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NTELL NATIONA
DIRECTOR
OFN
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL
THE
OF IONAL COUNC
INTEL
NATIO
LIGENCE
SENSE OF THE COMMUNITY MEMORANDUM
OFFICE
7 April 2025 SOCM 2025-11374
(b) (3 ) Venezuela: Examining Regime Ties to Tren de Aragua
(b) ( 3) Tren de Aragua ( TDA ) is a transnational gang based in Venezuela that has spread to at least seven South
America and Caribbean countries , operating in loosely-organized cells of localized, individual criminal networks.
TDA leaders have historically been located and broadly benefitted from various permissive conditions and incapacities
in Venezuela. They probably communicate to varying degrees with some TDA cells in other countries , although other
cells probably operate and coordinate amongst themselves independently, judging from DHS reporting
(b) ( 1 ) , ( b) (3) Some self-described TDA criminal entities or individuals lack direct
ties to TDA leadership but still use the TDA moniker for reputational benefits, complicating the IC's ability to identify
and track authentic group members and networks.
• (b)(3) TDA formed around 2007 in the Tocoron Prison located in Aragua State, Venezuela, which
served as its initial base of operations . The group's senior founders and probable core leaders are Hector Guerrero
Flores, a.k.a. Nino Guerrero or El Nino, Yohan Jose Romero a.k.a. Johan Petrica , and Larry Alvarez Nunez,
a.k.a. Larry Changa . Alvarez Nunez is in Colombian custody.
• (b)(3) In recent years, TDA leadership has faced setbacks , including losing their centralized location in
Tocoron Prison and having several senior TDA leaders arrested in Colombia by the Colombian National Police.
In 2023, the Venezuelan regime cleared TDA from Tocoron Prison, although the group's leaders were able to
escape in the operation, possibly assisted by low-level Venezuelan military and political leaders , judging from
DHS reporting. The regime may have expelled TDA from the prison to undercut regional press alleging TDA ties
to disputed Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, or to disrupt further destabilizing activities by gang members
inside Venezuela.
•
( b) ( 3 ) TDA and other Venezuelan organized criminal groups have spread to other countries , aided by the
movement of the larger body of Venezuelan migrants into Bolivia , Chile , Colombia , Ecuador , Peru , Trinidad and
Tobago, and the United States , in particular. Nicaragua and Panama have also reported encountering TDA
affiliates, (b) (1 ) , ( b) ( 3 ) From 2021 to 2024 there was a spike in Venezuelan
encounters at the US - Mexico border, in which some TDA members could have been present as they have
generally moved with Venezuelan migrant communities and profit from human trafficking and migrant
smuggling. (b)(1 ) , ( b ) ( 3) The small size of TDA's
cells, its focus on low-skill criminal activities , and its decentralized structure make it highly unlikely that TDA
coordinates large volumes of human trafficking or migrant smuggling.
(U) This assessment was prepared under the auspices ofthe NationalIntelligence Officer (NIO)for Western Hemisphere. It was drafted by the NationalIntelligence
Council(b)(1), (b)(3)
Classified By: (b)( 3 ) | Derived From : ( b ) ( 3 )
Declassify On : (b) (3 )
(b)(3)
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(b)(3) Maduro Regime Probably Maintains Ad Hoc Links to Some Criminal Groups in Venezuela
( b) (3 ) Maduro regime leadership probably sometimes tolerates TDA's presence in Venezuela,
and some government officials may cooperate with TDA for financial gain. (b)(1), (b)(3) instances ofregime officials'
cooperation with various armed and criminal groups, such as Colombia's National Liberation Army or Los Colectivos,
havebeen ad-hoc and reportedly driven by the regime's desire for help controlling territory or deterring aperceived
threat ofinvasion, or for individual financial gain.
