the degree of direct action and violence of parties against
each other. As with Marx, I think that the full impact of Simmel’s analysis
on modern theory can be seen more readily when his propositions are
stated formally and abstractly. I have listed these propositions in Table 6-
2,

Simmel was not concerned with developing scientific theory, but rather, he was inter-
ested in inducting social forms from interaction processes. This emphasis on forms makes
many of Simmel’s analytical statements rather easily converted into propositions. I should
emphasize, however, that transforming Simmel’s analytical statements into propositions
involves some risk of misinterpretation.
Simmel, Conflict, p. 58.
“For an excellent summary of this debate, see C. F. Fink, “Some Conceptual Difficulties
in the Theory of Social Conflict.” See also iny closing remarks in Chapter 8.
‘Pierre van de Berghe has argued that a dialectical model of conflict is ultimately one
where unification, albeit temporary, emerges out of conflict. But, as I will examine extensively
in the next chapter, the differences between Marx and Simmel have inspired vastly different
theoretical perspectives in contemporary sociology. See Pierre van de Berghe, “Dialectic
and Functionalism: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis,” American Sociological Review 28
(October 1963), pp. 695-705.
 GEORG SIMMEL AND CONFLICT THEORIZING 141

RE RTT TLE ERG LPL SPODELI gE LEG IED LED ELPAI BOTE Be PE EO IA AUG AEE EEE BITE SET i Tf IB ERT

TABLE 6-2 Simmel’s Propositions on Conflict Intensity

|. The greater is the degree of emotional involvement of parties to a conflict, the

more likely is the conflict to be violent.
A. The greater is the respective solidarity among members of conflict parties,
the greater is the degree of their emotional involvement.
B. The greater is the previous harmony between members of conflict parties,
the greater is the degree of their emotional involvement.
ll. The more that conflict is perceived by members of conflict groups to transcend
individual aims and interests, the more likely is the conflict to be violent.
lil. The more that conflict is a means to a clearly specified end, the less likely is the
conflict to be violent.

Propositions I, I-A, and I-B overlap somewhat with those developed

by Marx. In a vein similar to Marx, Simmel emphasized that violent
conflict is the result of emotional arousal. Such arousal is particularly
likely when conflict groups possess a great deal of internal solidarity and
when these conflict groups emerge out of previously harmonious relations.
Marx postulated a similar process in his contention that polarization of
groups previously involved in social relations (albeit exploitive ones) leads
to violent conflict. In Proposition II, Simmel indicated that, coupled with
emotional arousal, the extent to which members see the conflict as tran-
scending their individual aims increases the likelihood of violent conflict.
Proposition III is Simmel’s most important, I think, because it contradicts
Marx’s hypothesis that objective consciousness of interests will lead to
organization for violent conflict. In this proposition, Simmel argued that
the more clearly articulated their interests, the more focused are the goals
‘of conflict groups. With clearly articulated goals, it becomes possible to
view violent conflict as only one of many means for their achievement,
since other less combative conflicts, such as bargaining and compromise,
can often serve to meet the specific objectives of the group. Thus, for
Simmel, consciousness of common interests (Proposition II) can, under
unspecified conditions, lead to highly instrumental and nonviolent con-
flict. In the context of labor-management relations, for example, I think
that Simmel’s proposition is more accurate than Marx’s, for violence has
more often accompanied labor-management disputes in the initial for-
mation of unions, when interests and goals are not well articulated. As
interests become clarified, violent conflict has been increasingly replaced
by less violent forms of social interaction.”
Simmel then turned his attention to the consequences of conflict for
(1) the conflict parties and (2) for the systemic whole in which the conflict

Admittedly, Marx’s late awareness of the union movement in the United States forced
him to begin pondering this possibility, but he did not incorporate this insight into his
theoretical scheme.
142 CHAPTER 6 / THE ORIGINS OF CONFLICT AND CRITICAL THEORIZING

TABLE 6-3 Simmel's Propositions on the Functions of Conflict for the

Respective Parties

|. The more violent are intergroup hostilities and the more frequent is conflict
among groups, the less likely are group boundaries to disappear.
ll. The more violent is the conflict and the less integrated is the group, the more
likely is despotic centralization of conflict grouos.
lil. The more violent is the conflict, the greater will be the internal solidarity of
conflict groups.
A. The more violent is the conflict and the smaller are the conflict groups, the
greater will be their internal solidarity.
1. The more violent is the conflict and the smaller are the conflict groups,
the less will be the tolerance of deviance and dissent in each group.
B. The more violent is the conflict and the more a group represents a minority
position in a system, the greater will be the internal solidarity of that group.
C. The more violent is the conflict and the more a group is engaged in purely
self-defense, the greater will be its internal solidarity.

occurs. Simmel first analyzed how violent conflicts increase solidarity and
internal organization of the conflict parties, but when he shifted to an
analysis of the functions of conflict for the social whole, he drew attention
primarily to the fact that conflict promotes system integration and ad-
aptation. I think it reasonable to ask, however: how can violent conflicts
promoting increasing organization and solidarity of the conflict groups
suddenly have these positive functions for the systemic whole in which
the conflict occurs? For Marx, such a process is seen to lead to polarization
of conflict groups and then to the violent conflicts, which radically alter
the systemic whole. But for Simmel, the increased level of organization
within conflict groups enables them to realize many of their goals without
overt violence (but perhaps with a covert threat of violence), and such
partial realization of clearly defined goals cuts down internal system ten-
sion and hence promotes integration. Let me document Simmel’s rea-
soning with his propositions.
In Table 6-3, I have listed Simmel’s propositions on the functions of
violent conflict for the parties to the conflict. In these propositions, violent
conflict is seen, under certain conditions, to increase the degree of cen-
tralization and the level of internal solidarity of groups. Unlike Marx,
however, Simmel’s does not assume that conflict begets increasingly vi-
olent conflicts between ever more organized and polarized segments that,
in the end, will cause radical change in the system. This difference between
their analyses is most clear when Simmel’s propositions on the conse-
quences of conflict for the systemic whole are reviewed. The most notable
feature of several key propositions, which I have listed in Table 6-4, is
that Simmel was initially concerned with less violent conflicts and with
their integrative functions for the social whole, and only then, did he turn
 GEORG SIMMEL AND CONFLICT THEORIZING 143

TABLE 6-4 Simmel's Propositions on the Functions of Conflict for the

Systemic Whole
Rica owt sa ll nese 3 ge
|. The less violent is the conflict between groups of different degrees of power in
a system, the more likely is the conflict to have integrative consequences for the
social whole.
A. The less violent and more frequent is the conflict, the more likely is the
conflict to have integrative consequences for the social whole.
1. The less violent and more frequent is the conflict, the more members of
subordinate groups can release hostilities and have a sense of control
over their destiny and thereby maintain the integration of the social
whole.
2. The less violent and more frequent is the conflict, the more likely are
norms regularizing the conflict to be created by the conflicting parties.
B. The less violent is the conflict and the more the social whole is based on
functional interdependence, the more likely is the conflict to have integrative
consequences for the social whole.
1. The less violent is the conflict in systems with high degrees of functional
interdependence, the more likely is it to encourage the creation of norms
regularizing the conflict.
ll. The more violent and the more prolonged are conflict relations between groups,
the more likely is the formation of coalitions among previously unrelated groups
in a system. |
lll. The more prolonged is the threat of violent conflict between groups, the more
enduring are the coalitions of each of the conflict parties.

to more violent conflicts. And even here, he emphasized their integrative

consequences for the social whole.
I think that Proposition I in Table 6-4 provides an important qual-
ification to Marx’s analysis. Marx visualized mild conflicts as intensifying
as the combatants become increasingly polarized; and in the end, the
resulting violent conflict would lead to radical social change in the system.
In contrast, Simmel argued that conflicts of low intensity and high fre-
quency in systems of high degrees of interdependence do not necessarily
intensify or lead to radical social change. On the contrary, they release
tensions and become normatively regulated, thereby promoting stability
in social systems. Further, Simmel’s previous propositions on violent con-
flicts present the possibility that with the increasing organization of the
conflicting groups, the degree of violence of their conflict will decrease as
their goals become better articulated. The consequence of such organi-
zation and articulation of interests will be a greater disposition to initiate
milder forms of conflict, involving competition, bargaining, and compro-
mise. What I see as critical for developing a sociology of conflict is that
Simmel’s analysis provides more options than Marx’s propositions on
conflict outcomes. First, conflicts do not necessarily intensify to the point
of violence; and when they do not, they can have, under conditions that
need to be further explored, integrative outcomes for the social whole.
Marx’s analysis precludes exploration of these processes. Second, Simmel’s
144 CHAPTER 6 / THE ORIGINS OF CONFLICT AND CRITICAL THEORIZING

propositions allow for inquiry into the conditions under which initially
violent conflicts can become less intense and thereby have integrative
consequences for the social whole. This insight dictates a search for the
conditions under which the level of conflict violence and its consequences
for system parts and the social whole can shift and change over the course
of the conflict process. I see this expansion of options as representing a |
much broader and firmer foundation for building a theory of conflict. -
Finally, Propositions II and III in Table 6-4 note the functions of
violent conflict for integrating systemic wholes. These propositions could
represent a somewhat different way to state Marx’s polarization hypoth-
esis, since conflict was seen by Simmel as drawing together diverse ele-
ments in a system as their respective interests become more clearly rec-
ognized. But Simmel was not ideologically committed to dialectical
assumptions. Thus, unlike Marx, he appeared to be arguing only that
violent conflicts pose threats to many system units that, depending upon
calculations of their diverse interests, will unite to form larger social wholes.
Such unification will persist as long as the threat of violent conflict re-
mains. Should violent conflict no longer be seen as necessary, with in-
creasing articulation of interests and the initiation of bargaining relations,
then Simmel’s Propositions 1-A and 1-B on the consequences of conflict
for the social whole would become operative.
Simmel’s abstract propositions on conflict processes represent, I feel,
an important qualification of Marx’s reasoning. While various conflict
theorists have focused on either Marx or Simmel as their principle re-
source, there has been sufficient cross-fertilization to knock off the ex-
tremes in their respective analyses—for Marx, the overemphasis on or-
ganization and polarization and for Simmel, the unmitigated functionalism
and analysis of positive consequences.

Simmel’s Implicit Attack on Marx’s

Emancipatory Project
There is yet another sense in which Simmel’s ideas represent an important
qualification to Marx’s reasoning. Marx’s more emancipatory side saw
modern capitalism, especially as it creates a division of labor and ine-
quality, as oppressing individuals. His ideas about conflict are, of course,
a reflection of his view that capitalism produces the conditions that will
lead to a revolutionary conflict ushering in a new form of human orga-
nization where individuals are freed from the capitalists domination. Thus,
capitalism expands the division of labor, makes workers’ appendages to
machines, concentrates them in urban areas, quantifies social relations
through money and markets, and forces workers to be mere role players
(as opposed to fully involved participants) in social relations. In so doing,
it creates the personal alienation and resentments as well as the social
structural conditions that will lead subordinates to become aware of their
 GEORG SIMMEL AND CONFLICT THEORIZING 145

domination and to organize in an effort to change their plight (the prop-

ositions in Table 6-1 simply represent more abstract statements of these
ideas). 7
Simmel called into question much of Marx’s analysis in his The Phi-
losophy of Money,” where, as I will document in Chapter 10, he also
produced an important theory of social exchange. But for my present
purposes, I only want to stress the critique of Marx in this work. One of
the most important themes in Marx’s writing, which critical theorists
later elaborated, is that capitalism quantifies social life with money and,
in so doing, it makes exchanges in markets paramount. The result is that
human social relations are increasingly quantified, as is personified in the
labor market where workers sell themselves as a commodity. Moreover,
the growing division of labor makes workers mere cogs in an impersonal
organizational machine. And as I mentioned above, such processes would,
Marx believed, be so oppressive as to initiate revolutionary pressures for
their elimination. In contrast to Marx, however, Simmel looked at these
forces much differently. Although a certain level of alienation from work
and commodificationof relations through the use of money is inevitable
with increasing differentiation and expansion of productive forces and
markets, people are also freed from traditional constraints. They have
more options as to how they spend their money and what they do; they
can move about with more freedom and form new and varied social re-
lations; they can live lifestyles that reflect their tastes and values; and in
general, they are more liberated than their counterparts in less complex
and traditional societies.
This critique of Marx was, however, to be rejected by the early critical
theorists who did not want to visualize modern societies as liberating.
And yet, they were confronted with the failure of Marx’s predictions about
the coming emancipation of society with the communist revolution. In
an attempt to reconstruct Marx’s vision of humans’ capacity to make
history, they were forced to accept Weber’s highly pessimistic view of the
constraints of modern society and to reject Simmel’s more benign views.
But in so doing, they became trapped in a dilemma: If capitalism is
structurally not self-transforming in terms of Marx’s revolutionary model,
if modern life is not so liberating as Simmel felt, and if Weber’s analysis
of increasing constraint in societies must therefore be accepted as true,
then how is liberation to occur? What force is to drive people’s eman-
cipation from domination? Early critical theorists would not accept Sim-
mel’s judgment—that is, that people are more free than in traditional
societies—and so they conceptually retreated into a contemplative sub-
jectivism. They viewed the liberating force as somehow springing from

*Georg Simmel, The Philosophy of Money (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978;
originally published in 190%
146 CHAPTER 6 / THE ORIGINS OF CONFLICT AND CRITICAL THEORIZING

human nature and its capacity for conscious reflection; and as I will
document in Chapter 9, they moved away from Marx who had ‘‘turned
Hegel on his head” and put “Hegel back on his feet.”
Thus, Weber becomes a critical link in the reinterpretation of Marx
in this century by critical theorists. But Weber also presents, I feel, an
important corrective to Marx’s more formal theory of revolutionary con-
flict. Weber’s analysis of stratification and social change presents some
important propositions that consistently reappear in the more positivistic
conflict theoretic literature. And so to understand the development of
either critical theory or positivistically oriented conflict theory, we need
to examine some of the works of Max Weber.

(1864-1920) THEORY OF CONFLICT

a

MAX WEBER’S

Positivistic Strains in Weber’s Thought

Max Weber did not believe that sociology could be a natural science, as
positivists claim. Instead, he devoted his efforts to historical analyses,
especially of the transition to industrial-bureaucratic social! orders. Yet,
despite his misgivings about timeless laws about invariant properties of
the social universe, I see his work as filled with more abstract generali-
zations that imply more enduring and invariant social processes. Nowhere
is this “implicit positivism’ more evident than in Weber’s analysis of
stratification, conflict, and change. For in his seminal ideas on these
topics, he developed a number of important conflict principles, which are
similar to those espoused by Marx but which, at the same time, subtly
shift points of emphasis. I believe that much contemporary conflict im-
plicitly uses these principles, although this debt to Weber frequently goes
unacknowledged.
Most of these principles can be found in his discussion of the tran-
sition from societies based on traditional authority to those organized
around rational-legal authority.” In systems where the sanctity of tra-
ditions legitimates political and social activity, there are three conditions
that encourage the emergence of charismatic leaders who organize conflict
groups that challenge such traditional authority. One condition is a sit-
uation where there is a high degree of correlation among power, wealth,
and prestige or, in hig terms, incumbency in positions of political power
(party), occupancy in advantaged economic positions (class), and mem-
bership in high-ranking social circles (status groups). That is, when eco-
nomic elites, for example, are also social and political elites and vice versa,

“For a fuller discussion, see my and Leonard Beeghley’s The Emergence of Sociological
Theory (Homewood, IIl.: Dorsey Press, 1981), pp. 232-45 and 256-59. For original sources,
see Max Weber, Economy and Society (New York: Bedminister Press, 1968).
 MAX WEBER'S (1864-1920) THEORY OF CONFLICT 147

then those who are excluded from power, wealth, and prestige become
resentful and receptive to conflict alternatives.
Another condition is dramatic discontinuity in the distribution of
rewards, or the existence of divisions in social hierarchies that give priv-
ilege to some and very little to others. When only a few hold power, wealth,
and prestige and the rest are denied these rewards, then tensions and
resentments exist. Such resentments become a further inducement for
those without power, prestige, and wealth to engage in conflict with those
who hoard these resources.
A final condition encouraging conflict is low rates of social mobility.
When those of low rank have little chance to move up social hierarchies
or to enter a new class, party, or status group, then resentment accu-
mulates. Those denied opportunities to increase their access to resources
become restive and willing to challenge the system of traditional authority.
The critical force that galvanizes the resentments inhering in these
three conditions is charisma. Weber felt that whether or not charismatic
leaders emerge is, to a great extent, a matter of historical chance. But if
such leaders do emerge to challenge traditional authority and to mobilize
resentments over the hoarding of resources by elites and the lack of op-
portunities to gain access to wealth, power, or prestige, then structural
change would ensue.
When successful, such leaders confront organizational problems of
consolidating their gains. One result is that charisma becomes routinized,
as leaders create formal rules, procedures, and structures for organizing
followers after their successful mobilization to pursue conflict. If routin-
ization takes a traditional form, thus creating a new system of traditional
authority, renewed conflict can be expected as membership in class, status,
and party becomes highly correlated; as the new elites hoard resources;
and as mobility is blocked. However, if rational-legal routinization occurs,
then authority is based upon equally applied laws and rules; and perfor-
mance and ability become the basis for recruitment and promotion in
bureaucratic structures. Under these conditions, conflict potential will be
mitigated.
I have, of course, ripped Weber’s discussion out of its historical con-
text, but this is just what contemporary conflict theorists do when using
Weber’s work to develop principles about social conflict. In Table 6-5, I
have abstracted even further these ideas and presented them as a series
of propositions. When stated in this way, | think their similarity and
differences with those by Marx become more evident. For me, the unique
feature of Weber’s Proposition I is the recognition that inequality exists
along several dimensions and that the level of correlation among incum-
bents along these dimensions is critical. Moreover, the degree of discon-
tinuity in the distribution of resources and the rates of social mobility
are also crucial.
 THEORIZING
148 CHAPTER 6 / THE ORIGINS OF CONFLICT AND CRITICAL

TABLE 6-5 Weber's Propositions on Inequality and Conflict

l authority, the
|. The greater is the degree of withdrawal of legitimacy from politica
more likely is conflict between superordinates and subordinates.
group, and
A. The greater is the correlation of membership in class, status
party (or alternatively, access to power, wealth, and prestige), the more
(or
intense is the level of resentment among those denied membership
access), and hence, the more likely are they to withdra w legitima cy.
B. The greater is the discontinuity in social hierarchies, the more intense is the
level of resentment among those low in the hierarchies, and hence, the more
likely are they to withdraw legitimacy.
C. The lower are the rates of mobility up social hierarchies of power, prestige,
and wealth, the more intense is the level of resentment among those denied
opportunities, and hence, the more likely are they to withdraw legitimacy.
_ The more charismatic leaders can emerge to mobilize resentments of
subordinates in a system, the greater will be the level of conflict between
superordinates and subordinates.
A. The more conditions I-A, |-B, and I-C are met, the more likely is the
emergence of charismatic leadership.
The more effective are charismatic leaders in mobilizing subordinates in
successful conflict, the greater are the pressures to routinize authority through
the creation of a system of rules and administrative authority.
IV. The more a system of rules and administrative authority increases conditions
|-A, |-B, and I-C, the greater will be the withdrawal of legitimacy from political
authority, and the more likely is conflict between superordinates and
subordinates.

Unlike Marx, who tended to overemphasize the economic basis of

inequality and to argue for a simple polarization of societies into pro-
pertied and nonpropertied (exploited) classes, Weber’s Proposition I al-
lows more theoretical options. He tells us to look at variations in the
distribution of power, wealth, and prestige and the extent to which holders
of one resource control the other resources. He tells us to examine the
degree of discontinuity in the distribution of these resources—in other
words, the extent to which there are clear lines demarking privilege and
nonprivilege. Finally, he advises us to examine the degree of mobility—
the chance to gain access to power, wealth, and prestige—in order to
understand the resentments and tensions that make people prone to con-
flict. Marx’s scheme denotes the same processes but with a much heavier
and polemical hand. I think that Weber’s proposition encourages theorists
to explore more variations along more dimensions than does Marx’s
scheme.
In Propositions II, III, an¢ IV in Table 6-5, Weber emphasizes the
importance of political leadership and organization. Political leaders emerge
to galvanize resentments, and their effectiveness determines the course
of conflict. But for Weber, leadership is not inevitable, nor is it necessarily
liberating. Indeed, it can restore a new system of inequality and privilege
that will initiate a new wave of escalating resentments and potential
 MAX WEBER'S (1864-1920) THEORY OF CONFLICT 149

conflict. Marx, on the other hand, makes similar points but with much
more optimism about leaders’ capacity to further the evolutionary prog-
ress of societies toward his utopian end state, communism.

Weber’s Pessimism and the Dilemma for

Critical Theorists ,
As I indicated earlier, Weber was concerned with the historical transition
from traditional societies to modern capitalist societies. In his description
and explanation of this transition, as it occurred in the Western European
nations, is a devastating critique of Marx’s optimism that the conditions
for the revolutionary transition to a new utopian society were being cre-
ated. Weber’s analysis is complex, and the historical detail that he pre-
sents to document his case is impressive, but his argument is captured
by the word rationalization. Weber argued that the rationality that defines
modern societies is “‘means-ends rationality.” The nature of such ration-
ality involves selecting the best means to achieve a defined end. The
process of rationalization involves, Weber felt, the increasing penetration
of means-ends rationality into ever more spheres of life and the conse-
quent destruction of traditions. For as bureaucracies expand in the eco-
nomic and governmental sphere and as markets allow individuals to pur-
sue their personal ends rationally, then the traditional moral fabric is
broken. Weber agreed with Simmel that this rationalization of life brings
individuals a new freedom from domination by religious dogmatism, com-
munity, class, and other traditional forces; but in their place, it creates
a new kind of domination by impersonal economic forces, such as markets
and corporate bureaucracies, and by the vast administrative apparatus of
the ever-expanding state. Human options were, in Weber’s view, becoming
ever more constrained by the “iron cage” of rational-legal systems. And
unlike Marx, he did not see such a situation as rife with revolutionary
potential; on the contrary, he saw the social world as ever more admin-
istered by impersonal bureaucratic forces.
This pessimistic view seemed, by the early 1930s, to be a far more
reasonable assessment of modern society than Marx’s utopian dream.
Indeed, the communist revolution in Russia had degenerated into Stalin-
ism and bureaucratic totalitarianism by “the party”; in the West, par-
ticularly the United States, workers seemed ever more willing to sell them-
selves in markets and work in large-scale organizations; and political
fascism in Germany and Italy seemed to be increasing as dictators created
large authoritarian bureaucracies. How, then, was the first generation of
critical theorists to reconcile Weber’s more accurate assessment of em-
pirical trends with Marx’s optimistic emancipatory vision? Such is the
central question of all critical theory. And so, just as Weber’s ideas forced
revision of Marx’s more formal propositions among modern positivists,
150 CHAPTER 6 / THE ORIGINS OF CONFLICT AND CRITICAL THEORIZING

so his analysis of the process of rationalization required critical theorists

to reformulate the emancipatory dream of Marx.

THE PROLIFERATION OF CONFLICT SOCIOLOGY

From the reexamination of Marx, Weber, and Simmel came a powerful -
critique of positivist sociology in general and Parsons’s conceptual scheme
in particular. As the Parsonian scheme and functionalism receded, conflict
sociology gained greater prominence. Although not as dominant as the
Parsonian scheme once was, conflict sociology has been the most con-
spicuous successor to functionalism. Aside from self-conscious conflict
theories, the basic tenets of conflict sociology—inequality, tension, con-
flict—are now incorporated into many other theoretical orientations in
sociology.??
Within the narrower confines of conflict sociology itself, there is an
enormous diversity of activity. All that I can possibly hope to do with
such a proliferating perspective is examine the range of activity encom-
passed by the label conflict theory. Of course, I will examine in later
sections other approaches that incorporated elements of the more self-
conscious conflict theorists. But in the chapters to follow, I will explore
three very different conflict theories: the dialectical approach of Ralf Dah-
rendorf, the conflict functionalism of Lewis Coser, and the critical theory
of Jurgen Habermas. I will miss much theoretical activity in focusing on
these three approaches, but my sense is that these three are the most
central and, thus, worthy of detailed analysis.

22F'or example, there is the structuralist Marxism of Louis Althusser and Maurice Godelier
(who will not be examined in this book), the exchange theory of Peter Blau (whose blending
of conflict ideas into exchange theories is examined in Chapter 12), the conflict exchange
approach of Randall Collins (the subject of Chapter 21), and the structuration theory of
Anthony Giddens (who is examined in Chapter 22).
 CHAPTER 7

___ The Dialectical Conflict

____ Theory of Ralf Dahrendorf___

‘e ,
\

In the late 1950s, Ralf Dahrendorf persistently argued that the Parsonian
scheme and functionalism in general presents an overly consensual, in-
tegrated, and static vision of society. In Dahrendorf’s view, society has
two faces—one of consensus, the other of conflict. And it is time to begin
analysis of society’s ugly face and abandon the utopian image created by
functionalism. To leave utopia, Dahrendorf offered the following advice:
Concentrate in the future not only on concrete problems but on such
problems as involve explanations in terms of constraint, conflict, and change.
This second face of society may aesthetically be rather less pleasing than the
social system—but, if all sociology had to offer were an easy escape to Utopian
tranquility, it would hardly be worth our efforts.’

To escape utopia, therefore, requires that a one-sided conflict model

be substituted for the one-sided functional model. Although this conflict
perspective was not considered by Dahrendorf to be the only face of
society, it is a necessary supplement that will make amends for the past
inadequacies of functional theory.2 The model that emerges from this

1Ralf Dahrendorf, “Out of Utopia: Toward a Reorientation of Sociological Analysis,”

American Journal of Sociology 64 (September 1958), p. 127.
2As Dahrendorf emphasizes: “I do not intend to fall victim to the mistake of many
structural-functional theorists and advance for the conflict model a claim to comprehensive
and exclusive applicability ... it may well be that in a philosophical sense, society has two
faces of equal reality: one of stability, harmony, and consensus and one of change, conflict,
and constraint” (ibid.). Such disclaimers are, in reality, justifications for arguing for the
primacy of conflict in society. By claiming that functionalists are one-sided, it becomes fair
game to be equally one-sided in order to “balance” past one-sidedness.

151
 RALF DAHRENDORF
152 CHAPTER 7 / THE DIALECTICAL CONFLICT THEORY OF

, I feel, still
theoretical calling is a dialectical-conflict perspective, which
Marx and,
represents one of the best efforts to incorporate the insights of
propositions.
to a lesser extent, Weber into a coherent set of theoretical
rphic
I have my doubts that this dialectical conflict theory is more isomo
than functional with what occurs in the actual world, but I do think that
it represents an important corrective to Parsonian functionalism, which
tended to overemphasize social integration.
In his analysis, Dahrendorf is careful to note that processes other
than conflict are evident in social systems and that even the conflict
phenomena he examines are not the only kinds of conflict in societies.
Having said this, however, my sense is that Dahrendorf believes his con-
flict model represents a more comprehensive theory of society that pro-
vides a more adequate base for theorizing about human social organization
than either functionalism or other alternatives.

DAHRENDORF’S IMAGE OF THE SOCIAL ORDER

For Dahrendorf, the process of institutionalization involves the creation
of “imperatively coordinated associations” (hereafter referred to as CAs)
that, in terms of criteria not specified, represent a distinguishable orga-
nization of roles. This organization is characterized by power relation-
ships, with some clusters of roles having power to extract conformity from
others. I see Dahrendorf as somewhat vague on the point, but it appears
that any social unit—from a small group or formal organization to a com-
munity or an entire society—can be considered for analytical purposes an
ICA if an organization of roles displaying power differentials exists. Fur-
thermore, although power denotes the coercion of some by others, these
power relations in ICAs tend to become legitimated and can therefore be
viewed as authority relations in which some positions have the ‘‘accepted”
or “normative right” to dominate others. Dahrendorf thus conceives the
social order as maintained by processes creating authority relations in the
various types of ICAs existing throughout all layers of social systems.®
At the same time, however, power and authority are the scarce re-
sources over which subgroups within a designated ICA compete and fight.
They are thus the major sources of conflict and change in these insti-
tutionalized patterns. This conflict is ultimately a reflection of where
clusters of roles in an ICA stand in relation to authority, since the “ob-
jective interests” inherent in any role is a direct function of whether that
role possesses authority and power over other roles. However, even though

’Ralf Dahrendorf, “Toward a Theory of Social Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution

2 (June 1958), pp. 170-83; Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 168-69; Ralf Dahrendorf, Gesellschaft
un Freiheit (Munich: R. Piper, 1961); Ralf Dahrendorf, Essays in the Theory of Society
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1967). =
 DAHRENDORF’S IMAGE OF THE SOCIAL ORDER 153

roles in ICAs possess varying degrees of authority, any particular ICA

can be typified in terms of just two basic types of roles, ruling and ruled.
The ruling cluster of roles has an interest in preserving the status quo,
and the ruled cluster has an interest in redistributing power, or authority.
Under certain specified conditions, awareness of these contradictory in-
terests increases, with the result that ICAs polarize into two conflict
groups, each now aware of its objective interests, which then engage in
a contest over authority. The resolution of this contest or conflict involves
the redistribution of authority in the ICA, thus making conflict the source
of change in social systems. In turn, the redistribution of authority rep-
resents the institutionalization of a new cluster of ruling and ruled roles
that, under certain conditions, polarize into two interest groups. that in-
itiate another contest for authority. Social reality is thus typified in terms
of this unending cycle of conflict over authority within the various types
of ICAs comprising the social world. Sometimes the conflicts within di-
verse ICAs in a society overlap, leading to major conflicts cutting across
large segments of the society, while, at other times and under different
conditions, these conflicts are confined to a particular ICA.
As I think is clear, this image of social organization represents a
revision of Marx’s portrayal of social reality:
1. Social systems are seen by both Dahrendorf and Marx as in a
continual state of conflict.
2. Such conflict is presumed by both authors to be generated by the
opposed interests that inevitably inhere in the social structure of
society.
3. Opposed interests are viewed by both Marx and Dahrendorf as
reflections of differences in the distribution of power among dom-
inant and subjugated groups.
4. Interests are seen by both as tending to polarize into two conflict
groups.
5. For both, conflict is dialectical, with resolution of one conflict
creating a new set of opposed interests that, under certain con-
ditions, will generate further conflict.
6. Social change is thus seen by both as a ubiquitous feature of social
systems and the result of inevitable conflict dialectics within var-
ious types of institutionalized patterns.
Much like Marx, this image of institutionalization as a cyclical or
dialectic process has led Dahrendorf into the analysis of only certain key
causal reiations: (1) conflict is assumed to be an inexorable process arising
out of opposing forces within social-structural arrangements; (2) such
conflict is accelerated or retarded by a series of intervening structural
conditions or variables; (3) conflict resolution at one point in time creates
a structural situation that, under specifiable conditions, inevitably leads
to further conflict among opposed forces.
154 CHAPTER 7 / THE DIALECTICAL CONFLICT THEORY OF RALF DAHRENDORF

For Marx, the source of conflict ultimately lies beneath cultural values
and institutional arrangements, which represent edifices constructed by
those with power. In reality, the dynamics of a society are found in its
substructure, where the differential distribution of property and power
inevitably initiates a sequence of events leading to revolutionary class
conflict. While borrowing much of Marx’s rhetoric about power and coer-
cion in social systems, Dahrendorf actually ends up positing a much dif-
ferent source of conflict: the institutionalized authority relations of ICAs.
Such a position is. much different from that of Marx, who viewed such
authority relations as simply a superstructure erected by the dominant
classes, which, in the long run, would be destroyed by the conflict dy-
namics occurring below institutional arrangements. While Dahrendorf
acknowledges that authority relations are imposed by the dominant groups
in ICAs and frequently makes reference to “factual substrates,” the source
of conflict becomes, upon close examination, the legitimated authority
role relations of ICAs. I think that this drift away from Marx’s emphasis
on the institutional substructure forces Dahrendorf to seek the source of
conflict in those very relations that integrate, albeit temporarily, an ICA.
By itself, I see this shift in emphasis as desirable, since Dahrendorf clearly
recognizes that not all power is a reflection of property ownership—a fact
Marx’s polemics tended to underemphasize. But as I will later observe,
viewing power only in terms of authority can lead to analytical problems
as severe as those in Marx’s model and, in fact, somewhat reminiscent
of those in Parsons’ “social systems.”’
Although emphasizing different sources of conflict; Dahrendorf’s and
Marx’s models reveal similar causal chains of events leading to conflict
and the reorganization of social structure. Relations of domination and
subjugation create an “objective” opposition of interests; awareness or
consciousness by the subjugated of this inherent opposition of interests
occurs under certain specifiable conditions; under other conditions, this
newfound awareness leads to the political organization and then polari-
zation of subjugated groups, who then join in conflict with the dominant
group; the outcome of the conflict will usher in a new pattern of social
organization; this new pattern of social organization will have within it
relations of domination and subjugation that set off another sequence of
events leading to conflict and then change in patterns of social organization.
The intervening conditions affecting these processes are outlined by
both Marx and Dahrendorf only with respect to the formation of aware-
ness of opposed interests by the subjugated, the politicization and polar-
ization of the subjugated into a conflict group, and the outcome of the
conflict. The intervening conditions under which institutionalized pat-
terns generate dominant and subjugated groups and the conditions under
which these can be typified as having opposed interests remain , unspec-
ified—apparently because they are in the nature of institutionalization,
or ICAs, and do not have to be explained.
 CRITICISMS OF THE DIALECTICAL CONFLICT MODEL 155

In Figure 7-1, I have outlined the causal imagery of Marx and Dah-
rendorf. At the top of the figure are Marx’s analytical categories, stated
in their most abstract form. The other two rows specify the empirical
categories of Marx and Dahrendorf, respectively. Separate analytical cat-
egories for the Dahrendorf model are not enumerated because they are
the same as those in the Marxian model. As I think is clear, the empirical
categories of the Dahrendorf scheme differ greatly from those of Marx.
But the form of analysis is much the same, since each considers as non-
problematic and not in need of causal analysis the empirical conditions
of social organization, the transformation of this organization into rela-
tions of domination and subjugation, and the creation of opposed inter-
ests. The causal analysis for both begins with an elaboration of the con-
ditions leading to growing class consciousness (Marx) or awareness among
quasi groups (Dahrendorf) of their objective interests; then analysis shifts
to the creation of a politicized class ‘for itself’ (Marx) or a true ‘“‘conflict
group” (Dahrendorf); and finally, emphasis focuses on the emergence of
conflict between polarized and politicized classes (Marx) or conflict groups
(Dahrendorf).

CRITICISMS OF THE DIALECTICAL

CONFLICT MODEL
Problems in the Causal Analysis
The most conspicuous criticism of Dahrendorf’s causal imagery comes
from Peter Weingart. He has argued that in deviating from Marx’s con-
ception of the “substructure of opposed interests” existing below the cul-
tural and institutional edifices of the ruling classes, Dahrendorf forfeits
a genuine causal analysis of conflict and, therefore, an explanation of how
patterns of social organization are changed.‘ This criticism asks questions
reminiscent of Dahrendorf’s portrayal of Parsonian functionalism: How
is it that conflict emerges from legitimated authority relations among
roles in an ICA? How is it that the same structure that generates inte-
gration also generates conflict? Although for the Marxian scheme there
are, I think, rather severe analytical and empirical problems, the causal
analysis is clear, since the source of conflict—the opposition of economic
interests—is clearly distinguished from the institutional and cultural ar-
rangements maintaining a temporary order—the societal superstructure.
Dahrendorf, however, has failed to make explicit this distinction and thus
falls into the very analytical trap he has imputed to functional theory:

‘Peter Weingart, “Beyond Parsons? A Critique of Ralf Dahrendorf’s Conflict Theory,”

Social Forces 48 (December 1969), pp. 151-65. See also Jonathan H. Turner, “From Utopia
to Where: A Strategy for Reformulating the Dahrendorf Conflict Model,” Social Forces 52
(December 1973), pp. 236-44.
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 CRITICISMS OF THE DIALECTICAL CONFLICT MODEL 157

change inducing conflict must mysteriously arise from the legitimated

relations of the social system.
In an attempt to escape this analytical trap, I think that Dahrendorf’s
causal analysis often becomes confusing. One tack Dahrendorf employs
is to assert that many roles also have a nonintegrative aspect because
they represent fundamentally opposed interests of the incumbents. These
opposed interests are reflected in role conflict, which seemingly reduces
the issues of role strain and conflict to dilemmas created by objectively
opposed interests—surely a dubious assertion that is correct only some of
the time. In equating interests and role expectations, Dahrendorf would
seemingly have to hypothesize that all institutionalized patterns, or ICAs,
display two mutually contradictory sets of role expectations—one to obey,
the other to revolt—and that actors must decide which set they will follow.
Presumably, actors wish to realize their objective interests and hence
revolt against the role expectations imposed upon them by the dominant
group. This approach forces the Dahrendorf model to reduce the origins
of conflict to the wishes, wills, and sentiments of a person or group—a
reductionist imperative that I am sure Dahrendorf would reject but one
that his causal imagery would seemingly dictate.®
Many of these problems might be overcome, I feel, if Dahrendorf had
provided a series of theoretical statements that would indicate the con-
ditions under which legitimatized role relationships in ICAs create di-
chotomous authority relations of domination and subjugation. To simply
assume that this is the case is to avoid what I see as the critical causal
link in his analytical scheme. I believe that these propositions—or, as
Dahrendorf describes them, “intervening empirical conditions’—are a
necessary part of the model. Without them it is unclear how the types of
authority, coercion, and domination that lead to conflict ever emerge in
the first place. Assuming that they just emerge or are an endemic part of
social structure is to define away the theoretically important question
about what types of authority in what types of ICAs lead to what types
of domination and subjugation that, in turn, lead to what types of opposed
interests and what types of conflict. These are all phenomena that must
be conceptualized as variables and incorporated into the causal chains of
the dialectical-conflict model. Referring to Figure 7-1, this task would
involve stating the “intervening empirical conditions” at each juncture
of all of Dahrendorf’s empirical categories. What is now considered non-
problematic would become as problematic as subsequent empirical
conditions.
Initiating this task is difficult, but to do so would enable Dahrendorf
to avoid some of the more standard criticisms of this causal imagery:

5Weingart, “Beyond Parsons?”

6For my best effort on this score, see Jonathan H. Turner, “‘A Strategy for Reformulating
the Dialectical and Functional Theories of Conflict,” Social Forces 53 (March 1975), pp.
433-44,
158 CHAPTER 7 / THE DIALECTICAL CONFLICT THEORY OF RALF DAHRENDORF

(1) conflict not only causes change of social structure but changes of struc-
ture also cause conflict (under conditions that need to be specified in
greater detail than Simmel’s initial analysis); and (2) conflict can inhibit
change (again, under conditions that need to be specified).’ Unless these
conditions are part of the causal imagery, conflict theory merely states
the rather obvious fact that change occurs, without answering the the-
oretical questions of why, when, and where such change occurs.
Despite the vagueness of Dahrendorf’s causal analysis, I see the great
strength of his approach residing in the formulation of explicit proposi-
tions. These state the intervening empirical conditions that cause quasi
groups to become conflict groups, as well as the conditions affecting the
intensity (involvement of group members) and violence (degree of regu-
lation) of the conflict and the degree and the rate of structural change
caused by it. More formally, Dahrendorf outlines three types of inter-
vening empirical conditions: (1) conditions of organization that affect the
transformation of latent quasi groups into manifest conflict groups; (2)
conditions of conflict that determine the form and intensity of conflict;
and (3) conditions of structural change that influence the kind, speed,
and the depth of the changes in social structure.®
Thus, the variables in the theoretical scheme are the (1) degree of
conflict-group formation; (2) the degree of intensity of the conflict; (3)
the degree of violence of the conflict; (4) the degree of change of social
structure; and (5) the rate of such change. I think it significant, for crit-
icisms to be delineated later, that concepts such as ICAs, legitimacy,
authority, coercion, domination, and subjugation are not explicitly char-
acterized as variables requiring statements on the conditions affecting
their variability. Rather, these concepts are simply defined and interre-
lated to each other in terms of definitional overlap or stated as assump-
tions about the nature of social reality.
For those phenomena that are conceptualized as variables, Dahren-
dorf’s propositions appear to be an elaboration of those developed by
Marx. I have reworked them a bit and placed them in Table 7-1.°
Like Marx, Dahrendorf sees conflict as related to subordinates’ grow-
ing awareness of their interests and formation into conflict groups (Prop-
osition I). Such awareness and group formation is a positive function of
the degree to which (a) the technical conditions (leadership and unifying
ideology), (b) the political conditions (capacity to organize), and (c) the

For a convenient summary of these, see-Percy Cohen, Modern Sociological Theory (New
York: Basic Books, 1968), pp. 183-91.
®Dahrendorf, “Toward a Theory of Social Conflict.”
*The propositions listed in the table differ from a list provided by Dahrendorf, Class
and Class Conflict, pp. 239-40 in tw - respects: (1) they are phrased consistently as statements
of covariance, and (2) they are phrased somewhat more abstractly without reference to
“class,” which in this particular work was Dahrendorf’s primary concern.
 CRITICISMS OF THE DIALECTICAL CONFLICT MODEL 159

TABLE 7-1 Dahrendorf’s Abstract Propositions

|. The more members of quasi groups in ICAs can become aware of their
objective interests and form a conflict group, the more likely is conflict to occur.
A. The more the ‘technical’ conditions of organization can be met, the more
likely is the formation of a conflict group.
1. The more a leadership cadre among quasi groups can be developed, the
more likely are the technical conditions of organization to be met.
2. The more a codified idea system, or charter, can be developed, the more
likely are the technical conditions of organization to be met.
3. The more the ‘‘political’’ conditions of organization can be met, the more
likely is the formation of a conflict group.
1. The more the dominant groups permit organization of opposed interests,
the more likely are the political conditions of organization to be met.
C. The more the ‘‘social’’ conditions of organization can be met, the more likely
is the formation of a conflict group.
1. The more opportunity for members of quasi groups to communicate, the
more likely are the social conditions of organization to be met.
2. The more recruiting is permitted by structural arrangements (such as
propinquity), the more likely are the social conditions to be met.
ll. The less the technical, political, and social conditions of organization are met,
the more intense is the conflict.
lll. The more the distribution of authority and other rewards are associated with
each other (superimposed), the more intense is the conflict.
IV. The less the mobility between super- and subordinate groups, the more intense
is the conflict.
V. The less the technical, political, and social conditions of organization are met,
the more violent is the conflict.
VI. The more the deprivations of the subjugated in the distribution of rewards shifts
from an absolute to relative basis, the more violent is the conflict.
Vil. The less the ability of conflict groups to develop regulatory agreements, the
more violent is the conflict.
VII. The more intense the conflict, the more structural change and reorganization it
will generate.
IX. The more violent the conflict, the greater is the rate of structural change and
reorganization.

social conditions (ability to communicate) are met. These ideas clearly

come from Marx’s discussion (see Table 6-1). However, Proposition II
borrows from Simmel and contradicts Marx. It emphasizes that if groups
are not well organized—that is, if the technical, political, and social con-
ditions are not met—then conflict is likely to be emotionally involving
(see Table 6-2). Then’ Dahrendorf borrows from Weber in Proposition
III by stressing that the superimposition of rewards—that is, the degree
of correlation among those who enjoy privilege with respect to power,
wealth, prestige—also increases the emotional involvement of subordi-
nates who pursue conflict (see Table 6-5). Proposition IV also takes as
much from Weber as from Marx because it sees the lack of mobility into
160 CHAPTER 7 / THE DIALECTICAL CONFLICT THEORY OF RALF DAHRENDORF

positions of authority as escalating the emotional involvement of sub-

ordinates. Proposition V is clearly from Simmel and contradicts Marx,
in that the violence of conflict is related to the lack of organization and
clear articulation of interests. But Proposition VI returns to Marx’s em-
phasis that sudden escalation in people’s perception of deprivation—that
is, relative deprivation—increases the likelihood of violent conflict. In
Proposition VII, however, Dahrendorf returns to Simmel and argues that
violence is very much related to the capacity of a system to develop
regulatory procedures for dealing with grievances and releasing tensions.
And in Propositions VIII and IX, Dahrendorf moves again to Marx’s
emphasis on how conflict produces varying rates and degrees of structural
change in a social system.
I feel that Dahrendorf must be. commended for placing the proposi-
tions in a reasonably systematic format—a difficult task too infrequently
performed by theorists in sociology. However, even though this propo-
sitional inventory is highly suggestive, I see a number of criticisms that
need to be addressed.
One of the most obvious criticisms of the Dahrendorf perspective is
the failure to visualize crucial concepts as variables. Indeed, my rephrasing
has converted some of Dahrendorf’s concepts into variables. But still,
most conspicuous for their nominal character are such central concepts
of authority, domination-subjugation, and interest. Since it is from leg-
itimated authority relations that conflict ultimately springs, I find it some-
what surprising that this concept is not viewed as a variable, varying at
a minimum in terms of such properties as intensity, scope, and legitimacy.
Rather, Dahrendorf has chosen to define away the problem:
No attempt will be made in this study to develop a typology of authority.
But it is assumed throughout that the existence of domination and subju-
gation is a common feature of all possible types of authority and, indeed, of
all possible types of association and organization."
A typology of authority might offer some indication of the variable
states of authority and related concepts—a fact Dahrendorf ignores by
simply arguing that authority implies domination and subjugation, which
in turn gives him the structural dichotomy necessary for this dialectical
theory of conflicting interests. He refuses to speculate on what types of
authority displaying what variable states lead to what types of variations
in domination and subjugation that, in turn, cause what variable types
of opposed interests leading to what variable types of conflict groups.
Thus, I see Dahrendorf as linking only by assumption and definition
crucial variables that causally influence each other as well as the more
explicit variables of his scheme: the degree of conflict, the degree of in-
tensity of conflict, the degree of violence in conflict, the degree of change,

Tbid., p. 169.
 CRITICISMS OF THE DIALECTICAL CONFLICT MODEL 161

and the rate of social change. In fact, it is likely that these unstated
variable properties of authority, domination, and interests have as much
influence on the scheme’s explicit variables as the “intervening empirical
conditions” that Dahrendorf chooses to emphasize. Furthermore, as I
noted earlier, when viewed as variables, the concepts of authority, dom-
-ination-subjugation, and interests require their own intervening empirical
conditions. These conditions may in turn influence other subsequently
intervening conditions in much the same way as the “conditions of or-
ganization” also influence the subsequent intensity and violence of con-
flict in the scheme.
My criticisms suggest an obvious solution: to conceptualize ICAs,
legitimacy, authority, domination-subjugation, and interests as variable
phenomena and to attempt a statement of the intervening empirical con-
ditions influencing their variability. Expanding the propositional inven-
tory in this way would, I feel, reduce the vagueness of the causal imagery
in the present scheme. Such an alteration would also cut down on the
rather protracted set of dialectical assumptions—which are of dubious
isomorphism in reality—and address a theoretical (rather than philo-
sophical) question: under what conditions do ICAs create legitimated
authority relations that generate clear relations of domination and sub-
jugation leading to strongly opposed interests?

Methodological Problems
To his credit, Dahrendorf provides formal definitions of major concepts
and suggests operational clues about their application in concrete empir-
ical settings, as is evident in his analysis of class conflict in industrial
societies.!! Furthermore, the incorporation of at least some concepts into
an explicit propositional inventory—albeit an incomplete one—makes the
scheme appear more testable and amendable to refutation.
A number of methodological problems remain, however. One of these
concerns the extremely general definitions given to concepts. Although
these definitions are stated formally, they are often so general that they
can be used in an ad hoc and ex post facto fashion to apply to such a
wide variety of phenomena that their current utility for the development
and testing of theory can be questioned. For example, I think that the
concepts of power, legitimacy, authority, interests, domination, and even
conflict are defined so broadly that instances of these concepts can be
found in almost any empirical situation. Thus, Dahrendorf can rather
easily confirm his assumption that social life is rife with conflict. But
how is one to measure these vaguely and globally defined concepts? I
noted this problem earlier when discussing Dahrendorf’s reluctance to

“Tbid., pp. 241-318.

162 CHAPTER 7 / THE DIALECTICAL CONFLICT THEORY OF RALF DAHRENDORF

view crucial concepts, such as authority and domination, as variables. If

these concepts were so conceptualized, I feel that it would be easier for
investigators to put empirical handles on them, since definitional state-
ments about their variable states would specify more precisely the phe-
nomena denoted by the concept. Dahrendorf rarely does this service, pre-
ferring to avoid typologies; and even when concepts are defined as variables,
Dahrendorf avoids the issue with such statements as the following: “The
intensity of class conflict varies on a scale (from 0 to 1).’’ Coupled with
the formal definition of conflict intensity as the “energy expenditure and
degree of involvement of conflicting parties,” empirical investigators are
given few operational guidelines about how such a concept might be mea-
sured. Were these definitions supplemented with, at a minimum, a few
examples of prominent points along the 0 to 1 scale, then the concepts
and propositions of the scheme would be more amenable to empirical
investigation. As the definitions stand now, Dahrendorf does the very
thing for which he has so resoundingly criticized Parsons: he uses vague
concepts in a way that will inevitably confirm his overall scheme. More
attention to precise definitions would give the concepts more power as
theoretical constructs and as guidelines for investigators.
In sum, then, the Dahrendorf scheme presents a number of problems
for empirical investigators. Such a statement can be made for almost all
theoretical perspectives in sociology and by itself is not a unique indict-
ment. For the Dahrendorf scheme, however, it appears that methodolog-
ical problems could be minimized with just a little additional work. To
the extent that my suggested corrections are made, it is likely that the
dialectical-conflict perspective will offer a fruitful strategy for developing
sociological theory.

FROM UTOPIA TO WHERE?

A CONCLUDING COMMENT
As I emphasized at the beginning of this chapter, Dahrendorf has been
one of the harshest critics of functional forms of theorizing, likening them
to an ideological utopia. In order to set sociological theorizing on the road
out of utopia, Dahrendorf felt compelled to delineate a dialectical-conflict
scheme that presumably mirrors more accurately than Parsonian func-
tionalism the real character of the social world. In so doing, I presume
that Dahrendorf views his theoretical perspective and strategy as pro-
viding a more adequate set of theoretical guidelines for understanding the
nature and dynamics of human social organization.
What I find curious about Dahrendorf’s approach is that, upon close
examination, it appears quite similar to the one he imputed to Parsonian
functionalism. For example, a number of commentators" have noted that

"For the best of these critiques, see Weingart, “Beyond Parsons.”

 FROM UTOPIA TO WHERE? A CONCLUDING COMMENT 163

both Parsons and Dahrendorf view the social world in terms of institu-
tionalized patterns—for Parsons, the “social systems,” for Dahrendorf,
“imperatively coordinated associations.” Both view societies as com-
posed of subsystems involving the organization of roles in terms of le-
gitimate normative prescriptions. For Dahrendorf, these legitimated nor-
mative patterns reflect power differentials in a system; and, despite his
rhetoric about the coercive nature of these relations, I see this vision of
power as remarkably similar to Parsons’s conception of power as the
legitimate right of some status-roles to regulate the expectations attendant
upon other statuses.'4 Furthermore, in Dahrendorf’s model, deviation from
the norms established by status-roles will lead dominant groups to attempt
to employ negative sanctions—a position that is very close to Parsons’s
view that power exists to correct for deviations within a system.
The apparent difference between Dahrendorf’s and Parsons’s em-
phasis with respect to the functions of power in social systems (or ICAs)
is that Dahrendorf argues explicitly that power differentials cause both
integration (through legitimated authority relations) and disintegration
(through the persistence of opposed interests). However, to state that
conflict emerges out of legitimated authority is nothing more than to state,
a priori, that opposed interests exist and cause conflict. The emergence
of conflict follows from vague assumptions about such processes as the
“inner dialectic of power and authority” and the “historical function of
authority,’® rather than from carefully documented causal sequences.
Thus, I think that the genesis of conflict in Dahrendorf’s model remains
as unexplained as it does in his portrayal of the inadequacies of the func-
tional utopia, primarily because its emergence is set against a background
of unexplained conceptions of system norms and legitimated authority.
Dahrendorf’s problem in explaining why and how conflict groups can
emerge from a legitimated authority structure is partly a reflection of
hidden assumptions about functional requisites. In a subtle and yet con-
sistent fashion, he assumes that authority is a functional requisite for
system integration and that the conflict that somehow emerges from au-
thority relations is a functional requisite for social change. As Dahrendorf
argues, “the historical function of authority” is to generate conflict and
thereby maintain the vitality of social systems. From this notion of the
requisite for change, it is all too easy to assert that conflict exists to meet
the system’s needs for change—an illegitimate teleology that echoes Marx’s

18]bid.; Pierre L. van den Berghe, “Dialectic and Functionalism: Toward a Theoretical
Synthesis,” American Sociological Review 28 (October 1963), pp. 695-705.
“For example, see Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils, eds., Toward a General Theory
of Action (New York. Harper & Row, 1962), pp. 197-205.
*Tbid., p. 230.
Weingart, “Beyond Parsons,” p. 161.
164 CHAPTER 7 / THE DIALECTICAL CONFLICT THEORY OF RALF DAHRENDORF

teleological assumption that cycles of dialectical change are necessary to

create the communist utopia.
More fundamentally, however, is Dahrendorf’s inability to explain
the organization of ICAs. To assert that they are organized in terms of
power and authority defines away a theoretically interesting problem of
how, why, and through what processes the institutionalized patterns gen-
erating both integration and conflict come to exist. On the other hand,
Parsons’s analysis does attempt—however inadequately—to account for
how institutionalized patterns, or social systems, become organized: by
actors adjusting their various orientations, normative prescriptions emerge,
which affect the subsequent organization of action; such organization is
maintained by various mechanisms of social control—interpersonal sanc-
tions, ritual activity, safety-valve structures, role segregation, and, on
some occasions, power—and by mechanisms of socialization—the inter-
nalization of relevant values and the acquisiticn of critical interpersonal
skills. Quite naturally, because of his commitment to developing systems
of concepts instead of formats of propositions, Parsons gives only a vague
clue about the variables involved in the process of institutionalization by
which the types of opposed interests that lead to the organization of
conflict groups and social change are created. However, Parsons at least
attempts to conceptualize the variables involved in creating and main-
taining the very social order that Dahrendorf glosses over in his formu-
lation of the ICA concept. Yet it is from the institutionalized relations
in ICAs that conflict-ridden cycles of change are supposed to emerge.
Asserting one’s way out of utopia, as I think Dahrendorf does, will not
obviate the fundamental theoretical question facing sociological theory:
how is social organization, in all its varied and changing forms, possible?
In sum, then, I think that Dahrendorf has used the rhetoric of coer-
cion, dialectics, domination, subjugation, and conflict to mask a vision of.
social reality that is very close to the utopian image he has imputed to
Parsons’s work. In Dahrendorf’s ICA is Parsons’s social system; in his
concepts of roles and authority is Parsons’s concern with social control;
in his portrayal of conflict, the origin of conflict is just as unclear as he
assumes it to be in Parsons’s work; and even in the analysis of social
change, conflict is considered, in a way reminiscent of Parsons, to meet
the functional need for change. Thus, we can at least be suspicious about
Dahrendorf’s claim that we are on the road out of utopia. Yet, in making
this harsh judgment, I still think that the propositions in Table 7-1 will
be very useful in understanding some conflict processes. They will not, I
feel, be as fundamental to understanding the nature of social reality as
Dahrendorf seems to imply. But I-find them very useful for helping to
increase our knowledge of conflict processes in social systems. But I think
that there is more to social reality than dialectical conflict, and this is
where Dahrendorf and most conflict theorists go wrong: they assume, or
should I say, presume, too much of their more limited and delimited
schemes about conflict.
____ The Conflict Functionalism___
of Lewis A. Coser

In the 1960s and! 1970s, I see the criticisms of functionalism as looking

much the same. /They all berated Parsons and other functionalists for
viewing society as overly institutionalized and equilibrating. At the same
time, the conflict schemes offered as alternatives revealed considerable
diversity. The divergence in conflict theory is particularly evident when
the conflict functionalism of Lewis Coser is compared with Ralf Dahren-
dorf’s dialectica!-conflict perspective. Although Coser consistently criti-
cized Parsonian functionalism for its failure to address the issue of con-
flict, he has also been sharply critical of Dahrendorf and other dialectical
theorists for underemphasizing the positive functions of conflict for main-
taining social systems.
In his first major work on conflict, Coser launched what became the
standard polemic against functionalism: conflict is not given sufficient
attention, with related phenomena such as deviance and dissent too easily
viewed as “‘pathological” for the equilibrium of the social system.' Parsons,
in his concern for developing a system of concepts denoting the process
of institutionalization, underemphasized conflict in his formal analytical
works, seemingly viewing conflict as a disease that needs to be treated
by the mechanisms of the body social.? I think that this rather one-sided
portrayal of Parsons’s work allows Coser to posit the need for redressing
the sins of Parsonian functionalism with a one-sided conflict scheme.
Apparently such analytical compensation was to be carried out for well

1Lewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1956).
*Ibid., pp. 22-23.

165
166 CHAPTER 8 / THE CONFLICT FUNCTIONALISM OF LEWIS A. COSER

over a decade, since after the 10th anniversary of his first polemic Coser
was moved to reassert his earlier claim that it was “high time to tilt the
scale in the direction of greater attention to social conflict.’*® Yet, while
Coser has consistently maintained that functional theorizing “has too
often neglected the dimensions of power and interest,” he does not follow
either Marx’s or Dahrendorf’s emphasis on the disruptive consequences
of violent conflict.4 On the contrary, Coser seeks to correct Dahrendorf’s
analytical excesses by emphasizing the integrative and “adaptability”
functions of conflict for social systems. Thus, Coser justifies his efforts
by criticizing functionalism for ignoring conflict and conflict theory for
underemphasizing the functions of conflict.®

IMAGES OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

As I emphasized in Chapter 2, Emile Durkheim can be considered one of
the fathers of functionalism. And thus, I think it is interesting to note
that a “conflict functionalist” is critical of Durkheim’s approach.*® In par-
ticular, Coser views Durkheim as taking a conservative orientation to the
study of society, an orientation that “prevented him from taking due
cognizance of a variety of societal processes, among which social conflict
is the most conspicuous.” Furthermore, this abiding conservatism forced
Durkheim to view violence and dissent as deviant and pathological to the
social equilibrium, rather than as opportunities for constructive social
changes. Although Coser appears intent on rejecting the organicism of
Durkheim’s sociology, I find his own work filled with organismic analogies.
For example, in describing the “functions of violence,’”’ Coser likens vi-
olence to pain in the human body, since both can serve as a danger signal
that allows the body social to readjust itself.’ To take another example,

SLewis A. Coser, “Some Social Functions of Violence,” Annuals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science 364 (March 1966), p. 10.
‘Lewis A. Coser, Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict (New York: Free Press,
1967), p. 141.
5A listing of some of Coser’s prominent works, to be utilized in subsequent analysis,
reveals the functional flavor of his conflict perspective: Functions of Social Conflict; “Some
Social Functions of Violence”; “Some Functions of Deviant Behavior and Normative Flex-
ibility,” American Journal of Sociology 68 (September 1962), pp. 172-81; and “The Func-
tions of Dissent,” in The Dynamics of Dissent (New York: Grune & Stratton, 1968), pp.
158-70. Other prominent works with less revealing titles but critical substance include:
“Social Conflict and the Theory of Social Change,” British Journal of Sociology 8 (Sep-
tember 1957), pp. 197-207; “Violence and the Social Structure,” in Science and Psychoa-
nalysis, ed. J. Masserman, vol. 7 (New York: Grune & Stratton, 1963), pp. 30-42. These
and other essays are collected in Coser’s Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict. One
should also consult his Masters of Sociological Thought (New York: Harcourt Brace Jov-
anovich, 1977).
*Lewis Coser, “Durkheim’s Conservatism and Its Implications for His Sociological The-
ory, ’ in Emile Durkheim, 1858-1917: A Collection of Essays, ed. K. H. Wolff (Columbus:
Ohio State University Press, 1960); also reprinted in Coser’s Continuities, pp. 153-80.
"Coser, “Some Functions of Violence,” pp. 12-13.
 IMAGES OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 167
eee
Nee

in his analysis of the “functions of dissent,”’ Coser rejects the notion that
dissent is explainable in terms of individual sickness and embraces the
assumption that “dissent may more readily be explained as a reaction to
what is perceived as a sickness in the body social.’’® I do not think that
this form of analogizing fatally wounds Coser’s analysis, but it does reveal
that he has not rejected organicism. Apparently, Coser has felt compelled
to criticize Durkheim’s organicism because it did not allow the analysis
of conflict as a process that could promote the further adaptation and
integration of the body social.®
In rejecting the analytical constraints of Durkheim’s analogizing, Coser
embraces Georg Simmel’s organicism (see Chapter 6). Conflict is viewed
as a process that, under certain conditions, functions to maintain the
body social or some of its vital parts. From this vantage point, Coser
develops an image of society that stresses:
1. The social world can be viewed as a system of variously interrelated
parts.
2. All social systems reveal imbalances, tensions, and conflicts of in-
terests among variously interrelated parts.
3. Processes within and between the system’s constituent parts op-
erate under different conditions to maintain, change, and increase
or decrease a system’s integration and adaptability.
4. Many processes, such as violence, dissent, deviance, and conflict,
which are typically viewed as disruptive to the system, can also be
viewed, under specifiable conditions, as strengthening the system’s
basis of integration as well as its adaptability to the environment.
From these assumptions, Coser articulates a rather extensive set of
propositions about the functions (and to a limited extent, the dysfunc-
tions) of conflict for social systems. Coser offers some propositions about
the conditions under which conflict leads to disruption and malintegration
of social systems, but I see the main thrust of his analysis as revolving
around statements on how conflict maintains or reestablishes system in-
tegration and adaptability to changing conditions. In so doing, I see Cos-
er’s analysis as emphasizing: (1) imbalances in the integration of system
parts lead to (2) the outbreak of varying types of conflict among these
parts, which, in turn, causes (3) temporary reintegration. of the system,
which causes (4) increased flexibility in the system’s structure, increased
capability to resolve future imbalances through conflict, and increased
capacity to adapt to changing conditions.

*Coser, “The Functions of Dissent,” pp. 159-60.

*] should note that such an emphasis on the “positive functions” of conflict could be
construed as the pinnacle of conservative ideology—surpassing that attributed to Parsons.
Even conflict promotes integration rather than disruption, malintegration, and change. Such
a society, as Dahrendorf would argue, no longer has an ugly face and is as utopian as that
of Parsons’s. For Coser’s reply to this kind of charge, see Continuities, pp. 1 and 5.
168 CHAPTER 8 / THE CONFLICT FUNCTIONALISM OF LEWIS A. COSER

The causal imagery presents, I feel, a number of obvious problems.

The most important of these is that processes are too frequently viewed
as contributing to system integration and adaptation. Such an emphasis
on the positive functions of conflict may reveal hidden assumptions of
system needs that can be met only through the functions of conflict.
Although Coser is careful to point out that he is simply correcting for
analytical inattention to the positive consequences of conflict, the strategy
is nonetheless one-sided.!° Despite these shortcomings, I think that Coser
mitigates his functionalism by translating his image of social organization
into a series of abstract propositions about conflict in social systems. As
a result, the scheme takes on considerably more clarity than when stated
as a cluster of assumptions. Equally significant, the scheme’ becomes more
testable and amenable ‘o reformulation on the basis of empirical findings.
Let me now turn to these propositions, since they are the great strength
of Coser’s conflict functionalism.

PROPOSITIONS ON CONFLICT PROCESSES

Using both the substance and style of Georg Simmel’s provocative anal-
ysis, Coser has expanded the scope of Simmel’s initial insights, incor-
porating propositions not only from Marx but also from Weber and the
contemporary literature on conflict. Although the scheme reveals a large
number of problems, stemming from his primary concern with the func-
tions of conflict, I feel that Coser’s conflict perspective still remains one
of the most comprehensive in the current literature. This comprehen-
siveness can, I think, be made evident by a partial list of the phenomena
covered by his propositions: (1) the causes of conflict; (2) the violence of
conflict; (3) the duration of conflict; and (4) the functions of conflict.
Under each of these headings a variety of specific variables are incor-
porated into propositions.
One drawback to Coser’s propositional inventory is that it has not
been presented in a systematic or ordered format. Rather, the propositions
appear in a number of discursive essays on substantive topics and in his
analysis of Simmel’s essay on conflict. Although each discrete proposition
is usually stated quite clearly, I have had to extract and order the prop-
ositions. There is, of course, some danger of misinterpretation in this kind
of exercise. Yet, I feel Coser’s approach is much stronger when stated as
a series of formal propositions.

‘It is somewhat tragic for theory building in sociology that the early promising lead of
Robin M. Williams, Jr., in his The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions: A Survey of Research
on Problems of Ethnic, Social, and Religious Group Relations (New York: Social Science
Research Council, 1947) was not consistently followed. Most of the propositions developed
by Dahrendorf and Coser were summarized in this volume 10 years prior to their major
works. More important, they are phrased more neutrally, without an attempt to reveal
society’s “ugly face” or correct for inattention to the “functions of conflict.”
 PROPOSITIONS ON CONFLICT PROCESSES 169

TABLE 8-1 Coser’s Propositions on the Causes of Conflict

I. The more subordinate members in a system of inequality question the

legitimacy of the existing distribution of scarce resources, the more likely are
they to initiate conflict.
A. The fewer are the channels for redressing grievances over the distribution of
scarce resources by subordinates, the more likely are they to question
legitimacy.
1. The fewer are the internal organizations segmenting emotional energies
of subordinates, the more likely are they to be without grievance
alternatives and, as a result, to question legitimacy.
2. The greater are the ego deprivations of those without grievance channels,
the more likely are they to question legitimacy.
B. The more membership in privileged groups is sought by subordinates and
the less mobility allowed, the more likely are they to withdraw legitimacy.
ll. The more deprivations of subordinates are transformed from absolute to
relative, the greater will be their sense of injustice, and hence, the more likely
are they to initiate conflict.
A. The less is the degree to which socialization experiences of subordinates
generate internal ego constraints, the more likely are they to experience
relative deprivation.
B. The !ess are the external constraints applied to subordinates, the more likely
are they to experience relative deprivation.

The Causes of Conflict

In Table 8-1, I have formalized Coser’s discursive analysis on the causes
of conflict.1! Much like Weber (see Table 6-5), Coser emphasizes in Prop-
osition I that the withdrawal of legitimacy from an existing system of
inequality is a critical precondition for conflict. In contrast, dialectical
theorists such as Dahrendorf tend to view the causes of conflict as residing
in “contradictions” or “conflicts of interests.”’ As subordinates become
aware of their interests, they pursue conflict; and hence, the major the-
oretical task is to specify the conditions raising levels of awareness. But
Coser is arguing that conflicts of interest are likely to be exposed only
after the deprived withdraw legitimacy from the system. Coser emphasizes
that the social order is maintained by some degree of consensus over
existing arrangements and that “disorder” through conflict occurs when
conditions decreasing this consensus or legitimacy over existing arrange-
ments are present. Two such conditions are specified in Propositions I-
A and I-B, both of which owe their inspiration more to Weber than Marx.

“Again, it should be emphasized that it is dangerous and difficult to pull from diverse
sources discrete propositions and attempt to relate them systematically without doing some
injustice to the theorist’s intent. However, unless this kind of exercise is performed, the
propositions will contribute little to the development of sociological theory. The propositions
in Table 8-1 were extracted from: Functions of Social Conflict, pp..8-385, “Social Conflict
and the Theory of Social Change,” pp. 197-207; “Internal Violence as a Mechanism for
Conflict Resolution”; and “Violence and Social Structure.”
170 CHAPTER 8 / THE CONFLICT FUNCTIONALISM OF LEWIS A. COSER

Proposition I-A argues that when channels for expressing grievances do

not exist, the withdrawal of legitimacy is likely, especially if there are few
organizations to deflect and occupy people’s energy (I-A-1) and if there
are felt ego deprivations (I-A-2). Proposition I-B specifies that if the
deprived desire membership in higher ranks or if they have been led to
believe that some mobility is possible, a withdrawal of legitimacy will be
likely when little mobility is allowed.
Proposition II indicates, however, that the withdrawal of legitimacy,
in itself, is not likely to result in conflict. People must first become emo-
tionally aroused. The theoretical task then becomes one of specifying the
conditions that translate the withdrawal of legitimacy into emotional
arousal, as opposed to some other emotional state, such as apathy and
resignation. Here, Coser draws inspiration from Marx’s notion of relative
deprivation. For as Marx observed and as a number of empirical studies
have documented, absolute deprivation does not always foster revolt.!”
When people’s expectations for a better future suddenly begin to exceed
perceived avenues for realizing these expectations, only then do they be-
come sufficiently aroused to pursue conflict. The level of arousal will, in
turn, be influenced by their commitments to the existing system, by the
degree to which they have developed strong internal constraints, and on
the nature and amount of social control in a system. Such propositions,
for example, lead to predictions that in systems with absolute dictators,
who ruthlessly repress the masses, revolt by the masses is less likely than
in systems where some freedoms have been granted and where the de-
prived have been led to believe that things will be getting better. Under
these. conditions, the withdrawal of legitimacy can be accompanied by
released passions and emotions.

The Violence of Conflict

In Table 8-2, I have extracted and listed Coser’s most important prop-
ositions on the level of violence in a conflict.!® I find Coser somewhat
vague in his definition of conflict violence, but he appears to be denoting
the degree to which conflict parties seek to injure or eliminate each other.
As most functional theorists are likely to emphasize, Coser’s Proposition
I is directed at specifying the conditions under which conflict will be less
violent. In contrast, dialectical theorists, such as Marx, often pursue just

"James Davies, “Toward a Theory of Revolution,” American Journal of Sociology 27

(1962), pp. 5-19; Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1970) and “Sources of Rebellion in Western Societies: Some Quantitative Evidence,”
The Annals 38 (1973), pp. 495-501.
"These propositions are taken from Coser’s Functions of Social Conflict, pp. 45-50.
Again, I have made them more formal than Coser’s more discursive text.
 PROPOSITIONS ON CONFLICT PROCESSES 171

TS TE STII CE EIT SPIT SEIS ES I ETE ASIII SREP tte tities

TABLE 8-2 Coser’s Propositions on the Violence of Conflict

I. The more groups engage in conflict over realistic issues (obtainable goals), the
more likely are they to seek compromises over the means to realize their
interests, and hence, the less violent is the conflict.
Il. The more groups engage in conflict over nonrealistic issues, the greater is the
level of emotional arousal and involvement in the conflict, and hence, the more
violent is the conflict.
A. The more conflict occurs over core values, the more likely is it to be over
nonrealistic issues.
B. The more a realistic conflict endures, the more likely is it to become
increasingly nonrealistic.
lll. The less functionally interdependent are relations among social units in a
system, the less is the availability of institutional means for absorbing conflicts
and tensions, and hence, the more violent is the conflict.
A. The greater are the power differentials between super- and subordinates in a
system, the less functionally interdependent are relations.
B. The greater is the level of isolation of subpopulations in a system, the less
functionally interdependent are relations.

the opposite fact: to specify the conditions under which conflict will be
more violent. Yet, the inverse of Coser’s first proposition can indicate a
condition under which conflict will be violent. The key concept in this
proposition is “realistic issues.”” For Coser, realistic conflict involves the
pursuit of specific aims against real sources of hostility, with some esti-
mation of the costs to be incurred in such pursuit. As I noted in Chapter
6, Simmel recognized that when clear goals are sought, compromise and
conciliation are likely alternatives to violence. Coser restates this prop-
osition but adds Proposition II on conflict over “nonrealistic issues,” such
as ultimate values, beliefs, ideology, and vaguely defined class interests.
When nonrealistic, then the conflict will be violent. Such nonrealism is
particularly likely when conflict is over core values, which emotionally
mobilize participants and make them unwilling to compromise (Propo-
sition II-A). Moreover, if conflicts endure for a long period of time, then
it becomes increasingly nonrealistic as parties become emotionally in-
volved, as ideologies become codified, and as “the enemy” is portrayed in
increasingly negative terms (Proposition II-B).
Proposition III adds a more structural variable to the analysis of
conflict violence. In systems where there are high degrees of functional
interdependence among actors—that is, where there are mutual exchanges
and cooperation—then conflict is less likely to be violent. However, if
there is great inequality in power among units (Proposition III-A) or
isolation of subpopulations (Proposition III-B), functional interdepend-
ence decreases, and hence when conflict occurs, it will tend to be non-
realistic and violent. |
172 CHAPTER 8 / THE CONFLICT FUNCTIONALISM OF LEWIS A. COSER

aaa

TABLE 8-3 Coser’s Propositions on the Duration of Conflict

. The less limited are the goals of the opposing parties to a conflict, the more
prolonged is the conflict.
ll. The less is the degree of consensus over the goals of conflict, the more
prolonged is the conflict.
Ill. The less the parties in a conflict can interpret their adversary’s symbolic points
of victory and defeat, the more prolonged is the conflict.
IV. The more leaders of conflicting parties can perceive that complete attainment of
goals is possible at only very high costs, the less prolonged is the conflict.
A. The more equal is the power between conflicting groups, the more likely are
leaders to perceive the high costs of complete attainment of goals.
B. The more clear-cut are the indexes of defeat or victory in a conflict, the more
likely are leaders to perceive the high costs of complete attainment of goals.
V. The greater is the capacity of leaders of each conflict party to persuade
followers to terminate conflict, the less prolonged is the conflict.
A. The more centralized are the conflict parties, the greater is a leader’s
capacity to persuade followers.
B. The fewer are the internal cleavages within conflict parties, the greater is a
leader’s capacity to persuade followers.

The Duration of Conflict

Despite the recognition that conflict is a process, unfolding over time, I
find it surprising that few theorists have incorporated the variable of time
in their work. I emphasize, however, that this oversight is not just true
of conflict theory but also of all theory in sociology, although some recent
theoretical efforts have made time an explicit property of social structure
(see chapters 21 and 22). Coser’s incorporation of the time variable is
extremely limited. He views time in terms of the duration of conflict and
as a dependent variable, when it can also be an independent variable (see
Proposition II-B in Table 8-2, for example). Just how the duration of
conflict operates as an independent variable, influencing such variables
as conflict intensity, violence, or functions, is never specified. Thus, Cos-
er’s analysis is confined to the more limited, yet I think important, ques-
tion: what variables influence the length of conflict relations? In Table
8-3, I have extracted some of these propositions on conflict duration.
In Propositions I and II, Coser underscores the fact that conflicts
with a broad range of goals or with vague ones will be prolonged. When
goals are limited and articulated, it is possible to know when they have
been attained. With perception of attainment, the conflict can be ter-
minated. Conversely, with a wide variety or long list of goals, a sense of
attainment is less likely to occur—thus prolonging the conflict. In Prop-

“These propositions come from Coser, “The Termination of Conflict,” in Continuities,

pp. 37-52; Coser, Functions of Social Conflict, pp. 20, 48-55, 59, 128-33; Continuities in
the Study of Social Conflict, pp. 37-52.
 PROPOSITIONS ON CONFLICT PROCESSES 173

osition III, Coser emphasizes that knowledge of what would symbolically

constitute victory and defeat will influence the length of conflict. Without
the ability to recognize defeat or victory, then conflict is likely to be
prolonged to a point where one party destroys the other. Propositions IV
and V deal with the role of leadership in conflict processes. The more
leaders can perceive that complete attainment of goals is not possible and
the greater is their ability to convince followers to terminate conflict, the
less prolonged is the conflict.
Thus, I see Coser’s overall image of conflict duration as follows. Where
the goals of conflict parties are extensive, where there is dissent over
goals, where conflict parties cannot interpret symbolic points of victory
and defeat, where leaders cannot assess the costs of victory, and where
leaders cannot effectively persuade followers, then the conflict will be of
longer duration than when the converse conditions hold true. In turn, as
I think is evident, these variables are interrelated. For example, clear and
limited goals help members to determine symbolic points of victory or
defeat and leaders to assess the costs of victory. Although these inter-
relations are not fully or systematically developed, Coser has provided an
important lead in the study of the time dimension in the conflict process.

The Functions of Social Conflict

As I emphasized in the chapters on functionalism, the concept of “func-
tion” presents a number of problems. If some process or structure has
functions for some other feature of a system, there is often an implicit
assumption about what is good and bad for a system. If this implicit
evaluation is not operative, how does one assess when an item is functional
or dysfunctional? Even seemingly neutral concepts, such as survival or
adaptability, merely mask the implicit evaluation that is taking place.
Sociologists are usually not in a position to determine what is survival
and adaptation. To say that an item has more survival value or increases
adaptation is frequently a way to mask an evaluation of what is “good.”
In Coser’s propositions on the functions of conflict, I think that this
problem exists. Conflict is good when it promotes integration based on
solidarity, clear authority, functional interdependence, and normative
control. In Coser’s terms, it is more adaptive. Other conflict theorists
might argue that conflict in such a system is bad because integration and
adaptability in this specific context could be exploitive. And so, with these
qualifications, let me now turn to Coser’s propositions.
Coser divides his analysis of the functions of conflict along lines sim-
ilar to those by Simmel: the functions of conflict for (1) the respective
parties to the conflict and (2) the systemic whole in which the conflict
occurs. In Table 8-4, I have delineated the propositions on the functions
of conflict for the parties.

These propositions are taken from Coser, Functions of Social Conflict, pp. 37-38, 45,
69-72, 92-95.
174 CHAPTER 8 / THE CONFLICT FUNCTIONALISM OF LEWIS A. COSER

el

TABLE 8-4 Coser's Propositions on the Functions of Conflict for the

Respective Parties

|. The more violent or intense is the conflict, the more clear-cut are the boundaries
of each respective conflict party.
ll. The more violent or intense is the conflict and the more internally differentiated
are the conflict parties, the more likely is each conflict party to centralize its
decision-making structure.
Ill. The more violent or intense is the conflict and the more it is perceived to affect
the welfare of all segments of the conflict parties, the more conflict promotes
structural and ideological solidarity among members of each conflict party.
IV. The more violent or intense is the conflict, the more conflict leads to the
suppression of dissent and deviance within each conflict party as well as forced
conformity to norms and values.
V. The more conflict between parties leads to forced conformity, the greater is the
accumulation of hostilities, and the more likely is internal group conflict to
surface in the long run.

In the propositions listed in Table 8-4, the intensity of conflict—that

is, people’s involvement in and commitment to pursue the conflict—and
its level of violence increase the demarcation of boundaries (Proposition
I), centralization of authority (Proposition II), ideological solidarity
(Proposition III), and suppression of dissent and deviance (Proposition
IV) within each of the conflict parties. Conflict intensity is presumably
functional because it increases integration, although Proposition V in-
dicates that centralization of power as well as the suppression of deviance
and dissent create malintegrative pressures in the long run. Thus, there
appears to be an inherent dialectic in conflict group unification—one which
creates pressures toward disunification. Unfortunately, Coser does not
specify the conditions under which these malintegrative pressures are
likely to surface. In focusing on positive functions—that is, forces pro-
moting integration—I think that the analysis ignores a promising area of
inquiry. This bias becomes even more evident when Coser shifts attention
to the functions of conflict for the systemic whole within which the con-
flict occurs. I have listed these propositions in Table 8-5."
I have not presented Coser’s propositions in their full complexity in
Table 8-5, but the essentials of his analysis are clear.’’ In Proposition I,
complex systems that have a large number of interdependencies and ex-

'*Ibid., pp. 45-48; Lewis A. Coser, “Internal Violence as Mechanisms for Conflict Res-
olution”; “Social Conflict and the Theory of Social Change,” British Journal of Sociology
8 (September 1957), pp. 197-207; “Some Social Functions of Violence,” Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 364 (March 1966), p. 10; “The Functions
of Dissent,” in The Dynamics of Dissent, ed. L. A. ‘Coser (New York: Grune & Stratton,
1968); and “Social Conflict and the Theory of Social Change.”
"See third edition of The Structure of Social Theory (Homewood, Ill: The Dorsey Press,
1982).
 PROPOSITIONS ON CONFLICT PROCESSES 175

SS IAT LRA TEELEAL LEA BALD DD GRR ETE ADI LD LSE LPT PLES LILES. GELATO EY TERRES VEE

TABLE 8-5 Coser’s Propositions on the Functions of Conflict for the Social Whole

I. The more differentiated and functionally interdependent are the units in a

system, the more likely is conflict to be frequent but of low degrees of intensity
and violence.
ll. The more frequent are conflicts, the less is their intensity, and the lower is their
level of violence, then the more likely are conflicts in a system to (a) increase
the level of innovation and creativity of system units, (b) release hostilities
before they polarize system units, (c) promote normative regulation of conflict
relations, (d) increase awareness of realistic issues, and (e) increase the number
of associative coalitions among social units.
lll. The more conflict promotes (a), (6), (c), (d), and (e) above, then the greater will
be the level of internal social integration of the system and the greater will be its
capacity to adapt to its external environment.

changes are more likely to have frequent conflicts that are less emotionally
involving and violent than those systems that are less complex and where
tensions accumulate. It is in the nature of interdependence, Coser argues,
for conflicts to erupt frequently, but since they emerge periodically, emo-
tions do not build to the point where violence is inevitable. Conversely,
systems where there are low degrees of functional interdependence will
often polarize into hostile camps; and when conflict does erupt, it will be
intense and violent. In Proposition II, frequent conflicts of low intensity
and violence are seen to have certain positive functions. First, they will
force those in conflict to reassess and reorganize their actions (Proposition
IIa). Second, such conflicts will release tensions and hostilities before
they build to a point where adversaries become polarized around non-
realistic issues (Proposition IIb). Third, frequent conflicts of low intensity
and violence encourage the development of normative procedures—laws,
courts, mediating agencies, and the like—to be developed in order to reg-
ulate tensions (Proposition IIc). Fourth, these kinds of conflicts also in-
crease a sense of realism over what the conflict is about. That is, frequent
conflicts where intensity and violence are kept under control allow conflict
parties to articulate their interests and goals, thereby allowing them to
bargain and compromise (Proposition IId). Fifth, conflicts promote co-
alitions among units who are threatened by the action of one party or
another. If conflicts are frequent and of low intensity and violence, such
coalitions come and go, thereby promoting flexible alliances (Proposition
Ile). However, if conflicts are infrequent and emotions accumulate, co-
alitions often polarize threatened parties into ever more hostile camps,
with the result that when conflict does occur it is violent. And Proposition
III simply asserts Coser’s functional conclusion that when conflicts are
frequent and when violence and intensity are reduced, conflict will pro-
mote flexible coordination within the system and increased capacity to
adjust and adapt to environmental circumstances. This increased flexibility
176 CHAPTER 8 / THE CONFLICT FUNCTIONALISM OF LEWIS A. COSER

and adaptation is possible because of the processes listed in Proposition

II.

COSER’S FUNCTIONAL APPROACH:

AN ASSESSMENT
I think that Coser’s approach has done much to correct for the one-
sidedness of Dahrendorf’s analysis, while it has reintroduced Simmel’s
ideas into conflict theory. Yet, Coser’s scheme represents an analytical
one-sidedness that, if followed exclusively, would produce a skewed vision
of the social world. Coser begins with statements about the inevitability
of force, coercion, constraint, and conflict, but his analysis quickly turns
to the integrative and adaptive consequences of such processes. This em-
phasis could rather easily transform the integrative and adaptive functions
of conflict into functional needs and requisites that necessitate, or even
cause, conflict to occur. Such teleology was inherent in Marx’s work, where
revolutionary conflict was viewed as necessary to meet the need for a
communist society. But Coser’s teleological inspiration appears to have
come more from Simmel’s organic model than Marx’s dialectical scheme.
Once he documents how conflict contributes to the systemic whole, or
body social, Coser inadvertently implies that the body social causes con-
flict in order to meet its integrative needs. Although conflict is acknowl-
edged by Coser to cause change in social systems, it is still viewed pri-
marily as a crucial process in promoting integration and adaptation.
I think that Coser, like so many conflict theorists, creates a problem
when he tries to correct for past weaknesses in other approaches. For in
trying to compensate for the one-sidedness of dialectical theory and func-
tionalism, Coser presents yet one more skewed approach. In my presen-
tation of propositions in Tables 8-1 through 8-5, I have sought to mitigate
against this overemphasis on the positive functions of conflict, but the
actual scheme itself is heavily functional. I have not listed the many other
functional statements here,’ primarily because I have emphasized the
strong points in Coser’s scheme—that is, the propositions on the causes,
violence, and duration of conflict (see Tables 8-1, 8-2, 8-3). Tables 8-4
and 8-5 on the functions of conflict could, in fact, be longer than the
others combined, but I decided to limit my summary to only the strong
points. As a consequence, I have distorted Coser’s ideas somewhat.
Thus, the major substantive problem in Coser’s scheme is its func-
tionalism. To correct this problem, I see little need to redirect his prop-
ositions on the causes, violence, and duration of conflict. These propo-
sitions address, I feel, important questions neutrally and do not attempt
to balance or correct for past theoretical one-sidedness with another kind

‘Ibid.
 REDIRECTING CONFLICT THEORY: OVERCOMING UNRESOLVED ISSUES 177

of one-sidedness. Indeed, they display an awareness of key aspects of

conflict in social systems; and with supplementation and reformulation,
they offer an important theoretical lead. The substantive one-sidedness
in the scheme comes with Coser’s borrowing and then supplementing
Simmel’s functional propositions; and it is here that drastic changes in
the scheme must come. One corrective strategy, which does not smack of
another form of one-sidedness, is to ask the more neutral theoretical
question: under what conditions can what kinds of outcomes of conflict
for what types of systems and subsystems be expected? Although this is
not a startling theoretical revelation, I think that it keeps assessments of
conflict processes away from what ultimately must be evaluative questions
of functions and dysfunctions. If the question of outcomes of conflicts is
more rigorously pursued, the resulting propositions will present a more
balanced and substantively accurate view of social reality.
Because of the long and unfortunate organic connotations of words
such as “function,” I believe that it is wise to drop their use in sociology.
They all too frequently create logical and substantive problems of inter-
pretation. Coser appears well aware of these dangers, but he has invited
misinterpretation by continually juxtaposing notions of “the body social”
and the ‘“‘functions” of various conflict processes and related phenomena,
such as dissent and violence. Had he not done this, he would have better
achieved his goal of correcting for the inadequacies of functional and
conflict theorizing in sociology. Instead, he has created a heavily func-
tional scheme.
In sum, then, I think that it makes little sense to have new perspec-
tives that correct for the deficiencies of either dialectical or functional
conflict theory. Sociological theory has far too long engaged in this kind
of activity; and it is far more appropriate, I feel, to visualize conflict as
one of many important processes in the social universe and to develop
some abstract principles about this process that avoid problems inherent
in all forms of functional analysis.
Let me close this chapter by addressing problems in both Coser’s and
Dahrendorf’s approaches. For in redirecting both the functional and di-
alectical schemes, I think that more interesting propositions on conflict
processes will emerge.

REDIRECTING CONFLICT THEORY:

OVERCOMING UNRESOLVED ISSUES

What is Conflict?
To my constant surprise, one of the most controversial issues in conflic.
theory is the definition of conflict. What is and what is not conflict? A
quick review of the conflict theory literature will produce a surprisingly
diverse array of terms denoting different aspects of conflict: hostilities,
178 CHAPTER 8 / THE CONFLICT FUNCTIONALISM OF LEWIS A. COSER

war, competition, antagonism, tension, contradiction, quarrels, disagree-

ments, inconsistencies, controversy, violence, opposition, revolution, dis-
pute, and many other terms. This issue boils down to the question of
what kind of behavior among either individuals or collective units is to
be defined as conflict? For example, does conflict involve only overt action
of one party against another? Or can it include covert tensions among
these parties? Or does conflict embrace competition where parties strive
for mutually exclusive goals without directly confronting each other? Or
is conflict only antagonisms involving overt violence and efforts to injure
another party? .
There is no consensus on these issues. Dahrendorf and Coser both
employed broad definitions. For example, Dahrendorf uses the concept of
conflict for “contests, competitions, disputes, and tensions as well as for
manifest clashes between social forces.’’!® His definition is consistent with
his dialectical assumptions: ICAs reveal “conflicts of interest’? among
quasi groups, which under technical, social, and political conditions be-
come true conflict groups willing to engage in overt action against each
other. I assume that as long as one wants to prove that the social world
is rife with contradictions, a broad definition of conflict is desirable. For
when conflict can be any overt or covert state that hints of antagonism,
I imagine that it is rather easy to document the ubiquity of conflict. And
demonstrating the pervasiveness of conflict has indeed been one of Dah-
rendorf’s and other conflict theorists’ primary intellectual goals.
Similarly, Coser’s broad definition serves his intellectual purposes: to
demonstrate the ubiquity of conflict and to document its functions for
system integration. If Coser viewed conflict as only violent confrontations,
then its integrative functions might be less visible, since conflict parties
might indeed destroy each other. But if conflict can be any antagonistic
disposition of subgroups in a system, we are more likely to find instances
where these antagonisms have promoted integration and adaptability
among the parties or the systemic whole.
Presently, I see most conflict theorists as favoring a broad definition.
After exhaustively reviewing numerous definitions, for example, Clinton
Fink argues for a broad definition: conflict is “any social situation or
process in which two or more entities are linked by at least one form of
antagonistic psychological relation or at least one form of antagonistic
interaction.’’”° In turn, the concept of antagonism embraces such states
as incompatible goals, mutually exclusive interests, emotional hostility,
dissent, violent struggle, and regulated mutual interference.

‘Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1957), p. 135.
Clinton F. Fink, “Some Conceptual Difficulties in the Theory of Social Conflict,”
Journal of Conflict Resolution 12 (December 1968), p. 456.
 REDIRECTING CONFLICT THEORY: OVERCOMING UNRESOLVED ISSUES 179

Few would, for example, want to consider the kind of definition that
I prefer: “A conflict is direct and overt interaction between parties in
which the actions of each party are directed at inhibiting their adversary’s
attainment of its goals.” Such a definition makes conflict an overt and
direct interaction between parties, but it allows for considerable variability
in how one party inhibits the actions of the other. Such actions can be
normatively regulated or unregulated and violent. Other forms of inter-
action could be labeled with different terms; and as a result, I think that
we could avoid the lumping together of apples and oranges under the
generic rubric of conflict. At present, I see the term as so global and
encompassing that it embraces diverse forms of relationships, which, in
all probability, are highly distinctive and reveal somewhat different laws
of operation.
One of the few conflict theorists who has sought to develop a more
limited definition that also embraces diverse forms of conflict is Robin
Williams, Jr. Although he is not always this explicit, he defines conflict
in one essay as:

Interaction in which one party intends to deprive, control, injure, or elim-

inate another, against the will of that other. Pure conflict is a fight; its goal
is to immobilize, neutralize, destroy, or otherwise harm an opponent. In the
impure world of actuality, some overt struggles are conducted accordingly to
rules and for limited goals; oppositional behavior may then have the primary
goal of winning rather than of injuring the opponent; we then usually call
the encounter a game. Some games merge into debates in which the primary
aim is to convince or persuade opponents or others of the rightness or cor-
rectness or attractiveness of one’s views or claims.”!

This definition views conflict as direct interaction that takes a variety

of specific forms but also involves efforts to ‘‘deprive, control, injure, or
eliminate” the other. I feel that this kind of explicit definition of conflict
is what we need in conflict theory. As long as the background conditions,
such as contradictions, oppositions of interests, or hostilities, are viewed
as conflict, then we will have difficulty separating the causesof conflict—
that is, these and other background conditions—from the conflict itself.
When the preconditions of conflict are lumped together with the actual
emission of conflict acts, then theories are likely to be vague. The future
of conflict theory thus depends on making explicit what is and what is
not conflict and in distinguishing different types or forms of conflict from
each other.

“Robin M. Williams, Jr., “Social Order and Social Conflict,” Proceedings of the Amer-
ican Philosophical Society 114 (June 1970), pp. 217-25. Yet, in a more thorough analysis
of the “law of social conflict,” Williams does not present this kind of explicit definition.
See “Conflict and Social Order: A Research Stratecy for Compiex Propositions,” Journal
of Social Issues 28 (1972). nn. 11-96
180 CHAPTER 8 / THE CONFLICT FUNCTIONALISM OF LEWIS A. COSER

Conflict among or between What?

In addition to definitional problems over just what conflict is, J think
that there is also a unit of analysis problem in conflict theory. Typically,
just what the units are in conflict is left vague—whether they be individ-
uals, groups, organizations, classes, nations, communities, and the like.
For example, in Dahrendorf’s scheme, conflict occurs between such units
as quasi groups and conflict groups in equally vague ICAs. In Coser’s
portrayal, parties and groups are the units in conflict, although his essays
often deal with explicit empirical referents.
Leaving the units vague has the virtue of making theory abstract and
hence applicable to all social units, from individuals to nation-states.
Thus, theoretical statements can potentially be more powerful, explaining
conflict among all social forms. On the other hand, I see it as likely that
the type of the unit does influence the nature of the conflict. Conflict
between individuals and nations may have certain common properties
and thus be subsumable under some general laws, but there are also likely
to be clear differences in conflict between such disparate units.
The failure to address this issue has, I believe, given conflict sociology
a bipolarity: On the one hand, there are numerous abstract schemes, such
as Dahrendorf’s and Coser’s, that seek to uncover basic laws of conflict
among a wide variety of social units. On the other hand, there are nu-
merous middle-range theories of international, interpersonal, racial, class,
sexual, religious, ethnic, organizational, community, and occupational
conflict, to name just a few empirical areas where research and theory on
conflict are prominent.
Recognizing this polarity, a number of theorists have sought to isolate
those basic units that might reveal their own laws of conflict. For example,
Dahrendorf’s work posits conflict between and within five different levels
of organization: roles, groups, sectors, societies, and suprasocietal units.”
Other classifications, such as one by Johan Galtung, distinguish conflicts
between and within just two levels: the individual and the collective.’ In
this scheme, intrapersonal and interpersonal conflicts are presumed to be
of a different nature than intranational and international ones. In turn,
intrapersonal (within a person) differ from interpersonal (between person)
conflicts, and intranational (within society) and international (between
societies) reveal fundamental differences.
At present, then, conflict theory has yet to agree on how conflict
varies among different types of units. Yet I note that conflict theory has
at least addressed the issue of units. Sociological theory has rarely con-

*These distinctions are made in Dahrendorf’s untranslated work. Cited in Robert C.

Angel’s “The Sociology of Human Conflitt,” The Nature of Human Conflict, ed. E. McNeil
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 14.
*Johan Galtung, “Institutionalized Conflict Resolution: A Theoretical Paradigm,
” Jour-
nal of Peace Research 2 (1965), pp. 348-96.
 REDIRECTING CONFLICT THEORY: OVERCOMING UNRESOLVED ISSUES 181

cerned itself with how social relations vary with different types of units.
For example, Parsonian functionalism developed an elaborate conceptual
scheme around processes occurring in one type of unit—the social system—
which could be anything from a small group to a system of societies. Little
attention was devoted to indicate how social processes. varied with dif-
ferent types of social units.
As conflict theorists begin to define conflict more explicitly and to
develop theories that distinguish among phenomena denoted by such la-
bels as fights, games, war, revolution, competitions, and disputes, I think
that the units of analysis will become more relevant. For I believe that
the type of conflict will vary with the type of: unit. Or at least, certain
types of units will be found to be more likely to engage in one type of
conflict than in another. For example, a fight may be an interpersonal
conflict, whereas a revolution is a type of conflict among other types of
social units, such as social classes. Until these kinds of problems in dis-
tinguishing types of units and types of conflicts are resolved, conflict
theory will tend to remain somewhat vague. Coser’s and Dahrendorf’s
schemes illustrate this fact, for although I see them both as highly in-
sightful, they are nonetheless vague.”4

Escape from Functionalism?

In addition to my comments earlier, a number of recent commentaries
have sought to document the implicit functionalism in conflict theory.”
Such functional imagery is, of course, explicit in the conflict functionalism
of Lewis Coser. In asserting an implicit functionalism in conflict theory,
the charge is made that end states or the consequences of conflict often
take analytical precedence over the causes of conflict. This charge is, I
can imagine, particularly bothersome to dialectical theorists who have
sought to take sociology out of its functional utopia. And yet, I think that
it has the ring of truth.
There can be little doubt that the consequences of conflict are given
prominent attention by theorists. The issue of whether or not this em-
phasis on consequences distorts analysis is, however, less clear. In Figure
8-1, I have presented the over-all causal imagery in Dahrendorf’s and
Coser’s analysis, as well as in the analyses of most conflict theorists.

