The Alienated Subject

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The Alienated Subject
On the Capacity to Hurt

James A. Tyner

University of Minnesota Press

Minneapolis
London
Copyright 2022 by the Regents of the University of Minnesota

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To Meredith, Benilda, and Janet
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Contents

Introduction 1
1. A Flourishing, but Mortal Life 21
2. The Alienated Subject 43
3. The Intersectionality of Alienation 75
4. Whose Lives Matter? 107
5. The Emancipated Subject 161

Acknowledgments 189
Notes 191
Index 243
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Introduction

In late December 2019, a cluster of pneumonia cases, caused by a newly

identified coronavirus later designated Covid-­19, was documented in
Wuhan, China. Patients exhibited a variety of symptoms, including fever,
cough, fatigue, shortness of breath, and sore throat. The elderly and those
with underlying medical conditions such as hypertension, pulmonary dis-
ease, diabetes, and cardiovascular disease appeared to be especially at risk.1
Health experts realized that Covid-­19 posed a serious risk to people. Pre-
liminary studies indicated a case fatality risk of around 1 percent, making
the disease several times more deadly than the typical seasonal influenza
and comparable in severity to the 1918 influenza pandemic. With no vac-
cine available, virologists, epidemiologists, and other health experts rec-
ommended a combination of shelter-­in-­place policies, social distancing,
and the wearing of protective masks to minimize the spread of the virus.2
The first case of Covid-­19 was confirmed in the United States on Janu-
ary 21, 2020, and nine days later the World Health Organization (WHO)
declared a “public health emergency of international concern,” a designa-
tion reserved for extraordinary events that threaten to spread internation-
ally.3 However, as the virus inexorably swept across the globe, conservative
politicians in the United States sat by idly. At first, President Trump down-
played the pandemic. Asked whether he was worried about a potential
pandemic, Trump dismissed the question, replying “No. Not at all. And
we have it totally under control. It’s one person coming in from China. . . .
It’s going to be just fine.”4 Instead of marshalling resources in anticipation
of critical shortages of medical supplies, ventilators, and personal protec-
tive equipment (PPE), he dismissed warnings issued by the Centers for
Disease Control (CDC) and the WHO with false equivalences, suggesting
that Covid-­19 was comparable to the seasonal flu. Trump also politicized
the pandemic, claiming that the disease was a “hoax” perpetrated by his
“enemies.”5 Trump knew otherwise.
Trump in private described Covid-­19 as a “killer” and called it “the

1
2 · Intro

plague.”6 However, 2020 was an election year, and he fervently sought a

second presidential term. To that end, Trump continued to minimize the
health risks. On February 26, he quipped, “You have 15 people,” the presi-
dent explained, “and the 15 within a couple of days is going to be down
to close to zero.”7 Trump dithered, “You don’t want to see panic, because
there’s no reason to be panicked about it. There’s a chance it won’t spread,
too. And there’s a chance it will.”8
As the weeks turned into months, Trump’s malicious unwillingness to
adequately respond to the growing threat hardened and the number of
infections and deaths mounted. Medical experts cautioned that immediate
and drastic responses were necessary: mass production of medical supplies
and the establishment of an efficient distribution system; the initiation of
protocols for widespread testing and contact tracing; and the implemen-
tation of shelter-­in-­place orders to minimize community transmission.
Trump, however, refused to initiate comprehensive plans at the federal
level, preferring instead to delegate responsibility to the state level in a
thinly veiled attempt to deflect any potential blame from his mishandling
of the crisis. Indeed, on March 20 Jared Kushner—­Trump’s son-­in-­law and
trusted advisor—­met with several officials at the Federal Emergency Man-
agement Agency to determine how best to replenish the country’s depleted
reserves of PPE. In response to a comment that local businesses were
eager to help and were looking for guidance from the federal government,
Kushner reportedly brushed off the suggestion, stating that “Free markets
will solve this. That is not the role of government.”9 Kushner’s dismissive
attitude—­but really the entirety of the Trump administration—­is indica-
tive of a blind adherence to capitalist-­led solutions to crises, but so too is
it demonstrative of a pervasive indifference to the suffering of millions of
people vulnerable to a pandemic.
When Trump did grudgingly respond publicly, he did so in a blatantly
political fashion. As governors and other local officials across the coun-
try pleaded for critical medical equipment from a key national stock-
pile, the Trump administration favored Republican-­led states over their
Democratic-­led counterparts. States including Oklahoma and Kentucky
received more of some equipment they requested, while others, such as
Illinois, Massachusetts, and Maine received considerably less.10 Trump,
for his part, touted his personal relationships with specific governors and
declared, more broadly, that the federal government would not serve as a
 Intro · 3

“shipping clerk” for local officials. “All I want them to do—­very simple—­I
want them to be appreciative,” Trump explained.11
In defiance of Trump, a growing number of state and local governments,
notably in New York, Ohio, and Michigan, closed businesses and initiated
shelter-­in-­place regulations. Only workers deemed essential—­doctors,
nurses, paramedics, transit workers—­stayed on the job on-­site. Not un-
expectedly, unemployment rose precipitously. Within weeks, the number
of people out of work surpassed levels not seen in the United States since
the Great Depression of the 1930s, as the effects of the economic shut-
down quickly rippled across the country, albeit uneven in scale and scope.
By mid-­April, more than 22 million people had filed for unemployment.
Soon, millions of unemployed and underemployed workers faced mount-
ing bills. And as the economic crisis deepened, Covid-­19 laid bare the in-
equities of racial and wealth disparities present in the United States, with
Black and Brown people most adversely affected.12 By September 2020, as
the death toll surpassed 200,000 people, grave differences with the U.S.
population were evident. The mortality rate for African Americans stood
at 97.9 deaths per 100,000, compared to a rate of 46.6 deaths per 100,000
for whites. Hispanics and Indigenous peoples were equally hard hit, with
rates of 64.7 and 81.9 deaths per 100,000, respectively.13

Toward an Ontology of the Alienated Subject

It is easy—­and necessary—­to lay blame for the devastating death toll in
the United States at the feet of President Trump, to decry his political and
moral failings, his abrogation of responsibility, his racism and scapegoat-
ing of others, because, in the end, his inaction contributed to the pre­
mature deaths of hundreds of thousands of people. It is also easy to call
out the irresponsibility and opportunism of federal, state, and local poli-
ticians. However, the unfolding tragedy reflected something deeper than
the manipulations of an unqualified narcissist and his cabal of cronies that
let victims of the coronavirus die needlessly. As Kevin Anderson explains,
“too narrow a focus on Trump obscures how this abject failure illustrates
the essential nature of capitalism, its ‘normal’ macabre workings, which
are now revealed more openly.”14 Heather Brown concurs, noting that the
overall response of the Trump administration “lays bare the crassness of
contemporary capitalism. Trump is simply its most recent and clearest
4 · Intro

messenger.”15 For the Covid-­19 pandemic uncovered a rot within the body
politic of the United States, a rot long festering and long unchecked.
As Marx explains in the first volume of Capital, “Capital takes no ac-
count of the health and the length of life of the worker unless society forces
it to do so. Its answer to the outcry about the physical and mental degra-
dation, the premature death, the torture of over-­work, is this: Should that
pain trouble us, since it increases our pleasure (profit)?” As the recorded
death toll in the United States inexorably rose throughout the spring and
summer of 2020, politicians and protestors—­mostly on the far right of
the political spectrum—­continued to demand businesses and most if not
all sectors of the economy to open, thereby exposing workers (and con-
sumers) to the lethal machinations of an indiscriminate virus. And yet,
as we have seen, while Covid-­19 does not discriminate in its targeting of
hosts, one’s exposure and risk to premature death are decidedly unequal.
Structural inequalities, deeply entrenched in American society, produced
a landscape of suffering disproportionately experienced by precarious
workers, often persons of color. Indeed, the stark differences in mortality
among Covid-­19 victims highlights decades of racist, sexist, and other un-
just policies and practices that separate not only the haves and have-­nots
but also those able to live and those left to die. Indeed, more wealthy mem-
bers of U.S. society—­who are disproportionately white—­experienced the
pandemic very differently. As Vicky Ward writes, many families viewed
the pandemic as an extended vacation: One hedge fund billionaire stayed
at his ranch in Texas, another isolated on a compound in Martha’s Vine-
yard, and another couple relaxed at a villa in the Bahamas.16 But it isn’t just
the country’s wealthiest who are able to shelter-­in-­place in relative safety.
Unlike the so-­called essential workers, these people are able, more often
than not, to work from home; they are able also to purchase groceries and
other items online and have these delivered—­by the essential workers. In
the end, the privilege to place profits over potential premature death is a
classed privilege, but it is also a white privilege, a gendered privilege, an
ageist privilege, and an ableist privilege.
In a previous book, Dead Labor: Toward a Political Economy of Prema­
ture Death, I considered a set of interrelated questions: who lives, who dies,
and who decides. However, these questions were mediated by a more in-
sidious question, namely, who profits from the premature death of others?
There, I premised that one’s exposure to (premature) death is conditioned
by one’s position in capitalism; that is, the relationship between people
 Intro · 5

laboring within the capitalist mode of production and the market logics
of capitalism necessarily and materially mediate the relations between life
and death. Inequalities manifest along the familiar axes of exploitation and
oppression (such as ethnicity, gender, sexuality, citizenship, and physical
and mental abilities) and materialize as inequalities in the vulnerability to
premature death. To that end, I argued that we are witness to a new politi-
cal economy of premature death, an emergent mode of existence identified
as necrocapitalism, a neoliberal attitude on steroids in which the valua-
tion and vulnerability of life itself is centered on two overlapping criteria:
productivity and responsibility.17 Capital values those bodies deemed both
productive, that is, in a position to generate wealth, and responsible, con-
ceived of as the ability to participate fully as producers and consumers in
the capitalist system while simultaneously not incurring a net loss to the
system. Those individuals who are deemed nonproductive or redundant,
based on an economic bio-­arithmetic, are disproportionately vulnerable
and increasingly disallowed life to the point of premature death. They are,
effectively, left to die so that others may enjoy the fruits of (dead) laborers.
As such, necrocapitalism is marked by a distorted moral philosophy in
which mortality constitutes individual risk and failure or a necessary cost
of doing business. It is a supercharged utilitarian ethics whereby the lives
of essential workers are sacrificed for politics, profit, or pleasure.
The capacity to hurt to the point of letting die, in other words, is in-
herent to capitalism at a structural level. Left unfettered, capitalism must
continuously expand because, virus-­like, it kills its host—­that is, living
labor—­and thus requires newer, fresher hosts to infect. The failure to pro-
vide adequate safety measures and procedures, the life-­saving masks and
ventilators and testing kits, is not solely the consequence of immoral and/
or incompetent leaders. The failure of not saving lives is not a tragic failure
of capitalism but a critical feature of capitalism that expends lives in its
perpetual expansion. Harm, as a systemic capacity to hurt, is intrinsic to
capitalism; and this is why Marx focused on the structural relations inher-
ent to capital as opposed to individuals. It is not that all capitalists (or the
politicians who support them) are morally deficient; rather, the market
logics of competition and continued accumulation impel owners to exploit
workers. In doing so, capitalism itself infects the body politics and leaves
behind an alienated society addicted to mindless consumption, indifferent
to the suffering and premature death of others, and intolerant of demands
to affect change.
6 · Intro

The Covid-­19 pandemic made visible legions of alienated subjects who,

zombie-­like, gleefully assembled in armed protests and made demands for
greater sacrifices—­not of themselves but of those workers—­the grocery
clerks and retail workers, transit employees and sanitation workers, farm
laborers and farm processors—­most vulnerable to premature death. In
April, for example, several “Astro-­Turf ” social movements erupted, mostly
in key swing states or states with Democratic governors, demanding an
end to shelter-­in-­place rules and a return to “normal.” Protesters, mostly
white, frequently armed, and often waving Confederate flags, decried what
they felt was an abrogation of their personal freedoms.18 Trump, for his
part, joined the chorus of white protestors, simultaneously downplaying
the seriousness of the pandemic and elevating fears of vanishing liberties.19
Outside the state capital in Olympia, Washington, for example, thousands
of protestors gathered to call for the end of stay-­at-­home orders issued by
Governor Inslee. Protestors carried American flags and Trump flags, gun
rights advocates brought their firearms, and several held posters that read
“Give Me Liberty or Give Me Covid 19.” Republican Representative Robert
Sutherland stoked the crowd with demands to “take back the state.”20
In The Alienated Subject, I deepen my argument to consider the pos-
sibility of having a meaningful life within capitalism. This is a book about
alienation and our need to overcome alienation. It is thus a story about
our inability to live meaningful lives under capitalism, and of the neces-
sity to chart a new path forward, a path of emancipation that foregrounds
empathy over enmity. It is written against the backdrop of the Covid-­19
global pandemic, but this crisis should not overdetermine the purchase of
my argument.
Capitalism, as Marx argues, cares little about the life of laborers unless
society compels it to do so. Moreover, capitalism values only those lives
deemed productive, that is, those lives capable of producing objects not
to sustain life but to accumulate profit and, by extension, sustain capital-
ism itself. Within the capitalist mode of production, valuable lives are lives
valuable to capital; and the only lives that mean anything—­the only lives
that matter for capital—­are productive lives. Thus, when health experts
warned that a premature relaxation of precautionary measures would
result in the premature death of thousands of people, conservative poli-
ticians and pundits displayed little empathy. Lt. Governor Dan Patrick
(R-­TX), for example, rationalized that there are more important things
than living, and that it was incumbent that “we’ve got to take some risks
 Intro · 7

and get back in the game and get this country back up and running.”21
The message was clear: the sacrifice of the elderly, of the precarious but
essential workers, outweighed demands to patronize bars and bowling al-
leys, barber shops and beauty parlors. As the argument went, those who
succumb to the disease (notably the elderly or those with comorbid condi-
tions) would die anyway.
To this end, my concern with “meaning in life” strikes at the heart of
a fundamental and steadfast theme of Marx, expressed most clearly in his
so-­called early writings but also apparent in his later works, this being the
capability of human beings to enjoy a flourishing life. I do so, however,
through a focus on our awareness of death. As Zygmunt Bauman writes,
“The fact of human mortality and the necessity to live with the constant
awareness of that fact, go a long way toward accounting for many a crucial
aspect of social and cultural organization of all known societies.”22 The
capability to experience a flourishing life is mediated by our awareness of
death, of our finite, mortal existence. This is not the same as one’s fear of
death; this condition is too limiting. Instead, the primary factor is one’s
conscious awareness that death for all living organisms is a certainty. A
person may fear death; alternatively, a person may even welcome death.
These attitudes, moreover, are generally conditioned by one’s belief about
the existence (and possible experience) of an afterlife. Regardless of one’s
attitude toward death, however, the point remains that humans are aware
of death and that this conditions how we live our lives and—­importantly—­
interact with other, mortal beings. Indeed, an awareness of our shared
mortality informs and mediates how we treat other living beings, human
and nonhuman alike.
Catastrophes, such as the Covid-­19 pandemic, push our awareness of,
and response to, the specter of premature death to the forefront of daily
life. For many people, the fear of exposure to the virus meant that every-
day activities—­banal on one level, but socially meaningful on another—­
could no longer be taken for granted. For those individuals who abided
by shelter-­in-­place orders, life became severely circumscribed: the ability
to visit friends and families, to eat at a restaurant or watch a film at the
local theater, or to hug and console others in times of grief became all but
impossible. Myriad activities that once provided meaning in life seemed
to heighten one’s vulnerability to a premature death. From weddings to
birthday parties, vacations, and playdates, all of these activities that other-
wise help nurture meaningful lives suddenly forced people to stare into the
8 · Intro

abyss of their own mortality and the mortality of those individuals who
give meaning to their lives.
Governmental and public responses in the United States (and else-
where) to the pandemic reveal particular attitudes—­both subtle and
direct—­toward the vulnerability of different persons to premature death.
Most clearly expressed in policies geared to the meatpacking industry, the
Trump administration and (mostly) Republican governors laid bare a cal-
lousness in their calculus of human life. Workers—­especially migrant la-
borers and persons of color—­were confronted with a Hobson’s choice of
two equally and potentially fatal options: go to work in unsafe conditions
and risk exposure to a deadly virus, or stay home and get fired, thereby
losing both income and insurance. And those people (mostly Trump sup-
porters) who protested the imposition and continuance of shelter-­in-­place
orders and other measures designed to minimize the deadly effects of the
virus demonstrated an arrogance and insensitivity in their behaviors, ex-
pressing minimal regard for the well-­being of others as they promoted
their own self-­interests. Indifferent at best, these people were largely intol-
erant to the point of letting die a sizable portion of the public.
The Covid-­19 pandemic highlights also that the market logics of com-
petition and capital accumulation are structured not to promote or sustain
life—­meaningful or otherwise—­but to transform the living into the dead.
In turn, alienated subjects may see salvation not in the collective care of
others but through the coveting of commodified articles of consumption.
As such, we witness not only the ravages of a pandemic and economic
crisis; we witness also the gradual unfolding of a crisis of indifference, in
which the plight of the poor and the vulnerable are neglected and ignored,
as an alienated society demands the right to visit a barbershop or to buy
lawn fertilizers. In short, the pandemic swept aside the curtains of capital-
ist confusion and exposed the idolization of false profits rather than the
promotion of an ethics of meaningful empathy.
The Covid-­19 pandemic offers an opportunity—­and I use this term
cautiously—­to think about who and what we value in society, with value
determined not on conditions set by capital but instead based on our ca-
pacity to achieve meaning in life. In doing so, I critically interrogate the
ontology of the alienated subject as a counterbalance to the more conven-
tional “liberal subject.” As Frank Michelman explains, “To speak of the lib-
eral subject is to call to mind the sort of being theorists have in view when
they undertake to justify a liberal constitutional conception by showing
 Intro · 9

some benign relation between the favored conception and the values of
human lives.”23 To this end, long enshrined in the canons of Western politi­
cal philosophy, the liberal subject is heralded as the embodiment of rational
thought, self-­reflection, and self-­interest.24 However, the liberal subject is
also invariably an economically privileged, heterosexual, white male.25
How—­and why—­the liberal subject became a disguised substitute for
heterosexual white men is a story of slavery, colonialism, and genocide. As
Lisa Lowe writes, notions of “liberal freedom did not contradict slavery
but, rather, served precisely as a means to rationalize and implement slav-
ery and its aftermath.”26 Lowe explains that “many of the liberal concepts
that were used to justify slavery were also employed differently at other
times to justify settler occupation, theft of land, imperial war, and overseas
empire.”27 To this end, the attributes of the liberal subject, including ratio-
nal thought, self-­determination, and free will, gain their purchase precisely
because these are not universal but instead monopolized through acts of
physical and symbolic violence. Lowe concludes:

As modern liberalism defined the human and universalized its at-

tributes to European man, it simultaneously differentiated peoples
in the colonies as less than human. Even as it proposes inclusivity,
liberal universalism effects principles of inclusion and exclusion;
in the very claim to define humanity, as a species or as a condition,
its gestures of definition divide the human and the nonhuman,
classify the normative, and pathologize deviance. Universalizing
concepts of reason, civilization, and freedom divide humanity
according to a coloniality of power, affirming freedom for modern
man while subordinating the colonized, enslaved, and dispossessed
whose material labors and resources were the conditions of pos-
sibility for that liberty.28

On this point, as Eduardo Bonilla-­Silva explains, the presumption of a

universal subject, who by definition is color-­blind and genderless, side-
steps that people of color are not part of white people’s moral universe,
which limits white people’s capacity to empathize with “sufferers” of color.29
In other words, the fact that our subjectivities are deeply racialized, for
example, is discordant with the forwarding of legal, political, and social
ideologies premised on the uncritical presumption of the liberal subject.
At the very least, such presumptions work against taking seriously the
10 · Intro

racist foundation of the political economy of the United States; at worst,

it reaffirms and codifies the implicit superiority of whiteness. Thus, and in
contradistinction to the liberal subject, I introduce the litmus figure of the
alienated subject to accompany us on our path forward.
In ordinary speech, alienation “is often taken to describe vague feelings
of malaise or meaningless, particularly with respect to work.”30 Conceived
as such, there is a tendency to position the alienated subject as the sub-
altern, that is, a figure beaten down by exploitative relations inherent to
capitalism. This in fact informs many accounts of Trump’s popularity, in
which members of the so-­called white working class express their “class
anxiety” through their support of Trump.31 For example, many journalists,
academics, and commentators intimate that the sentiments of anger, intol-
erance, and outright hatred evinced by especially white men, coupled with
a pervasive indifference, result from deep-­seated feelings of alienation and
thus demand a modicum of empathy to their plight. Bonny Wells, to this
end, details that in the months leading up to and following the election of
Trump, many of these narratives attempted to understand the mentality
of the so-­called working class—­invariably presented as rural, low-­income
white people in areas that are economically depressed and have been ne-
glected by politicians and institutions. She notes that framings often attri-
bute Trump’s success to several factors, but that in many cases racism and
economic depression are prominent. Notably, however, these accounts also
use “economic anxiety” arguments, that is, alienation, to refute or compli-
cate the notion that white voters were motivated by Trump’s racist, xeno-
phobic, and misogynistic platform. In doing so, these accounts—­whether
sympathetic or vindictive to the white working class—­pointed to the fail-
ure of existing structural problems and institutions unable or unwilling
to remedy the economic ills of the white working class.32 Indeed, a com-
mon thread running through many of these narratives is the so-­called Left
Behind thesis, that is, poor working-­class whites—­the stereotypical alien-
ated subject—­supported Trump because, economically speaking, they did
not benefit in the wealth-­generating promise of capitalism. Representa-
tive examples include Katherine Cramer’s (2016) The Politics of Resent­
ment: Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of Scott Walker; Justin
Gest’s (2016) The New Minority: White Working Class Politics in an Age of
Immigration and Inequality; Arlie Hochschild’s (2016) Strangers in Their
Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right; and James Vance’s
(2016) Hillbilly Elegy: A Memoir of a Family and Culture in Crisis.33
 Intro · 11

This explanation was (and remains) popular both among conservatives

and liberals.34 And yet, it is patently false. In fact, many of these accounts
are actually premised on the experiences of middle-­income whites and not
the dogged blue-­collar workers struggling in the face of economic precar-
ity. Exit polls throughout the 2016 Republican primaries and the subse-
quent presidential campaign routinely indicated that the “average” Trump
supporter was economically better-­off than those voters who did not sup-
port him. According to one survey, for example, the median household
income of a Trump voter was $72,000, compared to a national median
income of $56,000.35 And yet, for many political prognosticators, the my-
thology of the working-­class support of Trump proved intoxicating and,
accordingly, the alienated subject continued to play a central role in the
spectacle of Trumpism.
In actuality, what is being described is a relative loss of privilege among
the better-­off white segment of society rather than any real account of seri-
ous and systemic economic decline that is uniquely affecting white citizens
in the United States.36 Indeed, the “ordinary” white Trump supporter was
not among those “left behind” but instead one who fears a perceived loss of
what gives them meaning in life—­white racial superiority.37 Concurrently,
those who have been left behind economically, notably people of color and
nonwhite immigrants, are “scapegoated for inequalities of material condi-
tions that are increasingly . . . shared by both black and white workers,
as well as others.”38 Effectively, the concept of alienation has been white-
washed, both unintentionally and intentionally.39 On the one hand, the
normative whiteness of much Marxist analysis leaves white bodies racially
unmarked. On the other hand, reference to the working class serves as a
dog whistle for racist conservatives and liberals alike.
Alienation is an important mediator of our present moment, but not
for reasons usually forwarded by pundits and politicians. This is difficult
to see, though, because alienation is too often couched in the color-­blind
and race-­neutral rhetoric of the liberal subject, that is, a rational being who
becomes aware of its alienated condition and organizes in solidarity with
other class-­conscious people. If we acknowledge, alternatively, that capital-
ism in the United States is a form of settler colonialism and racial capital-
ism, it follows that alienation must be similarly understood. And yet, with
a few notable exceptions, most discussions of alienation remain woefully
inadequate in their account of racism and other forms of structural op-
pression. Thus, to uncritically attribute the rise of Trumpism to the “class
12 · Intro

anxieties” of the (white) working class is to fundamentally misunderstand

the locus of alienation within a system of white supremacy. As Eduardo
Bonilla-­Silva explains, “Although it is true that white workers have lost
ground and that progressives should show empathy to them,” too often
pundits and scholars “give this segment of the white group a pass on their
racialized, gendered, and xenophobic consciousness. More problematic,
they ask for empathy for their white brethren, but show little understand-
ing and empathy for the plight of poor Black and Brown folks.”40
From the Communist Manifesto onward, as Peter Goodwin writes, the
self-­emancipation of the working class was central to Marx’s thought.41
Subsequently, the question of the revolutionary potential of the working
class has been central in the development of Marxist-­inspired scholarship
and practice for generations.42 From Engels to Kautsky, Lenin to Luxem-
burg, and Trotsky to Gramsci, countless Marxists wrestled with the ideas
developed by Marx in anticipation of a socialist revolution that seemed
always on the horizon. And whether implicit or explicit, the condition of
alienation remained crucial, for foundational to Marx’s notion of emanci-
pation was the premise that the alienated proletariat embodies the revo-
lutionary potential necessary to transform capitalism and to construct a
society free of exploitation and oppression.
It is necessary, therefore, to work through Marx’s premise that the work-
ing class holds the key toward universal emancipation from the exploita­tive
and alienating conditions of a racial and gendered capitalism. And to do so,
we proceed cautiously. Particularly in his early writings, Marx cherished a
rather romantic image of the proletariat, for as David Lovell explains, the
proletariat for Marx gained moral stature because it endured its suffering
without losing its human qualities.43 However, to romanticize the proletar-
iat, as Georg Lukács warns, is to risk losing sight of the fundamental con-
dition of the alienated subject, that is, a subject estranged from society.44
While Marx’s theory of alienation upholds the revolutionary and eman-
cipatory potential of the working class, in other words, the class of men
and women most often identified with Trump and conservative politics,
we find the anger and hatred of many of the so-­called alienated working
class directed not toward structures of oppression and exploitation but in-
stead toward other marginalized people. Such reductive accounts that po-
sition the working class as predominantly composed of white cis men too
often ignore the alienation of women, immigrants, and persons of color.
 Intro · 13

