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Brief Contents
Appendices
Appendix A Data Modeling Tools and Notation A-37
Appendix B Advanced Normal Forms B-37
Appendix C Data Structures C-37
7
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Contents
Preface 25
9
10 Contents
Hadoop 489
Components of Hadoop 490
The Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) 490
MapReduce 491
Pig 492
Hive 492
HBase 493
Integrated Analytics and Data Science Platforms 493
HP HAVEn 493
Teradata Aster 493
IBM Big Data Platform 493
Putting It All Together: Integrated Data Architecture 494
Analytics 496
Types of Analytics 497
Use of Descriptive Analytics 498
SQL OLAP Querying 499
Online Analytical Processing (OLAP) Tools 501
Data Visualization 503
Business Performance Management and Dashboards 505
Use of Predictive Analytics 506
Data Mining Tools 506
Examples of Predictive Analytics 508
Use of Prescriptive Analytics 509
Data Management Infrastructure for Analytics 510
Impact of Big Data and Analytics 512
Applications of Big Data and Analytics 512
Business 513
E-government and Politics 513
Science and Technology 514
Smart Health and Well-Being 514
Security and Public Safety 514
Implications of Big Data Analytics and Decision Making 514
Personal Privacy vs. Collective Benefits 515
Ownership and Access 515
Quality and Reuse of Data and Algorithms 515
Transparency and Validation 516
Changing Nature of Work 516
Demands for Workforce Capabilities and Education 516
Summary 516 • Key Terms 517 • Review Questions 517 •
Problems and Exercises 518 • References 519 •
Further Reading 520 • Web Resources 520
Versioning 555
Data Dictionaries and Repositories 557
Data Dictionary 557
Repositories 557
Overview of Tuning the Database for Performance 559
Installation of the DBMS 559
Memory and Storage Space Usage 559
Input/Output (I/O) Contention 560
CPU Usage 560
Application Tuning 561
Data Availability 562
Costs of Downtime 562
Measures to Ensure Availability 562
Hardware Failures 563
Loss or Corruption of Data 563
Human Error 563
Maintenance Downtime 563
Network-Related Problems 563
Summary 564 • Key Terms 564 • Review Questions 565 •
Problems and Exercises 566 • Field Exercises 568 •
References 568 • Further Reading 569 •
Web Resources 569
Online Chapters
Chapter 13 Distributed Databases 13-1
Learning Objectives 13-1
Introduction 13-1
Objectives and Trade-offs 13-4
Options for Distributing a Database 13-6
Data Replication 13-6
Snapshot Replication 13-7
Near-Real-Time Replication 13-8
Pull Replication 13-8
Database Integrity with Replication 13-8
When to Use Replication 13-8
Horizontal Partitioning 13-9
Vertical Partitioning 13-10
Combinations of Operations 13-11
Selecting the Right Data Distribution Strategy 13-11
Distributed DBMS 13-13
Location Transparency 13-15
Replication Transparency 13-16
Failure Transparency 13-17
Commit Protocol 13-17
Concurrency Transparency 13-18
Time-Stamping 13-18
Query Optimization 13-19
Evolution of Distributed DBMSs 13-21
Remote Unit of Work 13-22
Distributed Unit of Work 13-22
Distributed Request 13-23
Summary 13-23 • Key Terms 13-24 • Review Questions 13-24 •
Problems and Exercises 13-25 • Field Exercises 13-26 •
References 13-27 • Further Reading 13-27 •
Web Resources 13-27
CHAPTER XX
The reader need not expect that having brought our exposition to a
close we shall add a verdict upon Vico's work, or what is known as
an "appreciation" of it. If the verdict has not already emerged as a
result of the exposition itself, or as identical with it, if description and
criticism have been not one and same, the fault lies either with
ourselves or with the reader's lack of attention; and in either case it
cannot now be repaired by ornamental additions or redundant
repetitions.