“Lest there be a misunderstanding, I should emphasize that this point is not intended
as a critique of highly abstract conflict schemes. Indeed, these tend to be far superior to
the lower-level empirical analyses, which abound in the literature. But the schemes of Coser,
unit
Dahrendorf, Williams, Gamson, Gurr, and others are now sufficiently developed that
of analysis questions can be profitably addressed.
Brace
*Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories (New York: Harcourt
Jovanovich, 1968), p. 94; Piotr Sztompka , System and Function : Toward a Theory of Society
(New York: Academic Press, 1974).
182 CHAPTER 8 / THE CONFLICT FUNCTIONALISM OF LEWIS A. COSER

ee

FIGURE 8-1 Overall Causal Imagery of Conflict Theory

Inequality : Reorganization
All | of resource |Causes Sone Caan: ofsocial
socia distribution
systems aiaiets then system

I think it evident from Figure 8-1 and my discussion in these last

two chapters that conflict theory emphasizes inequality as the ultimate
source of conflict. Under varying conditions, which differ in each theory,
inequality causes conflict, which then, under differing conditions, changes
the organization of the social system. The feedback arrow at the top of
the figure underscores the dialectical assumption that reorganization of
the system sets off the conflict-producing process again. This sequence
is unending, because social systems are always assumed to reveal inherent
conflict-producing tendencies. As is obvious, of course, dialectical and
functional conflict theories focus on different types of conflict and on
varying forms of system reorganization. Dialectical theories concentrate
on more severe and violent conflicts causing redistribution of resources
into a new pattern of inequality that, in turn, will cause a new wave of
conflict and resource distribution. In contrast, functional theories focus
on less severe and violent conflicts and on their consequences for pro-
moting integration within and between conflict parties and for increasing
overall system adaptability and flexibility.
Both dialectical and functional conflict theories, then, are not merely
interested in what causes conflict. They are also interested in what conflict
does for the systemic whole in which it occurs. Conflict is both a dependent
variable—that is, a process caused by other forces—and an independent
variable—that is, a process that causes alterations in still other processes.
This distinction between conflict as a dependent and independent variable
is not always clear, however. It appears to me that theorists’ desire to
present social organization as either constantly in change or in adaptive
upgrading obscures the causes of conflict. Conflict is seen to emerge and
cause changes, but theories sometimes fail to specify what kind of conflict
revealing what properties causes what alterations in what subsystems or
systemic wholes.
This problem is compounded by the failure to define conflict and to
specify what conflict units are involved in what kinds of conflict. The
result is a vagueness about what conflict theorists are trying to explain:
the causes of different forms of conflict or the social functions of ill-defined
conflict processes? The simple answer to these questions about the causes
or consequences of conflict is that both are being explained. Yet, as with
 REDIRECTING CONFLICT THEORY: OVERCOMING UNRESOLVED ISSUES 183

all other forms of functionalism, the desire to explain the functions of a

social phenomenon—whether it be conflict, religion, or a mechanism of
social control—sometimes leads theorists to short-circuit the explanation
of what caused the phenomena in the first place. Coser and Dahrendorf
do provide suggestive causal statements, but their analysis of functions
also appears to be obscured by their desires to demonstrate the system
change and system integration consequences of conflict, respectively.
Thus, conflict theorists must, I feel, be more explicit in deciding if
conflict is to be an independent, intervening, or dependent variable in
their theoretical schemes. And as a variable, I think that they will then
ask the interesting theoretical questions: What are its varying states and
what causes these varying states? And what variations in other social
processes and structures do these varying states of conflict cause?
For behind these questions is, I sense, the more fundamental issue of
sorting out causes and consequences—the problem that has always plagued
functionalism (see Chapters 2-5). To delineate the causes of varying types
of conflicts is a much easier task than specifying what they do for system
parts and systemic wholes. For example, it might be possible to document
the causes of violent revolution between social classes, but to assess what
this revolution did for the social whole can prove illusive. What the vi-
olence brought in the first week is different from the first year, and the
first year’s results will differ, in all probability, from the first decade. Or
what were the consequences of the revolution for what units—individuals,
classes, political parties, the integration of the nation, international af-
fairs, and so on for any conceivable system referent? Thus, the scope, the
time, and the structures influenced by a particular conflict present prob-
lems of analysis—problems that inhere in a functional orientation.
In sum, then, I see these three problems—the definition of conflict,
the units of conflict, and the confusion over causes and functions—as
presenting a challenge to conflict theory. Theorists must first decide what
is and what is not conflict. If the definition remains too broad, then almost
any social process can be labeled conflict, since all that must be revealed
is a hint of antagonism, psychological hostility, frustration, dissent, or
any of the hundreds of terms currently subsumed under this concept.
Theorists will also have to decide on the scope and level of abstraction
of their theories. Are they seeking to develop general laws that can sub-
sume all the more specific conflict processes in the world? Or are they
attempting to develop a more middle-range theory about a specific type
of conflict—if so, what type of conflict among what types of units? And
finally, theorists must make clear what they are seeking to do: expiaia
the causes or functions of conflict? As Durkheim emphasized, causal and
functional analysis are separate tasks. It is unlikely, as the deficiencies
in Durkheim’s, Malinowski’s, Parsons’s, and Merton’s theories under-
score, that one theory can do both a causal and functional analysis. Hence,
it is in the context of these unresolved problems, I feel, that the future
of conflict theory resides.
 CHAPTER 9

____ The Critical Theorizing —__

_of Jurgen Habermas

As I emphasized in Chapter 6 on the origins of conflict theorizing, the

emancipatory theme in Karl Marx’s thought has been carried over into
this century in a number of guises, one of which is critical theory.’ Such
theorizing is explicitly evaluational in that it sees as its purpose the eman-
cipation of individuals from domination. However, as I also mentioned
in Chapter 6, the first generation of critical theorists confronted a modern
world that did not appear rife with emancipatory potential. Indeed, Max
Weber’s analysis of rationalization and the extension of bureaucratic sys-
tems of control into ever more spheres of life seemed to be a more apt
prognosis of the future than Marx’s utopian dream.
Thus, the first generation of critical theorists, who are frequently
referred to as the Frankfurt School because of their location in Germany
and their explicit interdisciplinary effort to interpret the oppressive events
of the 20th century, confronted a real dilemma: how to reconcile Marx’s

1Some basic reviews and analyses of critical theory and sociology include: Paul Connerton,
ed., Critical Sociology (New Ycrk: Penguin Books, 1970); Raymond Geuss, The Idea of a
Critical Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); David Held, Jntroduction
to Critical Theory (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1980); Trent Schroyer,
The Critique of Domination: The Origins and Development of Critical Theory (New York:
George Braziller, Inc., 1973); Albrecht Wellmer, Critical Theory of Society (New York:
Seabury Press, 1974); Ellsworth R. Fuhrman and William E. Snizek, “Some Observations
on the Nature and Content of Critical Theory,”” Humboldt Journal of Social Relations 7
(Fall-Winter 1979- 80), pp. 33-51; Zygmunt Bauman, Towards a Critical Sociology (Boston:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976); Robert..1. Antonio, “The Origin, Development, and Con-
temporary Status of Critical Theory,” The Sociological Quarterly 24 (Summer 1983), pp.
325-51; Jim Faught, “Objective Reason and the Justification of Norms,” California Soci-
ologist 4 (Winter 1981), pp. 33-53.

184
 EARLY CRITICAL THEORY: LUKACS, HORKHEIMER, ADORNO 185

emancipatory dream with the stark reality of modern society as concep-

tualized by Weber.? Indeed, when the Frankfurt Institute for Social Re-
search was founded in 1923, there seemed little reason to be optimistic
about developing a theoretically informed program for freeing people from
unnecessary domination. The defeat of the left-wing working-class move-
ments, the rise of fascism in the aftermath of World War I, and the
degeneration of the Russian Revolution into Stalinism had, by the 1930s,
made it clear that Marx’s analysis needed drastic revision. Moreover, the
expansion of the state, the spread of bureaucracy, and the emphasis on
means-ends rationality through the application of science and technology
all signaled that Weber’s analysis had to be confronted.
The members of the Frankfurt School wanted to maintain Marx’s
notion of praxis—that is, a blending of theory and action or the use of
theory to stimulate action, and vice versa. And they wanted theory to
expose oppression and to propose less constrictive options. Yet, they were
confronted with the spread of political and economic domination. Thus,
the development of modern critical theory in sociology was born in a time
when there was little reason to be optimistic about realizing emancipatory
goals. |
Three members of the Frankfurt School are most central: George
Lukacs, Max Horkheimer, and Theodor Adorno.? Lukacs’s major work
appeared in the 1920s,‘ whereas Horkheimer® and Adorno® were active
well into the 1960s. In many ways, I view Lukacs as the key link in the
transition from Marx and Weber to modern critical theory, for Horkh-
eimer and Adorno were reacting to much of Lukacs’s analysis and approach.

*For descriptions of this activity, see Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1973) and “The Frankfurt School’s Critique of Marxist Humanism,” Social
Research 39 (1972), pp. 285-305; David Held, Introduction to Critical Theory, pp. 29-110;
Robert J. Antonio, “The Origin, Development, and Contemporary Status of Critical The-
ory,” The Sociological Quarterly 24 (Summer 1983), pp. 325-51; Phil Slater, Origin and
Significance of The Frankfurt School (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977).
’Other prominent members included: Friedrich Pollock (economist), Erich Fromni (psy-
choanalyst, social psychologist), Franz Neumann (political scientist), Herbert Marcuse (phi-
losopher), and Leo Loenthal (sociologist). During the Nazi years, the school relocated in
America, and many of its members never returned to Germany.
‘George Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1968;
originally published in 1922).
5Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory: Selected Essays (New York: Herder and Herder,
1972) is a translation of essays written in German in the 1930s and 1940s; Eclipse of Reason
(New York: Oxford University Press in 1947; reprinted by Seabury Press in 1974) was the
only book by Horkheimer originally published in English. It takes a slightly 4\ferant\turn
than earlier works, but it does present ideas that emerged from his association with ‘T heodor
Adorno; and Critique of Instrumental Reason (New York: Seabury Press, 1974) Se 4 David
Held, Introduction to Critical Theory, pp. 489-91 for a more complete listing of Horkheimer’s
works in German.
*Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics (New York: Seabury Press, 1973; originally
published 1966); and with Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York: Herder
and Herder, 1972; originally published in 1947). See Held, Introduction to Critical Theory,
pp. 485-87 for a more complete listing of his works.
186 CHAPTER 9 / THE CRITICAL THEORIZING OF JURGEN HABERMAS

All of these scholars are important for the purposes of this chapter
because they directly influenced the intellectual development and sub-
sequent work of Jurgen Habermas, the most prolific contemporary critical
theorist. Thus, to appreciate fully the nature of critical theory in general
and Habermas’ work in particular, I will briefly examine Lukacs’s, Hork-
heimer’s, and Adorno’s ideas and how Habermas interpreted and reacted
to them.’ Then, I will move directly into a more detailed review and
analysis of Habermas’s work as it has developed over the last decades.

EARLY CRITICAL THEORY:

LUKACS, HORKHEIMER, ADORNO
In Habermas’s eyes, George Lukacs blended Marx and Weber together
by seeing a convergence of Marx’s ideas about commodification of social
relations through money and markets with Weber’s thesis about the pen-
etration of rationality into ever more spheres of modern life. Borrowing
from Marx’s analysis of the ‘fetishism of commodities,” Lukacs employed
the concept of “reification” to denote the process by which social rela-
tionships become “objects” that can be manipulated, bought, and sold.
Then, reinterpreting Weber’s notion of “rationalization” to mean a grow-
ing emphasis on the process of “calculation” of exchange values, Lukacs
combined Weber’s and Marx’s analysis. As traditional societies change,
he argued, there is less reliance on moral standards and processes of
communication to achieve societal integration; instead, there is more uti-
lization of money, markets, and rational calculations. As a result, relations
are coordinated by exchange values and by people seeing each other as
“things.’’
As Habermas contends, Lukacs painted himself into a conceptual
corner: if indeed such is the historical process, how is it to be stopped?
Lukacs’s answer is to resurrect Hegel and “stand him back on his feet”’
in opposition to Marx’s effort to “stand Hegel on his head.” That is,
rather than look to contradictions in material conditions—economic and
political forces—one must examine the dialectical forces inherent in hu-
man consciousness. For there are limits, Lukacs argued, to how much
reification and rationalization people will endure. There is an inner quality
in human subjects that keeps rationalization from completely taking over.’

"Chapter 4, “From Lukacs to Adorno: Rationalization as Reification,” pp. 339-99 in

Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1 (Boston: Beacon Press,
1984) contains Habermas’s critique of Luk&es, Horkheimer, and Adorno.
®Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness.
*Ibid., pp. 89-102. In a sense, Lukacs becomes another “Young Hegelian” whom Marx
would have criticized. Yet, in Marx’s own analysis, he sees alienation, per se, as producing
resistance by workers to further alienation by the forces of production. This is the image
that Lukacs seems to take from Marx.
 EARLY CRITICAL THEORY: LUKACS, HORKHEIMER, ADORNO 187

This emphasis on the process of consciousness is very much a part

of critical theory that borrows much from the early Marx" and that, at
the Frankfurt School, had a heavy dose of Freud and psychoanalytic
theory. But as Habermas was to emphasize, early critical theory was too
subjectivist and failed to analyze intersubjectivity, or the ways people
interact through mutually shared conscious activity. Emphasizing the
inherent resistance of subjects to their total reification, Lukacs could only
propose that the critical theorist’s role is to expose reification at work by
analyzing the historical processes that have dehumanized people. As a
consequence, Lukacs made critical theory highly contemplative, empha-
sizing that the solution to the problem of domination resides in making
people more aware and conscious of their situation through a detailed,
historical analysis of reification.
Both Horkheimer and Adorno were highly suspicious of Lukacs’s
Hegelian solution to the dilemma of reification and rationalization. These
processes do not imply their own critique, as Hegel would have suggested.
Subjective consciousness and material reality cannot be separated. Con-
sciousness does not automatically offer resistance to those material forces
that commodify, reify, and rationalize it. Critical theory must, therefore,
actively seek to (1) describe historical forces that dominate human free-
dom and (2) expose ideological justifications of these forces. Such is to
be achieved through interdisciplinary research among variously trained
researchers and theorists who confront each others’ ideas and use this
dialogue to analyze concrete social conditions and to propose courses of
ameliorative action. This emphasis on praxis—the confrontation between
theory and action in the world—involves the development of ideas about
what oppresses and what to do about it in the course of human struggles.
As Horkheimer argued: “[The] value of theory is not decided alone by
the formal criteria of truth ... but by its connection with tasks, which
in the particular historical moment are taken up by progressive social
forces.!! Such critical theory is, Horkheimer claimed, guided by a “par-
ticular practical interest” in the emancipation of people from class dom-
ination.!? Thus, critical theory is tied, in a sense that Marx might have
appreciated, to people’s practical interests.
As Adorno and Horkheimer interacted and collaborated, their posi-
tions converged (although by the late 1950s and early 1960s, Horkheimer
had seemingly rejected much of his earlier work). Adorno was, in my eyes,

1K ar] Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology (New York: International Pub-
lishers, 1947; originally written in 1846).
11Max Horkheimer, “Zum Rationalismusstreit in der gegenwartigen Philosophe,” orig-
inally published in 1935, reprinted in Kritische Theorie, vol. 1, ed. A. Schmidt (Frankfurt:
Fischer Verlag, 1968), pp. 146-7. This and volume 2, by the way, represent a compilation
of many of Horkheimer’s essays while at the Institute in Frankfurt.
12Habermas is to take up this idea, but he will extend it in several ways.
188 CHAPTER 9 / THE CRITICAL THEORIZING OF JURGEN HABERMAS

more philosophical and research oriented than Horkheimer; his empirical

work on “the authoritarian personality” had a major impact on research
in sociology and psychology, but I think that his theoretical impact came
from his collaboration with Horkheimer and, in many ways, through
Horkheimer’s singled authored work.!* Adorno was very pessimistic about
the chances of critical theory making great changes, although his essays
were designed to expose patterns of recognized and unrecognized domi-
nation of individuals by social and psychological forces. At best, his “neg-
ative dialectics” could allow humans to “tread water” until historical
circumstances were more favorable to emancipatory movements. The goal
of negative dialectics is to sustain a constant critique of ideas, conceptions,
and conditions. This critique cannot by itself change anything, for it
occurs only on the plane of ideas and concepts. But it can keep ideological
dogmatisms from obscuring conditions that might eventually allow for
emancipatory action.
I have not done justice to either Horkheimer or Adorno, but my goal
is not to summarize their ideas in total, but only those portions to which
Jurgen Habermas reacted. Both Horkheimer and Adorno emphasized that
humans’ “subjective side” is restricted by the spread of rationalization.
In conceptualizing this process, they created a kind of dualism between
the subjective world and the realm of material objects, seeing the latter
as working to oppress the former. And so, from their viewpoint, critical
theory must expose this dualism; and it must see how this invasion of
“instrumental reason” (means-ends rationality)'* has invaded the human
spirit. In this way, some resistance can be offered to these oppressive
forces. '
Habermas sees this kind of philosophical analysis—even with the ca-
veats to praxis—as terribly vague, excessively contemplative, and amaz-
ingly detached from what people actually do when they interact and use
their conscious faculties.* Such critical theory is also fatalistic, seeing
the forces of production as immobilizing the forces of subjective con-
sciousness and ameliorative action. What Habermas proposes, then, is a
shift in orientation away from the subjective consciousness of the indi-
vidual to the processes by which humans-create intersubjective under-
standings and to the processes by which they actually coordinate their
actions. For if there is oppression and domination, it can only be relieved
by understanding the specific mechanisms that integrate societies. For to
change a society requires detailed insight into what binds it together. And

FPN a W. Adorno, et al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper & Row,

‘*Means-ends rationality is action designed to use the most efficient means to achieve
stated ends or goals. For Max Weber’s use of this concept, see Chapter 6.
“Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, Chapter 4.
 THE CRITICAL APPROACH OF JURGEN HABERMAS 189

so, it is in the analysis of these integrating processes that critical theory

can propose realistic emancipatory solutions.

THE CRITICAL APPROACH OF JURGEN HABERMAS

Jurgen Habermas has been an enormously productive scholar in the past
two decades. This fact makes it difficult to summarize his work in a simple
way. Moreover, to be kind about the matter, Habermas’s style of expo-
sition is somewhat dense. Part of this denseness is his style of prose,
but much of it is Habermas’s Germanic approach, which involves an effort
to analyze all the relevant viewpoints on a topic before he presents his
case. As a result, Habermas’s main line of argument is often buried in
tangential analyses of scholars and issues that he perceives to be relevant
and essential to his point.'7 Consequently, there are varying interpreta-
tions of Habermas’s views; and I suspect that in working through his
work, I may misinterpret him. This danger of misinterpretation is par-
ticularly acute because I will try to extract the central themes from a
conceptual scheme that has evolved and changed over the years. Yet, I
see a certain continuity in the argument; and it is this aspect of his work
that I will emphasize.

The Central Problem of Critical Theory

Underlying Habermas’s work,I believe, are a series of unarticulated ques-
tions. These include: (1) How is social theory to develop ideas that keep
Karl Marx’s emancipatory project alive and, yet at the same time, rec-
ognize the empirical inadequacy of his prognosis for advanced capitalist
societies? (2) How is social theory to confront Max Weber’s historical
analysis of rationalization’ in a way that avoids his pessimism and thereby
keeps Marx’s emancipatory goals at the center of theory? (3) How is social
theory to avoid the retreat into subjectivism of earlier critical theorists,
such as Lukacs, Horkheimer, and Adorno, who increasingly focused on
states of subjective consciousness within individuals and, as a conse-
quence, lost Marx’s insight that society is constructed from, and must
therefore be emancipated in terms of, the processes that sustain social
relations among individuals? (4) How is social theory to conceptualize
and develop a theory that reconciles the forces of material production and
political organization with the forces of intersubjectivity among reflective
and conscious individuals in such a way that it avoids (a) Weber’s

16Indeed, the English translations of his work are difficult, but the German versions are
even worse. Translators consistently improve Habermas’s prose, but it still remains highly
obscure.
17In some ways, I find these tangents more interesting than the main argument.
1’That is, the spread of means-end rationality into ever more spheres of life.
190 CHAPTER 9 / THE CRITICAL THEORIZING OF JURGEN HABERMAS

pessimism about the domination of consciousness by rational economic

and political forces? (b) Marx’s naive optimism about inevitability of class
consciousness and revolt? and (c) Early critical theorists’ retreat into the
subjectivism of Hegel’s dialectic, where oppression mysteriously mobilizes
its negation through increases in subjective consciousnesses and resistance?
At different points in his career, Habermas focused on one or the
other of these questions, but my sense is that all four have always guided
his approach, at least implicitly. Habermas has been accused of aban-
doning the critical thrust of his earlier works, but I think that this con-
clusion is incorrect. For in trying to answer these questions, he has in-
creasingly recognized that mere critique of oppression is not enough. Such
critique becomes a “‘reified object itself’; and although early critical theor-
ists knew this, they never developed conceptual schemes that accounted
for the underlying dynamics of societies. For critique to be useful in lib-
erating people from domination, it is necessary, Habermas seems to say,
for the critique to be couched in terms of the fundamental processes that
integrate social systems. In this way, the critique has some possibility for
suggesting ways to create new types of social relations. Without theoretical
understanding of how society works, critique is only superficial debunking
and becomes an exercise in futility. It is this willingness to theorize about
the underlying dynamics of society, to avoid the retreat into subjectivism,
to reject superficial criticism and, instead, to base critique on reasoned
theoretical analysis and to incorporate ideas from many diverse theoret-
ical approaches that makes Habermas’s work theoretically significant.
In presenting his ideas, I will briefly summarize his earlier works,
showing how they have culminated in the synthesis of his ideas in the
two-volume work The Theory of Communicative Action.

Habermas’s Analysis of ‘“The Public Sphere’’2°

In his first major publication, Structural Transformation of the Public
Sphere, Habermas traces the evolution and dissolution of what he termed
the public sphere.”! This sphere is a realm of social life where people can
bring up matters of general interest; where they can discuss and debate
these issues without recourse to custom, dogma, and force: and where they
can resolve differences of opinion by rational argument. To say the least,
I find this conception of a public sphere as rather romanticized, but the
imagery of free and open discussion that is resolved by rational argu-
mentation becomes a central theme in Habermas’s subsequent approach.

"Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action.

Some useful reviews and critiques of Habermas's work include: John B. Thompson and
David Held, eds., Habermas: Critical Debates (London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1982): David
Held, An Introduction to Critical Theory, chapters 9-12.
"Jurgen Habermas, Struckturwandel der Offentlichkeit (Neuwied: Luchterhand. 1962).
 THE CRITICAL APPROACH OF JURGEN HABERMAS 191

Increasingly throughout his career, Habermas sees emancipation from

domination as possible through “communicative action,” which is a re-
incarnation of the public sphere in more conceptual clothing.
In this early work, however, Habermas appears more interested in
history and views the emergence of the public sphere as occurring in the
18th century, when various forums for public debate—clubs, cafés, jour-
nals, newspapers—proliferated. He concludes that these forums helped
erode the basic structure of feudalism, which is legitimated by religion
and custom rather than by agreements that have been reached through
public debate and discourse. The public sphere was greatly expanded,
Habermas argues, by the extension of market economies and the resulting
liberation of the individual from the constraints of feudalism. Free citi-
zens, property holders, traders, merchants, and members of other new
sectors in society could now be actively concerned about the governance
of society and could openly discuss and debate issues. But, in a vein similar
to Weber’s analysis of rationalization, Habermas argues that the public
sphere was eroded by some of the very forces that stimulated its expansion.
As market economies experience instability, the powers of the state are
extended in an effort to stabilize the economy; and with the expansion
of bureaucracy to ever more contexts of social life, the public sphere is
constricted. And increasingly, the state seeks to redefine problems as
technical and soluble by technologies and administrative procedures rather
than by public debate and argumentation.
The details of this argument are less important, I think, than the fact
that this work established Habermas’s credentials as a critical theorist.
All the key elements of critical theory are there—the decline of freedom
with the expansion of capitalism and the bureaucratized state; and the
seeming power of the state to construct and control social life. The so-
lution to these problems is to resurrect the public sphere, but how is this
to be done in light of the growing power of the state? Thus, in this early
work, I see Habermas as having painted himself into the same conceptual
corner as his teachers in the Frankfurt School. The next phase of his
work extends this critique of capitalist society, but it also tries to redirect
critical theory so that it does not have to retreat into the contemplative
subjectivism of Lukacs, Horkheimer, and Adorno. He begins this project
in the late 1960s with an analysis of knowledge systems and critique of
science.

The Critique of Science

In his The Logic of the Social Sciences”? and Knowledge and Human
Interest, Habermas analyzes systems of knowledge in an effort to elaborate

Jurgen Habermas, Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, a7t0).

%Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interest, trans. J. Shapiro (London: Hei-
192 CHAPTER 9 / THE CRITICAL THEORIZING OF JURGEN HABERMAS

a framework for critical theory. The ultimate goal of this analysis is to

establish the fact that science is but one type of knowledge that exists in
order to meet only one set of human interests. To realize this goal, Ha-
bermas posits three basic types of knowledge that encompass the full range
of human reason: (1) There is empirical-analytic knowledge, which are
those types of knowledge concerned with understanding the lawful prop-
erties of the material world. (2) There is hermeneutic-historical know]-
edge, which is devoted to understanding of meanings, especially through
the interpretations of historical texts. And (3) there is critical knowledge,
which is devoted to uncovering conditions of constraint and domination.
These three types of knowledge reflect three basic types of human inter-
ests: (1) a technical interest in the reproduction of existence through
control of the environment, (2) a practical interest in understanding the
meaning of situations, and (3) an emancipatory interest in freedom for
growth and improvement. Such interests do not reside in individuals, but
in more general imperatives for reproduction, meaning, and freedom that
presumably are built into the species as it has become organized into
societies. These three interests create, therefore, three types of knowledge.
The interest in material reproduction has produced science or empirical/
analytic knowledge; the interest in understanding of meaning has led to
the development of hermeneutic/historical knowledge; and the interest
in freedom has required the development of critical theory.
These interests in technical control, practical understanding, and
emancipation generate different types of knowledge through three types
of media: (1) “work” for realizing interests in technical control through
the development of empirical/analytic knowledge; (2) “language” for re-
alizing practical interests in understanding through hermeneutic knowl-
edge; and (3) “authority” for realizing interests in emancipation through
the development of critical theory. There is a kind of functionalism in
this analysis: needs for “material survival and social reproduction,” for
“continuity of society through interpretive understanding,” and for “uto-
pian fulfillment” create interests. Then, through the media of work, lan-
guage, and authority, these needs produce three types of knowledge: the
scientific, hermeneutical, and critical.
This kind of typologizing is, of course, reminiscent of Weber and
Parsons; and in many ways it is even more vague than Parsons’s typol-
ogizing. Nonetheless, it is the vehicle through which Habermas makes
the central point: positivism and the search for natural laws is only one
type of knowledge, although the historical trend has been for the empir-

nemann, 1970; originally published in German in 1968). The basic ideas in Zur Logik der
Sozialwissenschaften and Knowledge and Human Interest were stated in Habermas's in-
augural lecture at the University of Frankfurt in 1965 and were first published in “Knowledge
and Interest,” Jnquiry 9 (1966), pp. 285-300.
 THE CRITICAL APPROACH OF JURGEN HABERMAS 193

FIGURE 9-1 Types of Knowledge, Interests, Media (and Functional Needs)

Fr a

Functional Needs Interests Knowledge Media

Material survival and technical control of empirical/analytic work.
social reproduction environment, which knowledge, which is
generates leads to the achieved through:
pressures for: development of:
Continuity of social practical hermeneutic and language.
relations generates understanding historical
pressures for: through knowledge, which is
interpretations of achieved through:
others’ subjective
states, which leads
to development of:
Desires for utopian emancipation from critical theory, which authority.
fulfillment generates unnecessary is achieved through:
pressures for: domination, which
leads to
development of:

\
;
}

ical/analytic to dominate the other two types of knowledge. Thus, inter-

ests in technical control through work and the development of science
have dominated the interests in understanding and emancipation. And
so, if social life seems meaningless and cold, it is because technical in-
terests in producing science have come to dictate what kind of knowledge
is permissible and legitimate. Thus, Weber’s “rationalization thesis” is
restated with the typological distinction among interest, knowledge, and
media. There is, I should emphasize again, an implicit functionalism here:
two sets of universal functional needs—for “continuity through interpre-
tive understanding” and for “utopian fulfillment’—are not being met by
virtue of the ascendancy of concern with practical interests. And by im-
plication, then, one of the underlying causes of the problems in advanced
capitalism is the failure to meet the functional needs of Habermas’ implicit
functionalism. I will not pursue this point further, but it is worth con-
sidering. I have summarized Habermas’ excessive typological argument
in Figure 9-1. I have, however, revised it somewhat in order to make the
argument clear.
This typology allows Habermas to achieve several goals. First, he can
attack the assumption that science is value free because, like all knowl-
edge, it is attached to a set of interests. Second, he can revise the Weberian
thesis of rationalization in such a way that it dictates a renewed emphasis
on hermeneutics and criticism. For it is these other two types of knowledge
that are being driven out by empirical/analytic knowledge, or science.
Therefore, it is necessary to re-emphasize these neglected types of knowl-
edge. Third, he can justify certain topic areas that come to consume his
work. Let me elaborate on this last point.
194 CHAPTER 9 / THE CRITICAL THEORIZING OF JURGEN HABERMAS

By viewing positivism in the social sciences as type of empirical/

analytic knowledge, Habermas can associate it with human interests in
technical control. He can, therefore, visualize social science as a tool of
economic and political interests. Science thus becomes an ideology, and
in fact, Habermas sees it as the underlying cause of the legitimation crises
of advanced capitalist societies (more on this shortly). In dismissing pos-
itivism in this way, he can orient his own project to hermeneutics with
a critical twist. That is, he can visualize the major task of critical theory
as the analysis of those processes by which people achieve interpretative
understanding of each other in ways that give social life a sense of con-
tinuity. Increasingly, Habermas has come to focus on the communicative
processes among actors as the theoretical core for critical theorizing. Goals
of emancipation cannot be realized without knowledge about how people
interact and communicate. Such an emphasis represents a restatement
in a new guise of Habermas’s early analysis of the public sphere, but now
the process of public discourse and debate is viewed as the essence of
human interaction in general. Moreover, to understand interaction, it is
necessary to analyze language and linguistic processes among individuals.
Knowledge of these processes can, in turn, give critical theory a firm
conceptual basis from which to launch a critique of society and to suggest
paths for the emancipation of individuals. Yet, to justify this emphasis
on hermeneutics and criticism, Habermas must first analyze the crises of
capitalist societies in terms of the overextension of empirical/analytic
systems of knowledge.

Legitimation Crises in Society

As Habermas’s earlier work had argued, there are several historical trends
in modern societies: (1) the decline of the public sphere, (2) the increasing
intervention of the state into the economy, and (3) the growing dominance
of science in the service of the state’s interests in technical control. These
ideas are woven together in Legitimation Crisis, which I see as a further
critique of capitalist society and positivistic science.*4 But in locating the
crises of capitalist society in the ascendance of interests in technical
control, Habermas can justify his own critical project, especially as it
takes a hermeneutic turn—that is, as it moves toward an analysis of the
processes by which actors interpret each others’ subjective states.
The basic argument in Legitimation Crisis is that as the state in-
creasingly intervenes in the economy, it also seeks to translate political
issues into “technical problems.” Issues are not topics for public debate,
but rather, they represent technicai problems that require the use of tech-
nologies by experts in bureaucratic organizations. As a result, there is a

. “Jurgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, trans. T. McCarthy (London: Heinemann, 1976:

originally published in German in 1973).
 THE CRITICAL APPROACH OF JURGEN HABERMAS 195

“depoliticization” of practical issues by redefining them as technical prob-

lems. To do this, the state propagates a “technocratic consciousness” that,
to Habermas, represents a new kind of ideology. Unlike previous ideo-
logies, however, it does not promise a future utopia, but like other ideo-
logies it is seductive in its ability to veil problems, to simplify perceived
options, and to justify a particular way of organizing social life. At the
core of this technocratic consciousness is an emphasis on “instrumental
reason,” or what Weber termed means-ends rationality. That is, criteria
of the efficiency of means in realizing explicit goals increasingly come to
guide evaluations of social action and people’s approach to problems. This —
emphasis on instrumental reason operates to displace other types of ac-
tion, such as behaviors oriented to mutual understanding. This displace-
ment occurs in a series of stages: science is first used by the state to realize
specific goals; then, the criterion of efficiency is used by the state to
reconcile competing goals of groupings; next, basic cultural values are
themselves assessed and evaluated in terms of their efficiency and ra-
tionality; and finally, in Habermas’s version of Brave New World, deci-
sions are completely delegated to computers, which seek the most rational
and efficient course of action.
This reliance on the ideology of technocratic consciousnesses creates,
Habermas argues, new dilemmas of political legitimation. For Habermas,
capitalist societies can be divided into three basic subsystems: (1) the
economic, (2) the politico-administrative, and (3) the cultural (what he
later calls lifeworld). From this division of societies into these subsystems,
Habermas then posits four points of crises: (1) an ‘““economic crisis’ occurs
if the economic subsystem cannot generate sufficient productivity to meet
people’s needs; (2) a “rationality crisis” exists when the politico-admin-
istrative subsystem cannot generate a sufficient number of instrumental
decisions; (3) a “motivation crisis” exists when actors cannot use cultural
symbols to generate sufficient meaning for them to feel committed to
participate fully in the society; and (4) a “legitimation crisis” arises when
actors do not possess the “requisite number of generalized motivations”
or diffuse commitments to the political subsystem’s right to make deci-
sions. Much of this analysis of crises is couched in Marxian terms but
emphasizes that economic and rationality crises are perhaps less impor-
tant than either motivational or legitimation crisis. For as technocratic
consciousness penetrates all spheres of social life and creates productive
economies as well as an intrusive state, the crisis tendencies of late cap-
italism shift from the inability to produce sufficient economic goods or
political decisions to the failure to generate (a) diffuse commitments to
political processes and (b) adequate levels of meaning among individual
actors.
I have, of course, simplified Habermas’s argument, but my main intent
is only to highlight those aspects of his work that become prominent in
his most recent theoretical synthesis. In Legitimation Crisis is an early
 196 CHAPTER 9 / THE CRITICAL THEORIZING OF JURGEN HABERMAS

form of what becomes an important distinction: ‘‘systemic’’ processes

revolving around the economy and politico-administrative apparatus of
the state must be distinguished from ‘‘cultural” processes. This distinction
will later be conceptualized as system and lifeworld, respectively, but the
central point is this: in tune with his Frankfurt School roots, Habermas
is shifting emphasis from Marx’s analysis of the economic crisis of pro-
duction to crises of meaning and commitment; and if the problems or
crises of capitalist societies are in these areas, then critical theory must
focus on the communicative and interactive processes by which humans
generate understandings and meanings among themselves. For if instru-
mental reason, or means-ends rationality, is driving out action based on
mutual understanding and commitment, then the goal of critical theory
is to expose this trend and to suggest ways of overcoming it, especially
since legitimation and motivational crises make people aware that some-
thing is missing from their lives and, therefore, receptive to more eman-
cipatory alternatives. And so, the task of critical theory is to develop a
theoretical perspective that allows for the restructuring of meaning and
commitment in social life. This goal will be realized, Habermas argues,
by further understanding of how people communicate, interact, and de-
velop symbolic meanings.

Early Analyses of Speech and Interaction

In 1970, Habermas wrote two articles that marked a return to the idea
of the public sphere, but with a new, more theoretical thrust. They also
signaled an increasing emphasis on the process of speech, communication,
and interaction. In his “On Systematically Distorted Communication,”
Habermas outlines the nature of undistorted communication.” True to
Habermas’s Weberian origins, this outline is an ideal type. The goal is
to determine the essentials and essence of undistorted communication so
that those processes that distort communication, such as domination, can
be better exposed. What, then, are the features of undistorted commu-
nication? Habermas lists five: (1) expressions, actions, and gestures are
noncontradictory; (2) communication is public and conforms to cultural
standards of what is appropriate; (3) actors can distinguish between the
properties of language, per se, and the events and processes that are de-
scribed by language; (4) communication leads to, and is the product of,
intersubjectivity, or the capacity of actors to understand each others’
subjective states and to develop a sense of shared collective meanings;
and (5) conceptualizations of time and space are understood by actors to
mean different things when extertially observed and when subjectively

* Jurgen Habermas, “On Systematically Distorted Communication.” Inquiry 13 (1970),

pp. 205-18.
 THE CRITICAL APPROACH OF JURGEN HABERMAS 197

experienced in the process of interaction.”® The details of his analysis on

the distortion of communication are less essential than the assertions
about what critical theory must conceptualize. For Habermas, the con-
ceptualization of undistorted communication is used as a foil for mounting
a critique against those social forces that make such idealized commu-
nication difficult to realize. Moreover, as his subsequent work testifies,
Habermas emphasizes condition (4), or communication and intersubjec-
tivity among actors.
This emphasis becomes evident in his other article published in 1970,
entitled “Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence.’’’ Again, I
do not think the details of this argument are as critical as the overall
intent, especially since his ideas undergo subsequent modification. Ha-
bermas argues that for actors to be competent, they must know more than
the linguistic rules of how to construct sentences and to talk; they must
also master “dialogue-constitutive universals,” which are part of the “‘so-
cial linguistic structure of society.’’ Behind this jargon is the idea that
the meaning of language and speech is contextual and that actors use
implicit stores or stocks of knowledge to interpret the meaning of utter-
ances. Habermas then proposes yet another ideal type, ‘“‘the ideal speech
situation,” in which actors possess all of the relevant background know]-
edge and linguistic skills to communicate without distortion.
Thus, in the early 1970s, Habermas began to view the mission of
critical theory as emphasizing the process of interaction as mediated by
speech. But such speech acts draw upon stores of knowledge—rules, norms,
values, tacit understandings, memory traces, and the like—for their in-
terpretation. I see these ideals of the speech process as a restatement of
the romanticized public sphere, where issues were openly debated, dis-
cussed, and rationally resolved. What Habermas has done, of course, is
to restate this view of “what is good and desirable” in more theoretical
and conceptual terms, although it could be argued that there is not much
difference between the romanticized portrayal of the public sphere and
the ideal-typical conceptualization of speech. But with this conceptual-
ization, the goal of critical theory must be to expose those conditions that
distort communication and that inhibit realization of the ideal speech
situation. Habermas’s utopia is thus a society where actors are able to
communicate without distortion, to achieve a sense of each others’ sub-
jective states, and to openly reconcile their differences through argumen-
tation that is free of external constraint and coercion. In other words, he
wants to restore the public sphere but in a more encompassing way—that
is, in people’s day-to-day interactions.

J] am simplifying here. See also Jim Faught’s discussion in his “Objective Reason and
the Justification of Norms.”
21Jurgen Habermas, “Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence,” Inquiry 13
(1970), pp. 360-75.
198 CHAPTER 9 / THE CRITICAL THEORIZING OF JURGEN HABERMAS

Habermas moves in several different directions in trying to construct

a rational approach for realizing this utopia. He borrows metaphorically
from psychoanalytic theory as a way to uncover the distortions that in-
hibit open discourse,”* but I think that this psychoanalytic journey is far
less important than his growing concentration on the process of com-
municative action and interaction as the basis for creating a society that
reduces domination and constraint. Thus, by the mid-1970s, he labeled
his analysis universal pragmatics whose centerpiece is the “theory of
communicative action.’ I will discuss this theory in more detail shortly,
but let me briefly indicate its key elements. Communication involves more
than words, grammar, and syntax; it also involves what Habermas terms
validity claims. There are three types of claims: (1) those asserting that
a course of action as indicated through speech is the most effective and
efficient means for attaining ends; (2) those claiming that an action is
correct and proper in accordance with relevant norms; and (3) those main-
taining that the subjective experiences as expressed in a speech act are
sincere and authentic. All speech acts implicitly make these three claims,
although a speech act may emphasize one more than the other two. Those
responding to communication can accept or challenge these validity claims,
and if challenged, then the actors contest, debate, criticize, and revise
their communication. They use, of course, shared “stocks of knowledge”
about norms, means-ends effectiveness, and sincerity to make their claims
as well as to contest and revise them. This process that, I should add,
restates the public sphere in yet one more guise is often usurped when
claims are settled by recourse to power and authority. But if claims are
settled by the “giving of reasons for” and “reasons against” the claim in
a mutual give-and-take among individuals, then Habermas sees it as “ra-
tional discourse.” Thus, built into the very process of interaction is the
potential for rational discourse that can be used to create a more just,
open, and free society. Such discourse is not merely means-ends ration-
ality, for it involves adjudication of two other validity claims: those con-
cerned with normative appropriateness and those with subjective sincer-
ity..Actors thus implicitly assess and critique each other in terms of
effectiveness, normative appropriateness, and sincerity of their respective
speech acts; and so, the goal of critical theory is to expose those societal
conditions that keep such processes from occurring for all three types of
validity claims.

**Habermas sometimes calls this aspect of his program “depth hermeneutics.” And the
idea is to create a methodology of inquiry for social systems that parallels the approach of
psychoanalysis—that is, dialogue, removal of barriers to understanding, analysis of under-
lying causal processes, and efforts to use this understanding to dissolve distortions in
interaction.
*For an early statement, see “Some Distinctions in Universal Pragmatics: A Working
Paper,” Theory and Society 3 (1976), pp. 155-67.
 THE CRITICAL APPROACH OF JURGEN HABERMAS 199

In this way, Habermas has moved critical theory from Lukacs’s,

Horkheimer’s, and Adorno’s emphasis on subjective consciousness to a
concern with intersubjective consciousness and the interactive processes
by which intersubjectivity is created, maintained, and changed through
the validity claims in each speech act. Moreover, rather than viewing the
potential for liberating alternatives as residing in subjective conscious-
ness, Habermas can assert that emancipatory potential inheres in each
and every communicative interaction. And since speech and communi-
cation are the basis of interaction and since society is ultimately sustained
by interaction, the creation of less restrictive societies will come about
by realizing the inherent dynamics of the communication process.

Habermas’s Reconceptualization of Social Evolution

All critical theory is historical in the sense that it tries to analyze the
long-term development of oppressive arrangements in society. Indeed, as
I have emphasized, the central problem of critical theory is to reconcile
Marx’s and Weber’s respective analysis of the development of advanced
capitalism. It is not surprising, therefore, that Habermas produces a his-
torical-evolutionary analysis, but in contrast to Weber, he needs to see
emancipatory potential in evolutionary trends. Yet at the same time, he
needs to avoid the incorrect prognosis in Marx’s analysis and to retain
the emancipatory thrust of Marx’s approach. Habermas’s first major effort
to effect this reconciliation appears in his The Reconstruction of Histor-
ical Materialism,® parts of which have been translated and appear in
Communication and the Evolution of Society.*!
Habermas’s approach to evolution pulls together many of the themes
that I have discussed above, and so, a brief review of his general argument
can set the stage for an analysis of his most recent theoretical synthesis,
The Theory of Communicative Action.*? In many ways, Habermas rein-
troduces traditional functionalism into Marx’s and Weber’s evolutionary
descriptions, but with both a phenomenological and structuralist empha-
sis (see chapters 14, 18, and 19). As with all functional theory, he views
evolution as the process of structural differentiation and the emergence
of integrative problems. He also borrows a page from Herbert Spencer,
Talcott Parsons, and Niklas Luhmann when he argues that the integra-
tion of complex systems leads to an adaptive upgrading, increasing the

*Jurgen. Habermas, Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus (Frankfurt:

Suhrkamp, 1976).
Jurgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, trans. T. McCarthy
(London: Heinemann, 1979).
32For an earlier statement, see Jurgen Habermas, “Towards a Reconstruction of His-
torical Materialism,” Theory and Society 2 (3, 1975), pp. 84-98.
200 CHAPTER 9 / THE CRITICAL THEORIZING OF JURGEN HABERMAS

capacity of the society to cope with the environment.* That is, complex
systems that are integrated are better adapted to their environments than
less complex systems. The key issue, then, is what conditions increase or
decrease integration? For without integration, differentiation produces
severe problems.
Habermas’s analysis of system integration is both protracted and
vague; and so, I will offer only a cursory review. He argues that contained
in the world views or stocks of knowledge of individual actors are learning
capacities and stores of information that determine the overall learning
level of a society. In turn, this learning level determines the society’s
steering capacity to respond to environmental problems. At times, Ha-
bermas refers to these learning levels as organization principles. Thus,
as systems confront problems of internal integration and external con-
tingencies, the stocks of knowledge and world views of individual actors
are translated into organization principles and steering capacities, which,
in turn, set limits on just how a system can respond. For example, a
society with only religious mythology will be less complex and less able
to respond to environmental challenges than a more complex one with
large stores of technology and stocks of normative procedures determining
its organization principles. But societies can “learn’*4 that when con-
fronted with problems beyond the capacity of their current organization
principles and steering mechanisms, they can draw upon the “cognitive
potential” in the world views and stocks of knowledge of individuals who
reorganize their actions. The result of this learning creates new levels of
information that allow for the development of new organization principles
for securing integration in the face of increased societal differentiation
and complexity. |
I have only skimmed the surface of Habermas’s views, but the details
are perhaps best left out since they are ambiguous. Yet, there is an implicit
line of argument that I should emphasize: the basis for societal integration
lies in the processes by which actors communicate and develop mutual
understandings and stores of knowledge. To the extent that these inter-
active processes are arrested by the patterns of economic and political
organization, then the society’s learning capacity is correspondingly di-
minished. One of the main integrative problems of capitalist societies is
the integration of the material forces of production (economy as admin-
istered by the state), on the one side, and the cultural stores of knowledge
that are produced by communicative interaction, on the other side. So-
cieties that differentiate materially in the economic and political realms

**He borrows from Niklas Luhmann here (see Chapter 5), although much of Habermas's
approach is a reaction to Luhmann.
“Habermas analogizes here to Piaget's and Kohlberg’s analysis of the cognitive devel-
opment of children, seeing societies as able to “learn” as they become more structurallv
complex.
 THE CRITICAL APPROACH OF JURGEN HABERMAS 201

without achieving integration on a normative and cultural level (i.e., shared

understandings) will remain unintegrated and experience crises.
Built into these dynamics, however, is their resolution. The processes
of “communicative interaction” that produce and reproduce unifying cul-
tural symbols must be given equal weight to the “labor” processes that
generate material production and reproduction. It is at this point that
Habermas develops his more synthetic approach in The Theory of Com-
municative Action.

The Theory of Communicative Action

The two-volume The Theory of Communicative Action pulls together into
a reasonably coherent framework various strands of Habermas’s thought.®°
Yet, true to his general style of scholarship, Habermas wanders over a
rather large intellectual landscape. In Thomas McCarthy’s words, Ha-
bermas develops his ideas through “a somewhat unusual combination of
theoretical constructions with historical reconstructions of the ideas of
‘classical’ social theorists.’°* Such thinkers as Marx, Weber, Durkheim,
Mead, Lukacs, Horkheimer, Adorno, and Parsons are, for Habermas, “still
very much alive” and are treated as “virtual dialogue partners.’’” As a
consequence, the two volumes meander through selected portions of var-
ious thinkers’ work with an eye toward critiquing and yet utilizing key
ideas. After the dust settles, however, the end result is a very creative
synthesis of ideas into a critical theory.
Habermas’s basic premise is summarized near the end of volume 1:
If we assume that the human species maintains itself through the socially
coordinated activities of its members and that this coordination is established
through communication—and in certain spheres of life, through communi-
cation aimed at reaching agreement—then the reproduction of the species also
requires satisfying the conditions of a rationality inherent in communicative
action.

In other words, intrinsic to the process of communicative action,

where actors implicitly make, challenge, and accept each others’ validity

%Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, 2 vols. Only volume 1 is, at
this writing, translated. Its subtitle, Reason and the Rationalization of Society, gives some
indication of its thrust. The translator, Thomas McCarthy, has done an excellent service
in translating what is very difficult prose. Also, his “Translators Introduction” to volume
1, pp. v-xxxvii is the best summary of Habermas’s recent theory that I have come across.
Perhaps by the time this book is published, McCarthy will have finished the translation of
volume 2. My understanding of volume 2 is limited by my lack of fluency in German, but
I have waded through the text and consulted German colleagues. I would, in particular, like
to thank Angscar Weyman, Universitat Bremen.
*Thomas McCarthy, ‘Translators Introduction,” p. vii.
37Tbid.
%*Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, p. 397.
202 CHAPTER 9 / THE CRITICAL THEORIZING OF JURGEN HABERMAS

claims, resides a rationality that can potentially serve as the basis for
reconstructing the social order in less oppressive ways. The first volume
of The Theory of Communicative Action thus focuses on action and ra-
tionality in an effort to reconceptualize both processes in a manner that
shifts emphasis from the subjectivity and consciousness of the individual
to the process of symbolic interaction. In a sense, volume 1 is Habermas’s
microsociology, whereas volume 2 is his macrosociology. In this second
volume, Habermas introduces the concept of system and tries to connect
it to microprocesses of action and interaction through a reconceptualization
of the phenomenological concept of lifeworld (see Chapters 14 and 18).

The overall project. Let me begin by briefly summarizing the

overall argument, and then, I will return to volumes 1 and 2 with a more
detailed analysis. There are four types of action—(1) teleological, (2) nor-
mative, (3) dramaturgical, and (4) communicative. Only communicative
action contains the elements whereby actors reach intersubjective un-
derstanding. Such communicative action—which is, in fact, interaction—
presupposes a set of background assumptions and stocks of knowledge,
or in Habermas’s terms, a lifeworld. Also operating in any society are
“system” processes, which revolve around the material maintenance of
the species and its survival. The evolutionary trend is for system processes
and lifeworld processes to become internally differentiated and differ-
entiated from each other. The integration of a society depends upon a
balance between system and lifeworld processes. As modern societies have
evolved, however, this balance has been upset as system processes re-
volving around the economy and the state (also law, family, and other
reproductive structures) have “colonized” and dominated lifeworld pro-
cesses concerned with mutually shared meanings, understandings, and
intersubjectivity. As a result, modern society is poorly integrated.
These integrative problems in capitalist societies are manifested in
crises concerning the ‘“‘reproduction of the lifeworld”; that is, the acts of
communicative interaction that reproduce this lifeworld are displaced by
“delinguistified media,” such as money and power, that are used in the
reproduction of system processes (economy and government). The solu-
tion to these crises is a rebalancing of relations between lifeworld and
system. This rebalancing is to come through the resurrection of the public
sphere in the economic and political arenas and in the creation of more
situations where cominunicative action (interaction) can proceed unin-
hibited by the intrusion of system’s media, such as power and money.
The goal of critical theory is, therefore, to document those facets of society
where the lifeworld has been colonized and to suggest approaches whereby
situations of communicative action (interaction) can be reestablished.
Such is Habermas’s general argument; and now, I will fill in some of the
details.
 THE CRITICAL APPROACH OF JURGEN HABERMAS 203

The reconceptualization of action and rationality. In volume

1 of The Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas undertakes a long
and detailed analysis of Weber’s conceptualization of action and ration-
alization. He does so because he wants to reconceptualize rationality and
action in ways that allow him to view rational action as a potentially
liberating rather than as an imprisoning force.®* In this way, he feels, he
can avoid the pessimism of Weber and the retreat into subjectivity by
Lukacs, Adorno, and Horkheimer.
Habermas argues by adding typological distinctions on top of each
other, which, to say the least, makes the exposition somewhat ponderous.
I will simplify a bit and discuss only the critical distinctions. There are,
he concludes, several different types of action:*°

1. Teleological action is behavior oriented to calculating various

means and selecting the most appropriate means to realize explicit
goals. Such action becomes strategic when other acting agents are
involved in one’s calculations. Habermas also calls this action “‘in-
strumental” because it is concerned with means to achieve ends. Most
importantly, he emphasizes that this kind of action is too often con-
sidered to be “rational action” in previous conceptualizations of ra-
tionality. For as he is to argue, this view of rationality is too narrow
and forces critical theory into a conceptual trap: if teleological or
means-ends rationality is what has taken over the modern world and
what has, as a consequence, oppressed people, then how can critical
theory propose rational alternatives? Would not such a rational theory
be yet one more oppressive application of means-ends rationality?
The answers to these questions lie in recognizing that there are several
types of action and that true rationality does not reside in teleological
action, but in communicative action.
2. Normatively regulated action is behavior that is oriented to
common values of a group. Thus, normative action is directed toward
complying with normative expectations of collectively organized
groupings of individuals. 7
3. Dramaturgical action is action that involves conscious manip-
ulation of oneself before an audience or public. It is ego-centered in
that it involves actors mutually manipulating their behaviors to pres-
ent their own intentions, but it is also social in that such manipulation
is done in the context of organized activity.
4. Communicative action is interaction among agents who use
speech and nonverbal symbols as a way of understanding their mutual
situation and their respective plans of action in order that they can
agree on how to coordinate their behaviors.

*Recall that its subtitle is Reason and The Rationalization of Society.

“Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, pp. 85-102.
204 CHAPTER 9 / THE CRITICAL THEORIZING OF JURGEN HABERMAS

These four types of action presuppose different kinds of “worlds.”

That is, each action is oriented to a somewhat different aspect of the
universe that can be divided into the (1) “objective or external world” of
manipulable objects, (2) ‘‘social world” of norms, values, and other socially
recognized expectations, and (3) “subjective world” of experiences. Te-
leological action is concerned primarily with the objective world;
normatively regulated action with the social; and dramaturgical with the
subjective and external. But it is only with communicative action that
actors “refer simultaneously to things in the objective, social, and sub-
jective worlds in order to negotiate common definitions of the situation.”
Such communicative action is, therefore, potentially more rational
than all of the others because it deals with all three worlds and because
it proceeds in terms of speech acts that assert three types of validity
claims. Such speech acts assert that (1) statements are true in “propo-
sitional content,” or in reference to the external and objective world; (2)
statements are correct with respect to the existing normative context, or
social world; and (3) statements are sincere and manifest the subjective
world of intention and experiences of the actor.*? The process of com-
municative action in which these three types of validity claims are made,
accepted, or challenged by others is inherently more rational than other
types of action. For if a validity claim is not accepted, then it is debated
and discussed in an effort to reach understanding without recourse to
force and authority.** The process of reaching understanding through
validity claims, their acceptance, or their discussion takes place against

the background of a culturally ingrained preunderstanding. This background

remains unproblematic as a whole; only that part of the stock of knowledge
that participants make use of and thematize at a given time is put to the
test. To the extent that definitions of situations are negotiated by participants
themselves, this thematic segment of the lifeworld is at their disposal with
the negotiation of each new definition of the situation.“

Thus, in the process of making validity claims through speech acts,

actors use existing definitions of situations or create new ones that es-
tablish order to their social relations. Such definitions become part of the
stocks of knowledge in their lifeworlds, and they become the standards
by which validity claims are made, accepted, and challenged. Thus, in
reaching an understanding through communicative action, the lifeworld
serves as a point of reference for the adjudication of validity claims, which
encompass the full range of worlds—the objective, social, and subjective.

“Ibid., p. 95.
“Tbid., p. 99.
“Recall Habermas’s earlier discussion of nondistorted communication and the ideal speech
act. This is his most recent reconceptualization of these ideas.
“Ibid., p. 100. Emphasis in original.
 THE CRITICAL APPROACH OF JURGEN HABERMAS 205

And so in Habermas’s eyes, there is more rationality inherent in the very

process of communicative interaction than in means-ends or teleological
action.* As Habermas summarizes in a rare moment of succinctness:

We have .. . characterized the rational structure of the processes of reach-

ing understanding in terms of (a) the three world-relations of actors and the
corresponding concepts of the objective, social, and subjective worlds; (6) the
validity claims of propositional truth, normative rightness, and sincerity or
authenticity; (c) the concept of a rationally motivated agreement, that is, one
based on the intersubjective recognition of criticizable validity claims; and
(d) the concept of reaching understanding as the cooperative negotiation of
common definitions of the situation.“

Thus, as people communicatively act (interact), they use and at the

same time produce common definitions of the situation. Such definitions
are part of the lifeworld of a society; and if they have been produced and
reproduced through the communicative action, then they are the basis
for the rational and non-oppressive integration of a society. Let me now
turn to Habermas’s) discussion of this lifeworld that serves as the “court
of appeals”’ in communicative action.

The lifeworld and system processes of society. For Habermas,

the lifeworld is a “‘culturally transmitted and linguistically organized stock
of interpretative patterns.” But.what are these “interpretative patterns”’
about? What do they pertain to? His answer, as one comes to expect from
Habermas, is yet another typology. There are three different types of
interpretative patterns in the lifeworld: there are interpretative patterns
with respect to culture, or systems of symbols; there are those pertaining
to society, or social institutions; and there are those oriented to person-
ality, or aspects of self and being. That is, (1) actors possess implicit and
shared stocks of knowledge about cultural traditions, values, beliefs, lin-
guistic structures and their use in interaction; (2) they also know how to
organize social relations and what kinds and patterns of coordinated in-
teraction are proper and appropriate; and (3) they understand what people
are like, how they should act, and what is normal or aberrant.
These three types of interpretative patterns correspond, Habermas
asserts, to the following functional needs for reproducing the lifeworld
(and by implication, for integrating society): (1) Reaching understanding
through communicative action serves the function of transmitting, pre-
serving, and renewing cultural knowledge; (2) communicative action that
coordinates interaction meets the need for social integration and group

“Ibid., p. 302.
“Ibid., p. 137.
206 CHAPTER 9 / THE CRITICAL THEORIZING OF JURGEN HABERMAS

solidarity; and (3) communicative action that socializes agents meets the
need for the formation of personal identities.*’
Thus, the three components of the lifeworld—culture, society, per-
sonality—meet corresponding needs of society—cultural reproduction, so-
cial integration, and personality formation—through three dimensions
along which communicative action is conducted—reaching understanding,
coordinating interaction, and socialization. As Habermas summarizes in
volume 2:

In coming to an understanding with one another about their situation,

participants in communication stand in a cultural tradition which they use
and at the same time renew; in coordinating their actions via intersubjective
recognition of criticizable validity claims, they rely upon their membership
in groupings and at the same time reenforce their integration; through par-
ticipating in interaction with competent persons, growing children internalize
value orientations and acquire generalized capacities for action.*

These lifeworld processes are interrelated with system processes in a

society. Action in economic, political, familial, and other institutional
contexts draws upon, and reproduces, the cultural, societal, and person-
ality dimensions of the lifeworld. Yet, evolutionary trends are for differ-
entiation of the lifeworld into separate stocks of knowledge with respect
to culture, society, and personality and for differentiation of system pro-
cesses into distinctive and separate institutional clusters, such as econ-
omy, state, family, and law. Such differentiation creates problems of in-
tegration and balance between the lifeworld and system.*® And therein
reside the dilemmas and crises of modern societies.

Evolutionary dynamics and societal crises. In a sense, Ha-

bermas blends traditional analysis by functionalists on societal and cul-
tural differentiation with a Marxian dialectic whereby the seeds for eman-
cipation are sown in the creation of an ever more rationalized and
differentiated society. Borrowing from Durkheim’s analysis of mechanical
solidarity, Habermas argues that “the more cultural traditions predecide
which validity claims, when, where, for what, from whom, and to whom
must be accepted, the less the participants themselves have the possibility
of making explicit and examining the potential groups in which their yes/

“We are now into volume 2, ibid., pp. 205-40, which is entitled System and Lifeworld:
A Critique of Functionalist Reason, which is, I think, a somewhat ironic title because of
the heavily functional arguments in volume 2. But as I pointed out earlier, even Habermas's
earlier work has always had an implicit functionalism.
“Ibid., p. 208.
“This is the old functionalist argument of “differentiation” produces “integrative prob-
lems,” which is as old as Spencer and which is Parsons reincarnated with a phenomenological
twist.
 THE CRITICAL APPROACH OF JURGEN HABERMAS 207

no positions are based.” But ‘as mechanical solidarity gives way to

organic solidarity based upon functional interdependence,” then “the more
the worldview that furnishes the cultural stock of knowledge is decen-
tered” and “the less the need for understanding is covered in advance by
an interpreted lifeworld immune from critique,” and therefore, “the more
this need has to be met by the interpretative accomplishments of the
participants themselves.” That is, if the lifeworld is to be sustained and
reproduced, it becomes ever more necessary with growing societal com-
plexity for social actions to be based upon communicative processes. The
result is that there is greater potential for rational communicative action _
because less and less of the social order is preordained by a simple and
undifferentiated lifeworld. But system processes have operated to reduce
this potential; and the task of critical theory is to document how system
processes have worked to colonize the lifeworld and thereby arrest this
potentially superior rationality inherent in the speech acts of commu-
nicative action.
How have system processes restricted this potential contained in com-
municative action?, As the sacred/traditional basis of the lifeworld or-
ganization has dissolved and been replaced by linguistic interaction around
a lifeworld differentiated along cultural, social, and personality axes, there
is a countertrend in the differentiation of system processes. System ev-
olution involves the expansion of material production through the greater
use of technologies, science, and “‘delinguistified steering mechanisms’”’
such as money and power to carry out system processes.>! These media
do not rely upon the validity claims of communicative action; and when
they become the media of interaction in ever more spheres of life—mar-
kets, bureaucracies, welfare state policies, legal systems, and even family
relations—the processes of communicative action so essential for lifeworld
reproduction are invaded and colonized. Thus, system processes use power
and money as their media of integration, and in the process, they “de-
couple the lifeworld” from its functions for societal integration.®? There
is an irony here because differentiation of the lifeworld facilitated the
differentiation of system processes and the use of money and power®; and
so, “the rationalized lifeworld makes possible the rise of growth of sv)-
systems which strike back at it in a destructive fashion.’™
Through this ironical process, capitalism creates market dynamics
using money, which, in turn, spawn a welfare state employing power in

%] have shifted now, back to portions of volume 1. All quotes here are from p. 70 of
volume 1.
6t\Here Habermas is borrowing from Simmel’s analysis in The Philosophy of Money (see
Chapter 6) and Parsons’s conceptualization of generalized media (see Chapter 3).
8] am now back in volume 2 of The Theory of Communicative Action, pp. 256-76.
‘Habermas appears in these arguments to borrow heavily from Parscns’s analysis of
evolution (see Chapter 3).
“Volume 2, p. 227.
208 CHAPTER 9 / THE CRITICAL THEORIZING OF JURGEN HABERMAS

ways that reduce political and economic crises but which increase those
crises revolving around lifeworld reproduction. For the new crises and
conflicts “arise in areas of cultural reproduction, of social integration and
of socialization.”®

The goal of critical theory. Habermas has now circled back to

his initial concerns and those of early critical theorists. He has recast the
Weberian thesis by asserting that true rationality inheres in communicative
action, not teleological (and strategic or instrumental) action, as Weber
claimed. And he has redefined the critical theorist’s view on modern crises;
they are not ones of rationalization, but ones of colonization of those
truly rational processes that inhere in the speech acts of communicative
action, which reproduce the lifeworld so essential to societal integration.
Thus, built into the integrating processes of differentiated societies (note,
not the subjective processes of individuals, as early critical theorists
claimed) is the potential for a critical theory that seeks to restore com-
municative rationality in the face of impersonal steering mechanisms. If
system differentiation occurs in terms of delinguistified media, like money
and power, and if these reduce the reliance upon communicative action,
then crises are inevitable. The resulting collective frustration over the
lack of meaning in social life can be used by critical theorists to mobilize
people to restore the proper balance between system and lifeworld pro-
cesses. Thus, it is not crises of material production that will be the impetus
for change, as Marx contended. It is the crises of lifeworld reproduction
that will serve as the stimulus to societal reorganization. And returning
to his first work, Habermas sees such reorganization as involving (1) the
restoration of the public sphere in politics, where relinguistified debate
and argumentation rather than delinguistified power and authority, are
used to make political decisions (thus reducing “legitimation crises”) and
(2) the extension of communicative action back into those spheres—fam-
ily, work, and social relations—that have become increasingly dominated
by de'‘nguistified steering media (thereby eliminating “motivational
crises’).
The potential for this reorganization inheres in the nature of societal
integration through the rationality inherent in the communicative actions
that reproduce the lifeworld. It is the purpose of critical theory to release
this rational potential.

AN ASSESSMENT OF HABERMAS’S CRITICAL

THEORY AND PROJECT
Because it does not claim to be science or theory in the sense outlined
in Chapter 1, critical theory is difficult to assess in other than its own

“Ibid. p. 576.
 AN ASSESSMENT OF HABERMAS'S CRITICAL THEORY AND PROJECT 209

terms.” Yet, I have examined Habermas’s project in detail because, unlike

many in this area, it does try to develop a theoretical perspective for
understanding the dynamics of human organization. In assessing Haber-
mas’s approach, therefore, I will focus only on those portions of his project
that analyze human organization. I will leave to others the assessment of
his ideological argument, which, I must confess, I find hopelessly naive.
Naturally, Habermas’s critical approach owes its guiding inspiration to
the tradition of the Frankfurt School, and his formulation of concepts
has thereby been biased by these ideological commitments. But none-
theless, I will concentrate primarily on one central question: does Ha-
bermas’s approach give us new insight and understanding into the pro-
cesses of human action, interaction, and organization?
I admit that this question is somewhat unfair, because much of the
creativity in Habermas’s approach is the blending of theory and ideology.
But since my commitments are to the separation of science from ideology
(of course, I recognize the problems involved), I would have few positive
remarks for theory that is so explicitly ideological (of course, Habermas
would counter that science is ideological because it serves certain inter-
ests). Thus, just as I did for Marx in Chapter 6, I will try to stress the
merits of Habermas’s approach as theory, divorced from his critical project.

Evaluating Habermas’s Conception of Action

Habermas’s distinction among teleological (plus its strategic and instru-
mental variants), normative, dramaturgical, and communicative action
does direct our attention to different phases of behavior. The distinction
between teleological and normative adds little beyond Parsons’s formu-
lation in 1937.57 The dramaturgical does incorporate Goffman’s ideas into
action theory, but Habermas does not extend Goffman’s conceptualization
in any way.** The only unique portion of the approach, then, is the con-
ceptualization of communicative action, which is, in reality, a perspective
for the analysis of interaction.

Habermas’s Conception of Interaction

In the analysis of communicative action, Habermas does blend elements
of George Herbert Mead’s behaviorist/interactionist approach and Alfred
Schutz’s phenomenological/interactionist ideas (see Chapter 14) with

Indeed, it is both “ideological” and “scientific” in terms of the scheme drawn in Figure
1-1.
‘Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937) does
not go much beyond Weber’s analysis.
“Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Garden City, N.Y.: Dou-
bleday Publishing, 1959).
210 CHAPTER 9 / THE CRITICAL THEORIZING OF JURGEN HABERMAS

portions of ethnomethodology (see Chapter 18) and linguistic analysis. I

have not discussed Habermas’s detailed presentation of speech processes,
but they figure prominently in his classification of types of action and
the nature of validity claims in speech acts.*® Moreover, the emphasis on
the processes of reaching understanding and intersubjectivity through
speech acts and implicit background assumptions contained in the life-
world does, I think, represent a creative synthesis of linguistics, ethno-
methodology, phenomenology, and symbolic interactionism. Speech acts
are seen as contextual or indexical in that their meaning is shaped by
implicit stocks of knowledge; and actors use these stocks to interpret each
others’ gestures and achieve a sense of intersubjectivity. There is nothing
new in the formulation as I have just stated it, but the notion that speech
acts make three types of validity claims—propositional truth, normative
appropriateness, and subjective sincerity—is a very interesting idea. That
is, Habermas is asserting that in achieving understanding and intersub-
jectivity through the contextual interpretations of speech acts, humans
make implicit validity claims along these dimensions. Furthermore, Ha-
bermas’s contention that this sense of understanding and intersubjectivity
depends upon such validity claims being made, accepted, or challenged
without recourse to autuority is, likewise, an interesting proposition. Thus,
although I am not sure that Habermas’s ideas denote how interaction
actually occurs, he has given interactionist theory some new ideas. that,
I feel, need to be considered carefully.

Habermas’s Macrosociology: System and Lifeworld

By viewing lifeworld as consisting of interpretative patterns with respect
to culture, society, and personality, Habermas has done three things. First,
he has tied Talcott Parsons’s analytical distinctions among personality,
social, and cultural systems to the process of interaction. That is, people
use linguistically articulated patterns as well as more implicit and tacit
stocks of knowledge about culture, society, and personality in their day-
to-day interactions. These distinctions are not just those of analytical
theory; they are also implicit “folk categories” of actual people and are
part of the active lifeworld among interacting and communicating actors.
Secondly, Habermas has made less mysterious and vague the lifeworld
as it has been conceptualized by phenomenologists and ethnomethodol-
ogists. It is not just an amorphous mass of implicit and tacit understand-
ings; rather, it is a series of folk ideas about several classes of phenomena—
culture (symbols), society (social organization), and personality (self and
ego).

Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, pp. 273-344.

See Chapter 3. See also Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: Free Press,
1951).
 AN ASSESSMENT OF HABERMAS'S CRITICAL THEORY AND PROJECT 211

Third, Habermas has extended and refined functionalists’ arguments

about social integration as being dependent upon value consensus and
other cultural forces, while he has synthesized them with the more pro-
cessual arguments of interactionists. By viewing the lifeworld as inter-
pretative patterns with respect to culture, society, and personality and as
the background context for speech acts and validity claims, societal in-
tegration is reconceptualized as being sustained through the active pro-
cesses of interaction that utilize and reproduce the interpretative patterns
of the lifeworid. Culture is not some ex cathedra force external to actors,
pushing and shoving them around. Instead, it is part of a more encom-
passing stock of knowledge and a crucial resource that is used in inter-
action. And in being actively used, it is reproduced in ways that allow
actors to understand each others’ subjective points of view and to coor-
dinate their actions.® As such, it has functions for sustaining the ma-
crostructures of societies.
System processes are given a rather standard interpretation of insti-
tutional structures involved in material reproduction of the species through
the institutionalization of economic, political, legal, and family activities.
But there are creative points of synthesis in Habermas’s argument when
he views lifeworld and system processes as interdependent. That is, in-
stitutionalized structures like economy and polity function better when
the behaviors that reproduce them are conducted in terms of communi-
cative interactions utilizing and reproducing the interpretative patterns
of the lifeworld. And Habermas’s view of the integrative problems of
modern societies as a decoupling of lifeworld and system is, I feel, an
interesting way to reconceptualize the basic integrative problems of dif-
ferentiated systems. For when Habermas talks about a decoupling, she is
doing more than merely restating Durkheim’s anomie thesis, Marx’s al-
ienation argument, or Parsons’s discussion of imbalances of information
or energy in his cybernetic hierarchy of control.” He is also specifying
the particular processes of interaction that are being decoupled from in-
stitutionalized patterns. In so doing, Habermas is far less vague than
notions of malintegration so typical of functional theory. He is indicating
more precisely what is being lost—certain types of speech acts involving
validity claims and discourse that utilize lifeworld processes to create the
mutual understandings that integrate the social order.

Habermas’s View of Evolution

Habermas interprets evolution in highly functional terms as a dual process
of (1) differentiation and (2) creation of integrative problems, especially

¢1Habermas has also refined Mead’s view of “role-taking” with the ‘generalized other”
in this conceptualization. See Chapter 14.
*See Chapter 3, Figure 3-7.
212 CHAPTER 9 / THE CRITICAL THEORIZING OF JURGEN HABERMAS

those of sustaining common meanings among actors in differentiated niches

in a complex society. He borrows from Durkheim’s and Parsons’ view of
evolution as a process of differentiation between and within symbolic and
structural realms, with the essential dilemma of modern societies revolv-
ing around how to put these two realms back together again so that actions
in social structures are meaningful to individuals. But unlike most fune-
tional theory, he turns to interactionism (see Chapters 14-18) for his
answer: restore the processes of communicative action, or symbolic
interaction.
My sense is that he merely restated the problem in interactionist
terms, without telling us how and through what procedures communi-
cative action is to be restored. Moreover, I agree with Niklas Luhmann’s
critique that humans do in fact reach understanding in their interactious
in complex systems dominated by the steering media of power and money.®
Habermas has, I think, a rather romanticized view of what human in-
teraction is really like and of what humans actually need in their social
relations in order to be content. He assumes incorrectly, I believe, that
the symbolic interactions that generate intersubjectivity do not occur in
structures dominated by power and money; my sense is that they do, as
is amply evidenced by studies of “the informal system” in bureaucratic
structures.
And this line of argument brings me to my last observation of Ha-
bermas’s approach. There is a kind of naive romanticism in all of his
work, from his first discussion of the public sphere to the present. He
employs a totally artificial yardstick—first the yardstick of undistorted
communication, then one on the ideal speech situation, and finally the
criterion of communicative action—for assessing what’s wrong with mod-
ern societies. When one begins the analysis of human social organization
with a set of standards that, I suspect, have never been met in human
affairs, then one’s interpretation of events will be rather dramatically
obscured. Although Habermas has blended many diverse traditions in
creative ways and offered, as I have indicated, a number of interesting
conceptual leads, I do not think that these denote the operative dynamics
of human social systems. And this is where all critical theory goes wrong—
from Marx’s dream of the communist society to Habermas’s desire for a
society integrated by communicative action. When ideology and hope for
a future society are the beginning points of analysis, I doubt if the end
points will be as accurate as would be the case if these ideological hopes
were never a part of the theoretical project. Yet, it is a credit to both
Marx’s and Habermas’s genius that, despite this great flaw, they have
both produced a body of concepts that, when stripped of the ideological
trappings, can be useful in buiiding scientific theory.

“Niklas Luhmann, The Differentiation of Society (New York: Columbia University Press,
1982). Indeed, Luhmann and Habermas have had a number of stimulating debates on the |
issue, with Luhmann emerging the victor in my opinion.
 PART THREE

Exchange Theory

10. Early Forms

of Exchange Theorizing
11. The Exchange Behaviorism
of George C. Homans
12. The Structural Exchange Theory
|of Peter M. Blau
13./ The Exchange Network Theory
of Richard Emerson

213
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 CHAPTER 10

Early Forms of
Exchange Theorizing

The intellectual linéage culminating in modern exchange theory is very

diverse. What typifies this heritage as much as its diversity are the fre-
quently vague connections between contemporary exchange theorists and
their predecessors. Indeed, I find current exchange theories to be a curious
and unspecified mixture of utilitarian economics, functional anthropology,
conflict sociology, and behavioral psychology. As a result, tracing the roots
of exchange theory is an eclectic and uncertain enterprise. At best, I can
only summarize various types of early exchange theory, leaving unan-
swered the question of how each modern theorist has drawn from this
diverse legacy.

UTILITARIANISM: THE LEGACY OF

CLASSICAL ECONOMICS
The names of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill, and Jeremy
Bentham loom large in the history of economic theorizing between 1770-
1850. Each made a unique contribution to both economic and social
thought, but I see several common assumptions in all of their works that
enable their thought to be labeled utilitarianism. For these classical econ-
omists, humans are viewed as rationally seeking to maximize their ma-
terial benefits, or utility, from transactions or exchanges with others in
a free and competitive marketplace. As rational units in a free market-
place, people have access to all necessary information, can consider all
available alternatives, and, on the basis of this consideration, rationally
select the course of activity that will maximize material benefits. Entering
215
216 CHAPTER 10 / EARLY FORMS OF EXCHANGE THEORIZING

into these rational considerations are calculations of the costs involved

in pursuing various alternatives. Such costs must be weighed against ma-
terial benefits in an effort to determine which alternative will yield the
maximum payoff or profit (benefits less costs).'
With the emergence of sociology as a self-conscious discipline, there
was considerable borrowing, revision, and reaction to this conception of
humans. In fact, the debate between the intellectual descendants of util-
itarianism and those reacting to this perspective has raged since sociol-
ogy’s inception. For example, as I outlined in Chapter 3, Talcott Parsons
attempted to reformulate utilitarian principles and weld them to other
theoretical traditions in an effort to develop a general perspective on social
action.? Similarly, modern exchange theorists have attempted to refor-
mulate utilitarian principles into various theories of social exchange.’ This
reformulation asserts the following alternative assumptions:
1. Humans do not seek to maximize profits, but they always attempt
to make some profit in their social transactions with others.
2. Humans are not perfectly rational, but they do engage in calcu-
lations of costs and benefits in social transactions.
3. Humans do not have perfect information on ail available alter-
natives, but they are usually aware of at least some alternatives,
which form the basis for assessments of costs and benefits.
4. Humans always act under constraints, but they still compete with
each other in seeking to make a profit in their transactions.
5. Humans always seek to make a profit in their transactions, but
they are limited by the resources that they have when entering an
exchange relation.
In addition to these alterations of utilitarian assumptions, exchange
theory removes human interaction from the limitations of material trans-
actions in an economic marketplace. Rather, these alternative assump-
tions are seen to apply to all social contexts. requiring that I add two
more:
6. Humans do engage in economic transactions in clearly defined
marketplaces in all societies, but these transactions are only a
special case of more general exchange relations occurring among
individuals in virtually all social contexts.

‘For interesting discussions of utilitarian thought as it bears on the present discussion,

see Elie Halevy, The Growth of Philosophical Radicalism (London: Farber & Farber, 1928):
John Plamenatz, Man and Society (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963).
?This effort continues, as we saw with Jurgen Habermas’s work in the last chapter. And
in both sociology and economics today, there is concern—excessive concern, in my view—
with the notion of “rationality.”
*The most blatant of these efforts, which I will not examine in the following chapters,
is James Coleman’s “Foundations for a Theory of Collective Decisions,” American Journal
of Sociology 71 (1966), pp. 615-27.
 EXCHANGE THEORY IN ANTHROPOLOGY 217

7. Humans do pursue material goals in exchanges, but they also mo-

bilize and exchange nonmaterial resources, such as sentiments,
services, and symbols.

Aside from this revised substantive legacy, I believe that some forms
of modern exchange theory have also adopted the strategy of the utili-
tarians for constructing social theory. In assuming humans to be rational,
utilitarians argued that exchanges among people could also be studied by
a rational science,-ene in which the “laws of human nature” would stand
at the top of a deductive system of explanation.‘ Thus, utilitarians bor-
rowed the early physical-science conception of theory as a logico-deductive
system of axioms or laws and various layers of lower-order propositions
that could be rationally deduced from the laws of ‘“‘economic man.” Thus,
most exchange theories are presented in a propositional format, typically
in what I called a formal propositional scheme in Chapter 1.
In reviewing the tenets of utilitarianism, however, I think that only
part of the historical legacy of exchange theory is revealed. For utilitar-
ianism excited considerable debate and controversy in early anthropology.
In fact, I sense that much of the influence of utilitarianism on current
exchange theory /has been indirect, passing through social anthropology
around the turn of this century.

EXCHANGE THEORY IN ANTHROPOLOGY®

Sir James Frazer (1854-1941)

In 1919, Sir James George Frazer’s second volume of Folklore in the Old
Testament conducted what was probably the first explicit exchange-
theoretic analysis of social institutions.® In examining a wide variety of
kinship and marriage practices among primitive societies, Frazer was
struck by the clear preference of Australian aborigines for cross-cousin
over parallel-cousin marriages: “Why is the marriage of cross-cousins so
often favored? Why is the marriage of ortho-cousins [that is, parallel
cousins] so uniformly prohibited?”

‘Jurgen Habermas would, of course, make this a much more complicated issue. See his
The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1981).
’For a similar treatment of these materials, see Peter Ekeh, Social Exchange Theory
and the Two Sociological Traditions (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1975).
‘Sir James George Frazer, Folklore in the Old Testament, vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan,
1919); see also his Totemism and Exogamy: A Treatise on Certain Early Forms of Super-
stition and Society (London: Dawsons of Pall Mall, 1968; original publication 1910); and
his Preface to Bronislaw Malinowski’s Argonauts of the Western Pacific (London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1922), pp. vii-xiv.
7Quote taken from Ekeh’s Social Exchange Theory, pp. 41-42, discussion of Frazer
(original quote in Frazer, Folklore, p. 199).
218 CHAPTER 10 / EARLY FORMS OF EXCHANGE THEORIZING

While the substantive details of Frazer’s descriptions of the aborig-

ines’ practices are fascinating in themselves (if only for their inaccuracy),
I think that it is the form of his explanation that marks his theoretical
contribution. In a manner clearly indebted to utilitarian economics, Frazer
launched an economic interpretation of the predominance of cross-cousin
marriage patterns. In this explanation, Frazer invoked the “law” of “‘eco-
nomic motives,” since in having “no equivalent in property to give for a
wife, an Australian aborigine is generally obliged to get her in exchange
for a female relative, usually a sister or daughter.’® Thus, the material or
economic motives of individuals in society (lack of property and desire
for a wife) explain various social patterns (cross-cousin marriages). What
is more, Frazer went on to postulate that once a particular pattern em-
anating from economic motives becomes established in a culture, it con-
strains other social patterns that can potentially emerge.
For Frazer, the social-structural patterns that come to typify a par-
ticular culture are a reflection of economic motives in humans, who, in
exchanging commodities, attempt to satisfy their basic economic needs.
Although Frazer’s specific explanation was to be found sadly wanting by
subsequent generations of anthropologists, especially Malinowski and Lévi-
Strauss, modern exchange theory in sociology invokes a similar concep-
tion of social organization:
1. Exchange processes are the result of efforts by people to realize
basic needs.
2. When yielding payoffs for those involved, exchange processes lead
to the patterning of interaction.
3. Such patterns of interaction not only serve the needs of individuals,
but they also constrain the kinds of social structures that can
subsequently emerge.
In addition to anticipating the general profile of modern explanations
on how elementary exchange processes create more complex patterns in
a society, Frazer’s analysis also foreshadowed another concern of contem-
porary exchange theory: the differentiation of social systems in terms of
privilege and power. Much as Marx had done a generation earlier, Frazer
noted that those who possess resources of high economic value can exploit
those who have few such resources, thereby enabling them to possess high
privilege and presumably power. Hence, the exchange of women among
the aborigines was observed by Frazer to lead to the differentiation of
power and privilege in at least two separate ways: First, “Since among
the Australian aboriginals women had a high economic and commercial
value, a man who had many sisters or daughters was rich and a man who
had none was poor and might be unable to procure a wife at all.’”® Second.

*Ibid., p. 195.
*Frazer, Folklore, p. 198.
 EXCHANGE THEORY IN ANTHROPOLOGY 219

“the old men availed themselves of the system of exchange in order to

procure a number of wives for themselves from among the young women,
while the young men having no women to give in exchange, were often
obliged to remain single or to put up with the cast-off wives of their
elders.’’!° Thus, at least implicitly, Frazer supplemented the conflict the-
ory contribution with a fourth exchange principle:
4. Exchange processes operate to differentiate groups in terms of their
relative access to valued commodities, resulting in differences in
power, prestige, and privilege.
As provocative and seemingly seminal as Frazer’s analysis appears, I
doubt if it had a direct impact on modern exchange theory. Rather, it is
to those in anthropology who reacted against Frazer’s utilitarianism that
contemporary theory remains indebted.

Bronislaw Malinowski and Nonmaterial Exchange

Despite Malinowski’s close ties with Frazer, he developed an exchange
perspective that radically altered the utilitarian slant of Frazer’s analysis
of cross-cousin marriage. Indeed, Frazer himself in his preface to Mali-
nowski’s Argonauts of the Western Pacific recognized the importance of
Malinowski’s contribution to the analysis of exchange relations.'! In his
now-famous ethnography of the Trobriand Islanders—a group of South
Seas Island cultures—Malinowski observed an exchange system termed
the Kula Ring, a closed circle of exchange relations among individuals in
communities inhabiting a wide ring of islands.!2 What was distinctive in
this closed circle, Malinowski observed, was the predominance of ex-
change of two articles—armlets and necklaces—which the inhabitants con-
stantly exchanged-in opposite directions. Traveling one direction around
the Kula Ring, armlets were exchanged for necklaces moving in the op-
posite direction around the ring. In any particular exchange between in-
dividuals, then, an armlet would always be exchanged for a necklace.
In interpreting this unique exchange network, Malinowski was led to
distinguish material or economic from nonmaterial or symbolic exchanges.
In contrast with the utilitarians and Frazer, who did not conceptualize
nonmaterial exchange relations, Malinowski recognized that the Kula was
not only an economic or material exchange network but also a symbolic
exchange, cementing a web of social relationships: “One transaction does
not finish the Kula relationship, the rule being ‘once in the Kula, always
in the Kula,’ and a partnership between two men is a permanent and

bid., pp. 200-201.

Frazer, Preface to Argonouts (see note 12).
2Bronislaw Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacific (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1922), p. 81.
220 CHAPTER 10 / EARLY FORMS OF EXCHANGE THEORIZING

lifelong affair.”!* Although purely economic transactions did occur within

the rules of the Kula, the ceremonial exchange of armlets and necklaces
was observed by Malinowski to be the Kula’s principle function.
The natives themselves, Malinowski emphasized, recognized the dis-
tinction between purely economic commodities and the symbolic signif-
icance of armlets and necklaces. However, to distinguish economic from
symbolic commodities does not mean that the Trobriand Islanders failed
to assign graded values to the symbolic commodities; indeed, they made
gradations and used them to express and confirm the nature of the re-
lationships among exchange partners as equals, superordinates, or sub-
ordinates. But.as Malinowski noted, “‘in all forms of [Kula] exchange in
the Trobriands, there is not even a trace of gain, nor is there any reason:
for looking at it from the purely utilitarian and economic standpoint,
since there is no enhancement of mutual utility through the exchange.’
Rather, the motives behind the Kula were social psychological, for the
exchanges in the ring were viewed by Malinowski to have implications
for the needs of both individuals and society (recall from Chapter 2 that
Malinowski was also a founder of functional theory). From Malinowski’s
functionalist framework, he interpreted the Kula to mean “the funda-
mental impulse to display, to share, to bestow [and] the deep tendency
to create social ties.”!® For Malinowski, then, an enduring social pattern
such as the Kula Ring is considered to have positively functional con-
sequences for satisfying individual psychological needs and societal needs
for social integration and solidarity.
As Robert Merton and others were to emphasize (see Chapter 4), this
form of functional analysis presents many logical difficulties. Despite these,
I believe that Malinowski’s analysis made several enduring contributions
to modern exchange theory:

1. In Malinowski’s words, “‘the meaning of the Kula will consist in

being instrumental to dispel [the] conception of a rational being
who wants nothing but to satisfy his simplest needs and does it
according to the economic principle of least effort.’’®
2. Psychological rather than economic needs are the forces that in-
itiate and sustain exchange relations and are therefore critical in
the explanation of social behavior.
3. Exchange relations can also have implications beyond two parties,
for as the Kula demonstrates, complex patterns of indirect ex-
change can operate to maintain extended and protracted social
networks.

3]bid., pp. 82-83.

“Tbid., p. 175.
STbid., p. 175.
'*Tbid., p. 516.
 EXCHANGE THEORY IN ANTHROPOLOGY 221

4. Symbolic exchange relations are the basic social process underlying

both differentiation of ranks in a society and the integration of
society into a cohesive and solidary whole.
With these points of emphasis, Malinowski helped free exchange the-
ory from the limiting confines of utilitarianism. By stressing the impor-
tance of symbolic exchanges for both individual psychological processes
and patterns of social integration, he anticipated the conceptual base for
two basic types of exchange perspectives, one emphasizing the importance
of psychological processes and the other stressing the significance of emer-
gent cultural and structural forces on exchange relations.

Marcel Mauss and the Emergence of

Exchange Structuralism
Reacting to what he perceived as Malinowski’s tendency to overemphasize
psychological instead of social needs, Marcel Mauss reinterpreted Mali-
nowski’s analysis of the Kula.!” In this effort, he formulated the broad
outlines of a “collectivistic,” or structural exchange, perspective.'® For
Mauss, the critical question in examining an exchange network as complex
as that of the Kula was:
In primitive or archaic types of societies what is the principle whereby
the gift received has to be repaid? What force is there in the thing which
compels the recipient to make a return?’®

The “force” compelling reciprocity was, for Mauss, society or the

group. As he noted: “It is groups, and not individuals, which carry on
exchange, make contracts, and are bound by obligations.’° The individ-
uals actually engaged in an exchange represent the moral codes of the
group. Exchange transactions among individuals are conducted in ac-
cordance with the rules of the group, while reinforcing these rules and

1™Marcel Mauss, The Gift, trans. I. Cunnison (New York: Free Press, 1954; originally
published as Essai sur le don en sociologie et anthropologie [Paris: Presses universitaires
de France, 1925]). It should be noted that Mauss rather consistently misinterpreted Mali-
nowski’s ethnography, but it is through such misinterpretation that he came to visualize a
“structural” alternative to “psychological” exchange theories.
18Jn Peter Ekeh’s excellent discussion of Mauss and Lévi-Strauss (Social Exchange The-
ory, pp. 55-122), the term collectivist is used in preference to structural and is posited as
the alternative to individualistic or psychological exchange perspectives. I prefer the terms
structural and psychological; thus, although I am indebted to Ekeh’s discussion, these terms
will be used to make essentially the same distinction. My preference for these terms will
become more evident in subsequent chapters, since in contrast with Ekeh’s analysis, I
consider Peter M. Blau and George C. Homans to have developed, respectively, structural
and psychological theories. Ekeh considers the theories of both Blau and Homans to be
individualistic, or psychological.
Mauss, The Gift, p. 1.
*Ibid., p. 3.
222 CHAPTER 10 / EARLY FORMS OF EXCHANGE THEORIZING

codes. Thus, for Mauss, the over-concern with individuals’ self-interests

by utilitarians and the overemphasis on psychological needs by Mali-
nowski are replaced by a conception of individuals as representatives of
social groups. In the end, exchange relations create, reinforce, and serve
a group morality that is an entity sui generis, to borrow a famous phrase
from Mauss’s mentor, Emile Durkheim. Furthermore, in a vein similar
to that of Frazer, once such a morality emerges and is reinforced by
exchange activities, it comes to regulate other activities in the social life
of a group, above and beyond particular exchange transactions.
Mauss’s work has received scant attention from sociologists, but I see
him as the first to forge a reconciliation between the exchange principles
of utilitarianism and the structural, or collectivistic, thought of Durkheim.
In recognizing that exchange transactions give rise to and, at the same
time, reinforce the normative structure of society, Mauss anticipated the
structural position of some contemporary exchange theories. Mauss’s in-
fluence on modern theory has been indirect, however, for I think that it
is through the structuralism of Claude Lévi-Strauss that the French col-
lectivist tradition of Durkheim and Mauss influenced the exchange per-
spectives of contemporary sociological theory.

Claude Lévi-Strauss and Structuralism

In 1949, Claude Lévi-Strauss launched an analysis of cross-cousin mar-
riage in his classic work, The Elementary Structures of Kinship.?! In
restating Durkheim’s objections to utilitarians, Lévi-Strauss took excep-
tion to Frazer’s utilitarian interpretation of cross-cousin marriage pat-
terns. And in a manner similar to Mauss’s opposition to Malinowski’s
emphasis on psychological needs, Lévi-Strauss developed a sophisticated
structural-exchange perspective.”
In rejecting Frazer’s interpretation of cross-cousin marriage, Lévi-
Strauss first questions the substance of Frazer’s utilitarian conceptuali-
zation. Frazer, he notes, “depicts the poor Australian aborigine wondering
how he is going to obtain a wife since he has no material goods with
which to purchase her, and discovering exchange as the solution to this
apparently insoluble problem: ‘men exchange their sisters in marriage
because that was the cheapest way of getting a wife.’ ”’ In contrast, Lévi-
Strauss emphasizes that “it is the exchange which counts and not the

"Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Elementary Structures of Kinship (Boston: Beacon Press.

1969). This is a translation of Lévi-Strauss’s 1967 revision of the original Les structures
élémentaires de la parenté (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1949). The full impact
of this work was probably never felt in sociology, since until 1969 it was not available in
English. Yet, as will be noted in Chapter 11 on Homans, this work did have a profound
impact on Homans’s thinking, primarily because Homans felt compelled to reject Lévi-
Strauss’s analysis. I will examine Lévi-Strauss’s work again in Chapter 19.
*See Ekeh’s discussions for a more detailed analysis of Lévi-Strauss.
 EXCHANGE THEORY IN ANTHROPOLOGY 223

things exchanged.” For Lévi-Strauss, exchange must be viewed in terms

of its functions for integrating the larger social structure. Lévi-Strauss
then attacks Frazer’s and the utilitarian’s assumption that the first prin-
ciples of social behavior are economic. Such an assumption flies in the
face of the fact that social structure is an emergent phenomenon that
operates in terms of its own irreducible laws and principles.
Lévi-Strauss also rejects psychological interpretations of exchange
processes, especially the position advocated by behaviorists (see later sec-
tion). In contrast with psychological behaviorists, who see little real dif-
ference between the laws of behavior among animals and humans, Leévi-
Strauss emphasizes that humans possess a cultural heritage of norms and
values that separates their behavior and societal organization from that
of animal species. Human action is thus qualitatively different from an-
imal behavior, especially with respect to social exchange. Animals are not
guided by values and rules that specify when, where, and how they are
to carry out social! transactions. Humans, however, carry with them into
any exchange situation learned definitions of how they are to behave—
thus assuring that the principles of human exchange will be distinctive.
Furthermore, exchange is more than the result of psychological needs,
even those that have been acquired through socialization. Exchange can-
not be understood solely in terms of individual motives, because exchange
relations are a reflection of patterns of social organization that exist as
an entity, sui generis. Exchange behavior is thus regulated from without
by norms and values, resulting in processes that can only be analyzed in
terms of their consequences, or functions, for these norms and values.
In arguing this point of view, Lévi-Strauss posits several fundamental
exchange principles. First, all exchange relations involve costs for indi-
viduals, but in contrast with economic or psychological explanations of
exchange, such costs are attributed to society—to those customs, rules,
laws, and values that require behaviors incurring costs. Yet, individuals
do not assign the costs to themselves, but to the “social order.” Second,
for all those scarce and valued resources in society—whether material
objects, such as wives, or symbolic resources, like esteem and prestige—
their distribution is regulated by norms and values. As long as resources
are in abundant supply or not highly valued in a society, their distribution
goes unregulated, but once they become scarce and highly valued, their
distribution is soon regulated. Third, all exchange relations are governed
by a norm of reciprocity, requiring those receiving valued sources to be-
stow on their benefactors other valued resources. In Lévi-Strauss’s con-
ception of reciprocity there are various patterns of reciprocation specified
by norms and values. In some situations, norms dictate “mutual” and
direct rewarding of one’s benefactor, whereas in other situations the re-
ciprocity can be “univocal” involving diverse patterns of indirect exchange
in which actors do not reciprocate directly but only through various third
(fourth, fifth, and so forth) parties. Within these two general types of
224 CHAPTER 10 / EARLY FORMS OF EXCHANGE THEORIZING

exchange reciprocity—mutual and univocal—numerous subtypes of ex-

change networks can be normatively regulated.
For Lévi-Strauss, these three exchange principles offer a more useful
set of concepts to describe cross-cousin marriage patterns, because they
can now be viewed in terms of their functions for the larger social struc-
ture. Particular marriage patterns and other features of kinship organi-
zation no longer need be interpreted merely as direct exchanges among
individuals, but can be conceptualized as univocal exchanges between
individuals and society. In freeing exchange from the analysis of only
direct and mutual exchanges, Lévi-Strauss offers a tentative theory of
societal integration and solidarity. His explanation extends Durkheim’s
provocative analysis and indicates how various subtypes of direct and
univocal exchange both reflect and reinforce different patterns of societal
integration and organization.
This theory of integration is, in itself, of theoretical importance. But
I think it more significant for present purposes to stress Lévi-Strauss’s
impact on current sociological exchange perspectives. My sense is that
two points of emphasis exerted strong influence on modern sociological
theory.

1. Various forms of social structure rather than individual motives

are the critical variables in the analysis of exchange relations.
2. Exchange relations in social systems are frequently not restricted
to direct interaction among individuals, but protracted into com-
plex networks of indirect exchange. On the one hand, these ex-
change processes are caused by patterns of social integration and
organization; on the other hand, they promote diverse forms of
such organization.

In looking back on this anthropological heritage, I believe that Lévi-

Strauss’s work represents the culmination of a reaction to economic util-
itarianism as it was originally incorporated into anthropology by Frazer.
Malinowski recognized the limitations of Frazer’s analysis of only material
or economic motives in direct exchange transactions. As the Kula Ring
demonstrates, exchange can be generalized into protracted networks in-
volving noneconomic motives that have implications for societal integra-
tion. Mauss drew explicit attention to the significance of social structure
in regulating exchange processes and to the consequences of such pro-
cesses for maintaining social structure. Finally, in this intellectual chain
of events in anthropology, Lévi-Strauss began to indicate how different
types of direct and indirect exchange are linked to different patterns of
social organization. This intellectual heritage has influenced both the
substance and strategy of exchange theory in sociology, but it has done
so only after considerable modification of assumptions and concepts by
a particular strain of psychology: behaviorism.
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BEHAVIORISM AND EXCHANGE THEORY 225

PSYCHOLOGICAL BEHAVIORISM AND

EXCHANGE THEORY
As a psychological perspective, behaviorism began from insights derived
from observations of an accident. The Russian physiologist Ivan Petrov-
ich Pavlov (1849-1936) discovered that experimental dogs associated food
with the person bringing it.2? He observed, for instance, that dogs on
whom he was performing secretory experiments would salivate not only
when presented food but also when they heard their feeder’s footsteps
approaching. After considerable delay and personal agonizing, Pavlov un-
dertook a series of experiments on animals to understand such “condi-
tioned responses.” From these experiments, he developed several prin-
ciples that later were to be incorporated into behaviorism. These include:
(1) A stimulus consistently associated with another stimulus producing
a given physiological response will, by itself, elicit that response. (2) Such
conditioned responses can be extinguished when gratifications associated
with stimuli are no longer forthcoming. (3) Stimuli that are similar to
those producing a conditioned response can also elicit the same response
as the original stimulus. (4) Stimuli that increasingly differ from those
used to condition a particular response will decreasingly be able to elicit
this response. Thus, Pavlov’s experiments exposed the principles of con-
ditioned responses, extinction, response generalization, and response dis-
crimination. Although Pavlov clearly recognized the significance of these
findings of human behavior, his insights came to fruition in America under
the tutelage of Edward Thorndike and John B. Watson—the founders of
behaviorism.”
Edward Lee Thorndike conducted the first laboratory experiments
on animals in America. In the course of these experiments, he observed
that animals would retain response patterns for which they are rewarded.”
For example, in experiments on kittens placed in a puzzle box, Thorndike
found that they would engage in trial-and-error behavior until emitting
the response that allowed them to escape. And with each placement in
the box, the kittens would engage in less trial-and-error behavior, thereby
indicating that the gratifications associated with a response allowing the
kittens to escape caused them to learn and retain this response. From
these and other studies, which were conducted at the same time as Pavlov’s,

See, for relevant articles, lectures, and references, I. P. Pavlov, Selected Works, ed. K.
S. Kostoyants, trans. S. Belsky (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1955); and
Lectures on Conditioned Reflexes, 3d ed., trans. W. H. Grant (New York: International
Publishers, 1928).
41. P, Pavlov, “Autobiography” in Selected Works, pp. 41-44.
%F or an excellent summary of their ideas, see Robert I. Watson, The Great Psychologists,
3d ed. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1971), pp. 417-46.
#*Edward L. Thorndike, “Animal Intelligence: An Experimental Study of the Associative
Processes in Animals,” Psychological Review Monograph, Supplement 2 (1898).
226 CHAPTER 10 / EARLY FORMS OF EXCHANGE THEORIZING

Thorndike formulated three principles or laws: (1) the “law of effect,”

which holds that acts in a situation producing gratification will be more
likely to occur in the future when that situation recurs; (2) the “law of
use,” which states that situation-response connection is strengthened with
repetitions and practice; and (3) the “law of disuse,” which argues that
the connection will weaken when practice is discontinued.?’
These laws converge with those presented by Pavlov, but there is one
impcrtant difference. Thorndike’s experiments involved animals engaged
in free trial-and-error behavior, whereas Pavlov’s work was on the con-
ditioning of physiological—typically glandular—responses in a tightly con-
trolled laboratory situation. Thorndike’s work could thus be seen as more
directly relevant to human behavior in natural settings.
John B. Watson was one of only several thinkers to recognize the
significance of Pavlov’s and Thorndike’s work, but he soon became the
dominant advocate of what was becoming explicitly known as behavior-
ism.”* Watson’s opening shot for the new science of behavior was fired
in an article entitled “Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It”:

Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a purely objective experimental

branch of natural science. Its theoretical goal is the prediction and control
of behavior. Introspection forms no essential part of its methods, nor is the
scientific value of its data dependent upon the readiness with which they lend
themselves to interpretation in terms of consciousness. The behaviorist, in
efforts to get a unitary scheme of animal response, recognizes no dividing
line between man and brute.”