Consequently, an intersectional approach to alienation is required, for the

alienated subject inhabits multiple and intersecting geographies and, as
such, may simultaneously oppress and be oppressed.45 This follows from
the particular social and material relationships that intersect within the
alienated subjects’ everyday life. Concretely, we see this in the intolerance
and antipathy directed toward impoverished persons of color by members
of the so-­called (white) working class; and we see this in the support of
patriarchal programs by (often, white) women. But the alienated subject
is also Black, Asian, Latinx, or Native American; the alienated subject la-
bors as an assembly worker in an automotive factory but also works as a
domestic worker; and the alienated subject is racist but also antiracist. For
in the end, there is no single, essentialist alienated subject if by subjectivity
we understand the subject’s form of life as necessarily conditioned by its
social, political, and economic position.46
Effectively, the alienated subject was never a liberal subject for it always
embodied multiple and contradictory subject positions. The alienated sub-
ject is capable of extending care to some, while revealing a harmful indif-
ference or intolerance to others. In some cases, a person or a group of
persons might sometimes benefit from systemic exploitation while at other
times be the ones who are being exploited.47 For example, when white
workers benefit from white privilege, they benefit from the hyperexploita-
tion of persons of color while still being exploited themselves. However,
the deleterious effects of exploitative relations are lessened—­or, perhaps,
rendered more palatable—­by the privileges accorded to them through the
“psychological wages of whiteness.”48 Likewise, when men benefit from
patriarchy, they benefit from the hyperexploitation of women. Ultimately,
the alienated subject embodies an ethical ambiguity, and indifference,
manifested materially in the intolerance toward difference and the atten-
dant capacity to hurt.
From an ontological standpoint, there is no universal or transhistorical
condition of alienation; nor, for that matter, is there any universal or trans­
historical meaning in life. Rather, both alienation and meaningful life are
mediated by one’s material conditions. This is not to say that meaning, for
example, is dictated or determined by one’s wealth or lack thereof. Rather,
it is to call attention to the constellation of social relations that comprise
one’s quotidian existence, and how these social relations are organized
such as to make life itself possible. As John Fischer writes, “a meaningful
14 · Intro

life is not just a matter of pleasant internal states—­pleasures or other ex-

periences. It is in part a matter of how we are connected to the external
world.”49 In other words, a meaningful life should also be a meaningful so-
cial life, and this suggests we must consider how life is experienced not as
isolated individuals but as members of something beyond our immediate
self-­interests. Ultimately, I argue that the transformation of the alienated
subject to an emancipated subject is conditioned by one’s ability to over-
come indifference, intolerance, and the capacity to hurt through a moral
philosophy founded upon an ethics of care and empathy. This requires an
effort to cultivate, at a minimum, a meaning in life through our actions
and inactions that promote and do not inhibit the life and well-­being of
others. This extends an understanding of our shared mortality to include
an awareness of our uneven vulnerability to premature death, and in the
process to actively work toward the constitution of meaningful life as a
social good.
What then does this hold for the revolutionary potential of the so-­
called working class? For many scholars, as Erik Olin Wright explains, the
working class (both in a material and a discursive sense) has become in-
creasingly fragmented, internally unequal, and heterogenous in all sorts of
ways, impeding the broad class solidarity needed for sustained collective
action against capitalism.50 Indeed, Wright clarifies that part of the prob-
lem is the variegated landscape of labor and the lack of a “historical sub-
ject” comparable to Marx’s vision of the proletariat required for cohesive
forms of solidarity needed for an emancipatory overthrow of capitalism.51
The alienated subject, for example, has become thoroughly politicized,
so much so that within systems of racial capitalism the white alienated
subject accrues psychological comfort—­that is, meaningfulness in life—­
through the mere fact of being identified as white. To a certain extent,
therefore, the emotional satisfaction of white privilege offsets or counter-
balances the stultifying conditions of being exploited. The “psychological
wages of whiteness” continue to undermine class solidarity and pervert
many whites into believing that they must defend their racial position in
society through an “any means necessary” approach that includes vio-
lence, voter fraud, and the inscription of inequality into the legal frame-
work of the nation.52 So too patriarchal ideologies, misogynist practices,
homophobia, and ableist narratives obviate against class solidarity in any
meaningful sense.
 Intro · 15

The Path Ahead

The Covid-­19 pandemic, Heather Brown writes, lays bare capitalism’s quest
for limitless value creation and of the deference to profits over lives.53 This
of course is a point underscored repeatedly by Marx. Writing in Capital,
for example, Marx observes that “within the capitalist system all methods
for raising the social productiveness of labor are brought into effect at the
cost of the individual laborer.”54 In other words, capital survives—­indeed,
flourishes—­at the expense of those who make its perpetuation possible,
namely, the exploited and alienated workers forced to sell their labor in the
absence of other life-­sustaining activities. As Anderson grimly remarks,
how true Marx’s comments ring at a time when U.S. workers, but espe-
cially Black and other minority workers, are being forced back to labor in
workplaces rife with Covid-­19.55
Throughout The Alienated Subject I provide neither a history of aliena­
tion nor a reconstruction of Marx’s theory of alienation; nor do I provide an
exhaustive account of alienation in the United States, although my primary
examples are drawn from Trump’s America. Instead, I offer a critique of
the alienated subject in an effort to understand better the manifest indiffer-
ence toward, intolerance of, and capacity to hurt others within the capital-
ist mode of production. More broadly, the task I set to accomplish in the
following chapters is twofold: On the one hand, to reflect on the becoming
of the alienated subject and, on the other hand, to explore the possibility
of the overcoming of alienation, that is, the transformation of the alienated
subject into an emancipated subject. Throughout, I premise that the alien-
ated subject is indifferent to, or intolerant of, the suffering of others and, as
a corollary, incapable of seeing the meaningfulness of other lives. These at-
titudes of indifference and intolerance are expressed as racism, misogyny,
homophobia, transphobia, and xenophobia. This is not to say these atti-
tudes are unique to capitalism; indeed, these forms of prejudices pre-­date
the advent of capital. However, indifference, intolerance, and the capacity to
hurt others acquire a particular, concrete form under capitalism in that they
relate to, and are mediated by, specific social relations that underpin the
material necessities required to sustain a meaningful life.
For someone to be alienated is also to say that someone may not be alien­
ated. What is the condition of not being alienated? Any satisfactory answer
requires an engagement with the human condition; of what it means to
be human and, specifically, to be a human in a nonalienated existence.
16 · Intro

Throughout his writings, Marx focuses on creative, productive activity.

Building on this premise, in chapter 1 I forward the argument that a mean-
ingful life is conditioned by one’s awareness of death. As Martin Hägglund
explains, “Only in light of the apprehension that we will die . . . can we ask
ourselves what we ought to do with our lives and put ourselves at stake
in our activities.”56 I disagree, however, with the presumption that shared
mortality provides the basis for an emancipatory politics. Indeed, the con-
cept of shared mortality, while biologically accurate—­all living organisms
will ultimately die—­reifies a liberal conception of subjectivity that deflects
attention from structural inequalities that conditions one’s vulnerability
to premature death. In the end, by repositioning the alienated subject as a
mortal being aware that a meaningful life is mediated by one’s vulnerability
to premature death, we circle back to the historical-­materialist approach
of Marx, notably, the first premise of satisfying those materials necessary
for the production and reproduction of life itself. As Marx writes, “Man
can only live if he produces means of subsistence, but he can only produce
these means if he holds the means of production, the material conditions
for labor. It is easy to understand that, if the worker is deprived of the
means of production, he is also deprived of the means of subsistence.”57
Having sketched the contours of a flourishing but mortal life, in chap-
ter 2 I provide an overview of capitalism. Capitalism is a distinct mode of
production in which all participants—­producers and consumers—­depend
on the market for their basic needs.58 As a form of economic organiza-
tion, made possible by the exaltation of private property, capital’s founda-
tion is the social (class) separation of direct producers from the means
of production. It is because of this social relation that workers—­although
formally free—­are forced by material circumstances to sell their labor-­
power to capitalists, who own the means of production.59 Within capitalist
social relations, work tends to be an alienating rather than self-­affirming
activity.60 Understanding why this is so provides a first step toward the
transcendence of the alienated subject by the emancipated subject. Thus,
I continue chapter 2 with an engagement of Marx’s conceptualization of
alienation. Marx presents his account of alienation most fully in the post-
humously published Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Here,
he conceives of alienation as comprising four broad relations that cover
the totality of human existence: workers’ relationships to (1) their produc-
tive activity, (2) their products, (3) other people, and (4) the species-­being,
i.e., humanity.61 First, alienation is experienced when laboring activities
 Intro · 17

become external to the worker. Those workers assigned to assembly lines,

for example, exist as mere appendages to the factory; they do not control
their own productive activities but instead function at the beck and call of
those who own the means of production. Second, under such conditions
workers become alienated from the object of their labor: the commodities
produced are owned not by the worker but rather by those who own the
means of production. Workers derive no satisfaction for their labor activi-
ties. Third, workers become alienated from other people; all become mere
cogs in the machinery. Lastly, workers become alienated from humanity
itself. This final form, “species alienation,” we will see is of a qualitatively
different type that should be understood not as alienation from an ideal
human nature but as alienation from historically created human possibili-
ties, and especially from the human capacity for creativity.62
Alienation is not universal but is manifest in particular ways in specific
modes of production. To this end, I conclude chapter 2 with an extension
of Marx’s conceptualization of alienation to consider the multiple subject
positions of the alienated subject. Accordingly, I begin the task of reposi-
tioning the alienated subject as abstract figure within the specific contours
of actually existing capitalism. In the United States, for example, capitalism
does not exist in a vacuum but instead intersects with other structures and
social relations, notably racism and patriarchy. As such, the alienated sub-
ject assumes a particular form, redolent of struggles beyond that of class
and, in so doing, mediates one’s vulnerability to premature death.
In chapter 3 I continue my discussion of how alienation is systemic
to the productive processes inherent to the capitalist form of social orga-
nization, that is, to the concrete structural and social relations that give
rise to the alienated subject. However, I expand my discussion to argue for
an intersectional epistemology for the study of alienation. Simply put, any
account of the alienated subject that remains faithful to the myopia of the
liberal subject will always and necessarily be insufficient, that is to say, to
position the alienated subject as unmarked by race, gender, sexuality, and
so on is to circumscribe the concrete realities of class struggle through a
neglect of intersectional forms of oppression. Thus, we must remain vigi-
lant to the operative question, who comprises the working class? When
Marxists posit racial or gender relations, for example, as epiphenomena
to class struggle, they conveniently discount the crucial, and divisive, role
played by racism and sexism in society.63 We must, in other words, de-
center whiteness from the study of alienation; we must decenter the male
18 · Intro

subject from the study of alienation; we must decenter heteronormative

sexuality from the study of alienation; we must decenter citizenship from
the study of alienation.
Building on the theoretical scaffolding developed in chapters 2 and 3,
in chapter 4 I excavate the white alienated subject within the historical
geographies of white supremacy in the United States and its relation to
the Black Lives Matter movement and the counterclaim that “All Lives
Matter.” My purpose in this chapter is not to provide an exhaustive ac-
count of the Black Lives Matter movement—­see, for example the work of
Barbara Ransby and Keeanga-­Yamahtta Taylor.64 Instead, I offer a critical
interrogation of the white alienated subject, detailing how this subject fig-
ure is necessarily defined in relation to its Other. That is, the iconic white
worker—­and especially the alienated white worker—­derives and connotes
meaning by what it is not, whether that Other appears in the form of an
immigrant of color or a Black criminal. Stated differently, the abstract
white alienated worker is produced and reproduced primarily but not ex-
clusively through anti-­Black violence.65
Black matters, Katherine McKittrick reminds us, are spatial matters.66
To that end, McKittrick continues, “social practices create landscapes and
contribute to how we organize, build, and imagine our surroundings. Black
subjects are not indifferent to these practices and landscapes; rather, they
are connected to them due to crude racial-­sexual hierarchies and due to
their (often unacknowledged) status as geographic beings who have a
stake in the production of space.”67 In opposition therefore to the anti-­
Black violence that largely defines whiteness, the Black Lives Matter move-
ment disrupts “a seemingly stable white, heterosexual, class” geography.68
My underlying focus, therefore, remains on the hope provided by the
Black Lives Matter movement, for the simple yet powerful affirmation that
“Black Lives Matter” speaks forcefully to the everyday spatial struggle of
survivability within capitalism. This hope, however, remains conditional
upon the peculiar manifestation of alienation as mediated by settler colo-
nialism and racial capitalism. For under conditions of settler colonialism
and racial capitalism, white workers, although exploited and alienated,
have little incentive to overstep—­let alone overthrow—­a system in which
they overwhelmingly benefit to the detriment, collectively, of women, per-
sons of color, and members of the LGBTQ community.
In chapter 5, by way of conclusion, I consider the possible and poten-
tial transformation of the alienated subject into an emancipated subject.
 Intro · 19

In doing so, I draw heavily on Eric Fromm’s political philosophy of sa-

domasochism and the art of loving.69 My take is somewhat unconven-
tional; indeed, such an approach seems discordant with much of the
Marxist-­inspired literature on alienation and revolutionary emancipation.
The term itself is, as Lynn Chancer concedes, a “loaded and quite con-
troversial term” fraught with misunderstandings.70 Chancer explains, for
instance, that “Sadomasochism frequently is taken to connote sexual and/
or violent exchanges between two individuals—­the sadist and masochist—­
who play out relationships of domination and subordination in a language
of explicit physicality.” However, as a political philosophy, sadomasochism
directs attention toward concrete social relations as embedded in hege-
monic structures of production, distribution, and consumption, that is,
in particular modes of social organization, and, as such, offers a particu­
larly salient vantage point from which to interpret alienation. In other
words, sado­masochism, conceptually, underscores the fluid asymmetries
of power within myriad social relations in which the alienated subject inter­
acts in its everyday life. Chancer elaborates, noting that sadomasochism
accords with the highly stratified and inequitable structures of social ex-
perience in modern life—­patriarchy, white supremacy, heteronormativity,
and capitalism—­to which we have become habituated.71
From his reading of Marx, Fromm premised that alienation is a social
and structural relation systemic to the capitalist mode of production. In
addition, Fromm surmised that alienated social life in contemporary so-
ciety is debilitating, stressful, and dehumanizing but, crucially, modes of
behavior that are deemed normal or adaptive under these conditions are
neither healthy nor fulfilling, but rather undermine the ability of people
to lead meaningful, flourishing lives.72 These maladaptive behaviors, no-
tably the (masochistic) submission to authoritative figures and the (sadistic)
yearning to dominate others, appear normal—­a condition Fromm describes
as “the pathology of normalcy.”73 In other words, alienation is so pervasive
that subjects do not readily recognize their estrangement; nor do they com-
prehend that indifference, intolerance, and the capacity to hurt are simi-
larly reactions to structural and social relations of capitalism. Subjects are
thus both unaware of their own alienation and therefore complicit in their
alienation, insofar as they perpetuate illusions about their own “free” con-
ditions.74 As Fromm postulates, “Man lives with illusions because these
illusions make the misery of real life bearable.”75
I conclude that Fromm’s insights, in particular his social psychological
20 · Intro

reading of Marxist alienation, offer a framework toward the promotion

of a radical ethics of giving.76 Drawing inspiration from a much broader
corpus of feminist writings that call for a radical ethics of care and, spe-
cifically, the affirmation of love as a revolutionary concept, I premise that
love, understood as a productive act of giving, offers the potential, and the
promise, to transcend alienation. In doing so, love offers a path forward
to transform a society subsumed to the dictates of capital into an emanci-
pated society conditioned by socially just relations of production, distribu-
tion, and consumption. Ultimately, to overcome the deadening qualities
of capitalism requires efforts that liberate humanity from the structural
and social relations of exploitation and alienation that negate the possibil-
ity for living a meaningful, flourishing life. Only in this way is it possible
to achieve a society centered upon beloved relations and productive love.
 1

A Flourishing, but Mortal Life

According to Marx, under capitalism, men and women—­but humanity

as a whole—­are precluded from developing an unalienated, unestranged
consciousness. As Bertell Ollman writes, “The human species is deprived
of its reality, of what it requires to manifest itself as the human species.”1
Indeed, the exploitative practices of a society built upon a system of pro-
duction for exchange reduces humanity “to performing undifferentiated
work on humanly indistinguishable objects among people deprived of
their human variety and compassion.”2 It was for this reason that Marx
believed a socialist revolution, as a collective, nonindividuated form of
production—­was necessary to overcome the alienated life that typified
capitalism. Such a revolution, accordingly, was premised not solely to af-
fect political and economic change; it would occasion a moral transfor-
mation. With the abolition of those social and spatial relations that bring
about alienation, work would be experienced as a free and meaningful ex-
pression of a flourishing life.3
As Martin Hägglund explains, at the time when Marx lived, there was
a growing secular recognition that we are what we do and that we can do
things differently. In other words, we do not have to subject ourselves to
the dictates and doctrines of religion or capitalism; that we can transform
our historical situation through collective action and create institutions
that work toward the betterment of all humankind.4 This sense of opti-
mism is developed most explicitly in Marx’s so-­called early works, nota-
bly the posthumously published Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of
1844. Here, Marx makes a bold statement: “The capitalist can live longer
without the worker than can the worker without the capitalist.”5 In this
single sentence, Marx effectively captures the mortal consequences and
moral wrongness of capitalism, namely, the profound structural and social
inequalities that mediate one’s vulnerability to premature death. On this
point, Marx never turns away from his concern with the human condition
and, by extension, how capitalism prevents some people the opportunity

21
22 · A Flourishing, but Mortal Lif

to lead a meaningful, flourishing life.6 Indeed, Marx was well aware of the
misery and suffering associated with the advent of capitalism, of lives cut
short. For this reason, alienation remained a critical construct in Marx’s
political philosophy; it is not something he left behind as he moved toward
his more extensive economic analyses of capitalism.7 As Marx explains, “The
intimate connection between the pangs of hunger suffered by the most in-
dustrious layers of the working class, and the extravagant consumption,
coarse or refined, of the rich, for which capitalist accumulation is the basis,
is only uncovered when the economic laws are known.”8
As such, when Marx calls attention to the disparities between the life
of the worker and that of the capitalist, he challenges the liberal concep-
tion of universal, shared mortality. In other words, Marx underscores the
notion that death—­or, more precisely, one’s awareness of death—­is pivotal
toward the understanding and practice of living a flourishing, meaning-
ful life. Marx acknowledges the truism that all living beings are mortal.
However, Marx understands also that the sustenance of life is conditional,
that is, dependent upon the structural and social relations that constitute
society. Hägglund explains: “A living being cannot simply exist but must
do something to stay alive.”9 This something is productive labor, that is, the
conscious and deliberate production of the basic necessities that make life
possible. For Marx, the notion of alienation points to the fact that produc-
tion under capitalism negates free, cooperative activity.10 For this reason,
the alienated subject must become an emancipated subject.
Marx is no nihilist, for there is hope. Indeed, insofar as alienation is
constituted, it can also be changed, transformed, and overcome.11 To this
end, from the 1840s onward, the “working class” became a central part of
Marx’s thinking, for it was the alienated condition of the proletariat, in
particular, that impelled Marx in his interrogation of capitalism.12 Why
Marx places such faith in the proletariat is addressed in chapter 2. First,
however, it is necessary to explore more fully Marx’s conception of human
nature and of how humanity’s awareness of its own mortality conditions
the ability to lead a flourishing, meaningful life.

A Materialist Conception of Human Nature

Our moral foundations are premised upon particular understandings of
human nature, that is, different conceptions of human nature lead to dif-
ferent views about what we ought to do and how we can do it.13 Within
 A Flourishing, but Mortal Lif · 23

the Western philosophical canon, Socrates and Plato began a tradition of

rational inquiry into how we should live predicated, in part, by our distinc-
tive human nature.14 Plato, for example, premised that human beings are
social beings. Humans are not self-­sufficient and have needs that cannot
be met in isolation, and, consequently, a well-­ordered, “just” society is one
in which each class of person plays its distinctive role, in harmony with
each other.15 Aristotle, likewise, understood human beings as ineradicably
social beings and believed that our human nature reaches its full devel-
opment only when we live as members of an organized society.16 Marx
aligns with this tradition, drawing especially on the writings of Aristotle.17
Indeed, Marx’s very conception of being human—­what philosophers often
call “human nature” and what Marx calls “species-­being”—­supervenes upon
Aristotle’s theory of the good life.18
When Marx writes about species-­being, he raises a question similar to
that asked by Aristotle in the context of human ergon.19 The term ergon is
problematic, and classicists continue to debate its precise meaning used
throughout the writings of Aristotle.20 Variously defined as “work,” “activ-
ity,” or “deed,” ergon implies a functionality inherent both to organic and
inorganic objects; thus we may speak of the ergon of plants, of animals, and
of human beings, as well as shovels or oxcarts.
So what is the human ergon? As Thomas Nagel writes, “Humans do
a great many things, but since some are done equally well, or better, by
plants, fish, and animals, they are not among the things to do which is to
be human.”21 We can begin by answering, following Aristotle, what ergon
is not. Life—­as we have seen—­is an activity shared by all living organisms,
including plants, and therefore is not distinctive of human beings. Percep-
tion, likewise, is shared both by human beings and nonhuman beings, and
also must be ruled out. For Aristotle, there is only one other general func-
tion in the animate world, and humanity’s ergon consists in this: action
with logos.22 In other words, the human ergon is a particular form of life,
or activity, in accordance with reason.23
Marx, following Aristotle, conceives also the human species-­being as
conditioned by productive activity.24 Writing in The German Ideology,
Marx (with Engels), presupposes that humans begin to distinguish them-
selves from nonhuman animals “as soon as they begin to produce their
means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical [cor-
poreal] organization.”25 It is not life of a general nature nor the mere use
of tools that is characteristic of universal human nature. Rather, it is “free
24 · A Flourishing, but Mortal Lif

conscious activity [that] constitutes the species-­character of man” and that

“In creating an objective world by his practical activity, in working-­up in-
organic nature, man proves himself a conscious species being.”26 The cen-
tral point that Marx makes is that it is through productive activity with a
conscious plan that human beings actualize, that is, self-­realize, themselves
as human beings.27
For Marx and Engels, “The first premise of all human history is . . .
the existence of living human individuals. Thus, the first fact to be estab-
lished is the physical [corporeal] organization of these individuals and
their consequent relation to the rest of nature.”28 This imparts a particu-
lar spatiality to the human condition. As Ian Shaw and Marv Waterstone
write: “Our sense of self is bound to the spaces that we inhabit. Space is
the canvas of our being: we impress in the world our individuality, pass-
ing from the obscurity of inexistence to the security of coexistence.”29 We
inhabit a material world, and we imbue this world with meaning. Through
our daily activities we interact with other people and other places; our
thoughts and actions are affected by these encounters. At the same time,
our presence, our connections, reflect back upon those spaces. Just as we
are transformed through our everyday pursuits, so too are the spaces that
we inhabit transformed. Our being-­in-­the world, however, is conditioned
by social and structural relations that are antecedent to our existence. This
is not to condemn humanity to a nihilistic existence, or to resign ourselves
that our fate is predetermined because of where we live or who we are.
Instead, our awareness of the conditionality of life underscores that other
worlds are always possible.
Marx identifies a basic, universal condition of all living things, that
is, the necessity to survive and reproduce. Indeed, scattered throughout
Marx’s writings is the concept Anlage, a term imbued with biological con-
notations, including both the capacities and limiting factors required to
sustain and reproduce life. On the one hand, living organisms have physio­
logical needs and bodily limits and constraints and, on the other hand,
certain attributes to deal with those needs and limitations. Taken together,
the satisfaction of bodily constraints is the absolute precondition of a liv-
ing existence and provides the impetus and telos of production. Corporeal
limitations and bodily capacities are universal for living organisms; the
need to acquire by whatever means possible the basic necessities of life
itself are held in common by all living creatures and thus are elements of
 A Flourishing, but Mortal Lif · 25

a general nature. These dispositions—­the need to acquire food and water,

and to seek shelter, cannot therefore be considered distinctly human.
On this point, Marx’s use of “labor” as being the distinctive capacity of
the human species is striking.30 Marx acknowledges that certain species of
nonhuman animals also produce. However, Marx writes: “An animal only
produces what it immediately needs for itself or its young. It produces
one-­sidedly, while man produces universally.” He elaborates that non­
human animals “produce only under the dominion of immediate physi-
cal need, while man produces even when he is free from physical need
and only truly produces in freedom therefrom.”31 Echoing Aristotle, Marx
maintains that nonhuman animals produce instinctively in a set pattern,
whereas human production is flexible and can be based on specific judg-
ments about how to treat the materials that are to be transformed.32 To this
end, for Marx, “An animal forms things in accordance with the standard
and the need of the species to which it belongs, while man knows how to
produce in accordance with the standard of every species, and knows how
to apply everywhere the inherent standard to the object. Man therefore
also forms things in accordance with the laws of beauty.”33 Thus, in a well-­
known passage of Capital, Marx writes:

A spider conducts operations which resemble those of the weaver,

and a bee would put many a human architect to shame by the
construction of its honeycomb cells. But what distinguishes the
worst architect from the best of bees is that the architect builds the
cell in his mind before he constructs it in wax. At the end of every
labor process, a result emerges which had already been conceived
by the worker at the beginning, hence already existed ideally. Man
not only effects a change of form in the materials of nature, he also
realizes his own purpose in those materials.34

Both cooperation and conscious thought (logos) are foundational to

Marx’s abstract conception of human nature. As Marx and Engels write,
“The production of life, both of one’s own in labor and of fresh life in pro-
creations, now appears as a twofold relation: on the one hand as a natural,
on the other as a social relation—­social in the sense that it denotes the
co-­operation of several individuals, no matter under what conditions, in
what manner and to what end. It follows from this that a certain mode of
26 · A Flourishing, but Mortal Lif

production . . . is always combined with a certain mode of co-­operation.”35

In addition, as Morgan explains, “As a species, humans are creatures who
are necessarily self-­conscious, active, planning, creative and cooperative
(sometimes competitive but in ways that can require mutuality, depen-
dencies, reliance and perhaps trust). They are also able to change their
own lived circumstances and the broader material environment precisely
because of the nature of their being, which includes sociality.”36 Human
beings are thus knowing beings. Equipped with a consciousness and an
ability to reflect upon themselves, human beings can willfully create and
produce for a manifold of purposes, both as individuals and as a collec-
tive.37 This is a point that bears repeating. As Aristotle premised—­and
Marx followed—­a person should seek to transcend not only his or her
individual practical concerns, but also those of society or humanity as a
whole.38 Consequently, this enables Marx “to argue that there is no a priori
restriction based upon a theory of human nature, that would prohibit the
formation of a society governed by an overall identification of people with
one another as fellow beings.”39
For Marx, therefore, productive activity with logos both is unique to
human beings and provides a way forward for the betterment of being
human. This is not to say that Marx privileges humanity over other non­human
animals or nature itself. Nor does Marx advocate an instrumentalist valu-
ing of nonhuman nature.40 Instead, Marx advances a dialectic understand-
ing of human/nature, a framing influenced by both his knowledge of Greek
philosophy and contemporary scientific thought. On the one hand, Marx
drew inspiration from the Greek philosopher Epicurus (341–­270 BC),
namely, the relationship between life and death—­a topic I visit later in this
chapter. Here, we begin with Epicurus’s argument that death has no mean-
ing for humans or, for that matter, any living, sentient creature. In other
words, death from the standpoint of the living may be feared, but from
the standpoint of the dead, there is nothing to fear.41 Consequently, when
Marx writes that “nature fixed in isolation from man—­is nothing for man”
he is not reducing all of nonhuman nature to some form of instrumental-
ity but instead finds connection with Epicurus’s proposition that “Death is
nothing to us.”42 Marx underscores the idea that human beings are objec-
tive, corporeal, sensual beings, and that when removed (alienated) from
the sensual connections to earth and other living beings, nature (in Epi-
curean terms) is “nothing for man.”43 Hence, instead of positing a dualist
conception of human and nonhuman nature, Marx advances a human/
 A Flourishing, but Mortal Lif · 27

nature dialectic whereby “Nature is man’s inorganic body—­nature, that is,

insofar as it is not itself the human body. Man lives on nature—­means that
nature is his body, with which he must remain in continuous intercourse
if he is not to die. That man’s physical and spiritual life is linked to nature
means simply that nature is linked to itself, for man is a part of nature.”44
As Foster and Clark conclude, divorced from nature, human beings, like
nonhuman animals, would have no existence. Rather than representing a
separation of humans from other animals or a moral justification for the
utilitarian use of the latter, Marx acknowledges our shared universal exis-
tence as corporeal spatial beings.45
On the other hand, Marx studied the scientific advances of his day and,
specifically, incorporated the concept of metabolism, in a much broader
fashion, into all his major political economic works from the 1850s on-
ward.46 Indeed, for Marx the concept of metabolism provides the neces-
sary fulcrum with which to interpret the dialectic between human and
nonhuman nature.47 As Foster explains, Marx’s conceptual use of metabo-
lism was not simply (or even mainly) an attempt to solve a philosophical
problem but rather an endeavor to ground his critique of political econ-
omy materially in an understanding of concrete human-­nature relations
emanating from the natural sciences of his day. Accordingly, the concept
of metabolism became central to his analysis of both the production of
use-­values and the labor process.48 To this end, social metabolism for
Marx encompasses human labor and production in relation—­both so-
cially and spatially—­to the larger biophysical world and, effectually, captures
the complex interchange of matter and energy between human beings and
nature.49
Marx understood that natural systems, such as the nutrient cycle, had
their own metabolism, which operated independently of and in relation
to human society, allowing for their regeneration and/or continuance.
However, with the onset of capitalism, a new social metabolic order came
to dominate the material interchange between society and nature. Marx
recognized that the tendency of capital—­because capital “freely” robs from
nature—­is to violate the natural conditions that ensure nature’s vitality,
undermining the base on which ecological and human sustainability de-
pends.50 On that point, as Foster and Clark explain, “capitalism has both
an inner force that propels it and objective conditions outside itself that
set its boundaries, the relations to which are forever changing. The inner
dynamic of the system is governed by the process of exploitation of labor
28 · A Flourishing, but Mortal Lif

power, under the guise of equal exchange, while its primary relation to its
external environment is one of expropriation.”51 Notably Marx employs
the concept of metabolic rift to capture the material and spatial estrange-
ment, or alienation, of human beings in capitalist society from the natural
conditions of their existence.52 Marx explains, “Instead of a conscious and
rational treatment of the land as permanent communal property, as the
inalienable condition for the existence and reproduction of the chain of
human generations, we have the exploitation and the squandering of the
powers of the earth.”53 Under capitalism, therefore, an alienated form of
labor mediates the human-­social relation to nature.54 This is a point de-
manding additional clarification. The social and spatial separation implicit
in Marx’s conception of the metabolic rift does not reestablish a dualism
between “humans” and “nature”; rather, it underscores a maladaptive rela­
tionship in that under capitalism, labor is abstracted to only maximize the
accumulation of wealth. Labor no longer functions to fulfill human needs
and, as such, no longer provides meaning in life.
Returning to the matter of productive activity, our discussion thus far
has focused on human nature in the abstract, that is, of the presupposition
of a universal human nature. Marx and Engels readily understood that
abstractions, including those of human nature, “divorced from real history,
have no value whatsoever. They can only serve to facilitate the arrange-
ment of historical material. . . . But they by no means afford a recipe or
schema . . . for neatly trimming the epochs of history.”55 To this end, Marx
and Engels conclude that “Empirical observation must in each separate
instance bring out empirically, and without any mystification and specu-
lation, the connection of the social and political structure with produc-
tion.” As such, alongside an abstract, transhistorical conception of human
nature, Marx forwards an historical conception, whereby “The essence of
man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is
the ensemble of the social relations.”56 Stated differently, the concrete mani­
festation of being human arises from the fact that human beings participate
in, and live through, particular social relations over time and across space.
In his Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy, Marx expands
upon this idea. He writes: “In the social production of their existence, men
inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will,
namely, relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the devel-
opment of their material forces of production.”57 In this passage, Marx
does not promote a determinist position but instead acknowledges the his-
 A Flourishing, but Mortal Lif · 29

torical and geographical continuity (and adaptability) of human activity.