We confess also that we feel no sympathy with the chapters
commonly placed at the conclusion of critical works upon
philosophers and narrating the later history of their ideas. For if
these "ideas" are understood in an extrinsic sense, in their influence
upon society and culture, such a review may indeed have a value of
its own,[1] but is foreign to the history of philosophy properly so
called: if on the other hand they are considered as real and living
philosophical ideas, their later history amounts to neither more nor
less than the history of subsequent philosophy, and there is no
reason for appending it to a study of one philosopher rather than
another. Any other method implies the uncritical theory that ideas
are something solid and crystallised, like precious stones handed on
from one generation to another, whose shape and glitter can always
be recognised unaltered in the new diadems they compose and the
new brows they adorn. But in reality ideas are nothing but the
unremitting thought of man, and transmission for them is nothing
less than transformation.
It is nevertheless a fact that no one has written on Vico without
feeling a need of casting his eyes over later years and noting the
resemblances and analogies between the Neapolitan philosopher's
doctrines and those of fifty or a hundred years after. And further, we
ourselves, in spite of the antipathy we admittedly feel, and the
methodical criteria we professedly employ, yet recognise now the
same necessity. Why is this? Because Vico in his own day passed for
an eccentric and lived as a recluse; because the later development
of thought was almost entirely untouched by his direct influence;
because even to-day, though well enough known in certain restricted
circles, he has not taken the place he deserves in the general history
of thought. How then can we show the manner in which his
doctrines, true or false, respond to the deepest needs of the mind,
more simply than by recording the similarity of the ideas and
attempts which later appeared in such profusion and intensity as to
stamp their individuality upon the philosophical and historical labours
of a whole century? And even if after our intrinsic examination of his
thought this comparison with the facts of later history seems
unnecessary, it will at least be granted that if our discourse like any
other must have its rhetorical conclusion, no peroration occurs more
naturally than one consisting in a rapid review of subsequent
philosophy and philology and emphasising their points of contact
with the thought of Vico.
We might even adopt the method by which he compares the second
barbarism with the first, and present the later history of thought as a
"reflux" of Vico's ideas. In the first place his criticism of Descartes'
immediate knowledge recurs, together with his conversion of the
true with the created, in the speculative movement beginning with
Kant and Hegel and culminating in the doctrine of the identity of
truth and reality, thought and existence. His unity of philosophy and
philology recurs in the vindication of history against the scepticism
and intellectualism of the eighteenth century due to Cartesianism; in
the à priori synthesis of Kant which reconciles the real and the ideal,
experience and the categories; and in the historical philosophy of
Hegel, the greatest exponent of nineteenth-century historical
tendencies. This unity of philosophy and philology, a unity with Vico
sometimes confused and impure in method, recurred in its faulty
aspects also in the Hegelian school; so that this mental tendency
might with justice be entitled "Vicianism." The limitation which Vico
tried to impose on the value of mathematics and exact science
recurred, as did his criticism of the mathematical and naturalistic
conception of philosophy, in Jacobi's critique of Spinozistic
determinism and Hegel's of the abstract intellect; and in the case of
mathematics in particular Dugald Stewart and others recognised that
its validity lay not in the postulates but in the definitions, and the
"fictions" of which Vico speaks reappear in the modern terminology
of the philosophy of these sciences. His poetical logic or science of
the imagination passes into Aesthetic, so ardently studied by the
philosophers, literary men and artists of Germany in the eighteenth
century, brought by Kant into great prominence by his criticism of
the Leibnitian doctrine of intuition as confused conception, and
further advanced by Schelling and Hegel, who place art among the
pure forms of the mind and so approach the position of Vico.
Romanticism too, especially in Germany but also more or less in
other countries, was Vician, emphasising as it did the original
function of the imagination. His doctrines of language recurred when
Herder and Humboldt treated it not intellectualistically as an artificial
system of symbols, but as a free and poetic creation of the mind.
