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2nd INTER LAW COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY MOOT COURT COMPETITION

TEAM CODE:2025 111

2nd INTER LAW COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2025

2nd-3rd MAY, 2025

BEFORE
THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

IN THE MATTER OF

SUBHASH MITTAL…………………………………………………PETITIONER

VERSUS

STATE & ANR………………………………………………………RESPONDENT

WRIT (CRIMINAL MISCELLENEOUS) No. ____ of 2024

UNDER THE ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

MEMORIAL FILED ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS

COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
LIST OF ABBREVATIONS
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
STATEMENT OF FACTS
ISSUES RAISED
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
PRAYER
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES REFFERED:
S.no. Case Laws

1 Arun Vyas v. Anita Vyas (1999) 4 SCC 690

2 State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335)

3 G.V. Siddaramesh v. State of Karnataka (2010) 3 SCC 152

4 Juveria Abdul Majid Patni v. Atif Iqbal Mansoori 2014) 10 SCC 736

5 Rajesh Sharma v. State of U.P 2017) 10 SCC 826

6 Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque (2005) 1 SCC

122
7 Kusum Sharma vs. Mahinder Kumar Sharma 2017 SCC OnLine Del 12534

8 Kharak Singh vs. State of UP [1964] 1 S.C.R. 332

9 Gobind v. State of M.P (AIR 1975 SC 1378, (1975) 2 SCC 148)

10 Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) SCC 1

11 Suman Kapur v. Sudhir Kapur (2009) 1 SCC 422

12 T. Sareetha v. T. Venkata Subbaiah AIR1983AP356

13 State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 AIR 604

14 V.D. Bhanot v. Savita Bhanot Special Leave Petition (Crl.) NO. 3916 OF 2010

15 Rajnesh v. Neha AIR 2021 Supreme Court 569

16 Shailja v. Khobbanna Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No(s). 6025-6026/2013

LEGAL DATABASES REFERRED:

S.no. Websites
1 www.scc.online
2 www.manupatra.com
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3 www.judis.nic.in
4 www.indiankanoon.org
5 www.legalserviceindia.com
6 www.judgments.ecourts.gov.in

LEGISLATIONS
S.no Laws
.
1. Constitution of India, 1950
2. Indian Penal Code, 1908
3. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
4. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955
5. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023
6. Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023
7. Protection Of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005

LIST OF ABBREVATIONS
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Sn. Abbreviation TERM

1 AIR All India
Report
2 Anr Another
3 Ors. Others
4 SC Supreme Court
5 SCC Supreme Court
Cases
6 SCR Supreme Court
Reports
7 U.O.I. Union of India
8 V. Versus
9 Vol. Volume
10 U/s Under Section
11 Hon’ble Honorable
12 HC High Court

TITLE OF JOURNALS
S.NO. Title of Journals
1. All India Reporter(AIR)
2. Supreme Court Cases (SCC)
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Respondent has approached this Hon’ble court in pursuance of the claim filed by the
petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950. The parties agree to accept the
decision of the Hon’ble court as final and binding.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
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1. The present case arises from a deeply strained matrimonial relationship between Priya
Mittal, a 38-year-old professor and postgraduate in Economics from Delhi University,
and her husband Subhash Mittal, a 42-year-old businessman based in Delhi. The
couple entered into an arranged marriage in 2013, but Priya soon found herself
trapped in an environment of emotional neglect, suppression of her personal
aspirations, and growing psychological distress. Despite her strong academic
background and desire to continue her teaching career, Subhash insisted that she
abandon her profession to conform to traditional domestic roles, which led to frequent
conflicts, increasing isolation, and loss of autonomy. Over the years, Priya claims to
have endured persistent emotional abuse, financial domination, and systemic
undermining of her dignity within the household. Matters escalated further when
Subhash and his family allegedly began pressuring her for a dowry of Rs. 10 lakhs
and subjected her to physical assaults, compelling her to finally take legal action in
2021 after enduring nearly a decade of psychological and physical trauma.
2. Priya initiated multiple legal proceedings, including an FIR under Section 498A IPC
for cruelty and harassment, a petition under the Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005 seeking residence, protection, and monetary relief, and an
application under Section 125 CrPC for monthly maintenance. These steps were not
taken impulsively but rather as a last resort after prolonged suffering and failed
reconciliation attempts. In her defence, Priya’s legal team has presented substantial
evidence indicating that her complaints were genuine and consistent, including private
medical reports documenting the physical injuries and emotional trauma, archived
messages illustrating Subhash’s controlling behavior, and personal diary entries
chronicling years of mistreatment. They argue that Priya’s legal actions were not
vengeful but necessary to secure basic dignity, protection, and financial support,
which Subhash had consistently denied.
3. The trial courts, upon examining the initial evidence, found prima facie merit in
Priya’s allegations and granted her interim reliefs under various legal provisions.
These included interim maintenance, residence orders, and protection measures,
acknowledging the seriousness of the allegations and the need to safeguard her rights
during litigation. Despite Subhash’s attempts to characterize these legal moves as
harassment or manipulation, the consistent application of judicial mind across
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multiple forums reflects that her grievances were not frivolous but legally sustainable.
Moreover, the defence has produced evidence indicating that Subhash has concealed
assets and underreported income in an effort to evade financial responsibilities. A
forensic examination of his business records suggested that he continued to maintain
substantial reserves and investments, which undermined his claims of insolvency.
4. Priya’s legal team has also strongly challenged Subhash’s petition before the Delhi
High Court under Section 528 of the BNSS (equivalent to Section 482 CrPC), where
he has sought quashing of the FIR and connected proceedings. The defence
emphasized that granting such relief would be premature and unjustified, as the
allegations involve serious criminal misconduct and the case is still under
adjudication. They further cited landmark Supreme Court judgments which assert that
FIRs involving matrimonial cruelty and dowry-related abuse should not be quashed at
the threshold unless the allegations are manifestly absurd or inherently improbable. In
this case, they argue, the detailed factual matrix supported by medical, electronic, and
testimonial evidence discredits any such claim.
5. In response to Subhash’s assertions regarding the psychological toll of litigation, the
defence acknowledged his medical records but maintained that his emotional distress
cannot negate Priya’s constitutional right to seek redress for domestic abuse. They
submitted that such stress is an unfortunate but inevitable consequence of legal
accountability, not proof of victimhood. Suggesting alternative explanations such as
Subhash’s inability to cope with modern marital responsibilities and his regressive
expectations from his spouse, they argued that his health concerns must be viewed in
a broader context and not used to silence legitimate grievances.
6. Furthermore, the defence stressed that the simultaneous pursuit of remedies under
different statutes—Section 498A IPC, the Domestic Violence Act(protection,
residence and monetary compensation), and Section 125 CrPC—is legally permissible
and reflects the multi-dimensional nature of matrimonial cruelty, which can have
criminal, civil, and financial implications. They cautioned the court against labeling
this as “vexatious litigation,” as doing so would have a chilling effect on the ability of
aggrieved women to pursue justice through available legal avenues. They urged the
court to uphold the spirit of protective legislation that exists to address systemic
gender inequality and violence within marriages.
7. At present, the Delhi High Court is tasked with evaluating whether the allegations in
the FIR and subsequent cases constitute prima facie cognizable offences or are merely
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retaliatory. It must also assess whether the maintenance orders were justified based on
Subhash’s actual financial capacity and the needs of the claimant. Lastly, the court is
considering whether to direct the parties toward mediation in view of the deeply
personal nature of the conflict and the welfare of their minor children, which remains
a paramount concern.
8. In conclusion, Priya Mittal’s defence before the High Court asserts that her actions
were necessary, proportionate, and grounded in genuine grievances resulting from
prolonged matrimonial abuse. Her legal team seeks to uphold her right to dignity,
safety, and fair maintenance under the law, urging the court not to be swayed by
attempts to portray the litigation as baseless or vindictive.