Recall that Marx and Engels presuppose that human beings distinguished
themselves from animals as soon as they began to produce their means
of subsistence.58 This “first historical act” thus marked the production of
the means to satisfy the reproduction of life itself, but to do so required
the development of tools by which nature was transformed and specific
objects were created that satisfied these needs.59 In turn, the satisfaction of
initial biological needs creates new needs (and new tools); these needs, in
turn, require new products and, in an ongoing process, subsequent needs
and products are produced. Therefore, as Marx and Engels conclude, any
given “mode of production must not be considered simply as being the
reproduction of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a
definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing
their life, a definite mode of life on their part. As individuals express their
life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production,
both with what they produce and with how they produce. Hence what
individuals are depends on the material conditions of their production.”60
Consequently, “The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness,
is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material
intercourse of men—­the language of real life. . . . The same applies to men-
tal production as expressed in the language of the politics, laws, moral-
ity, religion, metaphysics, etc., of a people. Men are the producers of their
conceptions, ideas, etc., that is, real, active men, as they are conditioned
by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse
corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms.”61
The process by which we transform the material world therefore is si-
multaneously a process by which we continually create within ourselves
new needs and, thus, can be said to change our nature.62 As Marx explains
in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, “Men make their own his-
tory, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under
circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly en-
countered, given, and transmitted from the past.”63 In other words, Marx
recognizes that people are born into particular societies; and that this fact
alone shapes subsequent human activity, both from an individual and col-
lective standpoint.
To recap our discussion thus far: Marx’s historical (that is, particular)
conception of human nature is grounded in a robust transhistorical (that
is, universal) conception of human nature.64 Marx, as such, promotes a
30 · A Flourishing, but Mortal Lif

dialectic interpretation of human nature that operates both at an abstract

and concrete level, whereby the latter refers to the specific forms of human
social organization organized around particular modes of production
while the former refers to the general form that human social activity takes
place.65 At this point, it is necessary to consider more closely the individual
human, that is, the embodied subject, within Marx’s historical-­materialist
framework.
On the one hand, there is a “natural” body, the living organism sub-
ject to death in the absence of food, water, and shelter. This is a universal
conception, for as Sébastien Rioux explains, the importance of the natural
body lies precisely in its foundational, transhistorical character, for it is
the natural body that must inevitably die.66 On the other hand, there is the
“laboring” body—­that entity “engaged in the social production of material
life by metabolizing nature through labor in order to meet human needs
and survive.”67 Thus, the natural body and the laboring body are not sepa-
rate entities but exist in totality and operate at different levels, similar to
the transhistorical and historical forms of human nature.
The separation of abstract and concrete conceptions both of human
nature and of embodied subjects is crucial insofar as alienation, for Marx,
is not a universal condition of humanity in general but instead denotes
a particular social relation specific to the capitalist mode of production.
A detailed assessment of capitalism as generative of alienation must wait
until chapter 2. First, however, I turn my attention to a concept intimately
associated with that of human nature, this being meaningful life.

Marx and Meaningful Life

It is not uncommon for people to complain that their lives lack meaning,
that they yearn for something to give them purpose. However, as John
Fischer explains, “When people ask about the meaning of life, they are not
typically wondering about the purpose of human life in general. Rather,
they are asking about meaning (or meaningfulness) in human life.”68 To
this end, questions about meaning in life direct attention toward attendant
concepts such as nihilism, suffering, misery, morality, and death itself.69
Ontological questions surrounding one’s meaning in life do not figure
prominently in most accounts of Marx, and yet the potential of living a
flourishing—­that is, meaningful—­life is a central concern of Marx. In-
deed, “Marx’s epic critique of capitalism may be understood as an analysis
 A Flourishing, but Mortal Lif · 31

of the way that capitalism systematically denies the majority of people the
requirements of a ‘good life.’ ”70 The capacity to live a meaningful life, as
forwarded by Marx, is heavily indebted to Aristotle’s concept of eudemo­
nia.71 Itself a contested term, eudemonia is variously translated as “happi-
ness,” “wellness,” “goodness,” or “flourishing.”72 For Aristotle, eudemonia
describes the realization of a “good” or ethical life and thus refers to a
way of living, a way of carrying out the trajectory of one’s life.73 In short,
for Aris­totle, eudemonia relates directly to the natural purpose of being
human, that is, it is teleologically determined by human nature.74
Aristotle’s view was that every living being has a telos, some good that
it naturally strives to actualize.75 Consequently, his teleological conceptu-
alization of eudemonia was premised on a categorical distinction between
human and nonhuman nature.76 Both human and nonhuman beings, Aris­
totle acknowledges, require material resources in order to survive. How-
ever, human beings have an innate ability to consciously shape and control
their environment. Such capabilities require intelligence and, in turn, re-
quire a capacity for reason and the freedom to shape one’s own life through
deliberation and choice.77 Eudemonia, accordingly, is conceptually related
to ergon. As Richard Kim explains, “the argument is that for anything that
has a characteristic function or activity (ergon), that thing’s good resides in
its functioning well. And since, Aristotle claims, the characteristic activity
of a human being is to engage in rational activities, it is the engagement
of rational activities in accordance with the virtues or excellences, over a
lifetime, that constitutes [eudemonia].”78
Given Aristotle’s understanding that the ability to live in accord with
reason is unique to humans, it follows that he proposed that the most com-
plete way to live according to reason was to live virtuously. For Aristotle,
the virtues specific to human beings included living in a reflective way that
embraced our best values and engaged our highest talents and civic con-
cerns, including friendship, justice, and truthfulness.79 Notably, Aristotle
held that “the pinnacle of human excellences was the philosophical or con-
templative life.”80 Aristotle, in short, provides a way of determining what
constitutes a meaningful life by appealing to human nature and the char-
acteristic activities of human beings.81 For Aristotle, “a person could be
more or less characterized as a person who lives (or has lived) a good life,
insofar as that individual pursued or lived in accordance with the specific
human virtues. By engaging in these personal and civic virtues and excel-
lences, and when conditions allow, actualizing them, Aristotle expected
32 · A Flourishing, but Mortal Lif

persons to be most fulfilled.”82 Marx builds on this foundation, but does so

with a scaffolding predicated on an historically contingent conception of
being human. Briefly stated, for Marx, meaning in life is related to produc-
tive activity. As Marx and Engels write in The German Ideology:

The phantoms formed in the brains of men are also, necessar-

ily, sublimates of their material life-­process, which is empirically
verifiable and bound to material premises. Morality, religion,
metaphysics, and all the rest of ideology as well as the forms of
consciousness corresponding to these, thus no longer retain the
semblance of independence. They have no history, no development;
but men, developing their material production and their mate-
rial intercourse, alter, along with this their actual world, also their
thinking and the products of their thinking. It is not consciousness
that determines life, but life that determines consciousness.83

In other words, the capacity to achieve meaning in life is inseparable

from one’s productive activity. And yet, so conditioned are we to the alien-
ating tendencies of capitalism that such an assertion rings discordant to
contemporary ears. Indeed, it is strange to conceive of work, that is, labor-
ing activities, to hold the potential for meaningful life. For many people,
working under the conditions of capitalism becomes something they have
to do, instead of something they want to do. However, as Sven-­Eric Lied-
man explains, Marx lived in a time when the word labor itself contained
an expanded meaning, one that encompassed intellectual and artistic
activities.84
For Marx, all forms of labor—­whether materially productive or socially
reproductive—­entail human self-­realization; the essence of labor, there-
fore, lies not in its exchange value (as premised under capitalism) but in
its capacity to fulfill the needs of the human species.85 To this end, we un-
derstand eudemonia not as an emotion or a feeling, but instead as a guide
toward living itself. As Todd May explains, “The telos of a human life is
not an end result, where one becomes something and then spends the
rest of one’s life in that condition that one becomes.”86 Instead, meaning
in life is actively cultivated and requires a degree of autonomy and self-­
determination, that is, free will. This is only possible, however, within an
ensemble of social relations, for human beings are necessarily communal
beings.
 A Flourishing, but Mortal Lif · 33

For Marx, existing material conditions, and therefore concrete poten-

tials, are important parts of his definitions of humanity, and this privileging
of potentiality is the key conceptual lever that generates Marx’s critical de-
velopment.87 As Wallimann explains, in Marx’s investigation of the nature
of social organization, he found that throughout most of history individu-
als have not been able to live according to their capabilities.88 Paradoxi-
cally, human beings by nature are capable of subjecting production and
the product of their labor to their conscious control and yet, in actuality,
they are often prevented from doing so.89 For Marx, capitalism is especially
noteworthy in this regard. Indeed, for Marx, capitalism is anti-­eudemonic
precisely because it impairs the realization of human capabilities, restricts
the exercise of intelligence or creativity, restricts the exercise of delibera-
tion and freedom in productive activities, narrows life’s compass to the sale
of labor-­power as a means to obtain life’s necessities, and reduces social
relations among people to that of objects.90 In short, a good life is not that
of the rich and famous; a flourishing life is one that promotes well-­being in
others as opposed to being well off.
Capitalism, with its systemic promotion of endless material accumula­
tion, is anathema to a flourishing life. Indeed, we can take this assertion
one step further and argue that capitalism is not only not conducive to
living a meaningful life, it is anathema to life itself. As Sandro Mezzadra
writes, “We are confronted with an intensification of exploitation that
goes hand in hand with its extension—­to the point that, to mention just
a couple of instances, the poorest of the poor are exploited through the
financialization of their life, the boundaries between production and re-
production are blurred by the penetration of finance into households,
[and] mobility and migration connect and recombine geographic scales
of exploitation and resistance.”91 For these reasons, I expand upon Marx’s
concern with a flourishing life. I do so in a way that resonates strongly with
his materialist conception of history, namely, humankind’s awareness of its
own mortality.

Toward a Marxist Thanatology

An essential feature of human life—­indeed, a constituent component of
human nature—­is that we are aware, either explicitly or implicitly, of its
finitude.92 That is, human beings are conscious of our mortality and, in
fact, the mortality of all living organisms. “It may be,” May suggests, “that
34 · A Flourishing, but Mortal Lif

humans are the only animals with an ongoing sense of their own death.”93
Nonhuman animals, to be sure, fear danger; but, as May elaborates, “to
seek to remain alive when one’s life is threatened . . . is not the same as
having an ongoing awareness of one’s death.”94 To this end, human species-­
beings’ knowledge of the certainty of death and the constant awareness of
that fact conditions the social and cultural organization of all known so-
cieties.95 Truly, as Olivia Stevenson and colleagues observe, “Death and
bereavement are inevitably central to everyday life across culture, although
associated social and cultural practices vary by time and place, ranging
from sequestered social taboo to an integral part of ongoing social life.”96
For Zygmunt Bauman, “Once learned, knowledge that death may not
be escaped cannot be forgotten—­it can only not be thought about for a
while, with attention shifting to other concerns.”97 In other words, human
life is an ongoing process of learning to live with death.98 This is seen in
our practices as they relate to the dying and the dead, for example, in the
ways we grieve, mourn, and remember the dead.99 In addition, our at-
tempt to live with the inevitability of death informs our understanding of
the possibility of living a meaningful life. For many people, death is “bad”
in part because it deprives us of the ability to pursue projects that give our
lives meaning. As Martha Nussbaum writes, “The intensity and dedication
with which very many human activities are pursued cannot be explained
without reference to the awareness that our opportunities are finite.”100
An awareness of death leads naturally to a consideration of other, more
metaphysical questions, such as the existence of God, spirituality, and the
afterlife. Indeed, as human beings, many of our beliefs about living mean-
ingful lives are conditioned by attendant beliefs about what happens after
death occurs.101 In various Christian accounts, for example, one’s immortal
soul ascends to heaven and thereupon dwells in eternal peace.102 These in-
terpretations, among others, speak to the deep human desire felt by many
that our worldly existence should have some ultimate meaning or purpose
or significance.103 By way of contrast, existentialist philosophers such as
Søren Kierkegaard, Jean-­Paul Sartre, and Albert Camus denied the exis-
tence of an afterlife. Consequently, death itself lends no meaning to life.104
More recently, scholars have considered how technological advances, es-
pecially in the fields of medicine and health care, have altered conceptions
of death, to the extent that death is not only something undesirable but
something to be mastered and overcome.105 Regardless, though, of one’s
attitude toward death—­be it fear or ambivalence, something to be wel-
 A Flourishing, but Mortal Lif · 35

comed or avoided, or of the existence of an afterlife in whatever form—­the

point remains that humans are aware of death. This awareness, I suggest,
figures prominently in the conceptualization of alienation and one’s poten-
tial to lead a meaningful life.
Marx does not present an explicit framework of death; rather, his con-
ception of human mortality—­and of an awareness of death—­is scattered
throughout his works, usually in reference to the harmful, material condi-
tions of laboring within the capitalist mode of production. For example,
when Marx and Engels presuppose the “first premise of all human exis-
tence” is that “men must be in a position to live in order to be able to ‘make
history,’ ” they point specifically to the physiological imperative of bodily
survival and reproduction.106 Indeed, they recognize that the first activity
of being human relates to survival, that is, “pushing back the moment of
death, extending the life-­span, increasing life expectation and thus life’s
content-­absorbing capacity, making death a matter of concern, a signifi-
cant event.”107 As Marx, writing with Engels, elaborates:

But life involves before everything else eating and drinking, hous-
ing, clothing and various other things. The first historical act is
thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the pro-
duction of material life itself. And indeed this is an historical act,
a fundamental condition of all history, which today, as thousands
of years ago, must daily and hourly be fulfilled merely in order to
sustain human life.108

Here, Marx implies that the human body needs a certain number of
calories to reproduce its cells, a certain amount of liquid to prevent de-
hydration, a certain amount of shelter to maintain its temperature within
a fairly narrow range, and a certain amount of oxygen, rest, and sleep.109
However, beyond the materiality of life itself, Marx demonstrates a keen
awareness that one’s mortal existence is mediated by definite social rela-
tions that are largely independent of one’s will. As May explains, “We live
in the shadow of the fact that we will die. What we do, how we do it, the at-
titude we take towards it, happens against the background knowledge that
each of us is mortal.”110 This knowledge is nevertheless conditioned by the
concrete social and structural relations in which one inhabits. Within the
capitalist mode of production, for example, Marx writes, the worker “can
live as a worker only insofar as he exchanges his labor capacity for that
36 · A Flourishing, but Mortal Lif

part of capital which forms the labor fund [wages]. This exchange is tied
to conditions which are accidental for him, and indifferent to his organic
presence.”111 In other words, capital is indifferent both to the organic pres-
ence, that is, the living existence, of the worker, and the worker, in turn,
is able to live only through the “chance” of obtaining gainful employment.
Under perilous and uncertain conditions, “the worker is maintained as a
living being through the mercy of others.”112
Marx’s thanatology elides readily with his conception of productive and
meaningful activity, in that one’s awareness of death is the ultimate condi-
tion of cultural creativity as such.113 As Bauman explains: “Death, when it
comes, will brutally interrupt our work before our task is done, our mis-
sion accomplished. This is why we have every reason to be worried about
death now, when we are still very much alive and when death remains
but a remote and abstract prospect.”114 The imbrication of mortality and
meaningful life, however, raises another conceptual problem, notably the
philosophical basis of why death in and of itself is bad. For Marx, there
is an implicit understanding that the shortening of workers’ lives under
capitalism is inherently wrong. In drawing out comparisons between capi-
talists and wage workers during economic hard times, Marx writes, “In
those cases where worker and capitalist equally suffer, the worker suffers
in his very existence, the capitalist in the profit on his dead mammon.”115
Effectively, economic downturns threaten the capitalist with diminished
profits, and for the workers, a diminished, meaningful life to the point of
an early death.
Stepping back for a moment, though, we note that there is no consen-
sus among philosophers or theologians if death (in the abstract) is good
or bad. For Epicureans, for example, you must exist in order to be harmed.
Since death negates the existence of someone, no harms can come to the
dead and thus we should not fear death. For others, however, the bad-
ness of death results from the opportunities lost. As Fischer explains, “As
we live our lives, and even as we get older, we have preferences for pur-
suing projects that give our lives meaning. . . . Death now, rather than
later, may thwart these preferences.”116 Not surprisingly, it is this attitude
that often informs our response to learning of the death of an infant or
child as opposed to a more elderly person. For some people, the premature
death of a young person is more tragic than that of an older person, for
the simple calculus that the former has had fewer years to pursue their
dreams whereas the latter, supposedly, has already achieved theirs.117 Such
 A Flourishing, but Mortal Lif · 37

an attitude was on blatant display during the Covid-­19 pandemic in the

spring of 2020, for example, as conservative pundits in the United States
downplayed the severity of the disease since the elderly were thought to be
more susceptible to death as opposed to younger (and, presumably, more
productive) members of society.
If death constitutes a bad thing for an individual insofar as it deprives
them of what could have been on balance a meaningful continuation of
life, premature death is infinitely worse.118 However, premature death as
a theoretical concept is notoriously difficult to define.119 As Watson ex-
plains, “We often call the death of a young person tragic, a wasted poten-
tial and the feeling that they have suffered a great misfortune. But for an
individual who affirms their life and does not wish it to end, at least pre­
maturely, death at any point before then would seem a necessary harm.”120
On this point Watson asks, if death is a harm because of what it deprives
us of, then are all deaths then premature?121
Given the slipperiness of premature death as a concept, it is helpful to
consider the modernist origins of the term. According to Zohreh Bayatrizi,
premature death emerged as crucial concern during the seventeenth cen-
tury and subsequently was the main impetus behind the birth of popu-
lation statistics and demography. She explains that major killers such as
plague epidemics drove efforts to quantify and contain the causes of pre-
mature death, and this contributed to the development of new scientific
techniques for measuring longevity and mortality rates and for identify-
ing the most common causes of death.122 Conceptually, therefore, prema-
ture death is death in the abstract. As Bayatrizi explains, death “came to
be treated as a form of risk, that is, as an avoidable, indeterminate, and
manageable contingency. The construction of death as a preventable
risk entailed an overt “instrumentalization” of the knowledge of mortal-
ity, making death amenable to political management (as in public health
projects) and even economic profit-­making (as in life insurance calcula-
tions.”123 Understood as such, premature death refers not to the application
of violence or death by harmful intent, but instead the abstract application
of instrumental calculations. And this, in fact, is how premature death is
most often understood in the medical community. Epidemiologists, for
example, frequently utilize a measure known as “years of potential life lost”
that is calculated by subtracting the various ages at which individuals in
a population die from the average life expectancy or an arbitrarily chosen
number such as age sixty-­five.124
38 · A Flourishing, but Mortal Lif

Consider, for example, two scenarios. In the first, we have a young

woman in the United States—­perhaps in her early thirties—­who is diag-
nosed with cancer. She is admitted to the hospital and receives exceptional
care. Still, the disease spreads rapidly, and, in spite of the efforts of her doc-
tors, she dies. In this example, we may describe her death as premature,
in that she died well before the average life expectancy for women in the
United States. We may even question the meaning of her death and won-
der why she died at such an early age. However, we would probably not
describe her death as the result of deliberate harm. In our second example,
we again have a young woman in the United States, also in her thirties,
who is diagnosed with cancer. In this scenario, however, she is denied ac-
cess to medical treatment because of her inability to afford health insur-
ance. Without treatment, the woman succumbs to the disease.
In both cases the deaths of the women are premature; and yet, the term
premature at this point sounds hollow. My sense is that when we talk of
premature death we are referencing something beyond the calculation of
years lost. Rather, there is an implicit understanding that premature deaths
result from harm being done to someone, that death—­regardless of age—­
stems from some form of violence, whether direct or structural. People
who are denied medical treatment and people who are shot and killed are
harmed; this is why their deaths are morally wrong. Ruth Wilson Gil­more
captures this idea: “Fatalities—­premature deaths—­are not simply an objec-
tive function of any kind of power differential. . . . Rather, the application
of violence—­the cause of premature deaths—­produces political power in
a vicious cycle.”125 In other words, when we consider the “reality” of vio-
lence, of premature death, we must do so through an understanding of
how power and difference are sedimented into society.126 To this end, in
a previous work, I forwarded the concept of “truncated life.”127 Pre­mature
death as truncated life is that life which ends abruptly. Fundamentally,
truncated life directs attention to social and structural relations that medi-
ate harmful practices that result in death. It includes obvious situations,
such as homicide by firearms, but it includes also the harm brought about
by intransigent governments that refuse to enact gun control measures. It
includes the premature deaths that result from a lack of affordable health
care, and it includes those deaths resultant from lax occupational safety
regulations. In short, as Emma Laurie and Ian Shaw conclude, “truncated
life names the injustice of premature death.”128
We need to take seriously truncated life as foundational to the condi-
 A Flourishing, but Mortal Lif · 39

tions of precariousness and precarity. Judith Butler explains that “Lives are
by definition precarious: they can be expunged at will or by accident; their
persistence is in no sense guaranteed.”129 For Butler, precarious is a condi-
tion of all life—­including both human and nonhuman animals—­in that
all living organisms will die, that is, life in the collective marks a condition
of shared mortality. However, as Christopher Harker explains, the concept
of precariousness does not explain why certain subjects and populations
experience a greater risk of death and injury than others.130 There is, in
other words, a mediation to precarity itself, for while all living things will
at some point die, that point is highly conditional. As Sean Hill writes,
deployment of the term precarity often fails to address broader systems
and institutions responsible for precarity, notably racism, sexism, and
ableism, and how differently marginalized people experience a precarious
existence.131 Building on this premise, premature death as truncated life
is mediated by concrete structures and social relations, including but not
limited to racism, sexism, and ableism.132 In chapter 3 I develop this argu-
ment further; here, I call attention to the salience of intersectionality as an
epistemology toward a reworking of the notion of shared mortality. For
example, Kimberlé Crenshaw details that the location of women of color at
the inter­section of race and gender makes their actual experience of domes-
tic violence and rape qualitatively different than that of white women.133
Crucially, the concept of intersectionality “refuses a liberal and additive
theorization of power and justice” and, in doing so, highlights how struc-
tural oppressions mediate the inequalities and injustices surrounding one’s
vulnerability to a truncated life.134 Indeed, the concept of shared mortal-
ity falters precisely because it is predicated on a classical sense of univer-
sal human nature. As Martha Fineman explains, throughout much of the
world today, “dominant political and legal theories are built around a uni-
versal subject defined in the liberal tradition.”135
From the standpoint of the so-­called liberal subject, Fineman contin-
ues, equality “is the expression of the idea that all human beings are by
nature free and endowed with the same inalienable rights.”136 Accordingly,
the promotion of the liberal subject is based on the idea of a “sameness of
treatment,” whereby various classifications, such as ethnicity, gender, sexu-
ality, religion, and national origin, define individual legal identities and
form the main axes around which claims for equal protection are made.137
To this end, differential life expectancies are to be corrected through the
equal application of law: all persons, regardless of “identity,” are to have
40 · A Flourishing, but Mortal Lif

equal access to employment, housing, and so on. In practice, however, in-

stitutions are structured so as to preclude equal treatment under the law.
Indeed, this forms the basis of distinguishing between equality, equity, and
justice.
Certainly, all human beings are mortal and thus experience a shared
mortality. However, because we are positioned differently within a web of
economic, political, and institutional relationships, our vulnerabilities to a
truncated life through premature death are conditioned and experienced
in particular ways.138 Those conditions that are productive of truncated
life are decidedly not universal but instead manifest differently at different
times and in different places. For example, as Kathryn Gillespie and Patri-
cia Lopez write, “racialized social relations in the United States, character-
ized by uneven social and economic hierarchies of support and privilege,
make black bodies (and black male bodies, in particular) killable and dis-
proportionately exposed to bodily violence, incarceration, and premature
death.”139