The theory of religion and mythology abandoned the hypotheses of
allegory and deception, and with David Hume recognised that
religion is a natural fact, corresponding to the beginnings of human
life in its passionate and imaginative state; with Heyne, that
mythology is "symbolic speech," a product not of arbitrary invention
but of necessity and poverty, of the "lack of words," which finds
expression "in comparisons with things already known" (per rerum
iam tum notarum similitudines); and with Ottfried Müller, that it is
impossible to understand mythology without entering into the very
heart of the human soul, where we may see its necessity and
spontaneity. Religion was regarded no longer as something
extraneous or hostile to philosophy, as a piece of stupidity or of
deception practised by the unscrupulous upon the simple, but
according to Vico's own doctrine as a rudimentary philosophy; so
that the whole content of reasoned metaphysic was already to a
certain extent implicit in poetical or religious metaphysic. Similarly,
poetry and history were no longer kept distinct or set face to face to
destroy each other; and as one of the great inspirers of the new
German literature, Hamann (who in many ways resembles Vico in
tendency, though unequal to him in mental power), had already
foreseen when he uttered the warning, "if our poetry is worthless,
our history will become leaner than Pharaoh's kine," a breath of
poetry revived the historical study of the nineteenth century; once
colourless, it became picturesque: once frigid, it regained warmth
and life. The criticism of Hobbes' and Locke's utilitarianism, and the
affirmation of the moral consciousness as a spontaneous sense of
shame and a judgment entirely free from reflection reappeared in
full panoply with the Critique of the Practical Reason; and that of
their social atomism and consequent contractualism in Hegel's
Philosophy of Right. The liberty of conscience and religious
indifferentism professed and inculcated by the publicists of the
seventeenth century were negated as a philosophical doctrine; and a
nation without God seemed to Hegel, as it did to Vico, a
phenomenon not to be found in history and existing only in the
gossip of travellers in unknown or little-known lands. Carrying on the
work of the Reformation, which Vico could neither grasp nor truly
appreciate, the idealistic philosophy of Germany aimed not at
exterminating religion, but at refining it, and at giving philosophy
itself the spiritual value of religion. The certitude, the hard certitude
which Vico distinguished from truth in the sphere of law, formed the
subject of thought from Thomasius to Kant and Fichte and so on to
the most recent writers, who have sought even if they have never
found the distinctive criterion of the two forms; all or nearly all show
a vivid consciousness of what is called "constraint" or "compulsion,"
a fact which had been almost forgotten in the old superficial and
rhetorical moral theory. The historical school of law, in its reaction
against the abstract revolutionary and reformatory tendencies of the
eighteenth century, was bound to recall Vico's polemic against the
Platonic or Grotian theory of an ideal republic or a natural law above
and outside history and serving as a standard for history, and to
recognise with Vico that law is correlative to the whole social life of a
people at a given moment of its history and capable of being judged
only in relation to it; a living and plastic reality, in a continual
process of change like that of language. Finally, Vico's providence,
the rationality and objectivity of history, which obeys a logic different
from that attributed to it by the fancies and illusions of the
individual, acquires a more prosaic name, but without changing its
nature, in the "cunning of the reason" formulated by Hegel: it
appeared again, ingeniously but perversely treated, in
Schopenhauer's "cunning of the species," and again, treated with
little ingenuity on a purely psychological method, in Wundt's so-
called law of the "heterogenesis of ends."
Almost all the leading doctrines of nineteenth-century idealism, we
have seen, may be regarded as refluxes of Vician doctrines. Almost
all; for there is one of which we find in Vico not the premonition but
the necessity, not a temporary filling but a gap to be filled. Here the
nineteenth century is no longer a reflux of, but an advance upon
Vico; and discordant voices of warning or reproach rise up against
him. His distinction of the two worlds of mind and nature, to both of
which the criterion of his theory of knowledge, the conversion of the
truth with the thing created, was applicable, but applicable to the
former by man himself because that world is a world created by
man, and therefore knowable by him, to the second by God the
Creator, so that this world is unknowable by man; this distinction
was not accepted by the new philosophy, which, more Vician than
Vico, made the demigod Man into a God, lifted human thought to
the level of universal mind or the idea, spiritualised or idealised
nature, and tried to understand it speculatively in the "Philosophy of
Nature" as itself a product of mind. As soon as the last remnant of
transcendence was in this way destroyed, the concept of progress
overlooked by Vico and grasped and affirmed to some extent by the
Cartesians and their eighteenth-century followers in their superficial
and rationalistic manner shone out in its full splendour.
But if in this point Vico cannot stand the comparison with later
philosophy, the failure is amply atoned by the full agreement
between his historical discoveries and the criticism and research of
the nineteenth century. Above all, he agrees with his successors in
his rules of method, his scepticism as regards the narrative of
ancient historians, his recognition of the superiority of documents
and monuments over narrative, his investigation of language as a
store-house of primitive beliefs and customs, his social interpretation
of mythology, his emphasis on spontaneous development rather than
external communication of civilisation, his care not to interpret
primitive psychology in the light of modern psychology; and so on.