Watson thus became the advocate of the extreme behaviorism against

which many vehemently reacted.*° For Watson, psychology is the study
of stimulus-response relations, and the only admissible evidence is overt
behavior. Psychologists are to stay out of the “mystery box” of human
consciousness and to study only observable behaviors as they are con-
nected to observable stimuli.”

See Edward L. Thorndike, The Elements of Psychology (New York: Seiler, 1905), The
Fundamentals of Learning (New York: Teachers College Press, 1932), and The Psychology
of Wants, Interests, and Attitudes (New York: D. Appleton, 1935).
*Others who recognized their importance included: Max F. Meyer, Psychology of the
Other-One (Columbus: Missouri Book, 1921); and Albert P. Weiss, A Theoretical Basis of
Human Behavior (Columbus: Adams Press, 1925).
*J. B. Watson, “Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It,” Psychological Review 20 (1913),
pp. 158-77. For other basic works by Watson, see Psychology from the Standpoint of a
Behaviorist, 3d ed. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1929); Behavior: An Introduction to
Comparative Psychology (New York: Henry Holt, 1914).
*For example, in his Mind, Self, and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1934), Mead has 18 references to Watson's work.
“For a more detailed discussion of the emergence of behaviorism, see Jonathan H. Turner
= Leonard Beeghley, The Emergence of Sociological Theory (Homewood, Ill: Dorsey
ress, 1981).
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BEHAVIORISM AND EXCHANGE THEORY 227

In many ways, I see behaviorism as similar to utilitarianism, since it

operates on the principle that humans are reward-seeking organisms that
pursue alternatives that will yield the most reward and the least punish-
ment. Rewards are simply another way of phrasing the economist’s con-
cept of “utility,” and “punishment” is somewhat equivalent to the notion
of ‘“‘cost.”’ For the behaviorist, reward is any behavior that reinforces or
meets the needs of the organism, whereas punishment denies rewards or
forces the expenditure of energy to avoid pain (thereby incurring costs).
Modern exchange theories have borrowed from behaviorists the no-
tion of reward and used it to reinterpret the utilitarian exchange heritage.
In place of utility, the concept of reward has been inserted, primarily
because it allows exchange theorists to view behavior as motivated by
psychological needs. However, the utilitarian concept of cost appears to
have been retained in preference to the behaviorist’s formulation of pun-
ishment, since the notion of cost allows exchange theorists to visualize
more completely the alternative rewards that organisms forego in seeking
to achieve a particular reward.
Despite these modifications of the basic concepts of behaviorism, its
key theoretical generalizations have been incorporated with relatively lit-
tle change into some forms of sociological exchange theory. Let me list
these:
1. In any given situation, organisms will emit those behaviors that
will yield the most reward and least punishment.
2. Organisms will repeat those behaviors that have proved rewarding
in the past.
3. Organisms will repeat behaviors in situations that are similar to
those in the past in which behaviors were rewarded.
4. Present stimuli that on past occasions have been associated with
rewards will evoke behaviors similar to those emitted in the past.
5. Repetition of behaviors will occur only as long as they continue
to yield rewards.
6. An organism will display emotion if a behavior that has previously
been rewarded in the same or similar situation suddenly goes
unrewarded.
7. The more an organism receives rewards from a particular behavior,
the less rewarding that behavior becomes (due to satiation) and
the more likely is the organism to emit alternative behaviors in
search of other rewards. :

Since these principles were discovered in laboratory situations where

experimenters typically manipulated the environment of the organism, it
is difficult to visualize the experimental situation as interaction. The
experimenter’s tight control of the situation precludes the possibility that
the animal will affect significantly the responses of the experimenter. This
fact has forced modern exchange theories using behaviorist principles to
228 CHAPTER 10 / EARLY FORMS OF EXCHANGE THEORIZING

incorporate the utilitarian’s concern with transactions, or exchanges. In

this way, humans can be seen as mutually affecting each other’s oppor-
tunities for rewards. In contrast to animals in a Skinner box or some
similar laboratory situation, humans exchange rewards. Each person rep-
resents a potentially rewarding stimulus situation for the other.
As sociological exchange theorists have attempted to apply behav-
iorist principles to the study of human behavior, they have inevitably
confronted the problem of the black box: humans differ from laboratory
animals in their greater ability to engage in a wide variety of complex
cognitive processes. Indeed, as the utilitarians were the first to emphasize,
what is distinctly human is the capacity to abstract, to calculate, to project
outcomes, to weigh alternatives, and to perform a wide number of other
cognitive manipulations. Furthermore, in borrowing behaviorist’s con-
cepts, contemporary exchange theorists have also had to introduce the
concepts of an introspective psychology and structural sociology. Humans
not only think in complex ways; their thinking is emotional and circum-
scribed by many social and cultural forces (first incorporated into the
exchange theories of Mauss and Lévi-Strauss). Once it is recognized that
behaviorist principles must incorporate concepts denoting both internal
psychological processes and constraints of social structure and culture, it
is also necessary to visualize exchange as frequently transcending the
mutually rewarding activities of individuals in direct interaction. The
organization of behavior by social structure and culture, coupled with
humans’ complex cognitive abilities, allows protracted and indirect ex-
change networks to exist.
In looking back upon the impact of behaviorism on some forms of
contemporary exchange theory, then, I see a convergence of concepts and
principles. Although the vocabulary and general principles of behaviorism
are clearly evident, the concepts have been redefined and the principles
altered to incorporate the insights of the early utilitarians as well as the
anthropological reaction to utilitarianism. The end result has been for
proponents of an exchange perspective employing behaviorist concepts
and principles to abandon much of what made behaviorism a unique
perspective as they have dealt with the complexities introduced by human
cognitive capacities and their organization into sociocultural groupings.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL TRADITION AND

EXCHANGE THEORY
Thus far, I have concentrated on the influence of conceptual work in
economics, anthropology, and psychology on exchange theory. The vo-
cabulary of exchange theory clearly comes from utilitarianism and be-
haviorism. Anthropological work forced the recognition that cultural and
social dynamics need to be incorporated into exchange theory. When
looking at early sociological work, however, the impact of early sociological
 THE SOCIOLOGICAL TRADITION AND EXCHANGE THEORY 229

theorists on modern exchange theory is difficult to assess. I think that

this difficulty is the result of several factors. First, much sociological
theory represented a reaction against utilitarianism and extreme behav-
iorism and, therefore, has been reluctant to incorporate concepts from
these fields. Second, the most developed of the early exchange theories—
that provided by Georg Simmel in his The Philosophy of Money—re-
mained untranslated into English until recent years.*? Yet, I suspect that
_German-reading theorists, such as Peter Blau and Talcott Parsons, were
to some degree influenced by Simmel’s ideas. Third, the topics of most
interests to many sociological exchange theorists—differentiations of power
and conflict in exchanges—have more typically been conceptualized as
conflict theory than exchange theory. But as I will document, sociological
theories of exchange converge with those on conflict processes; and I have
little doubt that Marx’s ideas exerted considerable influence on modern
exchange theories.
Thus, while I am not sure of the exact lines of influence, I think that
Marx’s and Simmel’s work has been involved—perhaps only subliminally—
in the development of sociological exchange theory. Let me draw out this
line of argument for Marx and then for Simmel.

Marx’s Theory of Exchange and Conflict

Most contemporary theories of exchange examine the dynamics of ex-
change that follow from the fact that actors typically have unequal levels
of resources with which to bargain. Those with resources valued by others
are in a position to strike a better bargain, especially if those others who
value their. resource do not possess equally valued resources to offer in
exchange. This fact of social life is, I feel, the situation described in Marx’s
conflict theory.** Capitalists have the power to control the distribution
of material rewards, whereas all that workers have is their labor to offer
in exchange. Although labor is valued by the capitalist, it is in plentiful
supply, and thus, no one worker is in a position to bargain effectively
with an employer. As a consequence, capitalists can get labor at a low
cost and can force workers to do what they want. As capitalists press
their advantage, they create the very conditions that allow workers to
develop resources—political, organizational, ideological—which they can
then use to strike a better bargain with capitalists and, in the end, to
overthrow them. .
- Granted, I am simplifying Marx’s implicit exchange: theory, but my
point is clear: dialectical conflict theory is, I think, a variety of exchange
theory. Let me list some of these exchange dynamics more explicitly:

Georg Simmel, The Philosophy of Money, trans. T. Bottomore and D. Frisby (Boston:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978; originally published in 1907).
%See Chapter 6.
230 CHAPTER 10 / EARLY FORMS OF EXCHANGE THEORIZING

1. Those who need scarce and valued resources that others possess
but who do not have equally valued and scarce resources to offer
in return will be dependent upon those who control these resources.
2. Those who control valued resources have power over those who
do not. That is, the power of one actor over another is directly
related to (a) the capacity of one actor to monopolize the valued
resources needed by other actors and (b) the inability of those
actors who need these resources to offer equally valued and scarce
resources in return.
3. Those with power will press their advantage and will try to extract
more resources from those dependent upon them in exchange for
fewer (or the same level) of the resources that they control.
4. Those who press their advantage in this way will create conditions
that encourage those who are dependent on them to (a) organize
in ways that increase the value of their resources and, failing this,
to (b) organize in ways that enable them to coerce those on whom
they are dependent.

If the words capitalist and proletarian are inserted at the appropriate

places in the above list, I think that Marx’s exchange model becomes
readily apparent. Dialectical conflict theory is thus a series of propositions
about exchange dynamics in systems where the distribution of resources
is unequal. And, as I think will become evident in the next chapters,
sociological exchange theories have emphasized these dynamics that in-
here in the unequal distribution of resources. Such is, I feel, Marx’s major
contribution to exchange theory.

Georg Simmel’s Exchange Theory

In Georg Simmel’s The Philosophy of Money*4 is a critique of Marx’s
“value theory of labor”* and, in its place, a clear exposition of exchange
theory. Since this important work remained untranslated until recently,
I am not sure just how much influence it had on sociological exchange
theory. Yet, since a number of exchange theorists are fluent in German,
I suspect that Simmel’s work has shaped modern exchange theory more
than is commonly realized or acknowledged.
The Philosophy of Money is, as its title indicates, about the impact
of money on social relations and social structure. I need not go into the
details of Simmel’s insightful analysis and critique of Marx for our present
purposes. I only want to extract the purely exchange-theoretic principles

“Simmel, The Philosophy.

“Ibid. Simmel did not see value as inhering in “labor power,” but it is what people
desired and the level of scarcity in what they desired.
 THE SOCIOLOGICAL TRADITION AND EXCHANGE THEORY 231

from Simmel’s discussion. For Simmel, social exchange involves the fol-
lowing elements:
1. The desire for a valued object that one does not have.
2. The possession of the valued object by an identifiable other.
3. The offer of an object of value to secure from another the desired
object.
4. The acceptance of this offer by the possessor of the valued object.°°
Contained iftthis portrayal of social exchange are several additional
points that Simmel emphasized. First, value is idiosyncratic and is, ul-
timately, tied to an individual’s impulses and needs. Of course, what is
defined as valuable is typically circumscribed by cultural and social pat-
terns, but how valuable an object is will be a positive function of (a) the
intensity of a person’s needs and (b) the scarcity of the object. Second,
much exchange involves efforts to manipulate situations so that the in-
tensity of needs for an object are concealed and the availability of an
object is made to seem less than what it actually is. Inherent in exchange,
therefore, is a basic tension that can often erupt into other social forms,
such as conflict. Third, to possess an object is to lessen its value and to
increase the value of objects that one does not possess. Fourth, exchanges
will only occur if both parties perceive that the object given is less valuable
than the one received.*” Fifth, collective units as well as individuals par-
ticipate in exchange relations and, hence, are subject to the four processes
listed above. Sixth, the more liquid the resources of an actor in an ex-
change—that is, the more that resources can be used in many types of
exchanges—the greater will be that actor’s options and power. For if an
actor is not bound to exchange with any other and can readily withdraw
resources and exchange them with another, then that actor has consid-
erable power to manipulate any exchange.
Economic exchange involving money is only one case of this more
general social form. But it is a very special case. For when money becomes
the predominate means for establishing value in social relationships, the
properties and dynamics of social relations are transformed. This process
of displacing other criteria of value, such as logic, ethics, and aesthetics,
with a monetary criterion is precisely the long-term evolutionary trend
in societies. This trend is, as I mentioned earlier, both a cause and effect
of money as the medium of exchange. Money emerged to facilitate ex-
changes and to realize even more completely humans’ basic needs. But

%Simmel, The Philosophy, pp. 85-88.

"Surprisingly, Simmel did not explore in any great detail the consequences of unbalanced
exchanges, where people are forced to give up a more valuable object for a less valuable one.
Simmel simply assumed that at the time of exchange, one party felt that an increase in
value had occurred. Retrospectively, a redefinition may occur, but the exchange would not
occur if at the moment people did not perceive that they had received more value than they
had given up.
232 CHAPTER 10 / EARLY FORMS OF EXCHANGE THEORIZING

e
a

TABLE 10-1 Georg Simmel’s Exchange Principles

The Attraction Principle

|. The more actors perceive as valuable each other's respective resources, the
more likely is an exchange relationship to develop among these actors.
The Value Principle
ll. The greater is the intensity of an actor’s needs for a resource of a given type,
and the less available is that resource, the greater is the value of that resource
to the actor.
The Power Principle
Ill. The more an actor perceives as valuable the resources of another actor, the
greater is the power of the latter over the former.
IV. The more liquid are an actor's resources, the greater will be the exchange
options and alternatives, and hence, the greater will be the power of that actor
in social exchanges.
The Tension Principle
V. The more actors in a social exchange manipulate the situation in an effort to
misrepresent their needs for a resource and/or conceal the availability of
resources, the greater is the level of tension in that exchange and the greater is
the potential for conflict.

once established, the use of money has the power to transform the struc-
ture of social relations in society.
Thus, the key insight in The Philosophy of Money is that the use of
different criteria for assessing value has an enormous impact on the form
of social relations. Thus, as money replaces barter and other criteria for
determining values, social relations are fundamentally changed. But they
are transformed in accordance with some basic principles of social ex-
change, which are never codified by Simmel but which, as I have indicated
above, are very clear. In Table 10-1, I have codified these ideas into
abstract exchange principles, because I see them as the basic processes
depicted in sociological analysis of exchange. At. the risk of repeating
myself, let me summarize again the ideas behind the propositions. Prin-
ciple I states that interaction occurs because actors value each other’s
resources, and in accordance with Principle II, value is a dual function
of (a) actors’ needs for resources and (b) the scarcity of resources. Prin-
ciples III and IV underscore the fact that power is a part of the exchange
process. Actors who have resources that others value are in a position to
extract compliance from those seeking these resources (Principle III), and
actors who have liquid or generalized resources, such as money, will be
more likely to have power, since liquid resources can be more readily
exchanged with alternative actors. Principle V states that as actors seek
to manipulate situations in order to conceal the availability of resources
and their needs for resources, tensions are created, and these tensions can
result in conflict.
 MODERN EXCHANGE THEORY: A PREVIEW 233

MODERN EXCHANGE THEORY: A PREVIEW

Exchange theory is now one of the most prominent theoretical perspec-
tives in sociology. A number of exchange perspectives have emerged in
recent decades. Typically, they begin with inspiration from either the
behaviorist tradition in psychology or the utilitarian heritage in economic
theory. But as we will observe, these two traditions merge in modern
exchange theory, especially as they deal with the related issues of ine-
quality, power, and conflict.
In the chapters to follow, I will begin with the behavioristic approach
of George C. Homans, and then, I will examine the more economic strategy
of Peter M. Blau. As I believe will become clear, these two theorists begin
at somewhat different places, and they advocate varying theoretical strat-
egies, but I see their ideas as converging around the questions of tension
and conflict in exchange systems. I will close with the network exchange
approach of the late Richard Emerson and his frequent coauthor Karen
Cook. Borrowing from behaviorism but extending Simmel’s analysis of
social forms, they have given theoretical underpinnings to network so-
ciology. These three approaches offer,I feel, the best of the contemporary
exchange theories. |
 CHAPTER 11

____ The Exchange Behaviorism —__

of George C. Homans.

One of the most prominent theorists of this century is George C. Homans,

who, in recent decades, has advocated an exchange theoretic approach
that borrows key concepts and propositions from behavioristic psychol-
ogy.! Homans’s early work emphasized “what people do” and “‘how they
behave” in concrete settings, but it was highly inductive. It stressed pull-
ing from empirical contexts generalizations in an effort to tie theory to
ongoing social processes. But as I emphasized in Chapter 1, empirical
generalizations are not theory; rather, they are what a theory is supposed
to explain. And so, as Homans sought to explain a variety of empirical
findings and generalizations, he shifted to a more deductive theoretical
strategy. He labels this strategy axiomatic, but as I indicated in Chapter
1, axiomatic theorizing in sociology is not really possible. A better name
is formal theorizing where the strict requirements of axiomatic theory
are relaxed. But the basic idea is the same: to make deductions from
abstract principles to empirical generalizations; and to the extent that
the abstract statement subsumes or “covers” the empirical generalization,
then the abstract statement explains the generalization (consult Figure
1-4).
I think that Homans’s transition from empirical generalizations to
deductive explanations is instructive. For as I argued in Chapter 1, one
does not mechanically generalize from empirical findings to abstract laws.
Empirical generalizations always have contextual content; and it is not

‘I would like to thank George C. Homans for his constructive criticisms of this chapter
as it appeared in an earlier edition of this book.

234
 THE EARLY INDUCTIVE STRATEGY 235

easy to simply raise the level of abstract and create abstract theory. Rather,
a creative leap in abstraction is necessary, and then, armed with more
abstract principles, one makes deductions back down to empirical gen-
eralizations. Homans’s “creative leap” involved borrowing from behav-
ioristic psychology, and so, perhaps I should view his exchange work as
creative borrowing. Nonetheless, Homans recognized that induction from
empirical contexts can only go so far; at some point, one must construct
deductive propositional schemes to explain what one has induced from
these contexts.

THE EARLY INDUCTIVE STRATEGY

By 1950, with the publication of The Human Group, Homans’s work
revealed a clear commitment to an inductive strategy for building so-
ciological theory.” In studies ranging from the analysis of a work group
in a factory and a street gang to the kinship system of a primitive society
and the structure of an entire New England community, he stressed the
importance of observing people’s actual behaviors and activities in various
types of groups. By observing what people actually do, it is possible to
develop concepts that are attached to the ongoing processes of social
systems. Such concepts are termed by Homans first-order abstractions,
since they merely represent names that observers use to signify a single
class of observations in a group. Homans chose these words carefully. He
wanted to emphasize their difference from the “second-order abstrac-
tions” commonly employed by sociologists. As distinct from the abstrac-
tions he prefers, second-order abstractions refer to several classes of ob-
servations and are thereby somewhat detached from ongoing events in
actual groups. For example, ‘“‘status” and “role” are favorite concepts used
by sociologists to denote processes in groups, but upon careful reflection,
it is evident that one does not observe directly a status or role; rather,
they are highly abstract names that subsume numerous types and classes
of events occurring in groups. |
The typical practice of jumping to second-order abstractions in build-
ing theory was viewed by Homans as premature:
[Sociologists should initially] attempt to climb down from the big words
of social science, at least as far as common sense observation. Then, if we
wish, we can start climbing up again, but this time with a ladder we can
depend on.’
In constructing a firm bottom rung to the abstraction ladder, Homans
introduced three first-order abstractions that provided labels or names to
the actual events occurring in groups: activities, interaction, and

*George C. Homans, The Human Group (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1950).
‘Jbid., p. 13.
236 CHAPTER 11 / THE EXCHANGE BEHAVIORISM OF GEORGE C. HOMANS

sentiments. Activities pertain to what people do in a given situation;

interaction denotes the process in which one unit of activity stimulates
a unit of activity in another person; and sentiments refer to actions that
signal the internal psychological states of people engaged in activities and
interaction. |
The three first-order abstractions, or elements, as Homans was fond
of calling them, exist within an “external system.” For Homans, this
external system represents the environmental parameters of a particular
group under study. As he was to later label this analytical approach, the
external system summarizes the “givens” of a particular situation, which,
for the purposes at hand, are not examined extensively. Of more interest,
however, is the “internal system,” which operates within the constraints
imposed by the external system and which is composed of the interrelated
activities, interactions, and sentiments of group members. The fact that
activities, interactions, and sentiments are interrelated is of great ana-
lytical significance: changes in one element lead to changes in the other
elements.
Of critical importance in the analysis of internal systems is the process
of “elaboration” in which new patterns of organization among activities,
interaction, and sentiments are constantly emerging by virtue of their
interrelatedness with each other and with the external system. A group
thus “elaborates itself, complicates itself, beyond the demands of the orig-
inal situation”; in so doing, it brings about new types of activities, forms
of interaction, and types of sentiments.
In The Human Group, Homans’s strategy was to present a descriptive
summary of five case studies on diverse groups. From each summary,
Homans incorporates the elements of the internal system into proposi-
tions that describe the empirical regularities he had observed in the case
study.‘ As he proceeds in his summaries, Homans attempts to substantiate
the generalizations in one study from the next, while using each successive
study as a source for additional generalizations. With this strategy, he
hoped to generate a body of interrelated generalizations describing the
various ways different types of groups elaborate their internal systems of
activities, interactions, and sentiments. In this way, the first rungs of the
abstraction ladder used in sociological theorizing would be dependable,
providing a firm base for subsequent theorizing at a more abstract level.
Let me offer an example from Homans’s summary of the famous Bank
Wiring Room in the Hawthorne Western Electric Plant. In this setting,
Homans “observed” these regularities:® (1) If the frequency of interaction

‘In his work, Homans rarely makes direct observations himself. Rather. he has tended
to rely on the observations of others, making from their reports inferences about events.
As would be expected, Homans has often been criticized for accepting too readily the im-
precise and perhaps inaccurate observations of others as an inductive base for theorizing.
‘This extended example is adapted from the discussion of Homans’ propositions in M.
 THE EARLY INDUCTIVE STRATEGY 237

between two or more persons increases, the degree of their liking for one
another will increase, and vice versa.® (2) Persons whose sentiments of
liking for one another increase will express these sentiments in increased
activity, and vice versa.” (3) The more frequently persons interact with
one another, the more alike their activities and their sentiments tend to
become, and vice versa.® (4) The higher the rank of a person within a
group, the more nearly his activities conform to the norms of the group,
and vice versa.® (5) The higher the person’s social rank, the wider will be
the range of this person’s interactions.'°
These propositions describe some of the group-elaboration processes
that Homans “observed” in the Bank Wiring Room. Propositions 1 and
2 summarize Homans’s observations that the more the workers interacted,
the more they appeared to like one another, which, in turn, seemed to
cause further interactions above and beyond the work requirements of
the external system. Such elaboration of interactions, sentiments, and
activities also results in the differentiation of subgroups that reveal their
own levels of output, topics of conversation, and patterns of work assis-
tance. This tendency is denoted by Proposition 3. Another pattern of
differentiation in the Bank Wiring Room is described by Proposition 4,
whereby the ranking of individuals and subgroups occurs when group
members compare their activities with those of other members and the
output norms of the group. Proposition 5 describes the tendency of high-
ranking members to interact more frequently with all members of the
group, offering more on-the-job assistance.
Having tentatively established these and other empirical regularities
in the Bank Wiring Room, Homans then analyzes the equally famous
Norton Street Gang, described in William Whyte’s Street Corner Society.
In this second case study, Homans follows his strategy of confirming his
earlier propositions, while inducing further generalizations: (6) The higher
a person’s social rank, the larger will be the number of persons that
originate interaction for him or her, either directly or through interme-
diaries." (7) The higher a person’s social rank, the larger will be the
number of persons toward whom interaction is initiated, either directly
or through intermediaries.'? (8) The more nearly equal in social rank a

J. Mulkay, Functionalism and Exchange and Theoretical Strategy (New York: Schocken
Books, 1971), pp. 135-41. As was done by Mulkay, some of Homans’ propositions are
reworded for simplification.
*Homans, Human Group, p. 112.
TTbid., p. 118.
*Tbid., p. 120.
*Tbid., p. 141.
Ibid., p. 145.
“Tbid., p. 182.
Tbid.
238 CHAPTER 11 / THE EXCHANGE BEHAVIORISM OF GEORGE C. HOMANS

number of people are, the more frequently they will interact with one
another.'®
I see Propositions 6 and 7 as simply corollaries of Proposition 5. It
follows, almost by definition, that those with a wide range of interactions
will receive and initiate more interaction. However, Propositions 6 and
7 are induced separately from his observations of the Bank Wiring Room.
For the Norton Street Gang, Homans observes that Doc, the leader of
the gang, was the center of a complex network of communication. Such
a pattern of communication was not observable in the Bank Wiring Room
because stable leadership ranks had not emerged. Proposition 8 describes
another process Homans sees in groups with clear leadership: the internal
system tends to differentiate into super- and subordinate subgroups, whose
members appear to interact more with each other than those of higher
or lower rank.
After using the group-elaboration processes in the Norton Street Gang
to confirm and supplement the propositions induced from the Bank Wir-
ing Room, Homans then examines the Tikopia family, as described in
Raymond Firth’s famous ethnography. As with the Norton Street Gang,
the Tikopia family system was used to confirm earlier propositions and
as a field from which to induce further propositions: (9) The more fre-
quently persons interact with one another, when no one of them originates
interaction with much greater frequency than the others, the greater is
their liking for one another and their feeling of ease in one another’s
presence.'* (10) When two persons interact with one another, the more
frequently one of the two originates interaction for the other, the stronger
will be the latter’s sentiment of respect (or hostility), and the more nearly
will the frequency of interaction be kept to a minimum."
These propositions reveal, I should emphasize, another facet of Ho-
mans’s inductive strategy. They establish some conditions under which
Proposition 1 will hold true. In Proposition 1, Homans notes that in-
creased interaction between two persons increases their liking, but in the
Tikopia family system Homans discovered that this generalization holds
true only under conditions where authority of one person over another
is low. In the Tikopia family system, brothers revealed sentiments of liking
as a result of their frequent interactions, primarily because they do not
have authority over one another. However, frequent interaction with their
father, who does have authority, was tense because the father initiated
the interaction and because it usually involved the exercise of his authority.
Perhaps less critical than the substance of Propositions 9 and 10, I
think, is the strategy they reveal. Homans has used an inductive technique

8Tbid., p. 184.
“Tbid., p. 243.
*Ibid., p. 247.
 THE ADDITION OF A DEDUCTIVE STRATEGY 239

to develop a large number of propositions that describe empirical regu-

larities. By continually testing them in different types of groups, he can
confirm them or, as is the case with Propositions 9 and 10, qualify these
earlier propositions. By following this strategy, Homans argued in this
early work that it is possible to develop a large body of empirical state-
ments that reveal the form: y varies with x, under specifiable conditions.
Stated in this form and with a clear connection to actual events in human
groupings, such propositions encourage the development of more abstract
concepts and theoretical statements. In addition, these statements are
induced from a firm empirical footing that allows the abstract statements
of sociology to be tested against the facts of ongoing group life. The next
step in developing theory is to subsume these kinds of generalizations
under more abstract laws. For as I emphasized in Chapter 1, empirical
generalizations by themselves are not explanations. They are regularities
that require a theoretical explanation. And so, it is not surprising that
Homans eventually began to add another theoretical strategy to his gen-
eral approach: formal theorizing, dressed up in the vocabulary of axiomatic
theory (see Chapter 1 and Figure 1-4).
\}

THE ADDITION OF A DEDUCTIVE STRATEGY

Homans visualizes the process of deduction and induction in the following
way:
The process of borrowing or inventing the more general propositions I call
induction, whether or not it is the induction of the philosophers; the process
of deriving the empirical propositions from the more general ones I call ex-
planation, and this is the explanation of the philosophers.’®

The Human Group was, therefore, an exercise in induction, and now,

the task of the theorist is explanation through deduction. And it is to
this deductive approach—what I called formal theory in Chapter 1—that
Homans turned in the 1960s with the publication of Social Behavior. Its
Elementary Forms.” Such an approach emerged from Homans’s long-
standing criticism of most sociological theory, especially the functional
strategy of Talcott Parsons (see Chapter 3). For over the years, Homans
has mounted an increasingly pointed criticism of sociological theorizing,
with the hope that ‘we bring what we say about theory into line with
what we actually do, and so put an end to our intellectual hypocrisy.”’°
On the road out of “intellectual hypocrisy” is a rejection of Talcott

'%*George C. Homans, Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms (New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1961), p. 10.
1] bid.
IT bid.
240 CHAPTER 11 / THE EXCHANGE BEHAVIORISM OF GEORGE C. HOMANS

Parsons’s classificatory strategy of developing systems of concept and

categorical schemes (what I termed conceptual schemes in Chapter 1).
Some students get so much intellectual security out of such a scheme,
because it allows them to give names to, and to pigeonhole, almost any social
phenomenon, that they are hesitant to embark on the dangerous waters of
actually saying something about the relations between the phenomena—be-
cause they must actually take the risk of being found wrong.”

For Homans, a more proper strategy is the construction of deductive

systems of propositions. At the top of the deductive system are the general
axioms, from which lower-order propositions are logically deduced. The
lowest-order propositions in the scheme are those composed of first-order
abstractions that describe actual events in the empirical world. Because
these empirical generalizations are logically related to a hierarchy of in-
creasingly abstract propositions, culminating in logical articulation with
the axioms, the empirical generalizations are assumed to be explained by
the axioms (consult Figures 1-4 and 1-7 in Chapter 1). Thus, for Homans,
to have deduced logically an empirical regularity from a set of more general
propositions and axicms is to have explained the regularity.2” Armed with
this commitment to axiomatic theory, Homans articulates his exchange
approach.

THE EXCHANGE MODEL

Sources of Homans’s Psychological Exchange Perspective

I see Homans’s exchange scheme first surfacing in a polemica: reaction
to Leévi-Strauss’s structural analysis of cross-cousin marriage patterns. In
collaboration with David Schneider, Homans previews what become

‘*George C. Homans, The Nature of Social Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World,
1967), p. 13. Parsons has replied that such systems of concepts can be theory: “I emphatically
dispute this [deductive theory] is all that can legitimately be called theory. In biology, for
example, I should certainly regard the basic classificatory schemes of taxonomy, for example
in particular the comparative anatomy of vertebrates, to be theoretical. Moreover very
important things are, with a few additional facts, explained on such levels such as the
inability of organisms with lungs and no gills to live for long periods under water” (Talcott
Parsons, “Levels of Organization and the Mediation of Social Interaction,” Sociological
Inquiry 34 (Spring 1964], pp. 219-20).
*Homans has championed this conception of theory in a large number of works; see,
for example, Homans, Social Behavior; Homans, Nature of Social Science: George C. Ho-
mans, “Fundamental Social Processes,”- in Sociology, ed. N. J. Smelser (New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1967), pp. 27-78; George C. Homans, “Contemporary Theory in Sociology,”
in Handbook of Modern Sociology, ed. R.-E. L. Faris (Skokie, Ill: Rand-McNally. 1964).
pp. 251-77; and George C. Homans, “Bringing Men Back In,” American Sociological Review
29 (December 1964), pp. 809-18. For an early statement of his position, see George C.
Homans, “Social Behavior as Exchange,” American Journal of Sociology 63 (August 1958),
pp. 597-606. For a recent statement, see “Discovery and the Discovered in Social Theory.”
Humboldt Journal of Social Relations 7 (Fall-Winter 1979-80), pp. 89-102.
 THE EXCHANGE MODEL 241

prominent themes in his writings: (1) a skeptical view of any form of

functional theorizing, (2) an emphasis on psychological principles as the
axioms of social theory, and (3) a preoccupation with exchange-theoretic
concepts.”!
In their assessment of Lévi-Strauss’s exchange functionalism, Ho-
mans and Schneider take exception to virtually all that made Lévi-Strauss’s
theory. First, the conceptualization of different forms of indirect, gen-
eralized exchange is rejected. In so conceptualizing exchange, Lévi-Strauss
“thinned the meaning out of it.” Second, Lévi-Strauss’s position that
different forms of exchange symbolically reaffirm and integrate different
patterns of social organization is questioned, for an “institution is what
it is because it results from the drives, or meets the immediate needs, of
individuals or subgroups within a society.” The result of this rejection
of Lévi-Strauss’s thought is for Homans and Schneider to argue that
exchange theory must initially emphasize face-to-face interaction, focus
primarily on limited and direct exchanges among individuals, and rec-
ognize that social structures are created and sustained by the behaviors
of individuals.”
With this critique of the anthropological tradition, which, I should
emphasize, emerged as a reaction to utilitarianism, Homans resurrects
the utilitarian’s concern with individual self-interest in the conceptual
trappings of psychological behaviorism. For indeed, as Homans and
Schneider emphasize: ““We may call this an individual self-interest theory,
if we remember that interests may be other than economic.”*4 As becomes
evident by the early 1960s, this self-interest theory is to be cast in the
behaviorist language of B. F. Skinner. Given Homans’s commitment to
axiomatic theorizing and his concern with face-to-face interaction among
individuals, it was perhaps inevitable that he would look toward Skinner
and, indirectly, to the early founders of behaviorism—Pavlov, Thorndike,
and Watson (see Chapter 10). But Homans borrows directly from Skin-
ner’s reformulations of early behaviorist principles.” Stripped of its

21George C. Homans and David M. Schneider, Marriage, Authority, and Final Causes:
A Study of Unilateral Cross-Cousin Marriage (New York: Free Press, 1955). There are,
however, hints of this interest in exchange theory in Homans’s first major work, English
Villagers of the 13th Century (New York: Russell & Russell, 1941).
"Homans and Schneider, Marriage, p. 15.
In so doing, Homans advocates the principle of “methodological individualism,” which
sees social reality as the result of aggregated individual actions and behaviors. If social
structure is aggregations of individual behavior, then the highest order principles in the
deductive schemes of sociology must be about individual behavior. For another version of
this, see Chapter 21 on Randall Collins’s exchange perspective.
*Homans and Schneider, Marriage, p. 15.
Homans, Social Behavior, pp. 1-83. For an excellent summary of the Skinnerian prin-
ciples incorporated into Homans’s scheme, see Richard L. Simpson, “Theories of Social
Exchange” (Morristown, N.Y.: General Learning Press, 1972), pp. 3-4. As an interesting
aside, Peter P. Ekeh, Social Exchange Thecry and the Two Sociological Traditions (Cam-
242 CHAPTER 11 / THE EXCHANGE BEHAVIORISM OF GEORGE C. HOMANS

subtlety, as Homans prefers, Skinnerian behaviorism states as its basic

principle that if an animal has a need it will perform activities that in
the past have satisfied this need. A first corollary to this principle is that
organisms will attempt to avoid unpleasant experiences but will endure
limited amounts of such experiences as a cost in emitting the behaviors
that satisfy an overriding need. A second corollary is that organisms will
continue emitting certain behaviors only as long as they continue to pro-
duce desired and expected effects. A third corollary of Skinnerian psy-
chology emphasizes that as needs are satisfied by a particular behavior,
animals are less likely to emit the behavior. A fourth corollary states that
if in the recent past a behavior has brought rewards and if these rewards
suddenly stop, the organism will appear angry and gradually cease emitting
the behavior that formerly satisfied its needs. A final corollary holds that
if an event has consistently occurred at the same time as a behavior that
was rewarded or punished, the event becomes a stimulus and is likely to
produce the behavior or its avoidance.
These principles were derived from behavioral psychologists’ highly
controlled observations of animals, whose needs could be inferred from
deprivations imposed by the investigators. Although human needs are
much more difficult to ascertain than those of laboratory pigeons and
mice and despite the fact that humans interact in groupings that defy
experimental controls, Homans believes that the principles of operant
psychology can be applied to the explanation of human behavior in both
simple and complex groupings. One of the most important adjustments
of Skinnerian principles to fit the facts of human social organization
involves the recognition that needs are satisfied by other people and that
people reward and punish each other. In contrast with Skinner’s animals,
which only indirectly interact with Skinner through the apparatus of the
laboratory and which have littie ability to reward Skinner (except perhaps
to confirm his principles), humans constantly give and take, or exchange,
rewards and punishments.”
The conceptualization of human behavior as exchange of rewards (and
punishments) among interacting individuals leads Homans to incorpo-
rate, in altered form, the first principle of elementary economics: humans
rationally calculate the long-range consequences of their actions in a mar-
ketplace and attempt to maximize their material profits in their trans-
actions. I emphasize, however, that Homans qualifies this simplistic notion:

bridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1975) has argued that had Homans not felt so compelled
to reject Lévi-Strauss, he would not have embraced Skinnerian principles. Ekeh goes so far
as to offer a hypothetical list of axioms that Homans would have postulated, had he not
cast his scheme into the terminology of behaviorism.
*For a more detailed analysis of this point and the problems it presents, see Richard
M. Emerson, “Social Exchange Theory,” in Annual Review of Sociology 2 (Palo Alto, Calif.:
Annual Reviews, 1976).
 THE EXCHANGE MODEL 243

Indeed we are out to rehabilitate the economic man. The trouble with him
was not that he was economic, that he used resources to some advantage, but
that he was antisocial and materialistic, interested only in money and material
goods and ready to sacrifice even his old mother to get them.’
Thus, to be an appropriate explanation of human behavior, this basic
economic assumption must be altered in four ways: (1) People do not
always attempt to maximize profits; they seek only to make some profit
in exchange relations. (2) Humans do not usually make either long-run
or rational calculations in exchanges; for, in everyday life, “the Theory
of Games is good advice for human behavior but a poor description of
it.” (3) The things exchanged involve not only money but also other
commodities, including approval, esteem, compliance, love, affection, and
other less materialistic goods. (4) The marketplace is not a separate do-
main in human exchanges, for all interaction involves individuals ex-
changing rewards (and punishments) and seeking profits.

The Basic Concepts

F
In an effort to meet the objections of his critics, Homans has altered
somewhat his concepts since the original publication of his theory. Below,
I have summarized the concepts of the theory in their most recent form:?8
1. Stimulus—cues in the environment to which an organism responds
with action. |
2. Action—behaviors emitted by organisms directed at getting re-
wards and avoiding punishments.
3. Reward—the capacity to bestow gratification or to meet the needs
of an organism that a stimulus possesses.
4. Punishment—the capacity to harm, injure, or to block the satis-
faction of needs that a stimulus possesses.
5. Value—the degree of reward that a stimulus possesses.
6. Cost—rewards foregone or punishment incurred in engaging in one
line of action. .
7. Perception—the capacity to perceive, weigh, and assess rewards
and costs.

27Homans, Social Behavior, p. 79. Kenneth Boulding (“An Economist’s View of ‘Social
Behavior: Its Elementary Forms,’” American Journal of Sociology 67 [January 1962], p.
458) has noted that in Homans’s work “economic man is crossed with the psychological
pigeon to produce what the unkind might call the Economic Pigeon theory of human in-
teraction.” For a more detailed and serious analysis of Homans’s meshing of elementary
economics and psychology, see Ekeh, Social Exchange Theory, pp. 162-71.
**George Caspar Homans, Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms (New York: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, 1974), pp. 15-47. In contrast to the first edition of The Structure of
Sociological Theory, which concentrated on the earlier edition of Homans’s book, I have
relied almost exclusively on the revised edition of Social Behavior. For a discussion of
Homans’s original formulation of his exchange theory, the reader is referred to pp. 235-47
of my The Structure of Sociological Theory (Homewood, Ill: Dorsey Press, 1974).
244 CHAPTER 11 / THE EXCHANGE BEHAVIORISM OF GEORGE C. HOMANS

8. Expectation—the level of rewards, punishments, or costs that an

organism has come to associate with a particular stimulus.
These are the key concepts used in Homans’s statement of his “el-
ementary exchange principles.’’® He adds other concepts when applying
these principles to human behavior. These new concepts, however, merely
extend those listed here.

Elementary Principles of Social Behavior

Homans labels propositions in terins of the variables that each high-
lights.2° These labels are listed alongside the appropriate propositiuns as
I have listed them in Table 11-1.
In Propositions I through III in Table 11-1, the principles of Skin-
nerian psychology are restated. The more valuable an activity (III), the
more often such activity is rewarded (I), and the more a situation ap-
proximates one in which activity has been rewarded in the past (II), then
the more likely a particular activity will be emitted. Proposition IV in-
dicates the condition under which the first three fall into temporary abey-
ance. In accordance with the reinforcement principle of satiation or the
economic law of marginal utility, humans eventually define rewarded ac-
tivities as less valuable and begin to emit other activities in search of
different rewards (again, however, in accordance with the principles
enumerated in Propositions I-III). Proposition V introduces a more com-
plicated set of conditions that qualify Propositions I through IV. From
Skinner’s observation that pigeons reveal anger and frustration when they
do not receive an expected reward, Homans reasons that humans will
probably reveal the same behavior.
In addition to these principles, Homans introduces a “rationality
proposition,” which summarizes the stimulus, success, and value propo-
sitions. I have also placed this proposition in Table 11-1 because it is so
prominent in Homans’s actual construction of deductive explanations.
Let me translate the somewhat awkward vocabulary of Principle VI as
Homans wrote it. People make calculations about various alternative lines
of action. They perceive or calculate the value of the rewards that might
be yielded by various actions. But they also temper this calculation in
terms of the perceptions of how probable the receipt of rewards will be.
Low probability of receiving highly valued rewards would lower their re-
ward potential. Conversely, high probability of receiving a lower valued
reward increases their overall reward potential. This relationship can be
stated by the following formula:

: *The concept of cost does not appear in Homans’s actual axioms, but it is so prominent
in his scheme that it is listed here with his other important concepts.
See Homans, Social Behavior, pp. 11-68. Masculine pronouns are maintained, since
this is how Homans wrote the propositions.
 THE EXCHANGE MODEL 245

Action = Value X Probability

People are, Homans asserts, rational in the sense that they are likely to
emit that behavior, or action, among alternatives in which value on the
right side of the equation is largest. For example, if Action, is highly
valued (say, 10) but the probability of getting it by emitting Action, is
low (.20) and if Action, is less valued (say, 5) but the probability of
receiving it is greater (.50) than Action,, then the actor will emit Action,
(because 10 X .20 = 2 yields less reward than 5 X .50 = 2.5).
This proposition was implicit in Homans’s earlier version of his ex-
change theory, but he has now made it explicit. This proposition, as noted
above, summarizes the implications of the stimulus, value, and success
propositions, because it indicates why actors would choose one stimulus
situation that has been rewarding over another. And in fact, Homans had
tended to use the rationality proposition in his explanations long before
he made it explicit.*! I see such a proposition as reevoking utilitarian
notions of rational calculation but in the vocabulary of psychological
behaviorism.
As summarized in Table 11-1, these basic principles or laws are seen
by Homans to explain, in the sense of deductive explanation, patterns of
human organization. As is obvious, they are psychological in nature. What
is more, these psychological axioms constitute from Homans’s viewpoint
the only general sociological propositions, since “there are no general
sociological propositions that hold good of all societies or social groups
as such.”’5?
However, the fact that psychological propositions are the most general
does not make any less relevant or important sociological propositions
stating the relationships among group properties or between group prop-
erties and those of individuals. On the contrary, these are the very prop-
ositions that are to be deduced from the psychological axioms. Thus,
sociological propositions will be conspicuous in the deductive system em-
anating from the psychological principles. Homans stresses that sociology
will finally bring what it says about theory into what it actually does when
it arranges both abstract sociological statements and specific empirical
generalizations in a deductive system with the psychological axioms at
its top. For, as he continually emphasizes, to deduce propositions from
one another is to explain them.

Homans’s Construction of Deductive Systems

The fact that the basic axioms to be used in sociological explanation seem
to be obvious truisms should not be a cause for dismay. Too often, Homans

%1S¢e the first edition of The Structure of Sociological Theory and my “Building Social
Theory: Some Questions about Homans’ Strategy,” Pacific Sociological Review 20 (Apri’
1977), pp. 203-20.
Homans, “Bringing Men Back In.”
246 CHAPTER 11 / THE EXCHANGE BEHAVIORISM OF GEORGE C. HOMANS

TABLE 11-1 Homans's Exchange Principles

nn cnn anae set

|. Success Proposition: For all actions taken by persons, the more often a
particular action of a person is rewarded, the more likely the person is to
perform that action.
ll. Stimulus Proposition: If in the past the occurrence of a particular stimulus or set
of stimuli has been the occasion on which a person's action has been
rewarded, then the more similar the present stimuli are to the past ones, the
more likely the person is to perform the action or some similar action now.
lll. Value Proposition: The more valuable to a person is the result of his action, the
more likely he is to perform the action.
IV. Deprivation-Satiation Proposition: The more often in the recent past a person
has received a particular reward, the less valuable any further unit of that
reward becomes for him.
V. Aggression-Approval Propositions: (a) When a person's action does not receive
the reward he expected or receives punishment he did not expect, he will be
angry and become more likely to perform aggressive behavior, and the results
of such behavior become more valuable to him. (b) When a person's action
receives the reward expected, especially greater reward than expected, or does
not receive punishment he expected, he will be pleased and become more likely
to perform approving behavior, and the results of such behavior become more
valuable to him.
Vi. Rationality Proposition: In choosing between alternative actions, a person will
choose that one for which, as perceived by him or her at the time, the value of
the result, multiplied by the probability of getting that result, is greater.

insists, social scientists assume that the basic laws of social organization
will be more esoteric—and certainly less familiar—since for them the game
of science involves the startling discovery of new, unfamiliar, and pre-
sumably profound principles. In reference to these social scientists, Ho-
mans writes:
All this familiarity has bred contempt, a contempt that has got in the way
of the development of social science. Its fundamental propositions seem so
obvious as to be boring, and an intellectual, by definition a wit and a man
of the world, will go to great lengths to avoid the obvious.”
However, if the first principles of sociology are obvious, despite the
best efforts of scientists to the contrary, Homans suggests that sociology
cease its vain search for the esoteric and begin constructing deductive
systems that recognize the fact that the most general propositions are
not only psychological but familiar. In fact, if sociologists crave com-
plexity, this task shouid certainly be satisfying, since the deductive sys-
tems connecting these simple principles to observed empirical regularities
will be incredibly complex.
Unfortunately, Homans himself never offers a well-developed expla-
nation. He has tended to simply invoke, in a rather ad hoc fashion, his

%Homans, Nature of Social Science, p. 73.

 THE EXCHANGE MODEL 247

axioms and to reconcile them in a very loose and imprecise manner with
empirical regularities. Or he has constructed brief deductive schemes to
illustrate his strategy. These limitations in themselves constitute an im-
portant criticism of Homans’s work, because he has not fully implemented
his own theoretical strategy. Yet I do not see Homans’s failure to actually
do what he says should be done as negating the utility of the strategy.
Let me examine one of Homans’s deductive schemes to assess its potential
as well as its problems.
One of Homans’s explanations is reproduced below. Homans recog-
nizes that this is not a complete explanation, but he argues that it is as
good as any other that exists. Moreover, although certain steps in the
deductive scheme are omitted, it is the proper way to develop scientific
explanations from Homans’s point of view. In this scheme, Homans seeks
to explain Golden’s Law that industrialization and the level of literacy
in the population are highly correlated. As I emphasized in Chapter 1,
such empirical generalizations are often considered to be theory, but Ho-
mans has correctly perceived that this “law” is only an empirical gen-
eralization that belongs at the bottom of the deductive scheme (see Figure
1-4). Propositions move from the most abstract statement, or the ax-
iom(s),*4 to the specific empirical regularity to be explained. Golden’s Law
is thus explained in the following manner.

1. Men are more likely to perform an activity the more valuable they
perceive the reward of that activity to be.
2. Men are more likely to perform an activity the more successful
they perceive the activity to be in getting that reward.*
3. Compared with agricultural societies, a higher proportion of men
in industrial societies are prepared to reward activities that in-
volve literacy. (Industrialists want to hire bookkeepers, clerks,
and persons who can make and read blueprints, manuals, and so
forth.)
4. Therefore a higher proportion of men in industrial societies will
perceive the acquisition of literacy as rewarding.
. And [by (1)] a higher proportion will attempt to acquire literacy.
Oo. The provision of schooling costs money, directly or indirectly.
ao

7. Compared with agricultural societies, a higher proportion of men

in industrial societies is, by some standard, wealthy.
8. Therefore a higher proportion is able to provide schooling (through
government or private charity), and a higher proportion is able
to pay for their own schooling without charity.

*Note that I am using Homans’s vocabulary, but as I emphasized in Chapter 1, “axi-

omatic” theory for sociology is unrealistic.
%Note that “axioms” 1 and 2 here are simply an earlier version of Homans’s rationality
principle (VI) listed in Table 11-1.
248 CHAPTER 11 / THE EXCHANGE BEHAVIORISM OF GEORGE C. HOMANS

9. Anda higher proportion will perceive the effort to acquire literacy

as apt to be successful.
10. And [by (2) as by (1)] a higher proportion will attempt to acquire
literacy.
11. Since their perceptions are generally accurate, a higher proportion
of men in industrial societies will in fact acquire literacy. That
is, the literacy rate is apt to be higher in an industrial than in
an agricultural society.*®

Propositions 1 and 2 are an earlier statement of the rationality prop-

osition that summarizes the success, stimulus, and value propositions. It
is from these first two propositions, or axioms, that others are derived in
an effort to explain Golden’s Law (Proposition 11 in the scheme above).
Examining some of the features of this explanation can provide insight
into Homans’s deductive strategy.
In this example, the transition between Propositions 2 and 3 ignores
sO many necessary variables as to simply describe in the words of be-
havioral psychology what Homans perceives to have occurred. Why are
people in industrial societies prepared to reward literacy? This statement
does not explain; it describes and thus opens a large gap in the logic of
the deductive system. For Homans, this statement is a given. It states a
boundary condition, for the theory is not trying to explain why people
are prepared to reward literacy. Another story is required to explain this
event. Thus, Homans argues that “no theory can explain everything” and
that it is necessary to ignore some things and assume them to be givens
for the purposes of explanation at hand. The issue remains, however. Has
not Homans defined away the most interesting sociological issue—what
makes people ready to reward literacy in a society’s historical develop-
ment? For Homans, people are just ready to do so.
Another problem in this scheme comes with the placement of the
word therefore. This transitive is typically used immediately following a
statement of the givens that define away important classes of sociological
variables. For example, the “therefore” preceding key propositions (4 and
8) begs questions such as: Why do people perceive literacy as rewarding?
What level of industrialization would make this so? What level of edu-
cational development? What feedback consequences does desire for lit-
eracy have for educational development? By ignoring the why and what
of these questions, Homans can then in Propositions 5 and 10 reinsert
the higher order axioms (1 and 2) of the explanation, thereby giving the
scheme an appearance of deductive continuity. In fact, however, answers

*George C. Homans, “Reply to Blain,” Sociological Inquiry 41 (Winter 1971), pp. 19-
24. This article was written in response to a challenge by Robert Blain for Homans to
explain a sociological law: “On Homans’ Psychological Reductionism,” Seviological Inquiry
41 (Winter 1971), pp. 3-25.
 CRITICISMS OF HOMANS'S STRATEGY AND EXCHANGE THEORY 249

to the critical sociological questions have been avoided, such as why people
perceive as valuable and rewarding certain crucial activities. +
Homans’s reply to such criticisms is, I think, important}to note.°”
First, he emphasizes that this deductive scheme was just an example or
illustrative sketch, leaving out many details. Second, and more impor-
tantly, Homans contends that it is unreasonable for the critic to expect
that a theory can and must explain every given condition (Propositions
3 and 7, for example). He offers the example of Newton’s laws, which can
help explain the movement of the tides (by virtue of gravitational forces
of the moon relative to the axis of the earth), but these laws cannot explain
why oceans are present and why the earth exists. I think that this latter
argument is reasonable, in principle, since deductive theories explain only
a delimited range of phenomena, as can be recalled by reference to Figure
1-6 in Chapter 1. But let me anticipate a point that I will emphasize
shortly: while Homans does not need to explain the givens of a deductive
scheme, all of the interesting sociological questions are contained in those
givens. Moreover, these questions beg for the development of abstract
sociological laws to explain them (Golden’s Law is not an abstract prin-
ciple, only an empirical generalization). And so, I wonder why Homans
devotes his time to the construction of quasi-axiomatic (formal) systems
that contain no sociological laws. Why concentrate on the psychological
laws from which sociological laws are to be ultimately deduced when the
real task of sociology is to develop these sociological laws? But this is one
of many criticisms leveled at Homans’ scheme in particular and, to some
extent, at all exchange theory. Let me now turn to these criticisms and
discuss them in more detail.

CRITICISMS OF HOMANS’S STRATEGY AND

EXCHANGE THEORY

The Issues of Rationality

Homans’s proposition on rationality could potentially open his exchange
scheme to criticisms leveled against utilitarianism: do actors rationally
calculate the costs and rewards? Homans partially meets this criticism
by recognizing that people make calculations by. weighing costs, rewards,
and the probabilities of receiving rewards or avoiding punishments. But
people do so in terms of value—that is, in terms of what bestows grati-
fications on them. Just what is rewarding is thus a personal matter and
unique to all individuals. Depending on their past experiences, people

37Personal communication to the author.

250 CHAPTER 11 / THE EXCHANGE BEHAVIORISM OF GEORGE C. HOMANS

establish their own values. Rationality, then, occurs in terms of calcu-

lations of personal value.*®
There is, however, another implicit assumption that leaves Homans,
and most exchange schemes, open to criticism. Do all human actions
involve calculations? Do people always weigh and assess costs and rewards
in all situations?*° Often, critics argue, people just receive rewards without
prior calculations. For example, when a person receives a gift or becomes
the beneficiary of another’s desires to bestow rewards, prior calculations
are not involved. Rewards or reinforcement are, of course, still involved,
but the principle of rationality excludes much interaction. Thus, Homans
may have unduly limited his theory.

The Issue of Tautology

More fundamental to the exchange perspective is the problem of tautology.
If one examines the definition of key concepts—value, reward, and action—
they appear to be defined in terms of each other. Rewards are gratifications
that have value. Value is the degree of reward, or reinforcement. Action
is reward-seeking activity. The question arises, then, as to whether it is
possible to build a theory from axioms that are tautological. For example,
Homans’s proposition that ‘The more valuable to a person is the result
of his action, the more likely he is to perform the action” could be con-
sidered a tautology. Value is defined as the degree of reward, and action
is defined as reward-seeking behavior.*°
Homans acknowledges the circularity, but views the problem as re-
solved by the use of deductive theory. Indeed, he argues that many axioms
in deductive systems will be statements of equivalence, with concepts
defined in terms of each other (for example, f = ma and E = me? in
physics). For if the axioms are viewed as part of a deductive system, the

Parsons, who similarly has dealt with the rationality issue (“Levels of Organization,”
in Institutions and Social Exchange, ed. H. Turk and R. L. Simpson [Indianapolis, Ind.:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1971], p. 219), notes: “History thus seems to become for Homans the ultimate
residual categoiy, recourse to which can solve any embarrassment which arises from in-
adequacy of the more specific parts of the conceptual scheme. The very extent to which he
has narrowed his conceptualization of the variables, in particular adopting the atomistic
conception of values, . . . increases the burden thrown upon history and with it the confession
of ignorance embodied in the statement, ‘things are as they are because of ways in which
they have come to be that way.’ ”
*Robert Bierstedt, “Review of Blain’s Exchange and Power,” American Sociological
Review 30 (1965), pp. 789-90.
“For enlightening discussions of this problem, see Morton Deutsch, “Homans in the
Skinner Box,” in Institutions and Social Exchange, ed. H. Turk and R. L. Simpson (In-
dianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971), pp. 81-92; Bengt Abrahamsson, “Homans on Ex-
change: Hedonism Revived,” American Journal of Sociology 76 (September 1970), pp. 273-
85; Pitirim Sorokin, Sociological Theories of Today (New York: Harper & Row, 1966),
especially Chapter 15, “‘Pseudo-Behavioral and Empirical Sociologies,” and Mulkay, Func-
tionalism and Exchange, pp. 166-69.
 CRITICISMS OF HOMANS'S STRATEGY AND EXCHANGE THEORY 251

problem of tautology is soon obviated. Although value and action cannot

be measured independently when stated so abstractly, the deductive sys-
tem allows for their independent measurement at the empirical level.
Thus, “‘a tautology can take part in the deductive system whose conclusion
is not a tautology.”*! Thus, Homans argues that the tautological nature
of highly abstract axioms in a deductive system can be obviated when
precise and clear derivations from the axioms are performed. In this pro-
cess, independent definitions and indicators of key concepts can be
provided. If these deductive steps are left out, however, and vague axioms
are simply reconciled in an ad hoc fashion to empirical events, the problem
of tautology will persist. And it is here that critics note: in virtually every
explanation of social behavior in Homans’s recent work, rigorous dedhic-
tive systems are absent.‘ But in fairness, I think that Homans has been
only attempting to suggest the utility of his concepts for future construc-
tion of deductive systems and to point out to sociologists that the ultimate
explanatory principles of sociology are those about individual behavior.

The Issue of Reductionism

Periodically, old philosophical issues are resurrected and debated fer-
vently. Homans’s exchange perspective has rekindled one such debate:
the issue of reductionism. Homans’s statements on the issue are some-
times tempered and at other times polemic, but the thrust of his argument
has been made amply clear. He writes:
The institutions, organizations, and societies that sociologists study can
always be analyzed, without residue, into the behavior of individual men.
They must therefore be explained by propositions about the behavior of in-
dividua! men.*

This position has been particularly disturbing to some sociologists,

since it appears to pose a problem: if we accept the contention that

“1Homans, Social Behavior, p. 35.

“Ronald Maris (“‘The Logical Adequacy of Homans’ Social Theory,” American Sociol-
ogical Review 35 [December 1970]. pp. 1069-81) came to a somewhat different conclusion
about the logical adequacy of Homans’s theoretical manipulations. With the aid of symbolic
logic and the addition of some assumptions, ‘Homans’ theory of elementary social behavior
has not been proven inadequate.” But the criticisms of Maris’s logical manipulation are
sufficient to suggest that his analysis is not the definitive answer to the logical adequacy of
Homans’s deductions. For examples of these criticisms, see Don Gray, “Some Comments
concerning Maris on ‘Logical Adequacy’ ”’; Stephen Turner, “The Logical Adequacy of “The
Logical Adequacy of Homans’ Social Theory’ ”; and Robert Price, “On Maris and the Logic
of Time”; all in American Sociological Review 36 (August 1971), pp. 706-13. Maris’s “Second
Thoughts: Uses of Logic in Theory Construction” can also be found in this issue. For a
more adequate construction of a logically sophisticated exchange perspective, see B. F.
Meeker, “Decisions and Exchange,” American Sociological Review 36 (June 1971), pp. 485-
95.
“George C. Homans, “Commentary,” Sociological Inquiry 34 (Spring 1964), p. 231.
252 CHAPTER 11 / THE EXCHANGE BEHAVIORISM OF GEORGE C, HOMANS

sociological propositions are reducible to those about individuals, then

those about individuals are reducible to physiological propositions, which,
in turn, are reducible to biochemical propositions, and so on in a reduc-
tionist sequence ending in the basic laws of physical matter. Homans has
not been very helpful in alleviating sociologists’ concern with whether he
is advocating this kind of reductionism. In fact, he advocates the position
that although the psychological axioms “cannot be derived from phys-
iological propositions, .. . this condition is unlikely to last forever.”** His
tempered statements, however, are more revealing. Even if the laws of
sociology are reducible to those of psychology and, at some future date,
those of psychology to physiology, we will still need sociological laws. For
example, to know that portions of Newtonian mechanics can be deduced
from Einsteinian relativity theory does not stop us from using Newton’s
laws. Similarly, I think that Homans would argue: we need not reduce
every sociological law to psychology each time we construct an explanation
of an event.
This position argues against critics who have charged that Homans
is a “nominalist” who asserts that society and its various collective forms
(groups, institutions, organizations, and so forth) are mere names soci-
ologists arbitrarily assign to the only “really real” phenomenon, the in-
dividual. For Homans is very clear on the matter:
I, for one, am not going to back into the position of denying the reality
of social institutions. ... The question is not whether the individual is the
ultimate reality or whether social behavior involves something more than the
behavior of individuals. The question is, always, how social phenomena are
to be explained.*

I think that the thrust of the last phase has been underemphasized
in the criticisms of Homans’s reductionism. Critics have too often implied
that his reductionism forces him to embrace a particular variety of nom-
inalism. Yet, for Homans, the issue has always been one of how to explain
with deductive—or axiomatic—systems the groups and institutions studied
by sociologists.

Homans and the fallacy of ‘‘misplaced concreteness.’’ I see

the most persistent criticism of Homans’s reductionist strategy as re-
volving around charges that he has fallen into the fallacy of misplaced
concreteness.“ As originally conceived by the philosopher Alfred North
Whitehead, scientists had at one time fallen into the trap of thinking that

“Homans, “Commentary,” p. 225.

“Homans, Nature of Social Science, pp. 61-62.
“For examples of this line of criticism, see Parsons, “Levels of Organization”; and Blain,
“On Homans’ Psychological Reductionism,” Sociological Inquiry 41 (Winter 1971), pp. 10-
19.
 CRITICISMS OF HOMANS'S STRATEGY AND EXCHANGE THEORY 253

they could analyze the universe into its constituent parts and thereby
eventually discover the basic elements or building blocks of all matter.*’
Once the basic building block had been found, it would only then be
necessary to comprehend the laws of its operation for an understanding
of everything else in the universe. In the eyes of Whitehead and others,
these scientists had erroneously assumed that the basic parts of the uni-
verse were the only reality. In so doing, they had ‘“‘misplaced” the con-
creteness of phenomena. In reality, the relationships among parts forming
a whole are just as real as the constituent parts. The organization of parts
is not the sum of the parts, but rather, the constitution of a new kind of
reality.
Has Homans fallen into this fallacy? Numerous critics think that he
has when he implies that the behavior of persons or “men” are the basic
units, whose laws need only be understood to explain more complex so-
ciocultural arrangements. I think that these critics are overreacting to
Homans’s reductionism, perhaps confusing his reductionist strategy with
the mistaken assumption that Homans is a nominalist in disguise. Ac-
tually, Homans has never denied the importance of sociological laws de-
scribing complex sociocultural processes; on the contrary, they are critical
propositions in any deductive system that attempts to explain these pro-
cesses. In my view, all that Homans asserts is: these sociological laws are
not the most general; they are subsumable under more general psycho-
logical laws (his axioms), which, with more knowledge and sophisticated
intellectual techniques, will be subsumable under a still more general set
of laws. At no point in this reductionist philosophy is Homans asserting
that the propositions subsumed by a more general set of laws are irrelevant
or unimportant. Thus, Homans has not misplaced the concreteness of
reality. He has not denied the existence of emergent properties such as
groups, organizations, and institutions, nor the theoretical significance of
the laws describing these emergent phenomena. Homans is not a nomi-
nalist in disguise, but a sociological realist, who is advocating a particular
strategy for understanding sociocultural phenomena.

The utility of Homans’s reductionist strategy. Once it be-

comes evident that Homans’s reductionism is a theoretical strategy that
does not deny the metaphysical or ontological existence of emergent phe-
nomena, the next question becomes: is this strategy useful in explaining
phenomena? Some critics have emphasized that a reductionist strategy
will affect the kinds of theoretical and research questions sociologists will
ask.*8 If one is concerned primarily with psychological laws as explanatory

47Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: Macmillan, 1925).
“For example, see Blain, “On Homans’ Psychological Reductionism”; and Walter Buck-
ley, Sociology and Modern Systems Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967),
pp. 109-11.
254 CHAPTER 11 / THE EXCHANGE BEHAVIORISM OF GEORGE C. HOMANS

principles, it is likely that research questions and theoretical generali-

zations will begin to revolve around psychological and social-psychological
phenomena, because these phenomena are the most readily derived from
psychological axioms. Thus, despite a recognition that complex sociol-
ogical phenomena are real, the adoption of a reductionist strategy for
building theory will inadvertently result in the avoidance of the macro
patterns of social organization studied by many sociologists. To the extent
that such one-sided research and theory building are the result of a re-
ductionist strategy, then this strategy is undesirable and can be questioned
on these grounds alone. However, critics charge that there are more fun-
damental grounds on which to reject Homans’s strategy: adherence to his
strategy at the present time will lead to logically imprecise and empirically
empty theoretical formulations.
This indictment is, of course, severe and needs to be documented. I
sense that Homans may be correct in holding that a deductive axiomatic
strategy necessitates reductionism, for the goal of such a strategy is to
subsume under ever more general axioms what we previously considered
the most general ones. Such a process of subsumption may indeed lead
first to the subsumption of sociological axioms under psychological axioms
and then to the subsequent subsumption of these latter axioms under
physiological, biochemical, and physical laws. Just as many of the laws
of chemistry can be subsumed under the laws of physics, so sociological
laws may be subsumed by the laws of psychology. However, I believe that
deduction of sociological laws from psychological axioms should occur in
a two-step process: (1) A series of well-established sociological laws from
which it is possible to deduce a wide variety of sociological propositions
that have received consistent empirical support must be developed. (2)
Then, and only then, a clear body of psychological axioms, which are
amendable to similar reductions and which have received consistent em-
pirical support, can be used to explain the sociological laws.*? I think that
Step 1 must occur prior to Step 2, as it typically has in the physical
sciences. Homans has recognized the fact that the social sciences have
not achieved Step 1 when he notes that the “issue for the social sciences
is not whether we should be reductionists, but rather, if we were reduc-
tionists, whether we could find any propositions to reduce.’”®°
Yet, I believe that Homans fails to realize the full implications of his
statement. Without well-established sociological laws to subsume, the crit-
ics can correctly ask: What is the utility of attempting to subsume what
does not exist? Would it not be far wiser to expend our efforts in devel-
oping sociological laws and let the issue of reductionism take care of itself
when these laws are established? To-attempt prematurely to develop psy-

“Turner, “Building Social Theory.”

*Homans, Nature of Social Science, p. 86.
 CRITICISMS OF HOMANS'S STRATEGY AND EXCHANGE THEORY 255

chological axioms and then deduce sociological propositions from them

in the absence of well-established sociological laws is likely to generate
logically imprecise deductions, as I illustrated with Homans’s explanation
of Golden’s Law. What Homans typically does in his deductions is to
take as givens all the interesting sociological questions, answers to which
would lead to the development of the sociological laws needed to fill out
properly his deductive system. The end result is that an empirical gen-
eralization—say, Golden’s Law—may be explained without any of the de-
sirable components of a deductive system—clear sociological laws.
Such deductive systems will ultimately boil down to statements such
as: things are as they are because they are rewarding. What this does is
to repeat the empirical generalization to be explained in the words of
behavioral psychology, without logically deducing the generalization from
sociological laws, which, in turn, are deduced (if one is so inclined) from
psychological laws.*!

HOMANS’S IMAGE OF SOCIETY

What has always intrigued me about Homans’s approach is the substan-
tive image of society that he presents. I share his commitment to deductive
theory, although I think that he is premature in his overconcern with
psychological laws. But these kinds of criticisms aside, Homans has ap-
proached the substantive issues that divide sociologists in a very creative
way. The most prominent of these substantive issues is the micro versus
macro controversy that I outlined in Chapter 1. That is, how do we rec-
oncile the microprocesses of behavior, action, and interaction of individ-
uals with the macrostructures and institutions of society? How do we
explain their relationship? One answer is through deductive reduction;
that is, if sociological laws about social structures can be deduced from
those about individual behavior, then the micro-macro schism is resolved
by the logic of deductive reasoning. I find this answer less compelling
than the substantive image that Homans discursively develops in both
-

51The concepts of behavioral psychology do not have to muddle empirical generalizations.

so long as one does not prematurely try to deduce sociological propositions to crude psy-
chological propositions. In fact, operant principles can be used quite fruitfully to build (note:
not reduce) more complex exchange principles that pertain to sociological processes (note:
not psychological). For an impressive attempt at employing operant principles as a starting
point and then changing them to fit the facts of emergent properties, see Richard M. Emer-
son’s various works, especially “‘Power-Dependence Relations,” American Sociological Re-
view 27 (February 1962), pp. 31-41; “Power-Dependent Relations: Two Experiments,” So-
ciometry 27 (September 1964), pp. 282-98; “Operant Psychology and Exchange Theory,”
in Behavior Sociology: The Experimental Analysis of Social Process, ed. R. L. Burgess and
D. Bushell, Jr. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 379-405; and “Exchange
Theory, Part I: A Psychological Basis for Social Exchange” and “Exchange Theory, Part
II: Exchange Relations and Network Structures,” in Sociological Theories in Progress, ed.
J. Berger, M. Zelditch, Jr., and B. Anderson (New York: Houghton MifHin, 1972), pp. 38-
87.
256 CHAPTER 11 / THE EXCHANGE BEHAVIORISM OF GEORGE C. HOMANS

FIGURE 11-1 Homans's Image of Social Organization

1 2 3
Individuals New patterns of social Creating elaborated social
with capital organization which patterns employing
or resources provide capital for secondary reinforcers and
investors and payoffs explicit norms
for followers

Inturn, —
this elaborated
organizational
base allows
Organization allows for for expanded social
O Invest in expanded investment organization
(ne OS

The Human Group and Social Behavior. For I think that the substantive
vision of the social world first communicated in The Human Group and
expanded upon in the later exchange works is provocative and likely to
be the most enduring feature of Homans’s theoretical perspective. And
thus, Iet me close this chapter on Homans’s approach with a review of
this more substantive image of society.
In The Human Group, Homans’s numerous empirical generalizations
describe the processes of group elaboration and disintegration. Groups
are observed to differentiate into subgroups, to form leadership ranks, to
codify norms, to establish temporary equilibriums, and then, in his last
case study of a dying New England town, to reveal the converse of these
processes. In the later exchange works, the concepts of activities, inter-
actions, and sentiments, which are incorporated into the propositions
describing such group elaboration, are redefined in order to give Homans
the opportunity to explain why these processes should occur. Human
activity becomes action directed toward the attainment of rewards and
avoidance of punishments. Interaction becomes social behavior where the
mutual actions of individuals have cost and reward implications for the
parties to the interaction. People are now seen as emitting those activities
that increase the likelihood of profits—rewards less costs—measured against
a set of expectations. Such rewarding and costly exchanges of activities
are not viewed as necessarily involving the exchange of material rewards
and punishments, but more frequently “psychic profits.”
 HOMANS'’S IMAGE OF SOCIETY 257

a Eee er to ee ioe

4 5 6
Involving differentiation That can provide the basis
of social structures in for even more complex
terms of power and social patterns, but which
enforcement capacities fail to meet the primary
needs of some individuals

This differentiation
allows for more complex
social patterns

Just as he did in The Human Group, Homans enumerates concepts

that enable him to denote processes of group elaboration in his more
recent work. In Social Behavior, the particular explanations are of less
interest, I feel, than Homans’s descriptions of how vital group processes—
interaction, influence, conformity, competition, bestowal of esteem, jus-
tice, ranking, and innovation—ebb and flow as actors seek psychic profits
in their exchanges of rewards and punishments. In these descriptions,
considerable intuitive insight into the basic processes of human inter-
action is evident. It was these insights that made The Human Group
appealing, and I think that it is this same feature of Social Behavior that
makes it an important work.
Despite the suggestiveness of his descriptions of basic processes in
earlier chapters, the most theoretically interesting section of Social Be-
havior is the closing chapter, “The Institutional and the Subinstitu-
tional.” Introduced apologetically as a last-gasp “orgy,” Homans never-
theless returns to an issue first raised in The Human Group: the relationship
of processes in groups to the structures of larger societies, or “civiliza-
tions,” as he phrased the issue then. As he emphasized in the last par-
agraph of The Human Group, the development of civilizations is ulti-
mately carried out by persons in groups:

At the level of the smali group, society has always been able to cohere.
We infer, therefore, that if civilization is to stand, it must maintain, in the
258 CHAPTER 11 / THE EXCHANGE BEHAVIORISM OF GEORGE C. HOMANS

relation between the groups that make up society and the central direction
of society, some of the features of the small group itself.

In Social Behavior, Homans has a more sophisticated answer to why

it appears that society coheres around the small group: society is elabo-
rated and structured from fundamentally the same exchange processes
that cause the elaboration of the small group. All social structures are
thus built up from basically the same exchange processes. In the explication
of why this should be so, Homans provides an interesting image of how
patterns of social organization are created, maintained, changed, and bro-
ken down. This image is not developed into what can be considered ad-
equate theory, as has already been shown. But it does provide a vision of
the social world that can perhaps initiate a more useful exchange theoretic
perspective on the processes underlying various patterns of social
organization.
To explicate the relationship between elementary exchange processes
and more complex patterns of social organization, Homans—much like
Parsons a decade earlier—provides a sketch of the process of institution-
alization, which I have illustrated in Figure 11-1.*° At points in history,
some people have the “‘capital’”’ to reinforce or provide rewards for others,
whether it comes from their possessing a surplus of food, money, a moral
code, or valued leadership qualities. With such capital, “institutional elab-
oration” can occur, since some can invest their capital by trying to induce
others (through rewards or threats of punishments) to engage in novel
activities. These new activities can involve an ‘“‘intermeshing of the be-
havior of a large number of persons in a more complicated or roundabout
way than has hitherto been the custom.” Whether this investment in-
volves conquering territory and organizing a kingdom or creating a new
form of business organization, those making the investment must have
the resources—whether it be an army to threaten punishment, a charis-
matic personality to morally persuade followers, or the ability to provide
for people’s subsistence needs—to keep those so organized in a situation
where they derive some profit. At some point in this process, such or-
ganization can become more efficient and hence rewarding to all when
the rewards are clearly specified in terms of generalized reinforcers, such
as money, and when the activities expended to get their rewards are more
clearly specified, such as when explicit norms and rules emerge. In turn,
this increased efficiency allows for greater organization of activities. This

8*Homans, Human Group, p. 468.

**Homans, Social Behavior, Chapter 14. The reader should find interesting a comparison
of this model of institutionalization and that provided by Parsons, since Homans implicitly
sees this model as an alternative to that presented by functionalists such as Parsons. But
a careful reading of Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: Free Press, 1951), pp.
1-91 and his more recent work on evolution would reveal a remarkable similarity between
his conceptualization of this basic process and that of Homans. ,
 HOMANS'S IMAGE OF SOCIETY 259

new efficiency increases the likelihood that generalized reinforcers and

explicit norms will be used to regulate exchange relations and hence in-
crease the profits to those involved. Eventually, the exchange networks
involving generalized reinforcers and an increasingly complex body of
rules require differentiation or subunits—such as a legal and banking sys-
tem—that can maintain the stability of the generalized reinforcers and
the integrity of the norms.
Out of this kind of exchange process, then, social organization—whether
at a societal, group, organizational, or institutional level—is constructed.
The emergence of most patterns of organization is frequently buried in
the recesses of history, but such emergence is typified by these accelerating
processes: (1) People with capital (reward capacity) invest in creating
more complex social relations that increase their rewards and allow those
whose activities are organized to realize a profit. (2) With increased re-
wards, these people can invest in more complex patterns of organization.
(3) Increasingly complex patterns of organization require, first of all, the
use of generalized reinforcers and then the codification of norms to reg-
ulate activity. (4) With this organizational base, it then becomes possible
to elaborate further the pattern of organization, creating the necessity for
differentiation of subunits that assure the stability of the generalized
reinforcers and the integrity of norms. (5) With this differentiation, it is
possible to expand even further the networks of interaction, since there
are standardized means for rewarding activities and codifying new norms
as well as enforcing old rules.
However, these complex patterns of social organization employing
formal rules and secondary or generalized reinforcers can never cease to
meet the more primary needs of individuals.** Institutions first emerged
to meet these needs; and no matter how complex institutional arrange-
ments become and how many norms and formal rules are elaborated, these
extended interaction networks must ultimately reinforce humans’ more
primary needs. When these arrangements cease meeting the primary needs
from which they ultimately sprang, an institution is vulnerable and apt
to collapse if alternative actions, which can provide primary rewards,
present themselves as a possibility. In this situation, low- or high-status
persons—someone who has little to lose by nonconformity to existing
prescriptions—will break from established ways to expose to others a more
rewarding alternative. Institutions may continue to extract conformity
for a period, but they will cease to do so when they lose the capacity to
provide primary rewards. Thus, complex institutional arrangements must
ultimately be satisfying to individuals, not simply because of the weight
of culture or norms, but because they are constructed to serve people:
Institutions do not keep going just because they are enshrined in norms,
and it seems extraordinary that anyone should ever talk as if they did. They

Unfortunately, Homans never defines “primary need.”

260 CHAPTER 11 / THE EXCHANGE BEHAVIORISM OF GEORGE C. HOMANS

keep going because they have pay-offs, ultimately pay-offs for individuals.
Nor is society a perpetual-motion machine, supplying its own fuel. It cannot
keep itself going by planting in the young a desire for these goods and only
those goods that it happens to be in shape to provide. It must provide goods
that men find rewarding not simply because they are sharers in a particular
culture but because they are men.

The fact that institutions of society must also meet primary needs
sets the stage for a continual conflict between institutional elaboration
and the primary needs of humans. As one form of institutional elaboration
meets one set of needs, it may deprive people of other important rewards—
opening the way for deviation and innovation by those presenting the
alternative rewards that have been suppressed by dominant institutional
arrangements. In turn, the new institutional elaborations that may ensue
from innovators who have the capital to reward others will suppress other
needs, which, through processes similar to its inception, will set off an-
other process of institutional elaboration.
In sum, this sketch of how social organization is linked to elementary
processes of exchange represents an interesting perspective for analyzing
how patterns of social organization are built up, maintained, altered, and
broken down. Although there are obvious conceptual problems—for ex-
ample, the difficulty of distinguishing primary rewards from other types—
the image of society presented by Homans is provocative. It can perhaps
lead Homans to a fruitful strategy for developing a theory of exchange
relations.

Homans, Social Behavior, p. 366.

_____ The Structural Exchange __
__ Theory of Peter M. Blau

Peter M. Blau has been one of the most productive social theorists over
the last three decades. In his early work on informal processes within
bureaucracies, he noted how frequently employees exchanged assistance
with their work for respect, information for social approval, and other
processes of giving and receiving nonmaterial rewards. Yet, in looking
back on this early empirical work, he recently remarked, “I was not aware,
or did not remember, that conceptions of social exchange had been used
by many others before, from Aristotle to Mauss.”! In some ways, I think
that this ignorance may have been an advantage because in rediscovering
exchange processes, Blau created a constructive blend of exchange, func-
tional, and dialectical conflict theories. And although Blau has in recent
years abandoned his exchange approach for another theoretical strategy
(see Chapter 20),? I think that his exchange orientation is still very im-
portant and worthy of a more detailed analysis.®

1Peter M. Blau, “Contrasting Theoretical Perspectives,” paper delivered at the German-

American Theory Conference, 1984, p. 2.
2Peter M. Blau, Inequality and Heterogeneity (New York: Free Press, 1977).
’Peter M. Blau’s major exchange work is Exchange and Power in Social Life (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, 1964). This formal and expanded statement on his exchange perspective
was anticipated in earlier works. For example, see Peter M. Blau, “A Theory of Social
Integration,” American Journal of Sociology 65 (May 1960), pp. 545-56; and Peter M. Blau,
The Dynamics of Bureaucracy, 1st and 2d eds. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955,
1963). It is of interest to note that George C. Homans in Social Behavior: Its Elementary
Forms (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961) makes frequent reference to the data
summarized in this latter work. For a more recent statement of Blau’s position, see Peter
M. Blau, “Interaction: Social Exchange,” in International Encvelopaedia of the Social Sci-
ences, vol. 7 (New York: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 452-58.

261
262 CHAPTER 12 / THE STRUCTURAL EXCHANGE THEORY OF PETER M. BLAU

BLAU’S THEORETICAL STRATEGY

In contrast with Homans’s concern with developing deductive explana-
tions, Blau offers what he terms a theoretical prolegomenon—or a con-
ceptual sketch that can serve as a preliminary to more mature forms of
theorizing. In many ways, Blau’s strategy resembles Talcott Parsons’s,
for he appears less concerned with developing a rigorous system of prop-
ositions than with enumerating concepts that can capture in loosely phrased
and related propositions the fundamental processes occurring at diverse
levels of social organization. While there is less categorization than in
Parsons’s conceptual efforts, Blau is concerned with developing an initial
bundle of concepts and propositions that can provide insight into the
operation of a wide range of sociological processes, from the behavior of
individuals in small-group contexts to the operation of whole societies.
Yet, as his more recent theorizing reveals and as he was led to remark
in a retrospective look at his exchange approach, sociologists should be
concerned with exchange analysis because “it is one of the few subject
matters, outside of mathematical sociology, that lends itself to the de-
velopment of systematic axiomatic theory.’* Thus, although he does not
develop his exchange ideas into an axiomatic format as does George Ho-
mans (see Chapter 11), he clearly had this goal in mind. And as we will
see in Chapter 20, he has tried in recent years to implement a more formal
deductive approach. And so, as I proceed with Blau’s approach, I will
convert his ideas into formal principles. Such conversion is, I feel, in the
spirit of his underlying theoretical strategy.
But at this stage in his theoretical work on exchange, Blau tries to
use a bundle of exchange concepts and implicit principles to bridge the
micro-macro gap. For he thought that exchange theory could provide a
means for analyzing individual interactions as well as more structural
relations in terms of the same basic framework. Although he is no longer
so convinced that this can be the case, he sought in Exchange and Power
in Social Life to (1) conceptualize some of the simple and direct exchange
processes occurring in relatively small interaction networks and (2) then
expand the conceptual edifice to include some of the complexities inherent
in less direct exchange processes in larger social systems. In a vein similar
to Homans’s analysis, Blau first examines “elementary” forms of social
exchange with an eye to how they help in the analysis of “subinstitutional”
behavior. However, unlike Homans, who terminates his analysis by simply
presenting a conceptual “orgy” in Social Behavior,’ Blau begins to sup-
plement the exchange concepts describing elementary processes in an
effort to understand more complex processes of institutionalization.

‘Blau, “Contrasting Theoretical Perspectives.”

‘Homans, “The Institutional and the Subinstitutional,” Social Behavior, rev. ed.. C hap-
ter 16.
 BASIC EXCHANGE PRINCIPLES 263

Thus, in a manner reminiscent of Parsons’s analysis of the process

of institutionalization in The Social System® (see Chapter 3), Blau begins
with a conceptualization of basic interactive processes; then, utilizing and
supplementing the concepts developed in this analysis, he shifts to the
analysis of more elaborate institutional complexes.

BASIC EXCHANGE PRINCIPLES

I find that Blau does not define the variables in his exchange scheme as
explicitly as Homans does. Rather, considerably more attention is devoted
to defining exchange as a particular type of association, involving “actions
that are contingent on rewarding reactions from others and that cease
when these expected reactions are not forthcoming.’” For Blau, exchange
occurs only among those relationships in which rewards are expected and
received from designated others. Much like Parsons’s conception of vol-
untarism and Homans’s rationality proposition, Blau conceptualizes as
exchange activities only those behaviors that are oriented to specified
goals, or rewards, and that involve actors selecting from various potential
alternatives, or costs, a particular line of action that will yield an expected
reward. In pursuing rewards and selecting alternative lines of behavior,
actors are conceptualized as seeking a profit (rewards less costs) from
their relations with others. Thus, Blau employs the basic concepts of all
exchange theories—reward, cost, and profit—but he limits their applica-
tion to relations with others from whom rewards are expected and re-
ceived. This definition of exchange is considerably more limited than
Homans’s definition, which encompasses all activity as exchange, re-
gardless of whether rewards are expected or received.
In common with Homans, however, Blau recognizes that in focusing
on associations involving ‘‘an exchange of activity, tangible or intangible,
and more or less rewarding and costly, between two persons,” an ele-
mentary economic model is being employed.’ Indeed, social life is con-
ceived to be a marketplace in which actors negotiate with each other in
an effort to make a profit. But Blau shares the skepticism that led Homans
to reject the theory of games as good advice but a poor description of
human behavior and that induced Parsons’s earlier in The Structure of
Social Action to discard the extremes of utilitarianism.® Blau recognizes
that, unlike the simple “economic man” of classical economics (and of
more recent rationalistic models of human behavior), humans (1) rarely
pursue one specific goal to the exclusion of all others, (2) are frequently

*Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: Free Press, 1951), especially pp. 1-
200.
7Blau, Exchange and Power, p. 6.
*‘Thid., p. 88.
*Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937).
264 CHAPTER 12 / THE STRUCTURAL EXCHANGE THEORY OF PETER M. BLAU

e
ee

TABLE 12-1 Blau’s Implicit Exchange Principles

|. The Rationality Principle ie

The more profit people expect from one another in emitting a particular activity,
the more likely they are to emit that activity.
ll. The Reciprocity Principles
A. The more people have exchanged rewards with one another, the more likely
are reciprocal obligations to emerge and guide subsequent exchanges
among these persons.
B. The more the reciprocal obligations of an exchange relationship are violated,
the more are deprived parties disposed to sanction negatively those violating
the norm of reciprocity.
lll. The Justice Principles
A. The more exchange relations have been established, the more likely they are
to be governed by norms of “‘fair exchange.”
B. The less norms of fairness are realized in an exchange, the more are
deprived parties disposed to sanction negatively those violating the norms.
IV. The Marginal Utility Principle
The more expected rewards have been forthcoming from the emission of a
particular activity, the less valuable is the activity, and the less likely is its
emission.
V. The Imbalance Principle
The more stabilized and balanced are some exchange relations among social
units, the more likely are other exchange relations to become imbalanced and
unstable.

inconsistent in their preferences, (3) virtually never have complete in-

formation of alternatives, and (4) are never free from social commitments
limiting the available alternatives. Furthermore, in contrast with a purely
economic model of human transactions, social associations involve the
exchange of rewards whose value varies from one transaction to another
without a fixed market value and whose value cannot be expressed pre-
cisely in terms of a single, accepted medium of exchange (such as money).
In fact, the vagueness of the values exchanged in social life is a ‘“‘sub-
stantive fact, not simply a methodological problem.”!° As Blau empha-
sizes, the values people hold are inherently diffuse and ill defined."
As I just indicated, Blau does not develop explicit exchange axioms
or principles. But in Table 12-1, I have listed his basic ideas in propo-
sitional form. Proposition I, which I have termed the rationality principle,
combines Homans’s Axioms 1, 2, and 3, where rewarding stimulus situ-
ations, the frequency of rewards, and the value of rewards increase the

"Blau, Exchange and Power, p. 95.

“As I noted for Homans’s scheme, this “fact” creates both methodological and logical
problems. If value cannot be precisely measured, how is it possible to discern just how value
influences behavior? If value cannot be measured independently of the behavior it is sup-
posed to regulate, then propositions will be tautologous and of little use in building socio-
logical theory
 BASIC EXCHANGE PRINCIPLES 265

likelihood that actions would be emitted. Actually, as we saw in the last

chapter, Homans’s own deductive systems—for example, the one he con-
structed to explain Golden’s Law—collapses his first three axioms into a
similar rationality principle: “In choosing between alternative actions, a
person will choose that one for which as perceived by him at the time,
the value of the result, multiplied by the probability of getting the result,
is greater.’’!? In practice, then, Homans and Blau utilize the same basic
principle. Blau’s use of the concept “reward expectation” would encom-
pass the same phenomena denoted by Homans’s “perception of reward”
and “probability” of getting a reward.
Propositions II-A and II-B on reciprocity borrow from Malinowski’s
and Lévi-Strauss’s initial discussion as reinterpreted by Alvin Gouldner.*
Blau postulates that “the need to reciprocate for benefits received in order
to continue receiving them serves as a ‘starting mechanism’ of social
interaction.’’* Equally important, once exchanges have occurred, a ‘“‘fun-
damental and ubiquitous norm of reciprocity” emerges to regulate sub-
sequent exchanges. Thus, inherent in the exchange process, per se, is a
principle of reciprocity. Over time, and as the conditions of Principle I
are met, a social “norm of reciprocity,” whose violation brings about social
disapproval and other negative sanctions, emerges in exchange relations.
And I should emphasize here in anticipation of later discussion that vi-
olations of the norm of reciprocity become significant in Blau’s subsequent:
analysis of opposition and conflict.
Much like Homans, Blau recognizes that people establish expectations
about what level of reward particular exchange relations should yield.
Unlike Homans, however, Blau recognizes that these expectations are
normatively regulated. These normis are termed norms of fair exchange
since they determine what the proportion of rewards to costs should be
in a given exchange relation. And like Homans, Blau asserts that aggres-
sion is forthcoming when these norms of fair exchange are violated. I
have incorporated these ideas into Propositions III-A and III-B, terming
them the justice principles.
Following economists’ analyses of transactions in the marketplace,
Blau introduces a principle on “marginal utility” (Proposition IV). The
more a person has received a reward, the more satiated he or she is with
that reward, and the less valuable are further increments of the reward.'®

123Homans, Social Behavior, p. 43.

18A]vin W. Gouldner, “The Norm of Reciprocity,” American Sociological Review 25 (Aprii
1960), pp. 161-78.
“Blau, Exchange and Power, p. 92.
16See Peter M. Blau, “Justice in Social Exchange,” in Institutions and Social Exchange:
The Sociologies of Talcott Parsons and George C. Homans, ed. H. Turk and R. L. Simpson
(Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971), pp. 56-68; see also: Blau, Exchange and Power,
pp. 156-57.
*Blau, Exchange and Power, p. 90.
266 CHAPTER 12 / THE STRUCTURAL EXCHANGE THEORY OF PETER M. BLAU

I should note that this marginal utility principle is the same as Homans’s
axiom on “deprivation-satiation.” For both Blau and Homans, then, ac-
tors will seek alternative rewards until their level of satiation declines.
Blau’s exchange model is vitally concerned with the conditions under
which conflict and change occur in social systems, and so, these justice
principles become crucial generalizations. As I will document shortly, the
deprivations arising from violating the norms of fair exchange can lead
to retaliation against violators.
Proposition V on imbalance completes my listing of Blau’s abstract
laws. For Blau, as for all exchange theorists, established exchange relations
are seen to involve costs or alternative rewards foregone. Since most actors
must engage in more than one exchange relation, the balance and sta-
bilization of one exchange relation is likely to create imbalance and strain
in other necessary exchange relations. For Blau, social life is thus filled
with dilemmas in which people must successively trade off stability and
balance in one exchange relation for strain in others as they attempt to
cope with the variety of relations they must maintain. In his last chapter
on institutionalization, Homans hinted at this principle when he em-
phasized that, in satisfying some needs, institutional arrangements deny
others and thereby set into motion a perpetual dialectic between dominant
institutions and change-oriented acts of innovation and deviance.’ It is
from this concluding insight of Homans into the dialectical nature of
relationships between established social patterns and forces of opposition
that Blau is to begin his analysis of exchange in social life. Indeed, we
might even term Blau’s approach a dialectical exchange theory because
inherent in exchange relations are potentials for conflict. Indeed, as I
have indicated in the last chapter, Marxian conflict theory and exchange
theory have much in common, for both are concerned with the conditions
under which actors feel deprived of expected rewards and are mobilized
to redress their grievances.

BASIC EXCHANGE PROCESSES IN SOCIAL LIFE

Elementary Systems of Exchange

Blau initiates his discussion of elementary exchange processes with the
assumption that people enter into social exchange because they perceive
the possibility of deriving rewards (Principle I). Blau labels this perception
social attraction and postulates-that unless relationships involve such
attraction, they are not relationships of exchange. In entering an exchange
relationship, each actor assumes the perspective of another and thereby
derives some perception of the other’s needs. Actors then manipulate their

"Homans, Social Behavior, pp. 390-98 (1961 ed.); pp. 366-73 (1974 ed.).
 BASIC EXCHANGE PROCESSES IN SOCIAL LIFE 267

presentation of self so as to convince each other that they have the valued
qualities others appear to desire. In adjusting role behaviors in an effort
to impress others with the resources that they have to offer, people operate
under the principle of reciprocity, for by indicating that one possesses
valued qualities, each person is attempting to establish a claim on others
for the receipt of rewards from them. All exchange operates under the
presumption that people who bestow rewards will receive rewards in turn —
as payment for value received.
Actors attempt to impress each other through competition in which
they reveal the rewards they have to offer in an effort to force others, in
accordance with the norm of reciprocity, to reciprocate with an even more
valuable reward. Social life is thus rife with people’s competitive efforts
to impress each other and thereby extract valuable rewards. But as in-
teraction proceeds, it inevitably becomes evident to the parties to an
exchange that some people have more valued resources to offer than others,
putting them in a unique position to extract rewards from all others who
value the resources that they have to offer.
It is at this point in exchange relations that groups of individuals
become differentiated in terms of the resources that they possess and the
kinds of reciprocal demands they can make on others. Blau then asks an
analytical question: What generic types or classes of rewards can those
with resources extract in return for bestowing their valued resources upon
others? Blau conceptualizes four general classes of such rewards: money,
social approval, esteem or respect, and compliance. Although Blau does
not make full use of his categorization of rewards, he offers some sugges-
tive clues about how these categories can be incorporated into abstract
theoretical statements. Let me elaborate upon his argument.
Blau first ranks these generalized reinforcers in terms of their value
in exchange relations. In most social relations, money is an inappropriate
reward and hence is the least valuable reward. Social approval is an ap-
propriate reward, but for most humans it is not very valuable, thus forcing
those who derive valued services to offer with great frequency the more
valuable reward of esteem or respect to those providing valued services.
In many situations, the services offered can command no more than re-
spect and esteem from those receiving the benefit of these services. At
times, however, the services offered are sufficiently valuable to require
those receiving them to offer, in accordance with the principles of reci-
procity and justice, the most valuable class of rewards—compliance with
one’s requests.
When people can extract compliance in an exchange relationship, they
have power. They have the capacity to withhold rewarding services and
thereby punish or inflict heavy costs on those who might not comply. To
conceptualize the degree of power possessed by individuals, Blau for-
mulates four general propositions that determine the capacity of powerful
268 CHAPTER 12 / THE STRUCTURAL EXCHANGE THEORY OF PETER M. BLAU

TABLE 12-2 Blau’s Conditions for the Differentiation of Power in Social Exchange

|. The fewer services people can supply in return for the receipt of particularly
valued services, the more those providing these particularly valued services can
extract compliance.
ll. The fewer alternative sources of rewards people have, the more those providing
valuable services can extract compliance.
lll. The less those receiving valuable services from particular individuals can
employ physical force and coercion, the more tnose providing the services can
extract compliance.
IV. The less those receiving the valuable services can do without them, the more
those providing the services can extract compliance.

individuals to extract compliance. I have listed, and reformulated them

somewhat, in Table 12-2.'®
These four propositions list the conditions leading to differentiation
of members in social groups in terms of power. To the extent that group
members can supply some services in return, seek alternative rewards,
potentially use physical force, or do without certain valuable services,
individuals who can provide valuable services will be able to extract only
esteem and approval from group members. Such groups will be differ-
entiated in terms of prestige rankings but not power. Naturally, as Blau
emphasizes, most social groups reveal complex patterns of differentiation
of power, prestige, and patterns of approval, but of particular interest to
him are the dynamics involved in generating power, authority, and
opposition.
In focusing almost exclusively on the questions of power, authority,
and opposition, I think that Blau fails to complete his analysis of how
different types of social structures are influenced by the exchange of dif-
ferent classes of rewards. The logic of Blau’s argument would, I believe,
require additional propositions that would indicate how various types of
rewards lead to the differentiation of groups, not only in terms of power
and authority but also with respect to prestige rankings and networks of
social approval. Interesting theoretical questions left unanswered include:
What are the conditions for the emergence of different types of prestige
rankings? What are the conditions for the creation of various types of
approval networks? Presumably, answers to these questions are left for
others to provide. Blau chooses to focus primarily on the problem of how
power is converted into authority and how, in accordance with his basic
exchange principles listed in Table i2-1, various patterns of integration
and opposition become evident in human groupings.

“Blau, Exchange and Power, pp. 118-19.

 BASIC EXCHANGE PROCESSES IN SOCIAL LIFE 269

For Blau, power differentials in groups create two contradictory forces:

(1) strains toward integration and (2) strains toward opposition and
conflict.

Strains toward integration. Differences in power inevitably cre-

ate the potential for conflict. However, such potential is frequently sus-
pended by a series of forces promoting the conversion of power into au-
thority, in which subordinates accept as legitimate the leaders’ demands
for compliance. Principles II and III in Table 12-1 denote two processes
fostering such group integration: exchange relations always operate under
the presumption of reciprocity and justice, forcing those deriving valued
services to provide other rewards in payment. In providing these rewards,
subordinates are guided by rorms of fair exchange, in which the costs
that they incur in offering compliance are to be proportional to the value
of the services that they receive from leaders. Thus, to the extent that
actors engage in exchanges with leaders and to the degree that the services
provided by leaders are highly valued, subordination must be accepted as
legitimate in accordance with the norms of reciprocity and fairness that
emerge in all exchanges. Under these conditions, groups elaborate addi-
tional norms specifying just how exchanges with leaders are to be con-
ducted in order to regularize the requirements for reciprocity and to main-
tain fair rates of exchange. Leaders who conform to these emergent norms
can usually assure themselves that their leadership will be considered
legitimate. In fact, Blau emphasizes that if leaders abide by the norms
regulating exchange of their services for compliance, norms carrying neg-
ative sanctions typically emerge among subordinates stressing the need
for compliance to leaders’ requests. Through this process, subordinates
exercise considerable social control over each other’s actions and thereby
promote the integration of super- and subordinate segments of groupings.
Authority, therefore, “rests on the common norms in a collectivity
of subordinates that constrain its individual members to conform to the
orders of a superior.”!® In many patterns of social organization, these
norms simply emerge out of the competitive exchanges among collective
groups of actors. Frequently, however, in order for such “normative agree-
ments” to be struck, participants in an exchange must be socialized into
a common set of values that define not only what constitutes fair exchange
in a given situation but also the way such exchange should be institu-
tionalized into norms for both leaders and subordinates. Although it is
quite possible for actors to arrive at normative consensus in the course
of the exchange process itself, an initial set of common values facilitates
the legitimation of power. Actors can now enter into exchanges with a
common definition of the situation, which can provide a general framework

*Tbid., p. 208.
270 CHAPTER 12 / THE STRUCTURAL EXCHANGE THEORY OF PETER M. BLAU

for the normative regulation of emerging power differentials. Without

common values, the competition for power is likely to be severe. In the
absence of guidelines about reciprocity and fair exchange, considerable
strain and tension will persist as definitions of these are worked out. For
Blau, then, legitimetion “entails not merely tolerant approval but active
confirmation and promotion of social patterns by common values, either
preexisting ones or those that emerge in a collectivity in the course of
social interaction.””°
With the legitimation of power through the normative regulation of
interaction, as confirmed by common values, the structure of collective
organization is altered. One of the most evident changes is the decline in
interpersonal competition, for now actors’ presentations of self shift from
a concern of impressing others with their valuable qualities to an emphasis
on confirming their statuses as loyal group members. Subordinates come
to accept their statuses and manipulate their role behaviors to assure that
they receive social approval from their peers as a reward for conformity
to group norms. Leaders can typically assume a lower profile, since they
must no longer demonstrate their superior qualities in each and every
encounter with subordinates—especially since norms now define when and
how they should extract conformity and esteem for providing their valued
services. Thus, with the legitimation of power as authority, the interactive
processes (involving the way group members define the situation and
present themselves to others) undergo a dramatic change, reducing the
degree of competition and thereby fostering group integration.
With these events, the amount of direct interaction between leaders
and subordinates usually declines, since power and ranking no longer must
be constantly negotiated. This decline in direct interaction marks the
formation of distinct subgroupings as members seek to interact with those
of their own social rank, avoiding the costs of interacting with either their
inferiors or superiors.”! In interacting primarily among themselves, sub-
ordinates avoid the high costs of interacting with leaders; and although
social approval from their peers is not a particularly valuable reward, it
can be extracted with comparatively few costs—thus allowing for a suf-
ficient profit. Conversely, leaders can avoid the high costs (in terms of
time and energy) of constantly competing and negotiating with inferiors
over when and how compliance and esteem are to be bestowed upon them.
Instead, by having relatively limited and well-defined contact with sub-
ordinates, they can derive the high rewards that come from compliance
and esteem without incurring excessive costs in interacting with subor-
dinates—thereby allowing for a profit.