Conclusions
Under the conceptual guise of human species-­being, Marx presents a theory
about the nature of being human. Marx articulates a framework whereby it
is the potential capability of human beings to freely shape the material world
in accordance with a consciously adopted and nonexploitative plan that
provides the essential conditions for human fulfillment.140 In so doing,
Marx calls to question the deleterious effects of capitalism on one’s capacity
to live a flourishing, meaningful life. In other words, Marx underscores the
structural and social inequalities inherent to capitalism and how these me-
diate both one’s ability to live a meaningful life and, subsequently, one’s vul-
nerability to premature death. Marx writes, “It is true that labor produces
for the rich wonderful things—­but for the worker it produces privation. It
produces palaces—­but for the worker, hovels. It produces beauty—­but for
the worker, deformity.”141 Notably, Marx’s repeated references to the con-
cept of species-­being “is a reminder that there is a human who can flour-
ish or be harmed and the systemic weirdness of capitalism fundamentally
means that human well-­being is not an explicit concern of capitalism in
general.”142 For Marx, the primary consideration is always “the real indi-
viduals, their activity and the material conditions of their life.”143
 A Flourishing, but Mortal Lif · 41

Under the capitalist mode of production, Marx details, the “human

species-­being is not allowed to realize human freedom, but functions
merely to keep the worker alive. Whereas the satisfaction of our animal
needs for food, clothing, and shelter ought to function as the means to-
ward a realization of our specifically human natures, under the capital-
ist form of social organization, this relationship is reversed—­inverted.”144
Aware of their own mortality—­and that of their family and those dear to
them—­workers come to the realization that they utilize all their capabili-
ties for labor simply in order to sustain life itself.145 In doing so, workers
become alienated in their productive activities. Labor no longer holds any
meaning or provides a purpose in life beyond mere survival. Alienation is
thus “something produced or constituted through society, at the core of
which . . . is the way work is organized, since this is central to the whole of
society.”146
Capitalism, but more precisely the social relations of productive activi-
ties oriented around private property and commodity exchange, sunders
people from their potential to lead meaningful lives. On this point, alien-
ation is not a transhistorical, immutable feature of humanity but instead
a mutable, historically contingent production of being human. Effectively,
capitalism inhibits one’s capacity to live a meaningful life, and this limita-
tion constitutes an alienated existence: thus, the production of the alien-
ated subject.
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 2

The Alienated Subject

For Zygmunt Bauman, the United States is a “society of consumers” whereby

meaning is found not in the satisfaction of creative, productive activities
conducted individually and collectively but rather in the incessant drive
and consumption of stuff.1 In other words, the insatiable desire to consume
for consumption’s sake becomes desirable in and of itself and, in the act,
appears natural and normal.2 Consumption, effectively, appears to provide
meaning in life. As Nolen Gertz explains: “If a life of acquisition and con-
sumption is the only life we know, then we would not see a life of mean-
ingless labor for meaningless money for meaningless goods and services
for meaningless fulfillment as a meaningless life, instead we would see it as
the real world.”3 Consequently, as John Holloway elaborates, “It is the very
fact that wealth appears as a collection of commodities to us who live in
capitalist society that makes us take this appearance for granted. We are
used to seeing wealth in that way.”4
Marx sees things differently or, rather, hopes to make things different.
Marx wants us to reconsider our understanding of wealth and, in doing
so, to reevaluate what we find meaningful, as social beings, in our lives.
As Chris Byron observes, Marx’s comments on human nature, from his
early writings through the Grundrisse, Capital, and Theories of Surplus
Value are not divergent. Rather, when his views on labor, species-­being,
human nature, and alienation are analyzed together, some very consistent
themes are identified, notably that humans, individually and collectively,
produce both with purpose and creativity and that their free and conscious
production serves to generate meaning in life.5 Thus, in the Grundrisse,
Marx writes: “In bourgeois economics—­and in the epoch of production to
which it corresponds—­this complete working-­out of the human content
appears as a complete emptying-­out, this universal objectification as total
alienation, and the tearing-­down of all limited, one-­sided aims as sac-
rifice of the human end-­in-­itself to an entirely external end.”6 However,
Marx counters, “when the limited bourgeois form is stripped away, what

43
44 · The Alienated Subjec

is wealth other than the universality of individual needs, capacities, plea-

sures, productive forces etc., created through universal exchange?”7 That
is, for Marx, meaning in life outside of capitalism “is collective, it is social,
the product of human interaction—­the richness of what is often referred
to as ‘the common.’ ”8 Marx effectively stakes out a “world of tension,” a
contrast between a society of meaningless production and consumption
and a society of meaningful, communal interaction among people.9 As
Holloway concludes, this communal richness is “the richness of a street
filled with different traditions and ways of living, the richness of the turn
of the seasons in the countryside, the richness of a voice raised in song, be
it human or bird.”10
A society of wealth premised upon a deeper, more meaningful sense
of freedom, we will see, is denied the alienated subject. This assertion,
however, requires clarification, for the term freedom carries myriad con-
notations, many of which are routinely used toward particular political
ends. As Bauman writes, “The oft-­repeated assurance ‘this is a free coun-
try’ means: it is up to you what sort of life you wish to live, how you decide
to live it, and what kinds of choices you make in order to see your project
through.”11 However, within a capitalist, consumer-­oriented society, espe-
cially as currently configured in the United States, people believe they are
free because they can choose among a near infinite variety of breakfast
cereals or potato chips, where freedom appears in the form of cheese-­filled
sausages or raspberry-­infused beer. The confusion of concrete choices
with constraints in the abstract masks the degree to which the alienating
tendencies of capitalism have distorted one’s subjectivity and, by exten-
sion, one’s ability to live a meaningful, unalienated life.
The basis of alienation for Marx is not at its foundation religious or
philosophical doctrine but rather economic life.12 That said, neither is
alienation an intrinsic or transhistorical feature of production—­and thus
an essential trait of humanity. Instead, the tendency toward alienation is
mediated by particular forms of social organization.13 That is to say, alien-
ation is conditioned historically, geographically, and morally.14 On this
point, alienation is a social condition mediated by the capitalist mode of
social organization in two fundamental ways: through a fragmentation of
the human person and through a prohibition, or limitation, on the ex-
ercise of human productivity.15 The operative question, though, becomes
how alienation is manifest in the structural and social relations of capi-
talist organization.16 For as Sandra Lee Bartky discerns, alienation is not
 The Alienated Subjec · 45

a condition into which someone might stumble by accident; rather, it is

the manifestation of myriad structural and social relations that comprise
capitalism.17 My aim in this chapter, to this end, is not to reconstruct an
orthodox account of Marx’s conception of alienation—­a topic covered
extensively elsewhere—­but instead to theorize the place of the alienated
subject under capitalism, for as Ian Shaw and Marv Waterstone explain,
alienation presents as a profound loss, that is, a loss of one’s place in the
world.18
We begin with Marx, not because Marx is the ultimate arbiter of aliena­
tion but rather because Marx provides a robust account of capitalism both
as a mode of production and a way of life. Together, Marx calls to question
the structural and social relations inherent to capitalism as obstacles to the
simple fact of being human, in short, how the capitalist mode of produc-
tion negates our capacity to live meaningful lives. Simply put, capitalism
precludes a meaningful life for many because exploitation and the ever-­
present specter of a truncated life through premature death are built into
the organization of society. That said, Marx’s project is incomplete.
Marx readily understands that the history of capitalism “is written in
the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire.”19 He recognizes that
“the discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement
and entombment in mines of the indigenous population of that continent,
the beginnings of the conquest and plunder of India, and the conversion
of Africa into a preserve for the commercial hunting of blackskins, are all
things which characterize the dawn of the era of capitalist production.”20
Here, Marx—­unlike many of his predecessors—­locates colonialism, slav-
ery, and genocide as pivotal to social and structural relations of capitalism.
However, Marx does not elaborate on the salience of racism, for example,
in his conceptualization of alienation or for the transcendence of aliena­
tion. It will become necessary, therefore, to rearticulate Marx’s account
of alienation in concert with the formation of myriad subject positions
within capitalism. Following Epifanio San Juan Jr., we need to remain sen-
sitive to the fact that “the capitalist labor process and its conditions over-
determine the location of groups whose ethnic, racial, gender, and other
characteristics acquire value within that context.”21 Neither whiteness nor
patriarchy, for example, are autonomous factors operating apart from the
totality of social relations systemic to the capitalist mode of production,
for as San Juan Jr. concludes, a critique of ideologies of racism and sexism
operating in the arena of class antagonism becomes crucial in the effort
46 · The Alienated Subjec

to dismantle their efficacy.22 This discussion appears in chapter 3. First,

however, my objective is to sketch the contours of the capitalist mode of
production. As Mészáros writes, the basis of Marx’s assertion was not sim-
ply recognition of the unbearable dehumanizing effects of alienation but,
rather, the profound understanding of the objective ontological founda-
tion of the processes that remained veiled from his predecessors.23 That is
to ask, what makes capitalism so degrading and destructive that precludes
one from living a flourishing, meaningful life?

Producing the Laboring Subject

For Marx, the phrase “mode of production” refers to a set of social and struc-
tural relationships. His clearest exposition appears in his Contribution
to the Critique of Political Economy, whereby Marx explains that people
“inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their
will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the
development of their material forces of production.”24 Stated differently,
a mode of production entails two components: the forces of production
and the relations of production. Here, the “forces of production” consist
of the means of production, such as land and labor, and the existent tools
and technologies. The “relations of production” refers to the social organi-
zation of production, distribution, and consumption, that is, the ways in
which the means of production are effectively controlled, and by whom.25
In presenting his concept of the mode of production, Marx uses the ar-
chitectural metaphor of “base” and “superstructure.” Marx writes that the
“totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure
of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political su-
perstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social conscious-
ness.”26 The foundation, or base, is the unity of the forces of production,
which include the technological, geographical, and physical means of pro-
duction together with human labor power, and the relations of production,
which are the social and property relations; the superstructure, in turn,
comprises ideologies and institutions, such as the state, religion, and crimi­
nal justice systems.27 Marx’s metaphor, unfortunately, has been widely
misunderstood and misappropriated, both by supporters and detractors.
Indeed, Marxism has been accused repeatedly of being teleological, reduc-
tionist, dogmatic, and mechanistic.28 In his brief and incomplete discus-
sions of noncapitalist modes of production, for example, Marx’s heuristic
 The Alienated Subjec · 47

has been reduced to an overly simplistic caricature of economic forms:

“primitive communist,” “slave,” “ancient,” and “feudal.” Marx, of course,
never devoted much attention to theorizing these alternative modes of
production as thoroughly as he did capitalism; this lacuna has contributed
to much confusion in the applicability of Marx’s method.29
Marx does not present history as unfolding in a preordained, linear
fashion; nor is this his intent. Rather, Marx’s purpose in elaborating the
concept of the mode of production and applying it to the development of
different types of society was, according to John Haldon, to employ it as a
heuristic, as a means of asking questions about the basic structure of soci-
ety that informed the ways a given socioeconomic system worked.30 The
mode of production, in other words, is an abstraction, derived from his-
torical examples but in the end representing no specific society, but rather
one set of possible social relations of production.31 To this end, Marx’s
framing “of historical reality in terms of base and superstructure within
modes of production is an attempt to compel us to think about the rela-
tionship between material production and all the political, cultural, legal,
ideological and social manifestations of each human society.”32
In addition, Marx provides a means by which to explore and evaluate
the structural transformations that give rise to different modes of produc-
tion. In his Contribution, Marx explains that “at a certain stage of devel-
opment, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with
the existing relations of production.”33 For Marx, this begins an “era of
social revolution” whereupon the “changes in the economic foundation
lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense super-
structure.”34 In short, through class struggle a new mode of production
begins to undermine and replace the previous mode of production, a pro-
cess that involves not only a reorganization of the relations of production
but also the social, political, and ideological superstructure.35 Accordingly,
Marx presents an inclusive conceptual framework rather than a reduction-
ist account of staid economic forms. Marx is concerned with the totality
of human societies, of the ways in which all social apparatuses, including
but not limited to law and politics, are internally related to the dominant
mode of production at any given time or place. Consequently, any par-
ticular mode of production “must not be considered simply as being the
reproduction of the physical existence of individuals. Rather it is a definite
form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life,
a definite mode of life on their part. As individuals express their life, so they
48 · The Alienated Subjec

are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with
what they produce and with how they produce. Hence what individuals
are depends on the material conditions of their production.”36 To this end,
within capitalist mode of production, the alienated subject arises from the
material conditions of commodity production.
A commodity, Marx writes, is an external object, that is, “a thing which
through its qualities satisfies human needs of whatever kind.”37 That need,
moreover, may derive from our mortal existence, such as the need to eat
and drink; conversely, the need may arise from productive and creative
activities, such as the need for a basket or shovel. Consequently, commodi-
ties, as needed objects, are inseparable from the human species-­being.
Within capitalism, however, there is more to the commodity than meets
the eye. As Marx explains, “a commodity appears at first sight an extremely
obvious, trivial thing. But its analysis brings out that it is a very strange
thing.”38 This strangeness arises from the argument that “ordinary, sensu-
ous” things under capitalism are transformed into “extrasensory” things.39
As Marx explains, “The mysterious character of the commodity-­form
consists . . . simply in the fact that the commodity reflects the social char-
acteristics of men’s own labor as objective characteristics of the products
of labor themselves.”40 In other words, commodities are not merely needed
objects in and of themselves but instead signify particular social relations
that emanate from concrete human activities inherent to the production
process.
Within the capitalist mode of production, commodities exhibit a dual
character, being composed of use-­value, that is, something needed for a
particular task, but also of exchange-­value. This latter element appears as
a quantitative relation, the proportion in which use-­values of one kind ex-
change for use-­values of another kind.41 In a well-­known illustration, for
example, Marx considers the relation between the values of two commodi-
ties: 20 yards of linen = 1 coat. Here, Marx explains that the value of linen is
expressed in relation to that of a coat. It is not possible, he notes, to express
the value of linen in linen, for a “definite quantity of linen [can only be]
considered as an object of utility.”42 The value of linen must be expressed,
quantitatively, in terms of another commodity. The first commodity, linen,
is expressed as the relative value whereas the second commodity, coat,
constitutes the equivalent form of value. The obverse also holds true. It is
possible to state that one coat is equivalent to 20 yards of linen. This indi-
cates that “value cannot be grasped within an individual use value.”43 Here,
 The Alienated Subjec · 49

Marx wonders if there is something underlying exchange-­value governing

the relationship between commodities.44
Marx argues that commodities are not exchanged according to their
usefulness; instead, there is a quantitative relation that appears in all com-
modities that facilitates their exchange. This common denominator, Marx
concluded, was labor-­power, that is, labor in the abstract. This proposition
is important in that it establishes a foundation by which “labor” is evalu-
ated within capitalism. As Joseph Choonara explains, commodities have
value—­which is different from their price—­because they are products of
abstract labor; exchange-­value, consequently, is merely the form through
which this value is expressed.45
Historically, most production was directed toward consumption—­that
is, the immediate or near-­immediate use of products. Capitalism, con-
versely, is a system of generalized commodity production for exchange.46
For Marx, therefore, the circulation (exchange) of commodities is the start-
ing point of capital, for the distinction between money as money and money
as capital is nothing more than a difference in their form of circulation.47
Here, Marx identifies two general forms of circulation. The direct form en-
tails the conversion of a commodity (C) into money (M), and the reconver-
sion of the money into a commodity (C); this is represented as C-­M-­C.48
The first transformation, C-­M, represents the conversion of a commodity
into money, for example, the act of selling a bushel of corn, while the sec-
ond transformation, M-­C represents the conversion of money into a com-
modity, for example, the act of buying a bottle of wine. Hence, this single
process is two-­sided: from one pole, that of the commodity owner, it is a
sale, and from the other pole, that of the money owner, it is a purchase, that
is, an individual sells a bushel of corn in order to obtain money in which to
buy a bottle of wine.49 Broadly conceived, this circuit represents the circula-
tion through which every commodity passes to become a use-­value for its
owner; here, money simply serves as a medium of exchange.50
Alongside this form of circulation is a second form of circulation:
M-­C-­M, the transformation of money into commodities, and the recon-
version of commodities into money.51 Here, during the first phase, M-­C
(the purchase), money is changed into a commodity while, during the
second phase, C-­M (the sale), the commodity is changed back again into
money.52 Whereas the first circulation resulted in the exchange of com-
modities (albeit mediated through money), under the second circulation
there is an exchange of money for money via commodities. This latter form
50 · The Alienated Subjec

of circulation appears, on the surface, to be meaningless. As Elena Lange

explains, while the first commodity in C-­M-­C denotes a qualitatively dif­
ferent commodity than the second one, the exchange for money (M-­C-­M)
seems tautological: there is no qualitative difference if one spends money
to purchase a commodity and then sells the commodity at the same price.53
Here, Marx finds the unique feature of capitalism in that “the circulatory
process of M-­C-­M would be absurd and empty if the intention were, by
using this roundabout route, to exchange two equal sums of money.”54
Marx explains that “in the simple circulation of commodities [C-­M-­C] the
two extremes have the same economic form. They are both commodities,
and commodities of equal value. But they are also qualitatively different
use-­values, as for example corn and clothes.”55 However, within the sec-
ond circulation, “both extremes have the same economic form. They are
both money, and therefore are not qualitatively different use values, for
money is precisely the converted form of commodities.”56 Consequently,
the “process M-­C-­M does not . . . owe its content to any qualitative differ-
ence between its extremes, for they are both money, but solely to quantita-
tive changes.”57 As Harvey writes, “M-­C-­M only makes sense if it results
in an increment of value,” this being surplus-­value and is thus rewritten as
M-­C-­M'.58
The production of surplus value, that is, the conversion of money (M)
into more money (M') functions as the general formula for capital, namely,
profit for profit’s sake. Indeed, Marx cautions that use-­values must never
be treated as the immediate or even final aim of the capitalist.59 This is
a point well worth underscoring, for as a form of social organization, a
general system of production for exchange necessarily imparts a particular
ideology that permeates all social relations. What is decisive for Marx is
that the movement of capital does not aim at the satisfaction of particular
human needs; rather, the movement of capital aims at self-­valorization and
its quantitative transformation into a larger sum of money.60 Effectively,
under capitalism, the fundamental rationale for production is neither need
nor use, but simply profit.
Marx’s account highlights the importance of productive labor, that is,
value-­generating labor, under the capitalist mode of production. Marx
writes that “since the immediate purpose and the authentic product of
capitalist production is surplus value, labor is only productive, and an ex-
ponent of labor-­power is only a productive worker, if it or he creates sur-
plus value directly, i.e. the only productive labor is that which is directly
 The Alienated Subjec · 51

consumed in the course of production for the valorization of capital.”61

Considerable misunderstanding exists vis-­à-­vis Marx’s separation of pro-
ductive and unproductive labor, and it is necessary to clarify these terms
before proceeding. Marx, for example, does not minimize the role of ac-
tivities that take place outside the formal production process. He does not
make the argument that housework, for example, and those tasks neces-
sary for the reproduction of daily and generational life are less important
to the functioning of capital. Rather, Marx insists that capitalism values
only those activities that are productive for capital, namely, labor that not
only produces commodities (marketed use-­values), but also is employed
by capital and creates surplus value.62 Thus, within the capitalism mode of
production, unpaid household work constitutes a “free gift” to capitalists
while paid domestic workers are generative of value, that is, profit. The for-
mer represents a form of oppression and the latter a form of exploitation.
Regardless of the form, capital benefits, but it does so in particular ways
that greatly mediate the intersectionality of other forms of oppression.
If we consider production from the viewpoint of the capitalist, as does
Marx, we see that only certain types of labor are productive, in other words,
capable of generating exchange-­value. This, to clarify, is not Marx’s posi-
tion but rather his critique of bourgeois political economists who dimin-
ish the contributions of activities outside the formal circuits of capital.
Indeed, Marx stresses that “it is only bourgeois obtuseness that encourages
the view that capitalist production is production in its absolute form.”63 In
key respects, Marx’s observation is supported by the Republican response
to the Covid-­19 pandemic, for these politicians demanded that productive
workers—­mostly immigrants and persons of color—­return to work de-
spite the known risks they faced.
Marx’s discussion of productive and nonproductive labor is, in the
main, an explication of the commodification of society. As Murray Smith
explains, this entails two crucial postulates: that living labor is the sole
source of all new value at the level of the capitalist economy as a whole,
and that value exists as a definite quantitative magnitude precisely because
it is a social substance that has a real existence in the relations comprising
the social division of labor.64 Together, these claims have a direct bearing
on the “laws” of motion of capitalism, namely, the “self-­expanding” value
of capital. Here, the value-­expansion process upon which capital feeds is
precisely the process of producing and expropriating surplus value, that is,
the valorization process.65 The valorization process signifies capitalism’s
52 · The Alienated Subjec

“imperative need to expand in terms of total production” and thus sets

capitalism on a path toward the “commodification of everything.”66
The valorization of capital, that is, the accumulation of profit, begins
with the mobilization of labor-­power and assumes two basic forms, distin-
guished by whether they originate outside or within the realm of capital-
ist rule.67 The formal subsumption of labor under capital is characterized
by labor practices that preexist the imposition of capitalism but are sub-
sequently brought under the rule of capital, such as traditional farming
practices or craftwork.68 For Marx, this form of subsumption is formal, in
the sense that the substance of the labor process remains unchanged; the
workers continue to perform the same operations, but do so within a new
context.69 Conversely, the real subsumption of labor to capital occurs when
new (or modified) production techniques and management strategies are
introduced. These labor practices are generated within capital and are fun-
damentally different than the pre-­or noncapitalist practices that were in-
corporated in the formal subsumption processes.70 The introduction of
the assembly line, for example, marks one technique introduced under the
capitalist mode of production that radically transformed productive ac-
tivities. Marx’s materialist outlook holds that by nature humans produce
cooperatively in their community. However, when this cooperative pro-
ductivity happens in a way that is imposed upon people, then this becomes
an unnatural situation and, as we will see, an alienating condition.71
Marx’s distinction between formal and real subsumption is important
not only because it calls attention to the particular ways in which soci-
eties (and attendant labor processes) are brought under the purview of
capitalism. For Marx, the processes of formal and real subsumption cor-
respond to two fundamentally different ways in which capital is valorized,
these being absolute surplus value and relative surplus value. First, under
the formal subsumption of labor, the capitalist “buys” the commodity
labor-­power from the worker for a given period of time and, in return, the
worker receives in wages in order to purchase the material necessities (e.g.,
food, water, shelter) necessary for the worker to reproduce him-­or herself
as a worker.72 However, it is a peculiar feature of the capitalist-­laborer rela-
tion that the period of work time established by the contract will always
be longer than this necessary labor time. Otherwise, “there would be no
gain for the capitalist and thus no reason to bother with the whole affair.”73
Workers, for example, may produce enough value in six hours to offset
 The Alienated Subjec · 53

their reproduction. And yet capitalists purchase labor-­power for a longer

period of time, say, ten hours. The remaining four hours, Marx argues,
appear as absolute surplus labor time. Marx explains: “The fact that half a
day’s labor is necessary to keep the worker alive during 24 hours does not
in any way prevent him from working a whole day. Therefore the value of
labor-­power, and the value which that labor-­power valorizes . . . in the
labor process, are two entirely different magnitudes; and this difference
was what the capitalist had in mind when he was purchasing the labor-­
power.”74 In other words, workers produce enough value to cover the costs
of their wages in just a part of the working day; the labor performed for
the remainder of the day, therefore, does not have to be paid for—­it is “sur-
plus labor” that produces “absolute surplus value.”75 As Mandel explains,
when the producer is performing necessary labor, he or she is producing
a necessary product; when the laborer is performing surplus labor, he or
she is producing a social surplus product.76 The social surplus product is
thus that part of social production which is produced by the laboring class
but appropriated—­without compensation—­by the ruling class, regardless
of the form the surplus product may assume.77 Simply put, under the capi-
talist mode of production, the product of labor belongs not to the person
who produced it, but rather, the person who hired the laborer.
Capitalism is oriented toward neither the sustainability nor continu-
ance of life but instead toward the accumulation of capital. Capitalism, in
this way, is inherently detrimental to the production and reproduction of
the human species-­being, for the simple fact that not only do workers not
produce for their immediate need but also because production is not even
directed toward future need. As such, living laborers “live only so long as
they find work, and [they] find work only so long as their labor increases
capital.”78 In this manner, the formal subsumption of labor-­power to capi-
tal establishes the initial—­and alienating—­context of the human species-­
beings’ vulnerability to premature death from a truncated life. As Marx
identifies, there are physical limits on the extent to which capitalism can
depend on the production of absolute surplus value. The working day, for
example, can only be extended so long. This, of course, is a peculiarity of
capital’s adaptability to the diurnal rhythms of the Sun-­Earth relationship;
in principle, employers are not necessarily bound to measuring labor pro-
ductivity in twenty-­four-­hour blocks. More problematic, for capital, is the
physical stamina of the human species-­being. Marx elaborates:
54 · The Alienated Subjec

In its blind and measureless drive, its insatiable appetite for surplus
labor, capital oversteps not only the moral but even the merely
physical limits of the working day. . . . It is not the normal mainte-
nance of labor-­power which determines the limits of the working
day . . . but rather the greatest possible expenditure of labor-­power,
no matter how diseased, compulsory and painful it may be. . . . By
extending the working day, therefore, capitalist production . . . not
only produces a deterioration of human labor-­power by robbing
it of its normal moral and physical conditions of development and
activity, but also produces the premature exhaustion and death of
this labor-­power itself.79