In his actual solutions of historical problems he also agrees with later
historians. These restated the archaic and barbaric character of
primitive Greek and Roman civilisation, and the aristocratic and
feudal tendency of its political constitution: they took up the view of
ancient legal ceremonial as a dramatic poem containing allusions to
the actions of fighting: the transformation of the Roman heroes into
heroes of democracy came to an end with the Jacobins in France
and their imitators in Italy and elsewhere; Homer was considered
great in proportion to his ruggedness; the history of Rome was
reconstructed chiefly on the basis of Roman law, and the names of
the seven kings appeared as symbols of institutions and the
traditional origin of Rome as a late invention derived from Greece or
from Greek models: the substance of this history was seen to consist
in the economic and juridical struggle between patriciate and plebs,
and the plebs was derived from the famuli or clients: the struggle of
the classes, which Vico was the first to illuminate clearly, was
recognised as a criterion of wide application to the history of all time
and serving as an explanation of the most sweeping social
revolutions: the Middle Ages, especially during the Restoration which
followed the Napoleonic period, exercised a powerful appeal to
sentiment and influence on thought, being admired and regretted as
the antithesis of the rationalistic bourgeois society, and understood
in consequence as the religious, aristocratic and poetical period
discovered by Vico, the youth of modern Europe. Thus Italy
rediscovered the greatness of her own Dante, and the criticism of
that poet which Vico had initiated was carried to completion by De
Sanctis. In the same way, Niebuhr and Mommsen brought to
maturity his view of Roman history; Wolf, his theory of Homer;
Heyne, Müller and Bachhofen, his interpretation of mythology;
Grimm and other philologists his projected reconstruction of ancient
life by means of etymology; Savigny and the historical school, his
study of the spontaneous development of law, and his preference for
custom rather than statute and code: Thierry and Fustel de
Coulanges in France, Troya in Italy and a host of scholars in
Germany his conception of the Middle Ages and of feudalism: Marx
and Sorel his idea of the struggle of classes and the rejuvenation of
society by a return to a primitive state of mind and a new barbarism:
and lastly the superman of Nietzsche recalls in some degree Vico's
hero. These are merely a few names picked without care and almost
at random; for to mention all, and each in his right place, would
mean writing the whole history of the latest phase of European
thought, a history which is not yet finished, though it has
undergone, under the name of "positivism," a parenthetical
recurrence of the abstract and materialistic thought of the
eighteenth century, a parenthesis which now however seems to be
at an end.
These innumerable reappearances of the work of an individual in the
work of several generations, this parallelism between a man and a
century, justify a fanciful phrase with which we might draw from the
later developments in order to describe Vico; namely that he is
neither more nor less than the nineteenth century in germ. The
description may serve to summarise our reconstruction and
exposition of his doctrines, and to contribute towards a right
understanding of his place in the history of modern philosophy. He
may rightly be placed side by side with Leibniz, with whom he has so
often been compared; but not, as has been believed, because of any
resemblance (the comparisons made in this belief have been shown
to be false or superficial) but precisely because he is unlike him and
in fact his very opposite. Leibniz is Cartesianism raised to its highest
power; an intellectualist, in spite of the petites perceptions and the
confused knowledge; a mechanicist, in spite of his dynamism, which
perhaps exists in his fancy rather than in his actual thought; hostile
to history, in spite of his immense historical erudition; blind to any
knowledge of the true nature of language, though deeply interested
in language all his life; devoid of dialectic, in spite of his attempt to
explain the evil in the universe. In relation to later idealism, the
Leibnitian philosophy stands as the most complete expression of the
old metaphysic which had to be transcended: that of Vico is the
sketch of the new metaphysic, only needing further development
and determination. The one spoke to his own century, and his
century crowded round him and echoed his words far and wide. The
other spoke to a century yet to come; and the place in which he
cried was a wilderness that gave no answer. But the crowd and the
wilderness add nothing to and take nothing from the intrinsic
character of a thought.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX I
[1] Since the preceding portions of this work are strictly confined to the analysis of
Vico's philosophy and give no information as to his life and personal character, the
reader will not be displeased to find in this appendix a lecture delivered by myself
upon the latter subject before the Neapolitan Società di storia patria on April 14,
1909, and later written down and published in the Florence Voce(1st year, No. 43,
October 7, 1909). I add for convenience of memory that Vico was born at Naples
on June 23, 1668 (not 1670 as he says in his autobiography), and died on January
23 (not 20 as all his biographers say), 1744: the new edition of the Autobiografia,
carteggio e poesie varie (Bari, Laterza, 1911), pp. 101, 123, 124.