*Thid., p. 221.
As will be recalled from Chapter 11, these processes were insightfully described by
George C. Homans in The Human Group (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1950).
 BASIC EXCHANGE PROCESSES IN SOCIAL LIFE 271

Strains toward opposition. Thus far, I see Blau’s exchange per-

spective as decidedly functional. Social exchange processes—attraction,
competition, differentiation, and integration—are analyzed in terms of
how they contribute to creating a legitimated set of normatively regulated
relations. In a manner similar to Parsons’s discussion of institutionali-
zation, Blau emphasizes the importance of common values as a significant
force in creating patterns of social organization. However, Blau is keenly
aware that social organization is always rife with conflict and opposition,
creating an inevitable dialectic between integration and opposition in
social structures. Recognition of this fact leads Blau to assert:
The functional approach reinforces the overemphasis on integrative social
forces ... whereas the dialectical perspective counteracts it by requiring ex-
plicit concern with disruptive tendencies in social structures. The pursuit of
systematic analysis and the adoption of a dialectical perspective create a
dilemma for the sociologist, who must rivet his attention on consistent social
patterns for the sake of the former and on inconsistencies in accordance with
the latter. This dilemma, like others, is likely to give rise to alternating de-
velopments, making him veer in one direction at one time and in the opposite
at another.” |

What I think is especially important about Blau’s perspective is that,

in adopting dialectical assumptions, he does not reject the useful tenets
of functionalism. Blau recognizes that patterns of social organization are
created and maintained as well as changed and broken down, leading him
to seek the principles that can explain this‘spectrum of events. Thus,
unlike Dahrendorf’s conflict model, in which the organization of authority
relations in imperatively coordinated associations (ICAs) and the oppo-
sition of quasi groups were merely taken as givens, Blau seeks to address
the question of how, and through what processes, authority structures
such as ICAs are created. In so doing, Blau is in a much better analytical
position than Dahrendorf and other dialectical theorists to document how
the creation of social structure can also set in motion forces for conflict
and change. As I emphasized in my earlier discussion of conflict theory,
to assert that conflict is endemic to authority relations in social structure
and then to analyze how conflict changes structures is to define away the
interesting theoretical question: under what conditions, in what types of
structures, revealing what types of authority that have arisen through
what processes, is what type of conflict likely to emerge? I feel that Blau’s
discussion of strains for integration represents an attempt to answer this
question and provide a more balanced theoretical framework for discuss-
ing opposition and conflict in social systems.

@Peter M. Blau, “Dialectical Sociology: Comments,” Sociological Inquiry 42 (Spring

1972), p. 185. This article was written in reply to an attempt to document Blau’s shift from
a functional to dialectical perspective; see Michael A. Weinstein and Deena Weinstein,
“Blau’s Dialectical Sociology,” ibid., pp. 173-82.
272 CHAPTER 12 / THE STRUCTURAL EXCHANGE THEORY OF PETER M. BLAU

Blau’s exchange principles, which I summarized in Table 12-1, allow

for the conceptualization of these strains for opposition and conflict. As
Principle II-B on reciprocity documents, the failure to receive expected
rewards in return for various activities leads actors to attempt to apply
negative sanctions that, when ineffective, can drive people to violent re-
taliation against those who have denied them an expected reward. Such
retaliation is intensified by the dynamics summarized in Principle III-B
on justice and fair exchange, since when those in power violate such
norms, they inflict excessive costs on subordinates, creating a situation
that, at a minimum, leads to attempts to sanction negatively and, at most,
to retaliation. Finally, Principle V on the inevitable imbalances emerging
from multiple exchange relations emphasizes that to balance relations in
one exchange context by meeting reciprocal obligations and conforming
to norms of fairness is to put into imbalance other relations. Thus, the
imbalances potentially encourage a cyclical process in which actors seek
to balance previously unbalanced relations and thereby throw into im-
balance currently balanced exchanges. In turn, exchange relations that
are thrown into imbalance violate the norms of reciprocity and fair ex-
change, thus causing attempts at negative sanctioning and, under some
conditions, retaliation. For Blau, then, built into all exchange relation-
ships are sources of imbalance. When severely violating norms of reci-
procity and fair exchange, these imbalances can lead to open conflict
among individuals in group contexts.
I see these suggestive ideas as simply stating what can occur, without
specifying the conditions under which the forces that they denote will
actually be set into motion. Unfortunately, Blau provides few specific
propositions that indicate when opposition will be activated. And when
Blau does undertake a limited discussion of the conditions leading to
increasingly intense forms of opposition, I see his propositions as resem-
bling Dahrendorf’s discussion of the technical, political, and social con-
ditions of conflict group organization.
In Table 12-3, I summarize Blau’s ideas in propositional form.?* To
appreciate the degree to which these propositions resemble those in con-
flict theory, I suggest that Table 12-3 be compared with Tables 6-1 and
7-1. For in the end, I believe that dialectical conflict theory and exchange
theory are converging perspectives. In fact, I would go so far as to argue
that conflict theory is a derivative of exchange theory, although I am sure
that many would argue just the reverse. In either case, the perspectives
converge.
From the discursive context in which the propositions in Table 12-
3 are imbedded comes a concepiualization of opposition. Blau hypoth-
esizes that the more imbalanced exchange relations are experienced col-

*Blau, Exchange and Power, pp. 224-52.

 BASIC EXCHANGE PROCESSES IN SOCIAL LIFE 273

TABLE 12-3 Bilau’s Principles of Exchange Conflict

EE EET Yee Bhien Pin mite i ale mekeialis s.SLO0.> ©" eal eee a
I. The more exchange relations between super- and subordinates become
imbalanced, the greater is the probability of opposition to those with power.
A. The more norms of reciprocity are violated by the superordinates, the
greater is the imbalance.
B. The more norms of fair exchange are violated by superordinates, the greater
is the imbalance.
ll. The more individuals experience collectively relations of imbalance with
Superordinates, the greater is their sense of deprivation, and the greater is the
probability of opposition to those with power.
A. The less is the spatial dispersion of subordinates, the more likely are they to
experience collectively relations of imbalance with superordinates.
B. The more subordinates can communicate with each other, the more likely
are they to experience collectively relations of imbalance with
superordinates.
Ill. The more subordinates can experience collectively deprivations in exchange
relations with superordinates, the more likely are they to codify ideologically
their deprivations and the greater their opposition to those with power.
IV. The more deprivations of subordinates are ideologically codified, the greater is
their sense of solidarity, and the greater is the probability of opposition.
V. The greater is the sense of solidarity among subordinates, the more they can
define their opposition as a noble and worthy cause, and the greater is the
probability of their Opposition to those with power.
Vi. The greater is the sense of ideological solidarity, the more likely are
subordinates to view opposition as an end in itself, and the greater is the
probability of opposition to those with power.

lectively, the greater is the sense of deprivation and the greater is the
potential for opposition. While he does not explicitly state the case, he
appears to hold that increasing ideological codification of deprivations,
the formation of group solidarity, and the emergence of conflict as a way
of life will increase the intensity of the opposition—that is, members’
emotional involvement in and commitment to opposition to those with
power. I think that these propositions offer a suggestive lead for concep-
tualizing inherent processes of opposition in exchange relations. More-
over, unlike Dahrendorf’s dialectical model, Blau’s scheme presents the-
oretical insight into how the creation of relations of authority can also
cause opposition. Indeed, I see Blau’s conceptualization of the processes
of institutionalization and conflict in terms of the same abstract exchange
principles as representing a significant improvement over Dahrendorf’s
model, which failed to specify either how institutionalized patterns of
latent conflicts first emerge in authority systems. I also believe that Blau’s
presentation represents an improvement over Homans’s analysis of in-
stitutionalization and of the inherent conftict between the institutional
and subinstitutional. In Blau’s scheme there is a more adequate concep-
tualization of the process of institutionalization of those power relations
from which opposition, innovation, and deviance ultimately spring.
274 CHAPTER 12 / THE STRUCTURAL EXCHANGE THEORY OF PETER M. BLAU

Despite these strengths, however, I think that Blau’s model can be

improved by: (a) more precise formulation of the conditions under which
exchange imbalances are likely for various types of social units; and then
(b) specification of the conditions leading to various levels of intensity,
violence, and duration in relations of opposition among various types of
social units.
In looking back on Blau’s discussion of microexchange processes, it
is clear that he visualizes a series of basic exchange processes in human
groupings: attraction, competition, differentiation, integration, and op-
position. Of particular interest are the processes of differentiation in terms
of power and how this pattern of differentiation creates strains for both
integration and opposition—thus giving social reality a dialectical character.
Also noteworthy in the perspective is the attempt to utilize concepts
developed in the analysis of elementary exchange processes in order to
examine more complex exchange processes among the macrosocia! units
of social systems. Of great significance is Blau’s recognition of the ne-
cessity for reformulating and supplementing elementary exchange con-
cepts when analyzing more complex social processes. But, as I indicated
earlier, Blau is now convinced that this strategy was unsuccessful. For he
had hoped that exchange theory:

could serve as a microsociological foundation for building a macrosocio-

logical theory of social structure. This is what I attempted . . . but I was more
successful in the microsociological analysis of exchange processes than in
employing the micro principles as the groundwork for building a vigorous
macrostructural theory.”

And so, as a result, he shifted his theoretical approach to macro-

structure, as I will discuss in Chapter 20. But I am not so convinced that
Blau was correct in abandoning this exchange approach for macropro-
cesses, and therefore, I still think it useful to summarize the key elements
of his macroexchange perspective.

Exchange Systems and Macrostructure

While the general processes of attraction, competition, differentiation,
integration, and opposition are evident in the exchanges among macro-
structures, Blau sees several fundamental differences between these ex-
changes and those among microstructures.

1. In complex exchanges among macrostructures, the significance of

“shared values” increases, for it is through such values that indirect
exchanges among macrostructures are mediated.

“Blau, “Contrasting Theoretical Perspectives.”

 BASIC EXCHANGE PROCESSES IN SOCIAL LIFE 275

2. Exchange networks among macrostructures are typically institu-

tionalized. Although spontaneous exchange is a ubiquitous feature
of social life, there are usually well-established historical arrange-
ments that circumscribe the operation of the basic exchange pro-
cesses of attraction, competition, differentiation, integration, and
even opposition among collective units.
3. Since macrostructures are themselves the product of more ele-
mentary exchange processes, the analysis of macrostructures re-
quires the analysis of more than one level of social organization.

Mediating values. For Blau, the “interpersonal attraction” of el-

ementary exchange among individuals is replaced by shared values at the
macro level. These values can be conceptualized as “media of social trans-
actions” in that they provide a common set of standards for conducting
the complex chains of indirect exchanges among social structures and
their individual members. Such values are viewed by Blau as providing
effective mediation of complex exchanges by virtue of the fact that the
individual members of social structures have usually been socialized into
a set of common values, leading them to accept them as appropriate.
Furthermore, when coupled with codification into laws and enforcement
procedures by those groups and organizations with power, shared values
provide a means for mediating the complex and indirect exchanges among
the macrostructures of large-scale systems. In mediating indirect ex-
changes among groups and organizations, shared values provide standards
for the calculation of: (a) expected rewards, (b) reciprocity, and (c) fair
exchange.
Thus, since individuals are not the units of complex exchanges, Blau
emphasizes that in order for complex patterns of social organization to
emerge and persist, it is necessary for a ‘functional equivalent” of direct
interpersonal attraction to exist. Values assume this function and assure
that exchange can proceed in accordance with the principles presented
in Table 12-1. And even when complex exchanges do involve people, their
interactions are frequently so protracted and indirect that one individual’s
rewards are contingent on others who are far removed, requiring that
common values guide and regulate the exchanges.
I think that there is considerable similarity between Blau’s concern
with “mediating values” and Parsons’s analysis of “generalized media of
exchange” (see Chapter 3).2 Although the respective conceptualizations

*Ibid., pp. 253-311.

*See discussion in Chapter 3, as well as Talcott Parsons, “On the Concept of Political
Power,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 107 (June 1963), pp. 232-62;
Talcott Parsons, “On the Concept of Influence,” Public Opinion Quarterly 7 (Spring 1963),
pp. 37-67; and Talcott Parsons, “Some Problems of General Theory,” in Theoretical So-
ciology: Perspectives and Developments, ed. J. C. McKinney and FE. A. Tiryakian (New
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970), pp. 28-68. See also T. S. Turner, “Parsons’ Concept
of Generalized Media of Social Interaction and Its Relevance for Social Anthropology,”
Sociological Inquiry 38 (Spring 1968), pp. 121-34.
276 CHAPTER 12 / THE STRUCTURAL EXCHANGE THEORY OF PETER M. BLAU

of the general classes and types of media differ, each is concerned with
how social relationships utilize in varying contexts distinctive symbols,
not only to establish the respective values of actions among exchange
units but also to specify just how the exchange should be conducted. For
without shared values, exchange is tied to the direct interpersonal inter-
actions of individuals. Since virtually all known social systems involve
indirect exchange relations among various types of social units—from
individuals and groups to organizations and communities—it is necessary
to conceptualize just how this can occur. For Blau, mediating values are
a critical condition for the development of complex exchange systems.
Without them, social organization beyond face-to-face interaction would
not be possible.

Institutionalization. While values facilitate processes of indirect

exchange among diverse types of social units, institutionalization denotes
those processes that regularize and stabilize complex exchange processes.”’
As people and various forms of collective organization become dependent
upon particular networks of indirect exchange for expected rewards, pres-
sures for formalizing exchange networks through explicit norms increase.
This formalization and regularization of complex exchange systems can
be effective under three minimal conditions: (1) The formalized exchange
networks must have profitable payoffs for most parties to the exchange.
(2) Most individuals organized into collective units must have internalized
through prior socialization the mediating values used to build exchange
networks. And (3) those units with power in the exchange system must
receive a level of rewards that moves them to seek actively the formali-
zation of rules governing exchange relations.
Institutions are historical products whose norms and underlying me-
diating values are handed down from one generation to another, thereby
limiting and circumscribing the kinds of indirect exchange networks that
can emerge. Institutions exert a kind of external constraint on individuals
and various types of collective units, bending exchange processes to fit
their prescriptions and proscriptions. Institutions thus represent sets of
relatively stable and general norms regularizing different patterns of in-
direct and complex exchange relations among diverse social units.
I see this conception of institutionalization as similar to the somewhat
divergent formulations of both Parsons and Homans. Although institu-
tions represent for both of them the regularization through norms of
interaction patterns, Parsons visualizes institutions as normative struc-
tures, infused with values that allow for the patterning of interaction
among diversely oriented and goal-seeking actors, whereas Homans con-
siders institutions as the formalization through norms and generalized

"Blau, Exchange and Power, pp. 273-80.

 BASIC EXCHANGE PROCESSES IN SOCIAL LIFE 277

reinforcers of exchange relations that ultimately have payoffs for each

individual involved. Despite their respective points of emphasis, however,
both are concerned with the basic process through which norms emerge
to facilitate the attainment of goals and rewards by social units. Both
view the formalization of such institutional norms as allowing for ex-
panded networks of interaction or exchange among various social units.
Blau draws from both these perspectives by emphasizing, in a vein similar
to Homans, that institutionalized patterns of interaction must have pay-
offs for the reward-seeking individuals involved and, in a way reminiscent
of Parsons, that shared values must exist prior to effective institution-
alization of indirect exchange relations. In this way, Blau apparently has
sought to weld exchange-theoretical principles to the functionalist’s con-
cern with how values and norms account for the emergence and persis-
tence of complex social systems.
In doing so, Blau, I sense, recognizes Homans’s failure to develop
concepts that describe the various types and classes of institutionalized
exchange systems. In an effort to correct for this oversight, Blau develops
a typology of institutions embracing both the substance and style of the
Parsonian formulation. Just as Parsons employed the pattern variables
(see Chapter 3) to describe the values guiding institutionalized patterns,
Blau attempts to classify institutions in terms of the values they appear
to embody in their normative structure. He posits three generic types of
institutions: (1) Integrative institutions “perpetuate particularistic values,
maintain social solidarity, and preserve the distinctive character and iden-
tity of the social structure.’’* (2) Distributive institutions embody univ-
ersalistic values and operate to “preserve the social arrangements that
have been developed for the production and distribution of needed social
facilities, contributions, and rewards of various kinds.’ And (3) orga-
nizational institutions utilize values legitimating authority and serve “to
perpetuate the authority and organization necessary to mobilize resources
and coordinate collective effort in the pursuit of social objectives.’
However, Blau also recognizes that in this form of typologizing, the
potential is great for connoting an image of society as static and equilib-
rium maintaining. Thus, drawing from Homans’s recognition that insti-
tutions are accepted only as long as they have payoffs for humans’ primary
needs and from Dahrendorf’s concern with the inherent sources of conflict
and change in all relations of authority, Blau stresses that all

*Ibid., p. 278.
*Tbid.
*~Ibid., p. 279. It is of interest to note that Blau implicitly defines institutions in terms
of their functions for the social whole. Although these functions are not made explicit, they
are similar to Parsons’s requisites. For example, integrative institutions appear to meet
needs for latency; distributive institutions, for adaptation; and organizational institutions,
for integration and goal attainment.
278 CHAPTER 12 / THE STRUCTURAL EXCHANGE THEORY OF PETER M. BLAU

institutionalized exchange systems reveal a counterinstitutional compo-

nent “consisting of those basic values and ideals that have not been re-
alized and have not found expression in explicit institutional forms, and
which are the ultimate source of social change.””*! To the extent that these
values remain unrealized in institutionalized exchange relations, individ-
uals who have internalized them will derive little payoff from existing
institutional arrangements and will therefore feel deprived, seeking al-
ternatives to dominant institutions. These unrealized values, even when
codified into an opposition ideology advocating open revolution, usually
contain at least some of the ideals and ultimate objectives legitimated by
the prevailing culture. This indicates that institutional arrangements
“contain the seeds of their potential destruction” by failing to meet all
of the expectations of reward raised by institutionalized values.
Blau does not enumerate extensively the conditions for mobilization
of individuals into conflict groups, but his scheme explicitly denotes the
source of conflict and change: counterinstitutional values whose failure
of realization by dominant institutional arrangements create deprivations
that, under unspecified conditions, can lead to conflict and change in
social systems. In this way, Blau attempts to avoid the predictable charges
leveled against almost any form of functional analysis for failing to ac-
count for the sources of conflict, deviance, and change in social systems.
Unlike the Dahrendorf model of dialectical conflict, however, Blau’s scheme
does not just assert the pervasiveness of conflict and change in social
systems but also attempts to document how opposition forces, culminating
in conflict and change, are created by the very processes that lead to the
institutionalization of power in complex exchange systems.
Such tendencies for complex exchange systems to generate opposition
are explicable in terms of the basic principles of exchange. When certain
mediating values are not institutionalized in a social system, exchange
relations will not be viewed as reciprocated by those who have internalized
these values. Thus, in accordance with Blau’s principles on reciprocity
(see Table 12-1), these segments of a collectivity are more likely to feel
deprived and to seek ways of retaliating against the dominant institutional
arrangements, which, from the perspective dictated by their values, have
failed to reciprocate. For those who have internalized values that are not
institutionalized, it is also likely that perceptions of fair exchange have
been violated, leading them, in accordance with the principles on justice,
to attempt to sanction negatively those arrangements that violate alter-
native norms of fair exchange. Finally, in institutionalized exchange net-
works, the balancing of exchange relations with some segments of a col-
lectivity inevitably creates imbalances in relations with other segments
(the imbalance principle in Table 12-1), thereby violating norms of re-
ciprocity and fairness and setting into motion forces of opposition.

"Blau, Exchange and Power, p. 279.

 BASIC EXCHANGE PROCESSES IN SOCIAL LIFE 279

Unlike direct interpersonal exchanges, however, opposition in com-

plex exchange systems is between large collective units of organization,
which, in their internal dynamics, reveal their own propensities for in-
tegration and opposition. This fact requires that the analysis of integra-
tion and opposition in complex exchange networks be attuned to various
levels of social organization. Such analysis needs to show, in particular,
how exchange processes among macrostructures, whether for integration
or opposition, are partly influenced by the exchange processes occurring
among their constituent substructures.

Levels of social organization. To a great extent, Blau believes,

the “dynamics of macro structures rests on the manifold interdependence
between the social forces within and among their substructures.’’? The
patterns of interdependence among the substructures of distinguishable
macrostructures are various, including: (a) joint membership by some
members of macrostructures in constituent substructures; (b) mobility of
members between various substructures of macrostructures; and (c) direct
exchange relations among the substructures of different macrostructure.
To discern these dynamics of substructures and how they influence
exchanges among macrostructures, Blau first questions what generic types
of substructures exist, resulting in the isolation of four classes of sub-
structures: “categories,” “communities,” “organized collectivities,” and
“social systems.” Categories refer to an attribute, such as race, sex, and
age, that “‘actually governs the relations among people and their orien-
tations to each other.’* Communities are “collectivities organized in given
territories, which typically have their own government and geographical
boundaries that preclude their being overlapping, though every commu-
nity includes smaller and is part of larger territorial organizations.”*
Organized collectivities are “associations of people with a distinctive so-
cial organization, which may range from a small informal friendship clique
to a large bureaucratized formal organization.”*> Social systems “consist
not of the social relations in specific collectivities but of analytical prin-
ciples or organization, such as the economy of a society or its political
institutions.”
Values mediate the processes within these various types of substruc-
tures. However, discerning the complex relationships between the me-
diating values of substructures and those of macrostructures poses one of
the most difficult problems of analysis. On the one hand, some values
must cut across the substructures of a macrostructure if the latter is to

*Tbid., p. 284.
*Tbid., p. 285.
*“Thid.
*Tbid.
*Thid.
280 CHAPTER 12 / THE STRUCTURAL EXCHANGE THEORY OF PETER M. BLAU

remain minimally integrated; on the other hand, values of various sub-

structures not only can segregate substructures from each other, but also
generate conflict among them. Further, the relations among substructures
involve the same basic exchange processes of attraction, competition, and
differentiation in terms of the services they can provide for each other.
It thus becomes evident that the analysis of exchange networks among
macrostructures forces examination of the exchange processes of their
substructures. Additionally, the relations among these substructures are
complicated by the fact that they often have overlapping memberships
or mobility of members between them, making the analysis of attraction,
competition, differentiation, integration, and opposition increasingly
difficult.
Blau simplifies the complex analytical task of examining the dynamics
of substructures by positing that organized collectivities, especially formal
organizations, are the most important substructures in the analysis of
macrostructures. As explicit goal (reward) seeking structures that fre-
quently cut across social categories and communities and that form the
substructures of analytical social systems, collectivities are mainly re-
sponsible for the dynamics of macrostructures. Thus, the theoretical anal-
ysis of complex exchange systems among macrostructures requires that
primary attention be drawn to the relations of attraction, competition,
differentiation, integration, and opposition among various types of com-
plex organizations. In emphasizing the pivotal significance of complex
organizations, Blau posits a particular image of society that should guide
the ultimate construction of sociological theory.

THE ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF SOCIETY

Organizations in a society must typically derive rewards from each other,
thus creating a situation in which they are both attracted to, and in
competition with, each other. Out of this competition, hierarchical dif-
ferentiation between successful and less successful organizations operating
in the same sphere emerges. Such differentiation usually creates strains
toward specialization in different fields among less successful organiza-
tions as they seek to provide particular goods and services for dominant
organizations and each other. If such differentiation and specialization
among organizations is to provide effective means for integration, separate
political organizations must also emerge to regulate their exchanges. Such
political organizations possess power and are viewed as legitimate only
as long as they are considered by individuals and organizations to follow
the dictates of shared cultural vaives. Typically, political organizations
are charged with several objectives: (1) regulating complex networks of
indirect exchange by the enactment of laws; (2) controlling through law
competition among dominant organizations, thereby assuring the latter
of scarce resources; (3) protecting existing exchange networks among or-
 THE ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF SOCIETY 281

ganizations, especially those with power, from encroachment on these

rewards by organizations opposing the current distribution of resources.
For Blau, then, it is out of the competition among organizations in
a society that differentiation and specialization occur among macro-
structures. While mediating values allow differentiation and specialization
among organizations to occur, it is also necessary for separate political
organizations to exist and regularize, through laws and the use of force,
existent patterns of exchange among other organizations. Such political
organizations will be viewed as legitimate as long as they normatively
regulate exchanges that reflect the tenets of mediating values and protect
the payoffs for most organizations, especially the most powerful. However,
the existence of political authority inevitably encourages opposition move-
ments, for now opposition groups have a clear target—the political or-
ganizations—against which to address their grievances. As long as political
authority remains diffuse, opposition organizations can only compete un-
successfully against various dominant organizations. With the legitima-
tion of clear-cut political organizations charged with preserving current
patterns of organization, opposition movements can concentrate their
energies against one organization, the political system.
In addition to providing deprived groups with a target for their aggres-
sions, political organizations inevitably must aggravate the deprivations
of various segments of a population, because political control involves
exerting constraints and distributing resources unequally. Those segments
of the population that must bear the brunt of such constraint and unequal
distribution usually experience great deprivation in terms of the principles
of reciprocity and fair exchange, which, under various conditions, creates
a movement against the existing political authorities. To the extent that
this organized opposition forces redistribution of rewards, other segments
of the population are likely to feel constrained and deprived, leading them
to organize into an opposition movement. These facts indicate that the
organization of political authority assures that, in accordance with the
principle of imbalance, attempts to balance one set of exchange relations
among organizations throw into imbalance other exchange relations, caus-
ing the formation of opposition organizations. Thus, built into the struc-
ture of political authority in a society are inherent forces of opposition
that give society a dialectical and dynamic character.
Echoing the assumptions of Dahrendorf and Coser, Blau concep-
tualizes opposition as representing ‘‘a regenerative force that interjects
new vitality into a social structure and becomes the basis of social re-
organization.’’*? However, the extent to which opposition can result in
dramatic social change is limited by several counterforces:** (1) The

*[bid., p. 301. Such a position is inevitable in light of Blau’s explicitly stated belief that
“our society is in need of fundamental reforms” (Blau, “Dialectical Sociology,” p. 184).
*Blau, “Dialectical Sociology,” p. 187; Blau, Exchange and Power, pp. 301-9.
282 CHAPTER 12 / THE STRUCTURAL EXCHANGE THEORY OF PETER M. BLAU

FIGURE 12-1 Bilau’s Image of Social Organization

MICROEXCHANGE
Strains toward integration
(creation of organized
collectivity)
1. Legitimation of
inf power through
authority
Exchange of ——» Competition for ———» Differentiation 2. Subordinate Social —
j —+s
eg 1. Esteem social control attraction
pre ee
1. Impression 2. Power pees SE
among

Oe mea 2, aimee. Potential conflict collectivities

2. Extrinsic qualities
Strains toward opposition
1. Denial of
expected rewards
2. Violation of
norms of fair
exchan 2
3. False reciprocate Mediating
4. Blau’s conditions values provide |
listed in Chapter 12 basis for
Socialization Norms of “fair attraction
into common exchange”
values Cultural and
legal prohibitions From other
micro exchanges

interdependence of the majority of organizations upon each other for

rewards gives each a vested interest in the status quo, thus providing
strong resistance to opposition organizations. (2) Dominant organizations
that have considerable power to bestow rewards on other organizations
independently of political organizations have a particularly strong vested
interest in existing arrangements, thereby assuring their resistance to
change-oriented organizations. (3) By virtue of controlling the distribu-
tion of valued resources, both dominant and political organizations are
in a strategic position to make necessary concessions to opposition groups,
thereby diffusing their effective organization. (4) Opposition movements
must overcome the internalization of values by the majority; and without
control of the means of socialization, their ideological call for organization
is likely to fall on unsympathetic ears. (5) Societies composed of exchange
networks among complex organizations typically reveal high levels of so-
cial mobility up the organizational hierarchy, thus increasing the diffi-
culties involved in organizing a stable constituency.*®
In reviewing Blau’s analysis of exchanges among organizations in a
society, it is evident that he has attempted to cast many of the assump-
tions and propositions of Parsons, Dahrendorf, and Coser into an ex-
change perspective that extends Homans’s insights beyond the analysis
of individuals. In discussing the developments of exchange systems among
organizations and of political authority, Blau focuses on the institution-
alization of relations among what Parsons termed social systems. The fact

*However, Blau recognizes that high rates of mobility in a society can also increase the
sense of relative deprivation of those who are denied opportunities for advancement, thereby
making them likely constituents of an opposition organization.
 THE ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF SOCIETY 283

MACROEXCHANGE

Strains for integration

among organization
1. Political coalitions
2. Resistance to change
Exchange of —_e Competition ——© Differentiation 3. Legitimation
rewards for power

Potential conflict

Strains for opposition

to new levels of
organization among
collectiveness

—_ . Norms of
“fair
s exchange”
2. Political
authority
3. Laws

that such institutionalization rests upon the internalization of shared

values and that institutional patterns can be typologized in terms of the
dominance of various clusters of values further underscores Blau’s ana-
lytical debt to Parsons. In contrast with Parsons’s less explicit analysis,
Blau’s discussion is concerned with mechanisms of social change. Em-
bracing Marx’s, Dahrendorf’s, and Simmel’s assumptions of the dialectical
forces of opposition inherent in all micro and macro relations of power
and authority, Blau visualizes the source of conflict in the unbalanced
exchange relations, violating norms of reciprocity and fairness, which are
_ inevitable concomitants of some organizations having a disproportionate
hold upon valued resources.
Blau does not enumerate the conditions leading to the organization
of opposition as explicitly as did either Marx or Dahrendorf (‘conflict
groups” for Dahrendorf and ‘‘class” for Marx). But his debt to Marx’s
work (see Chapter 6) is evident in his analysis on how leveis of deprivation
are influenced by (1) the degree of ecological concentration and the ca-
pacity to communicate among the deprived, (2) the capacity to codify an
opposition ideology, (3) the degree of social solidarity among the deprived,
and (4) the degree to which opposition organization is politicized and
directed against the political organizations (see Table 12-3). Furthermore,
Blau’s incorporation of Dahrendorf’s key propositions is shown in his
recognition that the capacity of the population’s deprived segments to
organize opposition is affected by such variables as the rate of social
mobility, the capacity of dominant groups to make strategic concessions,
and the number of cross-cutting conflicts resulting from multigroup
affiliations. Finally, although Blau does not develop his argument exten-
sively, he clearly has followed Simmel’s and Coser’s lead in emphasizing
284 CHAPTER 12 / THE STRUCTURAL EXCHANGE THEORY OF PETER M. BLAU

that conflict and opposition are regenerative forces in societies that “con-
stitute countervailing forces against . . . institutional rigidities, rooted in
vested powers as well as traditional values, and . . . [that] are essential for
speeding social change.’’*°
In sum, then, Blau has offered a most varied image of society. By
incorporating—al' eit in an unsystematic manner—the fruitful leads of
sociology’s other dominant conceptual perspectives, Blau has indeed of-
fered a suggestive theoretical prolegomenon that can serve as a guide to
more explicit theoretical formulations. I have summarized both the micro-
and macroprocesses of this prolegomenon in Figure 12-1. As is evident,
Blau has synthesized several theoretical traditions, and in so doing, he
offers something for everyone. For the functionalist, Blau offers the con-
cept of mediating values, types of institutions, and the counterpart of
mechanisms of socialization and control that operate to maintain ma-
crosocial wholes. For the conflict theorist, Blau presents a dialectical-
conflict perspective emphasizing the inevitable forces of opposition in
relations of power and authority. For those concerned with interactions
among individuals, Blau’s analysis of elementary exchange processes places
considerable emphasis on the actions of people in interaction. And for
the critic of Homans’s reductionism, Blau provides an insightful portrayal
of exchanges among emergent social structures, which leaves the integrity
of sociological theorizing intact.
In offering a theoretical resting place for the major perspectives in
sociology, I think that Blau provides a useful example of how sociological
theorizing should proceed: rather than becoming bogged down in contro-
versies and debates among proponents of various theoretical positions, it
is much wiser to borrow and integrate the useful concepts and assumptions
of diverse perspectives. In offering this alternative to continued debate,
Blau left a number of theoretical issues unresolved, but I think that the
most important one is the question of how micro- and macroprocesses
can be incorporated into one theoretical approach.*! This issue is obscured
by the insightfulness of his synthesis, and yet its resolution constitutes
a critical next step in his theoretical strategy. And I suspect that the
failure to resolve it is what caused Blau to abandon this exchange approach.

THE UNRESOLVED ISSUE: MICRO VERSUS

MACRO ANALYSIS
As I emphasized in Chapter 1, one of the issues that haunts sociological
theory is: To what extent are structures and processes at micro and macro

“Blau, Exchange and Power, p. 302.

“For examples of criticisms on Blau’s work, see M. J. Mulkay, “A C onceptual Elaboration
of Exchange Theory: Blau,” in his Functionalism, Exchange, Theoretical Strategy (New
York: Schocken Books,1971), especially pp. 206-12; Percy S. Cohen, Modern Sociological
Theory (New York: Basic Books, 1968), pp. 123-27; and Anthony Heath, “Economic Theory
and Sociology: A Critique of P. M. Blau’s ‘Exchange and Power in Social Life,’ ” Sociology
2 (September 1968), pp. 273-92.
 THE UNRESOLVED ISSUE: MICRO VERSUS MACRO ANALYSIS 285

levels of social organization subject to analysis by the same concepts and

laws? At what levels of sociological organization do emergent properties
require use of additional concepts and description in terms of their unique
modes of analysis? In what ways are groups, organizations, communities,
or social systems similar and different? These questions are extremely
troublesome for sociological theorizing and constitute one of its most
enduring problems. In his early exchange approach, Blau tried to resolve
this problem in several ways: (1) by assuming that the basic exchange
processes of attraction, competition, differentiation, integration, and op-
position occur at all levels of social organization; (2) by explicating general
exchange principles and _orporating abstract exchange concepts that
can account for the unf. ag of these processes at all levels of organi-
zation; (3) by enumerating additional concepts, such as mediating values
and institutionalization, to account for emergent phenomena at increas-
ingly macro levels of social organization; and (4) by classifying the generic
types of organization—categories, communities, organized collectivities,
and social systems—that denote different levels of organization, requiring
somewhat different concepts for explication of their operation.
I see this as an interesting effort to bridge the micro-macro analytical
gap in sociological theorizing. A number of problems remain, however.
And it is to their resolution that efforts to improve upon Blau’s scheme
that I offer a few critical closing remarks.
First, Blau defines organized collectivities so broadly that they include
phenomena ranging from small groups to complex organizations. It is
likely that the concepts and theoretical generalizations appropriate to the
small primary group, the secondary group, a crowd, a social movement, |
a small organization, and a large corporate bureaucracy will be somewhat
different. Surely, there are emergent properties of social organization in
a spectrum ranging from a small group to a complex organization. In fact,
aside from the study of community, most subfields in sociology fall within
Blau’s category of organized collectivity. Thus, Blau has not resolved the
problem of emergent properties; rather, I think that it has been defined
away with an excessively broad category that subsumes most of the emer-
gent properties of interest to sociologists.
Second, the addition of concepts to account for differences in levels
of organization only highlights the micro-macro gap without providing a
sense of what concepts are needed to understand increasingly macro phe-
nomena. What Blau does is to assert that there are elementary exchange
processes that occur at macro levels of organization and that require the
addition of the concept, mediating values, if these emergent levels of
organization are to be understood. But such an analysis begs the key
question: When and at what levels of organization do such concepts be-
come critical? Among dyads? Triads? Primary groups? Secondary groups?
Small organizations? Large organizations? To phrase the issue differently,
at what point do what kinds of values, operating in accordance with what
laws, become analytically significant? Blau simply says that at some point
286 CHAPTER 12 / THE STRUCTURAL EXCHANGE THEORY OF PETER M. BLAU

mediating values become critical, and he thereby avoids answering the

theoretically interesting question.
Third, Blau’s presentation of exchange concepts and their incorpo-
ration into exchange principles is vague. My analysis and reformulation
of Blau’s ideas into tables and figures represent an attempt to make more
explicit the implicit exchange principles employed in his analysis. Without
explicit statements of the exchange laws that cut across levels of orga-
nization, Blau fails to address an issue that he claims to be of great
significance in the opening pages of his major work:
The problem is to derive the social processes that govern the complex
structures of communities and societies from the simpler processes that per-
vade the daily intercourse among individuals and their interpersonal relations.”

To make such derivations, it is necessary to formulate explicitly the

laws from which derivations from simpler to more complex structures are
to be made. Too often, Blau hides behind the fact that, to use his words,
his “intent is not to present a systematic theory of social structure; it is
more modest than that.”
Yet, even in his modesty, I believe that Blau synthesized diverse
theoretical traditions into a suggestive exchange perspective. But he aban-
doned it, nonetheless. He simply stopped trying to view macroprocesses
as fundamentally connected to microexchanges. I think that this shift in
strategy was mistaken, but it does signal a dissatisfaction with his own
exchange solution to the micro-macro issue.** My sense is that exchange
theory is one of the few approaches that can bridge this gap with common
principles. And thus, my belief is that it should be utilized, not abandoned,
in an effort to integrate interpersonal and structural theories.

“Blau, Exchange and Power, p. 2.

“Patrick Spread, “Blau’s Exchange Theory, Support, and the Macro Structure,” The
British Journal of Sociology 35 (June 1984), pp. 157-73.
 CHAPTER 13

____ The Exchange Network.

__ Theory of Richard Emerson
___

As my review of George Homans’s and Peter Blau’s approaches has em-

phasized, power is one of the central concepts of exchange theory. Ine-
qualities in resources generate differences in power among actors; and
many of the dynamics of social systems revolve around transactions among
actors who possess varying degrees of power. In particular, I find that
Blau’s approach converges with the dialectical conflict theory of Marx
and Dahrendorf, who viewed inequality as causing opposition and conflict.
Yet, as exchange theory has been used to analyze social structures and
their inherent conflict potential, the conceptualization of ‘‘structure” has
been very weak and, at best, metaphorical. Blau discusses levels of social
organization and opposition groups, but as I noted in Chapter 12, he is
not very precise in his analysis; and in fact, he has now abandoned ex-
change theory as a useful tool for theorizing about social structure (see
Chapter 20). With his overconcern with deducing principles of structure
from the axioms of behaviorist psychology, Homans never gets around to
developing principles about the structural properties of systems. Thus, I
think it fair to conclude that exchange theory has not adequately con-
ceptualized inequality and power in social structures.
In recent decades, social network analysis has been offered as a new
way to conceptualize social structures.'! By viewing actors as points in a

1For some basic references on network analysis, see Jeremy F. Boissevain and J. Clyde
Mitchell, eds., Network Analysis (The Hague, Holland: Mouton Publishers, 1973); Paul
Holland and Samuel Leinhardt, eds., Perspectives on Social Network Research (New York:

287
288 CHAPTER 13 / THE EXCHANGE NETWORK THEORY OF RICHARD EMERSON

system of interconnections, network analysis has been able to describe

the flows of events among actors. Yet, network analysis has developed
very little theory that explains the dynamics of network structures.’ In-
stead, emphasis has been on the development of techniques for describing
data sets from a network perspective. There are, of course, a few excep-
tions,’ but they are so few in number that they confirm my general point:
network sociology, for all its methodological sophistication, is decidedly
atheoretical.
We have, then, a curious situation: On the one side, there is exchange
theory, which denotes some of the crucial dynamics of human relation-
ships but which, at the same time, does not develop an adequate con-
ception of social structure. On the other side, we have network analyses,
which possess a powerful set of techniques for describing social structures
but which, despite its promise, does not evidence many theoretical ideas.
Until his recent death, Richard Emerson was one of the few social theor-
ists to realize the potential for blending exchange theory and network
analysis.‘ Using a sophisticated version of exchange theory, Emerson had
begun to analyze inequality and power in social networks, and as a result,
his perspective promised to give exchange theory what it needed—a more
precise conceptualization of structure—and to provide network analysis
what it needed—a theory of social structure.®

Academic Press, 1979); Linton C. Freeman, A Bibliography of Social Networks (Monticello,

Ill.: Council of Planning Librarians. 1976); J. Clyde Mitchell, ed., Social Networks in Urban
Situations (Manchester, Conn.: Manchester University Press, 1969) and “Social Networks,”
Annual Review of Anthropology 3 (1974), pp. 279-99; Peter Marsden and Nan Lin, eds.,
Social Structure and Network Analysis (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1982). Also
consult the journal Social Networks.
?Mark Granovetter, ‘““The Theory-Gap in Social Network Analysis,” in Perspectives on
Social Network Research, ed. P. Holland and S. Leinhardt. Granovetter, I should add, is
an exception to this statement. See, in particular, his ‘““The Strength of Weak Ties,”’ Amer-
ican Journal of Sociology 78 (1973), pp. 1360-80 and ‘The Strength of Weak Ties: A
Network Theory Revisited,” Sociological Theory 1 (1983), pp. 201-33. See also, for an
example of an effort to theorize, Barry Wellman, “Network Analysis: Some Basic Principles,”
ibid., pp. 155-200. See also Ronald Burt, Toward a Structural Theory of Action: Network
Models of Social Structure, Perception, and Action (New York: Academic Press, 1982).
3Tbid.
‘There are others, of course. For example, see David Willer, “The Basic Concepts of the
Elementary Theory,” in Networks, Exchange and Coercion, ed. D. Willer and B. Anderson
(New York: Elsevier/Greenwood, 1981). All of the essays in this volume are theoretical in
nature.
*Emerson’s perspective is best stated in his “Exchange Theory, Part I: A Psychological
Basis for Social Exchange” and “Exchange Theory, Part II: Exchange Relations and Net-
work Structures,” in Sociological Theories, ed. J. Berger, M. Zelditch, and B. Anderson, pp.
38-87. Earlier empirical work that provided the initial impetus to, or the empirical support
of, this theoretical perspective include: ‘““Power-Dependence Relations,” American Sociol-
ogical Review 17 (February 1962), pp. 31-41; ‘““Power-Dependence Relations: Two Experi-
ments,’ Sociometry 27 (September 1964), pp. 282-98; John F. Stolte and Richard M. Emer-
son, “Structural Inequality: Position and Power in Network Structures,” in Behavioral
 EMERSON'S EXCHANGE NETWORK APPROACH 289

Emerson’s death at the peak of his career was thus a great tragedy,
but fortunately, his colleague and collaborator, Karen S. Cook, has con-
tinued to explore this blending of exchange theory and network analysis.®
In my review of this promising approach, I will emphasize the basic ideas
in Emerson’s work, but I will also indicate some of the ways that Cook
has extended the theoretical foundation provided by Emerson.

EMERSON’S EXCHANGE NETWORK APPROACH

Much like Homans’s, Emerson’s approach begins with a discussion of
psychological behaviorism. His purpose is to extract basic concepts and
principles of operant psychology that are useful in analyzing more complex
social patterns. Unlike Homans, however, Emerson did not stop theo-
retical efforts once basic reinforcement principles are isolated. As I noted
in Chapter 11, Homans tends to define away the complexities of social
structure by viewing them as givens. Then in an ad hoc and ex post facto
manner, he reconciles psychological axioms and empirical generalizations.
And when Homans does address questions of social organization, he be-
comes metaphorical and abandons even the illusion of logical rigor in
favor of what he termed an “intellectual orgy.”
In contrast, Emerson’s strategy involves a careful analysis of the logic
of operant psychology, a selective borrowing of concepts and principles,
and, most important, an extension of these principles that allows for a
less metaphorical analysis of the complexity of social organization. His
efforts represented, of course, only a tentative beginning. And perhaps
more important than the state of the theory at his death is the strategy
that it personified.

The Overall Strategy

Emerson began by enumerating the basic propositions of operant psy-
chology. Then, through the development of corollaries, he extended these

Theory in Sociology, ed. R. Hamblin (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1977).
Other more conceptual works include “Operant Psychology and Exchange Theory,” in Be-
havioral Sociology, ed. R. Burgess and D. Bushell (New York: Columbia University Press,
1969) and “Social Exchange Theory,” in Annuai Review of Sociology, ed. A. Inkeles and
N. Smelser, 2 (1976), pp. 335-62.
*For example, see Karen S. Cook and Richard Emerson, ‘Power, Equity and Commit-
ment in Exchange Networks,” American Sociological Review 43 (1978), pp. 712-39; Karen
S. Cook, Richard M. Emerson, Mary R. Gillmore, and Toshio Yamagish, “The Distribution
of Power in Exchange Networks,” American Journal of Sociology 89 (1983), pp. 275-305;
Karen S. Cook and Richard M. Emerson, “Exchange Networks and the Analysis of Complex
Organizations,” Research in the Sociology of Organizations 3 (1984), pp: 1-30. See also
Karen S. Cook, “Exchange and Power in Networks of Interorganizational Relations,” So-
ciological Quarterly 18 (Winter 1977), pp. 66-82; ““Network Structures from an Exchange
Perspective,” in Social Structure and Network Analysis, ed. P. Marsden and N. Lin; and
Karen S. Cook and Karen A. Hegtvedt, “Distributive Justice, Equity, and Equality,” Amer-
ican Sociological Review 9 (1983), pp. 217-41.
2390 CHAPTER 13 / THE EXCHANGE NETWORK THEORY OF RICHARD EMERSON

propositions and made them more relevant to human social organization.

Finally, he derived from these propositions and their corollaries a series
of theorems to account for the operation of different social patterns. At
various points in the development of his system of propositions, corol-
laries, and theorems, new concepts that will be incorporated into the
corollaries and theorems are added.
Emerson never did perform the logical operations in deriving corol-
laries from basic operant propositions and in developing theorems from
these propositions and corollaries. Yet in contrast to Homans’s strategy,
Emerson’s work is extremely rigorous. Concepts are precisely defined and
represented by symbolic notation. Propositions, corollaries, and theorems
are stated in terms of covariance among these clearly defined concepts.
Thus, considerable attention is devoted to concept formation and then
to the use of these concepts in a system of propositions, corollaries, and
theorems. Rarely do sociological theories reveal this degree of rigor.’
Emerson followed the substantive strategy of other exchange theorists
by moving from microprocesses in simple structures to processes in more
complex structures. As the structures under investigation become more
complex, additional corollaries and theorems are developed. But the most
important difference between Emerson’s substantive approach and that
of other perspectives is his concern with the forms of exchange relations.
The theorems delineate the processes inherent in a given form of exchange
relationship. The nature of the units in this relationship can be either
micro or macro—individual persons or corporate units such as groups,
organizations, or nations. Much as the German sociologist Georg Simmel
(see chapters 6, 10, and 19) focused on the “forms of sociation” and their
underlying exchange basis, so Emerson sought to develop a set of theo-
retical principles that explain generic social forms. In this way, the dis-
tinction between micro- and macroanalysis is rendered less obstructive,
because it is the form of the relationship rather than the properties of
the units that is being explained. And as a consequence, he did not have
to abandon exchange theory, as did Blau, when he moved from micro- to
macrostructural analysis, nor did he define away, as does Homans, social
structure as mere givens in a deductive scheme.
Emerson’s strategy involves many problems of exposition, however.
His concern with rigorous concept formation involves the creation of a
new language. Acquiring a familiarity with this language requires consid-
erable time and effort. Moreover, the system of definitions, concepts,
propositions, corollaries, and theorems soon becomes exceedingly com-
plex, even though Emerson explores only a few basic types, or forms, of

7There are, of course, notable exceptions to this statement. See, for examples, Alfred
Kuhn, Unified Social Science (Homewood, IIl.: Dorsey Press, 1975) and the articles in
Berger, Zelditch, and Anderson, Sociological Theory in Progress.
 EMERSON’S EXCHANGE NETWORK APPROACH 291

social relations. My analysis of Emerson’s work therefore translates terms

into more discursive language and omits discussion of certain corollaries
and theorems. Also, in an effort to communicate succinctly the essence
of Emerson’s approach, I will not follow the exact sequence of his argu-
ment. In this way, I think that I can communicate more clearly the logic
of Emerson’s approach and its substantive implications.

The Basic Exchange Concepts

Below I present an incomplete list of key concepts in Emerson’s exchange
perspective. While the definitions for each concept appear, on the surface,
to be similar to those developed by Homans, important differences exist.
These differences will become increasingly evident as I proceed, but for
the moment, let me offer the definitions:

Actor: An individual or collective unit that is capable of receiving

reinforcement from its environment.
Reinforcement: Features of the environment that are capable of
bestowing gratification upon an actor.
Behaviors: Actions or movements of actors on their environment.
Exchange: Behaviors by actors that yield reinforcement from the
environment.
Value: The strength of reinforcers to evoke and reinforce behavioral
initiations by an actor, relative to other reinforcers and holding
deprivation constant and greater than zero.
Reward: The degree of value attached to a given type of
reinforcement.
Alternatives: The number of sources in the environment of an actor
that can bestow a given type of reinforcer.
Cost: The magnitude and number of rewards of one type foregone to
receive rewards of another type.
Exchange relation: Opportunities across time for an actor to ini-
tiate behaviors that lead to relatively enduring exchange transac-
tions with other actors in the environment.
Dependence: A situation where an actor’s reinforcement is contin-
gent upon behaviors on the part of another actor, with the degree
of dependence being a dual function of the strength of reinforcement
associated with behavior and the number of alternatives for rewards.
Balance: The degree to which the dependency of one actor, A, for
rewards from actor B is equal to the dependency of actor B for
rewards from actor A.
292 CHAPTER 13 / THE EXCHANGE NETWORK THEORY OF RICHARD EMERSON

Power: The degree to which one actor can force another actor to
incur costs in an exchange relation.
Resources: Any reward that an actor can use in an exchange relation
with other actors.

This list of concepts does not exhaust those employed by Emerson.

With these concepts, however, I think it possible to gain considerable
insight into the approach. Let me enhance several points about this list
of concepts. First, Emerson analyzes only the exchange relation between
actors. This approach bypasses the problem of tautology so evident in
Homans’s analysis by viewing an established relation—not the actors in
the relation—as the smallest unit of analysis. In this way, questions about
each actor’s values become less central because attention is focused on
the relationship between actors who exchange resources. This line of ar-
gument, of course, abandons explanation in terms of an individual actor’s
values. The emphasis is on the ratio of rewards exchanged among actors
and on how this ratio shifts or stabilizes over the course of the exchange
relationship. Propositions thus focus on explaining the variables outside
the actors in the broader context of the social relationship that might
influence the ratio of rewards in a given social relationship. Thus, behavior
is no longer the dependent variable in propositions; rather, the exchange
relationship becomes the variable to be explained. The goal is to discover
laws that help account for particular patterns of exchange relations. This
approach is contrary to traditional exchange theory, which seeks to ex-
plain why a person enters into an exchange relationship in terms of that
person’s values. But if the relationship is the unit of analysis, then the
question of why the individual enters the relationship is no longer of
prime concern. The fact is that the individual has entered a relationship
and is willing to exchange rewards with another. When this exchange
relationship among actors becomes the unit of analysis, Emerson argued,
theory seeks to discover what events could effect variations in the entire
relational unit, not in the individual behaviors of actors. For example, in
a hypothetical exchange, person A gives esteem and respect to person B
in return for advice. With the A,B relationship as the unit of analysis,
the question is not what made either A or B enter the relationship, answers
to which would take theory into A’s and B’s cognitive structure and
thereby increase the probability of tautologous propositions. Rather, since
the A,B unit already exists as an entity, theoretical questions should focus
on what events would influence the ratio of esteem and advice exchanged
in the A,B unit.
Second, as can be seen from the list of definitions above, the concepts
of actor, reinforcement, exchange, value, reward, cost, and resource are
all defined in terms of each other, but since they are not analyzed inde-
pendently of the exchange relation, the problem of tautology is bypassed.
 EMERSON’S EXCHANGE NETWORK APPROACH 293

These concepts are the givens of any existing exchange relation. Thus,
in contrast to Homans’s approach, social structure is not a theoretical
given. Instead, behavioral dispositions are the givens, and it is social
structure that is to be explained.
Third, in accordance with the emphasis on the structure of the ex-
change relation, as opposed to the characteristics of the actors, the con-
cepts of (a) dependence, (b) power, and (c) balance in exchange relations
become central. The key questions in Emerson’s scheme thus revolve
around how dependence, power, and balance in exchange relations help
explain the operation of more complex social patterns.
Fourth, actors are viewed as either individuals or collective units. The
same processes in exchange .elations are presumed to apply to both in-
dividuals and collectivi:ies of individuals, thus obviating many problems
in the micro versus macro schism in sociological theorizing. This emphasis
is possible when attention is shifted away from the attributes of actors
to the form of their exchange relationship.
Thus, while this partial list of Emerson’s concepts appears to be
similar to that developed by Homans and other behavioristically oriented
exchange theorists, | see an important shift in emphasis from concern
with the values and other cognitive properties of actors to a concern with
the structure of an exchange relation. This concern with structure takes
as a given the flow of valued resources among those involved in the ex-
change. Theoretical attention then focuses on the structural attributes of
the exchange relation and on the processes that maintain or change the
structural form of an ongoing exchange relationship.

The Basic Exchange Processes

In Emerson’s scheme, analysis begins with an existing exchange relation
between at least two actors. This relationship has been formed from (1)
perceived opportunities by at least one actor, (2) the initiation of behav-
iors, and (3) the consummation of a transaction between actors mutually
reinforcing each other. If initiations go unreinforced, then an exchange
relation will not develop. And unless the exchange transaction between
actors endures for at least some period of time, it is theoretically
uninteresting.
Emerson’s approach thus starts with an established exchange relation
and then asks: to what basic processes is this relationship subject? His
answer: (1) the use of power and (2) balancing. If exchange relations reveal
high dependency of one actor, B, on another actor, A, for reinforcement,
then A has what Emerson termed a power advantage over B. This con-
ceptualization of power is similar to Blau’s formulation, although Emerson
developed a different set of propositions for explaining its dynamics. To
294 CHAPTER 13 / THE EXCHANGE NETWORK THEORY OF RICHARD EMERSON

have a power advantage is to use it, with the result that actor A forces
increasing costs on actor B within the exchange relationship.
In Emerson’s view, a power advantage represents an imbalanced ex-
change relation. A basic proposition in Emerson’s scheme is that, over
time, imbalanced exchange relations tend toward balance. He visualized
this process as occurring through a number of “balancing operations”’:
1. A decrease in the value for actor B of reinforcers, or rewards, from
actor A.
2. An increase in the number of alternative sources for the reinforcers,
or rewards, provided to B by A.
3. An increase in the value of reinforcers provided by B for A.
4. A reduction in the alternative sources for the rewards provided by
B for A.
These balancing operations are, I think, somewhat similar to the
propositions enumerated by Blau on the conditions for differentiation of
power (see Table 12-2). But in contrast to Blau’s emphasis on the inherent
and incessant dialectic for change resulting from power imbalances, Emer-
son stressed that through at least one of these four balancing operations
the dependency of B and A on each other for rewards will reach an equi-
librium. Thus, exchange transactions reveal differences in power that,
over time, tend toward balance. Naturally, in complex exchange relations
involving many actors, A, B, C, D, ..., n, the basic processes of depen-
dence, power, and balance will ebb and flow as new actors and new rein-
forcers or resources enter the exchange relations. |

The Basic Exchange Propositions

In Table 13-1, I have selectively summarized the initial propositions that
Emerson developed to explain exchange relations. The general strategy
was to begin with behaviorist principles and then to derive theorems from
these that explain the basic exchange processes, use of power, and bal-
ancing. In turn, corollaries to these theorems can be developed to account
for the structural forms of exchange relations. Thus, the propositions in
Table 13-1 represent only a starting point, whereas they were. the end
point in Homans’s list of behaviorist axioms.
The crucial next step is to derive theorems from these behaviorist
principles that pertain to the dynamics of power and balancing. In Table
13-2, I have summarized Emerson’s initial set of theorems. These theo-
rems describe the dynamics of power as a function of one actor’s depen-
dency on another for valued resources (Theorem 4), whereas balance is
conceptualized as a process whereby dependency is reduced over time (see
definition of balance and Theorem 5). Thus, power (P) is a positive func-
tion of the dependency (D) of actor B on the resources of actor A. or Pras
 EMERSON’S EXCHANGE NETWORK APPROACH 295

TABLE 13-1 The Operant Propositions and Initial Corollaries

Proposition 1: The greater is the behavioral repertoire of actor A in a situation and

the greater are the variations in rewards for behaviors, the more likely
is A to emit those behaviors yielding the greatest rewards.
Corollary 1.1: The more rewards decrease for A in an established
exchange relation, the more variation in A’s behavior.
Corollary 1.2: The more rewards in an established exchange relation
approach a zero level of reinforcement, the fewer
initiations by A.
Corollary 1.3: The greater the power advantage of A over B in an
exchange relation, the more A will use its power
advantage across continuing transactions.
Corollary 1.4: The more power is balanced in an exchange relation
between A and B and the more A increases its use of
power, the more B will increase its use of power.
Proposition 2: The more frequent and valuable are the rewards received by actor A
for a given behavior in a situation, the less likely is actor A to emit
similar behaviors immediately.
Corollary 2.1: The more rewards of a given type received by A, the
less frequent A's initiations for rewards of this type.
Proposition 3: The more actor A must emit a given behavior for a given type of
reward, and the greater strength and number of rewards of this type in
a situation, the more likely is actor A to emit behaviors of a given type
in that situation. os
Corollary 3.1: The greater is the number of alternatives available to A
for a given reward, the less dependent is A upon that
situation. .
Corollary 3.2: The more a situation provides multiple sources of
reward for A, the more dependent is A on that
situation.
Corollary 3.3: The greater is the value of rewards received by A in a
given situation, the greater is the dependency of A on
that situation.
Corollary 3.4: The greater is the uncertainty of A ever receiving a
given reward in a given situation and the fewer
alternative situations for receiving this reward, the
greater is the dependency of A on that situation.
Corollary 3.5: The less is the value of a reward for A in an A,B
exchange relation and the greater the alternative
sources of that reward for A, the less cohesive is the
exchange relation between A and B; or conversely, the
more is the value of a reward for A, and the fewer
alternative sources of that reward for A, the more
cohesive is the relationship between A and B.
Corollary 3.6: The more an A,B exchange relationship at one point in
time is transformed to A—B—C relationship, the greater
the dependency of B upon A, and the fewer the
alternatives for B in the A,B relationship, then B’s
dependency upon A will be greater than B’s
dependency upon C.
Proposition 4: The more uncertain is an actor A of receiving a given type of reward
in
recent transactions, the more valuable is that reward for actor A.
Corollary 4.1: In a set of potential exchange relations, the more
maintenance of one transaction precludes other
transactions in this set, the greater the initial costs of
this one transaction, but the less the costs across
continuing transactions.
296 CHAPTER 13 / THE EXCHANGE NETWORK THEORY OF RICHARD EMERSON

ITE I IE A CCE EI SE ILE DE DLE EEE LALO

mr A i

TABLE 13-2 The Initial Theorems

Theorem 1: The greater is the value of rewards to A in a situation, the more

initiations by A reveal a curvilinear pattern, with initiations increasing over
early transactions and then decreasing over time (From Corollaries 1.2
and 2.1).
Theorem 2: The greater is the dependency of A on a set of exchange relations, the
more likely A is to initiate behaviors in this set of relations (From
Propositions 1 and 3).
Theorem 3: The more the uncertainty of A increases in an exchange relation, the
more the dependency of A on that situation increases, and vice versa.
(From Corollary 3.3 and Proposition 4).
Theorem 4: The greater is the dependency of B on A for rewards in an A, Bo
exchange relationship, the greater is the power of A over B and the
more imbalanced is the relationship between A and B (From Propositions
1 and 3 and definitions of cost, dependence, and power).
Theorem 5: The greater is the imbalance of an A,B exchange relation at one point in
time, the more likely it is to be balanced at a subsequent point in time
(From Corollaries 1.1, 1.3, 3.1, 3.3, and Proposition 4).

= Dga. Balance is a situation where B’s dependency for resources from

A is equal to A’s dependency for resources from B, or Dg, = Daz.
Thus far, Emerson has derived some basic theorems on power and
balance from a long list of behaviorist principles (Table 13-1). This list
of behaviorist assumptions now recedes, and the main task is to introduce
corollaries and new theorems to account for the structural form of an
ongoing exchange relation. It is at this point that Emerson introduced
ideas from network analysis.

Structure, Networks, and Exchange

I will simplify Emerson’s portrayal of social networks, but I should em-
phasize that network analysis is highly sophisticated and can be heavily
mathematical. But for our purposes here, I need only offer a simplified
view in order to communicate Emerson’s basic approach. In addressing
the forms of exchange relations, Emerson represented networks of rela-
tions among actors in graphic form. Although he followed the conventions
of digraph theory and developed a number of definitions, I think that
only two definitions are critical:
Actors: Points A, B, C, ..., n in a network of relations. Different
letters represent actors with different resources to exchange. The
same letters—that is, A,, A,, Az, and so forth—represent different
actors exchanging similar resources.
Exchange relations: A B,A B C,.A; As,
and other patterns that can connect different actors to each other
forming a network of relations.
 EMERSON’S EXCHANGE NETWORK APPROACH 2°97

With these two definitions, I think it possible to summarize the basic

thrust of Emerson’s network approach. But I should caution again that
his analysis is more complex, especially in summarizing the nature of
relations in an exchange network. The next conceptual task is to visualize
the forms of networks that can be represented with these two definitions.
For each basic form, new corollaries and theorems are added as Emerson
documented the way in which the basic processes of dependence, power,
and balance operate. His discussion is only preliminary, but it does il-
lustrate the perspective’s potential.
Several basic social forms are given special treatment: (a) unilateral
monopoly, (b) division of labor, (c) social circles, (d) stratification, and
along with Karen Cook, (e) centrality in networks. Each of these network
forms is discussed below.

Unilateral monopoly. In the network outlined below, actor A is

a source of valuable resources for actors B,, B,, and B;. Actors B,, B,,
and B, provide rewards for A, but since A has multiple sources for rewards
and the Bs only have A as a source for their rewards, the situation is a
unilateral monopoly.

FIGURE 13-1

el
meet

A Nademcees
—————— B>

Such a structure often typifies interpersonal as well as intercorporate

units. For example, A could be a female date for three different men, Bi,
B,, and B,. Or A could be a corporation that is the sole supplier of raw
resources for three other manufacturing corporations, B,, B,, and B;. Or
A could be a governmental body, and Bs dependent agencies. Thus, it is
immediately evident that by focusing on the structure of the exchange
relationship, many of the micro versus macro problems of exchange anal-
ysis, as well as of sociological theory in general, are reduced.
Another important feature of the unilateral monopoly presented above
is that, in terms of Emerson’s definitions, it is imbalanced and thus its
structure is subject to change. Previous propositions and corollaries listed
in Table 13-1 provide an initial clue as to what might occur. Corollary
298 CHAPTER 13 / THE EXCHANGE NETWORK THEORY OF RICHARD EMERSON

1.3 argues that A will use its power advantage and increase costs for each
B. Corollary 1.1 indicates that with each increment in costs for the Bs,
their behaviors will vary and they will seek alternative rewards from A),
A,,..., A, If another A can be found, then the structure of the network
would change.
Emerson developed additional corollaries and theorems to account
for the various ways this unilateral monopoly can become balanced. For
instance, if no A,, Ag, . . .. A, exist and Bs cannot communicate with each
other, the following corollary would apply (termed by Emerson, Exploi-
tation Type I):
Corollary 1.3.1: The more an exchange relation between A and
multiple Bs approximates a unilateral monopoly, the more addi-
tional resources each B will introduce into the exchange relation,
with A’s resource utilization remaining constant or decreasing.
Emerson saw this adaptation as short-lived, since the network will
become even more unbalanced. Assuming that Bs can survive as an entity
without resources from A, then Theorem 8 applies (termed by Emerson,
Exploitation Type II):
Theorem 8: The more an exchange relation between A and multiple
Bs approximates a unilateral monopoly, the less valuable to Bs the
resources provided by A across continuing transactions. (From Cor-
ollary 1.3, Theorem 4, and Corollary 4.1).
This theorem thus predicts that balancing operation 1—a decrease in
the value of the reward for those at a power disadvantage—will operate
to balance a unilateral monopoly where no alternative sources of rewards
exist and where Bs cannot effectively communicate.
Other balancing operations are possible, if other conditions exist. If
Bs can communicate, they might form a coalition (balancing operation
4) and require A to balance exchanges with a united coalition of Bs. If
one B can provide a resource not possessed by the other Bs, then a division
cf labor among Bs (operations 3 and 4) would emerge. Or if another source
of resources, A,, can be found (operation 2), then the power advantage of
A, is decreased. Each of these possible changes will occur under varying
conditions, but Corollary 1.3.1 and Theorem 8 provide a reason for the
initiation of changes—a reason derived from basic principles of operant
psychology.

Division of labor. The emergence of a division of labor is one of

many ways to balance exchange reiations in a unilateral monopoly. If each
of the Bs can provide different resources for A, then they are likely to
use these in the exchange with A and to specialize in providing A with
these resources. This decreases the power of A and establishes a new type
 EMERSON’S EXCHANGE NETWORK APPROACH 299

FIGURE 13-2

Unilateral monopoly Division of labor

at time, at time,

A
.
ee

A a changes to: Ae

B3 a

of network. For example, in Figure 13-2, the unilateral monopoly at the

left is transformed to the division of labor form at the right, with B,
becoming a new type of actor, C, with its own resources; with B, also
specializing and becoming a new actor, D; and with B, doing the same
and becoming actor E.
Emerson developed an additional theorem to describe this kind of
change, where each B has its unique resources:

Theorem 9: The more resources are distributed nonuniformly across

Bs in a unilateral monopoly with A, the more likely is each B to
specialize and establish a separate exchange relation with A. (From
theorems not discussed here and Corollaries 1.1 and 1.3.1).

Several points should be emphasized. First, the units in this trans-

formation can be individual or collective actors. Second, the change in
the structure or form of the network is described in terms of a theorem
systematically derived from operant principles, corollaries, and other
theorems. The theorem can thus apply to a wide variety of micro and
macro contexts. For example, the theorem could apply to workers in an
office who specialize and provide A with resources not available from
others. It could also apply to a division in a corporation that seeks to
balance its relations with the central authority by reorganizing itself in
ways that distinguish it, and the services it can provide, from other di-
visions. Or it could apply to relations between a colonial power (A) and
its colonized nations (B,, B,, B,), who specialize (become C, D, and E)
in their predominant economic activities in order to establish a less de-
pendent relationship with A.

Social circles. Emerson emphasized that some exchanges are in-

tercategory and others intracategory. An intercategory exchange is one
 N
300 CHAPTER 13 / THE EXCHANGE NETWORK THEORY OF RICHARD EMERSO

FIGURE 13-3
ea oe oe
Closed circle Closed network

A, —————— Ap en As

A3 ———————_- 44 A3 ————_- 44

FIGURE 13-4

Ay

A2

A3

where one type of resource is exchanged for another type—money for

goods, advice for esteem, tobacco for steel knives, and so on. The networks
discussed thus far have involved intercategory exchanges between actors
with different resources (A, B, C, D, E). An intracategory is one where
the same resources are being exchanged—affection for affection, advice
for advice, goods for goods, and so on. As I indicated earlier, such ex-
changes are symbolized by using the same letter—A,, A., A;, and so forth—
to represent actors with similar resources. Emerson then developed an-
other theorem to describe what will occur in these intracategory exchanges.
Theorem 10: The more an exchange approximates an intracategory
exchange, the more likely are exchange relations to become closed
(From Theorem 5, corollaries 1.3 and 1.1).

Emerson defines “closed” as either a circle of relations (diagramed

on the left in Figure 13-3) or as a balanced network where all actors
exchange with each other (diagramed on the right in Figure 13-3).
Emerson offered the example of tennis networks to illustrate this
balancing process. If two tennis players of equal ability, A, and A,, play
together regularly, this is a balanced intracategory exchange—tennis for
tennis. However, if A, enters and plays with A,, then A, now enjoys a
power advantage, as is diagramed in Figure 13-4.
 EMERSON’'S EXCHANGE NETWORK APPROACH 301

This is a unilateral monopoly, but unlike those discussed earlier, it

is an intracategory monopoly. A, and A, are dependent upon A, for tennis.
This relation is unbalanced and sets into motion processes of balance. A,
may be found, creating either the circle or balanced network diagramed
above. Once this kind of closed and balanced network is achieved, it resists
entry by others, A;, Ag, A;, ..., A,, because as each additional actor enters,
the network becomes unbalanced. Such a network, of course, is not con-
fined to individuals; it can apply to nations forming a military alliance
or common market, or to cartels of corporations, and other collective units.

Stratified networks. The discussion on how intracategory ex-

changes often achieve balance through closure can help us understand
processes of stratification. If, for example, tennis players A,, A,, A, and
A, are unequal in ability, with A, and A, having more ability than A, and
A,, an initial circle may form among A,, A,, A3, and A,; but over time,
A, and A, will find more gratification in playing each other, and A, and
A, may have to incur too many costs in initiating invitations to A, and
A,. For an A, and Ax, tennis match is unbalanced; A, will have to provide
additional resources—the tennis balls, praise, esteem, self-deprecation. The
result will be for two classes to develop, as is diagramed below:
Upper social class A,A,
Lower social class A,A,
Moreover, A, and A, may enter. into new exchanges with A, and A, at
their ability level, forming a new social circle or network. Similarly, A,
and A, may form new tennis relations with A, and Ag, creating social
circles and networks with players at their ability level. The result is for
stratification to reveal the pattern in Figure 13-5.
Emerson’s discussion of stratification processes was tentative, but he
developed a theorem to describe these stratifying tendencies:
Theorem 11: The more resources are equally valued and the more
resources are unequally distributed across a number of actors, the
more likely is the network to stratify in terms of resource magni-
tudes and the more likely are actors with a given level of resources
to form closed exchange networks (From Theorem 5, propositions
1 and 4).
Again, this theorem can apply to corporate units as well as individuals.
Nations become stratified and form social circles, such as is the case with
the distinctions between the developed and underdeveloped nations and
the alliances among countries within these two classes. Or it can apply
to traditional sociological definitions of class, since closed networks tend
to form among members within, rather than across, social classes.

The dynamics of centrality. An important concept in network

analysis is centrality. Indeed, it is considered one of the most critical
302 CHAPTER 13 / THE EXCHANGE NETWORK THEORY OF RICHARD EMERSON

FIGURE 13-5

——— Ao

Upper
social class

As 6

Ag A4

Lower
social class

Died stern Ag

properties of a network. Typically, centrality is determined by a variety

of measures that locate a point in a network in terms of (a) the number
of other points with which it is connected, (b) the number of points
between which it falls, or (c) the closeness of a point to others in a
network.® These measures of centrality are not the same, but the general
idea is this: a point (or actor) is central to the extent that it connects
with many other points (actors), lies between other points, or is close to
other points. In Figure 13-6, for example, actors A, and A, are more central
in terms of the number of points between which they fall and also the
number of points to which they are connected after two steps (A, and A,
are, after two steps, connected to all other points, whereas it takes three
or four steps for the other As to be so connected).
Most network analyses simply describe centrality, but Karen Cook
has tried to use Emerson’s theoretical ideas to explain the dynamics of
it.° I will simplify her argument and also rephrase it a bit, but the essential
logic is the same. Let me begin by creating a theorem that summarizes
her hypothesis.’°

’Linton C. Freeman, “Centrality in Social Networks: Conceptual Clarification,” Social

Networks 1 (1979), pp. 241-56.
*Karen S. Cook et al., “The Distribution of Power in Exchange Networks.”
This is my wording of a more complex argument presented by Cook, Emerson, and
others. See ibid.
 EXCHANGE NETWORK ANALYSIS: A CONCLUDING COMMENT 303

FIGURE 13-6

As Ag Az

Theorem 12: Over time, the distribution of power in complex net-

works decentralizes around those actors (points) who possess the
highest relative degree of access to resources (From Corollary 1.3.1
and theorems 4 and 5).
Using the above figure as an illustration of this theorem, Cook would
predict that power will become increasingly concentrated in A;, A,, and
A,. A, will become less powerful and, in a more sociological sense, less
central. In fact, the entire network will, over time, collapse around As,
A,, and A,. Why should this be so? The basic argument that follows from
the dynamics of power and dependence is this: A;, A,, and A, each have
a unilateral monopoly with at least three other As (for example, A; has
a monopoly exchange re! tion with A,,, A,., and A,3). Thus, to get re-
sources, A, must bargain th other As—that is, A,, A;, and A,—who can
extract more resources from those As over which it possesses a monopoly.
And so, A,, A;, and A, will increase exchanges with their monopolized
partners and decrease exchanges with A,, who, in all likelihood, will be-
come like the monopolized As. Hence, the network will decentralize around
A,, As, and A,, who possess the highest relative resources (by virtue of
their respective unilateral monopolies).
304 CHAPTER 13 / THE EXCHANGE NETWORK THEORY OF RICHARD EMERSON

The critical point here is that Cook and her associates are trying to
use the basic principles developed by Emerson to address more complex
network systems. In so doing, they can explain the process of centrality
(and perhaps other network properties) in terms of theoretical deductions.
Up to this point, network analysis has typically described centrality using
various measures, whereas the Emerson-Cook approach allows these net-
work properties to be explained in terms of an abstract theoretical
proposition. .

EXCHANGE NETWORK ANALYSIS:

A CONCLUDING COMMENT
Of the current exchange theories, I think that the Emerson-Cook ap-
proach offers the most potential.!! Let me close by simply listing the points
that make it superior to those discussed in previous chapters:
1. The Emerson-Cook approach evidences considerably more de-
ductive rigor than Homans’s scheme. Emerson and Cook have used
operant principles to build a theoretical scheme that executes Ho-
mans’s assertions adout what theory should be. But in contrast to
Homans’s efforts, their analysis does not define as givens what is of
most interest to sociologists: patterns of social structure. The Emer-
son-Cook scheme uses the principles of operant psychology in ways
that allow for sociological theorizing, while ignoring the issue of re-
ductionism and avoiding the ad hoc and ex post facto flavor of Ho-
mans’s polemics.
2. The exchange network approach has retained and expanded
upon Blau’s and Homans’s concern with the dynamics of power.
Emerson abandoned, however, the ideologically loaded concept of di-
alectics and instead sought to derive theorems that describe how de-
pendence, use of power, and balancing operations operate as sources
of change in social structures. Moreover, this analysis is free from
the polemics of conflict theorizing, while providing a set of principles
for explaining why imbalance in exchange relations sets into motion
processes of change.
3. This approach also removes much of the vagueness surrounding
Homans’s and Blau’s conceptualizations of social structures as “in-
stitutional piles” and “organized collectivities.” Social structure in
network analysis has a more precise definition as patterns of con-
nections among actors in networks of exchange relations. Further-
more, using digraph notation and other mathematical concepts opens

"Again, let me emphasize that others are also working with this approach. See, in
pa.ticular, the references to Willer cited in note 4.
 EXCHANGE NETWORK ANALYSIS: A CONCLUDING COMMENT 305

the possibility that social structures can be more precisely defined.

At the same time, the Emerson-Cook strategy puts some theory into
what has been, I believe, a highly atheoretical approach. Indeed, I
think that network sociology has become overly enamored with de-
veloping ever more sophisticated mathematical techniques for de-
scribing increasingly hypothetical network structures.
4. By concentrating on the forms of relations, analysis of the
nature of individual actors is forfeited. Yet, this emphasis allows for
theories that are distinctly sociological and that avoid the issue of
whether or not they are micro or macro. Much exchange theory, and
sociological theory in general, evidences considerable discontinuity
between processes and structures among individuals and those among
collective units. Network analysis is less prone to such discontinuity
since it focuses on the form of the relationship among units.
5. Finally, network analysis bypasses the problem of tautology by
taking as a given the existence of actors seeking gratification or re-
inforcement in social situations. This unit is a fact of social life, and
its existence is not, the end point—as is the case in operant psy-
chology—but the beginning of analysis. Exchange network theory be-
gins with an exchange relation and then seeks to understand variations
and changes in its form in terms of the properties of the relation
rather than the attributes of the actors.
These are the strong points of the Emerson-Cook appivach. To a
reat extent, the future of exchange theory hinges on how well these
ypparent advantages obviate the long-standing logical problem of tau-
ology and substantive problems of vagueness and micro-macro discon-
‘inuity. It is difficult to know at this point just whether or not Cook’s
slaboration of Emerson’s basic approach can resolve these problems. Yet
it does present an alternative to Homans’s and Blau’s perspectives, which,
for all their insight, are rather vague in how they conceptualize social
structure. And an exchange theory that cannot analyze the complexities
of social structure beyond metaphorical accounts is not likely to be useful
in building theory.
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 PART FOUR |

Interactionist Theory

14. Early Interactionism and

Phenomenology
15. The Symbolic Interactionism of
Herbert Blumer and Manford Kuhn
16. Structural Role Theory
17. The Process Role Theory of
Ralph H. Turner
18. The Ethnomethodological Challenge

307
 CHAPTER 14

Early Interactionism
and Phenomenology

|!

I think that some of the most intriguing questions in social theory concern
the relationships between society and the individual. In what ways does
one mirror the other? How does society shape individuals, or how do
individuals create and maintain and change society? How are society and
the personality of individuals interrelated and yet separate emergenu phe-
nomena? Indeed, as I have already emphasized for virtually all theorists
in the previous chapters, the issue of micro versus macro sociological
analysis boils down to a question of the relationship between the prop-
erties of individuals and interaction, on the one side, and those of social
structure, on the other.
It was near the close of the 19th century that the grand analytical
schemes of Marx, Durkheim, Spencer, and other Europeans were sup-
plemented by a concern for the specific processes that link individuals to
one another and to society. Instead of focusing on macrostructures and
processes, such as evolution, class conflict, and the nature of the body
social, attention shifted to the study of processes of social interaction and
their consequences for the individual and the society. And out of this
shift in concern came a variety of interactionist theories. For the most
part, the theory is American, but we will need to be aware of important
European contributions to the emergence of interactionism.

EARLY AMERICAN INSIGHTS

Modern interactiouism draws its inspiration from a number of prominent
thinkers in America and Europe, all of whom wrote between 1880 and
309
310 CHAPTER 14 / EARLY INTERACTIONISM AND PHENOMENOLOGY

1935. Yet, I believe that interactionism is indebted to the genius of one

in particular, George Herbert Mead. Much like Darwin’s great synthesis
of the theory of evolution from his own studies and the speculations of
others, so interactionist ideas were codified by George Herbert Mead.
Mead borrowed ideas from others and combined them with his own in-
sights to produce a synthesis that still stands as the conceptual core of
modern interactionism. And so, I will begin with Mead’s synthesis; and
then later, I will turn to European thought and indicate some of the ways
that it supplemented Mead’s great work.
To appreciate Mead’s feat, I think it best to review the contributions
of three thinkers who most influenced him: William James, John Dewey,
and Charles Horton Cooley. Each of these scholars provided a key concept
that was to form the basis of Mead’s synthesis.

William James (1842-1910) and the Concept of ‘‘Self’’

The Harvard psychologist William James was perhaps the first social
scientist to develop a clear concept of self. James recognized that humans
have the capacity to view themselves as objects and to develop self-feelings
and attitudes toward themselves. Just as humans can (a) denote sym-
bolically other people and aspects of the world around them, (b) develop
attitudes and feelings toward these objects, and (c) construct typical re-
sponses toward objects, so they can denote themselves, develop self-feel-
ings and attitudes, and construct responses toward themselves. James
called these capacities self and recognized their importance in shaping
the way people respond in the world.
James developed a typology of selves: “the material self,’ which in-
cludes those physical objects that humans view as part of their being and
as crucial to their identity; the “social self,’ which involves the self-
feelings that individuals derive from associations with other people; and
the “spiritual self,” which embraces the general cognitive style and ca-
pacities typifying an individual.! This typology was never adopted by
subsequent interactionists, but James’s notion of the social self was to
become a part of all interactionists’ formulations.
James’s concept of the social self recognizes that people’s feelings
about themselves arise out of interaction with others. As he noted, “a
man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recagnize
him.”? Yet James did not carry this initial insight very far. He was, after
all, a psychologist who was more concerned with internal psychological
functioning of individuals than with the social processes out of which the
capacities of individuals arise.

‘William James, The Principles of Psychology (New York: Henry Holt, 1890), pp. 292-
99 of vol. 1.
*Ibid., p. 294.
 EARLY AMERICAN INSIGHTS 311

Self and Social Process: Charles Horton Cooley

I believe that Charles Horton Cooley made two significant breakthroughs
in the study of self.° First, he refined the concept of self, viewing it as
the process in which individuals see themselves as objects, along with
other objects, in their social environment. Second, he recognized that self
emerges out of communication with others. As individuals interact with
each other, they interpret each other’s gestures and thereby see themselves
from the viewpoint of others. They imagine how others evaluate them,
and they derive images of themselves or self-feelings and attitudes. Cooley
termed this process the looking glass self: the gestures of others serve as
mirrors in which people see and evaluate themselves, just as they see and
evaluate other objects in their social environment.
Cooley also recognized that self arises out of interaction in group
contexts. He developed the concept of “primary group” to emphasize that
participation in front of the looking glass for some groups is more im-
portant in the genesis and maintenance of self than participation in other
groups. Those small groups where personal and intimate ties exist are the
most important in shaping people’s self-feelings and attitudes.
Cooley thus refined and narrowed James’s notion of self and forced
the recognition that it arises out of symbolic communication with others
in group contexts. These insights were to influence profoundly the thought
of George Herbert Mead.

Pragmatism and Thinking: The Contribution of

John Dewey (1859-1952)
John Dewey was, for a brief period, a colleague of Cooley’s at the Uni-
versity of Michigan. But more important was Dewey’s enduring associ-
ation with George Herbert Mead, whom he brought to the University of
Chicago. As the chief exponent of a school of thought known as prag-
matism, Dewey stressed the process of human adjustment to the world,
in which humans constantly seek to master the conditions of their en-
vironment. And thus the unique characteristics of humans arise out of
the process of adjusting to their life conditions.
What is unique to humans, Dewey argued, is their capacity for think-
ing. Mind is not a structure but a process that emerges out of humans’
efforts to adjust to their environment. Moreover, mind is the unique
capacity that allows humans to deal with conditions around them.
Dewey thus devoted considerable effort to understanding human con-
sciousness. His basic questions were: How does mind work? And how

’Charles Horton Cooley, Human Nature and the Social Order (New York: Charles Scrib-
ner’s Sons, 1902) and Social Organization: A Study of the Larger Mind (New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1916).
312 CHAPTER 14 / EARLY INTERACTIONISM AND PHENOMENOLOGY

does it facilitate adaptation to the environment? Mind for Dewey is the

process of denoting objects in the environment, ascertaining potential
lines of conduct, imagining the consequences of pursuing each line, in-
hibiting inappropriate responses, and then, selecting a line of conduct
that will facilitate adjustment. Mind is thus the process of thinking, which
involves deliberation:
Deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing
possible lines of action. .. . Deliberation is an experiment in finding out what
the various lines of possible action are really like. It is an experiment in
making various combinations of selected elements ... to see what the re-
sultant action would be like if it were entered upon.‘

Dewey’s conception of mind as a process of adjustment, rather than

as a thing or entity, was to be critical in shaping Mead’s thought. For
much as Cooley had done for the concept of self, Dewey had demonstrated
that mind emerges and is sustained through interactions in the social
world. This line of thought from both Cooley and Dewey was to prove
decisive as Mead’s great synthesis unfolded.

Main Currents of Thought in America:

Pragmatism, Darwinism, and Behaviorism
At the time that Mead began to formulate his synthesis, I think the
convergence of several intellectual traditions was crucial since it appears
to have influenced the direction of Mead’s thought. Mead considered
himself a behaviorist, but not of the mechanical stimulus-response type.
In fact, many of his ideas were intended as a refutation of such prominent
behaviorists as John B. Watson. Mead accepted the basic premise of
behaviorism—that is, the view that reinforcement guides and directs ac-
tion. He was, however, to use this principle in a novel way. Moreover, he
rejected as untenable the methodological presumption of early behavior-
ism that it was inappropriate to study the internal dynamics of the human
mind. James’s, Cooley’s, and Dewey’s influence assured that Mead would
rework the principle of reinforcement in ways that allowed for the con-
sideration of mind and self.
Another strain of thought that shaped Mead’s synthesis is pragma-
tism, as it was acquired through exposure with Dewey. As I noted, prag-
matism sees organisms as practical creatures who come to terms with the
actual conditions ot the world. Coupled with behaviorism, pragmatism
offered a new way of viewing human life: human beings seek to cope with
their actual conditions, but they learn those behavioral patterns that

‘John Dewey, Human Nature and Human Conduet (New York: Henry Holt, 1922), p.
yea —" statement of these ideas, see John Dewey, Psychology (New York: Harper
w, 1886).
 EARLY AMERICAN INSIGHTS 313

provide gratification; and the most important type of gratification is ad-

justment to social contexts.
This line of argument was buttressed in Mead’s synthesis by yet
another related intellectual tradition, Darwinism. Mead recognized that
humans are organisms who seek to find a niche in which they can adapt.
Historically, this was true of humans as an evolving species, and more
important, it is true of humans as they discover a niche in the social
world. Mead’s commitment to behaviorism and pragmatism thus allowed
him to apply the basic principle of Darwinian theory to each human: that
which facilitates survival or adaptation of the organism will be retained.
In this way, behaviorist, pragmatist, and Darwinian principles blended
into an image of humans as attempting to adjust to the world around
them and as retaining those characteristics—particularly mind and self—
that enable them to adapt to their surroundings. Mind, self, and other
unique features of humans evolve out of efforts to survive in the social
environment. They are thus capacities that arise from the processes of
coping, adjusting, adapting, and achieving the ultimate gratification or
reinforcement: survival. For this reason, Mead’s analysis emphasizes the
processes by which the infant organism acquires mind and self as an
adaptation to society. But Mead did much more; he showed how society
could survive only from the capacities for mind and self among individuals.
From Mead’s perspective, then, the capacities for mind, self, and society
are intimately connected.

George Herbert Mead’s Synthesis

The names of William James, Charles Horton Cooley, and John Dewey
figure prominently in the development of interactionism, but George Her-
bert Mead brought their related concepts together into a coherent the-
oretical perspective that linked the emergence of the human mind, the
social self, and the structure of society to the process of social interaction.®
As I have emphasized, Mead appears to have begun his synthesis with
two basic assumptions: (1) the biological frailty of human organisms force

’Mead’s most important sociological ideas can be found in the published lecture notes
of his students. His most important exposition of interactionism is found in his Mind, Self,
and Society, ed. C. W. Morris (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934). Other useful
sources include George Herbert Mead, Selected Writings (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964);
and Anselm Strauss, ed., George Herbert Mead on Social Psychology (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1964). For excellent secondary sources on the thought of Mead, see Tam-
otsu Shibutani, Society and Personality: An Interactionist Approach (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962); Anselm Strauss, Mirrors and Masks: The Search for Identity
The
(Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959); Bernard N. Meltzer, “Mead’s Social Psychology,” in
Social Psychology of George Herbert Mead (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Center for Sociological Re-
search, 1964), pp. 10-31; Jonathan H. Turner, “Returning to Social Physics: Illustrations
H.
from George Herbert Mead,” Perspectives in Social Theory 2 (1981). Also see Jonathan
of Sociological Theory (Homewood, IIL.:
Turner and Leonard Beeghley, The Emergence
Dorsey Press, 1981).
314 CHAPTER 14 / EARLY INTERACTIONISM AND PHENOMENOLOGY

their cooperation with each other in group contexts in order to survive;

and (2) those actions within and among human organisms that facilitate
their cooperation, and hence their survival or adjustment, will be retained.
Starting from these assumptions, Mead was able to reorganize the con-
cepts of others so that they denoted how mind, the social self, and society
arise and are sustained through interaction.

Mind. Following Dewey’s lead, Mead recognized that the unique

feature of the human mind is its capacity to (1) use symbols to designate
objects in the environment, (2) rehearse covertly alternative lines of action
toward these objects, and (3) inhibit inappropriate lines of actioh and
select a proper course of overt action. Mead termed this process of using
symbols or language covertly imaginative rehearsal, revealing his con-
ception of mind as a process rather than a structure. Further, as I will
develop more fully later, the existence and persistence of society, or co-
operation in organized groups, is viewed by Mead as dependent upon this
capacity of humans to imaginatively rehearse lines of action toward each
other and thereby select those behaviors that facilitate cooperation.
Much of Mead’s analysis focuses not so much on the mind of mature
organisms but on how this capacity first develops-in individuals. Unless
mind emerges in infants, neither society nor self can exist. In accordance
with principles of behaviorism, Darwinism, and pragmatism, Mead stressed
that mind arises out of a selective process in which an infant’s initially
‘wide repertoire of random gestures are narrowed as some gestures bring
favorable reactions from those upon whom the infant is dependent for
survival. Such selection of gestures facilitating adjustment can occur either
through trial and error or through conscious coaching by those with whom
the infant must cooperate. Eventually, through either of these processes,
gestures come to have common meanings for both the infant and those
in its environment. With this development, gestures now denote the same
objects and carry similar dispositions for all the parties to an interaction.
Gestures that have such common meanings are termed by Mead conven-
tional gestures. These conventional gestures have increased efficiency for
interaction among individuals because they allow for more precise com-
munication of desires and wants as well as intended courses of action—
thereby increasing the capacity of organisms to adjust to one another.
The ability to use and to interpret conventional gestures with common
meanings represents a significant step in the development of mind, self,
and society. By perceiving and interpreting gestures, humans can now
assume the perspective (dispositions, needs, wants, and propensities to
act) of those with whom they must cooperate for survival. By reading
and then interpreting covertly conventional gestures, individuals are able
to imaginatively rehearse alternative lines of action that will facilitate
adjustment to others. Thus, by being able to put oneself in another's place,
or to “take the role of the other” to use Mead’s concept, the covert re-
 EARLY AMERICAN INSIGHTS 315

hearsal of action can take on a new level of efficiency, since actors can
better gauge the consequences of their actions for others and thereby
increase the probability of cooperative interaction.
Thus, when an organism develops the capacity (1) to understand
conventional gestures, (2) to employ these gestures to take the role of
others, and (3) to imaginatively rehearse alternative lines of action, Mead
believed such an organism to possess “mind.”

Self. Drawing from James and Cooley, Mead stressed that just as
humans can designate symbolically other actors in the environment, so
they can symbolically represent themselves as an object. The interpret-
ation of gestures, then, can not only facilitate human cooperation, but it
can also serve as the basis for self-assessment and evaluation. This ca-
pacity to derive images of oneself as an object of evaluation in interaction
is dependent upon the processes of mind. What Mead saw as significant
about this process is that, as organisms mature, the transitory “self-im-
ages” derived from specific others in each interactive situation eventually
become crystallized into a more or less stabilized “self-conception’’ of
oneself as a certain type of object. With these self-conceptions, individ-
uals’ actions take on consistency, since they are now mediated through
a coherent and stable set of attitudes, dispositions, or meanings about
oneself as a certain type of person.
Mead chose to highlight three stages in the development of self, each
stage marking not only a change in the kinds of transitory self-images an
individual can derive from role-taking but also an increasing crystalli-
zation of a more stabilized self-conception. The initial stage of role-taking
in which self-images can be derived is termed play. In play, infant or-
ganisms are capable of assuming the perspective of only a limited number
of others, at first only one or two. Later, by virtue of biological maturation
and practice at role-taking, the maturing organism becomes capable of
taking the role of several others engaged in organized activity. Mead
termed this stage the game because it designates the capacity to derive
multiple self-images from, and to cooperate with, a group of individuals
engaged in some coordinated activity. (Mead typically illustrated this
stage by giving the example of a baseball game in which all individuals
must symbolically assume the role of all others on the team in order to
participate effectively.) The final stage in the development of self occurs
when an individual can take the role of the “generalized other” or ‘““com-
munity of attitudes” evident in a society. At this stage, individuals are
seen as capable of assuming the overall perspective of a community, or
general beliefs, values, and norms. This means that humans can both (1)
increase the appropriateness of their responses to others with whom they
must interact and (2) expand their evaluative self-images from the ex-
pectations of specific others to the standards and perspective of the broade1
community. Thus, it is this ever-increasing capacity to take roles witk
316 CHAPTER 14 / EARLY INTERACTIONISM AND PHENOMENOLOGY

an ever-expanding body of others that marks the stages in the develop-

ment of self.

Society. For Mead, society or institutions represent the organized

and patterned interactions among diverse individuals.® Such organization
of interactions is dependent upon mind. Without the capacities of mind
to take roles and imaginatively rehearse alternative lines of activity, in-
dividuals could not coordinate their activities. Mead emphasized:
The immediate effect of such role-taking lies in the control which the
individual is able to exercise over his own response. The control of the action
of the individual in a co-operative process can take place in the conduct of
the individual himself if he can take the role of the other. It is this control
of the response of the individual himself through taking the role of the other
that leads to the value of this type of communication from the point of view
of the organization of the conduct in the group.’

Society is also dependent upon the capacities of self, especially the

process of evaluating oneself from the perspective of the generalized other.
Without the ability to see and evaluate oneself as an object from this
community of attitudes, social control would rest solely on self-evaluations
derived from role-taking with specific and immediately present others—
thus making coordination of diverse activities among larger groups ex-
tremely difficult.®
While Mead was vitally concerned with how society and its institu-
tions are maintained and perpetuated by the capacities of mind and self,
these concepts also allowed him to view society as constantly in flux and
rife with potential change. The fact that role-taking and imaginative re-
hearsal are ongoing processes among the participants in any interaction
situation reveals the potential these processes give individuals for ad-
justing and readjusting their responses. Furthermore, the insertion of self
as an object into the interactive process underscores the fact that the
outcome of interaction will be affected by the ways in which self-concep-
tions alter the initial reading of gestures and the subsequent rehearsal of
alternative lines of behavior. Such a perspective thus emphasizes that
social organization is both perpetuated and altered through the adjustive
capacities of mind and the mediating impact of self:
Thus the institutions of society are organized forms of group or social
activity—forms so organized that the individual members of society can act
adequately and socially by taking the attitudes of others toward these activ-

*For a more detailed analysis, see Jonathan H. Turner, “A Note on G. H. Mead’s Be-
havioristic Theory of Social Structure,” Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 12 (July
1982), pp. 213-22.
™ead, Mind, Self, and Society, p. 254.
‘Ibid., pp. 256-57.
 EARLY AMERICAN INSIGHTS 317

ities. ... [But] there is no necessary or inevitable reason why social insti-
tutions should be oppressive or rigidly conservative, or why they should not
rather be, as many are, flexible and progressive, fostering individuality rather
than discouraging it.®

In this passage, I think, is a clue to Mead’s abiding distaste for rigid

and oppressive patterns of social organization. He viewed society as a
constructed phenomenon that arises out of the adjustive interactions
among individuals. As such, society can be altered or reconstructed through
the processes denoted by the concepts of mind and self. However, I believe
that Mead went one step further and stressed that change is frequently
unpredictable, even by those emitting the change-inducing behavior. To
account for this indeterminacy of action, Mead used two concepts first
developed by William James, the “I” and the “me”.!° For Mead, the “I”
points to the impulsive tendencies of individuals, and the “me” represents
the self-image of behavior after it has been emitted. With these concepts,
Mead emphasized that the “I,” or impulsive behavior, cannot be predicted
because the individual\can only ‘know in experience” (the ‘“‘me’’) what
has actually transpired’ and what the consequences of the “I” have been.
In sum, then, society for Mead represents those constructed patterns
of coordinated activity that are maintained by, and changed through,
symbolic interaction among and within actors. Both the maintenance and
change of society, therefore, occur through the processes of mind and self.
While many of the interactions causing both stability and change in groups
are viewed by Mead as predictable, the possibility for spontaneous and
unpredictable actions that alter existing patterns of interaction is also
likely.
This conceptual legacy had a profound impact on a generation of
American sociologists prior to the posthumous publication of Mead’s lec-
tures in 1934. -Yet, despite the suggestiveness of Mead’s concepts, I think
that they fail to address some important theoretical issues.
The most important of these issues concerns the vagueness of his
concepts in denoting the nature of social organization or society and the
precise points of articulation between society and the individual. Mead
viewed society as organized activity, regulated by the generalized other,
in which individuals make adjustments and cooperate with one another.
Such adjustments and the cooperation are seen as possible by virtue of
the capacities of mind -and self. Whereas mind and self emerged out
of existent patterns of social organization, the maintenance or change of
such organization is viewed by Mead as a reflection of the processes of
mind and self. Although these and related concepts of the Meadian scheme
point to the mutual interaction of society and the individual and although

*Tbid., pp. 261-62.

See James, Principles of Psychology, pp. 135-76.
318 CHAPTER 14 / EARLY INTERACTIONISM AND PHENOMENOLOGY

the concepts of mind and self denote crucial processes through which this
dependency is maintained, they do not allow for the analysis of variations
in patterns of social organization and in the various ways individuals are
implicated in these patterns. To note that society is coordinated activity
and is maintained or changed through the role-taking and the self-as-
sessment processes of individuals offers only a broad conceptual portrait
of the linkages between the individual and society. Indeed, Mead’s picture
of society does not indicate how variable types of social organization
reciprocally interact with variable properties of self and mind. Thus, in
the end, Mead’s concepts appeared to emphasize that society shapes mind
and self, whereas mind and self affect society—a simple but profound
observation for the times but one that needed supplementation.
The difficult task of filling in the details of this broad portrait began
only four decades ago, as researchers and theorists began to encounter
the vague and circular nature of Mead’s conceptual perspective. The initial
efforts at documenting more precisely the points of articulation between
society and the individual led to attempts at formulating a series of con-
cepts that could expose the basic units from which society is constructed.
In this way, the linkages between society and the individual could be more
adequately conceptualized.