ISSUES RAISED
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1. Whether the FIR under Section 498A IPC and related proceedings should be quashed
under Section 528 of BNSS (482 of CrPC), alleging abuse of process or not?
2. Whether the maintenance order under Section 125 CrPC is disproportionate to
Subhash Mittal's actual financial capacity, and whether it violates his rights under
Article 21 of the Indian Constitution or not?
3. Whether restitution of conjugal rights should be granted to Subhash Mittal or not?
4. Whether the institution of multiple legal proceedings for maintenance and domestic
violence by Priya Mittal constitutes vexatious litigation, warranting intervention by
the High Court to prevent misuse of protective matrimonial laws or not?

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
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I. Whether the FIR under Section 498A IPC and related proceedings should be
quashed under Section 528 of BNSS (482 of CrPC), alleging abuse of process or
not?
It is respectfully submitted before this Hon’ble court:
1. That The FIR contains specific and serious allegations of dowry demand, physical and
emotional cruelty. Under settled law, FIRs disclosing cognizable offences especially
matrimonial cruelty should not be quashed at the preliminary stage unless absurd or
improbable. Section 498A IPC involves a continuing offence, and as per Sections 468
and 473 CrPC, limitation can be extended in the interest of justice.
2. That the respondent's claims are substantiated with diary entries, medical records for
stress-related ailments, and digital communications. A medico-legal certificate and
police records contemporaneous to the FIR further support the allegations. The offence
of cruelty, whether mental or physical, varies case-to-case and is evident in this instance.
3. That the Legal steps were taken after failed reconciliation attempts and years of abuse.
The respondent sacrificed personal growth to preserve the marriage, and only resorted to
legal remedies after enduring sustained psychological, financial, and physical harm. Her
actions are not vindictive but compelled by circumstances.
4. That the Competent courts have granted interim reliefs like protection and maintenance
orders after contested hearings. The DV Act provides for various civil remedies and the
High Court should not pre-judge the case under Section 482 CrPC/528 BNSS when
lower courts have found merit in the respondent’s claims.
5. That the petitioner’s psychiatric records cannot alone justify quashing proceedings.
Litigation-related stress or unrelated mental conditions cannot negate legal
accountability. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Janshruti held that vague misuse claims
must be assessed individually, and protective laws for women should not be diluted.
6. That The petitioner’s claim of “legal harassment” attempts to undermine the
respondent’s legal rights. Protective laws like Section 498A IPC and DV Act are enacted
for safeguarding women. The Rajesh Sharma judgment cautions against setting
precedents that discourage victims from seeking justice.
7. That The matter involves complex facts that require a trial. As per Zandu
Pharmaceutical Works Ltd., quashing should only occur in the rarest cases. This case,
supported by evidence and serious allegations, merits a full trial and should not be
summarily dismissed.
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II. Whether the maintenance order under Section 125 CrPC is disproportionate to
Subhash Mittal's actual financial capacity, and whether it violates his rights under
Article 21 of the Indian Constitution or not?
It is respectfully submitted before this Hon’ble court:
1. That the Maintenance under Section 125 CrPC is not only a legal right but also a
constitutional and human right, aimed at preventing destitution and ensuring dignified
living. It complements Section 20 of the DV Act and is designed as a quick relief
mechanism.
2. That the respondent sacrificed her career due to marital and societal pressures. Given
the prolonged financial domination, she is entitled to seek maintenance from the
petitioner who holds the legal and moral duty to support her.
3. That the Articles 15(3) and 39 of the Constitution support special provisions for
women, including financial support post-marriage. The maintenance orders serve both
statutory and constitutional objectives aimed at protecting women's dignity and
autonomy.
4. That the petitioner’s claim that maintenance violates his right to life under Article 21 is
baseless. The orders were passed after due process, proportional to the respondent's
needs and the petitioner’s paying capacity, ensuring fairness under Article 21.
5. That the Despite claims of financial hardship, evidence like tax records, contracts, and
property details reveal the petitioner’s concealed wealth. His claims lack credibility,
and he should not be allowed to escape liability through selective disclosures.
6. That the Courts have clarified that a husband’s financial inconvenience does not
excuse him from maintenance duties. It is his burden to prove genuine incapacity, not
mere discomfort. The respondent’s basic needs justify the current maintenance amount.
7. That the Respondent’s claim is rooted in emotional neglect, violence, and financial
control. Maintenance is necessary for her basic survival and dignity, not a punitive
measure.
8. That in the various cases the Hon’ble Courts have held that complete destitution is not
required to claim maintenance. Quantum must be fair and based on needs and ability to
pay. Interim maintenance was granted after applying judicial mind to the facts.
9. That the maintenance awarded is legally sound, proportional, and constitutionally
supported. It enforces the respondent’s right to dignity, not a burden violating
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petitioner’s rights. The High Court should uphold the order to preserve the protective
intent of matrimonial laws.
III. Whether restitution of conjugal rights should be granted to Subhash Mittal or not?
It is respectfully submitted before this Hon’ble court:
1. That the concept of restitution of conjugal rights, though aimed at saving marriage, often
fails in practice and is criticized for conflicting with natural law. The respondent opposes
the petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act due to long-standing separation,
allegations of cruelty, and an irreparably broken relationship.
2. That the constitutional validity of Section 9 is questioned as it infringes on the right to
privacy, which is now recognized as part of personal liberty under Article 21.
3. That the marriage has irretrievably broken down, with parties living apart since 2021.
Their separation stems from serious allegations of dowry demands, assault, and
emotional neglect not minor disagreements, making forced cohabitation unjust and
harmful.
4. That the respondent has filed serious allegations under Section 498A IPC and DV Act,
backed by evidence like medical records and messages. Courts have acknowledged the
merit of these claims by granting interim relief. Forcing her to cohabit amid ongoing
legal proceedings would amount to secondary victimization.
5. That the Supreme Court has expanded Article 21 to include decisional autonomy and
bodily integrity. Forcing a woman to return to an abusive relationship under restitution
violates these rights and becomes legal coercion. Relief under Section 9 must align with
constitutional values, not override them.
6. That the present petition lacks genuine intent to reconcile and appears to be a retaliatory
measure against ongoing criminal and civil cases. Courts have held that relief under
Section 9 should not be used to obstruct justice or gain legal advantage
7. That the emotional and mental well-being of the respondent and her children must be
prioritized. Forcing her back into a harmful environment would cause re-traumatization
and negatively affect her parenting and children’s welfare.
8. That courts have consistently denied restitution of conjugal rights where credible
allegations of cruelty exist. Post the privacy judgment, such relief must be denied when
it endangers dignity and bodily autonomy, particularly amid pending criminal
proceedings.
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9. That Section 9 allows restitution only if the withdrawal from society was without
reasonable cause. In this case, the respondent’s separation was a self-protective measure
backed by substantial evidence and court findings, not desertion, thus disqualifying the
petitioner’s claim.
10. That therefore, granting restitution to Subhash Mittal would amount to legal coercion,
undermine the respondent’s dignity, and violate her fundamental rights. Given the serious
allegations, ongoing proceedings, and complete breakdown of trust, the petition must be
dismissed in the interest of justice and constitutional integrity.