Given the very likely prospect of workers succumbing to premature

death, capital (as embodied by capitalists) seeks ways around the physi-
cal limitations of the human body. It is not necessarily that the capitalist
evinces concern over the plight of any given worker; rather, if “the unnatu-
ral extension of the working day, which capital necessarily strives for in its
unmeasured drive for self-­valorization, shortens the life of the individual
worker, and therefore the duration of his labor-­power, the forces used up
have to be replaced more rapidly, and it will be more expensive to repro-
duce labor-­power.”80 Consequently, other means of increasing profit must
be sought. Here, “one of Marx’s most profound insights into the function-
ing of capitalism,” Prahhat Patnaik explains, “was that the system could
not do without a reserve army of labor.”81 Michael McIntyre concurs, not-
ing that for Marx the creation of an industrial reserve army was not an
aberration; it was an ordinary product of capitalist accumulation.82 As
Marx writes, “What experience generally shows to the capitalist is a con-
stant excess of population, i.e., an excess in relation to capital’s need for
valorization at a given moment, although this throng of people is made up
of generations of stunted, short-­lived and rapidly replaced human beings,
plucked, so to speak, before they were ripe.”83
Surplus populations do not constitute a monolithic or homogenous
group but instead may be differentiated by their position within the capi-
talist mode of production.84 To that end, Marx subdivides surplus popu­
lations into three categories: floating, latent, and stagnant. The floating
population consists of those workers who cycle in and out of the labor
force, that is, those workers who are “sensitive to fluctuations in the pro-
 The Alienated Subjec · 55

duction process, outsourcing, and long-­term economic trends.”85 Capi-

talism does not proceed uniformly but instead is reflective of recurrent
periods of expansion and contraction. This follows from the inherent con-
tradictions within the capitalist mode of production. Thus, in times of eco-
nomic growth, surplus workers enter the ranks of the formal waged-­labor
sector. Unemployment levels decrease—­but this is only temporary. Subse-
quent economic slowdowns result in massive lay-­offs, hence a replenish-
ing of the surplus population. Also included are those individuals made
redundant as a result of technological innovations.86 The latent popu­
lation includes those with insecure employment. Notable in this regard
are those in agriculture and artisanal industries who are made redundant
under processes of real and formal subsumption. The dispossession and
displacement of subsistence farmers, for example, constitutes a principle
means by which latent surplus populations are produced. As Marx writes,
“as soon as capitalist production takes possession of agriculture . . . the de-
mand for a rural working population falls absolutely, while the accumula-
tion of the capital employed in agriculture advances.”87 Third, the stagnant
population is composed of those workers who are only rarely employed.
It is the stagnant population, in particular, that forms the massive ranks
of the “inexhaustible reservoir of disposable labor-­power.”88 This popula-
tion includes those workers engaged in part-­time, casual, or “informal”
labor, with the largest part to be found in “domestic industries,” which
consists of “outwork” carried out through the agency of subcontractors on
behalf of manufacture, and dominated by so-­called cheap labor, primarily
women and children.89 To these three categories of surplus populations
Marx adds a fourth: the lumpenproletariat.90 Distinguished morally from
the working-­class proletariat, this “lowest sediment” of society includes
vagabonds, criminals, and prostitutes; those able to work but who do not
(e.g., paupers); and those unable to work because of particular incapaci-
ties.91 This latter subset was composed of “people who have lived beyond
the worker’s average life-­span; and the victims of industry, whose number
increases with the growth of dangerous machinery, or mines, chemical
works, etc., the mutilated, the sickly, the widows, etc.”92
For Marx the production of surplus populations is systemic to capi-
talism. Marx identifies a tendency within capitalism to “overproduce”
workers—­a paradoxical condition that exists alongside but apart from bi-
ology.93 Marx writes: “Independently of the limits of the actual increase of
56 · The Alienated Subjec

population, [capitalism] creates a mass of human material always ready for

exploitation by capital in the interests of capital’s own changing valoriza-
tion requirements.”94
The ability to exploit the labor-­power of surplus populations also is
neither infinite nor always practical. Accordingly, other techniques are
required by capitalists to expropriate surplus-­value beyond the extension
of the working day or the possibility of tapping into the so-­called reserve
army of labor. To this end, Marx introduces the concept of relative surplus
value. Unlike absolute surplus value, this value is generated not through
the prolongation of the working day but instead through the intensifica-
tion of the labor process itself, that is, through the real subsumption of
labor to capital. Here, Marx introduces the concept of “socially necessary
labor time,” that is, the quantity of labor necessary under the average con-
ditions of labor productivity existing in a given country at a given time.95
As an abstract concept, socially necessary labor time transfers the level
of argument from any individual capitalist to society as a whole.96 An
increase in average production, for example, increases the average num-
ber of commodities produced per unit of time; it thereby decreases the
amount of socially necessary labor time required for the production of a
single commodity and, hence, the value of each commodity.97 Greater effi-
ciencies of scale lesson the costs of production, thereby facilitating greater
profits. With an increase in the productivity of labor—­through refinements
in the division of labor or through the introduction of machinery—­the
value of labor-­power falls and the portion of the working day necessary for
the reproduction of that value will be shortened. For example, if a techni-
cal improvement in the conditions of production cheapens the consumer
goods that workers buy with their wages, then the value of labor-­power
has fallen; less time is required to reproduce labor-­power, and the portion
of the working day devoted to necessary labor will fall, with the remaining
hours of the working day appearing as surplus.98 Consequently, “with the
production of relative surplus-­value the form of production is altered and
a specifically capitalist form of production comes into being.”99
How much socially necessary labor time is required to reproduce labor-­
power?100 For Marx, the concrete determination contains both a historical
and moral element, the amount mediated by struggles between capital-
ists and workers.101 In the abstract, however, the amount is sufficient to
return the worker to such a condition that they can once more sell their
labor-­power to a capitalist; this value may also include the cost of raising
 The Alienated Subjec · 57

subsequent generations of workers and perhaps also the cost of support-

ing a nonworking partner.102 Marx explains: “The owner of labor-­power is
mortal. If then his appearance in the [labor] market is to be ­continuous . . .
the seller of labor-­power must perpetuate himself.”103 Moreover, given that
“the labor-­power withdrawn from the market by wear and tear, and by
death, must be continually replaced by, at the very least, an equal amount
of fresh labor-­power,” it follows that “the sum of means of subsistence nec-
essary for the production of labor-­power must include the means neces-
sary for the worker’s replacements, i.e., his children.”104 In short, capitalists
seek to provide the minimum wage possible to ensure the daily and gen-
erational reproduction of its workforce, for as Marx writes, “The wages
of labor have thus exactly the same significance as the maintenance and
servicing of any other productive instrument, or as the consumption of a
capital, required for its reproduction with interest; or as the oil which is ap-
plied to wheels to keep them turning.105 Beyond this, “the lowest and the
only necessary wage-­rate is that providing for the subsistence of the worker
for the duration of his work and as much more as is necessary for him to
support a family and for the race of laborers not to die out.”106 Capital, in
other words, “has an immanent drive, and a constant tendency, towards
increasing the productivity of labor, in order to cheapen commodities and,
by cheapening commodities, to cheapen the worker himself.”107
Notably, the relations established under the formal subsumption of
labor do not disappear; indeed, the direct subordination of the labor pro-
cess to capital remains. However, on this foundation “there now arises a
technologically and otherwise specific mode of production—­capitalist
production—­which transforms the nature of the labor process and its ac-
tual conditions. Only when that happens do we witness the real subsump-
tion of labor under capital.”108 Marx continues: the “real subsumption of
labor under capital is developed in all the forms evolved by relative, as op-
posed to absolute surplus-­value. With the real subsumption of labor under
capital a complete . . . revolution takes place in the mode of production, in
the productivity of the workers and in the relations between workers and
capitalists.”109
The problem with capitalism, Marx identifies, is that the productive
activity of laboring appears to humans as simply the means of satisfying
their need to maintain their own physical existence.110 To this end, system-
atic exploitation occurs when a form of social organization (capitalism)
develops an economic, political, or legal framework that locks alienation
58 · The Alienated Subjec

in place and allows one class routinely and “legitimately” to exploit an-
other, all behind the mask of appearing to act in the general interest of the
population.111 In the process, the alienated subject also comes into being.
For as Lynn Chancer explains, “A sense of powerlessness and dependency
results for the worker forced to accept conditions of work set by the more
authoritative capitalist.”112 In other words, the exploitative and alienating
conditions of capitalism are effectively sadomasochistic in orientation.

The Alienated Subject

On April 28, 2020, President Trump issued an executive order that de-
clared meatpacking plants to be “critical infrastructure” under the Defense
Production Act of 1950. Democratic politicians had for weeks pressured
Trump to invoke this act in an attempt to jump-­start the production of
much-­needed life-­saving medical equipment to combat the coronavirus.
When Trump did react, however, his concern was not centered on the pro-
duction of ventilators and respirators but instead sausages and sandwich
meats. To this end, the executive order prohibited the closure of meat-
packing plants and provided their parent companies legal immunity from
liability claims filed by workers or their families.113 Notably, there was little
concern expressed by politicians—­or even the media—­over the plight of
these working-­class folk, most of whom were Black or Latinx. Unlike the
iconic white coal miner or the white steel worker, these people who were
forced to work during a pandemic elicited little sympathy, especially by
Trump, the so-­called president of the working class.
Trump’s response, in part, reflected his political narcissism, for the
meatpacking industry had long been a supporter of the Republican Party.
More broadly, however, the executive order confirmed for many the cal-
lousness of racial capitalism. Throughout the early months of the Covid-­19
pandemic, meatpacking plants across the country emerged as hotspots for
the transmission and infection of the virus. From Wilkesboro, North Caro­
lina, to Tama, Iowa, hundreds of workers—­mostly low-­income people of
color—­tested positive for the coronavirus, with many subsequently dying.
Indeed, by September 2020 a nonprofit investigative news organization
discovered that over 42,000 meatpacking workers tested positive in nearly
500 plants; at least 203 died. Representatives of the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration acknowledged that many of these plants failed
to provide a workplace “free from recognized hazards that were causing
 The Alienated Subjec · 59

or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees in that em-

ployees were working in close proximity to each other and were exposed
to” the coronavirus.114 Compounding the vulnerabilities of meatpacking
workers were mandatory work orders that compelled them to remain on
the job—­despite the known risks. Iowa governor Kim Reynolds, for ex-
ample, announced that slaughterhouse employees who refused to show up
for work would be ineligible for unemployment benefits. The choice was
clear: stay on the job and risk possible death or stay home and risk possible
eviction, destitution, loss of health care, and death.115
Writing in the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels assert that the
majority of people under capitalism “live only so long as they find work,
and [they] find work only so long as their labor increases capital.”116 Their
words echo in the meatpacking plants and provide a grim epithet for those
men and women compelled to work so that the nation’s supply of bacon or
chicken tenders not be disrupted. As Crystal Rodriquez, a single mother of
four who worked in a meatpacking plant in Greeley, Colorado, explained,
“I’m kind of angry because I don’t understand why everybody’s lives are
being put at risk just to make the product.” By the time of her interview, six
workers had already succumbed to the coronavirus, with 200 other work-
ers infected. Rodriquez herself would later test positive and spend nearly a
month in the intensive care unit.117
The plight of meatpacking workers and of the myriad other “essential
workers” compelled to work illustrates the devastating effect of capital-
ist production on human beings, on their physical and mental states,
and on the social and spatial processes of which they are a part.118 Their
plight also depicts the mediation of living a meaningful life conditioned by
one’s awareness of premature death. To this end, we readily understand the
life-­or-­death tradeoffs forced upon workers dispossessed of the means of
production, where the only recourse is seemingly to accede to the demands
of capital. Accordingly, the separation of human beings from meaning-
ful work forms the basis upon which alienation in its capitalist form
materializes.
Humans depend on functioning ecosystems to sustain themselves.119
That is to say, there is a metabolic interaction between humans and nature,
“a process by which man, through his own actions, mediates, regulates and
controls the metabolism between himself and nature.”120 This is not to say
that humans dominate nature but rather to acknowledge that each mode
of production generates a particular social metabolic order that influences
60 · The Alienated Subjec

the society-­nature relationship, regulating the ongoing reproduction of

society and the demands placed on ecosystems.121 To fully appreciate this
dialectic, however, it is necessary to clearly differentiate between appro­
priation and expropriation. For example, writing in the Grundrisse, Marx
explains that “all production is appropriation of nature on the part of an
individual within and through a specific form of society.”122 This is the
material basis of labor and production, for there can be no human exis-
tence without the appropriation of those resources necessary for biological
continuance and reproduction. Appropriation, in other words, is an inher-
ent feature of human life and is present in all societies; appropriation con-
stitutes the fundamental basis by which life is made possible.123 Notably,
there is an implicit recognition that appropriation is sustainable. Humans
require food, water, and materials necessary for clothing and shelter; these
can be understood as the “conditions of reproduction.” As Paul Burkett
clarifies, “Free appropriation need not imply wasteful, destructive or un-
sustainable appropriation. The degree to which nature’s gifts are cherished
and cared for depends on the particular social organization governing
their use.”124
Appropriation differs from the practice of expropriation. Expropria-
tion, in this sense, refers to appropriation “without exchange” or “without
reciprocity.” In other words, production for exchange value imparts a rift
in the metabolic interaction between humans and society. As Marx writes,
“A presupposition of wage labor, and one of the historic preconditions for
capital, is free labor and the exchange of this free labor for money, in order
to reproduce and realize money, to consume the use-­value of labor not for
individual consumption, but as use value for money.”125 There, it follows
that “it is not the unity of living and active humanity with the natural,
inorganic conditions of their metabolic exchange with nature, and hence
their appropriation of nature, which requires explanation or is the result of
a historic process, but rather the separation between these inorganic con-
ditions of human existence and this active existence, a separation which
is completely posited only in the relation of wage labor and capital.”126 In
short, for Marx the separation of humanity’s productive activity and its en-
suing subsumption to the dictates of capital marks a radical break, one in
which an emergent alienated subject comes into being, a subject “reduced
to performing undifferentiated work on humanly indistinguishable ob-
jects among people deprived of their human variety and compassion.”127
Expressed most clearly in his unpublished 1844 Economic and Philo­
 The Alienated Subjec · 61

sophic Manuscripts, Marx presents alienation as comprising four broad

relations that, taken in their totality, cover the whole of human existence,
namely, alienation from a person’s productive activity, their product,
other people, and, ultimately, humanity itself.128 As Ian Shaw and Marv
Waterstone write, “Alienation is a disorienting sense of existential exclu-
sion: to be separated from the material conditions that enable humans to
flourish.”129
To begin, for Marx the human species-­being is a productive agent. It
is through self-­conscious, cooperative labor that humans find meaning in
life. Human beings exist as conscious, knowing beings, equipped with the
ability to reflect upon themselves and their environment. Species-­being,
recall, is the human capacity to consciously and freely transform the world,
through our work, to meet our creative needs.130 And to that end, human
beings are able to deliberately create and produce for myriad reasons, both
as individuals and as members of society.131 Capitalism, however, is anti­
thetical to life in the collective. Productive activity under capitalism is an
inherently alienating activity.132 As Shaw and Waterstone explain, “To
be alienated is to be denied this liberty of meaningful work: we cannot
take hold of the world, our place in it, and insist, I matter. The alienated are
denied an ability to reshape their simple being-­in-­the-­world.”133
An alienated existence arises because of the peculiar social and spatial
relations that comprise capitalism as a whole, namely, that capitalism is
based on the separation of workers from the means of production. For
this unusual relation to arise, however, two conditions are necessary. First,
“labor-­power can appear on the market as a commodity only if, and in so
far as, its possessor, the individual whose labor-­power it is, offers it for sale
or sells it as a commodity.”134 In other words, capitalism requires workers
to obtain waged employment. Second, “the possessor of labor-­power, in-
stead of being able to sell commodities in which his labor has been objecti-
fied, must rather be compelled to offer for sale as a commodity that very
labor-­power which exists only in his living body.”135 This holds tremen-
dous importance for Marx, who elaborates:

[The] fact that labor is external to the worker, i.e., it does not
belong to his essential being; that in his work, therefore, he does
not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but
unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy
but mortifies his body and ruins his mind. . . . His labor is therefore
62 · The Alienated Subjec

not voluntary, but coerced; it is forced labor. It is therefore not the

satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs external
to it.136

In claiming that productive activity under capitalism does not belong

to humanity’s species-­being, Marx presupposes that human beings deny
rather than affirm their existence.137 Accordingly, as production is more
fully subsumed to the dictates of capital, workers become mere append-
ages to the production process. “Modern industry,” Marx and Engels de-
scribe, “has converted the little workshop of the patriarchal master into
the great factory of the industrial capitalist. Masses of laborers, crowded
into the factory, are organized like soldiers. . . . Not only are they slaves of
the bourgeois class, and of the bourgeois state; they are daily and hourly
enslaved by the machine, by the overseer, and, above all, by the individual
bourgeois manufacturer himself.”138 Marx elaborates this in Capital, de-
tailing the transformations wrought by the advent of modern capitalism
on once-­creative, productive people who produced useful objects instead
of commodities:

In handicraft and manufacture, the worker makes use of a tool; in

the factory, the machine makes use of him. There the movements
of the instrument of labor proceed from him, here it is the move-
ments of the machine that he must follow. In manufacture the
works are the parts of a living mechanism. In the factory we have
a lifeless mechanism which is independent of the workers, who
are incorporated into it as its living appendages. “The wearisome
routine of endless drudgery in which the same mechanical process
is ever repeated, is like the torture of Sisyphus; the burden of toil,
like the rock, is ever falling back upon the worn-­out drudge.”139

For Marx, it is insufficient to render the deleterious aspects of alienation in

abstract terms; instead, he underscores the sensory-­mental condition it
generates.140 Marx writes:

Factory work exhausts the nervous system to the uttermost; at the

same time, it does away with the many-­sided play of the muscles,
and confiscates every atom of freedom, both in bodily and in
intellectual activity. Even the lightening of the labor becomes an
 The Alienated Subjec · 63

instrument of torture, since the machine does not free the worker
from the work, but rather deprives the work itself of all content.
Every kind of capitalist production, in so far as it is not only a
labor process but also capital’s process of valorization, has this in
common, but it is not the worker who employs the conditions of
his work, but rather the reverse, the conditions of work employ the
worker. . . . Owing to its conversion into an automaton, the instru-
ment of labor confronts the worker during the labor process in the
shape of capital, dead labor, which dominates and soaks up living
labor-­power.141

Ben Hamper provides a particular apt description of the drudgery of

alienation under the capitalist mode of production. Working on the assem-
bly line at the General Motors plant in Flint, Michigan, Hamper describes
how the time-­clock dominated living labor: “But the clock was a whole dif-
ferent mammal altogether. It sucked on you as you waited the next job. It
ridiculed you each time you’d take a peek. The more irritated you became,
the slower it moved. The slower it moved, the more you thought. Thinking
was a very slow death at times.”142 Hamper’s reference to the slow death
of workers as a feature of monotonous factory life is especially revealing,
for capitalism is indifferent to living laborers beyond their usefulness in
the valorization of capital. As Lisa Marie Cacho puts it, “The value of life
is subjected to an economic analysis and assessed accordingly: How has
this person contributed to society? What will he or she accomplish in the
future?”143
As Highmore explains, “What makes the assembly line such a telling
exemplification of everyday modernity is not the specificity of the factory
environment, but the generalized condition that it points to: ‘plodding,’
‘monotony’—­the emptiness of time.”144 And these are not unique to the
factory or to the assembly line. In its quest for efficiency, that is, to facilitate
and increase productive output, tasks become tedious and, when viewed
in isolation, pointless. There is no purpose in work other than to garner
a wage in order to buy the material necessities needed to live day to day.
For Marx, the nature of the human species-­being is to form “things
in accordance with the laws of beauty.”145 In other words, the essence of
being human, that which provides meaning in life, is derived from the
life-­activities of producing both consciously and freely. Under capitalism,
however, the human being is denied this. Objects are produced primarily
64 · The Alienated Subjec

for exchange-­value and, as such, the relationship between producer and

produce is irrevocably altered. Specifically, the productive activities associ-
ated with the capitalist mode of production establish a “hostile” and “alien”
relationship between the producer, that is, the worker, and the object pro-
duced. As Marx explains: “The worker puts his life into the object; but now
his life no longer belongs to him but to the object. . . . The alienation of the
worker in his product means not only that his labor becomes an object, an
external existence, but that it exists outside him, independently, as some-
thing alien to him, and that it becomes a power on its own confronting
him; it means that the life which he has conferred on the object confronts
him as something hostile and alien.”146 Consequently, the object “does not
belong to his essential being” and so through his work “he does not affirm
himself but denies himself.”147 If, however, the product of labor is alien to
the one who produced it, if it confronts the direct producer as something
alien and external, to whom does it belong?148
The short answer is, the capitalist. Marx elaborates:

If the product of labor does not belong to the worker, if it confronts

him as an alien power, this can only be because it belongs to some
other man than the worker. If the worker’s activity is a torment
to him, to another it must be delight and his life’s joy. . . . Thus, if
the product of his labor, his labor objectified, is for him an alien,
hostile, powerful object independent of him, then his position to-
wards it is such that someone else is master of this object, someone
who is alien, hostile, powerful, and independent of him. If his own
activity is to him an unfree activity, then he is treating it as activity
performed in the service, under the dominion, the coercion and
the yoke of another man.149

In Capital, Marx underscores that people sell their labor only after they
have been robbed of their own means of production, that is, only when
people are prevented by law or by force from living outside the param-
eters of capitalism. Indeed, as Chancer explains, “The capitalist’s ability
to impose his or her will is solidified and made all the more intimidating
in being reinforced and supported by the coercive powers of the capital-
ist state. And so the worker confronts labor from a position of alienation,
estranged from a process of which he or she had once been able to exert
participatory and independent self-­control; under capitalism, the labor
 The Alienated Subjec · 65

process is experienced as though it were the sole prerogative, right, and

belonging of others.”150 To this end, the lack of ownership of the means
of production is directly related to wage labor and is the reason why,
under capitalism, the worker is coerced into entering a subordinate re-
lationship to an alien will.151 Consequently, the rendering of free activity
to the dictates of capital degrades humanity and alienates workers from
their humanity. As Martin Hägglund writes, “Insofar as we spend our time
working a job that is not fulfilling but merely serves as a means for our
survival, our labor time is unfree, since we cannot affirm that what we do is
an expression of who we are. Instead of being free to engage the questions
of what makes our life worth living—­the question of what we ought to do
with our time—­our lives are mortgaged to a form of labor that is required
for our survival.”152 In the process, the alienated subject becomes oblivi-
ous to the source of its discontent and so must seek solace in pursuits and
interests beyond productive activity. This is a point worth underscoring.
Unable to engage in creative, productive tasks, the alienated subject seeks
salvation elsewhere and, in the process, alienation becomes a source of
further capitalist accumulation.153 To this end, capitalism transforms the
alienated subject into an “addict of commodity consumption.”154 Meaning
in life, for the alienated subject, is achieved in part through the insatiable
desire for senseless consumer objects.
Thus far, our focus has centered on the alienated proletariat. This is not
to suggest that capitalists are not also alienated.155 Marx was sensitive to
the fact that capitalism, in its totality, engulfed all people, including those
who owned the means of production. Under such a system, employers
and employees alike were subject to the market logics of production for
exchange and, in the process, alienated. That said, capitalists experience
alienation in profoundly different ways than do workers. Marx expands
this idea in The Holy Family: “The propertied class and the class of the
proletariat present the same human self-­alienation. But the former class
finds in this self-­alienation its confirmation and its good, its own power; it
has in it a semblance of human existence. The class of the proletariat feels
annihilated in its self-­alienation; it sees in it its own powerlessness and the
reality of an inhuman existence.”156 We should not read into this, however,
that the proletariat is more alienated than the capitalist, but instead that the
experience of alienation varies according to one’s subject position.
Remarkably, the alienated subject, whether in the form of employer or
employee, is not necessarily aware of its alienated existence or that of other
66 · The Alienated Subjec

alienated subjects. As Sandra Lee Bartky describes, alienation “serves to

make the work of domination easier by breaking the spirit of the domi-
nated and by rendering them incapable of understanding the nature of
those agencies responsible for their subjugation.”157 To this end, capitalism
thrives off the illusion of freedom and choice; indeed, it is this illusory
component that helps maintain order and stability.158 Because alienated
workers, for example, want to believe that markets operate on their own,
and thus are realms of equality and freedom, they too often fail to properly
scrutinize how the workings of the market actually concentrate wealth in
the hands of a few.159 They fail to see that they occupy a decidedly un-
equal position in the social relation of exchange, or that the wages paid
are not equal to the value created. Moreover, alienated workers often fail
to see in their employer the source of their alienation. Instead, alienated
subjects look for scapegoats—­often in the form of ethnic or gendered
­minorities—­to apportion blame for whatever failings are experienced.
In this fashion, the fetishized social relations of capitalism contribute to
a toxic environment of intolerance and hostility, with hatred directed not
toward the source of exploitation and alienation but rather toward other
human beings.
The prevalence of attitudinal indifference shapes social relations both
within and beyond the workplace. Within a commodified society, the
waged labor market becomes the model on which social relations are
structured. A competitive, atomistic worldview is promoted, and it is a
worldview predicated on assumptions of scarce and finite resources to be
fought over in an unending struggle for personal survival. Indeed, the
alienated subject’s awareness of the finitude of life mediates its attitudes
toward the plight of others. Eschewing a solidarity formed around no-
tions of shared mortality, the alienated subject sees in a life a zero-­sum
game, where its own life chances are necessarily threatened by those of
other subject-­beings. Conservative ideologies—­and moralities—­have only
deepened discriminatory and prejudiced attitudes of alienation. In many
contemporary capitalist societies, notably the United States, the myth of
the “self-­made man” is pervasive—­and underscores feelings of indiffer-
ence and intolerance toward the destitute and downtrodden. A commonly
held belief, for example, is that the ability to succeed—­as defined by accu-
mulated wealth—­is rooted in one’s hard work and perseverance, and that
external structures, such as white privilege and patriarchy, play a minimal
role in one’s ability to succeed. Conversely, those who are seen as failures
 The Alienated Subjec · 67

in society, that is, members of the so-­called underclass, are presumed to

have failed because of their individual—­and moral—­deficiencies. Here,
the term underclass—­unlike the positive connotations associated with the
working class—­implies a society that is anything but constructive. As Bau-
man explains, the “underclass” evokes an image of an aggregate of people
who have been declared off-­limits in relation to all classes and the class
hier­archy itself, with little chance and no need of readmission: people with-
out a role, making no useful contribution to the lives of the rest, and in
principle beyond redemption.160 In societies marked by racial capitalism,
the distinction between members of the underclass and the working class
pivots on racism.
On this point, journalistic and scholarly accounts routinely describe
members of the (white) working class as alienated, and thus somehow
justified in their anger directed toward immigrants and other minorities
for “stealing” their jobs or driving down wages. Members of the so-­called
underclass are rarely portrayed as alienated, but instead as indolent or ir-
responsible. And because their failings are seen as the result of their own
negligence and carelessness, they are deemed unworthy of any assistance—­
beyond, perhaps, charitable contributions. Too often, the subjugated are
viewed with indifference; more frequently, they are shunned and scorned,
vulnerable to acts of hostility. The irony, of course, is that members of both
the so-­called working class and underclass are alienated; they both are ex-
ploited within a productive system indifferent to their mortal existence
and both are made vulnerable to premature death by a system that privi-
leges profit over vital needs.