• (b)(3) | The Maduro regime generally does not impede illegal armed and criminal groups
from operating in Venezuela, but it does combat and seek to contain them when it fears they could destabilize the
regime or when corrupt deals sour. Venezuela'ssecurity services lackthe capacity to fully control Venezuelan
territory, giving the regime an interest in cooperating with armed groups for insight and control in areas outside
the services' traditional areas of operation. Furthermore, combatting such groups often results in personnel losses,
probably encouraging the regime to at times cooperate with some groups instead of contesting them.
• (b)(3) Some mid- to low-level Venezuelan officials probably profit from TDA's illicit activities, according
to (b)(1), (b)(3) and press reporting. For example, local military officials have alerted other armed and
criminal groups conducting aerial drug shipments to VenezuelanAir Force patrols and might have alerted TDA
leadership of a planned raid in 2023 against the prison that was its base of operations.
(b)(3) Maduro Regime Probably Not Directing TDA Activities
(b)(3) While Venezuela'spermissive environment enables TDA to operate, the Maduro
regime probably does not have a policy ofcooperating with TDA and is not directing TDA movementto and
operations in theUnited States. The IC bases this judgment on Venezuelan law enforcement actions demonstratingthe
regime treats TDA as a threat; an uneasy mix of cooperation and confrontation rather than top-down directives
characterizing the regime's ties to other armed groups; and the decentralized makeup of TDA that would makesuch a
relationship logistically challenging. Furthermore, most ofthe IC judges that intelligence indicating that regime leaders
are directing orenabling TDA migration to the United States is not credible and would need(x1). (bx(3) reporting
(b)(1 ), (b)(3) corroborated (b)(1 ), (b)(3) While FBI
analysts agreewiththe above assessment, they assess some Venezuelangovernment officials facilitate TDA members'
migration from Venezuela to the United States and use members as proxies in Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and
the United States to advance what they see as the Maduro regime's goal of destabilizing governments and undermining
publicsafety in these countries, based on DHS and FBI reporting as ofFebruary 2024.
• (b)(3) |Venezuelan intelligence, military, and police services view TDA as asecurity
threat (b)(1), (b)(3) and operate against it in ways that make it highly unlikely the two sides would cooperate in a
strategic or consistent way, according to (b)( 1), (b)(3) and press reporting (b)(1), (b)(3)
In late January, atleast two
Venezuelan National Guard units arrested TDA members in Venezuela in separate operations.
• (b)(3) Since at least 2016, Venezuelansecurity forces have periodically engaged in armed
confrontations with TDA, resulting in the killing ofsome TDA members, according to (b)(1), (b)(3)
press reporting. (b)(1 ), (b)(3 )
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• (b)(3) The IC has not observed the regime directing TDA, including to push migrants
to the United States, which probably would require extensive (b)( 1) , (b) (3) | coordination, and funding between
regime entities and TDA leaders that we would collect . (b)(1), (b)(3)
The IC also
recognizes the regime appreciates migration as a safetyvalve, allowing discontented Venezuelans to leave.US
border encounters of Venezuelannational have decreased since January because of migrant perceptions of new
US enforcement policies. Since late January, border encounters have plummeted more than 80 percent, according
to (b) ( 1 ) , (b) ( 3) | reaching the lowest level in decades.
• (b)(3) The limited IC reporting suggesting a linkbetween TDA and some Venezuelanofficials aimed at
facilitating TDA migration to the United States (b)(1 ) , (b)(3)
In some cases, reporting
warns that these sources could also be motivated to fabricate information. (b)(1 ), (b)(3)
(b)(3) Some regime officials are probably willing to capitalize on migration flows for personal financial or other
benefits, even though the Maduro regime probably is not systematically directingVenezuelan outflows, such as to sow
chaos in receiving countries. The intelligence record indicates Venezuelans have migrated voluntarily, often at great
personal risk, to flee political instability and near-collapse of Venezuela'seconomy.