Conceptualizing Structure and Role

And so although Mead’s synthesis provided the initial conceptual break-
through, it did not satisfactorily resolve the problem of how participation
in the structure of society shaped individual conduct, and vice versa. In
an effort to resolve this vagueness, sociological inquiry began to focus on
the concept of role. Individuals were seen as playing roles associated with
positions in larger networks of positions. And with this vision, efforts to
understand more about social structures and how individuals are impli-
cated in them intensified during the 1920s and 1930s. This line of inquiry
was to become known as role theory.

Robert Park and Role Theory

Robert Park, who came to the University of Chicago near the end of
Mead’s career, was one of the first to extend Mead’s ideas through an
emphasis on roles. As he observed, “everybody is always and everywhere,
more or less consciously, playing a role.”"! But Park stressed that roles
are linked to structural positicns in society and that self is intimately

"Robert E. Park, “Behind Our Masks,” Survey Graphic 56 (May 1926), p. 135. For a
convenient summary of the thrust of early research efforts in role theory, see
Ralph H.
Turner, “Social Roles: Sociological Aspects,” Jnternational Encyclopaedia of the Social
Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1968).
 EARLY AMERICAN INSIGHTS 319

linked to playing roles within the confines of the positions of social

structure.
The conceptions which men form of themselves seem to depend upon their
vocations, and in general upon the role they seek to play in communities and
social groups in which they live, as well as upon the recognition and status
which society accords them in these roles. It is status, i.e., recognition by the
community, that confers upon the individual the character of a person, since
a person is an individual who has status, not necessarily legal, but social.’
Park’s analysis stresses the fact that self emerges from the multiple
roles that people play.’ In turn, roles are connected to positions in social
structures. I see this kind of analysis as shifting attention to the nature
of society and how its structure influences the processes outlined in Mead’s
synthesis.

Jacob Moreno and Role Theory

Inspired in part by Mead’s concept of role-taking and by his own, earlier
studies in Europe, Jacob Moreno was one of the first to develop the
concept of role-playing: In Who Shall Survive and in many publications
in the journals that he founded in America, Moreno began to view social
organization as a network of roles that constrained and channeled be-
havior.'4 In his early works, Moreno distinguished different types of roles:
(a) “psychosomatic roles,” in which behavior is related to basic biological
needs, as conditioned by culture, and in which role enactment is typically
unconscious; (b) ‘“‘psychodramatic roles,” in which individuals behave in
accordance with the specific expectations of a particular social context;
and (c) “social roles,” in which individuals conform to the more general
expectations of various conventional social categories (for example, worker,
Christian, mother, and father).
Despite the suggestiveness of these distinctions, I see their importance
as coming not so much from their substantive content, but from their
intent: to conceptualize social structures as organized networks of ex-
pectations that require varying types of role enactments by individuals.
In this way, analysis can move beyond the vague Meadian conceptuali-
zation of society as coordinated activity regulated by the generalized other
to a conceptualization of social organization as various types of interre-
lated role enactments regulated by varying types of expectations.

12Robert E. Park, Society (New York: Free Press, 1955), pp. 285-86.
18{ndeed, Park studied briefly with Simmel in Berlin and apparéntly acquired insight
into Simmel’s study of the individual and the web of group affiliations (see later discussion).
Coupled with his exposure to William James at Harvard, who also stressed the multiple
sources of self, it is clear that Mead’s legacy was supplemented by Simmel and James through
the work of Robert Park.
“Jacob Moreno, Who Shall Survive (Washington, D.C., 1934); rev. ed. (New York:
Beacon House, 1953).
320 CHAPTER 14 / EARLY INTERACTIONISM AND PHENOMENOLOGY

Ralph Linton and Role Theory

Shortly after Moreno’s publication of Who Shall Survive, the anthro-
pologist Ralph Linton further conceptualized the nature of social orga-
nization, and the individual’s imbeddedness in it, by distinguishing the
concepts of role, status, and individuals from one another:
A status, as distinct from the individual who may occupy it, is simply a
collection of rights and duties. ... A role represents the dynamic aspect of
status. The individual is socially assigned to a status and occupies it with
relation to other statuses. When he puts the rights and duties which constitute
the status into effect, he is performing a role.’

In this passage are a number of important conceptual distinctions.

Social structure reveals several distinct elements: (a) a network of posi-
tions, (b) a corresponding system of expectations, and (c) patterns of
behavior that are enacted with regard to the expectations of particular
networks of interrelated positions. In retrospect, these distinctions may
appear self-evident and trivial, but I feel that they made possible the
subsequent elaboration of many interactionist concepts:
1. Linton’s distinctions allow for the conceptualization of society in
terms of clear-cut variables: the nature and kind of interrelations |
among positions and the types of expectations attending these
positions.
2. The variables Mead denoted by the concepts of mind and self can |
be analytically distinguished from both social structure (positions |
and expectations) and behavior (role enactment).
3. By conceptually separating the processes of role-taking and im-
aginative rehearsal from both social structure and behavior, the:
points of articulation between society and the individual can be :
more clearly marked,since role-taking pertains to covert inter- |
pretations of the expectations attending networks of statuses and |
role denotes the enactment of these expectations as mediated by '
self.

Thus, by offering more conceptual insight into the nature. of social|

organization, Park, Moreno, and Linton provided a needed supplement
to Mead’s suggestive concepts. For now it would be possible to understand |
more precisely the interrelations among mind, self, and society.

EARLY EUROPEAN INSIGHTS

At the same time that American theory turned to the study.of interaction
and roles, European thinking was making a similar shift in emphasis. .

'SRalph Linton, The Study of Man (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1936), p. 28

 EARLY EUROPEAN INSIGHTS 321

The more macro-oriented work of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim be-
came increasingly concerned with meaning and how society “sets inside”
the individual. But neither Weber nor Durkheim were as interactionistic
in approach as Georg Simmel. But in the end, the main theoretical con-
tribution to interactionism from Europe comes from philosophical phen-
omenology. And so, I will briefly summarize Weber’s, Durkheim’s, and
Simmel’s interactionist ideas; and then, I will turn to the early pheno-
menologists Edmund Husserl and Alfred Schutz.

Georg Simmel and “‘Sociation”’

Georg Simmel was perhaps the first European sociologist to begin a serious
exploration of interaction, or “sociability” as he called it. In so doing, he
elevated the study of interaction from the taken-for-granted.'* For Sim-
mel, as for the first generation of American sociologists in Chicago, the
macrostructures and processes studied by functional and some conflict
theories—class, the state, family, religion, evolution—are ultimately re-
flections of the specific interactions among people. These interactions
result in emergent social phenomena, but considerable insight into the
latter can be attained by understanding the basic interactive processes
that first give and then sustain their existence.
In Chapter 6, I discussed Simmel’s analysis of the forms of conflict;
and in Chapter 10, I summarized his exchange theory. But Simmel’s study
of interaction extends beyond just the analysis of conflict and exchange,
for he was concerned with understanding the forms and consequences of
many diverse types of interactions. Some of his most important insights,
which influenced American interactionists, concern the relationship be-
tween the individual and society. In his famous essay on “the web of
group affiliations,” for example, Simmel emphasized that human person-
ality emerges from, and is shaped by, the particular configuration of a
person’s group affiliations.!7 What people are—that is, how they think of
themselves and are prepared to act—is circumscribed by their group mem-
berships. As he emphasized, “the genesis of the personality [is] the point
of intersection for innumerable social influences, as the end-product of
heritages derived from the most diverse groups and periods of
adjustment.’’®
Although Simmel did not analyze in great detail the emergence of
human personality, his “formal sociology” did break away from the macro

%Georg Simmel, “Sociability,” in The Sociology of Georg Simmel, ed. K. H. Wolff (New
York: Free Press, 1950), pp. 40-57. For an excellent secondary account of Simmel’s signif-
icance for interactionism, see Randall Collins and Michael Makowsky, The Discovery of
Society (New York: Random House, 1972), pp. 138=42.
“Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations, trans. R. Bendix (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press,
1955; originally published in 1922).
‘8Tbid., p. 141.
322 CHAPTER 14 / EARLY INTERACTIONISM AND PHENOMENOLOGY

concerns of early German, French, and British sociologists. He began in

Europe a mode of analysis that, as I have just summarized, became the
prime concern of the first generation of American sociologists. Simmel
thus could be considered one of the first European interactionists.

Emile Durkheim’s Metamorphosis

In his Division of Labor in Society, Emile Durkheim portrayed social
reality as an emergent phenomena, sui generis, and as not reducible to
the psychic states of individuals. And yet, in his later works, such as The
Elementary Forms of Religious Life, Durkheim began to ask: How does
society rule the individual? How is it that society “gets inside” individuals
and guides them from within? Why do people share common orientations
and perspectives?! Durkheim never answered these questions effectively,
for his earlier emphasis on social structures prevented him from seeing
the micro reality of interactions among individuals implicated in macro
social structures. But I think it significant that the most forceful advocate
of the sociologistic position became intrigued with the relationship be-
tween the individual and society. I see two critical lines of interactionist
thought in Elementary Forms: (1) the analysis of ritual and (2) the con-
cern with categories of thought.
1. The implicit theory of ritual argues that people’s sense of sol-
idarity is reinforced by ritual activity. Durkheim emphasized that
religious rituals are, in essence, the worship of society. But there are
more general implications to his ideas: people’s sense of attachment
to the social order and to each other is very much dependent upon
ritual performances. That is, interpersonal rituals are vital to the
maintenance of the macro social order.”
2. The concern with thought in Elementary Forms also influenced
social theory. Durkheim emphasized that “the collective conscience”
is not “entirely outside us” and that people’s definitions of, and ori-
entations to, situations are related to the organization of subjective
consciousness. The categories of this consciousness, however, reflect
the structural arrangements of society. Hence, varying macro struc-
tures generate different forms of thought and perception of the world.
Such forms feed back and reinforce social structures.
But Durkheim’s metamorphosis influenced structural sociology more
than interactionism, and so, I will take up these ideas again in later
chapters (see 19-21). I mention them here only to stress that a dramatic

mile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (New York: Free Press, 1954:
originally published in 1912),
Randall Collins, Conflict Sociology (New York: Academic Press, 1975) develops this
idea. See Chapter 21.
 EARLY EUROPEAN INSIGHTS vee .

shift from macro to micro theorizing was occurring, even among the most
avowed macrotheorist, Emile Durkheim.

Max Weber and “Social Action’’

Max Weber was also becoming increasingly concerned with the micro
social world, although I think that his most important insights are in the
area of macro and historical sociology. Yet Weber’s definition of sociology
was highly compatible with the flourishing American school of interac-
tionism. For Weber, sociology is ‘‘that science which aims at the inter-
pretative understanding of social behavior in order to gain an explanation
of its causes, its course, and its effects.’’?! Moreover, the behavior to be
studied by sociology is seen by Weber as social action that includes:
All human behavior when and insofar as the acting individual attaches a
subjective meaning to it. Action in this sense may be overt, purely inward,
or subjective; it may consist of positive intervention in a situation, of delib-
erately refraining from such intervention, or passively acquiescing in the
situation. Action is social insofar as by virtue of the subjective meaning
attached to it by the acting individual (or individuals), it takes account of
the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course.”
Thus, Weber recognized that the reality behind the macrostructures
of society—classes, the state, institutions, and nations—are the meaningful
and symbolic interactions among people. Moreover, Weber’s methodology
stresses the need for understanding macrostructures and processes “at
the level of meaning.” For in the real world, actors interpret and give
meaning to the reality around them and act in terms of these meanings.
And yet, despite this key insight, Weber’s actual analysis of social struc-
tures—class, status, party, change, religion, bureaucracy, and the like—
rarely follows his own methodological prescriptions. As with other Eu-
ropean thinkers, he tended to focus on social and cultural structures and
the impact of these structures upon each other. The interacting and in-
terpreting person is often lost amid Weber’s elaborate taxonomies of struc-
tures and analyses of historical events. And it is just this failing that was
to attract the attention of Alfred Schutz, who, more than any other Eu-
ropean thinker, was to translate phenomenology into a perspective that
could be incorporated into interactionist theory.

European Phenomenology
Phenomenology began as the project of the German philosopher Edmund
Husserl (1859-1938). In his hands, I think, this project showed few signs

21Max Weber, Basic Concepts in Sociology (New York: Citadel Press, 1964), p. 29.
Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Free Press,
1947; originally published after Weber’s death), p. 88.
For some readable, general references on phenomenology, see George Psathas, ed.,
 OGY
324 CHAPTER 14 / EARLY INTERACTIONISM AND PHENOMENOL

of being anything more than an orgy of subjectivism. Yet, as I will em-

phasize, the German social thinker Alfred Schutz was to take Husserl’s
concepts and transform them into an interactionist analysis that has
exerted considerable influence on modern-day interactionism. I am sure
that Schutz’s migration to the United States in 1939 facilitated this trans-
lation, especially as he came into contact with American interactionism,
but my sense is that all of his most important ideas were formulated
before he came. His subsequent work while in America involved an elab-
oration of basic ideas originally developed in Europe. I will first analyze
Husserl’s original phenomenology and then turn to Schutz’s critique of
Max Weber and his transformation of Husserl’s ideas into an interac-
tionist perspective.

Edmund Husserl’s project. As the father of phenomenology, there

can be little doubt that Edmund Husserl’s thought has profoundly influ-
enced contemporary social science. Yet, as I have suggested, his ideas
have been transformed, especially by Alfred Schutz. Indeed, Husserl would
be upset by what is now attributed to his genius. As Z. Bauman notes:
“Tt took guile, utterly illegitimate as viewed from the Husserlian per-
spective, to devise a social science which would claim to be the brain-
child, or logical consequence of the phenomenological project.”
Husserl’s ideas, then, have been selectively borrowed and used in ways
that he would not condone to develop modern phenomenology and various
forms of interactionist thought. In reviewing Husserl’s contribution,
therefore, I think it best to focus more on what was borrowed than on
the details of his complete philosophical scheme. I will therefore highlight
several features of his work: (1) the basic philosophical dilemma, (2) the
properties of consciousness, (3) the critique of naturalistic empiricism,
and (4) the philosophical alternative to social science.”®

Phenomenological Sociology (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973); Richard M. Zaner, The
Way of Phenomenology: Criticism as a Philosophical Discipline (New York: Pegasus, 1970);
Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday Publishing, 1966); Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement,
vols. 1 and 2, 2d ed. (The Hague, Holland: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969); Hans P. Neisser, “The
Phenomenological Approach in Social Science,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Re-
search 20 (1959), pp. 198-212; Stephen Strasser, Phenomenology and the Human Sciences
(Pittsburgh, Pa.: Duquesne University Press, 1963); and Maurice Natanson, ed., Pheno-
menology and the Social Sciences (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973);
oe Lauer, Phenomenology: Its Genesis and Prospect (New York: Harper Torchbooks,

«Bauman, “On the Philosophical Status of Ethnomethodology,” The Sociological Review

21 (February 1973), p. 6.
**Husserl’s basic ideas are contained in the following:, Phenomenology and the Crisis of
Western Philosophy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965, originally published 1936); Ideas:
General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1969; originally
published in 1913); “Phenomenology,” in The Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th ed., vol. 17,
col. 699-702, 1929. For excellent secondary analyses, see Helmut R. Wagner, “The Scope
 EARLY EUROPEAN INSIGHTS 325

1. Basic questions confronting all inquiry are: What is real? What

actually exists in the world? How is it possible to know what exists?
For the philosopher Husserl, these were central questions that re-
quired attention. Husserl reasoned that humans know about the world
only through experience. All notions of an external world, “out there,”
are mediated through the senses and can only be known through
mental consciousness. The existence of other people, values, norms,
and physical objects is always mediated by experiences as these reg-
ister on people’s conscious awareness. One does not directly have
contact with reality; contact is always indirect and mediated through
the processes of the human mind.
Since the process of consciousness is so important and central to
knowledge, philosophic inquiry must first attempt to understand how this
process operates and how it influences human affairs. It is this concern
with the process of consciousness—of how experience creates a sense of
an external reality—that was to become the central concern of
phenomenology.
2. Husserl initially made reference to the “world of the natural
attitude.” Later, he was to use the phrase lifeworld. In either case,
with these concepts he emphasized that humans operate in a taken-
for-granted world that permeates their mental life. It is the world that
humans sense to exist. It is composed of the objects, peoples, places,
ideas, and other things that people see and perceive as setting the
parameters for their existence, for their activities, and for their pursuits.
This lifeworld or world of the natural attitude is reality for humans.
I see two features of Husser!’s conception of natural attitude as influencing
modern interactionist thought:
1. The lifeworld is taken for granted. It is rarely the topic of reflective
thought; and yet, it structures and shapes the way people act and
think.
2. Humans operate on the presumption that they experience the
same world. Since people experience only their own consciousness,
they have little capacity to directly determine if this presumption
is correct. Yet people act as if they experienced a common world.
Human activity, then, is conducted in a lifeworld that is taken for
granted and that is presumed to be experienced collectively. This fact

of Phenomenological Sociology,” in Phenomenological Sociology, ed. G. Psathas, pp. 61-86

and “Husserl and Historicism,” Social Research 39 (Winter 1972), pp. 696-719; Aron Gur-
witsch, “The Common-Sense World as Social Reality,” Social Research 29 (Spring 1962),
pp. 50-72; Robert J. Antonio, “Phenomenological Sociology,” in Sociology: A Multiple Par-
adigm Science, ed. G. Ritzer (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1975), pp. 109-12; Robert Welsh
Jordan, “Husserl’s Phenomenology as an ‘Historical Science,’ ” Social Research 35 (Summer
1968), pp. 245-59.
 OGY
326 CHAPTER 14 / EARLY INTERACTIONISM AND PHENOMENOL

out
brought Husserl back to his original problem: How do humans break
of their lifeworld and ascertain what is real? If people’s lifeworld structures
human
their consciousness and their actions, how is an objective science of
behavior and organization possible? These questions led Husser! to crit-
icize what he termed naturalistic-science, or the position that I advocated
in Chapter 1.

3 As I stressed in Chapter 1, science assumes that a factual world

exists out there, independent of, and external to, human senses and
consciousness. Through the scientific method, this factual world can
be directly known. With successive efforts at its measurement, in-
creasing understanding of its properties can be ascertained. But Hus-
serl challenged this vision of science: if one can only know through
consciousness and if consciousness is structured by an implicit life-
world, then how can objective measurement of some external and real
world be possible? How is science able to measure objectively an
external world when the only world that individuals experience is the
lifeworld of their consciousness?
4, Husserl’s solution to this problem is a philosophical one. He
advocated what he termed the search for the essence of consciousness.
To understand social events, the basic process through which these
events are mediated—that is, consciousness—must be comprehended.
The substantive content of consciousness, or the lifeworld, is not what
is important, but the abstract processes of consciousness, per se, are
to be the topic of philosophic inquiry.

Payal advocated what he termed the radical abstraction of the in-

7 I diyzdual from interpersonal experience. Investigators must suspend their
natural attitude and seek to understand the fundamental processes of
consciousness, per se. One must discover, in Husserl’s words, “Pure Mind.”
To do this, it is necessary to perform epoch—that is, to see if the substance
of one’s lifeworld can be suspended. Only when divorced from the sub-
stance of the lifeworld can the fundamental and abstract properties of
consciousness be exposed and understood. And with understanding of
these properties, then real insight into the nature of reality would be
possible. For if all that humans know is presented through consciousness,
it is necessary to understand the nature of consciousness in abstraction
from the specific substance or content of the lifeworld.
I should caution here that Husserl was not advocating Max Weber’s
method of verstehen, or sympathetic introspection into an investigator’s
own mind. Nor was he suggesting the unstructured and intuitive search
for people’s definitions of situations. These methods would, he argued,
only produce data on the substance of the lifeworld and would be no
different than the structured measuring instruments of positivism. Rather,
Husserl’s goal was to create an abstract theory of consciousness that
 EARLY EUROPEAN INSIGHTS 327

bracketed out, or suspended, any presumption of “an external social world

out there.”
Not surprisingly, I think, Husserl’s philosophical doctrine failed. He
never succeeded in developing an abstract theory of consciousness, rad-
ically abstracted from the lifeworld. But his ideas set into motion a new
line of thought that was to become the basis for modern phenomenology
and for its elaboration into ethnomethodology and other forms of theory.
Indeed, recall Jurgen Habermas’s critical project where the lifeworld is a
prominent concept (Chapter 9). Or, as I will emphasize for ethnometh-
odology in Chapter 18 and in the work of two microstructuralists in Chap-
ters 21 and 22, Husserl’s ideas have endured, although in a dramatically
transformed way. This transformation was, I feel, the major accomplish-
ment of Alfred Schutz’s early work. Indeed, he converted Husserl’s phe-
nomenological project into a type of interactionism.

The phenomenological-interactionism of Alfred Schutz.

Alfred Schutz migrated to the United States in 1939 from Austria, after
spending a year in Paris. With his interaction in American intellectual
circles and the translation of his early works into English over the last
decades, Schutz’s contribution to sociological theorizing is becoming in-
creasingly recognized.” As I have emphasized, his contribution resides in
his ability to blend Husserl’s radical phenomenology with Max Weber’s
action theory and American interactionism. This blend was, in turn, to
stimulate the further development of phenomenology, the emergence of
ethnomethodology, and the refinement of other theoretical perspectives.
Schutz’s work begins with a critique of his compatriot Max Weber,
who employed the concept of social action in his many and varied in-
quiries.?” Social action occurs when actors are consciously aware of each
other and attribute meanings to their common situation. For Weber, then,
a science of society must seek to understand social reality ‘‘at the level
of meaning.” Sociological inquiry must penetrate people’s consciousness
and discover how they view, define, and see the world. Weber advocated
the method of verstehen, or sympathetic introspection. Investigators must
become sufficiently involved in situations to be able to get inside the
subjective world of actors. Causal and statistical analysis of complex social
structures would be incomplete and inaccurate without such verstehen
analysis.
Schutz’s first major work addressed Weber’s conception of action. His
analysis is critical and detailed, and I need not summarize it here, except

For basic ideas of Alfred Schutz, see his The Phenomenology of the Social World
(Evanston, IIl.: Northwestern University Press, 1967; originally published in 1932); Collected
Papers, vols. 1, 2, 3 (The Hague, Holland: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964, 1970, and 1971, respec-
tively). For excellent secondary analyses, see Maurice Natanson, “Alfred Schutz on Socia!
Reality and Social Science,” Social Research 35 (Summer 1968), pp. 217-44.
279Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, 1921.
328 CHAPTER 14 / EARLY INTERACTIONISM AND PHENOMENOLOGY

to note that the basic critique turns on Weber’s failure to use his verstehen
method and to explore why, and through what processes, actors come to
share common meanings. In Schutz’s eye, Weber simply assumes that
actors share subjective meanings, leading Schutz to ask: Why and how
do actors come to acquire common subjective states in a situation? How
do they create a common view of the world? This is the problem of
“intersubjectivity,” and it is central to Schutz’s intellectual scheme. As
Richard D. Zaner summarizes:
How is it possible that although I cannot live in your seeing of things,
cannot feel your love and hatred, cannot have an immediate and direct per-
ception of your mental life as it is for you—how is it that I can nevertheless
share your thoughts, feelings, and attitudes? For Schutz the “problem” of
intersubjectivity is here encountered in its full force.

I should, of course, stress how close this concern with intersubjectivity

is to G. H. Mead’s analysis of role-taking, which was the process by which
actors anticipate each others’ dispositions to act.
Schutz was more influenced in his early years by Husserl’s pheno-
menology than by anything Mead had written. And yet, as Mead would
have directed, Schutz departs immediately from Husserl’s strategy of
holding the individual in radical abstraction and of searching for Pure
Mind or the abstract laws of consciousness. He accepts Husserl’s notion
that humans hold a natural attitude and lifeworld that is taken for granted
and that shapes who they are and what they will do. He also accepts
Husserl’s notion that people perceive that they share the same lifeworld
and act as if they lived in a common world of experiences and sensations.
Moreover, Schutz acknowledges the power of Husserl’s argument that
social scientists cannot know about an external social world out there
independently of their own lifeworld.
Having accepted these lines of thought from Husserl, however, Schutz
advocates Weber’s strategy of sympathetic introspection into people’s
consciousness. Only by observing people in interaction rather than in
radical abstraction can the processes whereby actors come to share the
same world be discovered. Social science cannot come to understand how
and why actors create a common subjective world independently of watch-
ing them do so. This abandonment of Husserl’s phenomenological project
liberated phenomenology from philosophy and allowed sociologists to study
empirically what Schutz considered the most important social reality: the
creation and maintenance of intersubjectivity—that is, a common sub-
jective world among pluralities of interacting individuals.
With his immigration to the United States, Schutz’s phenomenology
came under the influence of early symbolic interactionists, particularly

*Richard M. Zaner, “Theory of Intersubjectivity: Alfred Schutz,” Social Research 28

(Spring 1961), p. 76.
 EARLY EUROPEAN INSIGHTS 329

G. H. Mead and W. I. Thomas. But I am not sure that Mead and other
Chicago School interactionists exerted great influence on Schutz, who did
devote some attention to symbolic interactionism.” Indeed, their influ-
ence may have been subtle, if not subliminal. The early symbolic inter-
actionist’s concern with the process of constructing shared meanings was,
of course, similar to Schutz’s desire to understand intersubjectivity. Schutz
thus found immediate affinity with W. I. Thomas’s “definition of the
situation,” since this concept emphasizes that actors construct orienta-
tions to, and dispositions to act in, situations. Moreover, Thomas’s rec-
ognition that definitions of situations are learned from past experiences
while being altered in present interactions appears to have influenced
Schutz’s conceptualization of the process of intersubjectivity. Mead’s rec-
ognition that mind is a social process, arising out of interaction and yet
facilitating interaction, probably had considerable appeal for Schutz. But
if there was any direct influence from Chicago, I think it was Mead’s
concept of role-taking. For Schutz became vitally concerned with the
process whereby actors come to know each other’s role and to typify each
other as likely to behave in certain ways. Additionally, Mead’s concept
of the generalized other may have influenced Schutz in that actors are
seen as sharing a “community of attitudes” —or, in other words, common
subjective states. Yet, although there is considerable affinity and perhaps
some cross-fertilization between early symbolic interactionists’ concep-
tualizations and Schutz’s phenomenology, Schutz was to inspire a line of
sociological inquiry that often challenges the interactionism initiated by
Mead.
Having reviewed some of the intellectual influences on Schutz, let me
now summarize his scheme and indicate some of its implications for
sociological theorizing. Unfortunately, Schutz died just as he was begin-
ning a systematic synthesis of his ideas, and as a result, only a somewhat
fragmented but suggestive framework is evident in his collective work.
But his early analysis of Weber, Husserl, and interactionism led to a
concern with a number of key issues: (1) How do actors create a common
subjective world? (2) What implications does this creation have for how
social order is maintained?
All humans, Schutz asserted, carry in their minds rules, social recipes,
conceptions of appropriate conduct, and other information that allows
them to act in their social world. Extending Husserl’s concept of lifeworld,
Schutz views the sum of these rules, recipes, conceptions, and information
as the individual’s “stock knowledge at hand.” Such stock knowledge gives
people a frame of reference or orientation with which they can interpret
events as they pragmatically act on the world around them.
Several features of this stock knowledge at hand are given particular
emphasis by Schutz:

*See Schutz, Collected Papers for references to interactionists.

330 CHAPTER 14 / EARLY INTERACTIONISM AND PHENOMENOLOGY

. People’s reality is their stock knowledge. For the members of a

society, stock knowledge constitutes a “paramount reality” —a sense
of an absolute reality that shapes and guides all social events.
Actors use this stock knowledge and sense of reality as they prag-
matically seek to deal with others in their environment.
. The existence of stock knowledge that bestows a sense of reality
on events gives the social world, as Schutz agreed with Husserl, a
taken-for-granted character. The stock knowledge is rarely the ob-
ject of conscious reflection but rather an implicit set of assumptions
and procedures that are silently used by individuals as they interact.
. Stock knowledge is learned. It is acquired through socialization
within a common social and cultural world, but it becomes the
reality for actors in this world.
. People operate under a number of assumptions that allow them to
create a sense of a “reciprocity of perspectives.” That is, others
with whom an actor must deal are considered to share an actor’s
stock knowledge at hand. And, while these others may have unique
components in their stock knowledge because of their particular
biographies, these can be ignored by actors.
. The existence of stock knowledge, its acquisition through social-
ization, and its capacity to promote reciprocity of perspectives all
operate to give actors in a situation a sense or presumption that
the world is the same for all and that it reveals identical properties
for all. What often holds society together is this presumption of a
common world.
. The presumption of a common world allows actors to engage in
the process of typification. Action in most situations, except the
most personal and intimate, can proceed through mutual typifi-
cation as actors use their stock knowledge to categorize each other
and to adjust their responses to these typifications.*® With typi-
fication, actors can effectively deal with their world, since every
nuance and characteristic of their situation does not have to be
examined. Moreover, typification facilitates entrance into the so-
cial world; it simplifies adjustment because it allows for humans
to treat each other as categories, or as “typical” objects of a par-
ticular kind.

These points of emphasis in Schutz’s thought represent, as I noted

earlier, a blending of ideas from European phenomenology and American
interactionism. The emphasis on stock knowledge is clearly borrowed
from Husserl, but it is highly compatible with Mead’s notion of the gen-
eralized other. The concern with the taken-for-granted character of the

Ralph H. Turner’s emphasis on role differentiation and accretion is an example of how

these ideas have been extended by role theorists. See Chapter 17.
 MODERN INTERACTIONISM: A REVIEW 331

world as it is shaped by stock knowledge is also borrowed from Husserl,

but is similar to early interactionists’ discussions of habit and routine
behaviors. The emphasis on the acquired nature of stock knowledge co-
incides with early interactionists’ discussions of the socialization process.
The concern with the reciprocity of perspectives and with the process of
typification owes much to Husser! and Weber, but is very compatible with
Mead’s notion of role-taking by which actors read each other’s role and
perspective.
But the major departure from interactionism should also be empha-
sized: actors operate on an unverified presumption that they share a
common world; and this sense of a common world and the practices that
produce this sense are crucial in maintaining social order. In other words,
social organization may be possible not so much by the substance and
content of stock knowledge but by the actual fact of reciprocity of per-
spectives or by successful typification as actors’ presume that they share
intersubjective states. Schutz did not carry this line of inquiry far, but it
was to inspire new avenues of phenomenological inquiry.
In sum, then, I think that Schutz is primarily responsible for liber-
ating Husserl’s concern with the basic properties and processes of con-
sciousness from radical abstraction. Schutz brought Husserl’s vision of a
_ lifeworld back into the process of interaction. In so doing, he began to
ask how actors come to share, or presume that they share, intersubjective
states. He made Husserl’s ideas more compatible with interactionists’
concern with socialization and role-taking as well as with their emphasis
on pragmatic actors seeking to cope with their world. But Schutz gave
these concerns a new twist: humans act as if they see the world in similar
ways, and they deal with each other as if others could be typified and
categorized. This shift in emphasis to the interpersonal processes by which
actors create a sense of a shared world was to inspire challenges to tra-
ditional interactionism and role theory and, in the process, to correct for
some deficiencies in Vleadian interactionism.

MODERN INTERACTIONISM: A REVIEW

The Meadian legacy has directly inspired a theoretical perspective that
can best be termed symbolic interactionism. This perspective, which I
will discuss in the next chapter, focuses on how the symbolic processes
of role-taking, imaginative rehearsal, and self-evaluation by individuals
attempting to adjust to one another are the basis for social organization.
While accepting the analytical importance of these symbolic processes, a
more recent theoretical tradition has placed conceptual emphasis on the
vision of social structure connoted by Park’s, Moreno’s, and Linton’s
concepts. Although not as clearly codified or as unified as the symbolic
interactionist position, this theoretical perspective—the subject of Chap-
ter 16—can be labeled structural role theory, because it focuses primarily
332 CHAPTER 14 / EARLY INTERACTIONISM AND PHENOMENOLOGY

analytical attention on the structure of status networks and attendant

expectations as they circumscribe the internal symbolic processes of in-
dividuals and the eventual enactment of roles. As a reaction to this em-
phasis on structure, more process versions of role theory have emerged,
which are explored in Chapter 17.
In some respects, the distinction between symbolic interactionism
and the two role theoretic approaches may initially appear arbitrary, since
each perspective relies heavily on the thought of George Herbert Mead
and since both are concerned with therelationship between the individual
and society. Yet, despite the fact that each represents a variant of inter-
actionism, I think that there are great differences in emphasis between
symbolic interactionism and all role theories. However, Ralph H. Turner’s
process approach comes close to uniting symbolic interactionism and role
theory into a unified interactionist perspective (see Chapter 17).
_. Finally, I will examine in Chapter 18 the major interactionist per-
spective inspired by phenomenology: ethnomethodology. This perspective
challenges much interactionist theory, but as I will emphasize, this chal-
lenge has been rather shrill and, at times, silly. It is much wiser, I believe,
for ethnomethodology to be seen as an important supplement to tradi-
tional interactionist theory.
 CHAPTER 15

___ The Symbolic Interactionism

__
of Herbert Blumer”
________and Manford Kuhn

All interactionist theory draws upon the theoretical synthesis provided

by G. H. Mead. Yet, various contemporary thinkers have selectively bor-
rowed Mead’s ideas, and as a result, interactionist theorizing reveals con-
siderable diversity. Even within a particular interactionist school of
thought, there is conceptual controversy. Nowhere is this kind of con-
troversy more evident than within symbolic interactionism, the theoret-
ical perspective most closely tied to Mead’s ideas.
The poles around which this controversy rages are termed the Iowa
and Chicago Schools of symbolic interactionism.! These labels are, I feel,
somewhat archaic and inappropriate for several reasons. First, the prin-
ciple exponent of the Chicago School, Herbert Blumer, left Chicago more
than 30 years ago; it is true that he took over Mead’s social psychology
course at Chicago upon the latter’s death and that he has defined himself
as the principle interpreter of Mead’s thought, but the association with
Chicago is now so remote as to make the label seem rather contrived.
Second, although many who follow Blumer’s general approach were trained
at the University of Chicago, an equal number who are less sympathetic
to Blumer’s advocacy were also trained there. Moreover, many of these
Chicago-trained interactionists are more in tune with the principle figure

‘Bernard N. Meltzer and Jerome W. Petras, “The Chicago and Iowa Schools of Symbolic
Interactionism,” in Human Nature and Collective Behavior, ed. T. Shibutani (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970).

333
334 CHAPTER 15 / THE SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM OF BLUMER AND KUHN

of the Iowa School, Manford Kuhn. Third, Kuhn’s use of quantitative

measures of interactionist ideas while at the State University at lowa
were, in fact, pioneered by members of the Chicago department in the
1930s.2 And fourth, symbolic interactionists are located all over the coun-
try and employ such a diversity of approaches that simple labels are much
less relevant than they were a few decades ago.’
Yet, having said this, I will use the distinction between the Iowa and
Chicago Schools in this chapter. For I think that Kuhn’s positivistic
approach and Blumer’s critique of deductive theory do represent differ-
ences. Symbolic interactionists still gravitate toward Kuhn’s or Blumer’s
advocacy. And so, if I am to represent the scope and diversity of views
within symbolic interactionism, a detailed review of Blumer’s and Kuhn’s
respective approaches is a reasonable place to begin.

SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM:
POINTS OF CONVERGENCE
Before turning to the points of divergence between the Iowa and Chicago
Schools, let me review the common legacy of Mead’s assumptions that
all symbolic interactionists employ. These points of convergence are, I
believe, what make symbolic interactionism a distinctive theoretical
perspective.

Humans as Symbol Users

Symbolic interactionists, as their name implies, place enormous emphasis
on the capacity of humans to create and use symbols. In contrast to other
animals, whose symbolic capacities are limited or nonexistent, the very
essence of humans and the world that they create flows from their ability

2Jonathan H. Turner, “The Rise of Scientific Sociology,” Science 227 (March 15, 1985);
see also, Martin Bulmer, The Chicago School of Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1984) and Lester R. Kurtz, Evaluating Chicago Sociology (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1984).
3For examples, consult Jerome G. Manis and Bernard N. Meltzer, eds., Symbolic Inter-
action: A Reader in Social Psychology (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1972); J. Cardwell, Social
Psychology: A Symbolic Interactionist Approach (Philadelphia: F. A. Davis Co., 1971); Alfred
Lindesmith and Anselm Strauss, Social Psychology (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston,
1968); Arnold Rose, ed., Human Behavior and Social Process (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1962); Tamotsu Shibutani, Society and Personality (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
1961); C. K. Warriner, The Emergence of Society (Homewood, IIl.: Dorsey Press, 1970);
Gregory Stone and H. Farberman, eds., Symbolic Interaction: A Reader in Social Psychology
(Walthum, Mass.: Xerox Learning Systems, 1970); John P. Hewitt, Self and Society: A
Symbolic Interactionist Social Psychology (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1976); Robert H. Laver
and Warren H. Handel, Social Psychology: The Theory and Application of Symbolic In-
teractionism (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977); Sheldon Stryker, Symbolic Interactionism
(Menlo Park, Calif.: Benjamin-Cummings, 1980); Clark McPhail, “The Problems and Pros-
pects of Behavioral Perspectives,” The American Sociologist 16 (1981), pp. 172-74
 SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM: POINTS OF CONVERGENCE
335

to symbolically represent each other, objects, ideas, and virtually any

phase of their experience. Without the capacity to create symbols and to
use them in human affairs, patterns of social organization among humans
could not be created, maintained, or changed. Humans have become, to
a very great degree, liberated from instinctual and biological programming
and thus must rely on their symbol-using powers to adapt and survive in
% the world.

Symbolic Communication
-Humans use symbols to communicate with each other. By virtue of their
capacity to agree upon the meaning of vocal and bodily gestures, humans
can effectively communicate. Symbolic communication is, of course, ex-
tremely complex, since people use more than word or language symbols
in communication. They also use facial gestures, voice tones, body coun-
tenance, and other symbolic gestures in which there is common meaning
and understanding. |

Interaction and Role-Taking

_By reading and interpreting the gestures of others, humans communicate
_and interact. They become able tomutually read each other, to anticipate
each other’s responses, and to adjust to each other. Mead termed this
basic capacity “taking the role of the other,” or role-taking—the ability
to see the other’s attitudes and dispositions to act. Interactionists still
emphasize the process of role-taking as the basic mechanism by which
interaction occurs. For example, the late Arnold Rose, who was one of
the leaders of contemporary interactionism, indicated that role-taking
“means that the individual communicator imagines—evokes within him-
-self—how the recipient understands that communication.”” Or, as another
modern interactionist, Sheldon Stryker, emphasizes, role-taking is “an-
ticipating the responses of others with one in some social act.’ And as
Alfred Lindesmith and Anselm Strauss emphasize, role-taking is “im-
aginatively assuming the position or point of view of another person.’
Without the ability to read gestures and to use these gestures as a
basis for putting oneself in the position of others, interaction could not
occur. And without interaction, patterns of social organization could not
exist.

Rose, Human Behavior, p. 8.

"Sheldon Stryker, “Symbolic Interaction as an Approach to Family Research,” Marriage
and Family Living 2 (May 1959), pp. 111-19. See also his “Role-Taking Accuracy and
Adjustment,” Sociometry 20 (December 1957), pp. 286-96.
*Lindesmith and Strauss, Social Psychology, p. 282.
336 CHAPTER 15 / THE SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM OF BLUMER AND KUHN

Interaction, Humans, and Society

Just as Mead emphasized that mind, self, and society are intimately con-
nected to each other, so contemporary interactionists analyze the relation
between the genesis of “humanness” and patterns of interaction. What
makes humans unique as species and what enables each individual to
possess distinctive characteristics is the result of interaction in society.
Conversely, what makes society possible is the capacities that humans
acquire as they grow and mature in society.
I find that current symbolic interactionists tend to emphasize the
same human capacities as Mead: the genesis of mind and self. Mind is
the capacity to think: to symbolically denote, weigh, assess, anticipate,
map, and construct courses of action. Although Mead’s term, mind, is
rarely used today, the processes that this term denotes are given great
emphasis. As Rose indicates:

Thinking is the process by which possible symbolic solutions and other

future courses of action are examined, assessed for their relative advantages
and disadvantages in terms of the values of the individual, and one of them
chosen for action.’

Moreover, the concept of mind has been reformulated to embrace

what W. I. Thomas termed the definition of the situation. With the
capacities of mind, aciors can name, categorize, and orient themselves to
constellations of objects—including themselves as objects—in all situa-
tions. In this way, they can assess, weigh, and sort out appropriate lines
of conduct.®
As the concept of the definition of the situation underscores, self is
still a key concept in the interactionist literature. Present emphasis in
the interactionist orientation is on (a) the emergence of self-conceptions—
relatively stable and enduring conceptions that people have about them-
selves—and (6) the ability to derive self-images—pictures of oneself as an
object in social situations. Self is thus a major object that people inject
into their definitions of situations. It shapes much of what they see, feel,
and do in the world around them.
Society, or relatively stable patterns of interaction, is seen by inter-
actionists as possible only by virtue of people’s capacities to define sit-
uations and, most particularly, to view themselves as objects in situations.
Society can exist by virtue of human capacities for thinking and defining
as well as for self-reflection and evaluation.

"Rose, Human Behavior, p. 12.

8W. I. Thomas, “The Definition of the Situation,” in Symbolic Interaction, ed. J. Manis
and B. Meltzer, pp. 331-36.
*For clear statements on the concept of “definition of the situation” as it is currently
used in interactionist theory, see Lindesmith and Strauss, Social Psychology, pp. 280-83.
 AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT AND CONTROVERSY 337

In sum, these points of emphasis constitute the core of the interac-

tionist approach. Humans create and use symbols. They communicate
with symbols. They interact through role-taking, which involves the read-
ing of symbols emitted by others. What makes them unique as a species—
the existence of mind and self—arises out of interaction. Conversely, the
emergence of these capacities allows for the interactions that form the
basis of society.

AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT AND CONTROVERSY

From this initial starting point, Blumer and Kuhn often diverge, as do
more recent advocates of their respective positions.’ I see the major areas
of disagreement as revolving around the following issues: (1) What is the
nature of the individual? (2) What is the nature of interaction? (3) What
is the nature of social organization? (4) What is the most appropriate
method for studying humans and society? And (5) what is the best form
of sociological theorizing? Let me now examine each of these five con-
troversial questions |in more detail.

The Nature of the Individual

Both Blumer and Kuhn have emphasized the ability of humans to use
symbols and to develop capacities for thinking, defining, and self-reflec-
tion. However, there is considerable disagreement over the degree of struc-
ture and stability in human personality. Blumer emphasized that humans
have the capacity to view themselves as objects and to insert any object
into an interaction situation. Therefore, human actors are not pushed
and pulled around by social and psychological forces but are active creators
of the world to which they respond. Interaction and emergent patterns
of social organization can only be understood by focusing on these ca-
pacities of individuals to create symbolically the world of objects to which
they respond. For there is always the potential for spontaneity and

The following comparison draws heavily from Meltzer’s and Petras’s ‘““The Chicago and
Iowa Schools” but extends their analysis by drawing from the following works of Blumer
and Kuhn. For Blumer, Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969); ‘Comment on ‘Parsons as a Symbolic Interactionist,’”’ Socio-
logical Inquiry 45 (Winter 1975), pp. 59-62. For Kuhn, “Major Trends in Symbolic Inter-
action Theory in the Past Twenty-Five Years,” Sociological Quarterly 5 (Winter 1964), pp.
61-84; “The Reference Group Reconsidered,” Sociological Quarterly 5 (Winter 1964), pp.
6-21; “Factors in Personality: Socio-Cultural Determinants as Seen through the Amish,”
in Aspects of Culture and Personality, ed. F. L. Kittsu (New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1954);
“Self-attitudes by Age, Sex, and Professional Training,” in Symbolic Interaction, ed. G.
Stone and H. Farberman, pp. 424-36; T. S. McPartland, ‘““An Empirical Investigation of
Self-Attitude,” American Sociological Review 19 (February 1954), pp. 68-76; “Family Impact
on Personality,” in Problems in Social Psychology, ed. J. E. Hulett and R. Stagner (Urbana,
Ill.: University of Illinois, 1953); C. Addison Hickman, Individuals, Groups, and Economic
Behavior (New York: Dryden Press, 1956).
 338 CHAPTER 15 / THE SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM OF BLUMER AND KUHN

indeterminacy in human behavior. If humans can invoke any object into

a situation, they can radically alter their definitions of that situation, and
hence, their behaviors. Self is but one of many objects to be seen in a
situation; other objects from the past, present, or anticipated future can
also be evoked and provide a basis for action.
In contrast, Kuhn emphasized the importance of people’s “core self”
as an object. Through socialization, humans acquire a relatively stable
set of meanings and attitudes toward themselves. The core self will shape
and constrain the way people will define situations by circumscribing the
cues that will be seen and the objects that will be injected into social
situations. Human personality is thus structured and comparatively sta-
ble, giving people’s actions a continuity and predictability. And if it is
possible to know the expectations of those groups that have shaped a
person’s core self and that provide a basis for its validation, then human
behavior could, in principle, be highly predictable.!! As Kuhn and Hick-
man noted:

As self theory views the individual, he derives his plans of action from the
roles he plays and the statuses he occupies in the groups with which he feels
identified—his refererce groups. His attitudes toward himself as an object are
the best indexes to these plans of action, and hence to the action itself, in
that they are the anchoring points from which self-evaluations and other-
evaluations are made.!?

The Nature of Interaction

Both Blumer and Kuhn have stressed the process of role-taking in which
humans mutually emit and interpret each other’s gestures. From the in-
formation gained through this interpretation of gestures, actors are able
to rehearse covertly various lines of activity and then emit those behaviors
that can allow cooperative and organized activity. As might be expected,
however, Blumer and Kuhn disagree over the degree to which interactions
are actively constructed. Blumer’s scheme, and that of most of the Chicago
School, emphasizes the following points:

1. In addition to viewing each other as objects in an interaction

situation, actors select and designate symbolically additional objects
in any interaction. (a) One of the most important of these objects is
the self. On the one hand, self can represent the transitory images
that an actor derives from interpreting the gestures of others; on the

"For an interesting methodological critique of Kuhn’s self-theory, see Charles W. Tucker,

‘“Some Methodological Problems of Kuhn’s Self Theory,” Sociological Quarterly 7 (Winter
1966), pp. 345-58.
"Hickman and Kuhn, /ndividuals, Groups, and Economic Behavior, pp. 224-25.
 AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT AND CONTROVERSY 339

other, self can denote the more enduring conceptions of one as an

object that an actor brings to and interjects into the interaction. (b)
Another important class of objects are the varying types of expec-
tation structures—for example, norms and values—that may exist to
guide interaction. (c) Finally, because of the human organism’s ca-
pacity to manipulate symbols, almost any other object—whether an-
other person, a set of standards, or a dimension of self—may be in-
serted into the interaction.
- 2. It is because of the objects in interaction situations that actors
have various dispositions to act. Thus, in order to understand the
potentials for action among groups of individuals, it is necessary to
understand the world of objects that they have symbolically designated.
3. In terms of the particular cluster of objects and of the dispo-
sitions to act that they imply, each actor arrives at a definition of
the situation. Such a definition serves as a general frame of reference
within which the consequences of specific lines of conduct are as-
sessed. This process is termed mapping.
4. The selection of a particular line of behavior involves complex
symbolic processes. At a minimum, actors typically evaluate: (a) the
demands of others immediately present; (b) the self-images they de-
rive from role-taking, not only with others in the situation but also
with those not actually present; (c) the normative expectations they
perceive to exist in the situation; and (d) the dispositions to act toward
any additional objects they may inject symbolically into the interaction.
5. Once behavior is emitted, redefinition of the situation and
perhaps remapping of action may occur as the reactions of others are
interpreted and as new objects are injected into, and old ones dis-
carded from, the interaction.
Thus, by emphasizing the interpreting, evaluating, defining, and map-
ping processes, Blumer stressed the creative, constructed, and changeable
nature of interaction. Rather than constituting the mere vehicle through
which preexisting psychological, social, and cultural structures inexorably
shape behavior, the symbolic nature of interaction assures that social,
cultural, and psychological structures will be altered and changed through
shifting the definitions and behaviors of humans.
In contrast to Blumer’s scheme, Kuhn stressed the power of the core
self and the group context to constrain interaction. Much interaction is
released rather than constructed, as interacting individuals follow the
dictates of the self-attitudes and the expectations of their respective roles.
Although Kuhn would certainly not have denied the potential for con-
structing and reconstructing interactions, he tended to view individuals
as highly constrained in their behaviors by virtue of their core self and
the requirements of their mutual situation.
340 CHAPTER 15 / THE SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM OF BLUMER AND KUHN

The Nature of Social Organization

Symbolic interactionism tends to concentrate on the interactive processes
by which humans form social relationships rather than the end products
of interactions. Moreover, both Blumer and Kuhn, as well as other in-
teractionists, have tended to emphasize the microprocesses among indi-
viduals within small group contexts. Blumer has consistently advocated
a view of social organization as temporary and constantly changing, whereas
Kuhn typically focused on the more structured aspects of social situations.
Additionally, Biumer argued for a view of social structure as merely one
of many objects that actors employ in their definition of a situation.
As Blumer has emphasized: .

1. Since behavior is a reflection of the interpretive, evaluational,

definitional, and mapping processes of individuals in various inter-
action contexts, social organization represents an active fitting to-
gether of action by those in interaction. Social organization must
therefore be viewed as more of a process than a structure.
2. Social structure is an emergent phenomenon that is not re-
ducible to the constituent actions of individuals, but it is difficult to
understand patterns of social organization without recognizing that
they represent an interlacing of the separate behaviors among
individuals.
3. Although much interaction is repetitive and structured by clear-
cut expectations and common definitions of the situation, its symbolic
nature reveals the potential for new objects to be inserted or old ones
altered and abandoned in a situation. The result is that reinterpre-
tation, reevaluation, redefinition, and remapping of behaviors can
always occur. Social structure must therefore be viewed as rife with
potential for alteration and change.
4. Thus, patterns of social organization represent emergent phe-
nomena that can serve as objects that define situations for actors.
However, the very symbolic processes that give rise and sustain these
patterns can also operate to change and alter them.

In contrast to this emphasis, Kuhn usually sought to isolate the more

structured features of situations. In conformity with what I term struc-
tural role theory in the next chapter, Kuhn saw social situations as con-
stituting relatively stable networks of positions with attendant expecta-
tions or norms. Interactions often create such networks, but once created.
people conform to the expectations of those positions in which they have
anchored their self-attitudes.
By reviewing different assumptions of Blumer and Kuhn over the
nature of individuals, interaction, and social organization, it is clear that
Chicago School interactionists view individuals as potentially sponta-
neous, interaction as constantly in the process of change, and social or-
 =

AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT AND CONTROVERSY 341

ganization as fluid and tenuous.'* Iowa School interactionists are more

prone to see individual personality and social organization as structured,
with interactions being constrained by these structures.’ These differ-
ences in assumptions have resulted in, or perhaps have been a reflection
of, varying conceptions of how to investigate the social world and how
to build theory.

The Nature of Methods

E. L. Quarantelli and Joseph Cooper have observed that Mead’s ideas
provide for contemporary interactionists a “frame of reference within
which an observer can look at behavior rather than a specific set of hy-
potheses to be tested.” There can be little doubt that this statement is
true. Yet there is much literature attempting to test some of the impli-
cations of Mead’s ideas, especially those about self, with standard research
protocols. This diversity in methodological approaches is underscored by
the contrasting methodologies of Blumer and Kuhn. Indeed, the many
students and students-of-students of these two figures tend to use Mead’s
ideas as either a sensitizing framework or as an iaspiration for narrcw
research hypotheses.
Methodological approaches to studying the social world follow from
thinkers’ assumptions about what they can, or will, discover. The diver-
gence of Blumer’s and Kuhn’s methodologies thus reflects their varying
assumptions about the operation of symbolic processes. Ultimately, I think
that their differences boil down to the question of causality. Whether or
not events are viewed as the result of deterministic causes will influence
the methodologies that are employed. Thus, to appreciate why Blumer
and Kuhn diverge in their methodological approaches, it is necessary to
see how their assumptions about individual interaction and social orga-
nization have become translated into a set of causal images that dictates
different methodological approaches.

Diverging assumptions about causality. For Blumer, the Mea-

dian legacy challenges the utility of theoretical perspectives that

18Prominent thinkers leaning toward Blumer’s position include Anselm Strauss, Alfred
Lindesmith, Tamotsu Shibutani, and Ralph Turner. For a critique of Blumer’s use of Mead,
see Clark McPhail and Cynthia Rexroat, “Mead vs. Blumer,” American Sociological Review
44 (1979), pp. 449-67.
4Prominent Iowa School interactionists include Frank Miyamoto, Sanford Dornbusch,
Simon Dinitz, Harry Dick, Sheldon Stryker, and Theodore Sarbin. For a list of studies by
Kuhn’s students, see Harold A. Mulford and Winfield W. Salisbury II, “Self-Conceptions
in a General Population,” Sociological Quarterly 5 (Winter 1964), pp. 35-46. Again, these
individuals and those in note 12 would resist this classification, since none advocate as
extreme a position as Kuhn or Blumer. Yet, the tendency to follow either Kuhn’s or Blumer’s
assumptions is evident in their work and in that of many others.
16, L. Quarantelli and Joseph Cooper, “Self-conceptions and Others: A Further Test of
Meadian Hypotheses,” Sociological Quarterly 7 (Summer 1966), pp. 281-97.
342 CHAPTER 15 / THE SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM OF BLUMER AND KUHN

underemphasize the internal symbolic processes of actors attempting to

fit together their respective behaviors into an organized pattern.'* Rather
than being the result of system forces, societal needs, and structural mech-
anisms, social organization is the result of the mutual interpretations,
evaluations, definitions, and mappings of individual actors. Thus, the
symbolic processes of individuals cannot be viewed as a neutral medium
through which social forces operate, but instead these processes must be
viewed as shaping the ways social patterns are formed, sustained, and
changed. |
Similarly, as I emphasized earlier, Blumer’s approach challenges the-
oretical perspectives that view behavior as the mere releasing of pro-
pensities built into a structured personality. Just as patterns of social
organization must be conceptualized as in a continual state of potential
flux through the processes of interpretation, evaluation, definition, and
mapping, so the human personality must also be viewed as a constantly
unfolding process rather than a rigid structure from which behavior is
mechanically released. By virtue of the fact that humans can make varying
and changing symbolic indications to themselves, they are capable of
altering and shifting behavior. Behavior is not so much released as it is
constructed by actors making successive indications to themselves.
For Blumer, social structures and normative expectations are objects
that must be interpreted and then used to define a situation and to map
out the prospective behaviors that ultimately create and sustain social
structures. From this perspective, overt behavior at one point generates
self-images that serve as objects for individuals to symbolically map sub-
sequent actions at another point in time. At the same time, existing
personality traits, such as self-conceptions, self-esteem, and internalized
needs, mediate each successive phase of interpretation of gestures, eval-
uation of self-images, definition of the situation, and mapping of diverse
behaviors.
In such a scheme, causality is difficult to discern. Social structures
do not cause behavior since they are only one class of objects inserted
into an actor’s seemingly unpredictable symbolic thinking. Similarly, self
is only another object inserted into the definitional process. Action is thus
created out of the potentially large number of objects that actors can
insert into situations. In this vision of the social world, then, behavior
does not reveal clear causes. Indeed, the variables influencing an individ-
ual’s definition of the situation and action are of the actor’s own choosing
and apparently not subject to clear causal analysis.

‘See particularly Blumer’s “Society as Symbolic Interaction,” in Human Behavior and

Social Process, ed. A. Rose, pp. 179-92 (reprinted in Blumer’s Symbolic Interactionism):
“Sociological Implications of the Thought of George Herbert Mead,” in Symbolic Inter-
actionism; and “The Methodological Position of Symbolic Interactionism,” in Symbolic
Interactionism. ,
 AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT AND CONTROVERSY 343

In contrast to this seemingly indeterministic view of causality, Kuhn

argued that the social world is deterministic. The apparent spontaneity
and indeterminacy of human behavior are simply the result of insufficient
knowledge about the variables influencing people’s definitions and actions.
For if the social experiences of individuals can be discerned, it is possible
to know what caused the emergence of their core self. With knowledge of
the core self, of the expectations that have become internalized as a result
of people’s experiences, and of the particular expectations of a given sit-
uation, it is possible to understand and predict people’s definitions of
situations and their conduct. Naturally, this level of knowledge is im-
possible with current methodological techniques, but insight into deter-
ministic causes of behavior and emergent patterns of social organization
is possible in principle. For Kuhn, then, methodological strategies should
therefore be directed at seeking the causes of behaviors.

Diverging methodological protocols. These differing assump-

tions about causality have shaped divergent methodological approaches
within symbolic interactionism. The extremes of these diverging ap-
proaches are, | feel, best illustrated by Blumer’s and Kuhn’s respective
approaches.
Blumer has mounted a consistent and persistent line of attack on
sociological theory and research.!” His criticism questions the utility of
current research procedures for unearthing the symbolic processes from
which social structures and personality are built and sustained. Rather
than letting the nature of the empirical world dictate the kinds of research
strategies used in its study, Blumer and others have argued that present
practices allow research strategies to determine what is to be studied:

Instead of going to the empirical social world in the first and last instances,
resort is made instead to a priori theoretical schemes, to sets of unverified
concepts, and to canonized protocols of research procedure. These come to
be the governing agents in dealing with the empirical social world, forcing
research to serve their character and bending the empirical world to their
premises.'®

For Blumer, then, the fads of research protocol blind investigators

and theorists to the real character of the social world. Such research and
theoretical protocols force analysis away from the direct examination of
the empirical world in favor of preconceived notions of what is true and
how these truths should be studied. In contrast, the processes of symbolic
interaction dictate that research methodologies should respect the character

17See, in particular, Blumer’s “Methodological Position.”

*Tbid., p. 33.
344 CHAPTER 15 / THE SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM OF BLUMER AND KUHN

of empirical reality and adopt methodological procedures that encourage

its direct and unbiased examination.’®
To achieve this end, the research act itself must be viewed as a process
of symbolic interaction in which researchers take the role of those in-
dividuals whom they are studying. To do such role-taking effectively,
researchers must study interaction with a set of concepts that, rather than
prematurely structuring the social world for investigators, sensitize them
to interactive processes. This approach would enable investigators to
maintain the distinction between the concepts of science and those of
the interacting individuals under study. In this way, the interpretive and
definitional processes of actors adjusting to one another in concrete sit-
uations can guide the refinement and eventual incorporation of scientific
concepts into theoretical statements on the interactive processes that
make up society.
Blumer has advocated a twofold process of research, which first in-
volves “exploration” in which researchers prepare to observe concrete
situations and then revise their observations as new impressions of the
situation arise. Second, exploration must be followed by a process of “‘in-
spection,” whereby researchers use their observations to dictate how sci-
entific concepts are to be refined and incorporated into more abstract and
generic statements of relationships among concepts. In this dual research
process, investigators must understand each actor’s definition of the sit-
uation, the relationship of this definition to the objects actors perceive
in the situation, and the relationship of objects to specific others, groups,
and expectations in both the actor’s immediate and remote social worlds.”
In this way, the research used to build the abstract concepts and prop-
ositions of sociological theory is connected to the empirical world of actors
interpreting, evaluating, defining, and mapping the behaviors that sustain
patterns of social organization.
A major area of controversy over Blumer’s methodological position
concerns the issue of operationalization of concepts. How is it possible
to operationalize concepts, such as self and definition of the situation, so
that different investigators at different times and in different contexts
can study the same phenomena? I see Blumer as defining away the ques-
tion of how the interpretative, evaluational, definitional, and mapping
processes are to be studied in terms of clear-cut operational definitions.

‘For an interesting discussion of the contrasts between these research strategies, see
Llewellyn Gross, “Theory Construction in Sociology: A Methodological Inquiry,” in Sym-
— on Sociological Theory, ed. L. Gtoss (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), pp. 531-
63.
For an eloquent and reasoned argument in support of Blumer’s position, see Norman
K. Denzin, The Research Act: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods (C hicago:
Aldine Publishing, 1970), pp. 185-218; and Norman K. Denzin, “Symbolic Interactionism
and Ethnomethodology,” in Understanding Everyday Life: Toward a Reconstruction of
Sociological Knowledge, ed. J. D. Douglas (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1970), pp. 259-84.
 AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT AND CONTROVERSY 345

For Blumer, however, such questions “show a profound misunderstanding

of both scientific inquiry and symbolic interactionism.’?! The concepts
and propositions of symbolic interactionism allow for the direct exami-
nation of the empirical world; therefore, “their value and their validity
are to be determined in that examination and not in seeing how they fare
when subjected to the alien criteria of an irrelevant methodology.” Ac-
cording to Blumer, these “alien criteria’ embrace a false set of assump-
tions about just how concepts should be attached to events in the empirical
world. In general, these “false” assumptions posit that for each abstract
concept a set of operational definitions should guide researchers, who then
examine the empirical cases denoted by the operational definition.
Blumer has consistently emphasized current deficiencies in the at-
tachment of sociological concepts to actual events in the empirical world:
This ambiguous nature of concepts is the basic deficiency in social theory.
It hinders us in coming to close grips with our empirical world, for we are
not sure of what to grip. Our uncertainty as to what we are referring obstructs
us from asking pertinent questions and setting relevant problems for research.”

Blumer argues that it is only through the methodological processes

of exploration and inspection that concepts can be attached to the em-
pirical. Rather than seeking a false sense of scientific security through
rigid operational definitions, sociological theory must accept the fact that
the attachment of abstract concepts to the empirical world must be an
ongoing process of investigators exploring and inspecting events in the
empirical world.
In sum, then, Blumer’s presentation of the methodological position
of symbolic interactionism questions the current research protocols. As
an alternate, he advocates (a) the more frequent use of the exploration-
inspection process, whereby researchers seek to understand the symbolic
processes that shape interaction; and (b) the recognition that only through
ongoing research activities can concepts remain attached to the fluid
interaction processes of the empirical world. In turn, this methodological
position has profound implications for the construction of theory in so-
ciology, as we will see shortly.
In contrast to Blumer’s position, Kuhn’s vision of a deterministic
world led him to emphasize the commonality of methods in all the sci-
ences. The key task of methodology is to provide operational definitions
of concepts so that their implications can be tested against the actual
facts of social life. Most of Kuhn’s career was thus devoted to taking the
suggestive but vague concepts of Mead’s framework and developing mea-
sures of them. He sought to find replicable measures of such concepts as

21Blumer, “Methodological Position,” p. 49. |

Review
“Herbert Blumer, “What Is Wrong with Social Theory?” American Sociological
19 (August 1954), pp. 146-58.
346 CHAPTER 15 / THE SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM OF BLUMER AND KUHN

self, social act, social object, and reference group.” His most famous mea-
suring instrument—the Twenty Statements Test (TST)—can serve to il-
lustrate his strategy. With the TST, he sought to measure core self—the
more enduring and basic attitudes that people have about themselves—
by assessing people’s answers to the question, “What kind of person are
you?’”4 For example, the most common variant of the TST reads as
follows:
In the spaces below, please give 20 different answers to the question, “Who
Am I?” Give these as if you were giving them to yourself, not to somebody
else. Write fairly rapidly, for the time is limited.

Answers to such questions can be coded and scaled so that variations

in people’s self-conceptions can be linked to either prior social experiences’
or behaviors. Thus, Kuhn sought to find empirical indicators of key con-
cepts. These indicators would allow for viewing recorded variations in
one concept, such as self, to be linked to variations in other measurable
concepts. In this way, Mead’s legacy could be tested and used to build a
theory of symbolic interactionism.

The Nature and Possibilities of Sociological Theory

Blumer’s and Kuhn’s assumptions about the nature of the individual,
interaction, social organization, causality, and methodology are reflected
in their different visions of what theory is, should, and can be. Again,
Blumer and Kuhn stand at opposite poles, with most interactionists
standing between these extremes and yet leaning toward one or the other.

Blumer’s theory-building strategy. Blumer’s assumptions, im-

age of causal processes, and methodological position have all come to
dictate a particular conception of sociological theory. The recognition that
sociological concepts do not come to grips with the empirical world is
seen by Blumer as the result not only of inattention to actual events in
the empirical world but also of the kind of world it is. The use of more
definitive concepts referring to classes of precisely defined events is per-
haps desirable in theory building, but it may be impossible, given the
nature of the empirical world. Since this world is composed of constantly
shifting processes of symbolic interaction among actors in various con-
textual situations, the use of concepts that rip only some of the actual
ongoing events from this context will fail to capture the contextual nature
of the social world. More important, the fact that social reality is ulti-
mately “constructed” from the syimbolic processes among individuals as-

Meltzer and Petras, ‘““The Chicago and Iowa Schools.”

“For an important critique of this methodology, see Tucker, “Some Methodological
Problems.”
 AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT AND CONTROVERSY 347

sures that the actual instances denoted by concepts will shift and vary,
thereby defying easy classification through rigid operational definitions.
These facts, Blumer argued, require the use of “sensitizing concepts,”
which, although lacking the precise specification of attributes and events
of definitive concepts, do provide clues and suggestions about where to
look for certain classes of phenomena. As such, sensitizing concepts offer
a general sense of what is relevant and thereby allow investigators to
approach flexibly a shifting empirical world and feel out and pick one’s
way in an unknown terrain. The use of this kind of concept does not
necessarily reflect a lack of rigor in sociological theory but rather a rec-
ognition that if ‘our empirical world presents itself in the form of dis-
tinctive and unique happenings or situations and if we seek through the
direct study of this world to establish classes of objects and relations
between classes, we are ... forced to work with sensitizing concepts.”
The nature of the empirical world may preclude the development of
definitive concepts, but sensitizing concepts can be improved and refined
by flexibly approaching empirical situations denoted by sensitizing con-
cepts and then by assessing how actual events stack up against the con-
cepts. Although the lack of fixed bench marks and definitions makes this
task more difficult for sensitizing concepts than for definitive ones, the
progressive refinement of sensitizing concepts is possible through “careful
and imaginative study of the stubborn world to which such concepts are
addressed.” Furthermore, sensitizing concepts formulated in this way
can be communicated and used to build sociological theory; and although
formal definitions and rigid classifications are not appropriate, sensitizing
concepts can be explicitly communicated through descriptions and illus-
trations of the events to which they pertain.
In sum, the ongoing refinement, formulation, and communication of
sensitizing concepts must inevitably be the building block of sociological
theory. With careful formulation, they can be incorporated into provi-
sional theoretical statements that specify the conditions under which
various types of interaction are likely to occur. In this way, the concepts
of theory will recognize the shifting nature of the social world and thereby
provide a more accurate set of statements about social organization.
The nature of the social world and the type of theory it dictates have
profound implications for just how such theoretical statements are to be
constructed and organized into theoretical formats. Blumer’s emphasis
on the constructed nature of reality and on the types of concepts that
this fact necessitates has led him to emphasize inductive theory construc-
tion. In inductive theory, generic propositions are abstracted from ob-
servations of concrete interaction situations. This emphasis on induction

2Blumer, “What’s Wrong with Social Theory,” p. 150.

*Ibid.
348 CHAPTER 15 / THE SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM OF BLUMER AND KUHN

is considered desirable, since current attempts at deductive theorizing in

sociology usually do not involve rigorous derivations of propositions from
each other nor a scrupulous search for the negative empirical cases that
would refute propositions.?” These failings, Biumer contends, assure that
deductive sociological theory will remain unconnected to the events of
the empirical world and, hence, unable to correct for errors in its theo-
retical statements. Coupled with the tendency for fads of research protocol
to dictate research problems and methods used to investigate them, it
appears unlikely that deductive theory and the research it inspires can
unearth those processes that would confirm or refute its generic state-
ments. In the wake of this theoretical impasse, then, it is crucial that
sociological theorizing refamiliarize itself with the actual events of the
empirical world. As Blumer argued: ‘‘No theorizing, however ingenious,
and no observance of scientific protocol, however meticulous, are substi-
tutes for developing familiarity with what is actually going on in the sphere
of life under study.”?® Without such inductive familiarity, sociological
theory will remain a self-fulfilling set of theoretical prophecies bearing
little relationship to the phenomena it is supposed to explain.

Kuhn’s theory-building strategy. Kuhn advocated a more de-

ductive format for sociological theorizing than Blumer. Although his own
work does not reveal great deductive rigor, he held that subsumption of
lower-order propositions under more general principles is the most ap-
propriate way to build theory. He visualized his “‘self-theory” as one step
in the building of theory. By developing general statements on how self-
attitudes emerge and shape social action, it would be possible to under-
stand and predict human behavior. Moreover, less general propositions
about aspects of self could be subsumed under general propositions about
processes of symbolic interaction.
While Kuhn recognized that symbolic interaction theory had become
partitioned into many suborientations, including his own self-theory, he
held a vision of a unified body of theoretical principles. As he concluded
in an assessment of interactionist theory:
I would see in the next 25 years of symbolic interaction theory an accel-
erated development of research techniques, on the one hand, and a coalescing
of most of the separate subtheories.”

Thus, the ultimate goal of theory is consolidation or “coalescing” of

testable lower-order theories under a general set of symbolic interactionist
principles. Self-theory, as developed by Kuhn, would be but one set of
derivations from a more general system of interactionist principles. In

77Blumer, “Methodological Position.”

*Ibid., p. 39.
*Kuhn, “Major Trends,” p. 80.
 SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM: A CONCLUDING COMMENT 349

contrast to Blumer, then, theory for Kuhn was ultimately to form a unified
system from which specific propositions about different aspects or phases
of symbolic interactionism could be derived.

The Chicago and Iowa Schools: An Overview

In Table 15-1, I have summarized the points of convergence and diver-
gence of the Chicago and Iowa Schools, or of Blumer and Kuhn. The two
right columns explore a number of issues over which there is disagreement
among interactionists. But I think it important to place these disagree-
ments within the context of the points where symbolic interactionists
agree, as I have done in the left column.
I should caution again that distinctions between a Chicago and Iowa
school are hazardous when examining the work of a particular symbolic
interactionist. The distinction denotes only tendencies to view humans,
interaction, social organization, methods, and theory in a particular way.
Few symbolic interactionists follow literally either Blumer’s or Kuhn’s
positions. These positions merely represent the boundaries within which
symbolic interactionists work.

SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM:
A CONCLUDING COMMENT
Blumer’s vision of symbolic interactionism advocates a clear-cut strategy
for building sociological theory. The emphasis on the interpretive, eval-
uative, definitional, and mapping processes of actors has come to dictate
that it is only through induction from these processes that sociological
theory can be built. Further, the ever-shifting nature of these symbolic
processes necessitates that the concepts of sociological theory be sensi-
tizing rather than definitive, with the result that deductive theorizing
should be replaced by an inductive approach. Thus, whether as a preferred
strategy or as a logical necessity, the Blumer interactionist strategy is to
induce generic statements, employing sensitizing concepts, from the on-
going symbolic processes of individuals in concrete interaction situations.
Such a strategy is likely to keep theorizing attuned to the processual
nature of the social world. However, I feel that this approach and, to a
lesser extent, Kuhn’s has not been able to link conceptually the processes
of symbolic interaction to the formation of different patterns of social
organization. Furthermore, the utility of induction from the symbolic
exchanges among individuals for the analysis of interaction among more
macro, collective social units has yet to be demonstrated. Unless these
problems can be resolved, I do not think it wise to follow exclusively the
strategy of Blumer and others of his persuasion. Until symbolic inter-
actionists of all persuasions demonstrate in a more. compelling manner
than is currently the case that the inductive approach utilizing sensitizing
350 CHAPTER 15 / THE SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM OF BLUMER AND KUHN

TABLE 15-1 Convergence and Divergence in the Chicago and lowa Schools of
Symbolic Interactionism
Darke) Tay AP rr Ee eee ee
Theoretical Issues Convergence of Schools
The nature of humans Humans create and use symbols to denote aspects of the world
around them.

What makes humans unique are their symbolic capacities.

Humans are capable of symbolically denoting and involving objects,
which can then serve to shape their definitions of social situations
and, hence, their actions.
Humans are capable of self-reflection and evaluation. They see
themselves as objects in most social situations.

The nature of Interaction is dependent upon people's capacities to emit and

interaction interpret gestures.
Role-taking is the key mechanism of interaction, for it enables actors
to view the other's perspective, as well as that of others and
groups not physically present.
Role-taking and mind operate together by allowing actors to use the
perspectives of others and groups as a basis for their
deliberations, or definitions of situations, before acting. In this way.
people can adjust their responses to each other and to social
situations.

The nature of social Social structure is created, maintained, and changed by processes of
organization symbolic interaction.
It is not possible to understand patterns of social organization—even
the most elaborate—without knowledge of the symbolic processes
among individuals who ultimately make up this pattern.

The nature of Sociological methods must focus on the processes by which people
sociological methods define situations and select courses of action.
Methods must focus on individual persons.

The nature of Theory must be about processes of interaction and seek to isolate
sociological theory out the conditions under which general types of behaviors and
interactions are likely to occur.
 SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM: A CONCLUDING COMMENT 351

TABLE 15-1 (concluded)

ee

Chicago School lowa School

Humans with minds can introject any object into Humans with minds can define situations, but
a situation. there tends to be consistency in terms of the
objects that they introject into situations.
Although self is an important object, it is not the Self is the most important object in the definition
only object. of a situation.
Humans weigh, assess, and map courses of Humans weigh, assess, and map courses of
action before action, but humans can action, but they do so through the prism of
potentially alter their definitions and actions. their core self and the groups in which this
self is anchored.
Interaction is a constant process of role-taking Interaction is dependent upon the process of
with others and groups. role-taking.
Others and groups thus become objects that are The expectations of others and norms of the
involved in people's definitions of situations. situation are important considerations in
arriving at definitions of situations.
Self is another important object that enters into People’s core self is the most important _
people’s definitions. consideration and constraint on interaction.
People’s definitions of situations involve
weighing and assessing objects and then
mapping courses of action.
Interaction involves constantly shifting definitions Interaction most often involves actions that
and changing patterns of action and conform to situational expectations as
interaction. mitigated by the requirements of the core self.

Social structure is constructed by actors Social structures are composed of networks of

adjusting their responses to each other. positions with attendant expectations or
norms.
Social structure is one of many objects that While symbolic interactions create and change
actors introject into their definitions of structures, once these structures are created
situations. they operate to constrain interaction.
Social structure is subject to constant Social structures are thus relatively stable,
realignments as actors’ definitions and especially when people’s core self is invested
behaviors change, forcing new adjustments in particular networks of positions.
from others.

Sociological methods must seek to penetrate Sociological methods must seek to measure
the actors’ mental world and see how they with reliable instruments actors’ symbolic
construct courses of action. processes.
Researchers must be attuned to the multiple, Research should be directed toward defining
varied, ever-shifting, and often indeterminate and measuring those variables that causally
influences on definitions of situations and influence behaviors.
actions.
Research must therefore use observational, Research must therefore use structured
biographical, and unstructured interview measuring instruments, such as
techniques if it is to penetrate people’s questionnaires, to get reliable and valid
definitional processes and take account of measures Cf key variables.
changes in these processes.

Only sensitizing concepts are possible in Sociology can develop precisely defined
sociology. concepts with clear empirical measures.
Deductive theory is thus not possible in Theory can thus be deductive, with a limited
sociology. number of general propositions subsuming
lower-order propositions and empirical
generalizations on specific phases of
symbolic interaction.
At best, theory can offer general and tentative Theory can offer abstract explanations that can
descriptions and interpretations of behaviors allow for predictions of behavior and
and patterns of interaction. interaction.
352 CHAPTER 15 / THE SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM OF BLUMER AND KUHN

concepts can account for more complex forms of social organization, pur-
suit of its strategy will preclude theorizing about much of the social world.
Yet, I feel that both Blumer’s and Kuhn’s strategies call attention to
some important substantive and theoretical issues that are often ignored
in social theory. First, it is necessary that sociological theorizing be more
willing to undertake the difficult task of linking conceptually structural
categories to classes of social processes that underlie these categories. For
this task, symbolic interactionism has provided a wealth of suggestive
concepts. Second, macrosociological theorizing has traditionally remained
detached from the processes of the social world it attempts to describe.
Much of the detachment stems from a failure to define concepts clearly
and provide operational clues about what processes in the empirical world
they denote. To the extent that symbolic interactionist concepts can sup-
plement such theorizing, they will potentially provide a bridge to actual
empirical processes and thereby help attach sociological theory to the
events it purports to explain.
Symbolic interactionism has great potential for correcting the past
inadequacies of sociological theory, but it has yet to demonstrate exactly
how this corrective influence is to be exerted. At present, symbolic in-
teractionism seems capable of analyzing micro social patterns and their
impact on personality, particularly the self. Although interactionism has
provided important insights in the study of socialization, deviance, and
micro social processes, it has yet to demonstrate any great potential for
analyzing complex, macro social patterns. At best, it can provide in its
present form a supplement to macroanalysis by giving researchers a frame-
work and measuring instruments to analyze microprocesses within macro
social events.
I find that much of symbolic interaction, especially Blumer’s advo-
cacy, consists of gallant assertions that “‘society is symbolic interaction”
but without indicating what types of emergent structures are created,
sustained, and changed by what types of interaction in what types of
contexts. Much like the critics’ allegations about Parsons’s social system,
Dahrendorfs imperatively coordinated association, Homans’s institu-
tional piles, or Blau’s organized collectivities, social structural phenomena
emerge somewhat mysteriously and are then sustained or changed by
vague references to interactive processes. The vagueness of the links be-
tween the interaction process and its social structural products leaves
symbolic interactionism with a legacy of assertions but little in the way
of carefully documented statements about how, when, where, and with
what probability interaction processes operate to create, sustain, and
change varying patterns of sociak organization. It is to this goal that
interactionist theory must redirect its efforts.

Probably the most significant effort to overcome this problem is an unfinished man-
uscript by Tamotsu Shibutani, Social Processes: An Introduction to Sociology (Berkeley
Calif.: University of California Press, 1986).
 CHAPTER 16

______ Structural Role Theory

One of the most ambiguous concepts in sociology is “role.” For example,

is a role simply overt behavior? Is it a conception of appropriate behavior?
Is it normatively expected behavior? Is it behavior enacted by virtue of
incumbency in a status position? Or is it all of these? The lack of a
definitive answer to these questions has led some to advocate that soci-
ology abandon the concept.! I think that this solution is far too extreme.
Instead, we must try to clarify our conceptualization of roles, and so, in
this and the next chapter, I will present the range of approaches in the
analysis of roles.
My sense is that there is a structural approach to roles at one extreme
and a more processual strategy at the other.? This diversity mirrors the
range of approaches within interactionism in general. We might view this
range as a continuum and use the analogy of a play and a game to illustrate
its dimensions.’ At one pole of this continuum, individuals are seen as
players in the theater, while at the other end, players are considered to
be participants in a pick-up game. When human action is seen as occurring

1See, for example, Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society (Berkeley, Calif.: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1984).
2For two recent efforts to play down this distinction, see Warren Handel, “Normative
Expectations and the Emergence of Meaning as Solutions to Problems: Convergence of
Structural and Interactionist Views,” American Journal of Sociology 84 (1979), pp. 855-
81; and Jerold Heiss, “Social Roles,” in Social Psychology: Sociological Perspectives, ed. M.
Rosenberg, and R. H. Turner (New York: Basic Boeks, 1981), pp. 94-132._
3Bernard Farber, “A Research Model: Family Crisis and Games Strategy,” in Kinship
and Family Organization, ed. B. Farber (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966), pp. 430-
34. Walter Wallace (Sociological Theory (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1969], pp. 34-35) has
more recently chosen this same analogy to describe symbolic interactionism.

353
354 CHAPTER 16 / STRUCTURAL ROLE THEORY

in a theater, interaction is likely to be viewed as highly structured by the

script, directors, other actors, and the audience. When conceptualized as
a game, interaction is more likely to be seen as less structured and as
influenced by the wide range of tactics available to participants.
In this chapter, I will examine the more structural approach to role
theory.‘ I will not examine any one scholar’s work because, in truth, there
is no one theoretical approach. Rather, there is a large number of research-
oriented scholars who have contributed collectively to a structural con-
ceptualization of roles. Indeed, one of the major problems of the structural
approach is the lack of theoretical synthesis. As a result, my efforts in
this chapter will revolve around framing the issues that need to be the-
oretically synthesized.

THE CONCEPTUAL THRUST OF STRUCTURAL

ROLE THEORY
The thrust of the structural role perspective, as it flowed from a mixture
of Park’s, Simmel’s, Moreno’s, Linton’s, and Mead’s insights, has often
been captured by quoting a famous passage from Shakespeare’s As You
Like It:
All the world’s a stage
and all the men and women merely players:
They have their exits and their entrances;
And one man in his time plays many parts (Act II, scene vii).

The analogy is then drawn between the players on the stage and the
actors of society. Just as players have a clearly defined part to play, so
actors in society occupy clear positions; just as players must follow a
written script, so actors in society must follow norms; just as players must
obey the orders of a director, so actors in society must conform to the
dictates of those with power or those of importance; just as players must
react to each other’s performance on the stage, so members of society
must mutually adjust their responses to one another; just as players re-
spond to the audience, so actors in society take the role of various au-
diences or “generalized others”; and just as players with varying abilities
and capacities bring to each role their unique interpretations, so actors
with varying self-conceptions and role-playing skills have their own styles
of interaction.

‘For the first early analytical statements, see Jacob Moreno, Who Shall Survive, rev.
ed. (New York: Beacon House, 1953; original ed., 1934); and Ralph Linton, The Study of
Man (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1936).
‘For an example of this form of analogizing, see Bruce J. Biddle and Edwin Thomas,
Role Theory: Concepts and Research (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966), pp. 3-4. For
the best-known dramaturgical model, see Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in
Everyday Life (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Publishing, 1959).
 IMAGES OF SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL 355

Despite its simplicity, I think that the analogy is appropriate. As we

will come to appreciate, the role-theoretic perspective supports the thrust
of Shakespeare’s passage. At the outset, however, I should caution again
that despite its pervasiveness in sociology, role analysis is far from being
a well-articulated perspective.

IMAGES OF SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL

Shakespeare’s passage provides, I feel, the general outline of what role
theorists assume about the social world. In the concept of stage are as-
sumptions about the nature of social organization; in the concept of play-
ers are implicit assumptions about the nature of the individual; and in
the vision of men and women as “merely players” who have “their exits
and their entrances” are a series of assumptions about the relationship
of individuals to patterns of social organization.

The Nature of Social Organization

For structural role theorists, the social world .is viewed as a network of
variously interrelated positions, or statuses, within which individuals en-
act roles.® For each position, as well as for groups and classes of positions,
various kinds of expectations about how incumbents are to behave can
be discerned. Thus, social organization is ultimately composed of various
networks of statuses and expectations.’
Statuses are typically analyzed in terms of how they are interrelated
to one another to form various types of social units. In terms of variables
such as size, degree of differentiation, and complexity of interrelatedness,
status networks are classified into forms ranging from various types of
groups to larger forms of collective organization. There has been some
analysis of their formal properties, but status networks are rarely analyzed
independently of the types of expectations attendant upon them. Part of
the reason for this close relation between form and content is that the
types of expectations that typify particular networks of positions repre-
sent one of their defining characteristics. It is usually assumed that the
behavior emitted by incumbents is not an exclusive function of the structure

*For a recent effort to bring together structurally oriented conceptions of role, see Bruce
Biddle, Role Theory: Expectations, Identities, and Behaviors (New York: Academic Press,
1979).
7See, for example, Jacob L. Moreno, “Contributions of Sociometry to Research Meth-
odology in Sociology,” American Sociological Review 12 (June 1947), pp. 287-92; Jacob L.
Moreno, ed., The Sociometry Reader (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960); Oscar A. Oeser and
Frank Harary, “Role Structures: A Description in Terms of Graph Theory,’ Human Re-
lations 15 (May 1962), pp. 89-109; and Darwin Cartwright and Frank Harary, “Structural
Balance: A Generalization of Heider’s Theory,” Psychological Review 63 (September 1956),
pp. 277-93.
356 CHAPTER 16 / STRUCTURAL ROLE THEORY

of positions, per se, but also of the kinds of expectations that inhere in
these positions.
The range of expectations denoted by role-theoretic concepts is di-
verse. Pursuing the dramaturgical analogy to a play, I see three general
classes of expectations as typifying structural role theory’s vision of the
world: (a) expectations from the “script”; (b) expectations from other
“players”; and (c) expectations from the “audience.”

Expectations from the script. Much of social reality can be

considered to read like a script in that for many positions there are norms
specifying just how an individual ought to behave. The degree to which
activity is regulated by norms varies under different conditions; thus, one
of the questions to be resolved by role theory concerns the conditions
under which norms vary in terms of such variables as scope, power, ef-
ficacy, specificity, clarity, and degree of conflict with each other.

Expectations from other players. In addition to the normative

structuring of behavior and social relations, role theory also focuses on
the demands emitted bv the other players in an interaction situation.
Such demands, interpreted through role-taking of others’ gestures, con-
stitute one of the most important forces shaping human conduct.

Expectations from the audience. A final source of expectations

comes from the audiences of individuals occupying statuses. These au-
diences can be real or imagined, constitute an actual group- or a social
category, involve membership or simply a desire to be a member. It is
necessary only that the expectations imputed by individuals to such var-
iously conceived audiences be used to guide conduct. As such, the audi-
ences comprise a frame of reference, or reference group, that circumscribes
the behavior of actors in various statuses.®
In sum, then, structural role theory views the social world as organized
in terms of expectations from a variety of sources, whether the script,
other players, or various audiences. Just which types of expectations are
attendant upon a given status, or network of positions, is one of the
important empirical questions that follows from this assumption.

’Mead’s concept of the generalized other anticipated this analytical concern with ref-
erence groups. For some of the important conceptual distinctions in the theory of reference
group behavior, see Robert K. Merton, “Continuities in the Theory of Reference Groups
and Social Structure,” pp. 225-80; Tamotsu Shibutani, “Reference Groups as Perspectives,”
American Journal of Sociology 60 (May 1955), pp. 562-69; Harold H. Kelley, “Two Func-
tions of Reference Groups,” in Readings in Social Psychology, ed. G. E. Swanson et al. (New
York: Henry Holt, 1958); Ralph H. Turner, “Role-Taking, Role Standpoint, and Reference
Group Behavior,” American Journal of Sociology 61 (January 1956), pp. 316-28; and Herbert
Hyman and Eleanor Singer, eds., Readings in Reference Group Behavior (New York: Free
Press, 1968).
 IMAGES OF SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL 357

Although structural role theory implicitly assumes that virtually the

entire social spectrum is structured in terms of statuses and expectations,
rarely is this whole spectrum studied. In fact, I find that role analysis
usually concentrates on restricted status networks, such as the types of
expectations evident in more micro social units like small groups. Such
an emphasis can be seen as representing a strategy for analytically coping
with the incredible complexity of the entire status network and attendant
expectations of a society or of some of its larger units. In this delimitation
of inquiry, however, I believe that there is an implicit view of the social
order as structured only by certain basic kinds of micro groups and or-
ganizations. Larger social phenomena, such as social classes or nation-
states and relations among them, are less relevant because there is a
presumption that these phenomena can be understood in terms of their
constituent groups and organizations.
This emphasis on the microstructures of society is perhaps inevitable
in light of the fact that role theory ultimately attempts to account for
types of role performances by individuals. Although macro patterns of
social organization are viewed as providing much of the “structure” for
these performances, society cannot be conceptualized independently of
its individual incumbents and their performances.

The Nature of the Individual

Structural role theorists generally conceptualize the individual in terms
of two basic attributes: (a) self-xelated characteristics and (b) role-playing
skills and capacities. The self-related concepts of role theory are diverse,
but I see them as concerned with the impact of self-conceptions on peo-
ple’s interpretation of the expectations guiding conduct in a particular
status. Role-playing skills denote those capacities of individuals to per-
ceive various types of expectations and then, with varying degrees of
competence and with different role-playing styles, to follow a selected set
of expectations. These two attributes—self and role-playing skills—are
obviously interrelated, since self-conceptions will mediate the perception
of expectations and the way roles are enacted, while role-playing skills
will determine the kinds of self-images derived from an interaction sit-
uation and those involved in the construction of a stable self-conception.
This view of the individual parallels Mead’s portrayal of mind and
self. For Mead and contemporary role theorists, the capacity to take roles
and mediate self-images through a stable self-conception is what distin-
guishes the human organism. Although this conceptualization of self and
role-playing capacities offers the potential for visualizing unique inter-
pretations of expectations and for analyzing spontaneous forms of role-
playing, the opposite set of assumptions is more often connoted in struc-
tural role theory. That is, emphasis is on the ways that individuals con-
form to what is expected of them by virtue of oceupying a particular
358 CHAPTER 16 / STRUCTURAL ROLE THEORY

status. The degree and form of conformity are usually seen as the result
of a variety of internal processes operating on individuals. Depending on
the interactive situation, these internal processes are conceptualized in
terms of variables such as (1) the degree to which expectations have been
internalized as a part of an individual’s need structure,’ (2) the extent to
which negative or positive sanctions are perceived by the individual to
accompany a particular set of expectations,’ (3) the degree to which
expectations are used as a yardstick for self-evaluation,'! and (4) the extent
to which expectations represent either interpretations of others’ actual
responses or merely anticipations of their potential responses.'* Just which
combination of these internal processes operates in a particular inter-
action situation depends upon the nature of the statuses and attendant
expectations. While this complex interactive process has yet to be codified
into an inventory of theoretical statements, it remains one of the principal
goals of role theory.
From this conceptualization, the individual is assumed to be not so
much a creative role entrepreneur who tries to change and alter social
structure through varied and unique responses, but rather a pragmatic
performer who attempts to cope with and adjust to the variety of expec-
tations inhering in social structure. These implicit assumptions about the
nature of the individual are consistent with Mead’s concern with the
adaptation and adjustment of the human organism to society, but they
clearly underemphasize the creative consequences of mind and self for
the construction and reconstruction of society. Thus, structural role the-
ory has tended to expand conceptually upon only part of the Meadian
legacy. This tendency assures some degree of assumptive one-sidedness,
which is understandable in light of the role theorists’ concern for sorting
out only certain types of dynamic interrelationships between society and
the individual.

The Articulation between the Individual and Society

The point of articulation between society and the individual is denoted
by. the concept of role and involves individuals who are incumbent in
statuses and who employ self and role-playing capacities to adjust to

°*For example, Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: Free Press, 1951). pp. l-
94; and William J. Goode, “Norm Commitment and Conformity to Role-Status Obligations,”
American Journal of Sociology 66 (November 1960), pp. 246-58.
‘For example, B. F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior (New York: Macmillan.
1953), pp.313-55, 403-19; Biddle and Thomas, Role Theory, pp. 27-28; Shaw and Costanzo,
Theories of Social Psychology, pp. 332-33.
"Kelley, “Two Functions of Reference Groups”; Turner, “Role-Taking, Role Stand-
point”; and Ralph H. Turner, “Self and Other in Moral Judgement,” American Sociological
Review 19 (June 1954), pp. 254-63.
Turner, “Role-Taking, Role Standpoint.”
 IMAGES OF SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL 359

various types of expectations. Despite agreement over these general fea-

tures of role, current conceptualizations differ.!* Depending upon which
component of role is emphasized, I see three alternative
conceptualizations.'4

Prescribed roles. When conceptual emphasis is placed upon the

expectations on individuals in status positions, then the social world is
assumed to be composed of relatively clear-cut prescriptions. The indi-
vidual’s self and role-playing skills are seen as operating to meet such
prescriptions, with the result that analytical emphasis is drawn to the
degree of conformity to the demands of a particular status.

Subjective roles. Since all expectations are mediated through the

prism of self, they are subject to interpretations by individuals in statuses.
When conceptual emphasis falls upon the perceptions and interpretations
of expectations, the social world is seen as structured in terms of indi-
viduals’ subjective assessments of the interaction situation. As a conse-
quence, the interpersonal style of individuals who interpret and then ad-
just to expectations is given primary consideration.

Enacted roles. Ultimately, expectations and the subjective as-

sessment by individuals of these expectations are manifested in behavior.
When conceptual priority is given to overt behavior, the social world is
viewed as a network of interrelated behaviors. The more stress that is
placed upon overt role enactment, the less evident will be analyses of
either expectations or individual interpretations of them.
When viewed separately from each other, I think it is clear that these
three conceptual notions are inadequate. For overt human behavior ob-
viously involves a subjective assessment of various types of expectations.
In fact, a review of the research and theoretical literature on role theory
demonstrates that the prescriptive, subjective, or enacted components of
roles receive varving degrees of emphasis and that theoretical efforts usu-
ally deal with the complex causal relationships among these components.
Perhaps more than any conceptual perspective, role theory portrays
images of causality rather than an explicit set of causal linkages. Part of

13F'or summaries of the various uses of the concept, see Lionel J. Neiman and James W.
Hughes, “The Problem of the Concept of Role—A Re-survey of the Literature,” Social Forces
60 (December 1981), pp. 141-49; Ragnar Rommetveit, Social Norms and Roles: Explorations
in the Psychology of Enduring Social Pressures (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1955); Biddle and Thomas, Role Theory; Marvin E. Shaw and Philip R. Costanzo,
Theories of Social Psychology (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), pp. 334-38; and Morton
Deutsch and Robert M. Krauss, Theories in Social Psychology (New York: Basic Books),
pp. 173-77.
“Deutsch and Krauss, Theories in Social Psychology, p. 175; Daniel J. Levinson, “Role,
Personality, and Social Structure in the Organizational Setting,” Journal of Abnormal and
Social Psychology 58 (March 1959), pp. 170-80.
360 CHAPTER 16 / STRUCTURAL ROLE THEORY

FIGURE 16-1 The Causal Imagery of Role Theory

General causal Specific expectations Self-related Role-playing Enacted role

sequence among of delimited status process skills behavior
analytical units networks

Specific causal
chains among
analytical units
Role-playing
Reference groups skills

Specific causal
linkages within
analytical units

Reference groups

Self-esteem

the reason ’ * this vagueness stems from the fact that the label “role
theory” embraces a wide number of specific perspectives in a variety of
substantive areas. Despite these qualifications, I think that role theorists
have tended to develop concepts that denote specific interaction processes
without revealing the precise ways these concepts are interrelated. To the
extent that I can bring into focus role theory’s causal images, they appear
to emphasize the deterministic consequences of social structure on in-
teraction. However, rarely are larger, more inclusive units of culture and
structure included in this causal analysis. Rather, concern tends to be
with the impact of specific norms, others, and reference groups associated
with particular clusters of status positions on (a) self-interpretations and
evaluations, (6) role-playing capacities, or (c) overt role behavior. While
there is considerable variability in the role-theoretic literature, my sense
is that self-interpretations and evaluations are usually viewed as having
a deterministic impact on role-playing capacities, which then circumscribe
overt role behavior. I have depictest these causal images in Figure 16-1.
As I have portrayed in the middle section of Figure 16-1, the specific
causal images evident in the literature are more complex than the general
portrayal at the top of the figure. Expectations are still viewed as deter-
minative, but role theorists have frequently emphasiged the reciprocal
 IMAGES OF SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL 361

nature of causal processes. That is, certain stages in the causal sequence
are seen as feeding back and affecting the subsequent causal relations
among analytical units, which are portrayed in the middle section of
Figure 16-1. Although there are numerous potential interconnections
among these units, I find that structural role theory has emphasized only
a few of these causal linkages, as is designated by the arrows in the figure.
Furthermore, to the extent that specific units of analysis are concep-
tualized for expectations, self-variables, role-playing skills, and overt be-
havior, only some of the causal interconnections among these units are
explored, as I have indicated at the bottom of Figure 16-1.
_ With respect to the interrelations among expectations, self, role-play-
ing skills, and overt behavior, I see structural role theory as being primarily
concerned with conceptualizing how different types of expectations are
mediated by self-interpretations and evaluations and then circumscribed
by role-playing skills in a way that a given style of role performance is
evident. This style is then typically analyzed in terms of its degree of
conformity to expectations. However, at each stage in this sequence,
certain feedback processes are also emphasized so that the degree of sig-
nificance of norms, others, or reference groups for the maintenance of
individuals’ self-couceptions is considered critical in influencing which
expectations are most likely to receive the most attention. For this causal
nexus, emphasis is on the degree of imbeddedness of self in certain groups,’
the degree of intimacy with specific others,’ and the degree of commit-
ment to, or internalization of, certain norms.'® Another prominent feed-
back process that has received considerable attention is the impact of
overt behavior at one point in time on the expectations of others as they
shape the individual’s self-conception and subsequent role behavior at

The study of deviance, socialization, and role -playing in complex organizations and
small groups has profited from this form of analysis.
16F'or example, see Norman Denzin, “Symbolic Interactionism and Eikoomebisdblosy,.’
in Understanding Everyday Life: Toward a Reconstruction of Sociological Knowledge, ed.
J. D. Douglas (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1970), pp. 259-84. For the most thorough set
of such studies in this area, see Sarbin’s examinations of the intensity of self-involvement
and role-playing behavior: Theodore R. Sarbin, “Role Theory,” in Handbook of Social
Psychology, ed. G. Lindzey, vol. 1 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1954), pp.
223-58; Theodore R. Sarbin and Norman L. Farberow, “Contributions to Role-Taking
Theory: A Clinical Study of Self and Role,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 47
(January 1952), pp. 117-25; and Theodore R. Sarbin and Bernard G. Rosenberg, “Contri-
butions to Role-Taking Theory.” Journal of Social Psycholegy 42 (August 1955), pp. 71-
81.
See, for example, Tamotsu Shibutani, Society and Personality (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1961), pp. 367-403.
%John Finley Scott, Internalization of Norms: A Sociological Theory of Moral Com-
mitment (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), pp. 127-215; William Goode, “Norm
Commitment and Conformity”; B. F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior.
362 CHAPTER 16 / STRUCTURAL ROLE THEORY

another point in time. In this context, the childhood and adult socialization
of the individual and the emergence of self have been extensively studied,”
as has the emergence of deviant behavior.”
With respect to interrelations within the analytica! units of the overall
causal sequence, I think that the arrows at the bottom of Figure 16-1
portray the current theoretical emphasis of the literature. In regard to
the interrelations among types of expectations, analytical attention ap-
pears to be on how specific others personify group norms or the standards
of reference groups. In turn, these significant others are often viewed as
deterministically linking the self-interpretations and evaluations of an
individual to either the norms of a group or the standards of a reference
group.”! With respect to the relations among the components of self, anal-
ysis appears to have followed the lead of William James” by focusing on
the connections between the self-esteem and the self-conception of an
individual.” In turn, the interaction between self-esteem and other com-
ponents of self is viewed as the result of reactions from various others
who affect the self-images of the individual. Finally, all these components
interact in complex ways to shape the individual’s overt behavior.
Thus, looking back at Figure 16-1, it is evident that only some pro-
cesses have been extensively studied. Relatively little theoretical attention
has been drawn, I feel, to the following potential connections indicated
in the figure: (a) broader social and cultural structure and specific patterns
of interaction, (b) enacted role behaviors and their effect on role-playing
capacities, (c) these role-playing capacities and self, and (d) enacted roles
and the self-assessments that occur independently of role-taking with
specific others or groups. Rather, concern has been focused on the re-

For example, see Anselm Strauss, Mirrors and Masks (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959),
pp. 100-18; Shibutani, Society and Personality, pp. 471-596; Orville G. Brim and Stanton
Wheeler, Socialization after Childhood (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966).
See Edwin Lemert, Social Pathology (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951); Thomas Scheff,
“The Role of the Mentally Ill and the Dynamics of Mental Disorder: A Research Frame-
work,” Sociometry 26 (December 1963), pp. 436-53; Howard Becker, Outsiders: Studies in
the Sociology of Deviance (New York: Free Press, 1963).
*Turner, “Role-Taking, Role Standpoint”; Shibutani, Society and Personality, pp. 249-
80.
“William James, Principles of Psychology, 2 vols. (New York: Henry Holt. 1890).
*8See Shibutani, Society and Personality, pp. 433-46.
“There is much experimental literature on the impact of various types of “contrived”
role-playing on attitudes and other psychological attributes of individuals: as yet, the findings
of these studies have not been incorporated into the role-theoretic framework. For some
examples of these studies, see Bert T. Kiag and Irving L. Janis, “Comparison of the Ef-
fectiveness of Improvised versus Non-Improvised Role-Playing in Producing Opinion
Changes,” Human Relations 9 (May 1956), pp. 177-86; Irving C. Janis and Bert T. King,
“The Influence of Role Playing on Opinion Change,” Journal of Abnormal and Social
Psychology 49 (April 1954), pp. 211-18; Paul E. Breer and Edwin A. Locke. Task Experience
as a Source of Attitudes (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1955); Theodore Sarbin and V. L.
Allen, “Role Enactment, Audience Feedback, and Attitude Change,” Sociometry 27 (June
1964), pp. 183-94. |
 PROBLEMS AND ISSUES IN BUILDING ROLE THEORY 363

lations between self and expectations as they affect, and are affected by,
enacted roles.