IV. Whether the institution of multiple legal proceedings for maintenance and domestic
violence by Priya Mittal constitutes vexatious litigation, warranting intervention by
the High Court to prevent misuse of protective matrimonial laws or not?
It is respectfully submitted before this Hon’ble court:
1. That filing cases under Section 498A IPC, the Domestic Violence Act, and Section 125
CrPC is a lawful and necessary exercise of distinct legal remedies. These statutes serve
different objectives, and their simultaneous invocation is both permissible and essential in
cases involving abuse and neglect.
2. That courts have already found merit in the respondent’s claims and granted interim
reliefs, including maintenance under Section 125 CrPC. These are judicially scrutinized
orders and cannot be deemed malicious or vexatious.
3. That the respondent’s complaints are supported by medical reports, diary entries,
electronic records, and evidence of dowry demands and physical abuse. The allegations
are specific and legally sufficient to warrant trial; hence, the FIR cannot be quashed at
this stage.
4. That delay in filing complaints does not imply fabrication. Victims often delay reporting
due to fear, stigma, and pressure to preserve the marriage. The Supreme Court has
recognized this behavior in domestic abuse cases and clarified that different statutes may
be invoked lawfully for different forms of relief.
5. That seeking relief under both the Domestic Violence Act and Section 125 CrPC is not
duplicative litigation but a lawful invocation of separate legal protections. The Supreme
Court has affirmed women’s right to approach multiple forums depending on the nature
of relief sought.
6. That claims of financial distress made by the petitioner are baseless. Documentary
evidence shows he possesses sufficient assets and income. Maintenance was awarded
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after appropriate judicial assessment of the respondent’s needs and previous standard of
living.
7. That while litigation stress affects both parties, the petitioner’s medical issues cannot
invalidate the respondent’s right to access legal remedies. Her trauma is supported by
evidence and directly stems from the alleged abuse during the marriage.
8. That a woman’s right to seek redress for cruelty, dowry harassment, and neglect is
constitutionally protected. Labeling such action as vexatious undermines essential legal
protections and violates gender justice principles as upheld in Joseph Shine v. Union of
India.
9. That the respondent’s actions are grounded in credible evidence and genuine need for
protection. The petitioner’s plea for quashing is premature and legally unsound. The High
Court should allow the matter to proceed before the trial courts on merits.
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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
 Whether the FIR under Section 498A IPC and related proceedings should be
quashed under Section 528 of BNSS (482 of CrPC), alleging abuse of process or
not?
It is respectfully submitted before this Hon’ble court:
1. That the FIR lodged under Section 498A IPC clearly discloses a cognizable offense
and should not be quashed at this preliminary stage. The complaint contains
specific, detailed, and serious allegations of dowry demand, physical assault,
emotional cruelty, and mental harassment meted out by the petitioner and his
family members. It is a well-established principle of law that when a complaint
discloses commission of a cognizable offense, especially involving matrimonial
cruelty, courts should not exercise powers under Section 482 CrPC (or its
equivalent Section 528 BNSS) to quash the proceedings unless the allegations are
manifestly absurd or inherently improbable. However, U/S 468 of CrPC, a
complaint alleging commission of an offence under Section 498-A, can be filed
within 3 years of the alleged incident. However, Section 473 CrPC enables the
Court to take cognizance of an offence after the period of limitation if it is satisfied
that it is necessary so to do in the interest of justice. The essence of the offence in
Section 498-A is cruelty. It is a continuing offence and on each occasion on which
the woman was subjected to cruelty, she would have a new starting point of
limitation.1 The Supreme Court has categorically held that the inherent powers of
the High Court must be exercised sparingly, and only when the complaint fails to
disclose any offense.2 In the present case, the FIR contains clear assertions about
repeated demands for a dowry of Rs. 10 lakhs and acts of domestic violence, which
warrant a thorough trial rather than premature quashing.
2. That the respondent's version of events is not confined to unsubstantiated oral
allegations. Rather, it is supported by a strong corpus of contemporaneous
documentary evidence that corroborates the pattern of abuse and harassment. This
includes personal diary entries maintained by the respondent over the years
detailing instances of cruelty, private medical records indicating treatment for
stress-related ailment and trauma, and archived digital communications such as
1