Alienated Subjectivities
Thus far, we have theorized the production of the alienated subject through
a critical interrogation of the capitalist labor process. To leave our dis-
cussion at this point, however, would ultimately fail to capture fully the
variegated experiences of alienation. Indeed, a too-­narrow, class-­based
understanding of Marx will necessarily struggle to provide any meaning-
ful account of how patriarchy, racism, nationalism, and other structures
of oppression condition the day-­to-­day existence of the alienated subject.
The alienated subject is an abstract subject. As such, the alienated
subject stands in opposition to the more prevalent figure of the “liberal
subject.” As Martha Fineman explains, the “liberal subject informs our
68 · The Alienated Subjec

economic, legal, and political principles” and it does so from the stand-
point “of autonomy, self-­sufficiency, and personal responsibility, through
which society is conceived as constituted by self-­interested individuals
with the capacity to manipulate their independently acquired and over­
lapping resources.”161 In contradistinction to the liberal subject, I postu-
late the alienated subject as one who embodies the violence of indifference
that is endemic to capitalism, itself understood as an ensemble of social
relations mediated by one’s access to the means of production. The alien-
ated subject, accordingly, embodies the pursuit of material wealth not as
a means of cultivating a flourishing life for all but instead for an egotistic
need to accumulate for the sake of accumulation. The alienated subject
­exhibits—­in Zygmunt Bauman’s phrase—­a particular “moral blindness”
and thus remains “insensitive to human suffering” beyond its own self-­
defined and limited community.162 Indeed, it is this moral blindness that
enables the alienated subject to remain indifferent to the suffering of others
or to engage in harmful activities directed toward those it is intolerant of.
As an abstraction, the alienated subject is conditioned by its relation
to capital. Capitalism, though, is itself conditioned by myriad social and
structural relations beyond that of one’s access to the means of produc-
tion. Indeed, Michael Hardt and Toni Negri extend Marx’s conception
of the real subsumption of labor under capital to the real subsumption
of society under capital.163 For Hardt and Negri, this extension is neces-
sary, for it provides a means to evaluate the penetration of the capitalist
mode of production beyond the factory floor, that is, to theorize “the ex-
traordinarily wide and deep extension of capitalist relations of production
throughout the social fabric.”164 In doing so, they argue, it is important to
recognize that analyses of contemporary capitalist society in terms of a real
subsumption do not indicate a process of social homogenization.165 Capi-
talism, in other words, does not give rise to a society populated by “one-­
dimensional men” as argued by Herbert Marcuse but, following Hardt and
Negri, a composition of multiplicities.166
The recognition that all social relations, not just labor, are subsumed
under the capitalist mode of production refocuses attention toward the
complex interplay of dominant and subordinate subjectivities conditioned
along racial, gender, sexual, and other axes of oppression apart from but
alongside class divisions. This has a tremendous bearing for our under-
standing (detailed in chapter 5) of the varied subject positions of the alien-
ated subject as sadomasochist. As alluded to in the preface, the so-­called
 The Alienated Subjec · 69

working class is commonly rendered, implicitly if not explicitly, white and

male. David Harvey, for example, correctly identifies that “workers alien-
ate their labor-­power when they enter the factory to do whatever the capi-
talist commands” but that “alienation has a broader meaning that entails
the loss of trust, fairness or reciprocity.”167 For Harvey, the exchange of
labor for wages is legal but has the feel of something fraudulent and, con-
sequently, for the laborers “the response is a sense of loss and unfairness, of
powerlessness and loss of dignity, which is prone to provoke resentment,
anger, and frustration.”168 The workers’ ire and animosity, however, are
not necessarily directed toward the employer but, instead, toward others.
Harvey continues: “They want to tear down and destroy the existing order
of things. They want scapegoats to blame. The capitalist class feeds them
racial minorities, women, and immigrants as easy targets for blame.”169
Harvey concludes: “In this kind of world, we should not be surprised that
right-­wing populism and bigoted nationalist and racist movements thrive.
With mass alienation, somebody like Trump could come along and blast
his way into power. . . . For alienated, disempowered, frustrated and angry
people . . . Trump is the President of alienation.”170
Harvey’s account is attractive, in that is purports to explain the indif-
ference, intolerance, and capacity to hurt expressed by white members of
the working class. Harvey downplays, however, that the “racial minorities,
women, and immigrants” targeted as scapegoats for the working-­class
white men are also alienated members of the working class. For Harvey,
the alienated subject—­as a white, working man—­is premised to behave in
response to perceived slights attributed to his subject position. But what of
the Black alienated subject, for example? What of the vulnerable people of
color forced to work in slaughterhouses during a pandemic?
If we premise that alienation is not transhistorical but instead manifest in
particular ways under particular circumstances, we need to extend Marx’s
argument in accordance with Marx’s own method. We need, in other words,
to pick up where Marx left off and to consider how intersecting systems of
oppression prohibit the transcendence of alienation. The alienated subject,
in short, may be racist or the target of racist attacks; the alienated subject
may be a misogynist or the victim of sexual abuse; the alienated subject may
be a religious bigot or the object of religious persecution. Ultimately, the
alienated subject exhibits a capacity to hurt, but also a capacity to be hurt,
to dominate but also to submit. Required, therefore, is recognition that the
subject formation of the alienated subject always takes place within contours
70 · The Alienated Subjec

of sadomasochism. Indeed, as Chancer explains, “That capitalism as a social

system operates on sadomasochistic principles seems less than far-­fetched
when some of capitalism’s fundamental premises are unearthed, even super-
ficially.” She elaborates: “For wage earners, the vast majority of those under
its aegis, capitalism has inextricably tied work to survival; one has no choice
but to labor in order to meet basic subsistence needs. Yet, although a job is
a requisite to the substance of life, its provision is not taken to be a simple
human right. Under capitalism, the likelihood of ongoing work is continent
on a variety of factors over which most individuals have little and often no
control.”171 Not surprisingly, many of these factors appear as racism, mi-
sogyny, homophobia, and xenophobia.
To this end, scholars of racial capitalism and patriarchal capitalism ef-
fectively extend the analyses of formal and real subsumption and, in so
doing, provide a necessary reconfiguration of the alienated subject.172
Capitalism in the United States, for example, has since its inception been
deeply racialized.173 To this end, Cedric Robinson coined the term “racial
capitalism” in an effort to articulate the centrality of race in the historical
development of capitalism.174 Building on the writings of W. E. B. Du Bois,
C. L. R. James, and other Black radical scholars, racial capitalism forwards
the idea that capitalist accumulation requires human difference and, in
the process of exploiting it, reifies sociospatial differentiation.175 As Laura
Pulido writes, “A focus on racial capitalism requires greater attention to
the essential processes that shaped the modern world, such as coloniza-
tion, primitive accumulation, slavery, and imperialism.”176 In so doing,
Pulido explains, “By insisting that we are still living with the legacy of these
processes, racial capitalism requires that we place contemporary forms of
racial inequality in a materialist, ideological and historical framework.”177
The historical development of world capitalism, Robinson argues, was
influenced in a most fundamental way by the particular forces of racism
and nationalism.178 In other words, the geographic expansion of the capi-
talist mode of production “enlisted and deployed—­formally subsumed—­
racial markers and racial hierarchies within its own structures of rule.”179
As Robin D. G. Kelley explains, “capitalism emerged within the feudal
order and flowered in the cultural soil of a Western civilization already
thoroughly infused with racialism. Capitalism and racism, in other words,
did not break from the old order but rather evolved from it to produce
a modern world system of ‘racial capitalism’ dependent on slavery, vio-
lence, imperialism, and genocide. Capitalism was ‘racial’ not because of
 The Alienated Subjec · 71

some conspiracy to divide workers or justify slavery and dispossession,

but because racialism had already permeated Western feudal society.”180
To this end, as Hardt and Negri emphasize, “the fact that race and racial
hierarchies pre-­existed capital (and were subsequently incorporated and
redeployed in capitalist society) provides one means to recognize that
race is not an accidental or incidental feature of the capitalist system. Race
is constitutive of the capitalist mode of production and essential to the
continuing rule of capital.”181 We should note also though that capital is
constitutive of racism, to the extent that the racism is subsumed to the
logic of capital. To this end, if we premise that racism and capitalism are
co-­constitutive, it follows that alienation is always and already racialized.
The alienated subject is not naturally white.
Racial capital is of course mediated by myriad other structures of op-
pression, including but not limited to gender, sexuality, and ableism. Femi-
nist scholars, for example, document that patriarchy and misogyny, similar
to racism, preceded the advent of capitalism but were subsequently incor-
porated into the capitalist mode of production.182 As such, it is imperative
to understand, on the one hand, that “racism and patriarchy are not inci-
dental features of the capitalist system and not subordinate to its rule, as if
they were merely secondary enemies in the primary struggle against capi-
tal. They are relatively autonomous structures that have been subsumed
formally within it. On the other hand, racial and gender hierarchies are not
historically mutable but instead have been thoroughly transformed, rein-
vented, and redeployed—­that is, really subsumed—­within ‘properly capi-
talist’ society.”183 Thus, to the degree that “the ideas of the ruling class are
in every epoch the ruling ideas,” it holds that a society founded upon the
dominance of white men of the propertied class will reflect these condi-
tions.184 For example, in British North America—­what would become the
United States—­settler colonists created and developed a logic of race that
placed white European men at the pinnacle of the social hierarchy and all
others in various positions of subordination.185 Subsequently, an ideology
of white supremacy permeated the evolving political, economic, and legal
structures that in their totality “valorized whiteness and sanctioned the
violence of white domination, enslavement, and genocide while bolstering
Eurocentric understandings of land use, private property, and wealth ac-
cumulation.”186 Indeed, Marx and Engels conclude: “The class which has
the means of material production at its disposal, consequently also con-
trols the means of mental production, so that the ideas of those who lack
72 · The Alienated Subjec

the means of mental production are on the whole subject to it. The ruling
ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material
relations, the dominant material relations grasped as ideas.”187

Conclusions
As we move forward into the twenty-­first century, many progressives ques-
tion the long-­term salience of Marx, notably his apparent privileging of
the proletariat for its emancipatory potential. For as Erik Olin Wright ob-
serves, “We now live in a world very different from the one in which Marx
formulated his theoretical ideas, and it is difficult to sustain the exuberant
optimism of Marx’s theory of the future beyond capitalism.”188
Marx discerned the potential political power of the working class, that
is, the revolutionary and emancipatory promise of the alienated subject.189
Marx believed fervently that members of the working class would even-
tually overcome alienation through collective realization and regain con-
trol over their productive activity, whereby people would live free from
exploitation and of an alienated egoism of unfulfilled dreams of material
possessions.190 In doing so, the emancipation of the proletariat would en-
compass the emancipation of all people. Marx’s exploration of alienation
is, therefore, a hopeful foray into humanity’s existence, for if alienation was
an essential trait of being human, there would be no possible way of over-
coming alienation. However, our consciousness of alienation generates an
awareness that a nonalienated existence is possible, just as our awareness
of death mediates our experience of life. And yet, a Marxian proletariat has
yet to emerge. For this reason, as David Lovell writes, Marxism after Marx
has been a series of attempts to come to terms, theoretically and practi-
cally, with the actual working class.191 The issue, quite simply, is this: Is the
failure of a revolutionary proletariat to appear inherent in Marx’s concep-
tion of the alienated subject?192
Marx was correct when he premised that “the capitalist can live lon-
ger without the worker than can the worker without the capitalist.”193 The
stark mortality rates between the wealthy and the working class in the
midst of a global pandemic provide grim confirmation of this relation. As
Michael Yates writes, “Whether in health care, farm fields and labor camps,
food delivery, grocery stores, food banks, Fed Ex and UPS trucks, post of-
fices and postal delivery vehicles, buses, subways, trains, airplanes, boats,
 The Alienated Subjec · 73

warehouses, or construction sites, those who labor risk their lives to work,
with many becoming sick and dying.”194 Furthermore, as indicated earlier,
disparities in the exposure to premature death are decidedly shaped by
social and structural relations of racial, gendered, and sexual oppression.
Through September 2020, the age-­adjusted mortality rates of Black, His-
panic, and Indigenous peoples were three times that of whites.195
However, it is equally clear that capitalism is unable to reproduce itself
without the labor of the working class. Indeed, the working class holds
a unique position in that if workers stopped working, the system shuts
down. Historically, this accounts for the violent repression of the ruling
class to unions, mass strikes, work stoppages, slowdowns, and any other
technique that places the ongoing accumulation of profit in jeopardy.
Tellingly, as Heather Brown notes, Covid-­19 “has the potential for a mass
disruption of the workforce, the blocking of the production process, the
profits of capital, and above all the reproduction of capitalist production
relations.”196 And members of the working class readily grasped this real-
ity. Throughout the United States, workers rose up in defiance of orders to
continue to labor under unsafe conditions. In New Orleans, Louisiana, for
example, sanitation workers went on strike in May 2020, demanding haz-
ard pay, adequate personal protective equipment, and a $15 living wage.197
Other sectors, including food service, meat processing, retail, manufactur-
ing, transportation, health care, and education also experienced wildcat
strikes, walkouts, and protests as “essential workers” likewise demanded
better pay and safer working conditions.198
That said, the Covid-­19 pandemic makes clear also the diverse com-
position of the working class. As Roland Simon explains, “exploitation
doesn’t produce a homogenous social entity of the working class.” There is
no singular proletariat “able to be conscious of itself as a social subject, in
the sense habitually given to this, that is to say able to have a consciousness
of itself as a relation to itself, facing capital.”199 In other words, the pro-
letariat in the abstract still assumes a fundamental role toward the aboli-
tion of capital; but its role is mediated by myriad other social and material
relations that comprise the totality of the capitalist mode of production.
To this end, as Simon clarifies, “having lost its centrality as a principle
organizing the totality of the labor process, the big factory which gath-
ered a large number of workers together has not disappeared, but it is not
the principle organizing the labor process and the valorization process
74 · The Alienated Subjec

anymore. . . . In the contradiction between proletariat and capital, there

isn’t anything sociologically given a priori (as was the ‘mass-­worker’ of the
big factory) anymore.”200
The concrete working class, that is, those who labor under conditions
of “actually existing capitalism,” comprise a diffuse, divided, and disinte-
grated subject body. Class struggle remains important; but the struggle
is mediated by competing and often contradictory subject positions that
each, in their own particular way, provide meaning to one’s life. White
members of the working class, for example, may forgo class solidarity to
take advantage of white privilege; the racist alienated white worker dis-
dains class solidarity with other exploited but nonwhite workers. Indeed,
this alienated subject may increasingly become intolerant of government
interventions, such as affirmative action programs, perceived as unfairly
benefiting nonwhites. Working-­class men, similarly, may refuse class soli-
darity in favor of patriarchal superiority. In other words, the alienated sub-
ject may attempt to find meaning in life outside of the workplace, that is,
in other places and, in doing so, the alienated subject embodies an ethical
ambiguity that may foster an indifference to and intolerance of others. Ul-
timately, we find the alienated subject exhibits a social and spatial liminal-
ity whereby it is both capable of hurting and being hurt in the process of
being-­in-­the-­world. Consequently, we need to acknowledge, both in theory
and in practice, the intersectionality of alienation, for the emancipation of
the alienated subject is only possible through the concurrent fostering of a
society free from all forms of oppression. As Hardt and Negri maintain, “if
racism, patriarchy, and capital [among other forms of oppression] are mu-
tually constitutive, then feminist, anti-­racist and anti-­capitalist struggles
must intersect on equal terms.”201
 3

The Intersectionality of Alienation

After four years of incessant rallies and campaign events, Trump’s stump
speeches by 2020 displayed a discomforting familiarity of dog whistles and
gaslighting: racism, sexism, ableism, and xenophobia matched with not-­
so-­subtle support for physical violence. To this end, a notable mainstay
was his paean to the “American worker.” Indeed, during his many reelec-
tion rallies held during the 2020 presidential campaign, Trump repeat-
edly appealed to America’s downtrodden and neglected “working class.”
In Dayton, Ohio, for example, Trump accused Joe Biden, the Democratic
nominee, of selling out American workers. Billing himself as the “blue-­
collar president,” Trump ranted, “For 47 years, Joe Biden shook the hands
of American workers and then stabbed them in the back.” Trump con-
tinued: “The Democrats literally waged war on the American workers for
half a century. Look what they’ve done.” At a separate rally held in Toledo,
Ohio, Trump bellowed, “Proud citizens like you helped build this country,
and together we are taking back our country. We are returning power to
you, the American people.”1
That Trump’s blatant and obsequious cajolery to the working class was
coded language for white workers should come as no surprise.2 What is
remarkable, however, is the power of Trump’s rhetoric, for he effectively
tapped into a cherished myth of the United States. Ideologies of “rugged
individualism” and of “pulling one’s self up by the bootstraps” have long
shaped the ethos of a supposed American exceptionalism, and politicians
across the spectrum have capitalized on these platitudes. Likewise, these
ideologies harken to the liminal position of the working class in the United
States, namely, the government’s relationship to the working class, for not
all poor people are held as worthy of admiration. As Mechele Dickerson
explains, many Americans subscribe to the idea that the government has
a duty to assist the “deserving” poor enough to help them pull themselves
up by their bootstraps, but balk at the idea of providing assistance to the
unemployed but able-­bodied, which is seen as morally corrupting and

75
76 · The Intersectionality of Alienatio

fostering an attitude of economic dependency.3 To this end, Trump is no

exception.
It is noteworthy, though, how Trump’s style conveys more than sim-
ply the specter of material loss. Drawing on his slogan, “Make America
Great Again,” Trump assured his audiences that together they would “take
back our country” and in doing so restore the luster to a sullied country.
Certainly, Trump’s phrasing is a not-­so-­veiled racist diatribe against his
predecessor, Barack Obama, the first Black president of the United States.
Relatedly, though, Trump’s verbiage warns of the loss of something intan-
gible yet equally important, an emotional loss bordering on spirituality, a
loss of the psychological “wages of whiteness.”
In Black Reconstruction in America, W. E. B. Du Bois argues that while
white workers historically have received low wages, they also have been
“compensated in part by a sort of public and psychological wage.”4 Du Bois
elaborates: “They were given public deference and titles of courtesy be-
cause they were white. They were admitted freely with all classes of white
people to public functions, public parks, and the best schools.”5 In short,
white workers were offered the opportunity to cash in on their “privilege”
of simply being white in a society founded upon racial prejudice, discrimi-
nation, and violence. Trump’s campaign rhetoric effectively ties into the
fear that the privileges afforded to whiteness among the working class are
under duress, threatened by undeserving minorities favored by traitorous
liberal politicians prepared to stab American workers in the back. To this
end, Trump imagines an alternate reality whereupon both the material-
ity and meaningfulness of being white is discarded in favor of misguided
policies and programs geared to promote equity and inclusiveness. For
Trump, the white alienated subject becomes the flag-­bearer of a restored
America, rebuilt through the labors of the working class. Gilded with irony
no doubt lost on Trump and his supporters, Trump echoes the supposi-
tions of Marx, precisely that the working class, in the abstract, occupies
center-­stage in historical revolutions.
In this chapter I expand upon my discussion of the structural and so-
cial relations that give rise to the alienated subject. Precisely, I argue for an
intersectional epistemology for the study of alienation. On this point, I es-
tablish that any account of the alienated subject that remains faithful to the
myopia of the liberal subject will always and necessarily be insufficient, for
the alienated subject does not remain unmarked by race, gender, sexual-
ity, and other forms of positionality. Thus, I build upon Marx’s conception
 The Intersectionality of Alienatio · 77

of class struggle to consider Sartre’s spatially inspired postulates of group

formation. This is a necessary step, for it provides a concrete path toward
an intersectional repositioning of the alienated subject.

Class Struggle and the Working Class

In his 1859 Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx out-
lined the broad historical preconditions for revolution: “At a certain stage
of development, the material productive forces of society come into con-
flict with the existing relations of production or—­this merely expresses the
same thing in legal terms—­with the property relations within the frame-
work of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of
the productive forces, these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins
an era of social revolution.”6 In other words, revolutionary change is in-
ternal to society, based on the contradictions existing within each mode of
production.7 On the one hand, every mode of production in its own way
advances the material development of society but, on the other hand, does
so only within the limits of existing social relations of production. When
social relations hinder the development of material forces, class conflict
and struggle results.
The key concept of Marx’s political economy is that of contradictions.8
Contradictions give rise to problems, and thus to a set of possibilities and
the need to find a solution, and therefore to the need to make a choice.9
There are, for example, contradictory processes and possibilities, and there
are contradictory viewpoints or ideologies held by oppositional groups.
Modes of production, such as feudalism or capitalism, are conditioned by
contradictions. The capitalist mode of production, for example, consists
of several contradictions, such as that between use-­value and exchange-­
value, production and reproduction, and monopolies and competition.10
For Marx, the principal contradiction of capitalism is the contradiction
personified by the social relations inherent to the labor process. This is
no surprise, really, in that Marx assumes that creative, productive activity
is the raison d’être of the human species-­being. In capitalism, the entire
product belongs to the owner (the capitalist), who does not labor but who
owns the productive process. This capitalist stands in opposition to the
worker who does labor, that is, who produces commodities but owns nei-
ther the means of production nor the object produced. However, there is
an additional contradiction embodied by the workers, in that they are both
78 · The Intersectionality of Alienatio

producers and consumers. As waged workers, laborers produce commodi-

ties; as consumers, they are required to purchase these commodities on the
market. Now, in an effort to garner greater profits, the capitalist may in-
troduce “labor-­saving” devices or attempt to hire workers at lower wages.
This poses a contradictory crisis, however, in that workers-­as-­consumers
have less money to purchase commodities. Simply put, it matters little how
many products are made if they remain unsold; capitalism only continues
to the extent that commodities are purchased.
The Covid-­19 pandemic illustrates these contradictions systemic to
capitalism. Under quarantine guidelines encouraging people to shelter at
home, workers are neither producing nor consuming commodities. Capi-
talism slows down, with predictable ripple effects moving through the
economy. From this vantage point, the pandemic posed a potential eco-
nomic crisis, but also a crisis of meaning. For underlying the pandemic was
a struggle not only to sustain the valorization of capital but also over the
valorization of life itself.
Crises are moments of transformation in which capital typically rein-
vents itself and morphs into something else.11 To continue the preceding
example: in response to workers not having enough money collectively to
buy things, capitalists (instead of raising wages) extend credit to workers.
However, as David Harvey explains, the resolution of one contradiction
may be better or worse for the people even as it stabilizes the reproduction
of capital.12 Here, the extension of credit allows workers-­as-­consumers to
continue to buy products, thus facilitating the reproduction of capital. Un-
fortunately, readily available credit leads also to widespread debt. Conse-
quently, workers become even more dependent upon their access to waged
work in order to pay bills and buy food and pay rent. The resolution of
one crisis thus potentially contributes to the further immiseration and
hardship of the working class. As Marx concludes, “Capitalist production
therefore reproduces in the course of its own process the separation be-
tween labor-­power and the conditions of labor. It thereby reproduces and
perpetuates the conditions under which the worker is exploited. It inces-
santly forces him to sell his labor-­power in order to live, and enables the
capitalist to purchase labor-­power in order that he may enrich himself.”13
The Republican-­led response to Covid-­19, again, demonstrates this ten-
dency, in that both federal and state officials threatened meatpackers and
other “essential” workers to remain on the job despite a lack of adequate
safety measures and equipment.
 The Intersectionality of Alienatio · 79

For Marx, the objective of socialist revolution is the social and economic
emancipation of the working class.14 Under capitalism, the industrializa-
tion and automation of the labor process initiated unprecedented levels
of productive power. Paradoxically, these transformations brought about
a fundamental societal contradiction. Marx observed in England, France,
and a handful of other European countries that capitalism had increased
to the point that all basic material needs could be satisfied, and yet throngs
of men, women, and children continued to live in conditions of extreme
poverty. Production under capitalism should have provided the means to
humanize labor, reduce the working day, and lead to greater freedoms.15
Yet, under capitalism, societal inequalities deepened. This contradiction,
fundamentally, underscores the asymmetries of power within the capitalist
mode of organization. Simply put, as Chancer identifies, “The class divi-
sion between proletariat and bourgeoisie central to Marx’s conceptualiza-
tion of capitalism is simultaneously an interpersonal relationship steeped
in experiences of extreme domination and subordination.”16 Accordingly,
when we observe the gross inequalities of capitalism, of the coexistence of
obscene wealth and abject poverty, we can only conclude that capitalism
isn’t broken; instead, it’s operating according to design.
The overcoming of capitalism, Marx premised, was necessary to tran-
scend the stultifying and sadomasochistic conditions of exploitation and
alienation; in turn, the socialist transformation would provide the neces-
sary freedom for the development of human creativity and personal fulfill-
ment. When Marx drafted the rules for the International Workingmen’s
Association (IWA) in 1864, he openly declared the primacy of the working
class as revolutionary agent—­but only insofar as the proletariat struggled
for universal emancipation. “The emancipation of the working classes
must be conquered by the working classes themselves,” Marx writes, but
quickly adds, “the struggle for the emancipation of the working classes
means not a struggle for class privileges and monopolies, but for equal
rights and duties, and the abolition of all class rule.”17 Here, Marx postu-
lates the overcoming of alienation as all-­encompassing, that is, a revolu-
tionary transformation not simply for one class or even one species, but
as a necessary condition for the flourishing of nature itself. As Marx con-
cludes, “all living things must also become free.”18
Why does Marx place such a great responsibility on the working class?
The answer rests in part on Marx’s conceptualization of the alienated con-
dition of the proletariat. As detailed in chapter 2, Marx insists that the
80 · The Intersectionality of Alienatio

economic subjugation of workers to those who control the means of labor

lies at the bottom of servitude in all its forms, of all social misery, mental
degradation, and political dependence.19 However, social conditions of
immiseration and suffering are insufficient to affect revolutionary change.
As Marx acknowledges, many people—­including those excluded from the
working class—­endure horrific conditions under capitalism. Those who
are unemployed, for example, live exceptionally precarious lives and may
resort to criminal activities in order to survive. Marx, however, downplays
the political potential of the so-­called lumpenproletariat, favoring instead
the revolutionary potential of the working class.
Marx postulates that the struggle between those who own the means
of production and those denied access to the means of production is most
salient in the analysis of revolutionary transformation. The central idea
of Marx’s “revolutionary theory” is self-­liberation by the masses through
political praxis, a term Marx conceives as “consciously guided revolution-
ary practice, as distinct from practice, meaning simply carrying out an
action.”20 It is important to stress that praxis is an idea not unique to but
rather radically reconceptualized by Marx. In the early nineteenth century
throughout Europe, the relationship of philosophy to social and political
issues became increasingly fraught and, accordingly, the relationship be-
tween knowledge and action became an ever more contentious issue.21 The
Polish aristocrat and philosopher August von Cieszkowski (1814–­1894), for
example, forwards a positive notion of freedom, defined as the ability to
realize “the good” through human praxis.22 For Cieszkowski, philosophy
could no longer contend with theoretical knowledge but must give rise to
real action.23 Notably, Cieszkowski opposed revolution—­understood as vio­
lent insurrections—­opting instead for social and political transformation
realized through the self-­emancipation of the people and legal reform.24
Indeed, Cieszkowski insists that “for a holy end, the road must be holy,” for
whenever unholy means are applied to a holy end, “it is evident that you do
not sanctify the means, but debase the end itself.”25 To Cieszkowki, one can
add the likes of Bruno Bauer (1809–­1882), Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–­1872),
Johann Fichte (1762–­1814), and Friedrich Schelling (1775–­1854).26
Marx’s contribution was to make concrete the idea of alienation in the
terms of political economy.27 As Andrew Bowie contextualizes, the em-
ployment of labor in nineteenth-­century capitalism involved the most ap-
palling brutality and impoverishment, both material and spiritual, of the
 The Intersectionality of Alienatio · 81

working classes.28 For Marx the essential task was both to properly under-
stand how these conditions materialized under capitalism and to work to-
ward the transcendence of these conditions. Thus, when Marx writes, “The
philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point,
however, is to change it,” he is not saying that knowledge is unimportant
or inconsequential.29 Instead, Marx directs attention to the necessity of
consciously driven political activities born of material realities. Through
solidarity—­made possible through the spatial proximity of workers in the
modern, capitalist factory—­Marx insists that the proletariat, through self-­
awareness and collective determination, can achieve human emancipation.
However, to achieve a thorough, human form of emancipation, the ex-
ploited and alienated subjects would need to engage in informed direct
action on the basis of a critical understanding of their own plight and
of possible alternatives.30 Simply being a member of the so-­called work-
ing class does not express revolutionary potential or praxis. The working
class in-­and-­of itself does not designate a subjectivity grounded in self-­
consciousness. Indeed, the so-­called working class under capitalism ap-
pears as simply the aggregate of alienated subjects denied access to the
means of production. And therein lies the problem—­and limitation—­of
an exclusive focus on the emancipatory potential of the working class in
the abstract.
Conventionally, alienation is rooted in and emanates from exploitation
systemic to the capitalist mode of production. Indeed, Marx’s critique of
capitalism is based on the fact that as a mode of production, it is an in-
human system that prevents or distorts human flourishing. As such, the
possible transcendence of alienation begins at the moment of production,
when workers realize the source of their immiseration and suffering. The
alienated subject, however, is not confined solely to the factory floor and,
consequently, its self-­awareness and potential revolutionary consciousness
is mediated through social interactions formed elsewhere. Marx was aware
of this problem. In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 Marx
writes, “The worker therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in
his work feels outside himself. He is at home when he is not working,
and when he is working he is not at home.”31 Here, Marx alludes to the
alienation inherent to waged work, of the emptiness of laboring at a bor-
ing, repetitive job that affords no joy but is necessary simply to survive.
Consequently, if work no longer exists as a creative, productive activity,
82 · The Intersectionality of Alienatio

a flourishing life must be sought elsewhere. In other words, the alienated

subject seeks meaning in life beyond its place of employment and, in so
doing, renders negligible the potential for workplace emancipation.
Self-­emancipation of the alienated subject is a necessary condition
for the transformation and eventual overcoming of capitalism. However,
as the human species-­being is inherently a social and spatial being, this
means that self-­emancipation—­although individually experienced—­is
itself mediated by the concrete social and spatial relations in which the
alienated subject is embedded. For this reason, it is necessary to locate the
alienated subject in the everyday geographies of its existence, not as an
isolated (liberal) subject but instead as a living being dependent on other
living beings for its own survival.
In The Sane Society, Erich Fromm provides an evocative snapshot of
alienated life from the vantage point of factory workers in the abstract:

Men work together. Thousands stream into the industrial plants

and the offices—­they come in cars, in subways, in buses, in
trains—­they work together, according to a rhythm measured by
the experts, with methods worked out by the experts, not too fast,
not too slow, but together; each a part of the whole. The evening
stream flows back: they read the same newspaper, they listen to the
radio, they see the movies, the same for those on the top and for
those at the bottom of the ladder, for the intelligent and the stupid,
for the educated and the uneducated. Produce, consume, enjoy
together, in step, without asking questions. That is the rhythm of
their lives.32

In this passage, Fromm provides a dystopian reading of mindless produc-

tion and consumption; an interminable monotony of meaningless activi-
ties, repeated day after day until retirement or death, whichever comes
first. However, Fromm’s alienated society is a homogenous society, seem-
ingly populated with nondescript men.
To seriously challenge the alienated conditions inherent to the capi-
talist mode of production, it is necessary to challenge both scholarly and
popular accounts of the homogeneity of the so-­called working class. As
Sandro Mezzadra writes, efforts are needed to “politicize the analysis of the
proletarian body, which means to carefully investigate the ways in which
the construction of that body as a racialized or sexualized body facilitates
 The Intersectionality of Alienatio · 83

forms of domination and exploitation that acquire a differential charac-

ter.”33 To this end, I provide a scaffolding upon which to argue that the
alienated subject assumes myriad forms and its embodied form remains
always a contested field of struggle and subjectivation that is manifest in
the deleterious attitudes of indifference and intolerance, and the capacity
to hurt, both within and between classes. Racism, patriarchy, and other
prejudices inform the alienated social relations inherent to capitalism; ac-
cordingly, emancipation from class exploitation requires a direct engage-
ment with, but not exclusive of, feminist and antiracist practices.
In the first volume of Capital, Marx invites his readers to enter “the hid-
den abode” of production, that is, the industrial factory, to see concretely
the source of exploitation and alienation inherent to the capitalist mode
of production. In this hidden abode capitalists combine the means of pro-
duction (machinery and raw materials) with labor power (purchased on
the labor market) in order to create commodities for exchange. And here,
in graphic detail, Marx lays bare the inner workings of especially indus-
trial capitalism and the transformation of once-­vital, creative, productive
human beings into mere appendages of heartless, soulless machines. How-
ever, in order to fully realize the alienated subject in its totality, that is,
through its lived experiences beyond the factory, I invite readers to meet
the workers prior to their clocking in at work, that is, at the bus stop before
going to work.

Waiting at Sartre’s Bus Stop

Unlike more canonical accounts of the liberal subject as an individual, I
premise the everydayness of the alienated subject as always and already
mediated by its position within myriad and even contradictory social col­
lectives. For this reason, I find tremendous purchase in Sartre’s theory of
groups.34 In his Critique of Dialectical Reason, Sartre distinguishes several
“forms” of social collectives that are grounded in concrete examples of
every­day life.35 Accordingly, in his general orientation toward social rela-
tions, Sartre accepts the Marxist principle that the mode of production of
material life mediates the development of social, political, and intellectual
life.36 Thus, Sartre proposes a critical dialectics that understands human
activity in terms of reciprocal interactions between and among individuals
and groups.37 This is significant insofar as the alienated subject, unlike the
liberal subject, is premised as always positioned within a complex social
84 · The Intersectionality of Alienatio

ensemble of myriad groups that continually form and transform. As Iris

Marion Young explains, “the discourse of liberal individualism denies the
reality of groups” in that “categorizing people in groups by race, gender,
religion, and sexuality and acting as though these ascriptions say some-
thing significant about the person, his or her experience, capacities, and
possibilities, is invidious and oppressive.”38 However, for Young, the privi-
leging of the liberal subject—­as an individual—­obscures an understanding
of structural oppression. Young elaborates:

Without conceptualizing women [for example] as a group in some

sense, it is not possible to conceptualize oppression as a systematic,
structured, institutional process. If we obey the injunction to think
of people only as individuals, then the disadvantages and exclu-
sions we call oppression reduce to individuals in one of two ways.
Either we blame the victims and say that disadvantaged people’s
choices and capacities render them less competitive, or we attribute
their disadvantage to the attitudes of other individuals, who for
whatever reason don’t “like” the disadvantaged ones.39

A theoretical deference to the liberal subject, subsequently, contributes

to the fallacy that poor people are poor primarily, if not solely, because
of bad decisions, or that racism exists because a “few bad people” harbor
racist attitudes. Either way, the salience of social and structural relations
of prejudice, discrimination, and oppression are elided. A focus on group
formations, conversely, highlights the ways in which individuals benefit or
suffer from the privileges or drawbacks associated from concrete categori-
cal types. White privilege in the United States, for example, expresses the
gains white people derive, not through individual merit or accomplish-
ment, but simply through their identification as members of the dominant
social group.
To begin, a group can be defined simply as a collection of persons who
recognize themselves and others, however loosely, as being in a unified re-
lation with one another. This identification may be exceptionally banal, in
the sense of expressing a mutual affinity for a sports team or activity, such
as running or biking. Conversely, one may associate with a particular po-
litical party or labor union. In both examples, however, in self-­identifying
as a participant of a group, an individual acknowledges themselves as ori-
ented toward the same goals as the others in the group.40 Indeed, on this
 The Intersectionality of Alienatio · 85

basis, even standing in line at the grocery store constitutes a group—­and

it is this insight, of the spectrum of everyday group formations, that Sartre
underscores.
It is common to conceive of the everyday as comprising the most banal
of activities that occupy our daily lives: the dull routine of simply being.
On any “normal” day we eat breakfast, go to work, grab a quick lunch, go
shopping, exercise at the gym, eat dinner at a restaurant, take the dog for
a walk at a nearby park, catch a film at the local theater, and go to sleep,
only to repeat with slight variation many of these same activities day after
day after day. And when we stop and reflect upon our days, we wonder
where the time went. Our lives seem busy—­too busy—­packed with a mot-
ley mixture of tasks and chores. Our days are filled yet seem unfulfilled.
There is a quantitative sameness to our everyday life, notably under the
capitalist mode of production, as our lives become ever more abstracted.
Highmore explains that “the phrase ‘marking time’ brings with it some
of the flavor of the everyday modernity in its ambiguous play on the lit-
eral process of ‘marking’ (differentiating, discriminating) and its everyday
meaning of dull waiting, of boredom.”41 For Highmore, this ambiguity ma-
terializes in the standardization of time—­as evidenced by our submission
to bus and train schedules—­and the routinization of daily life, such as hav-
ing to clock in at work at a certain time or waiting for a doctor’s appoint-
ment.42 Thus, Susan Stewart writes: “The pages falling off the calendar, the
notches marked in a tree that no longer stands—­these are the signs of the
everyday, the effort to articulate difference through counting. Yet it is pre-
cisely this counting that reduces differences to similarities, that is designed
to be ‘lost track of.’ Such ‘counting,’ such signifying, is drowned out by the
silence of the ordinary.”43
Marx writes at length on the monotonous existence of factory work,
of the men and women reduced to nothing more than being “living ap-
pendages” of a heartless machine. However, as Highmore explains, “What
makes continuous production register so vividly is the regulating of time
within the widespread conditions of industrialization. From the point of
view of the everyday, industrialization is not something limited to fac-
tory production, but something registered in nearly all aspects of life.”44
In short, everyday modern life has become fully conditioned to the market
logic of capital: societal values are part and parcel of the production, distri-
bution, and consumption of commodities. This, in turn, has tremendous
importance for our understanding of the modern alienated subject, for no
86 · The Intersectionality of Alienatio

longer are we seemingly in control of our lives. Rather, capital itself has
taken control.
When Cole and Ferrarese ask how capitalism forms our lives, they ask
us to reflect on how we would like to live and, importantly, to consider
how our form of life delimits or forecloses certain prospects by excluding
other forms of life.45 They stress that “the notion of ‘form of life’ always
seeks to grasp the articulation of the ‘social’ and the ‘vital’ on which the
institutions of the human world rest.”46 Capitalism, as a form of life, is con-
ditioned by particular social and structural relations oriented around the
valorization of capital. Dominated by the market logic of exchange-­value,
for example, a flourishing life appears in the act of consumption, where
the opportunity to choose among dozens of brands of bagels or breakfast
cereals passes for freedom. It is no surprise, therefore, that many people
who protested against shelter-­in-­place mandates during the Covid-­19 pan-
demic expressed dismay that meaningful activities, including the ability to
shop at Wal-­Mart or eat at Applebee’s Restaurant, were being taken away
by un-­American liberals.
As a formative aspect of society, capitalism appears ossified, sedimented
into the sutures of everyday life. However, appearances are deceiving
and, as Marx and Engels premise, “all that is solid melts into air.”47 Zyg-
munt Bauman captures this fluidity in his concept of liquid modernity.48
For Bauman, modern capital has the illusion of solidity, of permanence,
in part because of the centralization of institutional power and the bu-
reaucratization of everyday life. However, as industrial capital gives
way to alternate forms—­advanced capitalism, flexible capitalism, finance
capitalism—­the i­llusion of modernity’s solid foundation dissipates. As
Raymond Lee writes, “In a world of shape-­shifting capital and labor, mo-
dernity is best defined as amorphous—­in short, liquid.”49 To that end, what
distinguishes liquid modernity from early modernity is the lack of stable
institutions.50 Accordingly, liquid modernity is a concept of “social change
that attempts to uncover the consequences of advanced social differen-
tiation and alienation” within the vicissitudes of “late” capitalism.51 It is a
warning that every­day life under capitalism is increasingly defined by “un-
bearable human suffering and injustice, characterized by increasing social
and economic polarization.”52
To render the everyday as the locus of alienation is not to succumb to
nihilism, for the social and spatial relations that condition alienation also
contain the seeds of salvation. As Lefebvre writes, it is in the everyday that
 The Intersectionality of Alienatio · 87

“people are born, live and die. They live well or ill; but they live in everyday
life, where they make or fail to make a living either in the wider sense of
surviving or not surviving, or just surviving or living their lives to the full.
It is in the everyday life that they rejoice and suffer; here and now.”53 The
everyday, in other words, is where (and when) we construct and experi-
ence meaning in life. It is thus an ambiguous space-­time configuration that
mediates the contradictions of alienation and emancipation.
Sartre’s theory of groups captures much of this ambiguity, for he rec-
ognizes that individuals who are engaged in their day-­to-­day activities are
embedded in myriad concrete social situations inhabited by other indi-
viduals engaged in their own activities. In other words, throughout our
daily routines, we enter and exit many group formations, and it is this dy-
namic that conditions both our sense of alienation and of meaning in life.
This was dramatically brought to the fore during the Covid-­19 pandemic.
Compelled to shelter in place, our daily activities were abruptly altered. No
longer was it possible to simply go to the store and buy groceries, or merely
go to the barber shop for a haircut, or only go for a walk through the park.
Day-­to-­day activities and mundane tasks that once mattered little now
mattered a great deal. So connected have we become to the spatiotemporal
rhythms of capitalism that our physical separation from its comforting but
alienating routine itself becomes a source of alienation. To that end, going
to Wal-­Mart or Applebee’s does for many people provide meaning; these
are places of comfort and security, evocative perhaps of simply spending
time with family and friends. Effectively, under capitalism, alienation can
and often does provide meaning, and paradoxically our emancipation—­
however ephemeral—­becomes alienating.
Why this is so is rooted in our formation of, and participation in, myriad
spatially bound social collectives, or groups. Often, when we study groups,
we begin with obvious but superficial characteristics that mark everyday
subdivisions between people: ethnicity, nationality, gender, occupation,
and so on. Sartre, conversely, begins with the gathering of people at particu-
lar times and particular places, related to some object of common concern,
such as waiting at a bus stop.54 In other words, there is often a time-­space
context to group formation. Bus stops, for example, are ordinary features
of the human landscape. At specified times and concrete locations, people
come together and wait for the bus, whether their personal destination
is work, a retail store, or a friend’s house. And beyond their shared con-
cern for the on-­time arrival of the bus, the people who wait for the bus are
88 · The Intersectionality of Alienatio

largely unaware and unconcerned with everyone else who is waiting. I

say “largely” for the fact that, in reality, some people are very much aware
of those around them. For example, as the work of feminist geographers
documents, women take very seriously the threat of sexual harassment or
physical violence.55 In particular, research into the geography of women’s
fear reveals a pervasive awareness of vulnerability to sexual assault and
an array of self-­protective strategies and behavioral constraints, such as
travelling with an escort or avoiding certain places at certain times.56 In
the abstract, however, the bus stop is just a place, that is, a place where
“we simply become ciphers, interchangeable parts in an undifferentiated,
functioning plurality: waiting for a bus.”57
Those waiting for the bus, Sartre explains, may differ in age, sex, class,
and social milieu, and they wait in relative isolation joined together—­that
is, unified—­by a particular albeit mundane activity, that is, waiting for the
bus to take them to their destination. This passive activity Sartre terms the
practico-­inert, that is, “those aspects of social reality that are the conse-
quences of human action, but that oppose, or set limits to, the pure free-
dom of individual action.”58 For example, the people waiting for the bus
are free to wait for the bus, and they are free to choose not to wait for the
bus. Their freedom, however, is limited, on one hand, by the bus schedule
and, on the other hand, by the actions of the bus driver. Indeed, as we
expand our understanding of the situation, we realize that the bus driver
is also circumscribed, for example, by her adherence to a schedule deter-
mined by someone else, by the proper maintenance of the bus so that it
does not break down, by the congestion of the road that might lead to
delays, and so on. Here, the practico-­inert is the spatiotemporal realm of
alienation, a realm marked by the ambiguous interplay of free will and
determinism, of discipline and resistance.
Within the capitalist mode of production, everyday human existence
produces a geography “of passive being, formidable in its inertia, which
in turn produces a definite kind of social grouping Sartre calls a ‘series.’ ”59
For Sartre, a series comprises a form of human gathering and alienation as
a mediated relation to the other.60 Stated differently, a series is a contingent
assembly of unrelated subjects united only by a common object, such as
waiting for a bus.61 As Peter Caws elaborates, “Serial relations abound in
daily life—­customers in the market, spectators in the theater, listeners to
the radio or watchers of television, voters in an election, drivers on a high-
 The Intersectionality of Alienatio · 89

way, all constitute series whose members share a connection to an external

object but have no internal connections between themselves.”62
As we move about in our day-­to-­day activities, we subject ourselves
to innumerable series, and we do so unreflexively. Indeed, so common is
the practice that we fail to think of these mundane activities as forming
any meaningful part of our lives. If asked, at the end of the day, how many
times we “gathered” in a series, we would be hard pressed to remember,
let alone say anything substantive about the experience. This is not to say
that series are unimportant in our everyday lives, but rather to suggest we
are largely indifferent to these groupings. We would obviously prefer not to
wait, but since it is so much a part of our day-­to-­day lives, we usually just
take it in stride.
Series give structure to our routines even as they may be the source of
boredom or frustration. Knowing that we will have to wait for a bus, for
example, we adjust our schedules so that we arrive at the bus stop at an ap-
propriate time. In anticipation of a long line at the bank, we leave earlier, in
an attempt to avoid the crowd. In short, our awareness of series conditions
other activities that do provide meaning. Thus, we stand in line at the bus
stop, in order to catch the bus and so arrive on time at work; and we avoid
the crowded bank so that we won’t be late when meeting friends to watch
a film at the local theater.
There is an element of randomness to series formations, in that many
people on any given day might arrive at the bus stop. That said, there also is
an element of regularity, for some people take the bus every day and come
to recognize those who routinely take the bus and those who do not. In
fact, some people may informally claim particular seats as their own when
riding the bus. In addition, a series may be more formally ordered in such
a way as to establish external connections between its members.63 At the
bank or movie theater, for example, people are often expected (required)
to stand in line. Similarly, at sporting events, spectators behave in a more
or less coordinated fashion, alternately cheering and booing in unison,
depending on the course of the game.64 Ultimately, though, behind the
façade of solidarity, the members of a series remain isolated, assembled
together only until the object of their coming together dissolves.
This, again, is not to imply that series are inconsequential. As George
Stack explains, despite its weakness as a social force, the seriality is anterior
to group formation and is thus the social structure out of which groups
90 · The Intersectionality of Alienatio

emerge.65 In other words, it is the coming together of disparate people, at

a particular time and place, that is necessary for the emergence of more
cohesive social formations. To this end, a more cohesive group forma-
tion occurs when the members of a series become aware of one another
not merely as accidental participants having no internal relations to one
another, but as sharing a common interest that engages a common emo-
tion.66 In Sartre’s example, a late bus draws the series together in a more
emotional way. People waiting for the bus begin to grumble about being
late to work or meeting their friends. A shared inconvenience brought
about through an external object—­the tardiness of the bus—­provides a
source of solidarity beyond the physical act of waiting at a bus stop. Now,
the members experience a common bond that provides a deeper sense
of meaning, indeed, an experience that becomes more memorable. The
series, at this point, transforms into a group-­in-­fusion.
The group-­in-­fusion is the negation of seriality, that is, the coming to-
gether of individuals to potentially act as a collective.67 In other words,
there is a latent power inherent in the group-­in-­fusion, a possibility for
direct action that transcends a sense of shared frustration. Sartre uses the
example of the peasantry storming the Bastille during the French Revo-
lution. We don’t have to posit anything so grand as this to realize that a
group-­in-­fusion can be an effective political force. Indeed, any spontane-
ous coming together of people who share a common objective or purpose
can be considered a group-­in-­fusion. Crucially, people who “belong” to
groups-­in-­fusion are not indifferent to the object of concern. The people
waiting at Sartre’s bus stop are no longer disinterested bystanders but ac-
tive agents who express their intolerance of the situation.
Within the group-­in-­fusion, individuals act as a collective subject and,
in the process, undergo a personal transformation of self-­realization.
While as members of a series, people exist in isolation, that is, as alienated
subjects, participation in a collective creates a communal sense of meaning
and purpose. Individual emancipation is made possible through collective
determination. And, in fact, this gets at Marx’s notion of social revolu-
tion, for Marx held that workers individually would realize through their
collective labors the source of their exploitation and thus join in solidar-
ity with other like-­minded workers to overthrow capitalism. However—­
and this is a point that cannot be overemphasized—­the group-­in-­fusion
is neither inherently revolutionary nor reactionary; it is, in the abstract,
politically neutral. On the one hand, we often think of social movements
 The Intersectionality of Alienatio · 91

as progressive, of people marching against unjust and discriminatory poli-

cies or institutional racism. Thus, the spontaneous protests that erupted in
opposition to Trump’s anti-­Muslim ban in 2017 can be considered groups-­
in-­fusion. On the other hand, there are innumerable instances of people
coming together to express their support for racist or misogynist ideals,
in opposition to progressive movements. Counterprotestors, such as the
Proud Boys who decried shelter-­in-­place orders, for example, are also ex-
amples of groups-­in-­fusion.
It is worth pausing for a moment on the importance of external ob-
jects as the source for groups-­in-­fusion. The object in question may have
a concrete reality, such as a late bus or a virus, but it may also be ideo-
logical or otherwise immaterial. Indeed, the “object” that unites a group of
people may only exist discursively, as in Trump’s incessant attacks on sup-
posed threats to the United States. For example, in his effort to build a wall
along the U.S.–­Mexico border and to deny entry of persons from Central
and South America, Trump routinely—­and falsely—­claimed immigrants,
legal or otherwise, commit crimes far in excess of so-­called U.S. citizens
(meaning, of course, white citizens). On March 2, 2019, to highlight one
instance, Trump cited a study by the anti-­immigrant hate group Federa-
tion for American Immigration Reform and claimed that “illegal aliens
are incarcerated at three times the rate of legal residents.”68 The myth of
the criminal immigrant—­a stalwart trope of Trump’s rhetoric—­has long
served anti-­immigrant hatred in the United States; under the Trump ad-
ministration, however, the discourse was elevated to new heights. Not only
did Trump regularly cite fallacious figures about immigrants committing
crimes, he also orchestrated public spectacles to both incite hatred against
persons of color and generate sympathy among otherwise indifferent
white people. In June 2018, for example, Trump met with family members
of individuals killed by undocumented immigrants, a group he calls “angel
families.” In attendance were members from Advocates for Victims of Il-
legal Aliens Crimes, a splinter group from the anti-­immigrant hate group
Remembrance Project.69 In its totality, Trump’s rhetoric of hatred and fear
serves to galvanize (mostly white) people who may otherwise be indif-
ferent to political issues such as immigration policy. In doing so, Trump
effectively created the conditions whereby disparate groups of people came
together, both in person and virtually through social media, to register
their intolerance and hostility to an imaginary threat.
The group-­in-­fusion is necessarily unstable. As Young explains, social
92 · The Intersectionality of Alienatio

life consists of constant ebbs and flows of groupings out of series; most
groups dissipate soon after they materialize—­such as the people waiting
impatiently for the late bus—­but other groups transform yet again and
assume a more substantive form.70 Now, members of a group-­in-­fusion
may decide that a more sustained commitment is necessary to confront
the threat. For example, what if the people waiting at the bus stop learn
that some policy exists that results in the bus being late on a regular basis.
The external threat, of being late for work or of meeting friends, is no lon-
ger understood as a random inconvenience but instead a systemic prob-
lem that demands more concentrated action. The bus riders, at this point,
establish a more formal committee and members pledge their support to
challenge the delinquent bus company. In Sartre’s terminology, the group-­
in-­fusion transforms into a “sworn” group.71
While the group-­in-­fusion is a spontaneous organic unity, the pledge
of the sworn group mediates between the members of the group and binds
one to the other; in turn, this creates a semipermanent structure that is
maintained by each individual’s promise to all its members that they will
protect the other from the external threat.72 In practice, the “swearing” or
“pledging” loyalty can assume many different forms. Potential members,
for example, may have to sign a written document or to perform a particu-
lar (and ritualistic) action; dues may be required and uniforms or some
other visible marker might be displayed. Regardless, the pledge, symboli-
cally, allows each member to promise to other members that they will act
in a way that advances their chosen cause.
The act of swearing or pledging to one another introduces a solemnity
that may have far-­reaching consequences.73 Within the sworn group, each
individual affirms that they will care for and affirm the other’s practical
freedom, that is, their freedom to confront the threat. However, as pledged
members, each person vows to fulfill specific obligations and to perform
necessary functions within the group. In this way, people’s individual free-
doms are effectively limited within the sworn group. The individuals of
the group-­in-­fusion support one another as they each act together to con-
front the same external threat; as members of a sworn group, however,
people are willing to relinquish a certain amount of freedom in return for
the opportunity to participate in something that gives them meaning. If
alienation is a disorienting feeling of existential exclusion, membership
in a sworn group provides something more than an emotional antidote.
Consequently, when the alienated subject experiences little or no mean-
 The Intersectionality of Alienatio · 93

ing through work, that is, productive labor, the alienated subject may find
meaning through membership in a “sworn group.” Here, group identifica-
tion transcends that of the hobbyist. The alienated subject is not merely
following a favorite sports team but is actively and consciously working
toward some objective in concert with other like-­minded individuals. As a
member of a sworn group, the alienated subject may be intensely loyal and
emotionally invested both to the leadership and to the greater purpose.
This effectively captures the cultlike qualities of many Trump supporters
who faithfully followed the former president from rally to rally.
Here, Eduardo Bonilla-­Silva forwards a conception of “racialized emo-
tions” that has a direct bearing on the generative meaning-­making of the
alienated subject.74 Bonilla-­Silva explains that racialized emotions are
anchored in our subjectivity as social collectives. Accordingly, the racial
subject should also be understood as an emotive subject who “feels” race.75
Building on this notion, the alienated subject is also and already an emo-
tive subject who feels race, gender, and so on. This in fact strikes at the
ambiguity of the alienated subject in the abstract, for alienated subjects
embody complex and indeed contradictory beliefs and behaviors, depend-
ing on their situated contexts. As developed more fully in chapter 4, the
white alienated subject (in the abstract) may attempt to transcend (or mol-
lify) class-­based exploitation through racist or sexist attitudes, including
intolerance toward those viewed as the cause of its exploitation. Conse-
quently, it is but a small step for the intolerant, alienated subject to take
direct action against those who are perceived to embody the threat. For
example, as Bonilla-­Silva muses, “when a white worker is happy with the
idea of building a wall, or a Muslim ban, or with wars and interventions
all over the world, they are defending emotionally a racial regime as they
see it and understand it.”76 On this point, we can turn now to Sartre’s con-
cept of “fraternity-­terror,” that is, of being faithful to one’s sworn group to
the point of doing harm toward a perceived enemy.77 Sartre writes of the
violence enacted:

It is a bond of fraternity aroused and accentuated amongst the

lynchers, in so far as it is a brutal reactualization of the pledge itself
and in so far as every stone that is thrown, every blow delivered, is
a new affirmation of the pledge: whoever participates in the execu-
tion of the [enemy] reaffirms the untranscendability of the group-­
being as a limit of his freedom and as his new birth, and he affirms
94 · The Intersectionality of Alienatio

it in a bloody sacrifice which, moreover, constitutes an explicit

recognition of the coercive right of all over every individual and
everyone’s threat to all.