PROBLEMS AND ISSUES IN BUILDING

ROLE THEORY

Constructing Propositions
To this point, I see role-theoretic concepts as providing only a means for
categorizing and classifying expectations, self, role-playing capacities, role
enactment, and relationships among these analytical units. The use of
concepts is confined primarily to classification of different phenomena,
whether attention is drawn to the forms of status networks,” types and
sources of expectations,” relations of self to expectations,”’ or the enact-
ment of roles.”8 In the future, as they begin the difficult task of building
interrelated inventories of propositions, structural role theorists, I believe,
will confront several theoretical problems.
First, they must fill in the gaps of their causal imagery. To continue
emphasizing only some causal links while ignoring others will encourage
skewed sets of theoretical statements. Particularly crucial in this context
will be the development of propositions that specify the linkages between
concepts denoting more inclusive social and cultural variables, on the one
hand, and concepts pointing to specific interaction variables, on the other.
Another problem is that the current propositions that do exist in the
literature will have to be reformulated so that they specify when certain
role processes are likely to occur. For example, in the theory of reference-
group behavior, propositions assert that the use of a particular group as
a frame of reference is likely to occur when (a) contact with members of
a reference group is likely, (6) dissatisfaction with alternative group mem-
berships exists, (c) perception of potential rewards from a group is likely,
(d) the perception of that group’s standards is possible, and (e) perception
of the availability of significant others in the group is possible.” Although

For example, see Davis, Human Society; Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure;
Benoit, “Status, Status Types”; and Biddle and Thomas, Role Theory, pp. 23-41.
*Davis, Human Society; Richard T. Morris, ‘““A Typology of Norms,” American So-
ciological Review 21 (October 1956), pp. 610-13; Alan R. Anderson and Omar K. Moore,
“The Formal Analysis of Normative Concepts,” American Sociological Review 22 (February
1957), pp. 9-16; Williams, American Society.
27Turner, “Role-Taking, Role Standpoint”; and Sarbin and Allen, “Role Enactment,
Audience Feedback.”
*Goffman, Presentation of Self; Sarbin, “Role Theory”; John H. Mann and Carola H.
Mann, “The Effect of Role-Playing Experience on Role-Playing Ability,” Sociometry 22
(March 1959), pp. 69-74; and William J. Goode, “A Theory of Role Strain,” American
Sociological Review 25 (August 1960), pp. 483-96.
*Example drawn from summary in Alvin Boskofi, The Mosaic of Sociologic al T heory
(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1272), pp. 49-51.
364 CHAPTER 16 / STRUCTURAL ROLE THEORY

these propositions are suggestive, they offer few clues as to what forms
of contact, what levels of dissatisfaction, what types of rewards and costs,
which group standards, and what type of significant others serve as con-
ditions for use as a frame of reference by an individual. Furthermore,
many relevant variables are not included in these propositions. For in-
stance, in order to improve the theory of reference-group behavior, I think
it necessary to incorporate theoretical statements on the intensity of self-
involvement, the capacity to assume roles in a group, the nature of group
standards, and their compatibility with various facets of an individual’s
self-conception.
These are the problems that a theoretical perspective attempting to
link social-structural and individual personality variables will inevitably
encounter. When psychological variables, such as self-concept, self-es-
teem, and role-playing capacities, are seen as interacting with cultural
and structural variables, such as status, norm, reference group, and others,
the resulting inventory of theoretical statements will become complex.
Such an inventory must not only delve into the internal states of indi-
viduals but must also cut across several levels of emergent phenomena—
at a minimum, the individual, the immediate interaction situation, and
the more inclusive structural and cultural contexts within which the in-
teraction occurs. Yet, despite the difficulties involved, I think that struc-
tural role theory is crucial to resolving some of the theoretical gaps in
sociology, especially those that concern the micro versus macro debate
(see Chapter 1).

Methodological Implications
The potential utility of role theory derives from its concern with the
complex interrelations among the expectations of social structure, the
mediation of these expectations through self-conceptions and role-playing
capacities of actors in statuses, and the resulting enactment of role be-
haviors. Measurement of role enactment does not pose a major meth-
odological obstacle, since it is the most observable of the phenomena
studied by role theorists. However, to the extent that such overt behavior
reflects the impact of expectations and self-related variables, several meth-
odological problems become evident. The complexity of the interrelations
between role behavior, on the one hand, and self and expectations, on the
other, as well as the difficulty of finding indicators of these interrelations.
pose a series of methodological problems that continue to make it difficult
to construct bodies of theoretical statements on the relation between
society and the individual.
Since one of the assumed links between society and the individual
revolves around the expectations that confront individuals, it is theoret-
ically crucial that various types of expectations and the ways they affect
individuals be measurable. One method is to infer expectations from ob-
 PROBLEMS AND ISSUES IN BUILDING ROLE THEORY 365

served behavior. The most obvious problem with this approach is that
expectations can only be known after the emission of the behavior they
are supposed to circumscribe. Therefore, the concept of expectations as
inferred from behavior has little theoretical utility, since it cannot be
measured independently of behavior. Hence, role behavior cannot be pre-
dicted from the content of expectations and their relationship to self. An
alternative method involves (a) the accumulation of verbal accounts of
individuals prior to a particular interaction sequence,?° (b) the inference
of what types of expectations are guiding conduct, and (c) the prediction
of how role behavior will unfold in terms of these expectations. This
method has the advantage of making predictions about the impact of
expectations, but it suffers from the fact that, much like inferences drawn
from role enactment, expectations are not measurable independently of
the individual who is to be guided by them.3! The end result of these
methodological dilemmas is for expectations to represent inferences that
are difficult to discern independently of the behavior—whether verbal
accounts or role enactment—that they are supposed to guide.
A final alternative to this methodological problem is for researchers
to become active participants in social settings and from this participation
to derive some “intuitive sense” of the kinds of expectations that are
operating on actors. From this intuitive sense it is then presumed that
more formal conceptual representation of different types of expectations
and of their varying impact on selves and behavior can be made. The
principal drawback to such an approach is that one researcher’s intuitive
sense is not another’s, and the result may be that the expectation structure
observed by different researchers in the same situation is a “negotiated”
product as researchers attempt to achieve consensus as to exactly what
this structure is to be. However, to the extent that such a negotiated
conceptualization has predictive value, it would represent an indicator of
the expectation structure that is, in part at least, derived independently
of the verbal statements and behavior of those whose conduct it is sup-
posed to guide. ;
In sum, then, I believe that studying expectations is a difficult en-
terprise. Since most bodies of sociological theory assume the existence of
an expectation structure, it is crucial that these methodological problems
be exposed because they have profound implications for theory building.
The most important of these implications concerns the possibility of

There are many ways to accumulate such accounts, ranging from informal observations
and unstructured interviews with subjects to highly structured interviews and questionnaires.
All of these have been employed by role theorists, whether in natural settings or the small-
group laboratory. |
“This dilemma anticipates the discussion of ethnomethodology to be undertaken in a
later chapter, for, as the ethnomethodologist would argue, these verbal accounts are the
“reality” that guides conduct. From this perspective, the assumption of a “really real” world,
independent of an actor’s mental construction of it, is considered to be unfounded.
366 CHAPTER 16 / STRUCTURAL ROLE THEORY

building theory with concepts that are not measurable, even in principle.
Examining either role behavior or verbal statements and then inferring
the existence of expectations tends to make specific propositions tauto-
logous, since variation in behavior is explained by variation in phenomena
inferred from such behavior. The use of participant or observational tech-
niques overcomes this problem, but it presents the equally perplexing
question of how different researchers are to replicate, and hence poten-
tially refute, each other’s findings. If conceptualization of the expectation
structure is a negotiated product, the subsequent investigation of similar
phenomena by different investigators would require renegotiation. When
the nature of phenomena that are incorporated into theoretical statements
is not explicitly defined and classified in terms of independently verifiable,
clear-cut, and agreed-upon standards but is instead the product of ne-
gotiation, then the statements are not refutable, even in principle. As
products of negotiation, they have little utility for building a scientific
body of knowledge. Ultimately, I imagine that the severity of these prob-
lems is a matter of subjective assessment. Some of these problems would
appear to be fundamental, whereas others stem from the inadequacies of
current research techniques. |
Whether problems with conceptualizing expectations are seen as either
fundamental or technical, they are compounded by the methodological
problems of measuring self-related variables. How is it possible to derive
operational indicators of self-conceptions, self-esteem, and intrapsychic
assessments of the situation? As the discussion of Blumer and Kuhn in
the last chapter stressed, verbal accounts and observational techniques
have typically been used to tap these dimensions of interaction. Although
they are technically inadequate in that their accuracy can be questioned,
verbal and observational accounts do not raise the same fundamental
questions as do expectations, since they do seem measurable in principle.
The problems arise only when attempts are made to link these self-related
variables to expectations that are presumed to have an independent ex-
istence that guides the creation and subsequent operation of self-related
processes. While the independent existence of norms, others, reference
groups, and the like is intuitively pleasing, just how these phenomena are
to be conceptualized and measured separately from the self-related pro-
cesses they are assumed to circumscribe remains a central problem of
interactionism in general.
The substantive criticisms of structural role theory revolve around
the overly circumscribed vision of human behavior, and presumably of
social organization, that it connctes. Although it can be argued that cur-
rent role theory is too diverse to be vulnerable to this line of criticism. I
think that both theory and research in this tradition portray a highly
structured view of social reality.
Structural role theory assumes the social world to be organized in
terms of status networks and corresponding clusterings of expectations.
 PROBLEMS AND ISSUES IN BUILDING ROLE THEORY 367

While these expectations are viewed as mediated by self- and role-playing

capacities (subjective role), the main thrust is on how individuals adjust
and adapt to the demands of the “script,” other “actors,” and the “au-
diences” of the “‘play.”” Undoubtedly, much social action is structured in
this way, but my serise is that analysis is loaded in the direction of as-
suming too much structure and order in the social world.
The conspicuous conceptualization of role conflicts? (conflicts among
expectations), role strain® (the impossibility of meeting all expectations),
and anomie™ (the lack of clear-cut expectations) in role theory would
seemingly balance this overly structured conception of reality. Yet fre-
quently, strain, conflict, and anomie are viewed as deviant situations that
represent exceptions to the structure of the normal social order. What is
critical, then, is that these concepts be elaborated upon and inserted into
current theoretical statements. In this way, they can serve to specify the
conditions under which the social world is less circumscribed by social
structure.
The causal imagery of role theory also contributes to an overly struc-
tured vision of social reality. Figure 16-1 emphasizes that the causal thrust
of role theory is on the way expectations, as mediated by selves and role-
playing capacities, circumscribe role enactment. Although attention is
drawn to the feedback consequences of role enactment for expectations,
this analysis usually concerns how behaviors of individuals alter the re-
actions of others in such a way that self-conceptions are reinforced or
changed.
The determinative consequences of role enactments for changes and
alterations in social structure are, I believe, ignored in this mode of struc-
tural analysis. In focusing primarily on how changes of behavior affect
self-conceptions, role theory has underemphasized the fact that behavior
can also force changes in the organization of status networks, norms,
reference groups, the responses of others, and other features of social
structure. Until structural role theory stresses the consequences of role
enactment, not only for self-related variables but also for the properties
of structure, it will continue to conceptualize the social world as exces-
sively ordered.
Some of the logical problems of role-theoretic analysis further con-
tribute to this conception of the social world. The vagueness of just how
and under what conditions social structure affects self and role enactment

For example, see John W. Getzels and KE. C. Guba, “Role, Role Conflict, and Effec-
tiveness,” American Sociological Review 19 (February 1954), pp. 164-75; Talcott Parsons,
Social System, pp. 280-93; Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, pp. 369-79; and
Robert L. Kahn et al., Organizational Stress: Studies in Role Conflict and Ambiguity (New
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974).
*Goode, “Theory of Role Strain.”
*Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, pp. 121-51.
368 CHAPTER 16 / STRUCTURAL ROLE THEORY

leaves much of role analysis with the empty assertion that society shapes
individual conduct. If role-theoretic assumptions are to have theoretical
significance, it is essential to specify just when, where, how, and through
what processes this circumscription of role behavior occurs. In fact, in
the absence of theoretical specificity, I think that a subtle form of func-
tionalism is connoted: the needs of social structure and the individual
require that behavior be circumscribed. This functionalism is further sus-
tained by the classificatory nature of role-theoretic concepts. In denoting
the types of interrelations among society, self, and behavior without in-
dicating the conditions under which these relationships are likely to exist,
these concepts appear to denote what processes must occur without in-
dicating when, where, and how they are to occur.*
Finally, the methodological problems of measuring expectations sep-
arately from the very processes that they are supposed to circumscribe
makes even more mysterious just how and in what ways social structure
affects individual conduct. Again, the inability to measure this crucial
causal nexus leaves the role theorist with the uninteresting assertion that
society shapes and guides individual conduct.
These problems have led others to propose a more processual version
of role theory. Yet, it would be foolish, I think, to ignore this more struc-
tural orientation. Social structures do exist; they do reveal normative
expectations; they do order people’s access to reference groups; and they
do circumscribe people’s options and self-evaluations. It has become very
“trendy” in social theory to ignore these facts, especially after the effort
to kill off Parsonian functionalism. I think that the more process-oriented
theorists had a legitimate criticism but they have often overreacted and
posited a social universe in which people are interpersonal entrepreneurs
and gadflies. Nonetheless, let us now turn to the more processual approach
of Ralph H. Turner, keeping in mind that roles are often enacted in social
structures and that theoretical sociology must confront this fact. For al-
though structural role theory has very clear problems, it does attempt to
analyze an important dynamic of social reality.

Although most structural. role theorists would vehemently deny it, they have followed
Parsons’s strategy for building theory, except on a more micro level. In developing concepts
to classify and order role-related phenomena, without also developing clear-cut propositions,
they have created a conceptual order without indicating when and how the order denoted
by concepts is maintained (or broken down or reconstructed).
 ____._ The Process Role Theory ____
eo| LO hee oO. Turher

Within interactionist theorizing, there is considerable diversity. Most of

this diversity, however, revolves around one central question: to what
extent do the interactions of individuals represent an enactment of ex-
pectations inhering in social structure, or conversely, to what degree are
lines of interaction fluid and negotiated anew in each encounter among
individuals? Among symbolic interactionists, the Blumer versus Kuhn
debate addresses this issue; and among role theorists, this is the central
question.! In the last chapter, I presented a summary and analysis of more
structural versions of role theory; and so, in this chapter, I will concentrate
on the more process-oriented role theory of Ralyh H. Turner.?

THE CRITIQUE OF STRUCTURAL THEORY

Over the course of several decades, Ralph H. Turner has mounted a con-
sistent line of criticism against role theory.’ This criticism incorporates
several lines of attack: (1) Role theory presents an overly structured vision
of the social world, with its emphasis upon norms, status positions, and
the enactment of normative expectations. (2) Role theory tends to con-
centrate an inordinate amount of research and theory-building effort on

'See Chapter 15.

21 am often asked if I am related to Ralph H. Turner. To avoid charges of familial
favoritism, let me emphasize that we are not related to each other.
’See, for example, Ralph H. Turner, ‘““Role-Taking: Process versus Conformity,” in Hu
man Behavior and Social Processes, ed. A. Rose (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962), pp. 20-
40.

369
370 CHAPTER 17 / THE PROCESS ROLE THEORY OF RALPH H. TURNER

“abnormal” social processes, such as role conflict and role strain, thereby
ignoring the normal processes of human interaction. (3) Role theory is
not theory but rather a series of disjointed and unconnected propositions.
(4) Role theory has not utilized to the degree required Mead’s concept of
role-taking as its central concept.
It is criticism on the overly structural view of roles that has, I believe,
been the main impetus to Turner’s alternative approach. Indeed, he has
recently emphasized the overly structural bias in role theory, even among
those who have tried to reconcile structural and processual accounts of
roles. He attacks structural approaches with a series of questions. First,
does the structural conception of role add anything that is not covered
by the concept of normative expectation? For if roles are merely enact-
ments of expectations, why even introduce the concept of role? Second,
can the structural analysis of roles deal with roles that are not lodged in
some organizational structure? Most roles, Turner contends, are not at-
tached to a clear structure; and if conceptualization of roles requires that
we examine roles with structural positions and expectations, then analysis
is dramatically limited. Third, can structural orientations to roles deal
with situations where new roles are created or old ones changed by efforts
of people to realize certain values or beliefs? For if roles are part of
structure, how is it possible to analyze the emergence of new roles, often
in defiance of structural dictates?
These questions led Turner to posit a series of unresolved issues in
role theory, which, he claims, structural role theory cannot handle. One
issue is whether or not roles are acts of conformity to norms or creative
constructions of actors. Turner believes that roles involving normative
conformity are, in reality, exceptional cases that occur when a repressive
structure limits opportunities, when people receive few rewards from their
roles, and when people are insecure about their capabilities. But these are
relatively rare situations, and so in most social contexts, people negotiate
their respective roles.
Another issue is whether or not roles are inventories of specific be-
haviors or more general gestalts and configurations of meaning about lines
of conduct. It is rare, Turner argues, for actors to be able to list precisely
the behaviors of a role; more typically, they can communicate only general
attitudes, styles, and loosely defined behavioral options associated with
a role. Only in rigid and pathological structures are roles so clearly defined
as to constitute a list of appropriate behaviors.

‘Ralph H. Turner, “Unanswered Questions in the Convergence between Structuralist

and Interactionist Role Theories,” in Perspectives on Sociological Theory, ed. S. N. Eisen-
stadt and H. J. Helle (London: Sage Publications, 1985). In particular, he addresses Warren
Handel, “Normative Expectations and the Emergence of Meaning as Solutions to Problems:
Convergence of Structural and Interactionist Views,” American Journal of Sociology 84
(1979), pp. 855-81.
 INTERACTION AND ROLES 371

Yet another issue is: Are roles fixed and predetermined, or do indi-
viduals negotiate which roles they are going to play in a situation? Even
in highly structural situations, roles are negotiated. And in most social
encounters, individuals must actively make roles for themselves and ne-
gotiate with others to their right to play a given role.
What emerges from Turner’s questions and presentation of unresolved
issues in role theory is a view of roles as general configurations of responses
that people negotiate as they form social relations. They are not mere
enactments of expectations, and they are not always tied to positions in
structures. In light of these considerations, Turner offers a conceptuali-
zation of roles that emphasizes the process of interaction over the dictates
of social structures.

INTERACTION AND ROLES

The Role-Making Process

Turner utilizes and extends Mead’s concept of role-taking to describe the
nature of social action. Turner assumes that “‘it is the tendency to shape
the phenomenal world into roles which is the key to the role-taking as
the core process in interaction.’> Like Mead and Blumer, Turner stresses
the fact that actors emit gestures or cues—words, bodily countenance,
voice inflections, dress, facial expressions, and other gestures—as they
interact. Actors use these gestures to “put themselves in the other’s role”
and to adjust their lines of conduct in ways that can facilitate cooperation.
This is essentially Mead’s definition of taking the role of the other, or
role-taking.
Turner then extends Mead’s concept. He first argues that cultural
definitions of roles are often vague and even contradictory. At best, they
provide a general framework within which actors must construct a line
of conduct. Thus, actors make their roles and communicate to others
what role they are playing. Turner then argues that humans act as if all
others in their environment are playing identifiable roles. Humans as-
sume others to be playing a role, and this assumption is what gives in-
teraction a common basis. Operating with this folk assumption, people
then read gestures and cues in an effort to determine what role others
are playing.’ This effort is facilitated by others creating and asserting
their roles, with the result that they actively emit cues as to what roles
they are attempting to play.

6Turner, ‘“Role-Taking: Processes versus Conformity.”

‘Ibid.; “Social Roles: Sociological Aspects,” International Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1968).
™The Normative Coherence of Folk Concepts,” Research Studies of the State College
of Washington 25 (June 1957).
372 CHAPTER 17 / THE PROCESS ROLE THEORY OF RALPH H. TURNER

For Turner, then, role-taking is also “role-making.”” Humans make

roles in three senses: (1) They are often faced with only a loose cultural
framework in which they must make a role to play. (2) They assume
others are playing a role and thus make an effort to discover the underlying
role behind a person’s acts. (3) Humans seek to make a role for themselves
in all social situations by emitting cues to others that give them claim
on a particular role. This role-taking process as it becomes transformed
into a role-making process is the underlying basis for all human inter-
action. It is what ultimately allows people to interact and cooperate with
each other.

The ‘“‘Folk Norm of Consistency”’

As people interact with each other, Turner argues, they assess behavior
not in terms of its conformity to imputed norms or positions in a social
structure but rather in regard to its consistency. Humans seek to group
each other’s behavior into coherent wholes or gestalts, and by doing so,
they can make sense of each other’s actions, anticipate each other’s be-
havior, and adjust to each other’s responses. If another’s responses are
inconsistent and not seen as part of an underlying role, then interaction
will prove difficult. Thus, there is an implicit “‘norm of consistency” in
people’s interactions with each other. Humans attempt to assess the con-
sistency of others’ actions in order to discern the underlying role that is
being played.
_ With the concepts of role-making and the norm of consistency, Turner
shifts the analysis of roles toward a position that symbolic interactionists
such as Blumer might appreciate. This shift is underscored by a third
major assumption with which Turner approaches the analysis of roles:
interaction is always a tentative process.

The Tentative Nature of Interaction

Turner echoes Blumer’s position when he states that “interaction is al-
ways a tentative process, a process of continuously testing the conception
one has of the role of the other.”® Humans are constantly interpreting
additional cues emitted by others and using these new cues to see if they
are consistent with those previously emitted and with the imputed roles
of others. If they are consistent, then the actor will continue to adjust
responses in accordance with the imputed role of the other. But as soon
as inconsistent cues are emitted, the identification of the other’s role will
undergo revision. Thus, a given imputation of a particular role to another
person will only persist as long as it provides a stable framework for

*Turner, “Role-Taking: Processes Versus Conformity,” p. 23.

 INTERACTION AND ROLES 373

interaction. The tentative nature of the role-making process points to

another facet of roles: the process of role verification.

The Process of Role Verification

Actors seek to verify that behaviors and other cues emitted by people in
a situation do indeed constitute a role. Turner argues that such efforts
at verification or validation are achieved by the application of external
and internal criteria: The most often used internal criterion is the degree
to which an actor perceives a role to facilitate interaction. External criteria
can vary, but in general, they involve assessment of a role by important
others, relevant groups, or commonly agreed-upon standards. When an
imputed role is validated or verified in this way, then it can serve as a
stable basis for continued interaction among actors.

_ Self-Conceptions and Role

All humans reveal self-conceptions of themselves as certain kinds of ob-
_ jects. Humans develop self-attitudes and feelings out of their interactions
with others, but as Turner and all role theorists emphasize, actors attempt
to present themselves in ways that will reinforce their self-conceptions.°
Since others will always seek to determine an actor’s role, it becomes
necessary for an actor to inform others, through cues and gestures, about
the degree to which self is anchored in a role. Thus, actors will signal
each other about their self-identity and the extent to which their role is
consistent with their self-conception. For example, roles not consistent
with a person’s self-conception will likely be played with considerable
distance and disdain, whereas those that an individual considers central
to self-definitions will be played much differently.'°
Let me now sum up Turner’s basic assumptions. An emphasis on the
behavioral aspect of role is retained, since it is through behavioral cues
that actors impute roles to each other. The notion that roles are concep-
tions of expected behaviors is also preserved, for the assignment of a role
to a person invokes an expectation that a certain type and range of re-
sponses will ensue. The view that roles are the norms attendant on status
positions is given less emphasis but not ignored, since norms and positions

*Ralph H. Turner, “The Rule and the Person,” American Journal of Sociology 84 (1978),
pp. 1-23.
Turner, “Social Roles: Sociological Aspects.” Turner has extensively analyzed this pro-
cess of self-anchorage in roles. See, for example, Ralph H. Turner, “The Real Self: From
Institution to Impulse,” American Journal of Sociology 81 (1970), pp. 989-1016; Ralph H.
Turner and Victoria Billings, “The Social Context of Self-Feeling,” working paper; Ralph
H. Turner and Steven Gordon, “The Boundaries of the Self: The Relationship of Authen-
ticity to Inauthenticity in the Self-Conception,” in Self-Concept: Advances in Theory and
Research, ed. M. D. Lynch et al. (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1981).
374 CHAPTER 17 / THE PROCESS ROLE THEORY OF RALPH H. TURNER

can be the basis for assigning and verifying roles.'! And the conception
of roles as parts that people learn to play is preserved, for people are able
to denote each other’s roles by virtue of their prior socialization into a
common role repertoire.
Not only do these assumptions embrace the major points of emphasis
in prominent definitions of role, but they also help reconcile the differ-
ences between symbolic interactionism and more structural versions of
role theory. Turner’s assumptions employ the key concepts of Mead’s
synthesis, while taking cognizance of Blumer’s emphasis on the processes
that underlie patterns of joint action. These assumptions also point to
the normal processes of interaction but are sufficiently general to embrace
the possibility of conflictual and stressful interactions. And these as-
sumptions about the role-making process do not preclude the analysis of
structured interaction, since formal norms and status positions are often
the major cues for ascertaining the roles of people as well as a source of
verification for imputed roles.
Assumptions are, however, only as good as the theory that they can
generate. I think it particularly significant that Turner delineates an ex-
plicit strategy for translating these assumptions into theoretical propo-
sitions. My sense is that tne execution of this strategy will help inter-
actionism bridge the gap between suggestive assumptions and concepts,
on the one hand, and the current plethora of narrow empirical proposi-
tions, on the other. Let me now outline the basic elements of this strategy.

THE STRATEGY FOR BUILDING ROLE THEORY

While Turner accepts the process orientation of Blumer, he is committed
to developing interactionism into “something akin to axiomatic theory.”
He recognizes that, in its present state, role theory is segmented into a
series of narrow propositions and hypotheses and that role theorists have
been reluctant “to find unifying themes to link various role processes.”
Turner’s strategy is to use propositions from the large number of
research studies to build more formal and abstract theoretical statements.
The goal is to maintain a productive dialogue between specific empirical
propositions and more abstract theoretical statements.

The Concepts of Role Theory

Turner argues against rigid definitions of concepts when beginning the
theory-building process. It is more useful, he contends, to begin with

"Ralph H. Turner, “Rule Learning as Role Learning,” /nternational Journal of Critical

Sociology 1 (September 1974).
"Ralph H. Turner, “Strategy for Developing an Integrated Role Theory,” Humboldt
Journal of Social Relations 7 (Winter 1980), pp. 123-39 and “Role Theory as Theory,”
unpublished manuscript.
 THE STRATEGY FOR BUILDING ROLE THEORY 375

loosely defined concepts such as “actor,” “role,” “other,” and “situation.”

The concepts will take on greater clarity as propositions incorporating
them are developed. Moreover, early emphasis on concept formation “turns
our attention from empirical to definitional concerns, from dynamic to
static questions, and many a theory-building enterprise becomes hope-
lessly diverted into creating an elegant system that neither suggests nor
generates new empirical propositions.”!°
Turner adopts Blumer’s position that theorists must begin with sen-
sitizing concepts. As I will document shortly, however, he uses these con-
cepts in ways that will allow for the formulation of more precise definitions
and propositions.

Sorting Out Tendencies

Without definitive concepts and with a large body of segmented propo-
sitions, an alternative way of linking sensitizing concepts to observe em-
pirical regularities is necessary. Turner advocates the use of what he terms
main tendency propositions to link concepts to empirical regularities and
to consolidate the thrust of these regularities.14 What Turner seeks is a
series of statements that highlight what tends to occur in the normal
operation of systems of interaction. These statements are not true prop-
_ositions because they are not of the form: under C,, C., C3, .. ., C, x varies
with y. Rather, they are statements of the form: in most normal situations,
event x tends to occur. These are not statements of covariance, but state-
ments of what is presumed to typically transpire in the course of interaction.
Turner provides a long list of main tendency propositions with respect
to a number of issues: (a) the emergence and character of roles, (6) role
as an interactive framework, (c) roles in relation to actors, (d) role in
organizational setting, (e) role in societal setting, and (f) role and the
person. Let me summarize some of these tendency propositions.

Emergence and character of roles. In these propositions, Turner

presents some observations about the nature of the social world as a series
of empirical tendencies. I should emphasize, however, that such tend-
encies are observed through the heavy prism of Turner’s assumptions.

1. In any interactive situation, behavior, sentiments, and motives

tend to be differentiated into units that can be termed roles; once
differentiated, elements of behavior, sentiment, and motives that
appear in the same situation tend to be assigned to existing roles.
(Tendencies for role differentiation and accretion.)

Turner, “Strategy,” pp. 123-24.

“Turner, “Social Roles: Sociological Aspects.”
376 CHAPTER 17 / THE PROCESS ROLE THEORY OF RALPH H. TURIIER

2. In any interactive situation, the meaning of individual actions for

ego (the actor) and for any alter is assigned on the basis of the
imputed role. (Tendencies for meaningfulness. )
3. In connection with every role, there is a tendency for certain at-
tributes of actors, aspects of behavior, and features of situations
to become salient cues for the identification of roles. (Tendencies
for role cues.)
4. The character of a role—that is, its definition—will tend to change
if there are persistent changes in either the behaviors of those
presumed to be playing the role or the contexts in which the role
is played. (Tendencies for behavioral correspondence.)
5. Every role tends to acquire an evaluation in terms of rank and
social desirability. (Tendencies for evaluation.)
These propositions both reassert Turner’s assumptions about the so-
cial world and provide several points of elaboration. People are seen as
viewing the world in terms of roles; they are visualized as employing a
folk norm to seek consistency of behaviors and to assign behavioral ele-
ments to an imputed role (role differentiation and accretion). Actors are
viewed as interpreting situations by virtue of imputing roles to each other
(meaningfulness tendency). Humans are observed to use cues of other
actors’ attributes and behaviors, as well as the situation, to identify roles
(role cues). When role behaviors or situations are permanently altered,
the definition of role will also undergo change (behavioral correspond-
ence). And humans tend to evaluate roles by ranking them in terms of
power, prestige, and esteem, while assessing them with regard to their
degree of social desirability and worth (tendency for evaluation).

Role as an interactive framework. In these tendency propo-

sitions, Turner elaborates his assumption that interaction cannot proceed
without the identification and assignment of roles. These propositions
specify the ways in which roles provide a means for interaction to occur.

6. The establishment and persistence of interaction tend to depend

upon the emergence and identification of ego and alter roles.
(Tendency for interaction in terms of roles.)
7. Each role tends to form as a comprehensive way of coping with
one or more relevant alter roles. (Tendency for role
complementarity.)
8. There is a tendency for stabilized roles to be assigned the character
of legitimate expectations and to be seen as the appropriate way
to behave in a situation. (Tendency for legitimate expectations.)
In these propositions, interaction is seen as dependent upon the iden-
tification of roles. Moreover, roles tend to be complements of others—as
is the case with wife-husband, parent-child, boss-employee roles—and thus
 THE STRATEGY FOR BUILDING ROLE THEORY 377

operate to regularize interaction among complementary roles. Finally,

roles that prove useful and that allow for stable and fruitful interaction
are translated into expectations that future transactions will and should
occur as in the past.

Role in relation to actor. These propositions concern the rela-

tionship between actors and the roles that provide the framework for
interaction.
9. Once stabilized, the role structure tends to persist, regardless of
changes in actors. (Tendency for role persistence.)
10. There is a tendency to identify a given individual with a given
role and a complementary tendency for an individual to adopt a
given role for the duration of the interaction. (Tendency in role
allocation.)
11. To the extent that ego’s role is an adaptation to alter’s role, it
incorporates some conception of alter’s role. (Tendency for role-
taking.)
12. Role behavior tends to be judged as adequate or inadequate by
comparison with a conception of the role in question. (Tendency
to assess role adequacy.)
13. The degree of adequacy in role performance of an actor determines
the extent to which others will respond and reciprocate an actor’s
role performance. (Tendency for role reciprocity.)
Thus, once actors identify and assign each other to roles, the roles
persist; and new actors will tend to be assigned to those roles that already
exist in a situation. Humans also tend to adopt roles for the duration of
an interaction, while having knowledge of the roles that others are playing.
Additionally, actors carry with them general conceptions of what a role
entails and what constitutes adequate performance. Finally, the adequacy
of a person’s role performance greatly influences the extent to which the
role, and the rights, privileges, and complementary behaviors that it de-
serves, will be acknowledged.

Role in organizational settings. Turner rejects an overly struc-

tural view of roles, but he still recognizes that many roles are enacted in
structured contexts, necessitating a listing of additional tendencies in the
role-making processes.
14. To the extent that roles are incorporated into an organizational
setting, organizational goals tend to become crucial criteria for
role differentiation, evaluation, complementarity, legitimacy or
expectation, consensus, allocation; and judgments of adequacy.
(Tendency for organization goal dominance).
15. To the extent that roles are incorporated into an organizational
setting, the right to define the legitimate character of roles, to
378 CHAPTER 17 / THE PROCESS ROLE THEORY OF RALPH H. TURNER

set the evaluations on roles, to allocate roles, and to judge role

adequacy tend to be lodged in particular roles. (Tendency for
legitimate role definers.)
16. To the extent that roles are incorporated into an organizational
setting, differentiation tends to link roles to statuses in the or-
ganization. (Tendency for status.)
17. To the extent that roles are incorporated into an organizational
setting, each role tends to develop as a pattern of adaptation to
multiple alter roles. (Tendency for role sets.)
18. To the extent that roles are incorporated into an orpeniiedional
setting, the persistence of roles is intensified through tradition
and formalization. (Tendency for formalization.)
When roles are lodged in organizations, then, its goals and key per-
sonnel become important in the role-making process. Moreover, it is pri-
marily within organizations that status and role become merged. In this
way, Turner incorporates Linton’s insight that status and role can become
highly related, but he does not abandon Mead’s and Blumer’s emphasis
that much interaction occurs in contexts where roles are not circum-
scribed by networks of clearly defined status positions. Turner also rec-
ognizes that roles in structured situations develop as ways of adapting to
a number of other roles that are typically assigned by role definers or
required by organizational goals. Finally, roles within organizations tend
to become formalized in that written agreements and tradition come to
have the power to maintain a given role system and to shape normative
expectations.

Role in societal setting. Many roles are identified, assumed, and

imputed in relation to a broader societal context. And so, in the tendencies
listed below, Turner first argues that people tend to group behaviors in
different social contexts into as few unifying roles as is possible. Thus,
people will identify a role as a way of making sense of disparate behaviors
in different contexts. At the societal level, values are the equivalent of
goals in organizational settings for identifying, differentiating, allocating,
evaluating, and legitimating roles. Finally, all people tend to assume mul-
tiple roles in society, but they tend to assume roles that are cdnsistent
with each other. Thus:
19. Similar roles in different contexts tend to become merged, so as
to be identified as a single role recurring in different relationships.
(Tendency for economy of roles.)
20. To the extent that roles refer to more general social contexts and
situations, differentiation tends to link roles to social values.
(Tendency for value anchorage.)
21. The individual in society tends to be assigned and to assume roles
consistent with each other. (Tendency for allocation consistency.)
 THE STRATEGY FOR BUILDING ROLE THEORY 379

Role and the person. The “person” is a concept employed by

Turner to denote “the distinctive repertoire of roles” that an individual
enacts in relevant social settings. The concept of person is his means for
summarizing the way in which individuals cope with their roles. In the
generalizations below, Turner observes that people seek to resolve tensions
among roles and to avoid contradictions between self-conceptions and
roles. These propositions are, to a very great extent, elaborations of Turn-
er’s assumptions about the relationship between self-conceptions and role.
22. Actors tend to act so as to alleviate role strain arising out of role
contradiction, role conflict, and role inadequacy and to heighten
the gratifications of high role adequacy. (Tendency to resolve role
strain.) ,
23. Individuals in society tend to adopt as a framework for their own
behavior and as a perspective for interpretation of the behavior
of others a repertoire of role relationships. (Tendency to be so-
cialized into common culture.) |
24. Individuals tend to form self-conceptions by selective identifi-
cation of certain roles from their repertoires as more character-
istically “themselves” than other roles. (Tendency to anchor self-
conception.)
25. The self-conception tends to stress those roles that supply the
basis for effective adaptation to relevant alters. (Adaptation of
self-conception tendency.)
26. To the extent that roles must be played in situations that con-
tradict the self-conception, those roles will be assigned role dis-
tance, and mechanisms for demonstrating lack of personal in-
volvement will be employed. (Tendency for role distance.)
These 26 generalizations represent only the first step in Turner’s
theoretical strategy. These empirical tendencies incorporate the loosely
defined concepts of interactionism, but they link these concepts to actual
events presumed to occur in the social world. Naturally, more tendencies
might be discerned and recorded. The list of 26 is sufficient, I think, to
illustrate what Turner views as the next step in developing a more in-
tegrated role theory.

Generating and Organizing Empirical Propositions

As I have emphasized, the tendency propositions are not true proposi-
tions. They do not reveal relations of covariance among variables. How-
ever, Turner believes that the tendency propositions can help generate
true empirical propositions of the form: x varies with y. This is done by
attempting to determine the empirical conditions that shape the degree
or rate of variation in a tendency proposition. For example, Tendency
Proposition 22 becomes the dependent variable in a search for independent
380 CHAPTER 17 / THE PROCESS ROLE THEORY OF RALPH H. TURNER

variables that can specify the conditions under which actors “tend to act
to alleviate role strain.” The tendency proposition thus provides an initial
set of guidelines for developing true propositions about relationships among
variables.
Furthermore, since the tendency propositions are grouped together,
as was done in the sections above, the true empirical propositions will be
organized around related tendencies. As such, the propositions are less
scattered and disparate than would be the case if the search for propo-
sitions had not begun with the delineation of certain normal tendencies.
Yet, I still find the transition from the tendency propositions to the true
empirical propositions rather vague. Nonetheless, Turner’s propositions
about the person and role can illustrate the potential of his theory-building
strategy (the last section in the tendency propositions above).'®
The person is viewed as the repertoire of roles that he or she plays.
And while “people are normally quite different actors in different roles,
and even have senses of ‘who they are,’ ”’ humans also use roles as a means
for self-identification and self-validation.'® Some roles are thus more im-
portant to individuals and resist compartmentalization, or separation,
from a person’s self-concept. Roles that arouse strong self-feelings, which
people appear to play across situations, refuse to abandon, and embellish
with associated attitudes, are likely to involve considerable merger of the
individual’s self with the role.
Thus, to generate an empirical proposition from these tendencies, we
need to know the conditions under which individuals become identified
with roles, using the role for purposes of self-identification and validation.
Tendency Propositions 24 and 26 can be dependent variables organizing
a search for the conditions under which individuals tend “to form self-
conceptions by selective identification of certain roles from their reper-
toire as more characteristically themselves than other roles” and to show
“role distance” and “a lack of personal involvement” in situations that
“contradict the self-conception.” For all the other tendency propositions
listed, a similar search could be initiated in an effort to discover the
empirical conditions that influence their rate, degree, and extent of
occurrence.!”
Turner divides his discussion of person and role into two general lines
of analysis: (1) how do others in the situation discover a merger of role
and person, and (2) how do the individuals come to lodge their selves in

‘Turner, “Role and the Person.” See also note 10.

'*Ibid., p. 2.
‘In his most recent effort, “Strategy for Developing an Integrated Role Theory,” Turner
has focused on “role allocation” and “role differentiation” because he views these as the
two most critical tendencies. My example of, “the person and role” results in the same
explanatory principles. Thus, this illustration provides additional examples of Turner's
strategy.
 THE STRATEGY FOR BUILDING ROLE THEORY 381

TABLE 17-1 Others and Role Merger in One Situation

ee eT RE RENED SARC Sy en teih int aan
I. The more inflexible the allocation of actors to a role, the greater the tendency
for members of the social circle to identify the role with the person, and the
stronger the tendency for the actors to accept that identification for themselves.
ll. The more comprehensively and strictly differentiated the role, the greater the
tendency for members of the social circle to identify the role with the person,
and the stronger the tendency for actors to accept that identification for
themselves.
Ill. The more conflictual the relationship between roles, the greater the tendency tor
members of the social circle to identify the role with the person, and the
strongei the tendency for the actors to accept that identification for themselves.
IV. The higher and more consistent the judgments of role adequacy, the greater the
tendency for members of the social circle to identify the role with the person,
and the stronger the tendency for the actors to accept that identification for
themselves.
V. The more difficult the role is thought to be, the greater the tendency for
members of the social circle to identify the role with the person, and the
stronger the tendency for actors to accept that identification for themselves.
VI. The more polar the evaluation of a role as favorable or unfavorable, the greater
the tendency for members of the social circle to identify the role with the
person, and the stronger the tendency for the actors to accept that identification
for themselves.
Vil. The more polar the social rank of a role as high or low, the greater the
tendency for members of the social circle to identify the role with the person, —
and the stronger the tendency for the actors to accept that identification for
themselves. .
Vill. The greater the potential power vested in a role, the greater the tendency for
members of the social circleto identify the role with the person, and the
stronger the tendency for the actors to accept that identification for themselves.
IX. The greater the discretion vested in a role, the greater the tendency for
members of the social circle to identify the role with the person, and the
stronger the tendency for the actors to accept that identification for themselves.
X. The greater the extent to which members of a social circle are bonded to role
incumbents by ties of identification, the greater the tendency for them to identify
the role with the person, and the stronger the tendency for the actors to accept
that identification for themselves.
Xl. The more intimate the role relationship between an actor's social circle and alter
roles, the greater the tendency for them to identify the role with the person, and
the stronger the tendency for the actor to accept that identification.

certain roles? Each of these questions organizes the propositions that I

have listed, respectively, in Tables 17-1 and 17-2.
In Table 17-1, Turner examines the simplest situation where an ac-
tor’s interaction with others is confined to one situation. When so con-
fined, others in that situation will identify the role as integral to the
person’s self-identification; and the person will accept this identification
by others under the conditions listed in each of the 11 propositions. For
example, if there is little flexibility in assuming a role (Proposition I),
then merger of person and role is increased. In Proposition II, the more
382 CHAPTER 17 / THE PROCESS ROLE THEORY OF RALPH H. TURNER

TABLE 17-2 Others, Person, and Role in Multiple Settings

|. The broader the setting in which a role is lodged, the greater the tendency for
others to identify the role with the person, and the stronger the tendency for the
actors to accept that identification for themselves.
ll. The more a role in one setting determines allocation and performance of roles
in other settings, the greater the tendency for others to identify the role with the
person, and the stronger the tendency for the actors to accept that identification
for themselves.
lll. The more conspicuous and widely recognizable the role cues, the greater the
tendency for others to identify the role with the person, and the stronger the
tendency for the actors to accept that identification for themselves.
IV. The more a role exemplifies the goals and nature of the group or organization
in which it is lodged, the greater the tendency for others to identify the role with
the person, and the stronger the tendency for the actors to accept that
identification for themselves.
V. The more that allocation to a role is understood to be temporary and the role
discontinuous in content with respect to preceding and succeeding roles, the
greater the tendency for community members not to identify the role with the
person, and the stronger the tendency for the actors not to identify role with
self.

clearly defined and distinguishable the role, the greater the tendency for
person-role merger. In Proposition III, the more that roles among person
and others are in conflict, the greater the role-person merger—andso on
for the remaining propositions. What is critical in these and other prop-
ositions is that they reveal covariance between variables and thus con-
stitute true propositions.
The social settings of actors often overlap. People see each other in
different settings, but as they interact, they seek to discover which role
is part of a person’s self-identification. The five propositions in Table 17-
2 are examples of some of the considerations that Turner views as op-
erating in multiple social settings to influence role-person merger. People
in multiple settings will be likely to identify the role with the person, and
the person will likely accept this identification when the role cuts across
many social settings (I), the role influences the other roles that a person
can play and/or how they are played (II), the role is highly conspicuous
(III), the role exemplifies, or personifies, the nature of the social unit in
which it is lodged (IV). Proposition V is an example of a condition under
which roles will not merge with the person. When a role is short-lived
and inconsistent with other roles played by a person, then the individual
will not identify with the role.
The propositions in Tables 27-1 and 17-2 address the question of
how others in situations discover a person-role merger. However, people
are rarely passive, accepting the labels of others. People actively seek to
dictate the merger of their self with a role. This fact is stressed with the
concept of role-making, thus requiring still more propositions on self and
role merger.
 THE STRATEGY FOR BUILDING ROLE THEORY 383

TABLE 17-3 Individual Efforts at Role Merger

|. The more highly evaluated a role, the greater the tendency to locate self in that
role.
ll. The more adequately a role can be performed, the greater the tendency to
locate self in that role.
Ill. The higher the evaiuation of roles among a repertoire of roles that can be
played adequately, the greater the tendency to locate self in the roles of highest
evaluation.
IV. The more visible and readily appraisable role performance, the greater the
tendency to locate self in highly evaluated roles will be modified by the tendency
to locate self in roles that can be played with high degrees of adequacy.
V. The more the scope of an individual's social world exceeds the boundaries of
the social circle of a given role, the greater the tendency to use evaluations of
the larger community rather than those of a specific social circle to locate self in
a role.
Vi. The more intrinsic (as opposed to extrinsic) the benefits derived from enacting a
role, the greater the tendency to locate self in that role.
Vil. The greater the investment of time and effort in gaining or maintaining the
opportunity to claim a role or in learning to play a role, the qreater the tendency
to locate self in that role.
Vill. The greater the sacrifice made in gaining or maintaining the opportunity to claim
a role or in learning to play a role, the greater the tendency to locate self in that
role.
IX. The more publicly a role is played and the more actors must explain and justify
a role, the greater the tendency to locate self in that role.
X. The more unresolved role strain encountered in a role has been prolonged, the
greater the tendency to locate self in that role.

Turner expands upon Mead’s insight that the emergence of self-con-

ceptions in individuals facilitates interaction and the functioning of so-
ciety. Self provides individuals with a way to discriminate among roles
and to partition them in terms of their importance and significance. If
individuals could not do this, they would emotionally exhaust themselves.
They could disrupt the flow of society by trying to play all roles equally
well and with the same degree of intensity. Additionally, self allows actors
to maintain an identity across roles and to resist sanctions that would
force them to act in contradictory ways. And, finally, self gives action
consistency and coherence across roles, which allows others to anticipate
that an actor will behave in a given way, thereby enabling others to adjust
their response to the actor.
The propositions in Table 17-3 offer some insight into these pro-
cesses. People are likely to locate their self in roles that are highly eval-
uated, that they can perform well, that are both highly evaluated and
played well (actors will, by implication, avoid roles of high evaluation that
they cannot play well), that are visible and more readily subject to eval-
uation by others, that are comprehensive and cut across social contexts,
that provide personal and subjectively defined benefits, that involve the
384 CHAPTER 17 / THE PROCESS ROLE THEORY OF RALPH H. TURNER

expenditure of time and effort, that involve sacrifice in reaching, that are
publicly played and in need of public justification, and that involve pro-
longed role strain and effort to eliminate strain.
These propositions on the person and role listed in Tables 17-1, 17-
2, and 17-3 are only tentative. Similar empirical propositions need to be
developed for Turner’s other tendency statements. Yet, even clearly ar-
ticulated empirical propositions represent only crude groupings of state-
ments and tendencies. Such propositions are the result of speculation,
and they can, no doubt, suggest additional propositions. But these em-
pirical propositions are not organized deductively—that is, in a way that
would allow them to be deduced from a small number of abstract prop-
ositions or “axioms.” The next step in Turner’s strategy, therefore, in-
volves an effort to generate explanatory propositions.

Developing Explanatory Propositions

Turner has applied a number of different labels to what are termed here
explanatory propositions. Turner’s avowed strategy is to ask the ques-
tions: Why should a series of empirical propositions cohere around a main
tendency? Is there some common principle that would explain why the
tendency should occur and why the empirical propositions with the tend-
ency as the dependent variable should hold true?
Once a number of potential explanatory propositions have been dis-
covered, Turner suggests that efforts be made to determine if some have
more explanatory power than others and if those with less power can be
seen as derivatives of the more powerful propositions. In this way, ex-
planatory propositions are consolidated into a small number of abstract
statements from which lower-level explanatory propositions, empirical
propositions, and main tendency propositions can be deduced.
Turner has only partially followed his avowed strategy. I think that
he narrows too quickly his search for explanatory propositions to just
two: (1) a proposition about “functionality” and (2) another about
“tenability.’!8

The functionality proposition. Turner discusses this explana-

tory proposition in the context of the tendency for roles to become dif-
ferentiated (Tendency Proposition I), to use role cues (Tendency 3), and
to be assigned or aliocated for the duration of an interaction (Tendency
10). However, he views this proposition as a potential explanation of many
more tendencies. He concentratés on these tendencies because he con-
siders them to be the most important."

'8Tbid.
; aecis He does this also because he feels these are perhaps the most generic dimensions
of roles.
 THE STRATEGY FOR BUILDING ROLE THEORY 385

What is the functionality proposition? Functionality is “the processes

whereby roles are used to achieve ends or goals in an effective and efficient
manner.” I should note here that these functionality considerations are
not stated as true propositions with at least two variables. To me, func-
tionality simply states another tendency proposition: people often use
roles as a way to efficiently and effectively reach goals, and this fact will
“explain” many tendency and empirical propositions.
Applying this functionality proposition to the tendency for role dif-
ferentiation yields the following deductive explanation: “the nature and
degree of role differentiation tend to vary according to functional require-
ments of effectiveness and efficiency.” For Turner, such a statement be-
gins to explain role differentiation in a deductive sense.

The tenability proposition. Tenability exists when “the condi-

tions surrounding performance of that role make it possible to play it
with some personal reward.” Thus, people must receive reinforcement,
whether this be confirmation of self, bolstering of self-esteem, an equitable
ratio of rights to duties, or some other consideration. Similarly, for me,
this proposition seems to be yet another tendency proposition, although
it does converge with behaviorism and exchange theory (see Chapters 10-
13). Applying this explanatory proposition to the tendency for role dif-
ferentiation results in the following deduction: “the nature and degree of
role differentiation vary according to the requirements of tenability.”
Fortunately, Turner’s search for explanatory propositions does not
end here. He then asks: when are functionality or tenability considerations
more likely to prevail? In his exploration for these conditions, Turner
develops what I see as more interesting propositions:”

1. The more goal-oriented interaction among individuals, the more

operative are considerations of functionality, and the less operative
considerations of tenability.
2. The more individuals bring to an interaction external power and
other salient attributes, the more operative are considerations of
viability, and the less operative are considerations of functionality.

Each of these two propositions now possesses at least two variables

and thus can serve as a more powerful explanatory proposition. Consid-
erations of tenability and functionality are now dependent variables that
vary under the impact, respectively, of the external attributes of actors,
such as power, and the degree of instrumentality of interaction.
Returning to the tendency proposition of role differentiation, I can
convert Turner’s argument into a more precise deductive format:

2] have phrased these differently than Turner would, but the meaning is the same. See
Turner, “Strategy.”
386 CHAPTER 17 / THE PROCESS ROLE THEORY OF RALPH H. TURNER

1. The more goal-oriented interaction among individuals, the more

operative considerations of functionality, and the less operative
considerations of tenability.
2. Plurality of actors, A, in situations, S, are seeking to reach a specific
- goal, G.
3. Therefore, the more A interacts in S in pursuit of G, the more
considerations of functionality and the less considerations of ten-
ability operate in the differentiation of roles among A in S.
In this way, the form of deductive theory is achieved with a specific
prediction about what should occur when deduced from a true abstract
proposition.
Thus far, I have applied Turner’s explanatory propositions only to
tendency propositions. But he also intends that explanatory propositions
be used to interpret empirical ones. The empirical propositions on the
person and role that I summarized in Tables 17-1, 17-2, and 17-3 cannot
all be examined here, and so I will focus on only one so as to assess the
usefulness of Turner’s explanatory propositions. What is said about the
utility of Turner’s strategy for this one proposition also pertains to the
others. Below is the empirical proposition to be explained:
The greater the investment of time and effort in gaining or maintaining
the opportunity to claim a role, the greater the tendency to locate self in that
role.

This empirical proposition should, in principle, be deducible from the

two explanatory propositions. Let me construct a crude deductive
explanation:

1. The more goal-oriented interaction among individuals, the more

operative considerations of functionality, and the less operative
considerations of tenability.
2. The more individuals bring to interaction external power and other
salient attributes, the more operative are considerations of tena-
bility, and the less operative are considerations of functionality.
3. Investment of time and effort in claiming and maintaining a role
usually means that an actor will bring to that role special attributes.
4. Therefore, by 2 above, the more individuals bring salient attributes
to a role, the more operative are considerations of tenability, and
hence, the greater the tendency to locate self in that role.

I think that such efforts tc- deduce the empirical propositions yield
considerable insight as to why people are willing to locate their selves in
roles. By working hard to claim and maintain a role, actors set up ex-
pectations that they should receive rewards proportionate to their in-
vestments. In other words, tenability considerations become important.
And when these become more important than functionality considera-
 PROCESS ROLE THEORY: A BRIEF ASSESSMENT OF TURNER’S APPROACH 387

tions, people are more willing to locate their selves in, and identify with,
roles.
The insertion of the concept of tenability also provides, as Turner
intended, an explanation for why the independent variables in the other
person and role propositions should increase the likelihood of self-location
in roles. For example, to the extent that “role adequacy,” “role evalua-
tion,” “role visibility,” “scope of social world,” ‘intrinsic benefits,” and
the other independent variables of Turner’s empirical propositions on
“individual efforts at role merger” (see earlier listings in Table 17-3) can
be seen as specific types or forms of the tenability principle, he has pro-
vided a common explanation of why people should locate self in a role.

PROCESS ROLE THEORY: A BRIEF ASSESSMENT

OF TURNER’S APPROACH
In assessing Turner’s strategy, let me return to some of the issues of
substance, method, and theory that have plagued interactionism in gen-
eral. With regard to substantive issues, Turner’s assumptions emphasize
the fluid nature of interactive processes, but in contrast to Blumer he
holds a deterministic view of causality. Moreover, unlike Blumer, he does
not make exaggerated claims about the range and scope of his theoretical
efforts, which are about individuals and the microprocesses by which they
come to terms with each other in varying types of social contexts. There
is no claim that all social events can be understood by his role theory.
Rather, to the extent that attention to the interactive processes of in-
dividuals is considered important, Turner argues that his approach is the
most appropriate.
With respect to method, Turner’s empirical work on a variety of topics
attests to his recognition that operationalization of concepts is critical.”
Observation techniques are an important research tool, but survey and
experimental techniques that utilize structured measuring instruments
are also deemed appropriate.

21For representative examples of the variety of empirical research conducted by Turner,

see “The Navy Disbursing Officer as a Bureaucrat,” American Sociological Review 12 (June
1947), pp. 342-48; “Moral Judgement: A Study in Roles,” American Sociological Review 17
(January 1952), pp. 70-77; “Occupational Patterns of Inequality,” American Journal of
Sociology 50 (March 1954), pp. 437-47; “Zoot-Suiters and Mexicans: Symbols in Crowd
Behavior” (with S. J. Surace), American Journal of Sociology 62 (July 1956), pp. 14-20;
“The Changing Ideology of Success: A Study of Aspirations of High School Men in Los
Angeles,” Transactions of the Third World Congress of Sociology 5 (1956), pp. 35-44; “An
Experiment in Modification of the Role Conceptions,” Yearbook of the American Philo-
sophical Society (1959), pp. 329-32; “Some Family Determinists of Ambition,” Sociology
and Social Research 46 (July 1962), pp. 397-411; The Social Context of Ambition (San
Francisco: Chandler & Sharp Publishing, Inc., 1964); and “Ambiguity and Interchangeability
in Role Attribution” (with Norma Shosid), American Sociological Review 41 (December
1976); “The True Self Method for Studying Self-Conception,” Symbolic Interaction 4 (1981),
pp. 1-20.
388 CHAPTER 17 / THE PROCESS ROLE THEORY OF RALPH H. TURNER

Finally, more than most interactionists, Turner has been concerned

with building theory. He recognizes that it is necessary to move beyond
sensitizing frameworks to propositions and that interactionism must be-
gin to explore strategies for developing deductive relations among prop-
ositions. Although I think that his functionality and tenability proposi-
tions will require revision and supplementation, he has at least developed
a strategy that may yield more powerful propositions.
In sum, then, I feel Turner’s role theory is one of the best efforts to
incorporate all varieties of symbolic interactionism and role theory into
a conceptual framework and strategy that stresses theory building and
theory testing. The general direction and thrust of his approach should,
I feel, be emulated if interactionism is to remain a viable theoretical
perspective.
 ___ CHAPTE
R 18

____ The Ethnomethodological_____

Challenge

In recent years, a more phenomenological form of interactionism has

emerged. This alternative interactionism goes by a number of labels, but
I see ethnomethodology as the most descriptive. As this label underscores,
ethnomethodology examines the “folk” (ethno) “methods” that people
use in dealing with each other. I should emphasize at the outset, however,
that ethnomethodologists would resent being discussed as interactionists.!
Indeed, they see themselves as proposing a radical new paradigm that
challenges existing conceptions of social reality, from functionalism to
symbolic interactionism. Yet, as I will argue, this challenge is more bluster
than substance. In fact, I do not see ethnomethodology as a challenge;
rather, it represents an important supplement to current interactionist
theorizing.
But why do ethnomethodologists so often see themselves as paradig-
matic messiahs? The answer resides in ethnomethodologists’ contention
that they have discovered an alternative reality that cannot be concep-
tualized by existing theoretical perspectives. And they raise a question
that owes its inspiration to Husserl and Schutz: how do sociologists and
other groups of humans create and sustain for each other the presumption
that the social world has a real character? A “more real’? phenomenon
for those who propose this question revolves around the complex ways
people (laypersons and sociologists alike) go about consciously and

1See, for example, Thomas P. Wilson, “Normative and Interpretative Paradigms in So-
ciology,” in Understanding Everyday Life, ed. J. Douglas (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1970).

389
390 CHAPTER 18 / THE ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGE

unconsciously constructing, maintaining, and altering their “sense” of an

external social reality. In fact, the cement that holds society together may
not be the values, norms, common definitions, exchange payoffs, role
bargains, interest coalitions, and the like of current social theory, but
people’s explicit and implicit “methods” for creating the presumption of
a social order.
Such is the general profile of their challenge. In viewing it, I think
that ethnomethodology has uncovered some important social processes.
But they have also been a bit pretentious, if not preposterous, in their
claims about the ‘new reality” that they have uncovered. But let me not
judge ethnomethodology too severely before I have discussed it in more
detail. I will begin with a brief overview of its origins and then turn to a
sampling of its major figures and other claims.

THE ORIGINS OF ETHNOMETHODOLOGY

Ethnomethodology borrows and extends ideas from phenomenology and,
despite disclaimers to the contrary, from Meadian-inspired symbolic in-
teractionism. In extending the ideas of these schools of thought, however,
ethnomethodology claims to posit a different view of the world. And so,
to appreciate just how ethnomethodology differs from more traditional
forms of sociological theory, I will assess it in relation to those perspectives
from which it tries to disassociate itself, but from which it still has drawn
considerable inspiration.

Blumer’s Interactionism and Ethnomethodology

As I emphasized in Chapter 15, Herbert Blumer’s interactionism em-
phasizes the constructed and fluid nature of interaction. Because actors
possess extensive symbolic capacities, they are capable of: (a) introjecting
new objects into situations, (b) redefining situations, and (c) realigning
their joint actions. As Blumer emphasizes, “it would be wise to recognize
that any given [act] is mediated by acting units interpreting the situations
with which they are confronted.””? While these situations consist of norms,
values, roles, beliefs, and social structures, they are merely types of many
“objects” that can be symbolically introjected and reshuffled to produce
new definitions of situations.
These ideas advocate a concern with how meanings, or definitions,
are created by actors interacting in situations. The emphasis is on the
process of interaction and on how actors create common meanings in
dealing with each other. This line of inquiry is also pursued by ethno-
methodologists. The ethnomethodologist also focuses on interaction and

*Herbert Blumer, “Society as Symbolic Interaction,” in Human Behavior and Social

Process, ed. A. Rose (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962).
 THE ORIGINS OF ETHNOMETHODOLOGY 391

on the creation of meanings in situations. But there is an important shift

in emphasis that corresponds to Alfred Schutz’s analysis of the lifeworld
In what ways do people create a sense that they share a common view
of the world? And how do people arrive at the presumption that there is
an objective, external world? Blumer’s interactionism stresses the process
of creating meaning, but it acknowledges the existence of an external
social order. Ethnomethodology suspends, or “brackets” in Edmund Hus-
serl’s terms, the issue of whether or not there is an external world of
norms, roles, values, and beliefs. Instead, it concentrates on how inter-
action creates among actors a sense of a factual world “out there.”

Goffman’s Dramaturgical Analysis

and Ethnomethodology
To the dismay of many ethnomethodologists, Paul Attewell has argued
that the work of the symbolic interactionist Erving Goffman represents
a significant source of inspiration for ethnomethodology.? Goffman’s work
has often been termed the dramaturgical school of interactionism because
it focuses on the ways that actors manipulate gestures to create an impres-
sion in a particular social scene. Goffman tends to emphasize the process
of impression management, per se, and not the purposes or goals toward
which action is directed. Much of Goffman’s analysis thus concentrates.
on the form of interaction itself rather than on the structures it creates,
sustains, or changes.‘ For example, Goffman has insightfully analyzed
how actors validate self-conceptions, how they justify their actions through
gestures, how they demonstrate their membership in groups, how they
display social distance, how they adjust to physical stigmas, and how they
interpersonally manipulate many other situations.
This concern with the management of social scenes is also prominent
in ethnomethodological analysis. Ethnomethodologists share Goffman’s
concern with the techniques by which actors create impressions in social
situations, but their interest is not with individuals’ impression-manage-
ment, but with how actors create a sense of a common reality. Ethno-
methodologists thus concentrate on interactional techniques, but they ask
a somewhat different question than Goffman: How do such interpersonal
techniques sustain a sense of social reality?

’Paul Attewell, “Ethnomethodology Since Garfinkel,” Theory and Society 1 (1974), pp.
179-210.
‘This is not always true, especially in some of his more institutional works, such as
Asylums (Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Books, 1961). Other representative works by Goffman
include The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday Pub-
lishing, 1959); Interaction Ritual (Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Books, 1967); Encounters
(Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1961); Stigma (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
1963).
392 CHAPTER 18 / THE ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGE

Alfred Schutz, Phenomenology, and Ethnomethodology

Schutz’s phenomenology, as I noted in Chapter 14, liberated phenomen-
ology from Husserl’s philosophical project.> Schutz asserted the impor-
tance of studying how interaction creates and maintains a “paramount
reality.” He was also concerned with how actors achieve reciprocity of
perspectives and how they construct a taken-for-granted world that gives
order to social life.
This emphasis on the taken-for-granted nature of the world and the
importance of this lifeworld for maintaining an actor’s sense of reality
becomes a prime concern of ethnomethodologists. Indeed, many ethno-
methodological concepts are borrowed or adapted from Husserl’s ahd
Schutz’s phenomenology. Yet, ethnomethodologists adapt phenomeno-
logical analysis to the issue of how social order is maintained by the
practices that actors use to create a sense that they share the same lifeworld.
Let me now summarize my argument thus far. Ethnomethodology
draws from and extends the concerns of interactionists such as Blumer
and Goffman and the phenomenological projects of Husserl and Schutz.
It emphasizes the process of interaction, the use of interpersonal tech-
niques to create situational impressions, and the importance of percep-
tions of consensus among actors. In extending interactionism and phen-
omenology, ethnomethodologists often think that they posit a different
vision of the social world and an alternative orientation for understanding
the question of how social organization is created, maintained, and changed.
As Mehan and Wood note, ethnomethodologists “have chosen to ask not
how order is possible, but rather to ask how a sense of order is possible.”
(I have added the emphasis here.)®

THE NATURE OF ETHNOMETHODOLOGY

Metaphysics or Methodology?
Ethnomethodology has often been misunderstood. Part of the reason for
this misunderstanding stems from the vagueness of the prose of some

‘See, in particular, Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers I: The Problem of Social Reality, ed.
Maurice Natanson (The Hague, Holland: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962); Alfred Schutz, Collected
Papers II: Studies in Social Theory, ed. Arvid Broderson (The Hague, Holland: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1964); and Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers III: Studies in Phenomenological Phi-
losophy (The Hague, Holland: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966). For adaptations of these ideas to
interactionism and ethnomethodology, see Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckmann, The
Structure of the Lifeworld (Evanston, IIl.. Northwestern University Press, 1973) as well as
Thomas Luckmann, ed., Phenomenology and Sociology (New York: Penguin Books, 1978).
See also Robert C. Freeman, “Phenomenological Sociology and Ethnomethodology,” in
Sioa Ha to the Sociologies of Everyday Life, eds. J. Douglas et al. (Boston: Allyn &
acon, .
“Augh Mehan and Houston Wood, The Reality of Ethnomethodology (New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1975), p. 190. This is an excellent statement of the ethnomethodological
perspective.
 THE NATURE OF ETHNOMETHODOLOGY 393

ethnomethodologists.”? One form of such misinterpretation asserts that

ethnomethodology represents a “corrective” to current sociological theo-
rizing because it points to sources of bias among scientific investigators.
From this position, it is assumed that ethnomethodology can serve to
check the reliability and validity of investigators’ observations by expos-
ing not only their biases, but those of the scientific community accepting
their observations. Although ethnomethodology might be used for this
purpose, if one were so inclined, those who advocate this use have failed,
I think, to grasp the main thrust of the ethnomethodological position.
For the ethnomethodologist, emphasis is not on questions about the re-
liability and validity of investigators’ observations, but on the methods
used by scientific investigators and laypersons alike to construct, main-
tain, and perhaps alter what each considers and believes to be a valid and
reliable set of statements about order in the world. The methodology in
the ethnomethodological perspective does not address questions about the
proper, unbiased, or truly scientific search for knowledge; rather, eth-
nomethodology is concerned with the common methods people employ—
whether scientists, housewives, insurance salespersons, or laborers—to
create a sense of order about the situations in which they interact. I think
that the’ best clue to this conceptual emphasis can be found in the word
ethnomethodology—ology, “ study of’; method, “the methods [used by]”;
and ethno, “folk or people.”
Another related source of misunderstanding in commentaries on eth-
nomethodology comes from those who assume that this perspective simply
uses “soft” research methods, such as participant observation, to uncover
some of the taken-for-granted rules, assumptions, and rituals of members
in groups.’ This interpretation would appear to transform ethnometho-
dology into a research-oriented variant of the symbolic interactionist

7See, for example, Harold Garnnkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology (Englewood Cliffs,

N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967). However, recent portrayals of the ethnomethodological position
have done much to clarify this initial vagueness. See, for example, Mehan and Wood, The
Reality of Ethnomethodology; D. Lawrence Wieder, Language and Social Reality (The Hague,
Holland: Mouton Publishers, 1973); Don H. Zimmerman and Melvin Pollner, “The Everyday
World as Phenomenon,” in Understanding Everyday Life, ed. J. D. Douglas (Chicago: Aldine
Publishing, 1970), pp. 80-103; Don H. Zimmerman and D. Lawrence Wieder, “Ethno-
methodology and the Problem of Order: Comment on Denzin,” in Understanding Everyday
Life, pp. 285-95; Randall Collins and Michael Makowsky, The Discovery of Society (New
York: Random House, 1972), pp. 209-13; George Psathas, ‘““Ethnomethods and Phenomen-
ology,” Social Research 35 (September 1968), pp. 500-520; Roy Turner, ed., Ethnometho-
dology (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1974); Thomas P. Wilson and Don H. Zimmerman,
“Ethnomethodology, Sociology and Theory,” Humboldt Journal of Social Relations7 (Fall-
Winter 1979-80), pp. 52-88; Warren Handel, Ethnomethodology: How People Make Sense
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1982); and George Psathas, ed., Everyday Language:
Studies in Ethnomethodology (New York: Irvington Publishers, 1979).
*For example, see Norman K. Denzin, “Symbolic Interactionism and Ethnomethodol-
ogy,” American Sociological Review 34 (December 1969), pp. 922-34.
394 CHAPTER 18 / THE ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGE

perspective.? Such a variant of ethnomethods would now represent a more

conscientious effort to get at actors’ interpretative processes and the re-
sulting definitions of the situation. By employing various techniques for
observation of, and participation in, the symbolic world of those inter-
acting individuals under study, a more accurate reading of how situations
are defined, how norms emerge, and how social action is controlled could
be achieved. Although ethnomethodologists do employ observation and
participant methods to study interacting individuals, their concerns are
not the same as those of symbolic interactionists. Like all dominant forms
of sociological theorizing, interactionists posit that common definitions,
values, and norms emerge from interaction and serve to regulate how
people perceive the world and interact with each other. For the inter-
actionist, concern is with the conditions under which various types of
explicit and implicit definitions, norms, and values emerge and thereby
resolve the problem of how social organization is possible. In contrast,
ethnomethodologists are interested in how members come to agree upon
an impression that there are such things as rules, definitions, and values.
Just what types of rules and definitions emerge is not a central concern
of the ethnomethodologist, since there are more fundamental questions:
Through what types of methods do people go about seeing, describing,
and asserting that rules and definitions exist? How do people use their
beliefs that definitions and rules exist to describe for each other the social
order?
Again, the methods of ethnomethodology do not refer to a new and
improved technique on the part of scientific sociology for deriving a more
accurate picture of people’s definitions of the situation and of the norms
of social structure (as is the case with interactionists). For the ethno-
methodologist, emphasis is on the methods employed by those under study
in creating, maintaining, and altering their presumption that a social order
actually exists out there in the real world.

Concepts and Principles of Ethnomethodology

Alfred Schutz postulated one basic reality—the paramount—in which peo-
ple’s conduct of their everyday affairs occurs. Most contemporary eth-
nomethodologists, however, are less interested in whether or not there is
one or multiple realities, lifeworlds, or natural attitudes. Far more im-
portant in ethnomethodological analysis is the development of concepts
and principles that can help explain how people’s sense of reality is con-
structed, maintained, and changed. Although ethnomethodology has yet
to develop a unified body of concepts or propositions, I see a conceptual

*For another example of this interpretation, see Walter L. Wallace. Sociological Theory
(Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1969), pp. 34-36.
 THE NATURE OF ETHNOMETHODOLOGY 395

core in the ethnomethodological perspective. Let me review some of its

key elements.

Reflexive action and interaction.!° Much interaction operates

to sustain a particular vision of reality. For example, ritual activity di-
rected toward the gods sustains the belief that gods influence everyday
affairs. Such ritual activity is an example of reflexive action; it operates
to maintain a certain vision of reality. Even when the facts would seem
to contradict a belief, human interaction upholds the contradicted belief.
For instance, should intense prayer and ritual activity not bring forth the
desired intervention from the gods, rather than reject beliefs the devout
proclaim that they did not pray hard enough, that their cause was not
just, or that the gods in their wisdom have a greater plan. Such behavior
is reflexive; it upholds or reinforces a belief, even in the face of evidence
that the belief may be incorrect.
Much human interaction is reflexive. Humans interpret cues, ges-
tures, words, and other information from each other in a way that sustains
a particular vision of reality. Even contradictory evidence is reflexively
interpreted to maintain a body of belief and knowledge. The concept of
reflexivity thus focuses attention on how people in interaction go about
maintaining the presumption that they are guided by a particular reality.
Much of ethnomethodological inquiry addresses this question of how re-
flexive interaction occurs. That is, what concepts and principles can be
developed to explain the conditions under which different reflexive actions
among interacting parties are likely to occur.

The indexicality of meaning. The gestures, cues, words, and

other information sent and received by interacting parties have meaning
in a particular context. Without some knowledge of the context—the bio-
graphies of the interacting parties, their avowed purpose, their past in-
teractive experiences, and so forth—it would easily be possible to mis-
interpret the symbolic communication among interacting individuals. This
fact of interactive life is denoted by the concept of indexicality."' To say
that an expression is indexical is to emphasize that the meaning of that
expression is tied to a particular context.
This phenomenon of indexicality draws attention to the problem of
how actors in a context construct a vision of reality in that context. They
develop expressions that invoke their common vision about what is real

For an early discussion of this phenomenon, see Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnometho-

dology. A more readable discussion can be found in Mehan and Wood, The Reality of
Ethnomethodology, pp. 137-78.
uGarfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology; Garfinkel and Sacks, “The Formal Properties
of Practical Actions,” in Theoretical Sociology, ed. J. C. McKinney and E. A. Tiryakian
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970).
396 CHAPTER 18 / THE ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGE

in their situation. The concept of indexicality thus directs an investi-

gator’s attention to actual interactive contexts in order to see how actors
go about creating indexical expressions—words, facial and body gestures,
and other cues—to create and sustain the presumption that a particular
reality governs their affairs.
With these two key concepts, reflexivity and indexicality, I think that
the interactionists’ concern with the process of symbolic communication
is retained, while much of the phenomenological legacy of Schutz is re-
juvenated. Concern is with how actors use gestures to create and sustain
a lifeworld, body of knowledge, or natural attitude about what is real. The
emphasis is not on the content of the lifeworld, but on the methods or
techniques that actors use to create, maintain, or even alter a vision of
reality. AsMehan and Wood note, “the ethnomethodological theory of
the reality constructor is about the procedures that accomplish reality.
It is not about any specific reality.’!2 This emphasis has led ethnometh-
odologists to isolate the general types of methods employed by interacting
actors.

Some general interactive methods. When analytical attention

focuses on the methods that people use to construct a sense of reality,
the task of the theorist is to isolate the general types of interpersonal
techniques that people employ in interaction. Aaron Cicourel, for example,
has summarized a number of such techniques or methods isolated by
ethnomethodologists: (1) searching for the normal form, (2) doing reci-
procity of perspectives, and (3) using the et cetera principle."

Searching for the normal form. If interacting parties sense that

ambiguity exists over what is real and that their interaction is strained,
they will emit gestures to tell each other to return to what is “normal”
in their contextual situation. Actors are presumed to hold a vision of a
normal form for situations or to be motivated to create one; and hence
much of their action is designed to reach this form.

Doing a reciprocity of perspectives. Borrowing from Schutz’s

formulation, ethnomethodologists have emphasized that actors operate
under the presumption, and actively seek to communicate the fact, that
they would have the same experiences were they to switch places. Fur-
thermore, until they are so informed by specific gestures, actors can ignore
differences in perspectives that might arise from their unique biographies.
Thus, much interaction will be consumed with gestures that seek to assure
others that a reciprocity of perspectives does indeed exist.

'"*Mehan and Wood, The Reality of Ethnomethodology, p. 114.

'*Aaron V. Cicourel, Cognitive Sociology (London: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 85-88. It should
be noted that these principles are implicit in Garfinkel’s Studies in Ethnomethodology.
 THE NATURE OF ETHNOMETHODOLOGY 397

Using the et cetera principle. In examining an actual interac-

tion, much is left unsaid. Actors must constantly “fill in” or “wait for”
information necessary to “make sense” of another’s words or deeds. When
actors do so, they are using the et cetera principle. They are agreeing not
to disrupt the interaction by asking for the needed information; they are
willing to wait or to fill in. For example, the common phrase, “you know,”
which usually appears after an utterance, is often an assertion by one
actor to another invoking the et cetera principle. The other is thus in-
formed not to disrupt the interaction and the sense of reality in the
situation with a counter utterance, such as, “No, I do not know.”
_ These three general types of folk methods are but examples of what
ethnomethodologists seek to discover. There are certainly more folk meth-
ods. For some ethnomethodologists, the ultimate goal of theory is to de-
termine the conditions under which these and other interpersonal tech-
niques will be used to construct, maintain, or change a sense of reality.
Yet, I have found few such propositions in the ethnomethodological lit-
erature. But let me try to imagine the nature of propositions, should they
ever be developed.

Two general ethnomethodological propositions. I see eth-

nomethodological propositions as following several assumptions: (1) So-
cial order is maintained by the use of techniques that give actors a sense
that they share a common reality. (2) The substance of the common reality
is less important in maintaining social order than the actors’ acceptance
of a common set of techniques. With these assumptions, I offer two ex-
amples of what ethnomethodological propositions might look like if eth-
nomethodologists ever got around to generating them.

1. The more actors fail to agree on the use of interactive techniques,

such as the et cetera principle, the search for the normal form,
and doing the reciprocity of perspectives, the more likely is inter-
action to be disrupted, and hence, the less likely is social order to
be maintained.
2. The more interaction proceeds on the basis of different, taken-for-
granted visions of reality, the more likely is interaction to be dis-
rupted, and hence, the less likely is social order to be maintained.

These propositions can perhaps be visualized as general laws from

which more specific propositions on how actors go about constructing,
maintaining, or changing their sense of reality could be developed. What
is needed in ethnomethodology is to discover the specific conditions under
which particular folk techniques are likely to be used to create a sense of
a common world among interacting individuals. Indeed, I think that eth-
nomethodologists should worry less about whether or not they have
discovered a radically new reality and instead direct their efforts to
398 CHAPTER 18 / THE ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGE

developing some general propositions about the conditions under which

actors will use various ‘‘folk methods.”

Varieties of Ethnomethodological Inquiry

Garfinkel’s pioneering inquiries. Harold Garfinkel’s Studies in
Ethnomethodology firmly established ethnomethodology as a distinctive
theoretical perspective.’ Although the book is not a formal theoretical
statement, the studies and the commentary in it established the domain
of ethnomethodological inquiry. Subsequent ethnomethodological re-
search and theory begins with Garfinkel’s insights and takes them in a
variety of directions.
Garfinkel’s work established ethnomethodology as a field of inquiry
that seeks to understand the methods people employ to make sense out
of their world. He places considerable emphasis on language as the vehicle
by which this reality construction is done. Indeed, for Garfinkel, inter-
acting individuals’ efforts to account for their actions—that is, to represent
them verbally to others—is the primary method by which the world is
constructed. In Garfinkel’s terms, to do interaction is to tell interaction;
or in other words, the primary folk technique used by actors is verbal
description. In this way, people use their accounts to construct a sense
of reality.
Garfinkel places enormous emphasis on indexicality—that is, on the
fact that members’ accounts are tied to particular contexts and situations.
An utterance, Garfinkel notes, indexes much more than it actually says;
it also evokes connotations that can only be understood in the context
of a situation. Garfinkel’s work was thus the first to stress the indexical
nature of interpersonal cues and to emphasize that individuals seek to
use accounts to create a sense of reality.
In addition to laying much of the groundwork for current ethno-
methodology, Garfinkel and his associates conducted a number of inter-
esting empirical studies in an effort to validate their assumptions about
what is real. One line of empirical inquiry is known as the breeching
experiment, in which the normal course of interaction is deliberately in-
terrupted. For example, Garfinkel reports a series of conversations in
which student experimenters challenged every statement of selected sub-
jects. The end result was a series of conversations revealing the following
pattern:

Subject: I had a flat tire.

Experimenter: What do you mean, you had a flat tire?
Subject: (appears momentarily stunned and then replies in a hostile
manner): What do you mean, “What do you mean?” A flat tire is

“Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology.

 THE NATURE OF ETHNOMETHODOLOGY 399

a flat tire. That is what I meant. Nothing special. What a crazy

question!!5

In this situation, the experimenter was apparently violating an im-

plicit rule for this type of interaction and thereby aroused not only the
hostility of the subject but also a negative sanction, “What a crazy ques-
tion!” Seemingly, in any interaction there are certain background features
that everyone should understand and that should not be questioned in
order for all parties to be able to “conduct their common conversational
affairs without interference.’’® Such implicit methods appear to guide a
considerable amount of everyday affairs and are critical for the construc-
tion of at least the perception among interacting humans that an external
social order exists. In this conversation, for example, the et cetera prin-
ciple and the search for the normal form are invoked by the subject.
Through breeching, Garfinkel hoped to discover implicit ethnomethods
by forcing actors to actively engage in the process of reality reconstruction
after the situation had been disrupted.
Other research strategies also yielded insights into the methods par-
ties use in an interaction for constructing a sense of reality. Garfinkel
and his associates summarized the “decision rules” jurors employed in
reaching a verdict.!” By examining a group such as a jury, which must by
the nature of its task develop an interpretation of what really happened,
the ethnomethodologist might achieve some insight into the generic prop-
erties of the processes of constructing a sense of social reality. From the
investigators’ observations of jurors, it appeared that ‘‘a person is 95
percent juror before [coming] near the court,” indicating that through
their participation in other social settings and through instructions from
the court, they had accepted the “official” rules for reaching a verdict.
However, these rules were altered somewhat as participants came together
in an actual jury setting and began the “work of assembling the ‘corpus’
which serves as grounds for inferring the correctness of a verdict.’’!® Be-
cause the inevitable ambiguities of the cases before them made it difficult
for strict conformity to the official rules of jury deliberation, new decision
rules were invoked in order to allow jurors to achieve a “correct” view of
“what actually happened.” But in their retrospective reporting to inter-
viewers of how they reached the verdicts, jurors typically invoked the
“official line” to justify the correctness of their decisions. When inter-
viewers drew attention to discrepancies between the jurors’ ideal accounts
and actual practices, jurors became anxious, indicating that somewhat

*Tbid., p. 42.
*Tbid.
i[bid., pp. 104-15.
*Ibid., p. 110.
400 CHAPTER 18 / THE ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGE

different rules had been used to construct the corpus of what really
happened.
In sum, I think that these two examples of Garfinkel’s research strat-
egy illustrate the general intent of much ethnomethodological inquiry: to
penetrate natural social settings or create social settings in which the
investigator can observe humans attempting to assert, create, maintain,
or change the rules for constructing the appearance of consensus over the
structure of the real world. By focusing on the process or methods for
constructing a reality rather than on the substance or content of the reality
itself, research from the ethnomethodological point of view can potentially
provide a more interesting and relevant answer to the question of “how
and why society is possible.” Garfinkel’s studies have stimulated a variety
of research and theoretical strategies. Several of the most prominent strat-
egies are briefly discussed below.

Harvey Sacks’s linguistic analysis. Until his untimely death

in 1976, Harvey Sacks exerted considerable influence within ethnometh-
odology. Although his work is not well known outside ethnomethodol-
ogical circles, it represents an attempt to extend Garfinkel’s concern with
verbal accounts while eliminating some of the problems posed by
indexicality.
Sacks was one of the first ethnomethodologists to articulate the phe-
nomenological critique of sociology and to use this critique to build what
he thought was an alternative form of theorizing.!® The basic thrust of
Sacks’s critique can be stated as follows: Sociologists assume that language
is a resource used in generating concepts and theories of the social world.
In point of fact, however, sociologists are confusing resource and topic.
In using language, sociologists are creating a reality; their words are not
a neutral vehicle but the topic of inquiry for true sociological analysis.”
Sacks’s solution to this problem in sociology is typical of phenomen-
ologists. If the pure properties of language can be understood, then it
would be possible to have an ‘objective social science without confusing
resource with subject matter. Sacks’s research tended to concentrate on
the formal properties of language-in-use. Typically, Sacks would take ver-
batim transcripts of actors in interaction and seek to understand the
formal properties of the conversation, while ignoring its substance. Such
a tactic resolved the problem of indexicality, since Sacks simply ignored
the substance and context of conversation and jocused on its form. For
example, “sequences of talk” among actors might occupy his attention.”"

Po ae Sacks, “Sociological Description,” Berkeley Journal of Sociology 8 (1963), pp.

1-17.
Harvey Sacks, “An Initial Investigation of the Usability of Conversational Data for
Doing Sociology” in Studies in Interaction, ed. D. Sudnow (New York: Free Press, 1972).
His best-known study, for example, is the coauthored article with Emmanue! Schegloff
and Gail Jefferson, “A Simplest Systematics for the Analysis of Turn Taking in Conver-
sation,” Language 50 (1974), pp. 696-735.
 THE NATURE OF ETHNOMETHODOLOGY 401

Sacks thus began to take ethnomethodology into formal linguistics,

a trend that has continued and, in fact, seems to dominate current eth-
nomethodology. More importantly, he sought to discover universal forms
of interaction—that is, abstracted patterns of talk—that might apply to
all conversations. In this way, he began to search for the laws of reality
construction among interacting individuals.

Aaron Cicourel’s cognitive approach. In his Method and Mea-

surement in Sociology, Aaron Cicourel launched a line of attack on so-
ciology similar to Sacks’s.22 The use of mathematics, he argues, will not
remove the problems associated with language, because mathematics is a
language that does not necessarily correspond to the phenomena that it
describes. Instead, it “distorts and obliterates, acts as a filter or grid for
that which will pass as knowledge in a given era.” The use of statistics
similarly distorts: events cannot be counted, averaged, and otherwise ma-
nipulated. Such statistical manipulations soon make sociological descrip-
tions inaccurate and mold sociological analysis to the dictates of statistical
logic.
In a less severe tone, Cicourel also questions Garfinkel’s assertion
that interaction and verbal accounts are the same process.”4 Cicourel notes
that humans see, sense, and feel much that they cannot communicate
with words. Humans use “multiple-modalities” for communicating in sit-
uations. Verbal accounts represent crude and incomplete transiations of
what is actually communicated in interaction. This recognition has led
Cicourel to rename his brand of ethnomethodology, cognitive sociology.
The details of his analysis are, I think, less important than the general
intent of his effort to transform sociological research and theory. Basi-
cally, he has sought to uncover the universal “interpretive procedures”
by which humans organize their cognitions and give meaning to situa-
tions.” It is through these interpretive procedures that people develop a
sense of social structure and are able to organize their actions. These
interpretive procedures are universal and invariant in humans; and their
discovery would allow for understanding of: how-humans create a sense
of social structure in the world around them.

Zimmerman’s, Pollner’s, and Wieder’s situational approach.

Sacks and Cicourel have focused on the universal properties, respectively,

Aaron V. Cicourel, Method and Measurement in Sociology (New York: Free Press,
1964).
Ibid., p. 35.
*Aaron V. Cicourel, “Cross Modal Communication,” in Linguistics and Language Sct-
ence, Monograph 25, ed. R. Shuy (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1973).
*See, for example, his Cognitive Sociology and “Basic and Normative Rules in the
Negotiation of Status and Role,” in Recent Sociology No. 2, ed. H. P. Dreitzel (New York:
Macmillan, 1970).
402 CHAPTER 18 / THE ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGE

of language use and cognitive perception/representation. This concern

with invariance, or universal folk methods, has become increasingly prom-
inent in ethnomethodological inquiry. In a number of essays, for example,
Don Zimmerman, D. Lawrence Wieder, and Melvin Pollner have devel-
oped an approach that seeks to uncover the universal procedures people
employ to construct a sense of reality.?* Their position is perhaps the
most clearly stated of all ethnomethodologies, drawing inspiration from
Garfinkel but extending his ideas. Let me summarize their argument:

kk In all interaction situations, humans attempt to construct the ap-

pearance of consensus over relevant features of the interaction
setting.
These setting features can include attitudes, opinions, beliefs, and
other cognitions about the nature of the social setting in which
they interact.
. Humans engage in a variety of explicit and implicit interpersonal
practices and methods to construct, maintain, and perhaps alter
the appearance of consensus over these setting features.
Such interpersonal practices and methods result in the assembling
and disassembling of what can be termed an occasional corpus—
that is, the perception by interacting humans that the current
setting has an orderly and understandable structure.
on This appearance of consensus is not only the result of agreement
on the substance and content of the occasioned corpus but also a
reflection of each participant’s compliance with the rules and pro-
cedures for assemblage and disassemblage of this consensus. In
communicating, in however subtle a manner, that parties accept
the implicit rules for constructing an occasioned corpus, they go
a long way in establishing consensus over what is out there in the
interaction setting.
In each interaction situation, the rules for constructing the oc-
casioned corpus will be unique in some respects and hence not
completely generalizable to other settings—thus requiring that hu-
mans in each and every interaction situation use interpersonal
methods in search for agreement on the implicit rules for the as-
semblage of an occasioned corpus.
~l. Thus, by constructing, reaffirming, or altering the rules for con-
structing an occasioned corpus. members in a setting are able to
offer each other the appearance of an orderly and connected world
out there, which compels éertain perceptions and actions on their
part.

*See,
I
for example, Zimmerman
:
and Pollner, “The World as a Phenomenon”: Zimmerman
’ ? - oe

and Wieder, “Ethnomethodology and the Problem of Order”: Wieder, Langtrage and Seciat
7s “e .

Reality.
 NEW PARADIGM OR IMPORTANT SUPPLEMENT? 403

It is from these kinds of assumptions about human interaction that

Zimmerman’s, Pollner’s, and Wieder’s ethnomethodology takes its subject
matter. Rather than focusing on the actual content and substance of the
occasioned corpus and on the ways members believe it to force certain
perceptions and actions, attention is drawn primarily to the methods
humans use to construct, maintain, and change the appearance of an
orderly and connected social world. These methods are directly observable
and constitute a major portion of people’s actions in everyday life. In
contrast, the actual substance and content of the occasioned corpus is
not directly observable and can only be inferred. Furthermore, in con-
centrating on the process of creating, sustaining, and changing the oc-
casioned corpus, it can be asked: Is not the process of creating for each
other the appearance of a stable social order more critical to understand
how society is possible than the actual substance and content of the
occasioned corpus? Is there anything more to society than members’ be-
liefs that it is out there forcing them to do and see certain things? If this
fact is true, order is not the result of the particular structure of the corpus
but of the human capacity to continually assemble and disassemble the
corpus in each and every interaction situation. This perspective suggests
to ethnomethodologists like Zimmerman, Pollner, Wieder, and many others
that theoretical attention should therefore be placed on the ongoing pro-
cess of assembling and disassembling the appearance of social order and
to the particular methods people employ in doing so.

NEW PARADIGM OR IMPORTANT SUPPLEMENT?

I think that ethnomethodology has uncovered a series of interpersonal
processes that traditional interactionists have failed to conceptualize. The
implicit methods that people use to communicate a sense of social order
are, I believe, a very crucial dimension of social interaction and organi-
zation. The theoretical goal is to specify the generic conditions under
which various folk methods are used by individuals.
The rather extreme polemics about the ‘new reality” exposed by
ethnomethodologists are, I feel, best forgotten.?” The few findings of eth-
nomethodologists do not sustain their metaphysical vision of the world
any more than they support interactionist formulations. Indeed, the find-
ings of ethnomethodologists blend very nicely with those of symbolic
interactionists, role theorists, and other theoretical traditions. Ethno-
methodologists have, therefore, rather overstated their case. I do not doubt
that people’s sense of sharing a common world is an important property

For an interesting discussion of this assumption that challenges the ethnomethodol.

in Sociological
ogical perspective, see Bill Harrell, “Symbols,-Perception, and Meaning,”
, ed. L. Gross (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), pp. 104-27.
Theory: Inquiries and Paradigms
404 CHAPTER 18 / THE ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGE

of interaction and organization, but it is not the only interactive dynamic,

And to the degree that ethnomethodologists assert that their domain of
inquiry is the only reality, they make themselves look foolish.#
It is time, I think, for ethnomethodologists to get off their high horse
and begin to integrate their ideas into social theory. For too much effort
has been spent challenging and attacking “normal sociology”; the goals
of theoretical cumulation would be better served if there was a conscious
and concerted attempt by ethnomethodologists to integrate their ideas
with those of mainstream interactionism.”

*8] agree with Lewis Coser on this issue. See his ““Two Methods in Search of a Substance,”
American Sociological Review 40 (1975), pp. 691-700. I also agree with him about the “other
method” discussed in this article.
*Actually, many nonethnomethodologists, such as Jurgen Habermas (see Chapter 9),
Randall Collins (see Chapter 21), and Anthony Giddens (see Chapter 22), have used the
ideas of ethnomethodologists to build interesting theory—far more interesting than that
produced by the ethnomethodologists themselves.
 ae aie em

_____ S$tructural Theory ss”

19. The Origins of

Structural Theorizing
20.- The Macrostructuralism
of Peter M. Blau
21. The Microstructuralism
of Randall Collins
22. The Structuration Theory
of Anthony Giddens

405
 CHAPTER 19

The Origins of.

Structural Theorizing

THE IDEA OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE

Despite sociologists’ frequent use of the concept social structure, its mean-
ing remains unclear. My sense is that notions of structure are employed
as metaphors for describing social interaction and relations that endure
over time, but beyond this, structure is not conceptualized precisely.
Through previous chapters, we have come across labels to denote struc-
ture—labels like “social system,” “‘imperatively coordinated associations,”
“institutions,” “strains toward integration,” “networks,” and so on. All
of these and other concepts emphasize that human soeial relations become
patterned and comparatively stable over time; and most theoretical per-
spectives in sociology try to understand how and why this is so. But
curiously, even as theorists make these efforts, their conceptualization of
social structure remains vague. In this last group of chapters, I will ex-
amine several representative approaches that seek to conceptualize social
structure more explicitly.
Each of these approaches is eclectic, borrowing from those perspec-
tives that I have already summarized; and each owes its inspiration to a
number of early thinkers who framed the general problems of structural
analysis and who provided many of the critical concepts. These early
thinkers are by now familiar, because I have examined them in other
contexts. But in this chapter, I want to focus more precisely on how they
each conceptualized social structure and how their respective views have
407
408 CHAPTER 19 / THE ORIGINS OF STRUCTURAL THEORIZING

it will be ev-
stimulated more modern structural theorizing.’ As I do so,
theorizing
ident that many of the basic issues that trouble sociological
ogy
become highly visible in structural theories. For example, can sociol
be a science, or is there something different and unique about human
structures? Can social structure be conceptualized independently of the
microprocesses from which it is constituted, or must it be analyzed in
terms of these microprocesses? And can the basic dimensions—both macro
and micro—of structure be isolated and analyzed by theory, or is structure
merely a reification?? As is evident, structural theorizing forces us to deal
with sociology’s more difficult questions. Let me now trace the origins of
these questions in the structural thought of sociology’s early masters.

KARL MARX AND STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS

There have been explicit efforts to reinterpret Marx by French structur-
alists, who, I should emphasize, are not discussed in the following chap-
ters.? Despite the failure of such reinterpretations of Marx in structuralist
terms, Marx’s ideas have nonetheless been influenced by the development
of less mystical analysis of social structure. This influence revolves around
Marx’s conceptions of (1) system reproduction and (2) system contra-
diction.’ I have imposed more modern terminology on Marx here, but the
ideas are his. Let me briefly review each.

1. Marx was concerned with how patterns of inequality “repro-

duce” themselves. That is, how is inequality in power and wealth
sustained? And how are social relations structured to sustain these
inequalities? This metaphor of social reproduction has been picked

1For one recent effort to clarify the “structuralisms” that pervade social theory, see Bruce
H. Mayhew, “Structuralism versus Individualism: Part 1, Shadowboxing in the Dark”’ and
“Structuralism versus Individualism: Part II, Ideological and Other Obfuscations,” Social
Forces 59 {2 and 3, 1981), pp. 335-75 and 627-48, respectively. See also a volume edited
by Ino Rossi, Structural Sociology (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982) for rep-
resentative analyses.
*For example, see Douglas W. Maynard and Thomas P. Wilson, “On the Reification of
Social Structure,” Current Perspectives in Social Theory 1 (1980), pp. 287-322.
‘Such is the case because I do not think that they have generated any theory, even if
we include meta-theory as part of sociological theorizing. Structuralism is, of course, a broad
intellectual movement, and its most Marxist exponent was Louis Althusser, For Marx (New
York: Penguin Books, 1969) and Politics and History (London: NLB, 1977). For an inter-
esting secondary review, see also Alison Assiter, “Althusser and Structuralism,”” The British
Journal of Sociology 35 (2, 1984), pp. 272-94.
‘See appendix for my review of Lévi-Strauss, the most prominent of these French
structuralists.
5See Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (New York: In-
ternational Publishers, 1970); The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (New
York: International Publishers, 1964; and Capital: A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Pro
duction (New York: International Publishers, 1967).
 KARL MARX AND STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 409

up by many structural theorists who like to view social structures as

“reproduced” by the repetitive social encounters among individuals.

From this metaphorical use of Marx’s ideas comes a vision of social

structure as the distribution of resources among actors who use their
respective resources in social encounters and, in the process, reproduce
social structure and its attendant distribution of resources. Thus, struc-
ture is the symbolic, material, and political resources that actors have in
their encounters; and as they employ these resources to their advantage,
they reproduce the structure of their social relations because they sustain
their respective shares of resources. For example, those who can control
where others are physically located, who have access to coercion, who
control communication channels, and who can manipulate the flow of
information can “structure” successive encounters with others who have
fewer resources in ways that reproduce inequalities. In so doing, they
reproduce structure, but structure is tied to the interactive encounters
among individuals using their resources. It is not something “out there”
beyond actors and their interactions in concrete situations.