Arun Vyas v. Anita Vyas (1999) 4 SCC 690
2
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335)
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WhatsApp messages and emails. These pieces of evidence collectively paint a

consistent narrative of prolonged mental and physical cruelty suffered by the
respondent during the course of the marriage. Further, Cruelty can either be mental
or physical, as it is difficult to straitjacket the term cruelty by means of a definition
because what constitutes cruelty for one person may not constitute cruelty for
another person.3 Additionally, the respondent has submitted a copy of the medico-
legal certificate and police records that were contemporaneously created at the time
of filing the FIR. This further strengthens the credibility of her version and
reinforces the argument that the criminal proceedings are based on substantive
grounds, not an afterthought or fabricated complaint.
3. That the legal actions instituted by the respondent are frivolous or malicious. On
the contrary, they were filed only after several attempts at reconciliation failed and
the matrimonial discord became completely irretrievable. The respondent endured
close to a decade of psychological pressure, controlling behavior, and emotional
neglect before deciding to pursue legal remedies. Throughout the marriage, she
attempted to salvage the relationship, even compromising her own professional
ambitions for the sake of marital harmony. However, repeated humiliation,
financial domination, and eventually, physical assault forced her to resort to lawful
avenues of redress. Importantly, no woman willingly subjects herself to the arduous
and stigmatizing the process of litigation unless compelled by circumstances.
Hence, the initiation of proceedings under Section 498A IPC, the Domestic
Violence Act, and Section 125 CrPC was a result of sustained abuse and not a
vindictive ploy.
4. That the Multiple judicial bodies, including the Magistrate's Court and the Family
Court, have already applied their judicial mind to the materials placed on record
and found sufficient prima facie merit in the respondent’s claims. On the basis of
these findings, interim reliefs including protection orders, residence rights, and
interim maintenance have been granted in favor of the respondent. These orders
were passed after contested hearings where the petitioner had full opportunity to
present his defence. Even before a criminal court where a case under Section 498-A
is pending, if allegation is found genuine, it is always open to the appellant to ask
for reliefs under Sections 18 to 22 of the Domestic Violence Act and interim relief

3
G.V. Siddaramesh v. State of Karnataka (2010) 3 SCC 152
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under Section 23 of the said Act, Juveria Abdul Majid Patni v. Atif Iqbal
Mansoori4. Domestic Violence Act, 2005 provide for a remedy under the civil law
which is intended to protect the women from being victims of domestic violence
occurring within the family and to prevent the occurrence of domestic violence in
the society. It makes provision for a protection order under Section 18, residence
order under Section 19, monetary relief under Section 20, custody order under
Section 21, compensation under Section 22 and interim relief under Section 23. It
is a settled legal position that when courts of competent jurisdiction have found
enough prima facie evidence to proceed with a case, the High Court should
exercise great restraint before interfering under Section 482 CrPC or Section 528
BNSS. To quash proceedings at this stage would amount to pre-judging the case
and denying the respondent her right to establish her allegations through a full-
fledged trial.
5. That the petitioner has produced medical records indicating psychiatric treatment
and stress-related ailments, these claims must be assessed with circumspection.
Emotional stress or mental health issues suffered by a litigant during the course of
legal proceedings cannot, by themselves, form a valid ground to quash criminal
prosecution. If this were to become an accepted basis for quashing FIRs, it would
effectively shield accused persons in matrimonial and domestic violence cases
from legal accountability by simply alleging emotional distress. Moreover, the
respondent submits that the petitioner’s mental health issues may stem from several
factors unrelated to litigation—such as lifestyle choices, professional pressures, or
pre-existing medical predispositions. It is also possible that such records are being
selectively highlighted to shift the narrative from his own alleged misconduct.
Recently, Hon’ble apex court in Janshruti (People's Voice) vs Union Of India,
remarked that claims of misuse were vague and required a case-by-case analysis
rather than sweeping generalizations. The bench emphasized that while there could
indeed be instances of misuse, the protective nature of the law for women’s rights
and empowerment should not be undermined.5 Therefore, the respondent’s legal
rights under the Indian Constitution and statutory provisions cannot be abridged
merely because the accused finds the litigation burdensome.