[2] See for the whole question Croce, Bibliografia vichiana, pp. 91-5.
[3] In the Giornali of Confuorto (MSS. in the library of the Neapolitan Historical
Soc. xx. c. 22, vol. iii. f. 111) under August 1692, we find "certain civil persons
were imprisoned in the prisons of St. Dominic by the tribunal of the Holy Office;
among them the doctor Giacinto de Cristofaro, son of the doctor Bernardo; many
others escaped, members of the Epicurean or Atheist sect, who believe the soul to
perish with the body." This De Cristofaro is the famous Neapolitan mathematician
and jurisconsult, for whom see F. Amodeo, Vita matematica napoletana, part iii.
(Naples, Giannini, 1905), pp. 31-44; he was Vico's friend. For other notices of the
"Epicureans" at Naples at this time see Carducci, Opere, vol. ii. pp. 235-6.
[4] Letter of October 12, 1720.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Autobiografia, in Opere, ed. Ferrari, 2nd ed. iv. p. 367.
[7] The "subject" is therefore not the religious objections, which he regarded as a
personal insult (Riposta al Giornale dei letterati, in Opp. ii. p. 160).
II
III
For, as is well known, his financial state was always of the gloomiest.
The son of a small Neapolitan bookseller, he was at first compelled
to go as a private tutor to a wild town of the Cilento; later, returning
to Naples, he tried in vain to obtain the position of secretary of the
city, and having in 1699 been elected to the chair of rhetoric, he
held that position for thirty-six years at an annual stipend of a
hundred ducats (£17). His attempt to pass to a chair of greater
importance in 1723 failed, whether owing to ill-luck or to inability—
he recognised that he was a "man of little spirit in matters of utility,"
[17]—he was compelled to give up hopes of academic advancement.
He was therefore obliged to eke out his resources by literary work
such as we have mentioned, and still more by private lessons; he
not only kept school at his own house as well as at the university,
but he went up and down other men's steps to teach grammar to
youths or even to children. His family fife was not a happy one. His
wife was illiterate, and had not the qualities with which her sex
sometimes compensates the defect; she was incapable of any
domestic employment whatever, so that her husband had to take her
place. Of his children, one girl died after a long illness and the heavy
expenses which embitter the diseases of the poor; one boy showed
such strong vicious tendencies that the father was compelled to seek
the intervention of the police and place him in a house of correction.
So sublimely irrational was his fatherly affection that upon this
occasion when he saw from the window the police officers he had
called in, coming to take his miserable and beloved son away, he ran
to him crying, "my son, flee!"[18]
He was indeed of an extremely affectionate disposition; a fact which
may be gathered for instance from the noble and touching speech
he composed on the death of his friend Donna Angela Cimini, from
the tone of pity and indignation with which in the Scienza Nuova he
spoke of the oppressed plebeians whose history he is investigating
or of the tragic figures of Priam and Polyxena, the romance of which
he feels keenly; and finally, from certain stylistic details scattered
here and there, such as the aphorism (no. xl.) where he says that
witches in order to solemnise their rites "slay without pity and cut in
pieces most lovely and innocent children," quite upset, in the most
inopportune but significant fashion, by the fate of these little
persons, whom his excited imagination adorns with a superlative
loveliness. His greatest domestic happiness came from his daughter
Luisa, a cultured and poetical soul, and his son Gennaro, who shared
with him and ultimately succeeded to his chair. When, in his
panegyric on the Countess of Althann, he calls ironically upon the
philosophers who dispute as they walk in pleasant gardens or
beneath painted porticoes, free from the agony and weariness of
"wives in travail" and "children wasting away with disease,"[19] we
feel that he is speaking from his own experience and smarting under
the memory of domestic troubles.