2. Marx was, of course, interested in changing capitalist society;

and so, he needed to introduce a concept that could break the vicious
cycle of system reproduction. His analysis of Hegel’s dialectics gave
him the critical idea of “contradiction.” Material social arrangements
contain, he argued, patterns of social relations that are self-trans-
forming. For example, capitalists must concentrate large pools of labor
around machines in urban areas, which allow workers to communicate
their grievances and to organize politically to change the very nature
of capitalism. Thus, private expropriation of profits by capitalists
stands in contradiction to the socially organized production process;
and over time, this underlying contradiction will produce conflictual
social relations—i.e., a revolution by workers—that change and trans-
form the nature of social relations and, hence, social structure.®

Again, my sense is that this notion of contradiction is borrowed in

a metaphorical way. It is used to introduce conflict and change into struc-
tural analysis. It posits, in essence, that the distribution of resources that
sustains or reproduces social relations is inherently subject to redistri-
bution, under certain conditions. The main condition is inequality. That
is, structures reproduced through unequal distribution of symbolic, ma-
terial, and political resources will exhibit underlying contradictions that
will, in turn, generate pressures for interactions that do not reproduce
the structure but instead transform it in some way through redistribution
of resources.

‘Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (New York: International
Publishers, 1971).
410 CHAPTER 19 / THE ORIGINS OF STRUCTURAL THEORIZING

‘There is, I think, an implicit exchange theory in these notions of

structure. In some works, such as those by Randall Collins (Chapter 21),
these exchange ideas in Marx’s analysis and in the metaphorical extension
of his ideas hecome more explicit. In other structural analyses, such as
Anthony Giddens’s “‘structuration theory” (see Chapter 22), they are left
recessive. And in still other approaches, such as that of Peter Blau, whose
eatly work was an explicit exchange perspective (see Chapter 12), the
exchange basis of social structure is no longer conceptualized and is aban-
doned altogether. Among those who still use Marx’s ideas, I think that
they dramatically distort them in an effort to address the microfounda-
tions of macrostructures. Yet, these distortions are, as we will see shortly,
rather creative and, from any point of view, not something over which
we should unduly agonize. Indeed, I think it best to use the ideas of early
scholars, transforming them as we see necessary in order to explain social
phenomena.

THE STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF

HERBERT SPENCER

Spencer’s Macrostructuralism
Herbert Spencer’s work is most commonly identified with functional theo-
rizing. But in actual fact, Spencer’s work is far less functional than is
commonly recognized.’ I think that a much more accurate label is ma-
crostructural, which violates, of course, our other misinterpretation of
Spencer as the staunch individualist who coined the phrase “survival of
the fittest.”” For contrary to our stereotypes, Spencer’s main theoretical
problem was the relationship among (a) the size of a population, (b) the
rates of contact and interaction among its members, (c) the level of dif-
ferentiation of activities and subgroupings in a population, and finally,
(d) the pattern of its integration. I see this emphasis as macrostructural
because there is not much concern with how individuals build and sustain
structure; rather, emphasis is on the form of structures and how they
constrain individual actions.’ Let me recapitulate Spencer’s macrostruc-
tural theory.®
For Spencer, increases in population size generate pressures for trans-
formation in the ways that activities of its members are organized. One
pressure for change comes from the fact that rates of face-to-face contact
decline with increases in size; peaple simply cannot all interact with each
other. As a result, informal social control is disrupted, forcing the elab-

See Jonathan H. Turner, Herbert Spencer: Toward a Renewed Appreciation (Beverly

Hills, Calif. and London: Sage Publications, 1985).
*But as I will stress shortly, he did develop such a microsociological approach,
*Herbert Spencer, The Principles of Sociology (New York: D. Appleton. 1885)
 THE STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF HERBERT SPENCER 411

oration of specialized agencies of political control. Moreover, once such

concentration of power increases, so do inequalities; and thus, large pop:
ulations are more likely to evidence social classes and strata than smaller
ones.
A related pressure comes from the fact that as populations grow, they
extend their geographical territories. As people live and interact in dif-
ferent places, they develop somewhat distinctive outlooks and patterns
of behavior. They become culturally difterentiated; and if these differences
are to be controlled and relations among culturally differentiated sub-
populations are to be regularized, concentrations of power are necessary-~
thus increasing the level of differentiation along political as well as cultural
dimensions.
Another pressure for change in structure comes from the increased
‘pressures on resources that a larger population exerts. This kind of pres-
sure exerts itself in several ways. First, under resource scarcity, there is
increased competition, which leads to specialization as some are more fit
to survive in some social niches than others.. Second, as the size of a
population increases relative to its resources, production and distribution
of resources becomes increasingly problematic. As a result, specialization
of individuals and organizations in order to expand production and fa-
cilitate distribution becomes necessary. And third, competition and grow-
ing specialization generate problems of coordination and control, thereby
encouraging further elaboration of political power to regulate and coor-
dinate activity.
Thus, for Spencer, increases in size generate pressures for increased
social differentiation of activities and for expanded concentration of power.
Inherent in differentiation, per se, is inequality since some individuals
and groups will usurp resources. But as differentiation requires ever more
concentrations of power, then inequalities are escalated.
Differentiating populations reveal problems of integration—that 1s,
difficulties coordinating activities. This is the result of the following pro-
cesses: (a) informal controls are reduced as people can no longer interact
face-to-face; (b) cultural and regional distinctions emerge as people spread
out in space; (c) common sentiments, or values and beliefs, cannot be
sustained among people who cannot interact frequently and who are spread
out in space; and (d) concentrated power becomes a double-edged sword,
for its use is necessary for coordination and control, but it also generates
inequalities and resentments, which escalate integrative problems.
These problems of integration are endemic to differentiating popu
lations. And for Spencer, they contain an inherent dialectic: as political
centralization and control are extended, inequalities and resentments about
political control increase, and as these resentments escalate, there are
pressures for decentralization of power. Yet, decentralized power increases
freedom at the cost of escalated competition and decreased coordination;
and as problems of coordination mount and as people resent competitive
412 CHAPTER 19 / THE ORIGINS OF STRUCTURAL THEORIZING

abuses, then there are pressures for centralization of power to regulate

affairs. There is, therefore, an inherent cycle between more centralized
and decentralized systems.
Such is Spencer’s macrostructural sociology; and I think that it can
be found in most contemporary structural themes. But Spencer also tried
to develop a more micro approach, which, although not greatly developed,
anticipates many present-day efforts to theorize about the microfoun-
dations of macrostructural processes. Let me briefly summarize this mi-
crostructural approach.

Spencer’s Microstructuralism
Spencer argued that ultimately all macrostructures are built from “cer-
emonial practices’’—that is, rituals, forms of address, bodily movements,
dress, badges and emblems, and other stereotyped presentations of self
and sequences of behavior. Moreover, macrostructures are sustained
through ceremonies, or interaction rituals. He argued that too often these
more micro processes are ignored because next to the macrostructures—
the state, classes, and religion, for example—‘“‘ceremonial control” seems
“of no significance.” Yet, Spencer did emphasize that growing size and
complexity at the macrostructural level undermine the extent to which
ceremonial control can be effective. But his major concern was with how
ritualized interaction varies under conditions of inequality. His guiding
proposition is that the greater is the degree of political centralization in
a population, the greater is the level of inequality, and hence, the more
pronounced are interaction rituals and the more they will be used to mark
ranks.
Spencer’s analysis of ceremony or interaction rituals is, I think, one
of the first efforts in sociology to analyze the connection between ma-
croprocesses of size, differentiation, spatial distribution, political cen-
tralization, and class inequalities with more micro processes that produce
and reproduce these macro properties of society. His work was very much
in the spirit of contemporary structural approaches, but tragically, his
ideas have been ignored, as evidenced by Talcott Parsons’s remark in
1937, “who now reads Spencer?” Yet, as I think will be evident in the
following chapters, contemporary theorists have rediscovered many of
Spencer’s insights.
One reason for our ignorance of Spencer is our misunderstanding of
his work. Sociologists frequently equate his ideas with what is now called
a right wing ideology. Such a conclusion is too simple a portrayal and
has kept sociologists from fully appreciating Spencer’s genius. Another
reason for our misconception of Spencer is that we have allowed Emile
Durkheim’s biased evaluation of Spencer to color our view.’° Indeed.

mile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (New York: Free Press, 1947).
 THE STRUCTURALISM OF EMILE DURKHEIM 413

Durkheim did a most unreasonable thing: he borrowed many ideas from

Spencer, but at the same time, he was so critical of him that it was easy
to lose sight of the fact that most of Durkheim’s basic macrostructural
ideas were anticipated 20 to 40 years earlier in Spencer’s work. Thus, I
think that much of the Spencerian influence on contemporary structural
theory comes via Durkheim’s “borrowing” of Spencer’s structural analysis.

THE STRUCTURALISM OF EMILE DURKHEIM

As with Spencer, I examined the work of Emile Durkheim in Chapter 2
on the emergence of functionalism. But unlike Spencer, Durkheim’s work
has directly influenced nonfunctional structural analysis in contemporary
social theory. Indeed, he is one of the main intellectual inspirations for
what can be loosely termed French structuralism, whose major proponent,
Claude Lévi-Strauss, is summarized in the appendix to this chapter."
More important than)this brand of structuralism is the influence of Durk-
heim’s ideas on more explicitly sociological analyses of structures. In this
area, his influence has been threefold: (1) the concern with social-struc-
tural differentiation, (2) the emphasis on cognitive processes, and (3) the
analysis of ritual activities and social solidarity. Let me examine each of
these in turn.
1. Durkheim’s analysis of structural differentiation is very similar to
Spencer’s.’? The increasing size of a population, especially when concen-
trated, escalates competition, which, in turn, leads to differentiation.
However, Durkheim sees his approach as different from that of Spencer,
who is accused of underemphasizing the significance of common senti-
ments in social systems. Durkheim made this charge stick, but it is pat-
ently false, as a reading of Book I of Spencer’s The Principles of Sociology
would indicate.'® More significant than his obfuscation of Spencer’s work
is the basic proposition that Durkheim advanced: the “volume,” “inten-
sity,” and ‘“determinateness”’ of the “collective conscience” decrease with
structural differentiation.'4 The idea here is that as systems differentiate,
people perform different activities and are attached to diverse groups. As
a result, their concrete actions can no longer be regulated by common
ideas and sentiments; at best, they can hold in common only the most
“general,” “abstracted,” and ‘“‘enfeebled” ideas. This situation produces
the basic dilemma of all large, complex systems: If common ideas—values,
beliefs, ideologies, and dogmas, for instance—cannot regulate and

“Again, I do not think that this approach has led anywhere, and hence, I am not going
to analyze it in any detail.
“Durkheim, The Division of Labor.
’Spencer, The Principles of Sociology.
“See Jonathan H. Turner and Leonard Beeghley, The Emergence of Sociological Theory
(Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1981), pp. 334-41 for a detailed analysis.
414 CHAPTER 19 / THE ORIGINS OF STRUCTURAL THEORIZING

coordinate activities, what is to hold a society together? What is to in-

tegrate the differentiated units?’
Durkheim’s answer is similar to Spencer’s in several respects. First,
he recognized that increasing concentrations of power and political au-
thority become necessary, although, just like Spencer, he saw this as a
necessary evil. Second, he viewed relations of exchange and their nor-
mative regulation as increasing. And third, he emphasized that differ-
entiation involves the creation of subcultures where common sentiments
emerge among subgroupings who are located in similar regions and places
in the division of labor.
Thus, much like Spencer, Durkheim emphasized the macrostructural
processes of size, spatial distribution, differentiation, and resolution of
integrative problems. But he also stressed the importance of ideas as an
integrating force. And this emphasis increasingly drew him toward a more
cognitive approach to structural analysis.
2. As early as 1900, Durkheim had recognized that common ideas
“rule us from within.” And by the second decade of this century,'* he was
arguing that at the roots of all our judgments there are a “certain number
of essential ideas ... of space, class, number, cause, substance . .. (that)
correspond to the most universal properties of things ... (and that) are
like the solid frame which encloses all thought.” But what determines
the content of these “essential ideas?” Durkheim’s answer was “the struc-
ture of society.” That is, the categories by which we perceive the world
are determined by the structure and pattern of our social relations, and
it is in this way that human categories of thought reinforce the structure
of society.
This line of argument was to become the main ingredient of French
structuralism, which, as I indicated earlier, is summarized in the appendix.
Most modern structuralists tend to turn “Durkheim on his head” in their
insistence that “deep structures” of thought, lodged in human biology,
determine the structure of social relations. Durkheim argued just the op-
posite: structures of thought reflect social structural arrangements, and
in so doing, they reinforce and reproduce those arrangements."* The par-
ticulars of Durkheim’s analysis
are not, I feel, very illuminating,'’® but the

‘*This is, I should stress, the basic dilemma that Adam Smith proposed much earlier in
his treatise.
‘Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (New York: Free Press. 1947:
originally published in 1912),
"Ibid., p. 9.
'*So did some of the early linguists who borrowed from Durkheim. But modern linguistics
has turned Durkheim, and those early French thinkers who borrowed from him, “on their
heads.”
‘Indeed, at times they are embarrassingly bad. For example, see Emile Durkheim and
Marcel Mauss, Primitive Classification (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963; orig-
inally published in 1903).
 THE STRUCTURALISM OF EMILE DURKHEIM 415

general approach can be found in much contemporary structural analysis.

But this modern analysis takes a slightly different tack: social structure
is, to a very great extent, the mental categories that actors have about
their social relations. People use their ideas about how to approach and
organize social relations, and in so doing, they reproduce these relations
and give them continuity across time. Moreover, they reinforce their ideas
about these relations, which then become the cognitive resources and
guidelines for subsequent interactions.
Thus, ideas are not floating around freely detached from people; cog-
nitions about social structures are part of individuals’ stocks of knowledge.
Similarly, social structure is not some ex cathedra entity wholly external
to individuals that pushes them around; it is embodied in actors’ cog-
nitions and then used as an interactive resource in social relations to
produce, reproduce, and potentially change patterns of social relations.
This line of argument, which strikes me as a bit vague but which is
asserted with sincerity and seriousness by many modern thinkers, shifts
attention away from macrostructure toward microstructural analysis of
what individuals in specific encounters actually think and do with their
stocks of knowledge about social relations. As analysis shifts to the micro
foundations of the macro order, Durkheim’s ideas on ritual often serve
as a conceptual springboard.
3. Durkheim made a simple observation about religious rituals: society
is personified in the sacred forces of religions, and so, the worship of these
forces is, in fact, the worship of society.” Rituals addressed toward gods
and supernatural forces are thus an affirmation of the power of society;
and as people enact these rituals, they legitimate existing social relations.
In his more discursive statements about the Arunta aborigines in The
Elementary Forms of Religious Life, Durkheim expanded these ideas
somewhat.”! Rituals among individuals who are gathered together promote
a sense of solidarity, a convergence of outlooks, and an increase in social
attachments. Using rather distorted accounts of Arunta aborigines, Durk-
heim believed that data on the periodic gatherings among traditional
peoples offered a window on the past; they were, in a sense, “living fossils”
about the nature of the first human societies. As a result, Durkheim
concluded that society is built from religious rituals that promote social
attachments and solidarity as well as a convergence of outlooks.
Contemporary structural theories often extend these ideas further. It
is argued that the micro basis of social structure revolves around the daily
interaction rituals that people perform in all social encounters. These
rituals are essential, it is asserted, for maintaining continuity across social
encounters and for giving people a sense of psychological security. Social!

*®Durkheim, The Elementary Forms.

*“Tbid.
416 CHAPTER 19 / THE ORIGINS OF STRUCTURAL THEORIZING

structure is thus built up from chains of interaction rituals that connect

successive encounters together and give individuals psychological security
as well as a sense of attachment to a larger social order.
In sum, I think that the major works in Durkheim’s career anticipate
the various positions in structural analysis today. The early work on size,
differentiation, and integration is clearly macrostructural in that social
structure is an emergent reality, swi generis, and is understandable in
terms of its own dynamics.” The later works begin to recognize that “the
collective force is not entirely outside of us; it does not act upon us wholly
from without; but rather, since society cannot exist except in and through
individual consciousness, this force must also penetrate us and organize
itself within us.” And as a result of this recognition, the microfounda-
tions of structure—mental stocks of knowledge and interaction rituals—
are increasingly emphasized. Durkheim’s first works are thus represen-
tative of contemporary macrostructural theory, whereas the later works
on religion are incorporated into present-day microstructural theory. And
just as Durkheim could never reconcile the two, so contemporary struc-
tural theorists grapple unsuccessfully with the relation between micro and
macro dimensions of social structure.

MAX WEBER AND STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS

Max Weber defined sociology as “a science concerning itself with the
interpretive understanding of a social action and thereby with a causal
explanation of its course and consequences.’ In actual practice, however,
Weber’s sociology is decidedly macro in emphasis, although he often at-
tempted to discern what social structural arrangements “‘mean”’ to par-
ticipants in these arrangements. But Weber did confront the micro-macro
issues in the beginning portions of his Economy and Society, which,
though they appear early, were written later in his career as he began to
ponder the connection between micro and macro reality.
As I noted in Chapters 2 and 3, Weber’s analysis of structure has
been more influential on the functional approach of Talcott Parsons than
contemporary structuralism. Yet, he addressed the question of how struc-
ture is built from action and interaction; and this has increasingly become
a concern of structural theorizing. Moreover, his tendency to classify
processes with typologies is, I feel, still a prominent mode of analysis in

2Durkheim, The Division of Labor.

*Durkheim, The Elementary Forms, p. 9.
*Max Weber, Economy and Society (New York: Bedminister Press, 1968), p. 4.
*See Jonathan H. Turner, “The Concept of Action in Sociological Analysis,” in Ana-
lytical and Sociological Theories of Action, ed. G. Seeba and R. Toumea (Dordrecht, Holland:
Reidel Publishers, 1985).
 GEORG SIMMEL'’S STRUCTURAL APPROACH 417

structural theorizing, especially that of Anthony Giddens (see Chapter

22).
Weber’s conceptual approach led him to visualize “institutional or-
ders” as constructed from social interactions among actors. But Weber
never really said how this is done. Instead, he generated a series of def-
initions and typologies. There are types of social actions that lead to types
of interaction that, in turn, cause the creation and maintenance of types
of institutional orders, or structures. Conversely, types of institutional
orders circumscribe the kinds of actions and interactions that can occur.
I have not filled in the details of these typologies here, because they are
not so relevant as the general approach: visualize types of structure as
constructed from types of action and interaction among subjectively ori-
ented actors. But Weber’s analysis is highly static because all he really
did was classify types of orientations, actions, interactions, and structures.
For example, an ‘economic order” is constructed from actions and in-
teractions among “instrumentally oriented” actors. Such rough correla-
tions among typologies do not tell us very much about how and through
what processes macrostructures are created, sustained, and changed by
microinteractions. Thus, I see Weber’s contributions to modern structural
thinking as rather minimal. He framed the issue, but his methodology
did not allow him to resolve it.

GEORG SIMMEL’S STRUCTURAL APPROACH

Georg Simmel’s influence on modern structural analysis is very direct in
the sense that Peter Blau acknowledges his debt to Simmel’s analysis of
numbers, size, and interaction. In one of his many provocative essays,
Simmel observed the effects of increasing numbers on interaction pat-
terns.” The form of social relations must, Simmel argued, change with
varying numbers of interactants. For example, the nature of interaction
changes dramatically when a dyad becomes a triad, since the addition of
a third party introduces the possibility of coalitions of two against one.
More important for modern macrostructural analysis is Simmel’s related
observation that as the number of people introduced into an encounter
or a group increases, the potential number of ties or relations among them
increases exponentially. For example, two people can have only 2 ties,
but three can have 6, four can have 12, and so on. The basic insight here
is that size affects the kinds of social ties and rates of interaction among
individuals and, hence, the form of social structure.?” Thus, numbers of
people become an important macrostructural force because they affect

(New
*See essays in Kurt Wolff's edited volume on The Sociology of Georg Simmel
| Hw!
York: Free Press, 1950).
analysis of
27’This is, in reality, a more precise way of stating Spencer’s and Durkheim's
size and differentiation.
418 CHAPTER 19 / THE ORIGINS OF STRUCTURAL THEORIZING

rates of interaction; and conversely, the rates of possible interaction among

individuals determine the kinds of relations that can be built among them
and, thereby, the forms of macrostructure that are possible.
As I stressed in Chapter 6, Simmel also developed an exchange per-
spective that was directly critical of Marx’s approach.”* He recognized
more than Marx did that social interaction involves exchanges of re-
sources among individuals and that the nature of the resources as well as
their respective values determine the patterns of social differentiation
among actors. The form of differentiation at the macrostructural level is
thus produced by the microexchanges among individuals, but once this
form is produced, it affects the distribution of actors’ respective resources.
The result is that it reproduces itself by loading the dice in favor of some
actors over others. Yet, as more generalized media, such as money, are
used in exchanges, then actors can have more options in their exchanges
(since a generalized media can be used in a greater variety of situations).
And so, there is more possibility of micro-level exchanges changing an
existing structural pattern.
However, I do no: think that these exchange ideas have exerted much
direct influence on modern structural analysis. ‘They have had to be re-
discovered by microstructural theorists, such as Collins (see Chapter 21),
who use an implicit exchange theory to analyze the microdynamics of
macrostructures. Thus, Simmel cannot be counted among the main pro-
genitors of contemporary structural analysis, even though his ideas have
clear relevance for many structural theories.

INTERACTIONISM AND MICROSTRUCTURALISM

As structural analyses have become more concerned with the interactive
processes by which structure is produced and reproduced, they have turned
to interactionist theory—primarily ethnomethodology, phenomenology,
Chicago School symbolic interactionism, and the work of Erving Goff-
man.” All of these interactionist traditions are built from the conceptual
base laid by George Herbert Mead* and, to a lesser extent, Alfred Schutz."
Let me first examine Mead’s ideas that reappear in contemporary struc-
tural analysis and then turn to Schutz’s approach.

*Georg Simmel, The Philosophy of Money (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978).
; See, for example, Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Garden
City, N.Y.: Doubleday Publishing, 1959); Behavior in Public Places (New York: Free Press,
1963); Forms of Talk (Boston: Blackwell Scientific Publications, Inc., 1981).
ws Herbert Mead, Mind, Self, and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

“Alfred Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World (Evanston, Ill: Northwestern
University Press, 1967; originally published in 1932).
 INTERACTIONISM AND MICROSTRUCTURALISM
419

G. H. Mead’s Behavioristic Structuralism

As I noted in Chapter 14, Mead was a social behaviorist. By
this, he
meant that those behavioral capacities that facilitate adjustment to
the
social environment will be retained by a maturing individual. They are
retained because they are reinforced by virtue of the fact that they fa-
cilitate adjustment to ongoing patterns of social organization. What, then,
are these behavioral capacities that facilitate adjustment to social struc-
tures? For Mead, they are (1) the capacity to assume the perspective of
a variety of others (role-taking); (2) to see oneself as an object in situations
and to adjust response in accordance with self-perceptions and evaluations
(self); and (3) to engage in the process of “Imaginative rehearsal” of al-
ternative lines of conduct and their potential outcomes (mind).
For Mead, existing social structures—that is, organized and coordi-
nated activities among individuals—exert “selection pressures” for the
development of capacities for role-taking, self, and mind. Once these ca-
pacities exist, they allow individuals to adjust their conduct to others,
thereby making coordinated activities or social structures possible.*2
With these basic elements, Mead presents a general image of social
organization as constructed and actively sustained through the mutual
reading of gestures (role-taking), the evaluation of oneself from the per-
spective of generalized others (self) or “communities of attitudes,” and
the reflexive weighing of alternatives (mind). These ideas are, today, very
much a part of most microstructural approaches. For it is through ca-
pacities for role-taking, self-reflection, and minded thought that social
structure is produced and reproduced. Yet, most micro approaches tend
to underemphasize Mead’s view that social structure—that is, existing
ways of coordinating activities—constrain and circumscribe the options
of individuals. In particular, Mead stressed role-taking with the gener-
alized other and self-evaluation in terms of communities of attitudes. That
is, structure is reproduced by people’s use of general attitudes (values,
beliefs, and norms in modern terms) as well as by spontaneous interper-
sonal practices. For most microstructuralists, however, this emphasis on
“cultural” and “normative” constraints smacks of Parsonian function-
alism, and so they steer away from it. Moreover, microstructuralists tend
to ignore Mead’s conception of self as relatively stable across situations
and as providing a compass by which acts are ordered and structured in
a given direction and with a consistent interpersonal style.
Microstructuralists thus take only part of Mead’s legacy, where em-
phasis is on situational interpersonal practices. They tend to ignore Mead’s
emphasis on conformity to generalized others and on acts sustaining a

For more detail, see Jonathan H. Turner, “A Note on G. H. Mead’s Behavioristic

Theory of Social Structure,” Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 12 (July 1984), pp.
213-22.
420 CHAPTER 19 / THE ORIGINS OF STRUCTURAL. THEORIZING

stable self-conception. And when they do address this question of symbolic

constraints, microstructuralists more frequently turn to Alfred Schutz.

Alfred Schutz
Microstructuralists seem to prefer Schutz’s conceptualization of stock
knowledge at hand to Mead’s notion of generalized others and to modern
conceptions of roles, values, beliefs, and norms. I assume that this pref-
erence comes from the metaphorical idea of stocks that can be used se-
lectively as the actor wants and desires. Schutz’s conception would appear
to de-emphasize explicit normative constraints and roles. But does it?
Let me quote Schutz:
Now, to the natural man all his past experiences are present as ordered
(italics in original), as knowledge or as awareness of what to expect, just as
the whole external world is present to him as ordered. Ordinarily, and unless
he is forced to solve a special kind of problem, he does not ask questions
about how this ordered world was constituted. The particular patterns of
order we are now considering are synthetic meaning—configurations of already
lived experience.

For me, Schutz’s view emphasizes constraint. Norms, values, beliefs,

roles are indeed highly salient parts of one’s implicit and, if need be,
explicit interpretation of a situation. They “order” experiences and lines
of conduct. But for microstructuralists, the concept of stock knowledge
is meant to connote something much less ordered and structured. For
them, it is a series of vaguely held cognitions that are used to construct
lines of conduct in strategic conduct. Thus, while some structuralists take
Schutz’s label, I do not think that they use it in the way that he intended.
Just as is done for Mead’s concept of the generalized other, micro-
structuralists de-emphasize the imposition of cultural ideas—norms, val-
ues, beliefs, roles—on individuals. They want to stress the active process
of reproduction of social relations rather than the reactive process of
conformity to norms and roles. In this way, they can distinguish their
efforts from those of functionalists like Talcott Parsons.

MODERN STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS

As this brief review of Marx’s, Spencer’s, Durkheim’s, Weber’s, Simmel’s,
Mead’s, and Schutz’s ideas would indicate, modern structural theory goes
in two directions within sociology. First, there is a macrostructural ap-
proach concerned with structural properties—size, differentiation, het-
erogeneity, inequality, and the like—and their consequences for the

*Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, p. 81.

 APPENDIX: THE STRUCTURALISM OF CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS 421

integration of social structures. When interaction is examined, it is con-

ceptualized in terms of rates or even as random process.34 Second, there
is a more microstructural approach that views structure as constructed
from interaction. Such microapproaches typically attempt to integrate
macro and micro levels of analysis, whereas macroapproaches do not.
There is a third line of structural argument, which might be termed
structuralism. As I have mentioned, I do not think that this strategy has
much to offer sociological theory because it becomes excessively mental-_
istic and often reductionistic, seeing social structures as expressions of
genetic mental codes. I do not want to give this mentalistic structuralism
much emphasis because it is not very theoretical, but in the appendix, I
offer a quick review of its most prominent advocate, Claude Lévi-Strauss.
Much more significant, I think, are the more sociological efforts of
(1) Peter Blau, whose recent work is a good example of a macrostructural
approach, (2) Randall Collins, whose work is increasingly microstructural
(although there is an effort to redefine macro and integrate it with micro-
level analysis), and, (3) Anthony Giddens, whose “structuration theory”
explicitly attempts to synthesize macro- and microanalysis (although I
think it is essentially a microtheory). These authors are performing highly
creative structural analyses. And hence, I will emphasize their work in
the next three chapters. But for those who want a glimpse of a more
mentalistic structural approach, I offer this appendix.

APPENDIX: THE STRUCTURALISM

OF CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS
In recent decades, Claude Levi-Strauss has become a dominant figure in
anthropology, and in the last few years, sociologists with a mentalistic
and reductionist bias have been attracted to his work. In Chapter 10 on
the emergence of exchange theory, I briefly examined Lévi-Strauss’s anal-
ysis of bridal exchanges. In The Elementary Structure of Kinship, Levi-
Strauss only hints at the more philosophical view of the world that his
analysis of kinship implies.** Most of his book examines the varying levels
of social solidarity that emerge from direct and indirect bridal exchanges
among kin groups. Yet, in many ways, The Elementary Structure of
Kinship is a transitional work between his intellectual debt to Emile

*See, for example, the “baseline approach” of Bruce H. Mayhew and various collabo-
cal
rators. In particular, consult his argument in a special issue of The Journal of Mathemati
Sociology 9 (4, 1984).
Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Elementary Structures of Kinship (Paris: University of France,
1949).
and in Anthro-
*Actually, an earlier work, “The Analysis of Structure in Linguistics
the form of Lévi-Strauss’s
pology,” Word 1 (1945), pp. 1-21, provided a better clue as to
structuralism.
422 CHAPTER 19 / THE ORIGINS OF STRUCTURAL THEORIZING

Durkheim?’ and Marcel Mauss.** There are, however, also clear departures
from Durkheim and Mauss, which signal that Lévi-Strauss was to “turn
Durkheim on his head” in much the same way that Marx was to revise
Hegel. For as Durkheim and Mauss had argued in Primitive Classification,
human cognitive categories reflect the structure of society.* In contrast,
Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism came to the opposite conclusion: the struc-
ture of society is but a surface manifestation of fundamental mental
processes.
Lévi-Strauss came to this position under the influence of structural
linguistics, as initially chartered by Ferdinand de Saussure*® and Roman
Jakobson. Ferdinand de Saussure is typically considered both the father
of structural linguistics‘! and of Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism. In reality,
as a contemporary of Durkheim, de Saussure was far more committed to
Durkheim’s vision of reality than is typically acknowledged. Yet, he made
a critical breakthrough in linguistic analysis of the 19th century: speech
is but a surface manifestation of more fundamental mental processes.”
Language is not speech nor the written word; but rather, it is a particular
way of thinking, which, in true Durkheimian fashion, de Saussure viewed
as a product of the general patterns of social and cultural organization
among people. This distinction of speech as a mere surface manifestation
of underlying mental processes was to increasingly be used as a metaphor
for Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism. Of course, this metaphor is as old as
Plato’s view of reality as a mere reflection of universal essences and as
recent as Marx’s dictum that cultural values and beliefs, as well as in-
stitutional arrangements, are reflections of an underlying substructure.
Lévi-Strauss also borrows from the early 20th-century linguist Roman
Jakobson the notion that the mental thought underlying language occurs
in terms of binary contrasts, such as good-bad, male-female, yes-no, black-
white, and human-nonhuman. Moreover, drawing from Jakobson and
others, Lévi-Strauss views the underlying mental reality of binary op-
posites as organized, or mediated, by a series of “‘innate codes” or rules
that can be used to generate many different social forms: language, art,

"See notes 10 and 16.

*Marcel Mauss, The Gift (New York: Free Press, 1954; originally published in’ 1924) is
given particular credit. It must be remembered, of course, that Mauss was Durkheim's
student and son-in-law.
*Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss, Primitive Classification. Originally published in
1903, this is a rather extreme and unsuccessful effort to show how mental categories directly
reflect the spatial and structural organization of a population. It is a horribly flawed work,
but it is the most extreme statement of Durkheim’s sociologistic position.
. “Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966);
originally compiled posthumously by his students from their lecture notes in 1915.
“| suspect that this is a retrospectively bestowed title by those looking for their intel-
lectual roots.
“Such analysis had focused on the written languages of Europe, seeking their evolutionary
origins.
 APPENDIX: THE. STRUCTURALISM OF CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS 423

music, social structure, myths, values, beliefs, and so on. Thus, over the
last decades, Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism has become concerned with un-
derstanding cultural and social patterns in terms of the universal mental
processes that are rooted in the biochemistry of the human brain.“ It is
in this sense that Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism is mentalistic and reduc-
tionistic. And for this reason, I do not think that it is sociologically very
useful.* Indeed, it is more philosophy than science. Yet, since it now
generates so much intellectual interest, even in sociology, let me at least
summarize its basic line of argument.*¢
Without enumerating the full complexity (and vagueness) of his ap-
proach, I see the following as the critical steps and built-in assumptions
of Lévi-Strauss’s theoretical (philosophical) strategy:

1. The empirically observable must be viewed as a system of rela-

tionships among components—whether these components be ele-
ments of myths and folktales or positions in a kinship system.
2. It is appropriate to construct “statistical models” of these observ-
able systems to summarize the empirically observable relationships
among components.
3. Such models, however, are only a surface manifestation of more
fundamental forms of reality. These forms are the result of using
various codes or rules to organize different binary opposites. Such
forms can be visualized through the construction of “mechanical
models,” which articulate the logical results of using various rules
to organize different binary oppositions.
4. The tendencies of statistical models will reflect, imperfectly, the
properties of the mechanical model. But it is the latter that is
“more real.”
5. The mechanical model is built from rules and binary oppositions
that are innate to humans and rooted in the biochemistry and
neurology of the brain.

8A ctually, Jakobson simply argued that children’s phonological development occurs as

a system in which contrasts are critical—for example, “papa versus mama” or the contrasts
that children learn between vowels and consonants. Lévi-Strauss appears to have added the
jargon of information theory and computer technology.
“See, for example, Claude Lévi-Strauss, “Social Structure,” in Anthropology Today, ed.
A. Kroeber (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 524-53; Structural Anthro-
pology (Paris: Plon, 1958; trans. 1963 by Basic Books); and Mythologiques: le cru et le cuit
(Paris: Plon, 1964).
“For relevant critiques, see Marvin Harris, The Rise of Anthropological Theory (New
York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1968), pp. 464-513, and Eugene A. Hammel, “The Myth of
Structural Analysis” (Addison-Wesley Module, no. 25, 1972).
“See, for example, Mirian Glucksmann, Structuralist Analysis in Contemporary Social!
Thought (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974). A more sympathetic review of Lévi-
Strauss, as well as a more general review of structuralist thought, can be found in Tom
Bottomore and Robert Nisbet, “Structuralism,” in their A History of Sociological Analysis
(New York: Basic Books, 1978).
424 CHAPTER 19 / THE ORIGINS OF STRUCTURAL THEORIZING

Steps 1 and 2 are about as far as Lévi-Strauss went in the first pub-
lication of The Elementary Forms of Kinship. Subsequent work on kin-
ship and on myths has invoked at least the rhetoric of Steps 3, 4, and 5.
What makes structuralism distinctive, therefore, is the commitment to
the assumptions and strategy implied in these last steps. The major prob-
lem with this strategy is that it is untestable, for if mechanical models
are never perfectly reflected in the empirical world, how is it possible to
confirm or disconfirm the application of rules to binary opposites? As
Marshall Sahlins sarcastically remarked, ‘““What is apparent is false and
what is hidden from perception and contradicts it is true.’’47 I think that
there are more profitable ways to analyze social structure, and so, let me
now turn to them in the next three chapters.

‘Marshall D. Sahlins, “On the Delphic Writings of Claude Lévi-Strauss,” Scientific

American 214 (1966), p. 134.
 CHAPTER 20

_____ The Macrostructuralism

of Peter M. Blau

In Chapter 12, I examined Peter Blau’s exchange structuralism. In this

review of Blau’s exchange theory, the tension among processes of differ-
entiation, integration, and conflict figured prominently. In recent years,
Blau has examined these basic processes with an alternative theory, which
he labels macrostructural.! Although his earlier theory can still prove
useful to those working within the exchange theoretic perspective, Blau’s
macrostructuralism is clearly intended to replace and supplant his ex-
change theory. In this recent effort, Blau attempts to develop a more
rigorous theory that follows from a more clearly articulated view of theory
construction than was evident in his earlier exchange theory.? In my
analysis to follow, I will concentrate, respectively, on the strategy, sub-
stance, and theoretical format of Blau’s new theory.

BLAU’S THEORETICAL STRATEGY

Blau’s new work is explicitly deductive and advocates a “covering law”
vision of theory (see Chapter 1). In Blau’s view, a scientific theory is a

1See Peter M. Blau, Inequality and Heterogeneity: A Primitive Theory of Social Structure
(New York: Free Press, 1977); “A Macrosociological Theory of Social Structure,” American
Journal of Sociology 83 (July 1977), pp. 26-54; see also “Contrasting Theoretical Perspec-
tives,” in The Micro-Macro Link, ed. J. C. Alexander,B.Gisen, R. Munch, and N. J. Smelser
(Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, in press).
*Indeed, he views his work on exchange as a prolegomenon—a kind of pretheory, which,
by its nature, would be unsystematic. Indeed, in Chapter 12, I had to extract the theoretical
principles.

425
426 CHAPTER 20 / THE MACROSTRUCTURALISM OF PETER M. BLAU

“hierarchical system of propositions of increasing levels of generality. All

lower order propositions follow in strict logic from higher order ones
alone.’ In developing such a theory, a number of steps are critical, and
their successful implementation is what typifies good theory.
First, theory must begin with a conception of the basic subject matter—
that is, what is to be explained? In deductive theory, the phenomenon
to be explained by a theory is termed the explicandum. For Blau, the
explicandum is the “pattern of relations between people in society, par-
ticularly those of their social relations that integrate society’s diverse
groups and strata into a distinct eoherent social structure.’
In addressing this range of phenomena, Blau offers a narrow definition
of macrostructure. Discussions of social structure, Blau notes, typically
recognize “that there are differences in social positions, that there are
social relations among these positions, and that people’s positions and
corresponding roles influence their social relations.”® But most theoretical
efforts extend the conceptual inventory, adding such notions as psycho-
logical needs, cultural values and beliefs, norms, technological forces, class
antagonisms, dialectics, and functions, In contrast to these tendencies,
Blau prefers to postulate a narrow view of social structure as consisting
of the distributions of people among different social positions and their
associations.

To speak of social structure is to speak of differentiation among people.

For social structures, as conceptualized, are rooted in the social distinctions
people make in their role relations and social associations.®

Yet, when one examines an entire society, a community, or any ma-

crostructure, analysis becomes more complicated. The number of people
and positions to be analyzed is great. Moreover, people occupy many
different positions simultaneously—religious, familial, neighborhood, work,
recreational, political, educational, and the like. Thus, for each type of
position, there is a separate.distribution of the population, making a
macrostructure a “multidimensional space of social positions among which
people are distributed and which affect their social relations.’ But how
are all these relations among large numbers of people occupying simul-
taneously many different positions to be analyzed? In Blau’s portrayal,
microstructural analysis would seek to analyze each and every relation
among all people in all positions, but when the numbers of people, po-

*Peter M. Blau, “Elements of Sociological Theorizing,” Humboldt Journal of Social

Relations 7 (Fall-Winter, 1979-80), p. 105. This article contains Blau’s statement of his
theoretical strategy that is outlined in this section.
‘Ibid., p. 112.
“A Macrosociological Theory of Social Structure,” p. 27.
*Ibid., p. 28.
"Ibid.
 BLAU’S THEORETICAL STRATEGY 427

sitions, and relations hecome large. macrostructural analysis must be con-

cerned with the general “patterns of social relations among different social
positions occupied by many persons, not with the networks of all relations
between individuals.”* This is done by defining social positions in terms
of common attributes of people—age, sex, race, occupation, religion—and
then by examining their overall rates of association. Note that not every
person nor every association is examined—only general categories of peo-
ple and overall rates of association among people in these categories. In ©
this way, macrostructural theory is distinguished from the microstructural
approaches, sociometry, and network analysis.°
Thus, Blau’s “conceptof the basic subject matter” to be examined is
similar to many previous theoretical approaches in that it is concerned
with how different groups and social strata come to form integrated or
conflictual social wholes. But in contrast to most efforts on this topic, I
see Blau as taking a very narrow view of social structure that excludes
many variables, such as the cultural and psychological, that are typically
included in traditional orientations. Yet, this narrow definition of struc-
ture is macro in focus, for unlike microanalysis of groups where each and
every position and relation is plotted, concern is with the general attri-
butes that distinguish types of people and that influence their overall
rates of association.
A second critical element in building theory is “familiarity with rel-
evant empirical knowledge.” The often rigid line between deduction and
induction is artificial, Blau argues, since deduction rarely occurs in an
empirical vacuum. Indeed, the very questions to be answered by a de-
ductive theory are typically the result of interesting empirical findings.
Thus, to know what it is that a theory should explain requires familiarity
with existing empirical generalizations.’
A third element in a theory is the “creative insight” that is typically
embodied in a “central theoretical term” or “operator.” An operator “‘sup-
plies the organizing principle for the major theoretical propositions.” In
Blau’s theory, the central concept is the intersection of parameters. A
parameter in Blau’s theory is simply the criterion by which a position is
distinguished—such as age, sex, race, income, wealth, education, or any
basis that people use to distinguish one another and that consequently
affects their rates of association. The intersection of parameters denotes
the fact that parameters are variously correlated with each other. When

;
‘Ibid.
do as Blau
*Actually, as network analysis begins to deal with larger populations, they
example, Harrison C. White, Scott A. Boorman, and Ronald L. Breiger,
advocates. See, for
81 (January
“Social Structure from Multiple Networks I,” American Journal of Sociology
1976). pp. 730 80.
“Blau’s empirical work on organizations and socioeconomic status preceded his theo-
retical efforts. He has thus followed his own advice.
URlau, “Blements of Sociological Theorizing.” p. 107.
428 CHAPTER 20 / THE MACROSTRUCTURALISM OF PETER M. BLAU

parameters intersect, occupancy in one position is not likely to be cor-

related with, or to predict, occupancy in another. For example, race in
some societies may not be associated with income; nor is prestige asso-
ciated with education. Conversely, when parameters consolidate, they re-
veal high correlations—race and income as well as education and prestige
are highly correlated in that being of a particular racial group predicts
income or level of education, which, in turn, assign a person a corre-
sponding level of prestige. Intersecting parameters reduce divisions in a
society because, under this condition, people associate with a diversity of
others in at least some of their positions. In contrast, consolidation of
parameters tends to create divisions in a society since positions cluster
together in ways that reduce associations with others outside a particular
circle of associations. For instance, the wealthy in most societies live in
certain neighborhoods, attend private schools, engage in recreation only
with each other, and hold other consolidated positions. The result is that
they are separated from others who are not wealthy in society. Thus, for
Blau, “the degree to which parameters intersect, or alternatively consol-
idate differences in social positions through their strong correlations, re-
flects the most important structural conditions in a society, which have
crucial consequences for conflict and for social integration.””
A fourth central element of theory building is conceptual clarification
of key terms, especially of the operator. For Blau, such clarification in-
volves distinguishing patterns of differentiation in terms of two basic
types of parameters. One basic type is a “nominal parameter,” which
divides people into different groups that are not rank ordered. The other
type is the “graduated parameter,” which differentiates people in terms
of hierarchical status rankings. Thus, all macrostructures reveal varying
degrees of differentiation in terms of nominal and graduated parameters.
When people are differentiated into many groups in terms of numerous
nominal parameters, then a high degree of “heterogeneity” exists. That
is, when two randomly chosen people are unlikely to belong to the same
group, heterogeneity is high. When people are differentiated into widely
different status positions on the basis of graduated parameters, then “‘in-
equality” is high. That is, when the differences in relative standing among
people distinguished by a graduated parameter are great, inequality is
high. Thus, differentiation varies along two axes, heterogeneity and in-
equality.!3 The specific dynamics of such differentiation are to be under-
stood with additional concepts, which I will discuss shortly when the
theory itself is examined, but the nction of intersecting parameters is still
the key operator, since it increases heterogeneity and decreases inequality.
A fifth important element in theory construction is the development
of a deductive system—that is, the incorporation of concepts into prop-

"Blau, “A Macrosociological Theory of Social Structure,” p. 32.

'SBlau, Inequality and Heterogeneity, p. 281.
 BLAU’S THEORY OF MACROSTRUCTURE 429

ositions and then the hierarchical ordering of them. Although Blau uses
the vocabulary of axiomatic theory, his system of propositions is what I
termed formal theorizing in Chapter 1, because it does not evidence the
rigor of true axiomatic theory (for as I emphasized, very little theory in
the social sciences can meet the criteria of axiomatic theory). In Blau’s
view, the ordering of propositions involves (a) the articulation of a number
of simple assumptions as axioms and (b) the development of theorems
that apply these assumptions to generic types of social relations. For
example, Blau’s most basic assumption is that social associations are more
prevalent among persons in proximate positions than among those in
distant social positions. Thus, people at similar ranks or in the same
group are more likely to interact than those in divergent ranks or different
groups. With this and other assumptions to be discussed shortly and with
the central operator and additional concepts, Blau can then generate a
number of theorems that explain why events in the empirical world should
occur. The essence of Blau’s theory thus involves the articulation of some
simple axioms or assumptions and the incorporation of these into theo-
rems that state relations among carefully defined concepts that have em-
pirical referents.
The final element of theory construction involves “confronting the
theory with empirical data.” There are two types of data to be used n
such confrontations. One is the existing data, which can be interpreted
and understood in terms of the theory. Another is the rigorous deduction
of hypotheses from the theorems, which serve to organize the collection
of new data.'*
In sum, then, the creative act of theory construction involves (1) a
conception of what is to be explained, (2) familiarity with relevant knowl-
edge, (3) a central term or operator, (4) conceptual elaboration and clar-
ification, (5) a deductive system of propositions, and (6) confrontation of
the theory with empirical data. This vision has clearly guided the sub-
stantive formulation of Blau’s theory of macrostructure.

BLAU’S THEORY OF MACROSTRUCTURE

Blau argues that in some theories the primitive assumptions represent
brilliant insights and mark the real contribution of the theory. In contrast,
other theories state obvious and simplistic assumptions that are viewed
as givens and are taken for granted. In such theories, “the contribution
of the theory rests on the new knowledge derived from the systematic
analysis of the implications of combinations of simple assumptions and
definitions.”® Blau views his theory as belonging to this second type.

“Blau has attempted to do so. For example, see his and Joseph E. Schwartz's, Cross-
cutting Social Circles (Orlando, Fla.:; Academic Press, 1984).
*Tbid., p. 245.
430 CHAPTER 20 / THE MACROSTRUCTURALISM OF PETER M. BLAU

Simple assumptions, or axioms, serve as premises for theorems, with the

result that the power of the theory to explain events resides in its theorems
and in subsequent deductions from these theorems to specific empirical
cases.
One problem with axiomatic theory in general and with Blau’s exe-
cution of this strategy is the proliferation of propositions. Blau articulates
21 assumptions, 34 major theorems, and more than 150 subtheorems (cor-
ollaries) in many different “sets of theorems.” In its present form, then,
I find the theory unmanageable. Much of this problem resides, I believe,
in the fact that the major theorems are stated at different levels of ab-
straction and, as a result, they overlap a great deal. Indeed, I find some
to be little more than empirical generalizations that illustrate a relation-
ship stated in a more abstract theorem. Another problem is Blau’s in-
sistence that axioms must represent simple assumptions and that 21 such
assumptions are necessary to generate all of the theorems.'® Moreover,
Blau argues each axiom must represent a primitive assumption that is
not derivable from another assumption. Thus, any theory that begins with
more than 20 assumptions can generate 34 theorems rather easily and
many more corollaries besides. But such a theory branches out in so many
directions that it loses the elegance and coherence of powerful theories.
Most of these problems can be overcome, I think, if Blau’s narrow
and restrictive view of axiomatic theory is relaxed. Thus, in presenting
the theory, I will remove some of Blau’s restrictions. In particular, I will
shorten the list of assumptions and include only the most critical ones.
Moreover, I will eliminate the redundancy among the theorems. In Table ™
20-1, I have listed Blau’s “axioms” after this necessary surgery.!? From
these axiomatic premises, there are four basic theorems in Blau’s theory.
I have listed these in Table 20-2. All other theorems in Blau’s scheme
can, I believe, be derived from these and, hence, constitute corollaries of
these four major theorems listed.
In Table 20-2, Theorem I asserts that if people occupy different po-
sitions in many groups and ranks and that if these positions are not highly
correlated, then diverse and varied associations are likely to ensue. Con-
versely, if occupancy in one group or rank is highly correlated with po-
sitions in other groups or ranks, then opportunities for associations with
other people are more limited, and associations will be with the same
persons. The effects of such intersection and consolidation become am-
plified, as is stated in Theorem II. Consolidation will become amplified
because, as Axioms III and IV stress, people usually come to know and
like friends of their friends, and once such relations are established, they

‘See Blau, “Elements of Sociological Theorizing,” p. 10.

"See my earlier effort along these lines: Jonathan H. Turner, “A Theory of Social Struc-
ture: An Assessment of Blau’s Strategy,’ Contemporary Sociology 7 (November 1978). pp.
698-705.
 BLAU’S THEORY OF MACROSTRUCTURE 431

TABLE 20-1 A Revised List of Blau’s ‘‘Axioms’’

NN CO EL STR Del". Sin, aaa
|. People in a society associate with others not in their group or status rank.
ll. Social associations among people in proximate positions are more prevalent
than those in distant positions.
A. In-group associations are more prevalent than out-group associations.
B. The prevalence of associations declines with increasing status distance.
lll. Established relations are resistant to disruption.
IV. Strangers who have common associates become, over time, associates.
V. Associates in other groups or strata often facilitate mobility to these groups or
Strata.
Vi. The distribution of status positions is skewed so that there are always fewer
high-ranking positions than middle- and low-ranking positions.
Vil. Social associations depend upon opportunities for social contact.
Vill. The influences of various parameters on social associations are partly additive
and not always contingent on each other.

TABLE 20-2 A Revised List of Blau’s Basic Theorems

|. The more multiple parameters intersect and remain unconsolidated, the greater
is the degree of heterogeneity and the less is the level of inequality, and hence,
the more likely are social associations among people (from Axioms |, Il, and VI).
ll. The more multiple parameters intersect or consolidate, the more likely is their
effect on social associations to exceed the additive effects of the parameters
alone (from Axioms |, Ill, IV, and VIil).
lil. The more parameters intersect, the greater is the rate of mobility, and the more
likely are social associations (from Axioms |, Il, V, and VII).
IV. The greater is the size differences between two groups or status ranks
distinguished by a parameter, the more likely are social associations among
members in the smaller group or rank with members of the larger group to
exceed those of members in the larger group with those in the smaller (from
Axioms |, Il, Vi, and VIl).

resist disruption. Intersection tends to become amplified for the same

reasons, but this process continually expands. This is because, in contrast
to consolidation, which creates closed circles of associations, intersection
constantly creates new opportunities for additional social association.
Theorem III states that intersection creates opportunities for mobility,
since as Axiom V posits, people tend to help each other be mobile. And
once people are mobile, their opportunities for social association increase,
but additionally, as Axiom III argues, they tend to maintain their old
social relations that they had before mobility. Theorem IV states a math-
ematical truism, or the law of proportion. If there are reciprocal relations
between groups or ranks of different size, then these reciprocal relations
must constitute a larger proportion of the total relations in the smaller
group. That is, it has fewer people who can potentially generate relations,
432 CHAPTER 20 / THE MACROSTRUCTURALISM OF PETER M. BLAU

whereas the larger group has more people who can have a greater number
of total relations; therefore, the same number of reciprocal relations must
represent a greater portion of the smaller than the larger groups’ total
relations.
From these four theorems, then, I believe that most other theorems
in Blau’s many “theorem sets” can be derived.'® Probably the most in-
teresting of the many examples that I could offer concern those that can
be derived from Theorem I on intersecting parameters and Theorem IV
on proportions. For example, Blau’s Theorem 26 postulates that “the
further society’s differentiation penetrates into successive subunits of its
structural components, the more it promotes the integration of groups by
increasing intergroup relations.’”® This theorem is directly derivable from
the notion of intersection versus consolidation of parameters (Theorem
I above). If a pattern of differentiation—for example, inequality of wealth—
repeats itself in every community in a society (this is successive pene-
tration), then the wealthy and not so wealthy people are more likely to
interact than if all wealthy people live in one community and all poor
people in another (this would be consolidation of wealth with community).
Since societies or any social system vary in terms of degrees of such
successive penetration, their integration will also vary.
Let me take another example. In Table 20-2, Blau’s Theorem IV
states that members of smaller groups or strata have more relations as a
proportion of their total with larger groups or strata than do members of
larger groups or strata with those in smaller groups.”? Thus, since the
distribution of people in status ranks will reveal a pyramid form, at least
from the middle ranks upward,”! high-ranking people are more likely to
have relations with lower-ranking persons than are lower-ranking with
higher-ranking persons. Such a simple artifact of mathematical propor-
tions can help explain, perhaps, the hostility of lower ranks toward higher
ranks, with whom they have little contact. Race and ethnic relations can
similarly be analyzed in this way, since majority members, who are the
larger group, are less likely to have relations with the minority than is
the minority with the majority. As a result, stereotypes and prejudice can
be more readily maintained when there is little contact by the majority,
especially when the processes described by this proportion principle are
exacerbated by the processes described in the intersection of parameters
principle (since minority status is often highly correlated with other po-
sitions that the majority does not occupy).
Blau’s basic theorems suggest many ways to analyze concrete empir-
ical cases, as Blau seeks to do throughout his work with various theorems

'8] suspect that Blau would disagree with this.

"See Blau, Inequality and Heterogeneity, p. 183.
See Ibid., pp. 42 and 73.
"Sometimes the lowest ranks are small, thereby creating a diamond-shaped distribution.
 MACROSTRUCTURALISM: AN ASSESSMENT 433

and as he has done in his research.” As he emphasizes, these efforts all

address the basic issue of social integration. For he assumes that social
contact and association among differentiated positions promote cooper-
ation and accommodation. Integration is thus viewed as the result of high
rates of interaction among people in different groups and strata. But,
differentiation poses barriers to interaction and association. As can be
seen by the theorems listed above, or by a review of Blau’s numerous
propositions, the theorems state structural conditions that promote or
retard social associations and, hence, integration. But unlike many other
analyses of this basic topic, Blau’s propositions are purely structural and
pertain,to the number of positions, their degree of intersection or con-
solidation or their degree of inequality and heterogeneity, and the dis-
tribution of people in these positions.
The theory is, of course, much more complex than my presentation
here, but the general profile and intent of his approach is clear. Such a
structural approach, cast into a formal format, offers considerable prom-
ise, but it is not without problems. Let me close, therefore, by offering a
brief assessment of this theoretical approach.

MACROSTRUCTURALISM: AN ASSESSMENT
Blau has isolated what he defines as two basic properties of the social
universe— heterogeneity and inequality as they are determined by the con-
solidation or intersection of parameters. He has also developed some ab-
stract principles about the dynamics inherent in these. This is, I believe,
the best way to develop theory; and as I have said elsewhere, I consider
this effort one of the most significant of this century.”* Having said this,
however, I will mention what I see as two limitations.
First, I think that the theory is too functional. In Figure 20-1, I have
diagramed Blau’s basic model to highlight this implicit functionalism. In
a subtle way, Blau assumes a functional need for integration of society
and views high rates of interactions as the way to meet this need. The
theoretical question then becomes one of determining what macrostruc-
tural forces affect rates of interaction. His answer: intersection and con-
solidation of parameters as they determine the respective levels of het-
erogeneity and inequality in a population. Many objections to this kind
of functional reasoning are immediately obviated by the fact that Blau
translates his ideas into propositions where the dependent variable is
‘social association” and “rates of interaction” without any functional
trimmings (about “needs,” “requisites,” and the like). Nonetheless, I raise
the issue because it limits the range of phenomena about which Blau is

2Blau and Schwartz, Crosscutting Social Circles.

*Turner, “A Theory of Social Structure,” p. 705.
 BLAU
434 CHAPTER 20 / THE MACROSTRUCTURALISM OF PETER M.

FIGURE 20-1 Bilau’s Functional Imagery

Number and
clarity of
nominal and
graduated
parameters
Patterns of Degree to which
inequality Rates of functional need
and interaction -for social
heterogeneity integration is met
Degree of
intersection
and consolidation
of parameters

willing to theorize. If the need for integration is the implicit theoretical

question, then only those properties of the universe that are relevant to
this issue will be present in a theory—in Blau’s case, rates of interaction
and parameters.
A second and related objection to Blau’s theory is that it excludes so
much. Interaction is conceptualized as a rate rather than as a process;
roles are relegated to their effects on parameters; values, beliefs, norms,
and other idea systems are eliminated or only viewed as relevant to the
extent that they help people define parameters; and the social-psycho-
logical properties of the universe, such as self-conceptions and other cog-
nitions of humans, are simply eliminated. Moreover, the theory cannot
tell us why a given set of parameters exists in the first place; instead, we
are only told about their functional consequences. Thus, I think that
Blau’s theory achieves parsimony by eliminating many critical dynamics
of the social universe, including those responsible for variations in his
own theoretical variable (nominal and graduated parameters).
Thus, in the end, Blau offers an interesting set of abstract propositions
on “rates of interaction” among populations of individuals. This is not,
however, a trivial issue, because I believe that many of the dynamics of
social structure are affected by such rates of interaction. But at the same
time, much is excluded. And so, I view Blau’s theory as an important
contribution to only one dimension of macrostructure, rates of interaction
as these are affected by two very critical properties of social structure.
inequality and heterogeneity. But this is not all there is to human or-
ganization, even when viewed in macrostructural terms; and approaches
that claim otherwise will, for all their insight, be too limiting.
__ The Microstructuralism
(of Randall Collins

THE MICRO AND MACRO REALMS

In contrast to the macrostructuralism of Peter Blau stands the micro-
structuralism of Randall Collins. For Blau and other macrostructuralists,
“structures” can be conceptualized as emergent phenomena that influence
rates of interaction, whereas for Collins “structures” can best be under-
stood in terms of the microprocesses that are aggregated in space and
across time to produce and sustain them.
I have termed Collins’s approach microstructural because of his as-
sertion that most sociological conceptions of structure are reifications and
metaphors. He does not deny the existence of social structures and macro
reality; rather, he argues that macro theories often disconnect structures
from the very processes by which they are constituted. For Collins asks:
what is structure and what does it really look like? His answer in early
works is, itself, somewhat metaphorical:
Imagine the view of human society from the vantage point of an airplane.
What we can observe are buildings, roads, vehicles, and—if our senses were
keen enough—people moving back and forth and talking to each other. Quite
literally, this is all there is; all of our explanations and all of our subjects to
be explained must be grounded in such observations. ‘“‘Social structure” could
be brought into such a picture if we understand that men live by anticipating
future encounters and remembering past ones. Structure is recurring sorts of
encounters. An imaginary aerial time-lapse photograph, then, would render
social structure as a set of light streaks showing the heaviness of social traffic.
If we go on to imagine different colored streaks corresponding to the emotional
quality of contacts—perhaps gray for purely formal relations, brown for

435
436 CHAPTER 21 / THE MICROSTRUCTURALISM OF RANDALL COLLINS

organizational relations infused with more personal commitments, yellow for

social relations, and red for close personal friendships—we would have an even
more significant map.’

Recent work has been more explicit.? Social structure is conceptual-

ized as “chains of interaction rituals” that are stretched out in time through
their repetition by individuals in concrete settings. That is, if encounters
among individuals are repeated again and again over time, then there is
a structure to their interaction. Social structure becomes ever more macro
when there is an increasing number of persons involved in social en- .
counters and an extension of the physical space in which these encounters |
occur. Thus, for Collins macrostructure consists of only three dimensions: |
(1) the sheer numbers of persons and encounters involved; (2) the amount |
of time consumed by an encounter and the degree to which it is connected |
to previous encounters; and (3) the amount and pattern of physical space |
used to emit the interaction rituals that typify an encounter. The more |
encounters are repeated across time, the more people that are involved; |
and the more space that is consumed, then the more macro is a social |
structure.
This is, I think, a very extreme line of argument, for macrostructure |
is defined simply by space, number, and time. In Figure 21-1, I have
simplified a figure used by Collins to illustrate this point.4 Across the top
of the figure is listed a crude time scale, ranging from seconds to centuries.
And down the left side I have indicated the number of people involved
and the space utilized in encounters. Within the body of the figure, il-
lustrative structures are mentioned. As one moves from the upper left to
lower right portions of the figure, one also goes from micro- to
macroanalysis.
With respect to the time dimension, one critical issue is the length
of time consumed by an encounter in which interaction occurs; and an-
other more important issue is the degree to which each encounter is a
link in a chain of encounters. Thus, a one-time interaction that lasts only
a few seconds or minutes is sociologically much less interesting than
encounters involving various interactive rituals that are repeated again
and again. In Collins’s eyes, then, sociological theory should be most

‘Randall Collins, Conflict Sociology: Toward an Explanatory Science (New York: Aca-
demic Press, 1975), p. 56.
*Randall Collins, “On the Micro-Foutdations of Macro-Sociology,” American Journal
of Sociology 86 (March 1981), pp. 984-1014; “Micro-translation as a Theory Building Strat-
egy,” in Advances in Social Theory and Methodology: Toward an Integration of Micro- and
Macro-Sociology, ed. K. Knorr-Cetina and A. V. Cicourel (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1981); and “Interaction Ritual Chains, Power and Property: The Micro-Macro Con-
nection as an Empirically-Based Theoretical Problem,” in The Micro-Macro Problem. ed.
J. C. Alexander et al. (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, in press).
‘Collins, “Interaction Ritual Chains.”
‘Collins, “On the Micro-Foundations of Macro-Sociology.”
 THE MICRO AND MACRO REALMS 437

FIGURE 21-1 Micro and Macro: Time, Space, and Number

Minutes Hours Days Years _ Centuries

Life-histo Genealo
MICRO “4 a
Ms
Several Fleeting encounters Small groups
persons ‘

Several Ne Crowds, organizations,

hundred \ communities,
to \. social movements,
thousands “
i
\
N
\
107-1014 |Thousands << Societies
to millions \
\
\. Empires
\
3

‘. MACRO

interested in “chains of interaction rituais” that extend across time. Such

chains represent a life history for an individual when enacted over years;
and if over generations, then they are part of a genealogy. More interesting
sociologically, however, are chains of interaction among several people in
an encounter, especially if interaction rituals are repeated over relatively
long time periods. And if there are many individuals linked together,
directly and indirectly, through chains of interaction rituals and who use
ever larger amounts of space, then social structures become increasingly
macro. Micro and macro in reality are, therefore, on a continuum that,
at the extreme micro end, involves few people using little space in short-
term interactions and that, at the macro end, involves very complex and
long-term chains of direct and indirect interaction among large numbers
of people extended across physical space.
As is evident, Collins does not reject macro reality as a phenomena
worth studying. But there is an important implication in his position:
the macro world is constructed from chains of interaction. There can be
variation with respect to the number of people involved, the length of
time consumed, and the amount. of space utilized, but the one invariant
property of structure is interaction among people. Social structure is ul-
timately chains of interaction rituals, and so, sociological theory must
438 CHAPTER 21 / THE MICROSTRUCTURALISM OF RANDALL COLLINS

emphasize what individuals actually do, for “structures never do anything;

it is only persons in real situations who act.”> Thus, a theory of social
structure must seek the “energizing processes” of social structure in the
interactions of individuals. Theory must explain macrostructures in terms
of principles that help us understand how micro interactions are stretched
over time, expanded in number, and extended across space.
Unlike other theorists who have made similar assertions, Collins does
not advocate a micro reduction of macroprocesses. Explanation of ma-
crostructural processes is not simply a matter of asserting that the only
reality is the individual in interaction. We cannot, Collins would argue,
merely outline how people interact and leave the matter settled. Instead,
theory must provide principles that inform us about how and through
what processes interactions are stretched across time in chains of en-
counters and aggregated in space among increasing numbers of individ-
uals. Thus, a theory of social structure must address the macro variables
of time, space, and number if it is to say anything about those structures
of most interest to sociologists—groups, organizations, crowds, social
classes, societies, empires, and the like.
I think that this attention to macrostructural processes makes Col-
lins’s approach unique among those who stress the interactive foundations
of structure. Moreover, he emphasizes that many interactive encounters
occur within an existing macrostructure (built, of course, from past chains
of interaction) that determines the number of people present, their re-
spective resources, how long they will interact, and where they will po-
sition themselves in space. As they interact, they reproduce the macro-
structure or potentially change it. And so, there is almost always a
reciprocity between the purely micro, interactive dimensions of social
reality and the macro context in which these microprocesses occur.
Yet, the “energizer” behind social reality is the interaction ritual.
Macrostructures are created, sustained, and changed at the level of what
people in interaction do in their encounters. And thus, the central task
of sociological theory is to develop some principles about interaction rit-
uals. Surprisingly, Collins’s early work left many of these interaction pro-
cesses somewhat implicit, moving rather quickly away from microanalysis
of interaction to macrstructural concerns about organizations, the state,
geopolitics, and the like. It is only recently that he has sought to explicate
in more detail a theory of “interaction ritual chains.’’® Let me review the
tentative and provisional outlines of this latest theory and then return
to Collins’s earlier work, which still, I think, represents his most signif-
icant contribution to sociological theory.

5Collins, “Interaction Ritual Chains.”

*Tbid.
 INTERACTION RITUAL CHAINS 439

INTERACTION RITUAL CHAINS

I see Collins’s conceptualization of “interaction ritual chains” as a mixture
of exchange theory, portions of interactionism, and perhaps elements of
psychoanalytic theory. His perspective is clearly an exchange theory be-
cause he visualizes social life as a constant negotiation among individuals
with resources trying to strike bargains with each other in social markets.
It is interactionist with an ethnomethodological twist in that there is
heavy emphasis on conversation and talk as key resources in social mar-
kets. And it is psychoanalytic since emotion is viewed as the underlying
motivational force behind interaction and social structure. Yet, as Collins
mixes these three traditions together, he becomes an intellectual alche-
mist, blending them with the ideas of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim to
produce a new and highly original theoretical approach.
For Collins, the basic micro unit of analysis is the “encounter” of at
least two people who confront each other and interact. The encounter is,
in Collins’s words, a “shared conversational reality” and will involve ne-
gotiations among individuals who possess varying resources and moti-
vations to participate in the interaction.’ That is, people will have re-
sources, such as stored memories of previous conversations, vocal styles,
special knowledge, access to wider communication networks, the capacity
to call upon others to support their position or to coerce, the right to
determine the physical location of parties, and so on. These resources can
be defined as an individual’s ‘cultural capital.” People will also bring a
given level of motivation, or “emotional energy,” to participate in the
conversation in a particular manner. Just how people feel about an en-
counter will, to a very great extent, influence what transpires in the pres-
ent and in future encounters.
As people negotiate their shared conversational reality by using their
cultural capital and expending their emotional energy, they are, in essence,
negotiating over their respective membership in groups.® Indeed, the more
issues of inclusion or exclusion from group membership are involved in
an encounter, the more intense will be the negotiation among individuals,
and the more will individuals spend their cultural capital and expend their
emotional energies.
When individuals’ levels of cultural capital are equal and their mo-
tivations are similar—for example, in a conversation among friends—the
parties can all increase their cultural capital (memories, vocal styles) and
their emotional energy (their “good feelings” about the encounter). How-
ever, many social encounters are among unequals in that some have more
cultural capital and motivational energy to expend than others. Those
with more capital and emotion can control the conversation, dictating

"Ibid.
*Ibid.
440 CHAPTER 21 / THE MICROSTRUCTURALISM OF RANDALL COLLINS

topics, content, and even where people stand and what they are allowed
to say. For example, an authoritative boss in an office speaking to a
subordinate has more cultural capital—the ability, for instance, to control
pay, dictate where people work—and more emotional energy to mobilize
in the conversation (since it will be more rewarding for the superordinate
than subordinate). Thus, the boss will increase both his or her cultural
capital (affirmation of dominance) and emotional energy (feelings of con-
trol) from the conversation, whereas the employee will lose capital and
energy (memories of being told what to do and bad feelings about sub-
ordination). Such encounters will, if repeated and stretched across time,
become highl&.formal and ritualized with the subordinate expending as
little energy and capital as possible at each meeting.
Most encounters are, of course, less extreme than this example. There
is usually room for more negotiation in a conversational encounter. More-
over, most encounters are structured in terms of previous encounters, in
several senses. First, parties know what to expect in terms of their mem-
ories and previous feelings about the conversation, and hence, they can
take care to use their resources wisely and appropriate the correct amount
of emotional energy. Second, many encounters are circumscribed by the
macro system as it has been constructed from chains of past encounters.
There is usually a physical place where talk occurs; there is usually a
typical number of others in the situation; and there isa »rmal duration
for a conversation in a situation. Thus, an encounter in a grocery store,
in a school classroom, and in other well-known contexts where the ma-
crostructure delimits place, number, and duration and where people al-
ready have a sense for the right mixture of cultural capital and emotional
energy will proceed with relative ease and with a high degree of ritual
(stereotyped sequences of talk).
The repetition of such encounters—for example, each day at home,
the office, and school—is what builds and sustains structures. And as these
ritualized chains of interaction embrace increasingly larger numbers of
people and are extended in space in various configurations, they produce
and reproduce macrostructures.
There is an important methodological corollary to this line of theo-
retical argument.° If macrostructures are produced and sustained by chains
of interaction rituais among individuals using cultural capital and ex-
pending emotional energy, then one should study structure by sampling
encounters across time. By sampling encounters over time, it becomes
possible to have a sense for what people are doing—how they talk, gesture,
position themselves as well as how they feel about what is occurring. Such
a strategy for studying social structure involves what Collins calls micro

*Collins, “Micro-translation as a Theory-building Strategy” as well as ““Micro-methods

as a Basis for Macro-sociology,” Urban Life 12 (1983), pp. 184-202.
 CONFLICT SOCIOLOGY 441

translation of macrostructures. That is, if macrostructures are nothing

more than complex chains of interaction rituals stretched across time and
space among large numbers of people, then to understand such structures,
we need to “translate” them into those interactive processes from which
they are constituted—interaction rituals chains. Research projects should
not, therefore, sample at one point in time with questionnaires, but rather,
they should select encounters over time where people can be observed
talking to each other. |
Much of Collins’s substantive and methodological arguments are in
their formative stages. The analysis of interaction ritual chains is still
preliminary and evolving. For this reason, I find the line of argument
often vague and imprecise, but I think that the essentials have been
summarized.
With the more recent approach in mind, I now want to return to
Collins’s earlier work, which he entitled conflict sociology.° There is no
great incompatibility between this recent and earlier work, but there ‘is
a shift in vocabulary. Conversation, ritual, and negotiation are prominent
in Collins’s early work, although the introduction of emotion as the coin-
age of interaction rituals is given more emphasis in recent works. But the
emphasis on inequality of resources and how people deal with this fact
is prominent in both the earlier and later conceptual work. And the will-
ingness to move back and forth between the micro reality of conversations
to the macro dynamics of world geopolitics (see Figure 21-1) is also ev-
ident in both the older and newer work.'! As I proceed to review Collins’s
conflict sociology, which is in reality an exchange perspective, I will try
to reconcile the vocabularies of the earlier conflict approach with the more
recent emphasis on chains of interaction rituals.

CONFLICT SOCIOLOGY
Collins’s general argument about the interactive foundations of social
structure and the effects of the macro dimensions of space, time, and size
on interaction were anticipated in earlier works. In Conflict Sociology,
Collins proposed the following steps for building social theory.” First,
examine typical real-life situations where people encounter each other.
Second, focus on the material arrangements that affect interaction—the
physical layout of situations, the means and modes of communication,
the available tools, weapons, and goods. Third, assess the relative resources

1°1t really should have been “exchange sociology,” but I guess that “conflict sociology”
sounded better and appealed more to the bias of sociology. See his Conflict Sociology.
“See, for example, Randall Collins, “Long-term Social Change and the Territorial Power
of States” in his Sociology Since Midcentury: Essays in Theory Cumulation (New York:
Academic Press, 1981).
“2Collins, Conflict Sociology, pp. 60-61.
442 CHAPTER 21 / THE MICROSTRUCTURALISM OF RANDALL COLLINS

that people bring to, use in, or extract from encounters. Fourth, entertain
the general hypotheses that those with resources press their advantage,
that those without resources seek the best deal they can get under the
circumstances, and that stability and change are to be explained in terms
of the lineups and shifts in the distribution of resources. Fifth, assume
that cultural symbols—ideas, beliefs, norms, values, and the like—are used
to represent the interests of those parties who have the resources to make
their views prevail. Sixth, look for the general and generic features of
particular cases so that more abstract propositions can be extracted from
the empirical particulars of a situation.
Thus, as with his recent work on interaction rituals, there is a concern
with the encounter, with the distribution of individuals in physical space,
with their respective capital or resources to use in exchanges, and with
inequalities in resources. As with his recent work, the respective resources
of individuals are critical: “power” is the capacity to coerce or to have
others do so on one’s behalf; “material resources” are wealth and the
control of money as well as property or the capacity to control the physical
setting and people’s place in it; and “symbolic resources” are the respective
levels of linguistic and conversational resources as well as the capacity to
use cultural ideas, such as ideologies, values, and beliefs, for one’s purposes.
A central consideration in all of Collins’s propositions is ‘“‘social den-
sity,” or the number of people co-present in a situation where an encounter
takes place. Social density is, of course, part of the macrostructure since
it is typically the result of past chains of interaction. But it can also be
a “material resource” that some individuals can use to their advantage.
Thus, the interaction in an encounter will be most affected by the par-
ticipants’ relative resources and the density or number of individuals co-
present. These variables influence the two underlying micro dynamics in
Collins’s scheme, talk, and ritual.

Talk and Ritual

For Collins, talk is the emission of verbal and nonverbal gestures that
carry meaning and that are used to communicate with others_and to
sustain (or create) a common sense of reality. Collins classifies conver-
sations among people in terms of the type of talk employed, including
“practical conversations” (used to accomplish ends or goals), “ideological
conversations” (used to arouse emotions to legitimate certain actions and
situations), “intellectual conversation” (discussions of ideas and issues),
“entertainment talk” (conversation for its own enjoyment), “gossip” (dis-
cussions and evaluations of acquaintances), and “personal talk” (discus-
sions of oneself).? Since talk is one of the key symbolic resources of

STbid., pp. 114-31.

 CONFLICT SOCIOLOGY 443

TABLE 24d eed Or

TABLE 21-1 Key Propositions on the Conditions Producing Talk and Conversation
Te eee LC pe eee ON Se

|. The likelihood of talk and conversational exchanges among individua

ls is a
positive and additive function of (a) the degree of their physical co-prese
nce; (b)
the emotional gratifications retained from their previous conversational
exchanges; (c) the perceived attractiveness of their respective resources; and
(d) their level of previous ritual activity.
I. The greater is the degree of equality and similarity in the resources of
individuals, the more likely are conversational exchanges to be (a) personal; (b) -
flexible; and (c) long-term.
Ut. The greater is the level of inequality in the resources of individuals, the more
likely are conversational exchanges to be (a) impersonal: (6) highly ritualized;
and (c) short-term.
IV. The greater is the amount of talk among individuals, especially among equals,
the more likely are (a) strong, positive emotions; (b) sentiments of liking; (c)
common agreements, moods, outlooks, and beliefs; and (d) strong social
attachments sustained by rituals.

individuals in encounters, much of what transpires among interacting

individuals is talk and the use of this cultural capital to develop their
respective lines of conduct. In Table 21-1, I have listed some of Collins’s
propositions on conversations, which, I should add, have been altered
somewhat in order to make them more parsimonious and to reconcile
them with his more recent terminology. As can be seen from Proposition
I in Table 21-1, the likelihood that people will talk is related to their
sheer co-presence, for if others are near, one is likely to strike up a con-
versation. More important sociologically are conversations that are part
of a “chain” of previous encounters, If people felt good about a past
conversation, they will usually make efforts to have another; and if they
perceive each others’ resources, especially symbolic or cultural but also
material ones, as desirable, then they will seek to talk again. And if they
have developed ritualized interaction that affirms their common group
membership, they will be likely to enact those rituals again. As Propo-
sition II indicates, conversations among equals who share common levels
of resources will be more personal, flexible, and long-term because people
feel comfortable with such conversations. As a result, the encounter raises
their levels of emotional energy and increases their cultural capital. That
is, they are anxious to talk again and to pick up where they left off.
However, the nature of talk in an encounter changes dramatically when
there is inequality in the resources of the participants. As Proposition
III emphasizes, subordinates will try to avoid wasting or losing emotional
energy and spending their cultural capital by keeping the interaction brief,
formal, and highly ritualized with trite and inexpensive words. Yet, as
Proposition IV argues, even under conditions of inequality and even more
when equality exists, people who interact and talk in repeated encounters
will tend, over time, to develop positive sentiments and will have positive
444 CHAPTER 21 / THE MICROSTRUCTURALISM OF RANDALL COLLINS

emotional feelings. Moreover, they will also converge in their definitions

of situations and develop common moods, outlooks, beliefs, and ideas.
And finally, they will be likely to develop strong attachments and a sense
of group solidarity, which is sustained through rituals.
As can be seen from the above propositions, rituals are a central
element of any encounter. Following Durkheim" and extending the anal-
ysis of ritual to include Erving Goffman’s’® vision of “everyday” inter-
action, Collins views rituals as comparatively stereotyped sequences of
gestures that people emit to create and sustain a particular type of social
relation. Thus, rituals are not just confined to formal actions confirming
the sacred or the body politic; they are the essence of normal encounters
among people in each of their life spheres: home, work, recreation, neigh-
borhood, and the like. Understanding the conditions under which varying
rituals are generated is thus central to an analysis of microsocial processes
or, for that matter, any macro pattern. Thus, much of what is actually
observable about societies and social systems is ordinary people talking
to each other and engaging in a variety of interaction rituals that allow
them to create, sustain, and alter a sense of reality.
Unfortunately, Collins’s articulation of theoretical principles in this
area is somewhat disjointed. He formalizes—most insightfully I should
add—Durkheim’s theory of ritual and social solidarity from Elementary
Forms of the Religious Life (see Chapter 2), and he supplements this
analysis with insights from Malinowski’s and Radcliffe-Brown’s work.’®
The end result is the propositions listed in Table 21-2. As can be seen
from Proposition I, ritual activity increases with the presence of others,
with the duration of their presence, and with the degree to which they
are pursuing common issues and questions. And as rituals increase, so do
people’s common attachments and outlooks, as I have indicated in Prop-
osition II. That is, as people in situations talk and develop ritual ways
of addressing each other, they begin to develop emotional attachments,
and they accumulate an investment of cultural capital over successive
encounters. As their levels of emotional and cultural investment in the
chain of encounters increase, they develop a sense of group solidarity,
which is sustained by the very rituals that produced it (see Principle V
in Table 21-2). Moreover, as a group’s sense of boundedness increases.

“Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms oj the Religious Life (New York: Free Press.
1948; originally published in 1912).
See, for example, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life and other works by Erving
Goffman, including: Encounters (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs- Merrill, 1961}; Interaction Ritual
oan York: Anchor Books, 1967); and Behavior in Public Places (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.

See A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, The Andaman Islanders (New York: Free Press, 1948:
originally published in 1922); Bronislaw Malinowski, Magic, Science and Religion (Garden
City, N. Y.: Doubleday Publishing, 1948).
 CONFLICT SOCIOLOGY 445

TABLE 21-2 Key Propositions on the Conditions Producing Ritual Activity

a ie aie sienna teege nope een es
Durkheim's Principles
|. The degree of ritual activity among individuals is a positive and additive function
of (a) the extent of actors’ physical co-presence; (b) the length of actors’
physical co-presence; (c) the number of actors physically co-
present; and (d) the degree of common focus among actors.
ll. The degree of social attachment and common outlook among individuals is a
positive function of their degree of ritual activity.
Ill. The greater is the degree of ritual activity sustaining social attachments and
common outlook among individuals, the more likely will deviations from
established rituals be negatively and severely sanctioned.
Malinowski's Principle
IV. The greater is the physical danger of activities among individuals, the greater is
their likelihood of invoking rituals that previously promoted social attachments
and a common outlook.
Radcliffe-Brown’s Principle
V. bi greater is the level of social attachment and common outlook among
individuals in a group, the greater will be ritual activity during (a) movements of
individuals into or out of the group; and (b) movement of individuals to new
positions within the group.

movement into or out of the group will be marked by rituals (ranging, for
example, from greetings of welcome to a tear-filled farewell party).
Thus, the essence of interaction is talk and ritual; and as chains of
encounters are linked together over time, conversations take on a more
personal and also a ritualized character that results from and, at the same
time, reinforces the growing sense of group solidarity among individuals.
Such is the case because the individuals have “invested” their cultural
capital (conversational resources) and have derived positive feelings from
being defined as group members. I do not think that Collins has developed
these ideas to any great extent, but we can see his intent: to view social
structure as the linking together of encounters through talk and ritual.
This basic view of the micro reality of social life pervades all of Collins’s
sociology, especially as he begins to move to the analysis of inequalities
in social life.

Deference and Demeanor

Inequality and stratification are structures only in the sense of being
temporal chains of interaction rituals among varying numbers of people
with different levels of resources. Thus, to understand these structures,
it is necessary to examine what people actually do across time and in
space. One thing that they do in interaction is exhibit deference and
demeanor. Collins and his coauthor Joan Annett define deference as the
446 CHAPTER 21 / THE MICROSTRUCTURALISM OF RANDALL COLLINS

process of manipulating gestures to show respect to others; or if one is

in a position to command respect, the process of manipulation of gestures
is to elicit respect from others.!7 The actual manipulation of gestures is
termed demeanor. Deference and demeanor are, therefore, intimately con-
nected to each other. They are also tied to talk and rituals, since talk
involves the use of gestures and since deference and demeanor tend to
become ritualized. Hence, deference and demeanor can be visualized as
one form of talk and ritual activity—a form that is most evident in those
interactions that create and sustain inequalities among people.
Collins visualizes several variables as central to understanding defer-
ence and demeanor:
1. Inequality in resources, particularly wealth and power.
2. Social density variables revolving around the degree to which be-
haviors are under the “surveillance of others” in a situation.
3. Social density variables revolving around the degree to which com-
munications networks are “cosmopolitan” (i.e., unrestricted to
others who are co-present in a situation).
In Table 21-3, these variables are incorporated into a few abstract
propositions that capture the essence of Collins’s and Annett’s numerous
propositions and descriptions of the history of deference and demeanor."*
In these propositions, Collins and Annett argue that rituals and talk re-
vealing deference and demeanor are most pronounced between people of
unequal status, especially when their actions are observable and when
communication outside the situation is restricted. Such density and sur-
veillance are, of course, properties of the macrostructure as it distributes
varying numbers of people in space. As surveillance decreases, however,
unequals avoid contact or perform deference and demeanor rituals in a
perfunctory manner. For example, military protocol will be much more
pronounced among an officer and enlisted personnel in public on a military
base than in situations where surveillance is lacking (e.g., off the base).
Moreover, Collins and Annett stress that inequalities and low mobility
between unequal groups create pressures for intragroup deference and
demeanor rituals, especially when communications outside the group are
low (for example, among new army recruits and their officers or among
prison inmates and guards). But as communication outside the group
increases and/or as surveillance by group members decreases, then de-
ference and demeanor will decrease.

Class Cultures
These microprocesses of talk, ritual, deference, and demeanor explain
what are often seen as more macroprocesses in societies. One such process

"Randall Collins and Joan Annett, “A Short History of Deference and Demeanor.” in
Conflict Sociology, pp. 161-224.
'Tbid., pp. 216-19.
 CONFLICT SOCIOLOGY 447

TABLE 21-3 Key Propositions on Deference and Demeanor

ac a a
I. The visibility, explicitness, and predictability of deference and demeanor rituals
and talk among individuals is a positive and additive function of:
A. The degree of inequality in resources among individuals, especially with
respect to:
1. Material wealth.
2. Power.
B. The degree of surveillance by others of behaviors emitted by individuals, with
surveillance being a positive function of:
1. The extent to which others are co-present.
2. The degree of homogeneity in outlook of others.
C. The restrictiveness of communication networks (low cosmopolitanism), with
restrictiveness being a negative function of:
1. The degree of complexity in communications technologies.
2. The degree of mobility of individuals.
ll. The greater is the degree of inequality among individuals and the lower is the
level of surveillance, the more likely are behaviors to be directed toward:
A. Avoidance of contact and emission of deference and demeanor by
individuals.
B. Perfunctory performance of deference and demeanor by individuals when
avoidance is not possible.
The greater is the degree of inequality among individuals and the lower is the
level of cosmopolitanism among individuals, the more likely are behaviors to be
directed toward simplified but highly visible deference and demeanor.
IV. The greater is the degree of inequality among individuals, and the less is the
degree of mobility among groups with varying levels of resources, the more
visible, explicit, and predictable are deference and demeanor rituals and talk
within these groups.
V. The greater is the equality among individuals, and the greater is the degree of
cosmopolitanism and/or the less is the level of surveillance, the less compelling
are deference and demeanor talk and rituals.

is variation in the class cultures. That is, people in different social classes
tend to exhibit diverging behaviors, outlooks, and interpersonal styles.
These differences are accountable in terms of two main variables:
1. The degree to which one possesses and uses the capacity to coerce,
to materially bestow, and to symbolically manipulate others so that
one can give orders in an encounter and have these orders followed.
2. The degree to which communication is confined to others who are
physically co-present in a situation, or conversely, the degree to
which communication is diverse, involving the use of multiple modes
of contact with many others in different situations.

Utilizing these two general classes of variables, which are part of the
macrostructure that has been built up in past chains of interaction as
well as several less central ones such as wealth and physical exertion on
the job, Collins describes the class cultures of American society. More
aad CHAPTER 21 / THE MICROSTRUCTURALISM OF RANDALL COLLINS

TABLE 21-4 Key Propositions on Class Cultures

|. Giving orders to others in a situation is a positive and additive function of the

capacity to mobilize and use coercive, material, and symbolic resources.
ll. The behavioral attributes of self-assuredness, the initiation of talk, positive self-
feelings, and identification with the goals of a situation are a positive function of
the capacity to give orders to others in that situation.
lll. The behavioral attributes of toughness, courage, and action in a situation are a
positive function of the degree of physical exertion and danger in that situation.
IV. The degree of behavioral conformity exhibited in a situation is a positive
function of the degree to which people can communicate only with others who
are physically co-present in that situation and is a negative function of the
degree to which people can communicate with a diversity of others who are not
physically co-present.
V. The outlook and behaviora! tendencies of an individual are an additive function
of those spheres of life—work, politics, home, recreation, community—where
‘varying degrees of giving-receiving orders, physical exertion, danger, and
communication occur.

significantly for theory building, he also offers several abstract proposi-

tions that stipulate certain important relationships among power, order-
giving, communication networks, and behavioral tendencies. among in-
dividuals. I have restated these relationships in somewhat altered form
in Table 21-4.° With these principles, Collins explains variations in the
behaviors, outlooks, and interpersonal styles of individuals in different
occupations and status groups. For example, those occupations that re-
quire Order-giving, that reveal high co-presence of others, and that involve
little physical exertion will generate behaviors that are distinctive and
that circumscribe other activities, such as whom one marries, where one
lives, what one values, and what activities one pursues in various spheres
of life. Different weights to these variables would cause varying behavioral
tendencies in individuals. Thus, it is from the processes delineated in the
propositions of Table 21-4 that understanding of such variables as class
culture, ethnic cultures, lifestyles, and other concerns of investigators of
stratification is to be achieved. But such understanding is anchored in
the recognition that these class cultures are built up and sustained by
interaction chains where deference and demeanor rituals have figured
prominently. Thus, a class culture is not mere internalization of values
and beliefs as well as simple socialization (although this is no doubt in-
volved), but rather, it is the result of repeated encounters among unequals
under varying conditions imposed by the macrostructure as it has been
built up from past chains of interaction.

Collins, Conflict Sociology. pp. 49-88

 CONFLICT SOCIOLOGY 449

TABLE 21-5 Key Propositions on Sex Stratification

Sr
e esapemsoniseeesaremeese n Pare
|. Control over sexual activities between males and females as well
as talk and
ritual activities is a positive and additive function of:
A. The degree of one sex’s control over the means of coercion, which is a
negative function of:
1. The existence of coercive powers outside sexual partners and family
groupings (such as the state).
2. The presence of relatives of the subordinate sex.
B. The degree to which one sex controls material resources, which is a positive
and additive function of:
1. The level of economic surplus in a population.
2. The degree to which key economic activities are performed by one sex.
3. The degree to which resources are inherited rather than earned.
ll. The greater is the degree of control of sexual relations and related activities by
one sex, the more likely are sexual! relations to be defined as property relations,
and the more likely are they to be normatively regulated by rules of incest,
exogamy, and endogamy.
lll. The greater is the degree of control of sexual relations and related activities by
one sex, the greater will be the efforts of the other sex to:
A. Reduce sexual encounters.
B. Regulate them through ritual.

Sexual Stratification
The propositions in Tables 21-1 through 21-4 represent, I think, Collins’s
theoretical approach to the analysis of stratification. The propositions in
these tables provide the basic principles for the analysis of specific forms
of stratiiication, such as those created by age and sexual categories. For
as is clearly evident, stratification for Collins is a process that occurs in
types of encounters among individuals in diverse spheres of life. One such
sphere is encounters between males and females that become organized
into family relations and elaborated into kinship systems. In Table 21-
5, I have summarized some of Collins’s propositions on sexual stratifi-
cation. Deductions from these, Collins implicitly argues, can help explain
the nature of talk and ritual between the sexes as well as the structuring
of male-female encounters in kinship systems. These latter deductions
are not produced in the table, but Collins provides numerous additional
propositions”® and discursive text?! to illustrate the properties and dy-
namics of sexual stratification.
; These propositions can, in Collins’s eyes, explain the diversity in
chains of sexual encounters and the resulting structure of family systems.
For example, in societies where females perform much of the economic

*Tbid., pp. 281-84. :

“Tbid., pp. 225-59; see also the relevant chapters in his Family Sociology (Chicago:
Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1985).
450 CHAPTER 21 / THE MICROSTRUCTURALISM OF RANDALL COLLINS

,
aaa

TABLE 21-6 Key Propositions on Age Stratification

|. The degree of age stratification among individuals is a positive and additive

function of the degree to which individuals in one age group control (a) the
means of coercion; (b) material resources; (c) symbolic resources (@.g., capacity
to evaluate actions in terms of moral values); and (d) sociability (e.g., access to
peers, recreation, and related activities).
ll. The form of control exercised by individuals in one age group over individuals in
another age group is a direct function of the types of resources that are most
controlled by the dominant groups (see I(a), (b), (Cc), (a) above).
lll. The greater is the degree of age stratification, the greater is the level of ritual
interaction between individuals in different age groups, and conversely, the more
equally balanced are the resources between age groups, the less is the level of
ritual activity between individuals in different age groups.
IV. The greater are the efforts by individuals of one age group to control individuals
in another age group but the greater the level of resources available to
individuals of subordinate age groups, the greater is the level of conflict
between individuals of different age groups.

labor and where wealth is passed through the female line (as is the case
in matrilineal kinship systems), male dominance is greatly mitigated. Or
in American society, females who enter the labor force possess resources
to counter the males’ control of the means of coercion, thereby reducing
male dominance (especially since the state rather than kin groups is the
ultimate source of coercive power in the society). Conversely, women who
do not work are often forced to counter the economic and coercive power
of males by limiting sexual encounters and by ritualizing such encounters
when they do occur. Many other specific forms of male-female stratifi-
cation can, in Collins’s view, be explained by making deductions from
these abstract propositions to specific empirical cases. But such expla-
nations do not rely upon concepts of norms, values, and roles. Rather,
they emphasize the respective resources that people have and how these
determine what happens in an encounter as well as how structures are
built up from chains of encounters among individuals with varying
resources.

Age Stratification
Another universal form of stratification is by age, which, like sexual re-
lations, involves control of resources by individuals in one age group and
efforts by individuals in subordinaie age groups to mitigate their situation
in daily encounters. I have listed several of Collins’s key propositions on
this in Table 21-6. These propositions can, I think, explain variations in
age stratification.” For example, among poor families in America, parents
often possess only physical coercion in abundance (not having money,

™Collins, Conflict Sociology, pp. 259-81.

 CONFLICT SOCIOLOGY 451

much leisure, or capacity to provide recreation), whereas youth often

possess counterresources of their own, such as extensive peer relations
and moral codes of peer evaluation that are built up from chains of en-
counters among themselves. The result is often high levels of conflict
between parents and children. In contrast, affluent parents possess many
resources, such as money, the capacity to schedule recreation, and the
time to impose and sanction moral standards. As a result, they typically
resort to coercion as a punishment of last resort, only after material in-
centives, moral shaming, or withholding of leisure-time privileges fail to
generate conformity to parental dictates. Interaction in such families will,
despite its seeming informality, involve the use of ritual and talk in clear
deference and demeanor activities. Similar kinds of analyses can, I believe,
be made of other societies using these principles as premises from which
deductions to specific empirical cases can be made.

Organizational Processes
After examining stratification processes, Collins turns to an extensive
analysis of organizations and develops a rather long inventory of prop-
ositions on their properties and dynamics.”* These propositions overlap,
to some degree, with those on stratification, since an organization is typ-
ically a stratified system with a comparatively clear hierarchy of authority.
In Table 21-7, I have extracted only three groups of propositions from
Collins’s analysis. These revolve around processes of organizational con-
trol, the administration of control, and the general organizational struc-
ture. Other topic areas in Collins’s inventory are either incorporated into
these propositions or omitted. Moreover, I have rephrased considerably
the propositions and have also stated them at a higher level of abstraction
than in Collins’s text. By placing the propositions at a high level of ab-
straction, I think that they can explain political control in more than
complex organizations; in my view, they would seem relevant to under-
standing other patterns of social organization, such as entire societies.
Even as Collins begins to examine more macrostructures, like bu-
reaucratic organizations, it is evident that the conceptual emphasis is on
microprocesses. Organization control, its administration, and the general
structure of an organization are all created and sustained by people using
resources in encounters. As these encounters are repeated, the chains of
interactions develop a structure, whose profile depends on the respective
levels and types of resources possessed by participants.

The State and Economy

Collins develops propositions on many topics in Conflict Soctology, but I
will close with an illustration of his more purely macroanalysis of the

*Tbid., pp. 286-347.

452 CHAPTER 21 / THE MICROSTRUCTURALISM OF RANDALL COLLINS

TABLE 21-7 Key Propositions on Organizations

phate tes fin i EE
Processes of Organizational Control
. The degree of control in patterns of social organization is a positive and additive
function of the concentration among individuals of (a) coercive resources; (b)
material resources; and (c) symbolic resources.
. The form of control in patterns of social organization is a function of the type of
resource that is concentrated in the hands of those individuals seeking to
control others.
The more control is sought through the use of coercive resources, the more
likely are those subject to the application of these resources to (a) seek escape;
(b) fight back, if escape is impossible; (c) comply if the above are impossible
and if material incentives. exist; and (d) sluggishly comply if the above do not
apply.
. The more control is sought through the use of material resources, the more
likely are those subject to the manipulation of material incentives to (a) develop
acquisitive orientations; and (b) develop a strategy of self-interested
manipulation.
. The more control is sought through the use of symbolic resources, the more
likely are those subject to the application of such resources to (a) experience
indoctrination into values and beliefs; (b) be members of homogeneous cohorts
of recruits; (c) be subject to efforts to encourage intraorganizational contact: (d)
be subject to efforts to discourage extraorganizational contact; (@) participate in
ritual activities, especially those involving rites de passage; and (f) be rewarded
for conformity with upward mobility.
Administration of Control
Vi. The more those in authority employ coercive and material incentives to control
others, the greater is the reliance on surveillance as an administrative device to
control. :
Vil. The more those in authority use surveillance to control, the greater is (a) the
level of alienation by those subject to surveillance; (b) the level of conformity in
only highly visible behaviors; and (c) the ratio of supervisory to nonsupervisory
individuals.
. The more those in authority employ symbolic resources to control others, the
greater is their reliance on systems of standardized rules to achieve control.
. The greater is the reliance on systems of standardized rules, the greater is (a)
the impersonality of interactions; (b) standardization of behaviors; and (c) the
dispersion of authority.
Organizational Structure
. Centralization of authority is a positive and additive function of (a) the
concentration of resources; (b) the capacity to mobilize the administration of
control through surveillance, material incentives, and systems of rules; (c) the
Capacity to control the flow of information; (d) the capacity to control
contingencies of the environment; and (e) the degree to which the tasks to be
performed are routine.
Xl. The bureaucratization of authority and social relations is a positive and additive
function of (a) record-keeping technologies; (b) nonkinship agents of
socialization of potential incumbents; (c) money markets; (d) transportation
facilities; (e) nonpersonal centers of power; and (f) diverse centers of power and
authority.
 MICROSTRUCTURALISM: AN ASSESSMENT 453

TABLE 21-8 Key Propositions on the State, Economy, and Ideology

|. The size and scale of political organization is a positive function of the

productive capacity of the economy.
ll. The productive capacity of the economy is a positive and additive function of (a)
level of technology; (b) level of natural resources; (c) population size; and (d)
efficiency in the organization of labor.
ill. The form of political organization is related to the levels of and interactive
effects among (a) size of territories to be governed; (b) the absolute numbers of
people to be governed; (c) the distribution and diversity of people in a territory;
(a) the organization of coercive force (armies); (e) the distribution (dispersion or
concentration) of power and other resources among a population; and (f) the
degree of symbolic unification within and among social units.
IV. The stability of the state is a negative and additive function of:
A. The capacity for political mobilization by other groups, which is a positive
function of:
1. The level of wealth.
2. The capacity for organization as a status group (see I-V in Table 21-2; |,
Ill, and VI in Table 21-3).
B. The incapacity of the state to resolve periodic crises.

state and economy.” A cursory look at Table 21-8 reveals, I think, few
‘eferences to individuals at the micro level. One might, as Collins would
msist, make micro translations of the processes incorporated into the
propositions, but it is clear that Collins abandons discussions of micro-
interactional ritual chains when he begins to talk about large-scale social
processes. And even his insistence that the macro is no more than size,
number, and time seems somewhat strained, although population size and
extent of territory are crucial variables in the propositions.