4
Juveria Abdul Majid Patni v. Atif Iqbal Mansoori 2014) 10 SCC 736
5
India 2025 INSC 536
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6. That the petitioner’s repeated emphasis on alleged “legal harassment” dangerously

borders on an attempt to trivialize the respondent’s genuine exercise of her
constitutional and statutory rights. Matrimonial laws in India, particularly Section
498A IPC and the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, were
enacted to protect women from systemic abuse and to ensure access to justice in
intimate partner violence cases. Curtailing the respondent’s right to invoke these
remedies merely because the accused is facing professional setbacks or societal
stigma would set a regressive precedent. Such a move would discourage other
victims from reporting abuse for fear of being accused of misusing the law. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Sharma v. State of U.P.6 emphasized the need to
strike a balance but cautioned against undermining the purpose of protective
legislation for women. The present case, with its serious allegations supported by
evidence, does not fall into the category of misuse and thus deserves judicial
scrutiny, not summary dismissal.
7. That the issues raised in the FIR involve complex questions of fact that require
appreciation of evidence, cross-examination of witnesses, and proper evaluation of
materials on record. Such an exercise can only be undertaken during trial and not in
proceedings for quashing under Section 528 BNSS. The Hon’ble Supreme Court
has repeatedly held that disputed questions of fact cannot be adjudicated in
quashing petitions. In Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque,7
the Court observed that “the power to quash criminal proceedings should be
exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare
cases.” The present case clearly does not fall in that exceptional category.
Therefore, the respondent humbly prays that the Hon’ble Court decline the
petitioner’s prayer for quashing and allow the criminal trial to proceed on its
merits.
 Whether the maintenance order under Section 125 CrPC is disproportionate to
Subhash Mittal's actual financial capacity, and whether it violates his rights
under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution or not?
It is respectfully submitted before this Hon’ble court:
8. That the right to claim maintenance under Section 125 CrPC is not merely a legal
entitlement but a reflection of the State’s duty to prevent the destitution and social

6
(Rajesh Sharma v. State of U.P 2017) 10 SCC 826
7
Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque (2005) 1 SCC 122
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degradation of women. The maintenance is both- constitutional right as well as part of

human rights.8 There are twofold objectives behind grant of maintenance viz.
Preventing vagrancy due to strained husband-wife relationships, and To ensure that the
financially disable spouse is not paralyzed as a result of scarcity of funds to defend or
prosecute the case. A wife is entitled to claim maintenance under Section 20 of the
D.V. Act irrespective of an order of maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC (now
Sec. 144 of BNSS, 2023) or any other legislation to this effect. The provision is
designed to serve a social purpose—namely, ensuring that no wife is left to suffer or
live in poverty merely because she is financially dependent on her husband. It is a
summary remedy, meant to provide quick and effective relief.
9. That in the above context, Respondent, who gave up active professional opportunities
early in the marriage due to marital pressures and societal expectations placed upon
her, has a legitimate legal claim to seek maintenance. Her economic vulnerability must
be balanced against Subhash’s legal and moral obligation to support her, especially
when she has alleged continued financial domination and control throughout the
marriage.
10. That the Respondent’s entitlement to maintenance is not only grounded in statutory
law but is also reinforced by constitutional protections. Article 15(3) empowers the
State to make special provisions for women and children, and it must be read to mean
that only those special provisions for women are permissible which do not result in
discrimination against men. It is said that there can be certain facilities which can be
given to women without those facilities resulting in discrimination against men. Article
39 places a directive on the State to ensure that women are not forced by economic
necessity to enter vocations unsuited to their strength and capacity. These provisions
affirm the validity of laws like Section 125 CrPC and the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005, which protect women’s financial rights and seek to
restore a semblance of dignity in their lives after separation. Therefore, the orders of
maintenance granted in Respondent’s favour fall squarely within the framework of
both constitutional and statutory objectives.
11. That the claim of petitioner regarding the maintenance orders and that it infringes his
right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 is wholly untenable. The right to life
under Article 21 does include the right to livelihood, dignity, and mental peace.
However, it does not include the right to evade legal obligations or to avoid financial
8
Kusum Sharma vs. Mahinder Kumar Sharma 2017 SCC OnLine Del 12534
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responsibilities arising from marriage. The orders under Section 125 CrPC were passed
after due judicial application of mind. The trial courts evaluated the facts, reviewed
evidence regarding both parties’ financial conditions, and applied the principle of
proportionality based on the "needs of the claimant" and "ability to pay" of the
husband. Therefore, the procedure followed in awarding maintenance was fair, just,
and reasonable, thereby satisfying the tests laid down under Article 21.
12. That the respondent further argues that the amount of maintenance awarded is not
disproportionate, especially considering Petitioner’s concealed income streams and
lifestyle indicators. While Subhash has claimed a financial downturn due to ongoing
litigation, Respondent’s legal team has submitted detailed documentary evidence,
including bank statements, tax returns, business contracts, and property holdings, that
demonstrate that he is still financially stable. The respondent also highlighted that there
were unexplained discrepancies in Petitioner’s declared income and expenditures, and
that assets appear to have been deliberately transferred or undervalued. Hence, the
claim of financial distress lacks credibility and should not become a tool for denying
fair support to an estranged spouse.