We often meet, especially in these days, with men of some talent
who consider themselves freed from this or that humble duty: and
we ought the more to admire this man of genius who on the
contrary accepted them every one, and (to use a phrase of
Flaubert's) while thinking the thought of a demigod lived the life of a
townsman or even that of a man of the people. He had acquired the
habit of reading, writing, thinking and composing his works "while
discussing matters with his friends amid the uproar of his children."
[20]
His health was never very good: his friends called him "Mastro
Tisicuzzo":[21] very weak in youth, he was in his old age afflicted
with ulcers in the throat and pains in his thighs and legs. In a word,
the repose, the peace, the tranquillity which other philosophers
enjoy all their life or for long periods together was always lacking to
Vico. He was forced to play both Martha and Mary: working at every
moment for his own and his family's practical needs and working at
the same time to fulfil the mission to which he was devoted from his
birth and to give concrete form to the spiritual world that moved
within him.
Thus we need not invent or demand a heroic Vico, looking for him in
the life of religion, society or politics. The true hero is the Vico who
stands before us, the hero of the philosophic life. Others beside
ourselves have noticed his love for the word "hero" and all its
derivatives, "heroism," "heroic," and so on: and the continual use
and varied application he makes of it. Heroism was for him the
mighty virgin force which appears in the beginning and reappears in
the reflux of history. This force he must surely have felt in himself as
he laboured for the truth and, overthrowing obstacles of every kind,
opened up new paths of science. It was this force that enabled him
to overcome the youthful uncertainties, fears and defeats which
sometimes plunged him in a profound individual and cosmic
pessimism, visible in the poem entitled "Feelings of One in Despair,"
to rise to the certainty of scientific method enunciated in the De
nostri temporis studiorum ratione and his first attempt at
philosophico-historical research represented by the De antiquissima
Italorum sapientia; and from this point, abandoning in part his own
thought and weaving a new tissue of what remained, led him to the
De uno universi iuris principio et fine uno and to the Scienza Nuova
"after twenty-five years," as he says of the discoveries contained in
that work, "of unremitting and toilsome thought."
The work completed by this poor teacher of grammar and rhetoric,
by this pedagogue whom a contemporary satirist saw "lean, with a
rolling eye, ferule in hand,"[22] by this unhappy paterfamilias, is
amazing and almost terrifying; such is the mass of mental power
compressed into it. It is a work at once reactionary and
revolutionary: reactionary in relation to the present, by its
attachment to the traditions of the ancient world and the
Renaissance; revolutionary as against the present and the past in
laying the foundations of that future later to be known as the
Nineteenth century.
Within the domain of science, this humble man of the people
became an aristocrat: and the "lordly style"[23] which he falsely
ascribed to the wretched writings of the proud nobles and pompous
prelates of his day was in reality his own. He loathed the polite and
social literature which was gradually spreading in France and Italy
and other European countries, the "ladies' books."[24] But he
avoided no less that other class of treatise which we nowadays call
"handbooks," which explain in detail elementary definitions and facts
ascertained by others; books useless except to the young.[25] Vico,
who suffered quite enough from the young within the circle of his
school, saw no need to sacrifice to them any part of his own
inviolable life of science. The public towards which he looked was
not composed of boys, lords and ladies. When he wrote, his first
practical thought was, "what would a Plato, a Varro or a Quintus
Mucius Scaevola think of the fruits of his thought?" and secondly,
"what will posterity think?"[26] Among his contemporaries he looked
only at the republic of letters, the brotherhood of scholars, the
Academies of Europe: a public which did not require him to repeat
what had been already discovered and stated in the course of the
history of science, and was perfectly familiar to him, but only
demanded the exposition of such thoughts as constituted a real
advance of knowledge: not voluminous works, but "little books, all
full of original things."[27] His public was an ideal one, which
sometimes in his simplicity he confused with the actual professional
scholars and the critics of literary reviews: and the mistake often
caused him surprise. Short books on metaphysical subjects seemed
to him to have a peculiar power, as in fact they have; he compares
them very justly with religious meditations "which briefly set forth a
small number of points" and are more valuable for the development
of the Christian spirit than "the most eloquent and lucid sermons of
the most gifted preachers."[28] This love of brevity inspires his
refusal to burden with many books the republic of letters, which, he
says, is already sinking beneath the weight. He left his discourses
unpublished, only printed his De ratione out of a sense of duty, and
often expressed a desire that the Scienza Nuova alone should
survive him, as the work which summed up in itself the concentrated
and perfected fruits of all his earlier efforts.