MICROSTRUCTURALISM: AN ASSESSMENT
I think that Collins’s work is among the most creative in social theory
today. Its great strength resides in the effort to develop abstract propo-
sitions about fundamental properties of the universe. For unlike so many
in social theory today, Collins is not so antipositivist that he must retreat
into an excessive relativism and solipsism.
A related strength in Collins’s approach is his willingness to theorize.
Meta-theoretical pontification is minimal; and he gets right down to the
business of developing propositions about the social universe. Moreover,
he is willing to theorize about a wide range of phenomena in terms of
just a few fundamental ideas. He thus achieves breadth of substantive
analysis without an overly elaborate conceptual scheme. Instead, he makes
deductions from a limited number of basic prupositions.

*Tbid., pp. 348-413.

454 CHAPTER 21 / THE MICROSTRUCTURALISM OF RANDALL COLLINS

Equally significant, I think, is that Collins’s work is filled with creative

insights. He takes ideas from diverse intellectual traditions and combines
them with his own ideas to produce works that are stimulating. For in
the end, theory is not just mechanical induction or deduction; it involves
creative leaps of imagination, and Collins’s work is filled with them.
The substantiveness of Collins’s theoretical approach reflects this
creativity. He has sought to conceptualize the basic nature of interaction
and how it produces and reproduces more macrostructures, and vice versa.
At times, I think that he argues too polemically as to the micro basis of
reality, but his conceptualization of the micro realm in terms of inter-
action ritual chains among actors using resources to their advantage and
the macro realm in terms of chains of encounters that are strung out in
time and stretched in space among various numvers of individuals is, I
believe, a useful way to look at the social world. Simply stated in these
terms, however, Collins’s work would not be so interesting. But as he
translates these metaphorical ideas into abstract propositions, the ap
proach begins to come to life.
But there are, I think, some major problems with the approach. First,
despite his assertion that much existing social theory is metaphorical in
its conception of structure, I find his own formulations rather vague and
metaphorical. He rarely defines concepts precisely: and he shifts his vo-
cabulary in ways that often make it difficult to get a clear grasp of even
such central concepts as resources, power, coercion, property, wealth, ne-
gotiations, encounters, rituals, and structures. Indeed, as I have presented
his ideas in this chapter, I have had to make many inferences about his
meaning. I think that Collins gets away with this vagueness in concept
formation because he writes so well. Indeed; he is probably the best writer
in academic sociology today, and because he can be so engaging, he can
also be conceptually very slippery and vague.
A second problem is that in Collins’s Conflict Sociology and elsewhere,
there is a lack of deductive rigor in the propositions. There are simply
too many propositions that overlap each other and that do not follow
from well-articulated axioms, corollaries, and theorems. Naturally, it can
be argued that at the more preliminary stages of theory building such
deductive precision is not possible nor even desirable. To lose richness of
insight in the name of theoretical elegance and precision is obviously not
desirable in an immature science like sociology. Yet, with more than 400
propositions in Conflict Sociology, Collins’s inventory becomes unman-
ageable. In many ways, my reformuiations of Collins’s propositions rep-
resent an attempt to make them more manageable. But in the end, Collins
will need to articulate some basic theorems if his theoretical strategy is
to realize its full potential.
If this latter effort is made, one suspects that the “axioms” or highest-
order propositions would look very much like those of exchange theory
(see chapters 10-13). For in the final analysis, Collins’s propositions typ-
 MICROSTRUCTURALISM: AN ASSESSMENT 455

ically deal with (1) the respective resources of individuals, (2) the effort
to use resources to advantage and to avoid heavy costs in the process, (3)
the differentiation of individuals in terms of their respective resources,
and (4) the processes by which such differentiation is regularized, on the
one hand, and is the source of conflict and change, on the other. Collins’s
ideas on “interaction ritual chains” do this to some extent, but only in
a most imprecise and metaphorical sense. I believe that considerably more
attention should be devoted to rigorous definitions of concepts and explicit
formulation of his implicit exchange theoretic propositions. In this way,
the full potential of this microstructural approach can be realized.
 CHAPTER 22

_.__ The Structuration Theory

___of Anthony Giddens ______

Among the recent efforts to redirect sociological theorizing is Anthony

Giddens’s work on what he terms the theory of structuration.' In a critical
fashion, Giddens has mounted a consistent line of attack against existing
forms of theorizing, particularly functionalism, Marxism, structuralism,
phenomenology, portions of traditional symbolic interactionism, and role
theory.” In their place, he has attempted to create a theoretical approach
that eliminates the shortcomings of these perspectives and that, at the
same time, tries to blend interactionist concepts with those allowing for
an understanding of the structural properties of societies.
To appreciate Giddens’s strategy, I think that it is wise to begin by
outlining his critique of social theory. In this way, I can place the strategy
and substance of “‘structuration theory” into its critical context.

THE CRITIQUE OF SOCIAL THEORY

Rejecting Naturalism and Positivism

At the core of Giddens’s effort to redirect social theory is the rejection
of a “covering law” view of sociological explanation (see Chapter 1). In

"The basic theory is presented in numerous places, but the two most comprehensive
statements are Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of
Structuration (Oxford: Polity Press, 1984) and Central Problems in Social Theory (London:
Macmillan Press, LTD, 1979). The University of California Press also has editions of these
two books.
*See, in particular, Anthony Giddens, Profiles and Critiques in Sucial Theory (London:
Macmillan Press LTD, 1982) and New Rules of Sociological Method: A Positive Critique
of Interpretative Sociologies (London: Hutchinson Ross Publishing Co., 1976).

456
 THE CRITIQUE OF SOCIAL THEORY 457

what I feel is a shortsighted view, he flatly dismisses the idea that sociology
can be like the natural sciences. For Giddens, there can be no enduring
abstract laws about social processes. In asserting this view, he echoes
Herbert Blumer’s charge that social organization is changeable by the
acts of individuals, and thus, there can be no laws about the invariant
properties of social organization.? And much like Blumer, he visualizes
“the concepts of theory . .. should for many research purposes be regarded
as sensitizing devices, nothing more.”‘ I should emphasize, however, that
the reasons for this assertion are different than those traditionally ad-
vocated by Chicago School symbolic interactionism.
First, Giddens asserts that social theorizing involves a ‘‘double her-
meneutic” that, stripped of this jargon, asserts that the concepts and
generalizations used by social scientists to understand social processes
can be employed by agents to alter these processes, thereby potentially
obviating the generalizations of “science.” We must recognize, Giddens
contends, that lay actors are also “social theorists who alter their theories
in the light of their experience and are receptive to incoming informa-
tion.’> And thus, social science theories are not often ‘“‘news”’ to lay actors,
and when they are, such theories can be used to transform the very order
they describe. For within the capacity of humans to be reflexive—that is,
to think about their situation—is the ability to change it.®
Second, social theory is by its nature social criticism. Social theory
often contradicts ‘“‘the reasons that people give for doing things”’ and is,
therefore, a critique of these reasons and the social arrangements that
people construct in the name of these reasons. Sociology does not, there-
fore, need to develop a separate body of critical theory, as others have
argued (see Chapter 9); it is critical theory by its very nature and by virtue
of the effects it can have on social processes.
The implications of these facts, Giddens believes, are profound. We
need to stop imitating the natural sciences. We must cease evaluating our
success as an intellectual activity in terms of whether or not we have
discovered “timeless laws.” We must recognize that social theory does
not exist “outside” our universe. We should accept the fact that what
sociologists and lay actors do is, in a fundamental sense, very much the
same. And, we must redirect our efforts at developing “sensitizing con-
cepts” that allow us to understand the active processes of interaction
among individuals as they produce and reproduce social structures while
being guided by these structures.

3See Chapter 15.

‘Giddens, The Constitution of Society, p. 326.
5Tbid., p. 335.
6(iddens lists conditions under which social science will not have “transtormational
implications” for social organization; see ibid., pp. 341-43.
458 CHAPTER 22 / THE STRUCTURATION THEORY OF ANTHONY GIDDENS

Obviating Sociological Dualisms

I think that one of the most useful criticisms mounted by Giddens is the
rejection of dualisms in social theory—micro versus macro theory, subject
(people) versus object (structure), individual versus society, subjectivism
versus objectivism, and similar dichotomies around which great debate
rages. At the heart of his approach is the assertion that “so-called ‘mi-
crosociological’ study does not deal with a reality that is somehow more
substantial than that with which ‘macrosociological’ analysis is concerned.
But neither, on the contrary, is interaction in situations of co-presence
simply ephemeral, as contrasted to the solidity of large-scale or long-
established institutions.”’ The process of “structuration” is intended to
emphasize that the individual-society, subject-object, and micro-macro
dichotomies do not constitute a dualism, but a “duality.” That is, people
in interaction use the rules and resources that constitute social structure
in their day-to-day routines in contexts of co-presence, and in so doing,
they reproduce these rules and resources of structure. Thus, individual
action, interaction, and social structure are all implicated in each other.
They do not constitute separate realities, but a duality within the same
reality, for “the structural properties of social systems are both the me-
dium and the outcome of the practices that constitute those systems.”®
One cannot understand action and interaction without reference to the
rules and resources of social structure, whereas one cannot fully under-
stand large-scale, long-term institutional structures without knowledge of
how actors use the rules and resources of these institutional structures
in concrete interaction.
At times, Giddens recognizes, it is necessary to “bracket out” con-
sideration of either individuals in interaction or institutional structures.
But this is a methodological procedure rather than an ontological asser-
tion. I think that Giddens is correct in his conclusion that too much social
theory converts this methodological procedure of bracketing with onto-
logical statements about what is really real in the social universe.

The Critique of Functionalism and Evolutionism

In what I think can he viewed as the merciless flogging of two dying
horses, Giddens has consistently attacked (1) functionalism, or the anal-
ysis of social phenomena in terms of the needs that structures meet; and
(2) evolutionism, or the description: of the inexorable stages that societies
must pass through on the road to modernity. Functionalist theories are
almost all evolutionary (see Chapters 2-5); and thus Giddens rejects them
as an appropriate approach to understanding society. Similarly—and here

"Ibid., p. 26.
*Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, p. 69.
 THE CRITIQUE OF SOCIAL THEORY 459

Giddens is more creative—he attacks Marx’s work and much contem

-
porary Marxism as both functional and evolutionary and, hence, not very
useful.®
I think that Giddens’s list of criticisms is fairly standard, and we
need not review them here. However, I see the general argument as very
important: functional analysis tends to ignore the active processes of
agents in interaction and to overemphasize social structure as an “external _
constraint” on actors, whereas evolutionary analysis tends to stress the
inexorable movement of societies in response to some causal factor, such
as size, war, and means of production. For Giddens, the “duality of struc-
ture”’ is lost in all of this analysis of functional needs, the constraints of
structure, the stages of development, and the “prime causes” of change.
That is, agents in situations of interaction are not seen as doing very
much; and structure is seen to march along disembodied from the actors
who are involved in its reproduction or transformation.

The Limits of Interactionism

Giddens draws upon interactionist theory, especially that developed by
Erving Goffman. Yet, he is critical of Goffman and other interactionist
theories in several respects. First, they tend to perpetuate the dualism
(as opposed to duality) of individual versus structure. Rarely do inter-
actionists discuss social structure in a way that allows for an understand-
ing of how it is reproduced through the processes of interaction. Moreover,
some interactionists are openly chauvinistic, dismissing institutional pro-
cesses as somehow less “real” than face-to-face symbolic interaction.
Second, interactionist theories tend to ignore motivation. In other
words, what drives actors to do what they do? There is an implicit view
of actors, especially in Goffman’s dramaturgy, as cynical manipulators of
gestures in staging areas. But rarely are the questions asked: why do actors
engage in certain gesturing practices?; why enter or exit a stage or region?;
or why use a “folk method”? Thus, interactionist theory needs a revision
in terms of a theory of motivation that avoids the imprecision and mys-
ticism of psychoanalytic theory while moving beyond a view of actors as
cynical and self-centered orchestrators of gestures.
Third, more structurally oriented forms of interactionism, such as
structural role theory, begin to visualize roles as the constitutive basis of
structure. In Giddens’s view, it is actual practices of people or collective
units, not roles, that are the point of articulation between the individual
and society. While these practices may be influenced by an agent’s po-
sition, “social systems ... are regularized social practices, sustained in
encounters.” Too often, the concept of role has been used as a substitute

*See, in particular, Anthony Giddens, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materi-

alism: Volume 1, Power, Property and the State (London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1981).
460 CHAPTER 22 / THE STRUCTURATION THEORY OF ANTHONY GIDDENS

for normative constraints on individuals who passively perform their as-

signed roles. As a result, the typification of structure as a system of roles
tends to remove the active. reflexive. creative, and potentially transfor-
mative behaviors of agents.

The Critique of Structuralism

Giddens has been very critical of Claude Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism (see
appendix to Chapter 19), because it simply ignores human agency or the
capacity of people to reflect. monitor, define, and decide. In such struc-
turalist approaches, actors are pushed, if not compelled, to act in ac-
cordance with immanent systems of codes. Other forms of structural theo-
rizing, such as Peter Blau’s macrostructuralism, are chauvinistic and simply
define away as relevant to sociology the reflexive capacities of human
agents.'° In such macrostructuralism, social structure simply requires ac-
tors to do its bidding. ae ~ Pee
In all of these and other structural theories, then, there is a failure
to recognize that structure is actively reproduced (or altered) by agents
in interaction. For Giddens, structure is not some ex cathedra, external,
and constraining force that makes humans into robots and dupes. Rather,
structure is implicated in, and reproduced by, the day-to-day routines of
people in interaction. It is, in Giddens’s words, “both constraining and
enabling.” One cannot, therefore, define away people in interaction as
peripheral to the task of sociological explanation.
Let me now summarize. Giddens criticizes sociological theory for its
unwarranted belief that universal laws can be developed, for its unnec-
essary dualisms, for its functionalism and evolutionism, for its failure to
implicate motives and structure in the process of interaction, and for its
tendency to view structure and symbols as somehow alien to the actors
who produce, reproduce, and transform these structures and symbols.
Unlike many critics, Giddens does not dismount his soap box at this point
and go home. To his credit, he then tries to develop an alternative mode
of theoretical analysis that, he believes, overcomes these deficiencies.

THE “THEORY OF STRUCTURATION”

Since Giddens does not believe that abstract laws of social action, inter-
action, and organization exist, his “theory of structuration” is not a series
of propositions. Instead, I see the theory as a cluster of sensitizing con-
cepts linked together discursively. Giddens’s work is thus what I called a
sensitizing conceptual scheme in Chapter 1. The key concept is “struc-
turation,”’ which is intended to communicate the “duality of structure.”

See The Constitution of Society, pp. 207-13.

 THE "THEORY OF STRUCTURATION': 461

That is, social structure is used by active agents; and in so using the
properties of structure, they transferm or reproduce this structure. Thus,
the process of structuration requires a conceptualization of the nature of
structure, of the agents who use structure, and of the ways that these are
mutually implicated in each other to produce varying patterns of human
organization.

Reconceptualizing Structure and Social System

For Giddens, structure can be conceptualized as the “rules” and “re-
sources” that actors use in “interaction contexts” that extend across
“space” and over “time.” In so using these rules and resources, actors
sustain or reproduce structures in space and time.
Rules are “generalizable procedures” that actors understand and use
in various circumstances. For Giddens, a rule is a methodology or tech-
nique that actors know about, often only implicitly, and that provides a
relevant formula for action."! From a sociological perspective, the most
important rules are those which agents use in the reproduction of social
relations over significant lengths of time and across space. These rules
reveal certain characteristics: (1) they are frequently used in (a) conver-
sations, (b) interaction rituals, and (c) the daily routines of individuals:
(2) they are tacitly grasped and understood and are part of the “stock
knowledge” of competent actors; (3) they are informal, remaining un-
written and unarticulated; and (4) they are weakly sanctioned through
interpersonal techniques.'?
With this conceptualization, Giddens subsumes (a) the functionalist’s
emphasis‘on institutional norms and cultural values, (b) the ethnometh-
odologist’s emphasis on folk methods, (c) the structuralist’s concern with
the generative nature of symbols and codes. and (d) just about all other
conceptualizations in between. T'he thrust of Giddens’s argument is that
rules are part of actors’ ‘“knowledgeability.” Some may be normative in
that actors can articulate and explicitly make reference to them, but many
other rules are more implicitly understood and used to guide the flow of
interaction in ways that are not easily expressed or verbalized. Moreover,
actors can transform rules into new combinations as they confront and
deal with each other and the contextual particulars of their interaction.
As the other critica) property of structure, resources are facilities that
actors use to get things done. For even if there are well-understood meth-
odologies and formulas--that is, rules-- to guide action, there must also be
the capacity to perform tasks. Such capacity requires resources, or the
material equipment and the organizational ability to act in situations.

"Tbid., pp. 20-21.

2} bid., p. 22.
ABE CHAPTER 22 / THE STRUCTURATION THEORY OF ANTHONY GIDDENS

Giddens visualizes resources as what generates power.'* Power is not a

resource, as much social theory argues. Rather, the mobilization of other
resources is what gives actors power to get things done. Thus, power is
integral to the very existence of structure, for as actors interact, they use
resources; and as they use resources, they mobilize power to shape the
actions of others.
Giddens visualizes rules and resources as “transformational” and as
‘“mediating.’’4 What he means by these terms is that rules and resources
can be transformed into many different patterns and profiles. Resources
can be mobilized in various ways to perform activities and achieve ends
through the exercise of different forms and degrees of power; rules can
generate many diverse combinations of methodologies and formulas to
guide how people communicate, interact, and adjust to each other. Rules
and resources are mediating in that they are what tie social relations
together. They are what actors use to create, sustain, or transform rela-
tions across time and in space. And because rules and resources are in-
herently transformational—that is, generative of diverse combinations—
they can lace together many different patterns of social relations in time
and space.
Giddens develops a typology of rules and resources that I think is
rather vague and imprecise.’> He sees the three concepts in this typology—
domination, legitimation, and signification—as ‘theoretical primitives,”
which, I suspect, is an excuse for defining them imprecisely. The basic
idea is that resources are the stuff of domination because they involve
the mobilization of material and organizational facilities to do things.
Some rules are transformed into instruments of legitimation because they
make things seem correct and appropriate. Other rules are used to create
signification, or meaningful symbolic systems, because they provide people
with ways to see and interpret events. Actually, I think that the scheme
makes more sense if the concepts of domination, legitimation, and sig-
nification are given less emphasis and the elements of his discussion are
selectively extracted to create the typology presented in Figure 22-1.
In the left column of Figure 22-1, structure is viewed by Giddens as
composed of rules and resources. Rules are transformed into two basic
types of mediating processes: (1) normative, or the creation of rights and
obligations in a context; and (2) interpretative, or the generation of schemes
and stocks of taken-for-granted knowledge in a context. Resources are
transformed into two major types of facilities that can mediate social
relations: (1) authoritative resources, or the organizational capacity to
control and direct the patterns of interactions in a context; and (2) al-

'8Tbid., pp. 14-16.

“Here Giddens seems to be taking what is useful from “structuralism” and reworking
these ideas into a more sociological approach.
“The Constitution of Society, p. 29 and Central Problems in Social Theory, pp. 97-107.
 THE ‘‘THEORY OF STRUCTURATION”’ 463

FIGURE 22-1 Social Structure, Social System, and the Modalities of Connection

(1) (2) (3)

Structure Modalities Social system

Normative rules «———_—_—_———-» Specific rights <——_______-» Sanctions

(legitimation) and obligations

Allocative resources
(domination)

——» Facilitiesto ~<———_—________-» Power,

realize goals
Authoritative resources
(domination)

Interpretative rules «—__—_—_—+» interpretative +———> Communication

(signification) schemes and stocks
of knowledge

locative resources, or the use of material features, artifacts, and goods to

control and direct patterns of interaction in a context.
Giddens sees these types of rules and resources as mediating inter-
action via three modalities, as is portrayed in column 2 of Figure 22-1:
norms, facilities, and interpretative schemes. I have deviated somewhat
from Giddens’s discussion, but the same idea is that rules and resources
are attached to interaction, or “social system” in Giddens’s terms, via
these three modalities. These modalities are then used to (a) generate the
power that enables some actors to control others, (b) affirm the norms
that, in turn, allow actors to be sanctioned for their conformity or non-
conformity, and (c) create and use the interpretative schemes that make
it possible for actors to communicate with each other.
Giddens also stresses that rules and resources are interrelated. In a
discussion that I see as very similar to many by Talcott Parsons (see
Chapter 3), Giddens emphasizes that the modalities and their use in
interaction are only separated analytically. In the actual flow of inter-
action in the real empirical world, they exist simultaneously, thereby
making their separation merely an exercise of analytical decomposition.
Thus, the use of power, sanctions, and media of communication are in-
terconnected, as are the rules and resources of social structure. In social
systems, where people are co-present and interact, power is used to secure
a particular set of rights and obligations as well as a system of commu-
nication; and conversely, power can be exercised only through commu-
nication and sanctioning.
464 CHAPTER 22 / THE STRUCTURATION THEORY OF ANTHONY GIDDENS

I think it reasonable to ask: why does Giddens create this analytic

scheme of social structure and social system, especially since it is very
vague? I suspect that the answer resides in Giddens’s desire to visualize
structure in entirely different terms than either functional or structuralist
theory. For Giddens, social structure is to be seen as something used by
actors, not as some external reality that pushes and shoves actors around.
Thus, social structure is defined as the rules and resources that can be
transformed as actors use them in concrete settings. But then, the ques-
tion arises: how is structure to be connected to what people actually do
in interaction settings, or what Giddens terms “‘social systems’? The
answer is the awkward notion of modalities, whereby rules and resources
are transformed into power, sanctions, and communication. Thus, struc-
ture is not a mysterious system of codes, as Lévi-Strauss and other struc-
tural idealists imply, nor is it a set of determinative parameters and ex-
ternal constraints on actors, as Peter Blau ard other macrostructuralists
contend. In Giddens’s conceptualization, social structure is transforma-
tive and flexible; it is “part of” actors in concrete situations; and it is
used by them to create patterns of social relations across space and through
time. |
Moreover, I think that this typology allows Giddens to emphasize
that as agents interact in social systems, they can reproduce rules and
resources (via the modalities) or they can transform them. Thus, social
interaction and social structure are reciprocally implicated. Structuration
is, therefore, the dual processes in which rules and resources are used to
organize interaction across time and in space and, by virtue of this use,
to reproduce or transform these rules and resources.

Reconceptualizing Institutions
For Giddens, institutions are systems of interaction in societies that en-
dure over time and that distribute people in space. Giddens uses what I
see as rather vague phrases like “deeply sedimented across time and in
space in societies” to express the idea that when rules and resources are
reproduced over long periods of time and in explicit regions of space, then
institutions can be said to exist in a society. Giddens offers a typology of
institutions in terms of the weights and combinations of rules and re-
sources that are implicated in interaction." If signification (interpretative
rules) is primary, followed respectively by domination (allocative and au-
thoritative resources) and then by legitimation (normative rules), a “sym-
bolic order” exists. If authoritative domination, signification, and legi-
timation are successively combined, political institutionalization occurs.
If allocative dominance, signification, and legitimation are ordered. eco-

‘*Central Problems in Social Theory, p. 107; and The Constitution of Society, p. 31.
 THE “THEORY OF STRUCTURATION” 465

TABLE 22-1 The Typology of Institutions

ScunESSneermmemeneremesereeee meeeee eS SRO SS
Type of Institution Rank Order of Emphasis on Rules and
Resources
1. Symbolic orders, are produced and the use of interpretative rules
or modes of reproduced by (signification) in conjunction with
discourse, and normative rules (legitimation) and
patterns of allocative as well as authoritative
communication : resources (domination).
2. Political are produced and the use of authoritative resources
institutions reproduced by (domination) in conjunction with
interpretative rules (signification)
and normative rules (legitimation).
3. Economic are produced and the use of allocative resources
institutions reproduced by (domination) in conjunction with
interpretative rules (signification)
and normative rules (legitimation).
4. Legal institutions are produced and the use of normative rules
reproduced by (legitimation) in conjunction with
authoritative and allocative
resources (domination) and
interpretative rules (signification).

nomic institutionalization prevails. And if legitimation, dominance, and

signification are rank ordered, institutionalization of law occurs. Table
22-1 summarizes Giddens’s argument.
In so many ways, I see this typology as imprecise, and thankfully, it
is not used very much in his subsequent analysis of structuralism. But
once again I think it reasonable to ask: why generate it in the first place,
especially since it smacks of the same kind of concept mongering found
in much functional analysis? One reason appears to be Giddens’s desire
to reject functional modes of institutional analysis by presenting his al-
ternative. Most functional theories analyze the process of institutional
differentiation among, for example, economy, law, polity, education, and
kinship (see Chapters 2-5). Such differentiation is typically seen to occur
in an evolutionary framework, with each stage of evolution marked by
increased separation and autonomy of institutions from each other. Gid-
dens wishes to avoid this mechanical view of institutionalization, in sev-
eral senses. First, systems of interaction in empirical contexts are a mix-
ture of institutional processes. Economic, political, legal, and symbolic
orders are not easily separated; there is usually an element of each in any
social system context. Second, institutions are tied to the rules and re-
sources that agents employ and thereby reproduce; they are not external
to individuals because they are formed by the use of varying rules and
resources in actual social relations. Third, the most basic dimensions of
all rules and resources—signification, domination, and legitimation—are
all involved in institutionalization; it is only their relative salience for
 S
466 CHAPTER 22 / THE STRUCTURATION THEORY OF ANTHONY GIODEN

actors that gives the stabilization of relations across time and in space
its distinctive institutional character.
To his credit, Giddens is unlike many interactionists because he wants
to acknowledge the importance of analyzing stabilized social relations—
that is, institutionalization. But as with all interactionist theory, he wishes
to stress that institutionalized social relations are actively reproduced in
terms of the creative transformations of rules and resources that are em-
ployed by agents in actual interaction. Thus, one of the most important
structural features of social relations is their institutionalization in space
and across time. Such institutionalization moves along four dimensions—
law, economy, political, and symbolic—which are distinguished from each
other in terms of the relative use of various rules and resources. I am not
sure that he needed the typology in Table 22-1 to make this important
point, but it is the vehicle by which he chose to make his argument, and
so, I have discussed it here.

Structural Principles, Sets, and Properties

The extent and form of institutionalization in societies is related to what
Giddens terms structural principles.'’? These are the most general prin-
ciples that guide the organization of societal totalities. These are what
“stretch systems across time and space,” and they allow for “system in-
tegration” or the maintenance of reciprocal relations among units in a
society. For Giddens, “structural principles can thus be understood as the
principles of organization which allow recognizably consistent forms of
time-space distanciation on the basis of definite mechanisms of societal
integration.””* I find such definitions rather vague, to say the least, but
the basic idea seems to be that rules and resources are used by active
agents in accordance with fundamental principles of organization. Such
principles guide just how rules and resources are transformed and em-
ployed to mediate social relations.
On the basis of their underlying structural principles, three basic types
of societies have existed: (1) “Tribal societies,” which are organized in
terms of structural principles that emphasize kinship and tradition as the
mediating force behind social relations across time and in space; (2) “class-
divided societies,” which are organized in terms of an urban-rural differ-
entiation, with urban areas revealing distinctive political institutions that
can be separated from economic institutions, formal codes of law or legal
institutions, and modes of symbolic coordination or ordering through
written texts and testaments; and (3) “class societies,” which involve

“The Constitution of Society, pp. 179-93.

'"Tbid., p. 181.
 THE ‘THEORY OF STRUCTURATION”’ 467

structural principles that separate and yet interconnect all four institu-
tional spheres, especially the economic and political.’
Structural principles are implicated in the production and reproduc-
tion of “structures” or “structural sets.”” These structural sets are rule/
resource bundles, or combinations and configurations of rules and re-
sources, which are used to produce and reproduce certain types and forms
of social relations across time and space. Giddens offers the example of
how the structural principles of class societies (differentiation and clear
separation of economy and polity) guide the use of the following structural
set: private property-money-capital-labor-contract-profit. The details of
his analysis are less important than the general idea that the general
structural principles of class societies are transformed into more specific
sets of rules and resources that agents use to mediate social relations. The
above structural set is used in capitalist societies and, as a consequence,
is reproduced. In turn, such reproduction of the structural set reaffirms
the more abstract structural principles of class societies.
As these and other structural sets are used by agents and as they are
thereby reproduced, societies develop “structural properties,” which are
““institutionalized features of social systems, stretching across time and
space.’° That is, social relations become patterned in certain typical ways.
Thus, the structural set of private property-money-capital-labor contract-
profit can mediate only certain patterns of relations; that is, if this is the
rule/resource bundle with which agents must work, then only certain
forms of relations can be produced and reproduced in the economic sphere.
Hence, the institutionalization of relations in time and space reveals a
particular form, or in Giddens’s terms, structural property.

Structural Contradiction
Giddens always wants to emphasize the inherent “transformative” po-
tential of rules and resources. Structural principles, he argues, “‘operate
in terms of one another but yet also contravene each other.’?! In other
words, they reveal contradictions that can be either primary or secondary.
A “primary contradiction” is one between structural principles that-are
formative and constitute a society, whereas a “secondary contradiction”
is one that is “brought into being by primary contradictions.”” For ex-
ample, there is a contradiction between structural principles that mediate
the institutionalization of private profits, on the one hand, and those that
mediate socialized production, on the other. If workers pool their labor

For an extensive discussion of this typology, see Giddens’s A Contemporary Critique

of Historical Materialism.
*The Constitution of Society, p. 185.
*1Tbid., p. 193.
4Tbid.
468 CHAPTER 22 / THE STRUCTURATION THEORY OF ANTHONY GIDDENS

to produce goods and services, it is contradictory to allow only some to

enjoy profits of such socialized labor.
Contradictions are not, Giddens emphasizes, the same as conflicts.
Contradiction is a “disjunction of structural principles of system orga-
nization,” whereas conflict is the actual struggle between actors in “def-
inite social practices.” Thus, the contradiction between private profits
and socialized labor is not, itself, a conflict. It can create situations of
conflict, such as struggles between management and labor in a specific
time and place, but such conflicts are not the same as contradiction.
I must confess to being somewhat confused by Giddens’s discussion
of these topics. It is a most imprecise analysis. Yet, beneath all of the
jargon is, I feel, an important insight: the institutional patterns of a society
represent the creation and use by agents of very generalized and abstract
principles; these principles represent the development of particular rules
and the mobilization of certain resources; such principles generate more
concrete “‘bundles” or “sets” of rules and resources that agents actively
use to produce and reproduce social relations in concrete settings; and
many of these principles and sets contain contradictory elements that
can encourage actual conflicts among actors. In this way, structure “‘con-
strains” but is not something disembodied from agents. Rather, the “prop-
erties” of total societies are not external to individuals and collectivities
but are persistently reproduced through the use of structural principles
and sets by agents who act. Let me now turn to Giddens’s discussion of
these active agents. |

Agents, Agency, and Action

As is evident, Giddens visualizes structure as a duality, as something that
is part of the actions of agents. And so in Giddens’s approach, it is es-
sential to understand the dynamics of human agency. He proposes a
“stratification model,” which I see as an effort to synthesize psychoan-
alytic theory, phenomenology, ethnomethodology, and elements of action
theory. This model is depicted in the lower portions of Figure 22-2. For
Giddens, “agency” denotes the events that an actor perpetrates rather
than “intentions,” “purposes,” “ends,” or other states. Agency is what
an actor actually does in a situation that has visible consequences (not
necessarily intended consequences). To understand the dynamics of agency
requires analysis of each elemeni on the model.
As I have drawn the model in Figure 22-2, it actually combines two
overlapping models in Giddens’s discussion, but his intent is reasonably
clear: humans “‘reflexively monitor” their own conduct and that of others;

*Ibid., p. 198.
 THE ‘THEORY OF STRUCTURATION”: 469

FIGURE 22-2 The Dynamics of Agency

Institutionalized
patterns
(a) Regionalized contexts
(b) Routinized contexts

Interaction with others in

contexts (social system)

|
Reflexive monitoring of actions

Rationalization through
discursive consciousness

|
Interpretation through
practical consciousness

|
Unconscious pressures

|
Unconscious motives to sustain
ontological security
(achieving trust with others
and reducing anxiety)

in other words, they pay attention, note, calculate, and assess the con-
sequences of actions. Monitoring is influenced by two levels of con-
sciousness. One is “discursive consciousness,” which involves the ca-
pacity to give reasons for or rationalize what one does (and presumably
to do the same for others’ behavior). “Practical consciousness” is the
stock of knowledge that one implicitly uses to act in situations and to
interpret the actions of others. It is this knowledgeability that is con-
stantly used, but rarely articulated, to interpret events—one’s own and
those of others. Almost all acts are indexical, to use Garfinkel’s term, in
that they must be interpreted by their context; and it is this implicit stock

*Tbid., pp. 5-7; see also Central Problems in Social Theory, pp. 56-59.
*His debt to Schutz and phenomenology is evident here, but he has liberated it from
its subjectivism. See Chapter 14 on the emergence of interactionism.
470 CHAPTER 22 / THE STRUCTURATION THEORY OF ANTHONY GIDDENS

of knowledge that provides these contextual interpretations and

frameworks.”
There are also unconscious dimensions to human agency. There are
many pressures to act in certain ways, which an actor does not perceive.
Indeed, Giddens argues that much motivation is unconscious. Moreover,
motivation is often much more diffuse than action theories portray. That
is, there is no one-to-one relation between an act and a motive. Actors
may be able to rationalize through their capacity for discursive con-
sciousness in ways that make this one-to-one relationship seem to be
what directs action. But in fact, much of what propels action lies below
consciousness and, at best, provides very general and diffuse pressures to
act. Moreover, much action may not be motivated at all; an actor simply
monitors and responds to the environment.
In trying to reintroduce the unconscious into social theory, Giddens
adopts Erik Erickson’s psychoanalytic ideas.2” The basic “force” behind
much action is an unconscious set of processes to gain a “sense of trust”
in interaction with others. Giddens terms this set of processes the on-
tological security system of an agent. That is, one of the driving but highly
diffuse forces behind accion is the desire to sustain ontological security
or the sense of trust that comes from being able to reduce anxiety in social
relations. Actors need to have this sense of trust. How they go about
reducing anxiety to secure this sense is often unconscious because the
mechanisms involved are developed before linguistic skills emerge in the
young and because there may also be psychodynamics, such as repression,
that keep these fundamental feelings and their resolution from becoming
conscious. In general, Giddens argues that ontological security is main-
tained through the routinization of encounters with others, through the
successful interpretation of acts in terms of practical or stock knowledge,
and through the capacity for rationalization that comes with discursive
consciousness.
As the top portions of Figure 22-2 emphasize, institutionalized pat-
terns have an effect on, while being a consequence of, the dynamics of
agency. As we will see shortly, unconscious motives for ontological security
require routinized interactions (predictable, stable over time) that are
regionalized (ordered in space). Such regionalization and routinization is
the product of past interactions of agents, while being sustained or re-
produced through the present (and future) actions of agents. To sustain
routines and regions, actors must monitor their actions, while drawing
upon their stock knowledge and discursive capacities. In this way, Giddens
visualizes institutionalized patterns implicated in the very nature of agency.
Institutions and agents cannot exist without each other, for institutions

*Here Giddens is using ideas of phenomenology and ethnomethodology without all the
ontological and metaphorical rhetoric.
"The Constitution of Society, pp. 45-59.
 THE ‘‘THEORY OF STRUCTURATION” 471

are reproduced practices by agents, whereas the conscious and uncon-

scious dynamics of agency depend upon the routines and regions provided
by institutionalized patterns.

Routinization and Regionalization of Interaction

Both the ontological security of agents and the institutionalization of
structures in time and space depend upon routinized and regionalized
interaction among actors. Routinization of interaction patterns is what
_ gives them continuity across time, thereby reproducing structure (rules
and resources) and structures (institutions). At the same time, routini-
zation gives predictability to actions and, in so doing, provides for a sense
of ontological security. Thus, routines become critical for the most basic
aspects of structure and human agency. Similarly, regionalization orders
action in space by positioning actors in places vis-a-vis one another and
by circumscribing how they are to present themselves and act. As with
routines, the regionalization of interaction is essential to the sustenance
of broader structural patterns and ontological security of actors, because
it orders people’s interactions in space and time, which, in turn, repro-
duces structures and meets an agent’s need for ontological security. Let
me now elaborate on these general ideas because I think they mark an
important contribution to social theory.

Routines. In discussing routines, Giddens sees them as the key

link between the episodic character of interactions (they start, proceed,
and end), on the one hand, and basic trust and security, on the other.”
Moreover, “the routinization of encounters is of major significance in
binding the fleeting encounter to social reproduction and thus to the
seeming ‘fixity’ of institutions.” In a very interesting discussion in which
he borrows heavily from Erving Goffman but with a phenomenological
twist, Giddens proposes several procedures, or mechanisms, that humans
use to sustain routines: (1) opening and closing rituals, (2) turn taking,
(3) tact, (4) positioning, and (5) framing. These are not necessarily ex-
clusive,*° and I must confess that I am guessing here as to Giddens’s actual
intent; but the general idea is that people employ these mechanisms to
sustain routines and, thereby, reproduce social structures while main-
taining ontological security. Let me elaborate briefly on these five routines.
1. Since interaction is serial—that is, it occurs sequentially—there
must be symbolic markers of opening and closing. Such markers are
essential to the maintenance of routines because they indicate when

*Tbid., pp. 60-109.

; |
*Tbid., p. 72.
discussion.
*] have created this list from what is a much more rambling
472 CHAPTER 22 / THE STRUCTURATION THEORY OF ANTHONY GIDDENS

in the flow of time the elements of routine interaction are to begin

and end. There are many such interpersonal markers—words, facial
gestures, positions of bodies—and there are physical markers, such as
rooms, buildings, roads, and equipment that also signal when certain
routinized interactions are to begin and end (note, for example, the
interpersonal and physical markers for a lecture, which is a highly
routinized interaction that sustains the ontological security of agents
and perpetuates institutional patterns).
2. Turn taking in a conversation is another process that sustains
a routine. All competent actors contain in their practical conscious-
ness, or implicit stock of knowledge, a sense of how conversations are
to proceed sequentially. There are “folk methods” that people rely on
to construct sequences of talk, and in so doing, they sustain a routine
and, hence, their psychological sense of security and the larger in-
stitutional context (think, for example, about a conversation that did
not proceed smoothly in terms of conversational turn taking; and
recall how disruptive this was for one’s sense of order and routine).
3. Tact is, in Giddens’s view, ‘“‘the main mechanism that sustains
‘trust’ or ‘ontological security’ over long time-space spans.” By tact,
Giddens means ‘“‘a latent conceptual agreement among participants
in interaction” about just how each party is to gesture and respond
and about what is appropriate and inappropriate.*! People carry with
them implicit stocks of knowledge that signal to them what would be
“tactful” and what would be “rude” and “intrusive.”’ And they use
this sense of tact to regulate their emission of gestures, their talking,
and their relative positioning in situations in order “to remain tactful,”
thereby sustaining their sense of trust and the larger social order.
(Imagine interactions where tact is not exercised and how they disrupt
routines, our sense of comfort, and our perceptions of an orderly
situation.)
4. Giddens rejects the idea of “role” as very useful and substitutes
the notion of “position.” People bring to situations a position or
“social identity that carries with it a certain range of prerogatives
and obligations,” and they emit gestures in a process of mutual po-
sitioning, such as locating their bodies in certain points, asserting
their prerogatives, and signaling their obligations. In so doing, inter-
actions can be routinized, and people can sustain their sense of mutual
trust as well as the larger social structures in which their interaction
occurs. (For example, examine a student-student or professor-student
interaction in terms of positioning and determine how it sustains a
sense of trust and the institutional structure.)

a1
The Constitution of Society, p. 75. Surprisingly, Giddens never really dennes “tact,”
assuming we know what it means. I had to infer this definition.
 THE ‘THEORY OF STRUCTURATION” 473

5. Much of the coherence of positioning activities is made possible

by “frames” that provide formulas for interpreting a context. Inter-
actions tend to be framed in the sense that there are rules that apply
to them, but these are not purely normative in the sense of precise
instructions for participants. Equally important, frames are more im-
plicitly held, and they operate as markers that assert when certain
behaviors and demeanors should be activated. (For example, compare
your sense of how to comport yourself at a funeral, cocktail party,
class, and other contexts that are “framed.’’)

In sum, social structure is extended across time by these techniques

that produce and reproduce routines. In so stretching interaction across
time in an orderly and predictable manner, people realize their need for
a sense of trust in others. In this way, then, Giddens connects the most
basic properties of structure (rules and resources) to the most fundamental
features of human agents (unconscious motives).

Regionalization. Structuration theory is concerned with the re-

production of relations not only across time but also in space. With the
concept of regionalization of interaction, Giddens addresses the intersec-
tion of space and time.*? For interaction is not just serial, moving in time;
it is also located in space. Again borrowing from Goffman and also time-
geography, Giddens introduces the concept of “locale” to account for the
physical space in which interaction occurs as well as the contextual knowl-
edge about what is to occur in this space. In a locale, actors are not only
establishing their presence with respect to each other but they are also
using their stocks of practical knowledge to interpret the context of the
locale. Such interpretations provide them with the relevant frames, the
appropriate procedures for tact, and the salient forms for sequencing ges-
tures and talk.
Giddens classifies locales in terms of their ‘““modes.” Locales vary in
terms of (1) their physical and symbolic boundaries, (2) their duration
across time, (3) their span or extension in physical space, and (4) their
character or the ways they connect to other locales and to broader in-
stitutional patterns. Locales also vary in terms of the degree to which
they force people to sustain high public presence (what Goffman termed
front stage) or to allow retreats to back regions where public presence is
reduced (Goffman’s back stage).*°> They also vary in regard to how much
disclosure of self (feelings, attitudes, and emotions) that they require,
some allowing “enclosure” or the withholding of self and other locales
requiring “disclosure” of at least some aspects of self.

%2Tbid., pp. 110-44. |

%See Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday Publishing, 1959).
 GIDDENS
474 CHAPTER 22 / THE STRUCTURATION THEORY OF ANTHONY

FIGURE 22-3 Key Elements of ‘‘Structuration Theory”

Structural Regionalization/ Discursive Unconscious
Rules and
sets routinization consciousness motives
resources

Structural «—* Structural «—> — systems «—*» Practical =» Needs for

Structure —»
principles properties .consciousness ontological
institutions Pas rabiae | |security

Elements Elements of | Elements of Elements of Elements of '

of functional interactionism, phenomenology psychoanalytic
structuralism — theory especially and theory
dramaturgy ethnomethodology

Regionalization of interaction through the creation of locales facili-

tates the maintenance of routines. In turn, the maintenance of routines
across time and space sustains institutional structures. Thus, it is through
routinized and regionalized systems of interaction that the reflexive ca-
pacities of agents operate to reproduce institutional patterns.

THE THEORY QF STRUCTURATION: A SUMMARY

AND ASSESSMENT
The most important part of Giddens’s theoretical effort is the synthesis
of diverse theoretical traditions. Figure 22-3 summarizes the main ele-
ments of his theory and indicates the theoretical tradition incorporated
into each element. Giddens’s conceptualization of structure as rules and
resources that are inherently generative of many diverse combinations
and his vision that societies reveal general structural principles and sets
borrows from French structuralism (see appendix to Chapter 19) but, in
a very real sense, turns this structuralism on its head. Structure is not
something that is lodged in human biology, nor is it a free-floating system
of ideas and ideals. Rather, it is actively produced, reproduced, and trans-
formed by the capacities of agents. Structural analvsis is thus reattached
to the ongoing process of interaction.
The analysis of modalities through which rules and resources influ-
ence interaction and the typology of institutions conceptualizes the useful
portions of functional analysis: the processes of institutionalization or
the creation and maintenance of relatively stable social relations. This
emphasis on institutions and institutionalization corrects for deficiencies
in most forms of structuralism and interactionism. Some modes of struc-
tural analysis, such as the structural idealism of Lévi-Strauss, deny the
ontological status of institutions, seeing them as merely derivative of more
 THE THEORY OF STRUCTURATION: A SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT
475

fundamental codes. Other forms of structural analysis, such as that by

Peter Blau (see Chapter 20) or Bruce Mayhew, analyze structure without
reference to either the processes behind human agency and interaction
or the symbolic rules and resources created and used by actors. At the
other extreme, interactionists fail to address the topic of structure, typ-
ically viewing it as an “object,” “frame,” or some other given within which
the interpersonal process unfolds. In contrast to the deficiencies of these
approaches, Giddens’s theory is vitally concerned with the way in which
interaction becomes “deeply sedimented in time and space.” But unlike
much functional theorizing, institutions do not constitute an “external
constraint” but a process of reproduction by actors in situations of co-
presence.
The discussion of regionalization and routinization is an important
theoretical contribution because it attaches institutional analysis to the
interactions of actors in situations of co-presence. By inserting Goffman’s
dramaturgical concepts, coupled with time-space geography, Giddens an-
chors the rather vague typology of institutions and their imprecise por-
trayal as “deeply sedimented in time and space’ to something less slip-
pery: actors orienting their bodies and self in regionalized and routinized
situations of co-presence. But because the staging regions of interaction
exist within broader time-space regions as these are shaped by structural
principles, sets, and institutions, the processes of interactive dramaturgy
are connected to the broader structures of societal totalities. In this way,
the limitations of most interactionist theory are overcome.
The analysis of discursive and practical consciousness draws from
both phenomenology and ethnomethodology, but it connects them con-
ceptually to interactionism, on the one side, and psychoanalytic theory,
on the other. Giddens corrects for the extremes of ethnomethodology,
which have tended to deny the ontological reality of social structures and
phenomenology, which has frequently become an orgy of subjectivism.
He does so by emphasizing the reflexive monitoring of action in situations
of co-presence, with such monitoring involving layers of conscience and
unconscious activity. Actors use rules and resources that are part of both
discursive consciousness and practical stocks of knowledge; and this dis-
cursive and practical consciousness involves the subtle application of folk
or ethno methods in regions of co-presence. And unlike phenomenology,
ethnomethodology, and interactionism, which do not devote much effort
to conceptualizing motivation, or unlike functionalism and its intellectual
companion, “action theory,” which are prone to develop rather mechan-
ical views of motivation (e.g., for each act, there is a causative motive),
Giddens reworks the psychoanalytic concept of anxiety and unconscious

“See, for example, Bruce Mayhew, “Hierarchical Differentiation in Imperatively =

ordinated Associations,” Research in the Sociology of Organizations 2 (1983), pp. 153-229.
 GIDDENS
476 CHAPTER 22 / THE STRUCTURATION THEORY OF ANTHONY

un-
motivation. The result is a perspective that ties diffuse and largely
conscious needs for “ontological security” into actors’ reflexive monitor-
ing, use of ethno methods, and participation in routinized interaction.
Such are the strong points of Giddens’s theory, as I see them. He has
performed, I feel, a remarkable synthesis that demonstrates how very
diverse theoretical perspectives can be pulled together into a reasonably
coherent theoretical scheme. I do see many problems with his approach,
however. Let me now turn to these, cautioning that my perception is
guided by my theoretical bias, which Giddens and many others in soci-
ology do not share.
One major problem is that while Giddens’s writing is crisp and elo-
quent, it is also vague. There is a great deal of jargon, metaphor, and just
plain imprecision. It is often difficult to understand in more than a general
way what is being said. I sense that “‘structuration theory” is very much
like Parsonian functionalism in at least one sense: one has to “internalize”
the perspective with all its imprecision in order to use it. One must become
an intellectual convert to Giddens’s cause and, in the best tradition of
the ethnomethodologists’ et cetera principle, accept what he has to say,
even though you cannot quite understand some of it. One must feel, as
opposed to verbalize, elements of structuration theory; and this is not, I
feel, the way to build social theory.
The above is a remarkable conclusion, I admit, in light of the fact
that the theory has been articulated several times in major works, has
received considerable and deserved attention,® has always offered many
definitions of concepts and graphic portrayals of their relations, and has
even presented us with a glossary of theoretical terms in its latest incar-
nation.** Thus, it might be seriously asked: how can IJ reach the conclusion
that the theory is vague? It just is, for several reasons. First, the theory
is actually a series of definitions. The linkages among concepts are always
rather vaguely stated, despite their suggestiveness. Second, Giddens often
argues by example rather than analytically. It is extremely difficult to
interpret an analytical discussion that is presented by example. (For ex-
ample, Giddens offers the same example in several works to illustrate the
concepts of structural principles and structural sets; and yet, the defini-
tions of these ideas and the conceptual discussion of them aré decidedly
unclear.)
Another problem is that Giddens’s theory is, in reality, only a system
of concepts. It is very much like Talcott Parsons’s strategy of “analytical
realism,” although I find Giddens’s scheme far more interesting and in-

%*For recent commentaries, see the special volumes of the following journals devoted to
Giddens’s work: Theory, Culture, and Society, vol. 1 (no. 2, 1982) and Journal for the
Theory of Social Behavior, vol. 13 (no. 1, 1983). See also John B. Thompson, Studies in
the Theory of Ideology (Berkeley, Calif.; University of California Press, 1984).
*The Constitution of Society, pp. 373-77.
 THE THEORY OF STRUCTURATION: A SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT 477

triguing than Parsons’s. Giddens’s theory is a series of definitions that

are not precisely linked together. Moreover, the scheme tends to become
concerned with its own architecture—that is, with the elaboration of ad-
ditional concepts in a vain effort to “complete” the edifice that, like all
conceptual schemes, just keeps growing.
As Giddens admits, this conceptual scheme offers “sensitizing con-
cepts” for the researcher. He does not believe that a natural science view
of explanation is appropriate for the social sciences, and he consistently
associates functionalism, naturalism, and objectivism—the unholy alliance
or “orthodox consensus” that he and others are breaking down. The irony
is that he produces a scheme that in its form looks very much like Par-
sons’s. The substantive thrust is, of course, vastly different and superior
to Parsons’s. But it looks like Parsons’s scheme in its overconcern with
conceptual definitions, in its typological character, and in its need to be
intellectually internalized when using it to analyze a particular problem.
(I should add, however, that both Giddens’s and Parsons’s interpretation
of empirical events is highly stimulating?’; and thus as others internalize
and use Giddens’s scheme, I am sure interesting interpretations of em-
pirical events will result.)
These problems, which many would not see as problems at all, stem
from what I believe is the major deficiency of Giddens’s approach: the
rejection of positivism and naturalism. Much of this rejection is made
plausible by associating a search for natural laws with functionalism,
evolutionism, and other highly deficient forms of theorizing. But guilt by
association is not a sufficient reason to reject the search for abstract
principles. If one does not believe that there are invariant properties of
the social universe that can be articulated in abstract principles, then
what is a theorist to do? The answer is: construct conceptual schemes
that sensitize us to empirical processes and that allow us to describe rather
than explain these processes. In fact, descriptions of events are what
Giddens and many others mean by explanation.
His view of explanation is misguided, although I must confess that
Giddens has produced an important contribution with it (I can only imag-
ine how much better it would be if he dropped this extreme antiscience
viewpoint). There are several reasons for this assertion, which, I should
emphasize again, many others do not share. First, Giddens’s work con-
tradicts his belief that there are no invariant properties of the social world.
If there are not basic and fundamental processes, what good is his con-
ceptual scheme? Will it not be outdated as soon as lay actors incorporate
it? My answer is no; and so is Giddens’s, at least implicitly. Giddens has
isolated some of the basic properties and processes of the universe; and

*7And in Chapter 6 of ibid., he uses the scheme to re-interpret insightfully several em-
pirical studies.
478 CHAPTER 22 / THE STRUCTURATION THEORY OF ANTHONY GIDDENS

just because lay actors know about them and lock them into their dis-
cursive and practical consciousness, these properties will not change. Sec-
ond, and this is related to the above point, Giddens has a very narrow
view of what a law is. For Giddens, a law is an empirical generalization—
a statement of covariance among empirical events. If this is your vision
of law, then it is easy to assert that there are no universal laws, since
indeed empirical events change (in accord, I should add, with many of
the invariant processes in Giddens’s conceptual scheme). Third, I think
there are several examples of laws in Giddens’s scheme, and it is at just
these points where he articulates a law that the scheme takes on more
clarity and, for me at least, more interest. Here is one example of a law
that Giddens articulates but that he would deny as universal: ““The level
of anxiety experienced at the level of discursive and practical levels of
consciousness is a positive function of the degree of disruption in the
daily routines for an actor.” There is also a similar proposition about
anxiety and unconscious trust and ontological security, but I will for the
present ignore this. There are many propositions like this one in Giddens’s
scheme; and these are universal. If they were not, then his scheme would
not make any sense. And most importantly, the law is not obviated by
our knowledge of it, for an actor will not feel less anxiety if day-to-day
routines are disrupted. One might even use the law to diagnose the prob-
lem and create new, or restore the old, routines, but in the process, the
law has not been obviated. For, when one’s routines are disrupted, the
individual will experience anxiety.
I have not extracted these and many propositions from Giddens, since
it would violate the essence of his approach. But here resides the great
flaw; and I hope that others working with Giddens’s concept are not so
antipositivistic as he. For there is too much insight into the basic prop-
erties and dynamics of human action, interaction, and organization to
use the scheme as a mere “sensitizing device.” It has far more potential
than Giddens would admit for helping develop a natural science of so-
ciety—that is, for developing abstract laws of the social universe.
 _ Name Index _

Abbelbaum, Richard P., 135 n Blau, Peter M., 14n, 16n, 20 n, 150 n,
Abrahamsson, Bengt, 250 n 221 n, 229, 261-86
Adorno, Theordor, 130 n, 185, 187-88 Blumer, Herbert, 6 n, 333, 337-48, 390 n,
Alexander, Jeffrey C., 9; 59 n, 102 n, 4361 457
Allen, V. L., 362 n, 363 n Boissevain, Jeremy F., 287 n
Althusser, Louis, 150 n, 408 n Boorman, Scott A., 427 n
Anderson, Alan R., 363 n Boskoff, Alvin, 363 n
Anderson, B., 255 n, 288 n, 290 n Bottomore, Tom, 109 n, 229 n, 423 n
Angel, Robert C., 180 n Boulding, Kenneth, 131 n, 242 n
Annett, Joan, 445 Braithwaite, R. B., 80n
Antonio, Robert J., 184 n, 185 n, 325n Bredemeier, Harry C., 80n
Assiter, Alison, 408 n Breer, Paul E., 362 n
Attewell, Paul, 391 Brieger, Ronald L., 427n
Brim, Orville G., 362 n
Britt, David, 131
Bales, Robert, 68 Brodbeck, M., 80 n
Barber, Bernard, 80 n, 102 n Broderson, Arvid, 392 n
Bauman, Zygmunt, 184, 324 Buck, Gary, L., 76 n
Becker, Howard, 362 n Buckley, Walter, 253 n
Beeghley, Leonard, 1 n, 42 n, 57n, 146 n, Bulmer, Martin, 334 n
226 n, 313 n, 413 n Burgess, R. L., 255 n, 288 n
Belsky, S., 225 n Burt, Ronald, 288 n
Bendix, R., 321 n Bushell, D., Jr., 255 n, 288 n
Bentham, Jeremy, 215
Berger, Peter L. 324n
Berger, J., 255 n, 288 n, 290n
Berghe, Pierre L. van de, 140 n, 163 n Cancian, Francesca, 80 n
Bergman, G., 82 n Canfield, J., 82n
Bernard, Jessie, 131 n Cardwell, J., 334 n
Biddle, Bruce J., 354 n, 355 n, 358 n, Cartwright, Darwin, 355 n
359 n, 363 n Carver, Thomas, 131 n
Bierstedt, 250 n Cicourel, A. V., 30 n, 396, 401, 436
Billings, Victoria, 373 n Cohen, Jere, 60 n
n
Blain, Robert, 248 n, 252 n, 253 n Cohen, Percy S., 47 n, 80 n, 158 n, 284
Coleman, James, 131 n, 216 n
Blalock, Herbert M., 3 n
ii NAME INDEX

Collins, Randall, 31 n, 131 n, 150 n, 241 n, Firth, Raymond, 238

321 n, 322 n, 393 n, 403 n, 410, 421, Frazer, Sir James George, 217-19
435-55 Freeman, Linton C., 287 n, 302 n
Comte, Auguste, 1-4, 39-41 Freeman, Robert C., 392
Connerton, Paul, 184 n Freese, Lee, 14n
Cook, Karen S., 388-89, 302 Freud, Sigmund, 187
Cooley, Charles Horton, 311 Friedrich, C. J., 8ln
Cooper, Joseph, 341 Friedrichs, Robert W., 57 n
Coser, Lewis A., 79 n, 87 n, 165-83, 403 n Frisby, D., 229 n, 109 n
Costanzo, Phillip R., 358 n, 359 n Fromm, Erich, 185
Costner, Herbert L., 14n Fuhrman, Ellsworth R., 184 n
Cunnison, I., 221 n

Galle, Omer R., 131 n

Dahrendorf, Ralf, 79, 130, 151-64, 178, Galtung, John, 180
180, 271 Gamson, William, 131 n
Davies, James C., 131 n, 170 n, 363 n Garfinkel, Harold, 4 n, 393 n, 395 n, 398,
Denzin, Norman K., 344n 361 n, 393n 469
Deutsch, K., 82n Gerstein, Dean Robert, 57 n, 102 n
Deutsch, Morton, 250 n, 359 n Gerth, Hans, 53 n
Dewey, John, 311- 12 Getzels, John W., 367 n
Dick, Harry, 341n Geuss, Raymond, 184 n
Dinitz, Simon, 341 n Gibbs, Jack, 3n
Dore, Phillip Ronald, 80 n Giddens, Anthony, 6 n, 31 n, 150 n, 353 n,
Dornbusch, Sanford, 341 n 404 n, 410, 417, 421, 456-78
Douglas, J. D., 4.n, 344 n, 361 n, 389 n, Gillmore, Mary R., 289n
392 n Glucksmann, Miriam, 423 n
Dreitzer, H. P., 130 n, 401 n Godelier, Maurice, 150 n
Dubin, Robert, 3 n Goffman, Erving, 209, 354 n, 363 n, 391,
Ducasse, C. J., 82n 418, 444, 459, 471, 473, 475
Durkheim, Emile, 10, 41, 45-47, 54, 100 n, Goode, William J., 358 n, 361 n, 363 n
114n, 166, 222, 322-23, 412-16, 422, Gordon, Steven, 373 n
444 Gouldner, Alvin, 57 n, 80 n, 265
Granovetter, Mark, 288 n
Grant, W. H., 225n
Easton, David, 81 n Gray, Don, 251 n
Einstein, Albert, 88 Gross, Llewellyn, 80 n, 344 n, 403 n
Hisenstadt, S. N., 370 n Guba, E. C., 367 n
Ekeh, Peter, 217 n, 221 n, 241n, 242n Gurr, Ted Robert, 131 n, 170 n
Emerson, Richard M., 255 n, 287-305 Gurwitsch, Aron, 325n
Emmet, D., 82 n
Engels, Friedrich, 132, 187 n
Erasmus, Charles, J., 80 n Habermas, Jurgen, 130 n, 138, 184, 186,
Erickson, Erik, 470 187 n, 189-212, 198 n, 216 n, 217 n,
327, 403 n
Hage, Jerald, 3n, 7n
Farbarman, H., 334 n, 337n Haleévy, Elie, 216 n
Farbarow, Norman L., 359 n Hamblin, R., 288 n
Farber, Bernard, 353 n Hammel, Eugene A., 423 n
Faris, R. E. L., 240 n Handel, Warren H, 334 n, 353 n, 370 n,
Faught, Jim, 184 n, 197 n 393 n
Feigl, H., 80 n, 82 n Harary, Frank, 355 n
Fever, L.S., 82 n Harrell, Bill, 403 n
Fink, Clinton F., 131 n, 140 n, 178 Harris, Marvin, 423 n
 NAME INDEX ii

Hayes, Adrian, 102 n Lauer, Quentin, 324 n

Hazelrigg, Lawrence E., 60 n Lauer, Robert H., 334 n
Heath, Anthony, 284 n — Leik, Robert K., 14n
Hegel, Georg, 132, 186 Leinhardt, Samuel, 287 n, 288 n
Hegvedt, Karen A., 289 n Lemert, Edwin, 362 n
Heiss, Jerold, 353 Lenski, Gehard, 18 n
Held, David, 184 n, 185 n, 190 n Lenski, Jean, 18n
Helle, H. J., 370n Lerner, D., 82 n
Hempel, Carl G., 5 n, 80-n Lévi-Strauss, Claude, 221 n, 222-24, 240-
Hewitt, John P., 334n 41, 408 n, 413, 421-34, 460, 464, 475
Hickman, C. Addison, 337 n, 338 n Levinson, Daniel J., 359 n
Holland, Paul, 287 n, 288 n Lidz, Victor, 102 n
Holmes, S., 102 n Lin, Nan, 287 n, 289 n
Homans, George C., 221 n, 234-60, 261 n, Lindesmith, Alfred, 334 n, 335, 341 n
262, 270 n, 276-77, 289 Lindzey, G., 361 n
Horkheimer, Max, 130 n, 185, 187-88 Linnaeus, Carolus, 38
Hughes, James W., 359 n Linton, Ralph, 320, 354 n
Hulett, J. E., 337 n : Locke, Edwin, 362 n
Husserl, Edmund, 324-27, 391 Lockwood, David, 79 n, 129
Hyman, Herbert, 356n | Loenthal, Leo, 185
Loomis, Charles, P., 13in
Luckman, Thomas, 324 n, 392 n
Inkeles, A., 288 n Luhmann, Niklas, 102-25, 199, 212
Isajiw, W. W., 82 n Lukacs, George, 185-86
Lynch, M. D., 373 n

Jacobson, Alvin L., 75n, 76n, 131n

Jakobson, Roman, 422-23
James, William, 310, 319 n, 362 McCarthy, Thomas, 194 n, 199 n, 201
Janis, Irving L., 362 n McClelland, David C., 74 n
Jay, Martin, 185 Mace, C. A., 82 n
Jefferson, Gail, 400 n Mack, Raymond, 131 n
Jordan, Robert Welsh, 325 n McKinney, J. C., 4n, 73 n, 275 n, 395 n
McNeil, E., 131 n, 180 n
McPhail, Clark, 334 n, 341 n
Kahn, Robert L., 367 n Makowsky, Michael, 321 n
Kaplan, A., 82 n Malinowski, Bronislav, 47, 50-52, 90, 92 n,
Kelley, Harold H., 356 n, 358 n 217 n, 219-21, 444
King, Bert T., 362 n Manis, Jerome G., 334 n, 336 n
Kittsu, F. L., 337 n Mann, Carola H., 363 n
Kock, S., 72 n Mann, John H., 363 n
Kohlberg, 200 n Marcuse, Herbert, 130 n, 185
Kostoyants, K. S., 225 n Maris, Ronald, 251 n
Knorr-Cctina, K., 30 n, 436 n Marsden, Peter, 287 n, 289 n
Krauss, Robert M., 359 n Martindale, Don, 50 n, 55 n
Kriesberg, Louis, 131 n Martineau, Harriet, 39 n
Kroeber, A., 423 n Marx, Karl, 10, 130-38, 187, 229-30, 283,
Kurtz, Lester R., 334 n 408-10
Kuhn, Alfred, 290 n Maryanski, Alexandra, 47 n, 50 n, 92 n
Kuhn, Manford, 334, 334-49 Masserman, J., 66 n
Kuhn, Thomas, 31 Mauss, Marcel, 221-22, 414 n, 422
Mayhew, Bruce H., 408 n, 421 n, 475
Mayhew, Leon, 59 n
Larmore, C., 102 n Maynard, Douglas W., 408 n
iv NAME INDEX

Mead, George Herbert, 209, 310-18, 329, Pollner, Melvin, 4 n, 393 n, 402-3
418-20 Pollock, Friedrich, 185 n
Meeker, B. F., 251 n Pope, Whitney, 60 n
Mehan, Hugh, 392, 393 n, 395 n, 396 Popper, Karl R., 3 n, 25
Meltzer, Bernard N., 313 n, 333 n, 334 n, Price, Robert, 251 n
336, 337 n, 346 n Psathas, George, 4 n, 324n, 325 n, 393 n
Merton, Robert K., 15 n, 80 n, 87-102,
220, 356 n, 363 n, 367 n
Meyer, Max F., 226n Quarantelli, E. L., 341
Mill, John Stuart, 215 Quetelet, Adolphe, 40
Mills, C. Wright, 53 n, 79 n
Mitchell, J. Clyde, 287 n
Miyamoto, Frank, 341 n Radcliffe-Brown, A. R., 2 n, 47-50, 54, 90,
Moore, Omar K., 363 n 444
Moreno, Jacob L., 319, 354 n, 355 n Rapoport, Anatol, 131 n
Morris, C. W., 313 n Rexroat, Cynthia, 341 n
Morton, Richard T., 363 n Reynolds, Paul Davidson, 3 n, 7 n
Mulford, Harold A., 341 n Rhoads, John K., 80n
Mulkay, M. J. 236 n, 250 n, 284n Ricardo, David, 215
Mullins, Nicholas C., 3n Ritzer, George, 31 n, 325 n
Minch, Richard, 10, 11 n, 57n, 102n Rommetveit, Ragnar, 359 n
Rose, Arnold, 334 n, 335, 336, 342 n, 369 n,
390 n
Nadel, S. F., 80 n Rosenberg, Bernard G., 359 n
Naegele, K. D., 72 Rosenberg, M., 353 n
Nagel, Ernest, 80 n, 82 Rossi, Ino, 408 n
Natanson, Maurice, 324 n, 327 n
Neiman, Lionel T., 359 n
Neisser, Hans P., 324 n Sacks, Harvey, 395 n, 400-401
Newmann, Franz, 185 Sahlins, Marshall D., 424
Nisbet, Robert A., 47 n, 423 Salisbury, Winfield W., II, 341 n
Sarbin, Theodore R., 341 n, 361 n, 362 n,
363 n
Oberschall, Anthony, 131 n Saussure, Ferdinand de, 422
Oeser, Oscar A., 355 n Scheff, Thomas, 362 n
Scheffer, I., 82 n
Schegloff, Emmanuel, 400 n
Park, Robert, 318-19 Schelling, Thomas C., 131 n
Parsons, Talcott, 3 n, 10, 11 n, 52-53, 57- Schneider, David, 240-41
86, 87 n, 91, 102, 103 n, 104 n, 108, Schroyer, Trent, 130 n, 184n
114n, 120 n, 129-30, 150, 163 n, 164- Schutz, Alfred, 4 n, 209, 323-24, 327-31,
65, 181, 199, 209-10, 216, 229, 239, 391-92, 418, 469 n
240 n, 250 n, 252 n, 258 n, 262-63, Schwanenberg, Enno, 59 n
275-77, 283, 358 n, 367 n, 412, 416, Schwartz, Joseph E., 429 n
420, 463, 476-77 Scott, John Finley, 361 n
Partland, L. S., 337 n Scott, Joseph F., 57n
Patterson, John S., 131 n Seeba, G., 62 n, 416 n
Pavlov, Ivan Petrovich, 225 Sellars, W., 82 n
Petras, Jerome W., 333 n, 337 n, 346 n Shapiro, J., 191 n
Piaget, Jean, 200 n Shaw, Marvin E., 358 n, 359 n
Pitts, J. R., 72 n Shibutani, Tamotsu, 313 n, 333 n, 334 n,
Plamenatz, John, 216 n 341 n, 352 n, 356 n, 359 n, 362 n
Plato, 41 n, 422 Shils, Edward, 66 n, 68, 72 n, 163 n
Platt, Gerald M., 73 n Shosid, Norma, 387 n
 NAME INDEX Vv

Shuy, R., 401 n 146 n, 157 n, 226 n, 245 n, 313 n,

Simmel, Georg, 109 n, 122 n, 131, 138-46, 316 n, 334 n, 410 n, 413 n, 416 n, 419n
167-68, 229, 230-32, 290, 319, 321-22, Turner, Ralph H., 318 n, 332, 341 n, 353 n,
417-18 356 n, 358 n, 363 n, 369-88
Simpson, Richard L., 75 n, 241 n, 249 n, Turner, Roy, 393 n
250 n, 265 n Turner, Stephen, 251 n
Singer, Eleanor, 356 n Turner, T. S., 74n, 275 n
Skinner, B. F., 241, 358 n, 361 n
Sklair, Leslie, 80 n
Slater, Phil, 185
Wagner, Helmut R., 325 n
Smelser, Neil J., 69, 102 n, 240 n, 288 n Wallace, Walter L., 3 n, 353 n, 394 n
Smith, Adam, 37, 38 n, 215, 414 n Warriner, C. K., 334 n
Snizek, William E., 184 n Watson, John B., 226-28, 312
Snyder, David, 131 n Watson, Robert I., 225 n
Snyder, Richard C., 131 n Weber, Max, 10, 52-54, 62 n, 64 n, 131,
Sorokin, Pitirim, 250 n 146-50, 188 n, 323, 416-17
Speigelberg, Herbert, 324 n Webster, Murray, Jr., 3 n
Spencer, Herbert, 41-45, 50, 52, 76, 113 n, Weider, D. Lawrence, 4 n, 393 n, 402-3
199, 410-13 \ Weingart, Peter, 155, 162 n, 163 n
Spread, Patrick, 286n Weinstein, Deena, 271 n
Stagner, R., 337 n Weinstein, Michael A., 271 n
Stinchcombe, Arthur L., 3n, 7 n, 49 n, Weiss, Albert P., 226 n
80 n, 83 n, 98n, 133 n, 181n Wellman, Albrecht, 184 n
Stolte, John F., 288 n Wellman, Barry, 288 n
Stone, Gregory, 334n Weyman, Angsear, 201 n
Strasser, Stephen, 324 n Wheeler, Stanton, 362 n
Strauss, Anselm, 313 n, 334 n, 335, 341 n, Whitacker, Ivan, 55 n
362 n White, Harrison C., 427 n
Stryker, Sheldon, 334 n, 335, 341 n Whitehead, Alfred North, 253
Sudnow, D., 400 n Whyte, William, 237
Surace, S. J., 387 n Willer, David, 3 n, 5 n, 288 n, 303 n
Swanson, G. E., 356 n Willer, Judith, 5n
Sztompka, Piotr, 82 n, 181n Williams, Robin M., Jr., 131 n, 168 n, 179,
363 n
Thomas, Edwin, 354 n, 363 n Wilson, Thomas P., 389 n, 408 n
Thomas, W. I., 68, 329, 336, 358 n Wolff, Kurt H., 138 n, 166 n, 321 n, 417n
Thompson, John B., 190 n, 476 n Wood, Houston, 392, 393 n, 395 n, 396
Thorndike; Edward Lee, 225-26
Timasheff, Nicholas A., 131 n
Tiryakian, E. A., 4 n. 73 n, 275.n, 395n Yamagish, Toshio, 289 n
Toby, Jackson, 72 n
Toumea, Raimo, 62 n, 416 n
Tucker, Charles W., 338 n, 346 n Zaner, Richard D., 324 n, 328
Turk, H., 75 n, 249 n, 250 n, 265 n Zelditch, M., 255 n, 288 n, 290 n
Turner, Jonathan H., 6n, 18n, 27 n, 30n, Zetterberg, Hans, 3 n, 80n
42 n, 47n, 50 n, 57n, 62 n, 89 n, 92 n, Zimmerman, Don H., 4n, 393 n, 402-3
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 Subject Index

Aborigines, 217-19 | Adaptation (A), 69-70

Abstraction, level of in theory, 21-24 Affectivity-affective neutrality, 65
Achievement-ascription, 66 American political machines, 96-101
Action theory, 53 centralize power, 97
analysis of structures versus functions, and deprived groups, 99
70 economic control by, 99
continuity of, 85 Analytical formats, 10-11
criticisms of, 78-85 descriptive/sensitizing, 11
cultural patterns and, 66 naturalistic/positivistic, 11
deviance in as pathological, 79 theoretical value of, 26
evolution in, 75 as typologies, 10-11
functional imperatives, 69 Argonauts of the Western Pacific
functional requisites, 64, 72, 84-85 (Malinowski), 219
functional sectorization, 70 Arunta aborigines, 415
generalized symbolic media of exchange, Axioms, 13
Axiomatic theory, 13-14
73-74
goal of, 63 abstractness and scope of, 22-24
and human condition, 76-78 limitations on, 13
theoretical value of, 26
integration and, 64
and integrative problems, 77
‘interpenetrating action systems, 63 Behaviorism, 225-28, 289, 294, 312
methodological yardstick, 85 black box problem, 228
modes of orientation, 62-63 experimental control, 227-28
motives, 62-63 and human needs, 242
organism versus subsystem within, 72 key generalizations, 227
reciprocal interchanges between laws of, 226
functional requisites, 78 and need satisfaction, 242
social, cultural, and personality systems, nonmaterial rewards, 261
63 and utilitarianism, 227
system requisites, 66 Binary contrasts, 422-23
tautology within, 84 Biological sciences, 38, 39-40, 45, 53
teleological propositions within, 81-82 Bracketing out considerations, 458
types of action, 63
values, 62-63
and violent change, 80 Capital (Marx), 132

vii
viii SUBJECT INDEX

Capitalism, as oppressor, 144 The Communist Manifesto (Marx &

Capitalist societies Engels), 132
delinguistified media, 202 Complexity, need to reduce, 103-4
points of crises, 195 Concepts
subsystems of, 195 abstract in functionalism, 58
Causal analysis, 98 abstractness of, 5-6
implied causal chains, 100 become variables, 7
concrete, 6
separate from function, 100
labeling, 7
versus statements of correlation, 99
parallel systematic features, 59
Change, social, 74-76, 129
sensitizing, 6; see also Sensitizing
and cybernetic hietarchy of controls, 76
concepts
elements of process, 75
systematization of, 58
excesses in the exchange, 74
uniform meaning of, 5
locus of, 74
Conditioned responses, 225
macro emphasis on, 75
Conflict
as pathological, 79
biological origin of, 139
shortages and, 74
broad versus restrictive definitions, 178-
Class conflict model, 134-38
79
Class conflict theory
consequences of, 181
bipolar, 134
definition of, 177-78
class consciousness versus false
as dependent versus independent
consciousness, 135
variable, 182
and dialectical conflict theory, 153-55
as deviant, 129
factors that heighten class
functions of, 167
consciousness, 137
inequality as source, 182
key propositions, 136-37
inevitable, 135, 138
positivistic approach within, 138
instrumental, 141
Cognitive sociology, 401 maintains integration, 167
Communication, 106, 109-11 as pathological, 165
as basis for social integration, 200 promotes solidarity, 139, 143-44
delinguistified steering mechanisms, 207 as source of social change, 153
dialogue-constitutive universals, 197 type varies with unit, 180-81
features of undistorted, 196 variable continuum of, 140
implicit alternatives, 109-10 violence level, 144
intersubjective consciousness, 198 Conflict functionalism
media of, 110 adaptive conflict, 173
multiple modalities, 401 and causes of conflict; 169-70
rational discourse, 198 emotional arousal and, 170
rationality within and social order, 201 frequent, mild conflicts, 175
reflexivity, 110-11 functionalism within, 176-77
self-thematization, 111 functions of conflict, 173-76
symbolic code, 109-10 independence of actors, 171
and variation in society, 113 inevitability of conflict, 176
Communication and the Evolution of intensity encourages integration, 174
Society (Habermas), 199 interdependence and, 174-75
Communicative action, 191, 201-5, 209-10 level of violence, 170-71
defined, 203 malintegrative pressures, 174
rational, 207 order from consensus, 169
and rational social integration, 205 outcomes of conflicts, 177
rationality inherent in, 204 overemphasis of positive functions of
restricted, 207 conflict, 176
versus teleological action, 203, 207-8 propositions about, 168-76
validity claims, 198, 204, 210 realistic versus nonrealistic conflict, 171
 SUBJECT INDEX ix

Conflict functionalism—Cont. Critical theory—Cont.

time variable, 172-73 major task of, 194
victory criteria and conflict duration, naive romaniticism, 212
173 normatively regulated action, 203
withdrawal of legitimacy, 169-70 political issues as technical problems.
Conflict sociology 184
age stratification, 450-51 and practical interests, 187
class culture, 446-48 and psychoanalytic theory, 197
conversation types, 442 subjective-material dualism, 188
cultural capital, 443 systematic versus cultural processes, 195
deference and demeanor, 445-46 types of action, 202, 209
essence of interaction, 445 unarticulated questions, 189-90
family conflict, 450-51 Critique, as emancipatory, 190
microprocesses explain macroprocesses, Cross-cousin marriage, 218, 222, 224
446 Culture, 210-11
and organization structure, 451
propositions, 443, 445, 447-50, 452-53
resources, 442 Deductive rigor, 454
rituals, 444-45 Deductive system, 428-29
sexual stratification, 449-50 Depth hermeneutics, 197n
social density, 442 Dialectical conflict theory, 151-52
and the state, 452-53 authority relations, 152
status, 446 concepts as variables, 160, 162
steps of building theory, 441-42 and class conflict theory, 153-55
talk, 442-43 contradictory role expectations, 157
Conflict Sociology (Collins), 441, 451, 454 domination and subjugation, 154
Conflict theory empirical measurement of concepts, 162
as counterbalance to functionalism, 151 explicit propositions of, 158-60
challenges to, 183 generality of definitions, 161-62
as exchange theory, 229-30 hidden assumptions about functional
implicit functionalism, 181 requisites, 163
origins of, 129-32 imperatively coordinated associations;
proliferation of, 150 see Imperatively coordinated
unit of analysis problem, 180-181 associations (ICAs)
Consciousness, 325 and institutionalization, 153
essence of, 326 institutions in, 163
versus social reality, 133 intervening empirical conditions, 154,
Conventional gestures, 314 157-58
Covariant propositions, 382 organization of ICAs unclear, 164
Covering law, 14 origins of domination, 157
Critical theory power in, 163
communication and, 194, 196-99 reductionist imperative, 157
communicative action; see ruling versus ruled cluster of roles, 153
Communicative action sources of change, 152
dramaturgical action, 203 source of conflict in, 154
efficiency, 195 standard criticisms of, 157-58
goals of, 193 theoretical variables, 158
as historical, 199 typology of authority, 160-61
implicit functionalism, 193 unclear causal chains, 155
interaction mediated by speech, 197 unending cycle of conflict, 153
kinds of interests, 192 Dialectical exchange theory, 266
kinds of knowledge, 192 Differentiation
kinds of media, 192 and autonomy of subsystems, 116
kinds of worlds, 203-4 in communication media, 114
x SUBJECT INDEX

Differentiation—Cont. Ethnomethodology—Cont.
of economic systems, 121 decision rules, 399
extended, 113-14 et cetera principle, 397
functional, 115 to expose scientific bias, 393
increases risk of dysfunction, 116 formal properties of language-in-use, 400
among individuals’ roles, 114-15 general intent of, 400
internal, 114 indexicality, 395-96, 398
material, 116 as interactionism, 389
of a political system, 118 language and reality construction, 398
segmentation, 115 lifeworld, 391-92; see also Lifeworld
social, 114 normal form, 396
stratification, 115 occasioned corpus, 402-3
symbolic effects, 117 and phenomenology, 389-90, 392
Diffuseness-specificity, 65 reciprocity of objectives, 396
Digraph notation, 296, 304 reflexive action, 395
Division of labor, 133 “sense” of reality, 393-94
Division of Labor in Society (Durkhiem), soft research methods, 393-94
45, 322 symbolic communication, 396
Double hermeneutic, 457 universal interpretive procedures, 401
Dramaturgical school of interactionism, Evolution of society, 112-17
391 and differentiation, 112-16
Dramaturgy, 459 dual process of, 211
Dualisms, versus dualities, 458-59 as increasing integration, 199
learning levels, 200
selection mechanism, 113
Economic man, 263 temporal effects, 116
Economic perspective in sociology, 37 variation mechanisms, 113
Economic systems, 121-24 Evolutionary theory, 458-59
complexity of and risk, 123 Exchange behaviorism, 240-49
deterministic social structure, 134 altered economic assumptions, 243
domination by, 149 deductive schemes within, 246-49
markets in, 121-22 discontinuity between macro and micro
money as a medium of, 122 theory, 304
and time, 121-22 elementary exchange principles, 244
tripart internal differentiation on, 123 human behavior as exchange of rewards,
Economy, governmental power in, 123 242
Economy and Society (Parsons & institutionalization, 258
Smelser), 69 institutions and human needs, 260
Economy and Society (Weber), 416 misplaced concreteness in, 252-53
The Elementary Forms of Religious Life patterns of organization, 259
(Durkheim), 322, 415, 444 propositions, 244-46
The Elementary Structures of Kinship rationality proposition, 244-45, 248
(Levi-Strauss), 222, 421, 424 reductionism in, 251-55
Emancipation, social force for, 145 relationships of parts, 252-53
Empirical generelizations as theory, 15-16, reward potential formula, 244
89, 234-35 variables, 244
abstractness and scope of, 23 Exchange network theory
and causal models, 19 actors and, 293
level of abstractness, 16 alternative sources of supply, 298
theoretical value of, 25 balancing operations, 293-93, 298-99
Ethnomethodology, 332, 389-404 basic concepts, 291
background features of interaction, 399 centrality, 301-3
breeching experiment, 398-99 coalitions, 298
common reality, 397 closed exchange relations, 299-302
 SUBJECT INDEX xi

Exchange network theory—Cont. Exchange theory—Cont.

definitions, 296 tautology in, 250-51
division of labor, 298-99 tension inherent in, 231
exploitation types I and II, 297-98 as a type of association, 263
forms of exchange relations, 290, 304 Explicandum, 426
generalized reinforcers, 259
initial propositions, 294-96
initial theorems, 296 Folklore in the Old Testament (Frazer),
inter- versus intracategory exchanges, 217
300 Formal sociology, 138
key questions, 292 conflict function propositions, 142-43
network differentiation, 259 hostile impulse, 139
power and, 287, 293, 304 conflict intensity propositions, 141
primary needs of individuals, 259 less violent conflict, 144
ratio of rewards exchanged, 292 principles of, 139-40
relations as units of analysis, 291-92 Formal theory, 14-14, 429
relative resources, 303 and abstract principles, 15
rigor of, 289-90, 304 abstractness and scope of, 22-24
social circles, 299-300 and axiomatic theory, 234
social forms, 296-303 combined with analytical models, 28
social structure in, 304 conditions within, 15
stratification, 301 theoretical value of, 26, 28-29
structural changes, 297 Formats, 8
tautology avoided, 304-5 four basic types, 8
unilateral monopoly, 297-98, 303 Frankfurt Institute of Social Research, 185
Exchange and Power in Social Life (Blau), Frankfurt school, 184-85, 209
262 French Revolution, 38
Exchange theory Functional analysis
and anthropology, 217-24 assumption in, 100
assumptions that contradict central regularities, 94
utilitarianism, 216-17 causal explanation in, 101
authority and exchanges, 238 elements of, 95-96
behaviorism and, 225-28 excluded alternatives, 94
and class conflict theory, 229-30 implied sequencing of, 96
cultural heritage and, 223 manifest versus latent functions, 97, 100
direct exchange, 241 meaning, 94
early sociology and, 229-32 net balance of consequences, 95
economic motives for social acts, 218 motives, 94
group morality in, 222 selective advantages, 98-99
individual exchanges with society, 223- “sheer description” of activities, 94
24 Functionalism, 38
liquidity of resources, 231 abstract concepts in, 58
and money, 231-32 and analytical realism, 58
and object value, 231-32 in anthropology, 47-52
power in, 218-19 category systems and, 53-55
principles of, 218-19, 223 causal processes, 94
as a rational science of utilitarian cause versus function, 46
exchanges, 217 conceptual schemes versus systems of
rationality criticisms, 249-50 propositions, 56
reciprocity, 221-24 conflicting assumptions, 135
reward, 227 criteria for system survival, 84
and social integration, 223-24 diverse functions within, 91
structural, 221-22 early focuses of, 55
symbolic exchange, 219-21 empirical foundation for, 92
xii SUBJECT INDEX

Functionalism—Cont. Hawthorne Western Electric plant, 206-37

functional alternatives and substitutes, Heuristic value of assumptions, 91
92 Hierarchy of informational controls, 71-72
functional unity postulates, 90-91 cybernetic hierarchy, 72-73
indispensability of structures, 92-94 energic conditions, 72
individual-institutional duality, 52-53 Human agency, 460, 468-71
institutions and, 51-52 defined, 468
and integration of a society, 48-49, 50 and institutionalized patterns, 470
mode of analysis, 44-45 levels of consciousness, 469
multiple consequences, 93 motivation and, 470
normal versus pathological functioning, ontological security system, 470
45 regionalization and routinization, 470
Parsonian, 57 stratification model of, 468
and radical positivism, 59 Human consciousness and society, 186-87
social context, 93 The Human Group (Homans), 235-36, 256
structural limits, 93
and system levels, 50-52
systematic revision, 89 Ideal types, 53
systemic concepts, 59 Illegitimate teleology; see Teleological
universal functional needs, 52 reasoning
utilitarian thought within, 59 Imaginative rehearsal, 314
utopian features of, 79 Imperatively coordinated associetions
of whole versus parts, 45 (ICAs), 152
factual substrates, 154
and social systems, 164
General systems theory, 103 as variables, 161
bottlenecks, 107 Individual and society, 309
conflict and differentiation, 107 Inductive theory building, 235-39
differentiation and complexity, 106 versus deduction, 239
disagreement over values, 108 elaboration, 236
dispersal of energies, 108 elements; see first-order abstractions
entrance/exit rules, 105-6, 108 external versus internal systems, 236
functional divisions, 107 first-order abstractions, 235-36
impersonality of encounters, 109 interrelated gerneralizations, 236
interaction systems, 105 propositions and, 239
material dimension, 104 second-order abstractions, 235
mechanisms, 104 utility for macro units, 349
nesting of system levels, 107 Institutions in society
organization systems, 105 as subsystems, 65
social control organizations, 108 universal elements of, 51-52
societal systems, 106 Institutionalization, 64-65, 79, 276-79,
symbolic dimension, 104 283, 464-66
system versus environment, 111 counterinstitutional values, 278
temporal dimension, 104 mediating values and, 276
Generalized other, 315-16, 356n minimal conditions for, 276
and stock knowledge, 331 as process versus structure, 64-65
The German Ideology (Marx & Engels), Instrumental reason; see Means-end
132 rationality
Goal attainment (G), 69-70 Integration (I) of society, 69-70, 107-8,
Golden’s Law, 15, 16, 247-48 200, 210, 269
Group in society, 256-58 applied to historical processes, 76
Group elaboration, 237-38, 255-57 functional requisites for, 64
concepts of, 256 maintains equilibrium, 68
psychic profits, 256. overconcern with, 79
 SUBJECT INDEX x

Integration (I) of society—Cont. Macrostructuralism, 426

as a postulate, 90-91 diversity of associations, 430-31
functionalist view of, 63 heterogeneity and inequality, 433
institutionalized patterns of as social implicit functionalism, 433
system, 63 and individual parameters, 427-28
Interactionism; see also Symbolic integration and diffentiation, 433-34
interactionism mobility with structure, 431
Chicago school of, 329 number of people, 426-27
group affiliations, 321 rates of interaction, 434
and level of meaning, 323 reciprocal relations, 431-32
micro action and macro structure, 322 stereotypes and prejudice, 432
and ritual, 322 Macrostructures in society, 274-80
social structure in, 320 classes of substructures, 279
Intersubjectivity, 87, 188, 199, 328-30 exchange relations within, 280
Invisible hand of order, 37 interdependence among substructures,
isomorphism with actual systems, 78 279
mediating values and, 275-76, 279
Male dominance, 449-50
Marginal utility, 265
Knowledge and Human Interest
Material conditions of life
(Haberme;), 191
altering, 134
Kula Ring, 219-21
determinant of people’s lives, 133
Means-end rationality, 149, 188, 195-96,
203
Labor-management relations, 141 Meta-theoretical formats, 9-10
Labor theory of value, 230 abstractness and scope of, 22, 24
Latency (L), 69-70 and inherently unresolvable
pattern maintenance, 69 controversies, 10
tension management, 69 prior to theory, 9
Law as reanalysis, 10
versus ideology, 120 theoretical value of, 25-26
reflexive quality of, 120 Method and Measurement in Socvology
theoretical, 478 (Cicourel), 401
Legitimation Crisis (Habermas), 194-95 Microstructuralism
Lifeworld, 196, 202, 204-6, 210, 325-26, chains of interaction rituals, 436-37,
328-29, 391-92 439-41
components of, 205 cultural capital, 439
crises of, 208 encounter, 439-41
differentiation and, 206 energizing processes, 438
functional needs for reproducing, 205 and exchange theory, 454-55
independent of social institutions, 211 group membership, 439
and social integration, 205 micro-macro continuum, 437
types of interpretative patterns, 205 microtranslation of macrostructures, 441
Locale, 473 macrostructure and past encounters, 440
as frames, 473 reciprocity between micro- and macro
modes of, 473 structure, 438
The Logic of the Social Sciences ritualization of encounters, 440
(Habermas), 191 shared conversational reality, 440-41
three dimensions of macrostructure, 436
time dimension, 436
Macro versus micro analysis, 30-31, 53, Middle-range theories, 15-16, 88
201, 255, 262, 284-86, 290, 297, 415- abstractness and scope of, 23
17 generalized, 89
synthetic efforts, 31 goal of, 23
xiv SUBJECT INDEX

Middle-range theories—Cont. Phenomenology—Cont.

legitimate theory, 89 reciprocity of perspectives, 330-31
as part of formal theory, 29 sense experience, 325
as statements of empirical regularity, 90 stock knowledge, 330-31
theoretical value of, 29 typification, 330-31
Mind, 122-23, 311-13, 314-15 The Philosophy of Money (Simmel), 145,
emergence in infants, 314 229, 230, 232
Pure, 326, 328 Power, concentration of, 118
Model, defined, 18 Political systems, 280-81
Modeling formats, 16-21 aggravate imbalances, 281
abstractness and scope of, 19, 22-24. differentiation of, 118
advantage over propositional formats, 21 elites in, 119
analytical, 19-21 legal autonomy, 120
causal, 18-20 legitimacy, 118
theoretical value of, 25, 27-28 origin of, 117
Money, 231-32 positivation of law, 119
as communication medium, 73 reflexiveness of, 119
as emancipator, 145 structural abstraction, 118
quantifies social relations, 145 and traditional moral code, 119
reflexivity of, 122-23 typologies within, 119
and time, 122 as unified targets for opposition, 281
versus value consensus, 119
Positivism, 39, 193, 476-77
Negative dialectics, 188 Power, 117-18
Network analysis, 287-88; see also Pragmatism, 311
Exchange netv’9?k theory Praxis, 185, 187
Newtonian physics, 40, 249, 252 Primary group, 311
Norton Street Gang, 237-38 Principles of Biology (Spencer), 42
The Principles of Sociology (Spencer, 413
Process role theory
On Systematically Distorted actors and their roles, 377
Communications (Habermas), 196 behavioral correspondence, 375
Ontological security, 476 concept of person, 379
Opening and closing rituals, 471-72 consistency of role, 372
Operant psychology; see Behaviorism deductive format, 385-86
Operational definitions, 6 emergence of roles, 375-76
Organismic analogies, 40, 45, 47, 139, 166- empirical propositions, 380, 386
67 explanatory propositions, 384-87
functionality proposition, 384-85
identification of role, 371
Paradigms in sociology, 31 main tendency propositions, 375-80
Parameters negotiated roles, 370-71
intersection and consolidation on, 427- person-role merger, 380-84
28, 430-31 role cues, 376
nominal versus graduated, 428 role distance, 379
Path analysis, 19n role as general framework, 370-71
Pattern variables, 65-66 role-making, 372, 383
Phenomenology, 324-31; see also role reciprocity, 377
Ethnomethodology role sets, 378
common world assumption, 330 role strain, 379
criticism of naturalistic science, 326 role-taking, 371, 377
lifeworld, 325-26, 328-29; see also role verification, 373
Lifeworld roles facilitate interaction, 376-77
radical abstraction of the individual, 326 roles in organizations, 377-78
 SUBJECT INDEX XV

Process role theory—Cont. Science

self in, 383 and ideology, 194, 209
self-conception and, 373-74 limitations on, 192.
sensitizing concepts, 375 prevents emancipation, 192
social setting in, 382 Scope conditions of theory, 13, 23-24
society and roles, 378 Self, 315-16
tenability proposition, 385 game and, 315
tentative nature of interaction, 372 and generalized other, 315
willingness to take on roles, 386-87 the “I” versus, the “me,” 317 .
Propositional format, 11-16 looking-glass, 311
abstractness and scope of, 12-13 and multiple roles, 319
_ “Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It” play and, 315
(Watson), 226 typology of, 310
Public sphere, 190-91, 197 Self-collectivity, 66
erosion of, 191
Self-images versus self conception, 315
Sensitizing concepts, 457, 460, 477
Social action, 52, 327
Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms
Rational-legal authority, 146-47
(Homans), 239, 256
“Gron cage’’ of, 149
Social control, 67-68
The Reconstruction of Historical
and cultural patterns, 68
Materialism (Habermas), 199
Social physics, 40
Reductionism, 251-55
Social system
inevitable in deductive theory, 254
common symbolic resources, 68
and macrostructure, 253
equilibrating tendencies, 67
utility of, 253-55
general systems definition, 103
Refutation of theory, 25
and institutionalization, 64-65
Regression equations, 17n
institutionalized patterns of interaction
Reification, 186-87
as, 63
Requisite functionalism, 43-44
interchanges with subsystems, 70
Research, and theory, 8%
and normative organization of status-
Research methods
roles, 63
exploration and inspection, 344-45
inductive versus deductive reasoning, personality systems within, 67
347-48
types of, 105-6
The Social System (Parsons), 62, 68, 70,
operational definitions, 345
operationalization of concepts, 344 263
problematic instructional role theory, Socialization, 67
366 Society, 316-18
as process of symbolic interaction, 344 constructed phenomenon, 317
sensitizing concepts, 347 and generalized other, 316
Reverse causal chains, 98 self in, 316
Revolutionary class conflict, 134; see also structure and individual conduct, 318
Class conflict theory Sociology, as a science, 30
Role, 318 Stalinism, 149
ambiguity of concept, 353 Street Corner Society (Whyte), 237
and networks of statuses, 320 Structural exchange theory
as passive, 459-60 classes of rewards, 267-68
structural versus processual view of, conflict in, 271-74, 283-84
353-54; see also Process role theory converges with dialectical conflict
and Structural role theory theory, 272
types of, 319 differentiation by resources, 267
Role theory, 318-20 differentiation and specialization, 280-
Russian Revolution, 185 81
 a 7%

V1 999l
peel
xvi SUBJECT INDEX

Structural exchange theory—Cont. Structural role theory—f ont.

ideological codification of deprivations, role-playing skills, 3
273 : role-taking, 356
imbalanced exchanges, 272-74, 281 self-image and behavior, 362
indirect exchanges, 275 ' self-related concepts 357, 366
institutionalization in, 276-79 “signifieant-others,,3
justice principles, 265-66 status networks, 355-57
leaders and, 269 style of role performance, 361
legitimation of authority, 269-70 subjective roles, 359
limits on social change, 282 theoretical specificity, 368
macroexchange processes, 274-80 timing of role processes, 363
and mediating values, 275-76, 285-86 unmeasurable concepts, 366
microexchange processes, 274 Structural Transformation of the Public
norms of fair exchange, 265 Sphere (Habermas), 190
organization structure altered in Structuralism
authority legitimation, 270 behavioral capacities facilitate, 419
organized collectivities, 279-80 and brain biochemistry, 423
political organizations, 280-81 common ideas, 413
power and compliance, 267-68 differentiating populations, 411
prestige rankings, 268 French, 413-14, 474
profits on relations, 263 generalized exchange media, 418
rationality principle, 264-65 implicit exchange theory, 410
reciprocity, 265, 267, 278 and the individual, 419-20
retaliation for sanctions imposed, 272 and interactionism, 418-20
social attraction, 266 macro versus micro, 420-21
social competition, 267 and mental categories, 415
social integration in, 269 micro, 412, 416
social life as marketplace, 263 normative constraints, 420
stability versus strain, 266 numbers of interactants, 417-18
subgroupings, 270 population size and differentiation, 413
subordination, 269 population size and face-to-face contact,
typology of institutions, 277 410-11
vagueness of values, 264 power concentration, 411, 414
Structural role theory, 332, 340 religious rituals, 415
causal images, 359, 363 reproduction of systems, 408-9
deviance in, 367 and resource distribution, 409
enacted roles, 359 ritualized interaction, 412, 415-16
expectations and, 356, 364-65 selection pressures, 419
feedback process, 361 specialization, 411
internal process variables, 358 speech and, 422
microstructural emphasis, 357 statistical models, 423
* new roles, 370 and stock knowledge, 420
norms, 356 structure as reification, 435
play analogy, 354-55 subgroups with populations, 414
positions; see status networks system contradiction, 409
prescribed roles, 359 typologies of, 416-17
psychological versus social variables, 364 Structuration, 458, 460-61
reciprocal causality, 360-61 basic types of societies, 466-67
reference groups, 356 and conflicts, 468
relevant variables, 364 contradiction within structures, 467-68
research as participant, 365 dual processes of, 464
restricted status networks, 357 frames for interactions, 473
role entrepreneur versus pragmatic human agency and; see Human agency
performer, 358 and institutionalization, 464-66
Author... YZ
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 Se ofSonielenienlTheory eyJonathan im‘purher isarevisedSonik
enlarged edition encompassing the most recent developments in sociological
-theary Dr Turner's. success fiesinproviding a brilliant analysis of the major
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“paradigms” aiong withhis criticisms. Fiive main theoreticat perspectives, namely,
_ functional, conflict,exchange, interactionist andstructural have been discussed
“fiveparts comprising twenty-two chapters including the introductory chapter. Dr.
_ Turner includes: almost everything regarding sociological theory iin this volume. It
isanencyclopaedic gift‘for both teachers and students, The inti eee all the
existing texts onsociological theory. ceosSrerkarer |
tha book provides a global and balancedpershootive, Turner believés that fetes
jeteay international. Therei isaconvergence of va rious theoretical perspectives and
- paradigms. Today, theory |iseclectic and pragmatic rather than uni-directional and
one-sided. Dr.Tu rnerhas — eananed price ie — underlying
various theoretical formulations.
Dr. Turner believes that sociology canPon a “natural science”. It can develop
abstract theoretical principles and paradigms about social reality. The book brings
a sanciearly Turner'sS pointofview. It is the mostdetailed account of sociolegioed

‘The structure of sociological ean in termsof subeiaiuaes contours have been |

os presented to the readers. Itis this: one book which alone can give maximum
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Vee theory. }

Site H. > Tisha isProfessor ofcack at ‘aesheen of California at

Riverside. He received his Bachelor of Arts deg ree from the University of California
in 1965 and hisPh. D. from Cornell‘University.in 1968. He iis the author of fourteen
: - booksen a variety ¢oftopics, — neemiponice! —- atlas society, social
: a “organization and
a d ethnicrelations. ahs

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