13. That The Hon’ble Court have repeatedly held that financial hardship or legal stress on
the part of the husband does not automatically justify denial or reduction of
maintenance. The Hon’ble Apex Court reiterated that the object of Section 125 CrPC is
to prevent vagrancy and destitution and that maintenance must be sufficient to enable
the wife to live with dignity, not mere survival. The burden is on the husband to
demonstrate genuine incapacity to pay, not mere inconvenience or preference to
channel funds into business operations. Respondent has shown that Petitioner
continues to maintain a comfortable lifestyle, and the current maintenance amount is
proportionate to her basic needs, which include rent, medical expenses, and minimal
living costs.
14. That Respondent’s circumstances are not just economically disadvantaged but
emotionally and psychologically harmful. She has alleged prolonged emotional
neglect, dowry demands, and even physical violence—all of which contribute to her
inability to sustain a livelihood independently at this stage. Maintenance is not a
windfall but a basic requirement for a dignified existence. Petitioner’s claim that
respondent is weaponizing the legal process is a diversion from the core issue of her
sustained dependency created by years of domestic subjugation. As such, the
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maintenance granted is neither excessive nor punitive—it is compensatory and

protective in nature.
15. That the respondent also relies on various judicial precedents, especially where the
Court held that it is not necessary for the wife to be completely destitute to claim
maintenance and provided detailed guidelines for determining the quantum of
maintenance, emphasizing fairness, consistency, and need-based assessment. These
precedents clearly support Priya’s case, where the court has already applied its mind
and awarded interim maintenance based on prima facie findings.
16. Therefore, the maintenance awarded under Section 125 Cr.P.C is legally justified,
proportionately assessed, and supported by constitutional and judicial mandates. It
does not violate petitione’s rights under Article 21; rather, it enforces Respondent’s
right to live with dignity. Petitioner’s claim of disproportionate burden is untenable in
the light of suppressed financial disclosures and a deliberate attempt to evade liability.
The High Court should therefore uphold the maintenance order, reaffirming the
protective purpose of matrimonial relief laws and resisting attempts to dilute them
under the garb of financial strain.

 Whether restitution of conjugal rights should be granted to Subhash Mittal or

not?

It is respectfully submitted by respondent:

“A Horse can be brought to the water pond but cannot be compelled to drink”
17. That the above-mentioned proverb is very famous and the concept of restitution seems to
be akin to the theory of conjugal rights. When a person is separated emotionally from
another, then it becomes really difficult to unite them. Thus, restitution of conjugal rights
is such a matrimonial remedy, which will force the person to save the marriage but it
cannot guarantee its effectiveness. Some section of people also say that it is against the
concept of natural law theory.
18. That the respondent strongly opposes the petitioner’s prayer for restitution of conjugal
rights under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The relief sought is both legally
untenable and factually inappropriate given the grave allegations of cruelty, the long-
standing separation, and the irreparable breakdown of the marital relationship.
19. That Constitutional Validity of Section 9 It is to be noted that there arises a contention that
restitution of Conjugal Rights clearly violates Right to privacy of the wife. Hence,
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Privacy “is an essential ingredient of personal liberty”. 9 The Hon’ble Supreme Court
stated in a recent judgement that right to privacy -among other rights is included in right
to liberty.10
20. That the most fundamental ground on which the petition must fail is the fact that the
marriage between the parties has irretrievably broken down. The parties have been living
separately since 2021, and the nature of their separation is not incidental but marked by
acrimony, hostility, and prolonged litigation across multiple forums. The very foundation
of a marital relationship—trust, companionship, mutual respect, and emotional support—
has been completely eroded over the years. This separation is not a result of minor
disagreements or misunderstandings that can be resolved through judicial direction. It is
the culmination of serious allegations involving dowry demands, physical assault,
emotional neglect, and financial subjugation. Forcing the respondent to cohabit with the
petitioner under such circumstances would be unjust, insensitive, and legally
unjustifiable. The relief of restitution of conjugal rights cannot be used to force a spouse
into resuming marital ties where the emotional and psychological fabric of the marriage is
damaged beyond repair.
21. That the respondent has filed serious and specific allegations of cruelty under Section
498A IPC. She has also initiated criminal proceedings under the Protection of Women
from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. These are not vague or baseless complaints; they are
supported by substantial evidence including medical records, diary entries, and text
messages. The FIR includes grave accusations of dowry demands amounting to ₹10 lakhs
and physical assault by both the petitioner and his family members. These allegations are
being investigated and have already been found to have prima facie merit by competent
courts, which have granted interim reliefs to the respondent at various stages. When such
serious charges are pending, any attempt to compel the wife to return to the marital home
defeats the very purpose of matrimonial and criminal law protections provided to women.
The judiciary must act with extreme caution to ensure that a woman who alleges abuse is
not further victimized by being legally compelled to cohabit with her alleged abuser. The
principle that justice must also appear to be done becomes especially critical in cases
involving intimate partner violence.