His aristocratic ideal was accompanied by the loftiest dignity and the
profoundest loyalty in his conception of the life of science. From his
polemics we might compile a whole catechism on the right method
of conducting literary controversy. We must aim at victory, he says,
not in the controversy but in the truth; hence he desires that it
should be conducted "in the calmest manner of reasoning," because
"he who is strong does not threaten, and he who is right does not
use insults"; the dispute must at any rate be interspersed with
peaceful words "showing that the minds of the disputants are placid
and tranquil, not excited and perturbed." To opponents whose
objections are vague he replies, "the judgment is in too general
terms: and serious men never deign to reply except to particular and
determinate criticisms made upon them." When these same
opponents appeal to the "refined taste of the age, which has
banished," etc., etc., he replies contemptuously, "a grave criticism
this, in truth: it is no criticism at all. In thus taking refuge from one's
opponents before the tribunal of one's own judgment, by saying that
what they say is a thing of which one has no idea, from an opponent
one becomes the judge." He refused to rely upon his authorities, but
yet did not undervalue them; authority ought to "make us attentive
to seek the causes which could have induced authors, especially the
most weighty, to adopt such and such opinions." Again, accused of
attributing errors to philosophers so as to be able to refute them
with ease, like Aristotle, he protests with dignity: "I would rather
enjoy my own small and simple stock of knowledge than be
compared in bad faith with a great philosopher." His moderation may
be illustrated by his splendid eulogy of Descartes, though he spent
the best part of his mental powers in opposing him. His loyalty is
shown by his prompt recognition of his own errors: "I admit," he
says at one point to the critics of the Giornale dei letterati, "that my
distinction is faulty."[29] "The reader must not think it ostentatious in
us" (he writes in the second Scienza Nuova), "that not satisfied with
the favourable judgments of such men as these upon our works, we
yet disapprove and reject these works. On the contrary, it is a proof
of the high veneration and respect in which we hold these men. For
rude and haughty writers uphold their works even against the just
accusations and reasonable corrections of others: some, who by
chance are of a small spirit, sate themselves with the favourable
judgments they receive and because of these go no further towards
perfection: but in our case the praise of great minds has increased
our courage to amend, to complete, and even to recast in a better
form this work of ours."[30]
His scientific life was upright, worthy of a serious searcher after
truth; his emotional life disturbed and restless, worthy of one who
sees face to face the truth he has long sought and desired, and
rejoices in the power of laying it before mankind. Hence his lofty
poetry, expressed not in verse but in prose, and especially in the
Scienza Nuova. "Vico is a poet," writes Tommaseo: "he brings fire
from smoke, and lively images from metaphysical abstractions: he
reasons as he narrates and depicts while he reasons: over the
mountain-tops of thought he does not walk, he flies; and in one
sentence he often compresses more lyrical feeling than may be
found in many an ode."[31] De Sanctis saw in the Scienza Nuova the
progress of a poem, almost a new Divina commedia. Sublime like
Dante, he was more severe than Dante himself; if the lips of the
Ghibelline show at times the flicker of "a passing smile," Vico looks
at history with a face "that never smiles." Moreover, the man whose
style has been so often criticised is not a commonplace writer; he
was as careful a student of pure Tuscan[32] as he was a fine
connoisseur, according to Capasso, of Latin phraseology.[33] But he
was faulty in the arrangement of his books, because his mind did not
master all the philosophical and historical material it had
accumulated; he wrote carelessly because wildly and as if possessed
by a demon: and hence arise the lack of proportion and the
confusion in the various parts of his work, within single pages and
single paragraphs. He often gives the impression of a bottle of water
quickly inverted, in which the liquid trying to issue forth so presses
against the narrow opening "that it comes out painfully, drop by
drop." Painfully, by fragments, and disjointedly. One idea while he is
expressing it recalls another, that a fact, and that another fact: he
tries to say everything at once, and parenthesis branches off into
parenthesis in a manner to make one's brain reel. But these chaotic
periods, weighted as they are with original thoughts, are no less
woven of striking phrases, statuesque words, phrases full of
emotion, and picturesque images. A bad writer, if you will, but his is
the kind of bad writing of which only great writers possess the
secret.
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