(bX1). (bX3
The IC attributes increased
migration flows, including the spike in US arrivals from 2021 to 2024, ofVenezuelan nationals - which could
include some TDA members - to a variety ofpush and pull factors including socioeconomic conditions, family ties to
the United States, and migrants' perceptions of US and regional enforcement. At the same time, Maduro has nottaken
meaningful steps to curb migration, highlighting his partial accountability, probably because it has helped him retain
power by having dissidents leave the country, increasing remittances to Venezuela that help ease economic strains for
remaining populations, and allowing the regime to spend less on social services. The Maduro regime may have also
welcomed the logistical, financial, and political headaches that unregulated migration has causedfor the US
Government, its perceived principal adversary, even ifnot a principal intent.
(b)(3) Since 2014, an estimated 7.8 million Venezuelans have departed theircountry, with roughly6.6 million
now residing in Latin America and the Caribbean as of late 2024. Increased migration flows have coincided with
periods of acute political and economic instability in Venezuela, and irritated regional receiving countries,
including neighboring Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Most Venezuelan migrants, including those travelingtothe
UnitedStates and in the region, seek more stable economic and political environments, judging from surveys and
interviews with regional and US-bound Venezuelan migrants.
(b)(3) The lackoftransparency and accountability in Venezuela has created an environment for widespread
corruption and for regime officials to benefit from a variety ofillicit activities, an environment fueled byMaduro's
illegitimate and autocratic grip on power. This persistent outflow of migrants probably offers opportunities for
some regime officials in capacities to facilitate migration movement to look for and receive personal kickbacks for
their services, and to conceal the benefits theyreceive.
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( b)(3) Evaluating Reporting ofMaduro Regime Ties to Tren de Aragua
(b)(3) Weexamined the body of intelligence reporting on this topic, evaluatingthe nature of(b)(1), (b)(3) claimed
access to understand whether they could credibly have access to the information reported, whetherthe report
contained details that could be corroborated, (b)(1), (b)(3)
or details of the kinds of support the regime has provided TDA in exchange for following its
directions. Outside of DHS, FBI, and an additional US law enforcement report, the IC (b)(1 ), (b)(3)
(b)(1), (b)(3)
(b)(3) US law enforcement reports claim members of the regime, including Cabelloand former
Venezuelan Minister ofPenitentiaries Iris Varela, have cooperated with TDA by providing financial or
materiel support, but we cannot verify the sources' access. Even so, these reports do not claim thatthese
figures direct the group.
? (b)(3) Some reports come from people detained for involvementin criminal activity in the UnitedStatesor
for entering the country illegally, which could motivate them to make false allegations about their ties to the
Venezuelanregime in an effort to deflect responsibility for their crimes and to lessen any punishmentby
providing exculpatory or otherwise "valuable" information to US prosecutors.
(b)(3) Potential Indicators of a Change in the Maduro Regime-TDA Relationship
(b)(3) The IC is closely tracking key indicators ofany shift in the relationship between the Maduro regime and TDA,
including (b)(1), (b)(3) weapons transfers, ( b)(1 ), (b)(3) If the regime's
relationship with the group became more cooperative, the IC would expect to see most regime operations against TDA
to cease and some indication that the regime was providing TDA state resources . (b)(1 ), (b)(3)
• (b)( 1 ), ( b)(3 )
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• (b)(1), (b)(3)
| Local press provides some insight on potential ties between the regime and
TDA, but the IC typically does not rely solely on such media given the highly polarized media environment.
? (b)(3) US law enforcement reporting has the most focus on TDA and its activities in the United States because
ofits unique legal collection authorities among IC components . (b)(1), (b)(3)
(b)(3) The next event that may shed light on regime ties to TDA involves the legal case in 2023 ofa
junior Venezuelan military officer who escaped imprisonment in Venezuela after he participated in coup plotting
againstthe regime and was killed in Chile in 2024. Last week, Chilean officials took the case to the International
Criminal Court (ICC), alleging the Maduro regime is involved in the killing, acting via TDA. (b)(1), (b)(3)
(b)(3)
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