9
Kharak Singh vs. State of UP [1964] 1 S.C.R. 332
10
Gobind v. State of M.P (AIR 1975 SC 1378, (1975) 2 SCC 148)
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22. That The Hon’ble Supreme Court in expanded the scope of Article 21 of the Constitution
to include the right to privacy and decisional autonomy 11. Forcing a woman to cohabit
with her husband against her will—especially where she has alleged domestic abuse—
violates her constitutional right to bodily integrity, personal liberty, and dignity.
Restitution of conjugal rights, in its mechanical application, can amount to legal coercion.
In the modern constitutional framework, matrimonial reliefs must be seen in light of
fundamental rights. A woman cannot be forced to resume conjugal life merely because the
husband desires it, especially where there are serious contentions of emotional trauma,
social isolation, and fear of physical harm. The respondent cannot be stripped of her
agency to choose whether to continue in a marriage that has inflicted mental, emotional,
and possibly physical damage upon her.
23. That the respondent contends that the present petition under Section 9 is not driven by
any genuine intent to reconcile or restore marital harmony. Instead, it appears to be a
tactical counterblast to the criminal and civil proceedings already initiated by her.
Subhash Mittal’s sudden turn to seek restitution, after having opposed her academic
aspirations, isolated her socially and financially, and subjected her to litigation stress,
is evidently motivated by an attempt to dilute or nullify her legitimate legal claims.
Courts have repeatedly held that restitution of conjugal rights should not be granted
where the petitioner lacks bona fide intention or where the relief is being used to
frustrate pending litigation. In this case, the restitution plea is clearly being used as a
strategic tool to create legal leverage and not out of a sincere desire to rebuild the
marital relationship. The petition must therefore be dismissed as an abuse of legal
remedy.
24. That It is important to consider the mental and emotional well-being of the respondent
and her children, who are directly affected by the toxic nature of the marital
environment. Forcing respondent to resume cohabitation in a home where she has
allegedly suffered abuse would not only retraumatize her but would also negatively
impact the children’s psychological development. Courts have held that the welfare of
the children and the safety of the mother must be paramount in all matrimonial matters.
Legal compulsion to cohabit would subject her to renewed distress, potentially
impairing her ability to parent effectively. Therefore, the Court must reject any relief
that threatens to compromise the welfare of the respondent.

11
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017)
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25. That the Hon’ble courts have consistently held that restitution of conjugal rights
should not be granted where there are credible allegations of cruelty or abuse. In
matrimonial cases, the Supreme Court held that matrimonial reliefs cannot be granted
mechanically without considering the circumstances surrounding the breakdown of the
relationship.12 The Andhra Pradesh High Court had profoundly argued that such relief
violates the dignity and privacy of a woman. These arguments have now found deeper
constitutional recognition post the privacy judgment.13 Furthermore, courts have held
that pending criminal proceedings under Section 498A 14 are sufficient ground to deny
restitution of conjugal rights, as cohabitation under such circumstances is deemed both
unsafe and undesirable.
26. That Under Section 915, restitution of conjugal rights can only be granted when the
withdrawl from society is “without reasonable cause.” In the present case, the
respondent has produced ample evidence and judicial acknowledgments to show that
her separation was necessitated by the abusive conduct of the petitioner and his family.
Her withdrawal is not willful desertion but a protective measure in the face of
sustained cruelty, mental harassment, and legal intimidation. Thus, the legal
requirement for restitution is not fulfilled, and the petition deserves to be dismissed.
27. That therefore, the respondent respectfully submits that granting restitution of
conjugal rights to Subhash Mittal in the current factual matrix would amount to
legalizing coercion, trivializing abuse, and violating her fundamental rights. Given the
long-standing and substantiated allegations of cruelty, emotional and financial
domination, pending criminal proceedings, and total breakdown of trust between the
parties, the petition must be dismissed in the interest of justice, dignity, and the
constitutional values that underpin matrimonial law in India.

 Whether the institution of multiple legal proceedings for maintenance and

domestic violence by Priya Mittal constitutes vexatious litigation, warranting
intervention by the High Court to prevent misuse of protective matrimonial laws
or not?

12
Suman Kapur v. Sudhir Kapur (2009) 1 SCC 422
13
T. Sareetha v. T. Venkata Subbaiah AIR1983AP356
14
Indian Penal Code,1860
15
Hindu Marriage Act,1955
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It is respectfully submitted before this Hon’ble court:

28. That her initiation of multiple legal proceedings under different matrimonial laws is a
legitimate and necessary exercise of her legal rights and does not, in any manner, amount
to vexatious litigation. The proceedings under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, the
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, and Section 125 of the Criminal
Procedure Code serve different statutory purposes and are designed to offer distinct forms
of relief to an aggrieved wife. These remedies are not mutually exclusive, and invoking
them simultaneously, particularly in cases of long-standing emotional neglect, financial
control, and physical abuse, is not only legally permissible but is also an essential
recourse to ensure justice and protection.
29. That the courts of first instance have already examined the material presented by
respondent and found sufficient prima facie merit in her claims to grant interim reliefs.
The learned Magistrate and Family Court have granted interim maintenance, under the
Section 125 CrPC. These orders were passed after judicial scrutiny and cannot be
presumed to be the result of any malicious prosecution. The fact that different judicial
forums found her claims credible enough to warrant protective measures contradicts the
petitioner’s allegation that the litigation is vexatious or malicious. The Respondent relies
on the principle wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that allegations of false
implication must be established through trial and not presumed in a petition seeking
quashing under Section 482 CrPC (now Section 528 BNSS)16. Moreover, the
Respondent’s complaints are backed by a consistent pattern of behavior substantiated
through specific evidence. Priya has placed on record personal diary entries maintained
contemporaneously with the events, archived electronic communications, and medical
records indicating episodes of emotional trauma and treatment for psychosomatic
symptoms. The FIR also clearly states the demand of dowry to the tune of ₹10 lakhs and
instances of physical assault by the petitioner and his family members. These are not
vague or general accusations but rather detailed allegations warranting investigation and
trial. The Supreme Court laid down that criminal proceedings can only be quashed where
no cognizable offense is disclosed even if the complaint is taken at face value. 17 Here, the
allegations do make out a case under Section 498A IPC and other applicable provisions,
and hence the FIR cannot be termed an abuse of process at this stage.

16
Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand AIR 2010 SUPREME COURT 3363
17
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 AIR 604
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30. That the petitioner has argued that the timing of the complaints — nearly seven years
after marriage — indicates fabrication and vindictiveness. However, it is a well-
documented socio-legal reality that victims of domestic abuse often delay reporting due to
fear, social stigma, and pressure to preserve marital relationships. This delayed action
does not automatically render the complaints false or motivated. The hon’ble Supreme
Court recognized that cruelty within a marriage can be cumulative and that delayed
reporting should not be viewed with suspicion, especially in the context of domestic
relationships where the victim is socially and emotionally entangled. 18 Furthermore, the
Respondent submits that there is no legal bar on initiating parallel proceedings under
different statutes if the factual circumstances so demand. Section 125 CrPC is a summary
remedy for maintenance, independent of the reliefs under the Domestic Violence Act,
which is a civil welfare legislation aimed at ensuring a safe living environment for
women. The initiation of proceedings under both does not amount to multiplicity of
litigation but rather a lawful invocation of distinct legal remedies. The Supreme Court
explicitly stated that women are entitled to seek maintenance and other reliefs under
multiple statutes, depending on the nature of the reliefs required, and that such recourse
does not imply mala fides or forum shopping.19
31. That the petitioner’s claim of financial distress is vehemently denied. The Respondent’s
legal team has produced documentary evidence such as bank statements, tax returns, and
business transaction records to show that the Petitioner continues to possess substantial
income and assets. Attempts to portray financial insolvency appear to be an afterthought,
devised to avoid maintenance obligations. The financial hardship must be judged
realistically, and a husband cannot escape liability simply by alleging temporary distress
or engineered losses20. The Respondent's needs and previous standard of living must be
taken into account while determining maintenance, and the lower courts have done so
after appropriate assessment.
32. That the mental health issues cited by the Petitioner as a consequence of litigation stress,
while unfortunate, cannot be used as a ground to invalidate the Respondent’s access to
legal remedies. Litigation, particularly of a matrimonial nature, is inherently stressful.
However, this stress is not unique to the petitioner alone. The Respondent has also
suffered immense psychological harm, much of which is documented and directly

18
V.D. Bhanot v. Savita Bhanot Special Leave Petition (Crl.) NO. 3916 OF 2010
19
Rajnesh v. Neha AIR 2021 Supreme Court 569
20
Shailja v. Khobbanna Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No(s). 6025-6026/2013
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attributable to the prolonged emotional neglect, coercive control, and physical

mistreatment she experienced during the marriage. The Petitioner’s claim that his medical
issues are a direct result of the cases filed by the Respondent ignores the deeper reality
that it was his alleged conduct which triggered these legal proceedings in the first place.
33. That lastly, it must be emphatically stated that a woman's right to seek protection under
law for genuine grievances — including but not limited to cruelty, dowry harassment, and
economic neglect — is a constitutionally guaranteed right. Reducing such legitimate legal
action to “vexatious litigation” merely because it causes discomfort to the opposite party
sets a dangerous precedent. In Joseph Shine v. Union of India 21, Hon’ble apex court
emphasized that women's legal autonomy and access to justice must be fiercely protected,
and any societal discomfort with that must not dilute the enforcement of protective laws.
34. That therefore, the Respondent submits that the proceedings initiated by her are grounded
in substantive allegations supported by credible evidence. These actions were not
motivated by malice but by a genuine need for legal protection and sustenance. The
invocation of various statutory provisions was lawful, appropriate, and proportionate to
the facts and circumstances of the case. The High Court should, therefore, refrain from
intervening at this preliminary stage and allow the respective trial courts to adjudicate the
matters based on evidence. The Petitioner’s prayer for quashing the proceedings should
be dismissed as premature, unwarranted, and inconsistent with settled principles of law.

PRAYER

May it please this Hon’ble Court:

In view of the facts stated, submissions made, and documents placed on record,
it is most respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to:

Dismiss the present petition filed under Section 528 of BNSS seeking quashing
of FIR registered under Section 498A of IPC and other connected proceedings,
as the same are based on prima facie cognizable allegations of cruelty,
21
2019 (3) SCC 39
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harassment, dowry demands and physical abuse, warranting trial and judicial
scrutiny.

Hold and declare that the maintenance orders passed by the competent courts
under Section 125 CrPC and the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence
Act, 2005 are just, legal, and in accordance with law, and do not violate the
petitioner’s constitutional rights under Article 21, since they are based on the
legally recognized needs of the wife and children and after proper judicial
consideration.

Reject the prayer for restitution of conjugal rights made by the petitioner, as the
same is not tenable in light of the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage,
continued allegations of abuse, and absence of bona fide intent on part of the
petitioner to genuinely resume matrimonial cohabitation.

Hold that the Respondent’s initiation of separate proceedings under different

statutory frameworks does not amount to vexatious litigation, but is a lawful
exercise of her statutory and constitutional rights aimed at securing justice and
protection after enduring prolonged domestic abuse and neglect.

Award appropriate costs to the Respondent for defending the present petition, as
the initiation of this petition further exemplifies the ongoing pattern of legal
intimidation and pressure tactics employed by the Petitioner.

Pass such other or further orders as may be deemed just and proper in the facts
and circumstances of the present case, in the interest of justice.
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