The violent act, in other words, becomes a statement and an affirmation

of one’s loyalty to a cause; physical violence directed toward a perceived
enemy provides meaning for the alienated subject living in fear. We see this
especially in the attitudes and actions of far-­right extremists.78 On June 17,
2015, for example, a twenty-­one-­year-­old white man, Dylann Roof, shot
and killed nine African Americans at a Bible study meeting at Emanuel
African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina. Prior
to the attack, Roof reportedly said he was there “to shoot black people.”79
On August 3, 2019, Patrick Crusius, a twenty-­one-­year-­old white man, en-
tered a Wal-­Mart in El Paso, Texas, and opened fire with an automatic
rifle. Just prior to the shootings, he posted online a four-­page manifesto
to make clear his reasons.80 Here, Crusius referred to immigrants to the
United States as “invaders” and parroted many white supremacist talking
points, including fears of “ethnic displacement” and “race mixing.”81 During
the shooting, Crusius explicitly and self-­consciously targeted Hispanics.
Within minutes, twenty-­two people lay dead or dying, with more than two
dozen others injured. On October 27, 2018, a neo-­Nazi attacked the Tree
of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, killing eleven at Shabbat
morning services. According to eyewitnesses, he shouted “All Jews must
die” as he walked in.82 And on April 27, 2019, nineteen-­year-­old John Ear-
nest entered the Chabad of Poway synagogue in Poway, California, during
Passover celebrations and opened fire with an AR-­15, killing sixty-­year-­old
Lori Kaye and injuring three others. Prior to the attack, Earnest posted
an open letter on the white supremacist–­friendly online forum 8Chan;
his statement was steeped in white supremacist tropes, replete with false
claims of a global conspiracy to replace white people.
Although the causes of mass shooting events are complex, we would
be remiss to ignore the vitriolic rhetoric of Trump and his supporters as
contributing factors. Trump’s dehumanizing language; his repeated asser-
tions of Muslims and Hispanics as invaders, of Mexicans as “criminals and
rapists”; and his implicit (but at times explicit) calls for direct violence are
echoed in the words of far-­right shooters. Crusius, for example, repeated
Trump’s hateful statements against immigrants and persons of color and
his frequent allusions to “invasions” and “infestations.” Indeed, Crusius
 The Intersectionality of Alienatio · 95

explains in his manifesto, “This attack is a response to the Hispanic inva-

sion of Texas.”83 This illustrates Sartre’s fraternity-­terror, in that far-­right
extremists, through their violent actions, express their loyalty to hateful
causes and in doing so claim membership to a larger group.
We should consider also the oft-­repeated explanation of these violent
acts as being perpetrated by “lone wolves,” that is, by individuals acting on
their own accord and not in response to the racist rhetoric expressed, for
example, by the president. Framed as a deviant individual or the victim
of circumstances (such as bad parenting or alienation), and redolent of
the liberal subject, the lone wolf enables pundits and politicians to sunder
racist violence from the persistence of racial and gendered inequalities in
society. However, as Gavin Rae explains, the sworn group is an example
of the sort of organized, democratic, and fundamentally open group for­
mation that affirms rather than constrains individual’s practical freedoms;
in turn, the pledge of the organized group provides a standing promise
that each member will protect and care for the freedom of the other.84 In
short, through one’s identification with, for example, white supremacy, a
person can commit individual and isolated acts of violence in the spirit
of the overall group. The aforementioned mass shooters, in other words,
did act alone, but only insofar as they recognized a common purpose—­a
meaning in life—­with other like-­minded individuals. As Sartre concludes,
the “pledge, whether implicit or explicit, defines everyone as a common
individual, not only because it concerns his being-­in-­the-­group, but also
because it is only through the mediation of all that it can take place in
everyone.”85 In other words, in a white supremacist society in which
white people claim allegiance, either directly—­as in membership in hate
groups—­or indirectly—­through one’s acceptance of white privilege—­there
is no exteriority, and thus “lone wolf ” violence does not exist. Individual
acts of violence are symptomatic of structural forms of racist ideologies.
Over time, sworn groups may dissolve, perhaps fractured by internal
dissent, or they may harden into more formal structures, such as “statutory
groups” or “institutions.” Sartre’s argument, at this point, is not that there is
necessary progression of, for example, sworn groups into more permanent
structures, but instead that groups, under the right conditions and lead-
ership, continually form and transform. As Caws concludes, “What they
have in common is the potential for totalization, the uniting of multiple
individuals into a totality, which from the outside takes on solidity and
objectivity.”86
96 · The Intersectionality of Alienatio

In summary, Sartre provides a useful framework to evaluate the intri-

cacies of group formation and, in so doing, directs attention toward the
myriad social and spatial groupings in which the alienated subject enters
and exists. In addition, it is important to recognize that the myriad social
formations identified by Sartre and elaborated on by subsequent scholars
do not constitute successive stages of historical development but instead
coexist, clash, and coalesce. In its everyday existence, the alienated subject
participates, to a greater or lesser degree, in myriad and even contradic-
tory group formations and, consequently, embodies and inhabits multiple
subject positions.
Marx writes of the emancipatory potential of the proletariat, and many
who follow Marx continue to privilege a class-­based agenda to overcome
the exploitation and alienation that is systemic to capitalism. In the pro-
cess, antiracist and antisexist agendas, for example, are seen as second-
ary. However, as Sandro Mezzadra asks, “Is it possible to think of class
formation while emphasizing the deep heterogeneity of contemporary
living labor?”87 This is a crucial question, one that is fundamental to the
work of Kimberlé Crenshaw, Patricia Hill Collins, Martha Gimenéz, Holly
Lewis, and many other scholars working at the intersection of Marxism,
feminism, queer studies, and critical race studies. It is a question, also, that
remains essential to my overall project, given the profound heterogeneity
of the alienated subject.

The Intersectionality of Alienation

The working class assumes a central place in Marx’s thinking precisely be-
cause of its potential for revolutionary self-­emancipation. That said, Marx
frequently tempers his optimism, conceding that the development of a
proletarian class consciousness is a tendency grounded in the material ex-
istence of the worker.88 In other words, the peculiar and particular social
and structural relations produced and reproduced under capitalism bring
about concrete contradictions that, in their resolution, hold the possibility
of self-­emancipation and, through solidarity, the subsequent transforma-
tion and transcendence of capitalism.
On the occasion of Marx’s 200th birthday, Peter Goodwin asks: “Is it
possible to be a Marxist without accepting the self-­emancipation of the
working class as an integral part of Marxism?”89 Goodwin’s question
weighs heavily on our excavation of the alienated subject, not least be-
 The Intersectionality of Alienatio · 97

cause, conventionally, the alienated subject is positioned as a member of

the working class. This of course is a misreading of Marx, for under the
capitalist mode of production, even capitalists are alienated. However, as
we have seen, Marx insists that “the capitalist can live longer without the
worker than can the worker without the capitalist.”90
Throughout this project I return frequently to Marx’s axiom because
it speaks directly to the uneven vulnerability and susceptibility to a trun-
cated life. All human beings share a biological mortality, but this common-
ality is tempered by unequal access to employment opportunities, health
care, criminal justice, and so on. When claims are made for social justice,
the demand isn’t to privilege one group over another; rather, the point is to
underscore the inequity of social and structural relations that impede the
capability of some people to not only live a flourishing life but to avoid a
truncated life through premature death. To remain indifferent to the vast
gulf that separates the life chances among people is itself a hallmark of
privilege. Self-­emancipation—­and I think Marx implies this—­requires an
awareness of the decided unfairness of life conditioned by the capitalist
mode of production.
The alienated subject in the abstract is not a member of the working
class but instead is a subject whose life is mediated by, or subsumed under,
the ideology and material relations of capitalism. The alienated subject
we see waiting at Sartre’s bus stop is not de facto a white cis heterosexual
man who labors in an automobile factory in Ohio. Instead, the alienated
subject occupies multiple subject positions. The alienated subject is the
unmarried Filipina domestic worker in Hong Kong, the divorced Roma-
nian man washing dishes in Barcelona, the Mexican lesbian working in a
maquiladora in Ciudad Juarez, the Black transgender woman who oper-
ates a small publishing house in London. To this end, recognition of the
multiple subject positions of the alienated subject raises difficult questions
for a reconstructed theorization of alienation, notably the relation between
exploitation and myriad other structures of oppression, such as racism, pa-
triarchy, trans-­and homophobic prejudice, xenophobia, nationalism, re-
ligious bigotry, and so on. How are we to proceed? How, precisely, should
we understand the subject that is the alienated subject and may become
the emancipated subject?
An obvious starting point is the concept of the subject. Notably, I do
not employ the terms individual, person, or body, nor do I frame alienation
as an identity. Each of these terms carries their own intellectual baggage
98 · The Intersectionality of Alienatio

and are equally fraught with potential misunderstanding.91 Here, I follow

Catherine Belsey in my adoption of subject as a more capacious way of
thinking about issues.92 On the one hand, as a grammatical term, subject
places the emphasis on the language we learn and from which we internal-
ize the meanings. We see this, for example, in the ways in which we con-
ceive “man” or “woman” or “white” or “black.” Indeed, one critical thematic
of feminism is the important question of what it means to be a woman
under different historical and geographical circumstances.93 On the other
hand, subject calls out the ambiguity and contestation surrounding who—­
and what—­we are. We may, for example, subject ourselves to dominant
discourses of societal-­specific meanings of “man,” “woman,” and so forth.
Thus, a white man may internalize the hegemonic power of “whiteness”
and “manliness” in the United States, thereby enjoying the privileges of his
exalted position. Alternatively, we can resist prevailing norms and chal-
lenge accepted meanings. That said, one’s ability to “freely” subject oneself
to any particular discourse is not guaranteed. To be a subject entails also
the possibility that one is subjected to intolerant views and stereotypes.
One does not choose to be categorized as an inferior subject, but that
is precisely what racism does: it categorizes specific racialized groups as
inferior and thus undeserving of empathy or justice. When Trump uses in-
flammatory rhetoric to describe Mexicans as criminals and rapists, he is
subjecting an entire population to his racist bigotry. This is a crucial ele-
ment of any subject position, for the process of subjectivization, that is,
of being subjected to particular discourses, impacts greatly our exercise
of free will. Indeed, simply being aware of how others frame ourselves is
sufficient to modify our everyday behaviors and impacts our ability to live
a meaningful life, free from the fear of violence. In a key passage of Black
Skin, White Masks, Frantz Fanon describes the experience of being called
out as a “nigger.” Fanon writes:

My body was given back to me sprawled out, distorted, recolored,

clad in mourning in that white winter day. The Negro is an animal,
the Negro is bad, the Negro is mean, the Negro is ugly; look, a
nigger, it’s cold, the nigger is shivering, the nigger is shivering
because he is cold, the little boy is trembling because he is afraid
of the nigger, the nigger is shivering with cold, that cold that goes
through your bones, the handsome little boy is trembling because
he thinks that the nigger is quivering with rage, the little white boy
 The Intersectionality of Alienatio · 99

throws himself into his mother’s arms: Mama, the nigger‘s going to
eat me up.94

Here, Fanon describes in unadulterated language his subjectively expe-

rienced response to a hateful, racist epithet.95 Moreover, Fanon captures
the efficacy of subjectivization, for physical force is not required when
the coercive violence of being seen and being labeled is sufficient to exert
dominance over another. As Michel Foucault writes, “There is no need for
arms, physical violence, material constraints. Just a gaze. An inspecting
gaze, a gaze which each individual under its weight will end by interior-
izing to the point that he is his own overseer, each individual thus exercis-
ing this surveillance over, and against, himself.”96 In short, adherence to
the term subject reveals the contradictions associated with simply being:
of who we are, but equally important, to what degree are we safely able to
determine who we are.
There is an additional motivation to my employment of the term sub­
ject. As Paola Rebughini notes, “The concepts of subject and subjectivity
have been important in social science debates since the turning point of
1968, when they ceased to be an object of abstract philosophical reflec-
tion and became a matter of political and sociological theory.”97 She ex-
plains: “This politicization of the subject concerns not only its demolition
as ontological representation of the white, male, bourgeois and European
emancipated subject, but it also concerns the renewal of the reflection on
the status of the subject as citizen entitled to rights.”98 As Sylvia Wynter
writes, the liberal subject as rational, political subject exists always in op-
position to its secret twin, that is, “its negation, the nonrational subject.”99
To this point, anti-­Black violence is a necessary function in the production
of whiteness and white subjectivity. As Orisanmi Burton explains, “White-
ness [is] a structural position atop the racial order and blackness [is] that
which must always be policed.” Within the racial capitalist systems, Burton
elaborates, “Whiteness extols capital accumulation over all other objectives
and it afflicts its proprietors with a twin condition of blindness and aphasia,
inhibiting their capacity to recognize the discriminatory public policies, or
name the forms of genocidal violence that make whiteness possible. And
because it requires public recognition and acceptance of its norms and
values, whiteness places a premium on social homogenization. Whiteness
is simultaneously produced by and productive of the hegemonic structure
of white supremacy—­a racially ordered regime of dominance.”100
100 · The Intersectionality of Alienatio

In calling for the negation of the liberal subject, I postulate the figure of
the alienated subject. Under the capitalist mode of production, the alien-
ated subject in the abstract is impeded in its ability to lead a flourishing life
through the realization of its creative, productive potential. Even the alien-
ated bourgeois subject, abstractly, is hindered in fulfilling its creative, pro-
ductive potential. However, to critically interrogate the concrete realities
of the alienated subject as a lived being requires an intersectional epistemol-
ogy that takes seriously the multiple and contradictory subject positions
that condition its life and gives it meaning.
Intersectionality, and the subsequent metaphor of intersecting catego-
ries of discrimination, was introduced by the Black feminist legal scholar
Kimberlé Crenshaw to underscore the inadequacy of approaches that
treat race and gender as exclusive or essentially separate categories.101
Crenshaw’s objective, she explains, was “to illustrate that many of the
experiences Black women face are not subsumed within the traditional
boundaries of race or gender discrimination . . . and that the intersection
of racism and sexism factors into Black women’s lives in ways that cannot
be captured wholly by looking at the race or gender dimensions of those
experiences separately.”102 In doing so, Crenshaw builds upon over a cen-
tury of Black feminist thought in an effort to more fully interrogate the
concrete realities of Black women living in the United States and other set-
tler societies. Indeed, elements of intersectionality as a concept, Elena Ruíz
notes, is seen in Black feminist writings since the nineteenth century and
includes the works of Maria Stewart, Sojourner Truth, Anna Julia Cooper,
Ida B. Wells, Elise McDougald, Sadie Alexander, and Francis Beale.103
Collectively, Ruíz explains, their contributions are “based on critical ex-
aminations of lived experience in light of the systemic racism, sexism, and
classism that permeated all aspects of their lives” and “disclose the exis-
tence of compound structural oppressions in society, since Black women
were at the crossroads of gendered bias in patriarchal society, racial bias in
racialist republics, and class bias in stratified public life.”104 Crucially, these
writings display also a sensitivity toward, and awareness of, the finitude of
life, for one’s vulnerability to a truncated life through premature death is
conditioned by one’s exposure to multiple and intersecting oppressions.
To this end, a key moment in the history of the Black feminist intellec-
tual tradition was the appearance in 1978 of “A Black Feminist Statement”
authored by the Combahee River Collective.105 In this brief but powerful
document, they write, “Our politics initially sprang from the shared belief
 The Intersectionality of Alienatio · 101

that Black women are inherently valuable, that our liberation is a necessity
not as an adjunct to somebody else’s but because of our need as human
persons for autonomy.”106 This is a critical declaration, in that it calls out
the hypocrisy of so-­called universal declarations of rights and social jus-
tice, for historically such rights were understood from the vantage point
of property-­owning, heterosexual white cis men. Conversely, the Com-
bahee River Collective, as Black feminists and lesbians, demanded their
right “to be recognized as human.”107 Fundamentally, members sought to
affirm unequivocally that “Black women’s lives were valuable and worth
saving.”108
To be recognized as human, however, requires one to be recognized
as a complex human being, that is, to not be reduced to a singular attri-
bute in isolation. Subject formation is both relational and contextual; who
we “choose” to be—­and how others view us—­is informed by preexisting
structures, institutions, and norms. As Amartya Sen explains, in terms that
resonate with Sartre’s conceptualization of group formations:

In our normal lives, we see ourselves as members of a variety of

groups—­we belong to all of them. A person’s citizenship, residence,
geographic origin, gender, class, politics, profession, employment,
food habits, sports interests, taste in music, social commitments,
etc., make us members of a variety of groups. Each of these collec-
tives, to all of which this person simultaneously belongs, gives her
a particular identity. None of them can be taken to be the person’s
only identity or singular membership category.109

That said, there are those who seek to restrict and constrain our subjec-
tivity, through various means of physical and symbolic violence. Thus, the
Combahee River Collective explains, “The mere names of the pejorative
stereotypes attributed to Black women (e.g., mammy, matriarch, Sapphire,
whore, bulldagger), let alone cataloguing the cruel, often murderous,
treatment we receive, indicates how little value has been placed upon our
lives during four centuries of bondage in the Western hemisphere.”110
Accordingly, members of the collective recognized that traditional ac-
counts of oppression erased their lived experiences in favor of essential-
ized constructs—­woman, Black, poor. They write: “Our situation as Black
people necessitates that we have solidarity around the fact of race, which
white women of course do not need to have with white men, unless it is
102 · The Intersectionality of Alienatio

their negative solidarity as racial oppressors. We struggle together with

Black men against racism, while we also struggle with Black men about
sexism.”111
To this end, intersectionality provides an analytical tool for open-­
ended investigations of the overlapping and conflicting dynamics of race,
gender, class, sexuality, and other potential sites of inequalities and injus-
tices.112 Indeed, the intersectional arguments foreshadowed by the Com-
bahee River Collective are indispensably important toward our theorizing
the negation of the alienated subject by an emancipated subject. Members
of the Collective, for example, affirmed that, while the liberation of all
oppressed peoples necessitates the destruction of the political-­economic
systems of capitalism and imperialism, such a revolution must necessar-
ily, among other things, also be feminist and antiracist.113 As Taylor ex-
plains, “Because Black women were among the most marginalized people
in [the United States], their political struggles brought them into direct
conflict with the intertwined malignancies of capitalism—­racism, sexism,
and poverty.”114 Taylor continues: “The women of the C.R.C. believed that,
if Black women were successful in their struggles and movements, they
would have an impact far beyond their immediate demands. As they put
it, ‘If Black women were free, it would mean that everyone else would have
to be free since our freedom would necessitate the destruction of all the
systems of oppression.’ ”115
Marx, I believe, is correct to underscore the emancipatory potential
and revolutionary power of the alienated proletariat, that is, those sepa-
rated from the means of production. His hope that self-­awareness medi-
ated by collective determination can unleash a social movement capable of
transforming capitalism in such a way to permit the flourishing of mean-
ingful life for humanity as a whole is not entirely misguided. However, as
we move forward, we must acknowledge that the profit logics of capitalism
produced myriad subject positions who might alternately benefit or suffer
from its workings. As Bohrer concludes, “That capitalism requires multiple
kinds of exploitation, multiple forms of dispossession, and multiple kinds
of subjects in order to gain global hegemony is corroborative evidence for
Marx’s fundamental diagnosis of the system’s simultaneous resilience and
its ultimate fragility.”116 Given this admission, Marx’s analysis of alienation
must simultaneously be stretched to account for the contradictory subject
positions that enable some to remain indifferent to, or intolerant of, oth-
ers. Alienated subjects do not constitute a homogenous group but instead
 The Intersectionality of Alienatio · 103

comprise a multitude of people who experience exploitation and aliena­

tion in vastly different ways. Alienated subjects occupy multiple subject
positions that, in turn, condition their experiences of, and responses to,
class alienation. Exploited and alienated white workers, for example, may
find meaning in their privileged whiteness and so remain indifferent to
the suffering of racialized Others deemed inferior or undeserving. In the
end, the Combahee River Collective concludes, “We need to articulate the
real class situation of persons who are not merely raceless, sexless workers,
but for whom racial and sexual oppression are significant determinants in
their working/economic lives.”117

Conclusions
The hope and purpose in life for Marx was the overcoming of the stultify-
ing effects of the capitalist mode of production. For not only does capital-
ism impede one’s ability to cultivate a flourishing life, capitalism inheres
a gross violation of those conditions that for many people make life itself
possible. We all share the fact of mortality, but how this is experienced
is far from equal under the logics of capitalism. On this point, Marx
believed in the revolutionary potential of the proletariat, for it was this
group, Marx surmised, that would develop its consciousness and become
capable of building a new society that would lead to the betterment of all
humankind.118
That said, many scholars and activists question the relevancy both of
Marx and of the central role afforded to the working class toward the abo-
lition of structures and social relations of oppression. David Lovell, for ex-
ample, concludes that Marx’s theory is incidental to radical social change
and that it no longer has the power to convince us that the working class
is the class of the future.119 And while Lovell concedes that Marx was too
honest and intelligent to ignore evidence of the proletariat’s passivity and
susceptibility to “bourgeois prejudices” such as racial intolerance, when
Marx does address these, he too often considers them transient or isolated.
In other words, racism, sexism, and other forms of structural oppressions
are mostly rendered impotent and appear as epiphenomenal to the pri-
macy of class subjectivity and struggle. Consequently, for Lovell, the tran-
scendence of exploitation, alienation, and other forms of oppression must
be found elsewhere.
Lovell, I believe, overstates the case; there is a continued relevancy. Marx’s
104 · The Intersectionality of Alienatio

conception of revolution, that is, the philosophy of praxis and its accom-
panying notion of workers’ self-­emancipation, remains a useful compass
toward the abolition of injustices systemic to capitalism. As Löwy remarks,
however, this does not mean that one can find in Marx the answers to all
our problems, or that there is nothing to be reconsidered or criticized in
the complex body of his economic or political views.120 Indeed, the limi­
tations inherent to Marx’s writings should serve as a guide in our way
forward. To this end, a principle corrective is the dismantling of the privi-
leged role of the (white, male) alienated subject.
In this chapter I make the case for an intersectional epistemology for
the study of alienation. This follows from an awareness that the extrac-
tion of surplus labor, as San Juan Jr. writes, always involves conflict and
struggle.121 We readily understand, for example, how the social relations
of production condition the way in which subjectivities are mediated
by the capitalist form of life. And yet, workers are not spatially confined
to their place of employment. While alienation may be rooted in the ex-
ploitation of waged labor, meaning in life is often developed elsewhere, as
workers and capitalists alike form and reform complex and contradictory
groupings. Indeed, subject positions—­including class consciousness—­are
articu­lated in myriad group formations, some formally organized, others
more ephemeral. To this end, the particular subject positions of race, gen-
der, sexuality, and so on enter into the totality of contradictions that define
a specific conjuncture.122
Conjunctures, much like intersections, are crossroads. And as Bauman
cautions, “Crossroads call for decisions about which way to go, but the first
crucial, and not at all obvious decision to be taken is to recognize the cross-
roads as a crossroads—­to accept that more than one way leads from here
into the future, and that sometimes pursuing the future—­any future—­may
require sharp turns.”123 The Covid-­19 pandemic marks one such crossroad.
As Heather Brown writes, each passing day illustrates the need to uproot
a vicious and vile capitalism that places value on human life only as far
as it can profit from it and replace it with a society that values all of its
members as living embodiments of our species, regardless of race, class,
gender, sexuality, gender identity, or ability.124 For the pandemic under-
scores the persistent indifference to life inherent to the capitalist mode
of production and not simply because markets are unable to effectively
respond to human needs. Rather, as Brown clarifies, the Covid-­19 pan-
demic brings into sharp focus the inequalities intrinsic to and necessary
 The Intersectionality of Alienatio · 105

for capitalism. In the United States, for example, millions of people—­but

especially the poor and people of color—­lack adequate health care and
thus are less likely to seek or to receive treatment.125 In addition, as epide-
miologist and former director of the Detroit Health Department explains,
too many Americans work gigs—­like waiting tables or driving Uber or
Lyft—­that leave them uniquely vulnerable to the economic interruptions
caused by Covid-­19. Economic losses, in turn, may leave millions at risk of
eviction and becoming unhoused, thereby exacerbating their vulnerability
to illness and lack of adequate health care.126
And the grave consequences are anything but shared equally within so-
ciety. Indeed, the deaths attributed to Covid-­19 document in grave ways the
inequalities systemic to racial capitalism in the United States. As Whitney
Laster Pirtle writes, “Those with high socioeconomic status secure a supe-
rior set of knowledge, power money, power, prestige, and beneficial social
connections, all of which can alleviate the consequences of the disease.”127
Given the stark racial disparities among wealth, this translates into an
increased vulnerability especially among Blacks, Latinx, and Indigenous
peoples in the United States. Indeed, with respect to unemployment, mor-
bidity, and mortality, Black, Indigenous, other people of color, and women
have suffered disproportionately during the pandemic.128 In this way, the
Covid-­19 pandemic intensified the vulnerability of an already precarious
population, for as El-­Sayed affirms, “When you look at communities that
are suffering the most, they’re communities on which environmental in-
justice, structural racism, and their implications on poverty, have already
softened the space for the incoming of this virus to devastate people.”129
It is not simply that capitalism benefits from racial divisions. More di-
rectly, racial solidarity trumps class solidarity in the sense that attitudes
of racial superiority provide a sense of meaning not found elsewhere. The
alienated subject, for example, may affirm its meaning in life through an
intolerance directed at those perceived as the Other, that is, toward those
whom the alienated subject believes is the source of its own alienation.
That this lack of solidarity is possible emanates from the power of myriad
and intersectional structures and relations of oppression. As Michael Yates
writes, despite—­or maybe because of—­the conditions workers encoun-
tered during the pandemic, many protested and struck. Yates recounts that
there were “strikes and threatened strikes at Amazon warehouses, a Barnes
and Noble warehouse, Whole Foods, automobile plants, food delivery ser-
vices like Instacart, transit companies, restaurants, sanitation companies,
106 · The Intersectionality of Alienatio

farms, and food processing plants. In fact, between March and early July
2020, there were more than 800 wildcat strikes, varying in size and dura-
tion, across the United States.130
For Yates and many other commentators, the protests staged in sup-
port of vulnerable members of the working class—­the meatpackers and
bus drivers, the nurses and caregivers, the farm laborers and sanitation
workers—­offered hope for charting a path toward a society that promotes
the flourishing, rather than sacrificing, of life. This hope, however, was
only dimly perceived until the state-­supported premature death of an
alienated Black man.
 4

Whose Lives Matter?

He was known to many of his friends as Big Floyd. Born on October 14,
1973, in Fayetteville, North Carolina, George Floyd grew up in public-­
housing projects of the Third Ward, an impoverished Houston neigh-
borhood called the Bricks. In high school, Floyd excelled in sports. He
received a basketball scholarship from South Florida Community College
and became the first of his siblings to attend college. He later transferred to
Texas A&M University’s Kingsville campus, but never earned his degree. A
series of bad decisions plunged Floyd into a dark period of his life. He was
arrested multiple times and, beginning in 2004, Floyd served ten months
in jail for a $10 drug deal. Four years later, Floyd pleaded guilty to aggra-
vated robbery with a deadly weapon. For this, he served an additional four
years in prison.1
At forty years old, Floyd’s once promising life appeared all too predict-
able: another Black man on the brutal carousel of America’s carceral sys-
tem. But Floyd wanted to follow a different path: he wanted to help others,
and to help others learn from his experience, of his struggle with drugs
and depression and violence. As Patrick Ngwolo, a lawyer and pastor of
Resurrection Houston, describes Floyd, his story was one of redemption.2
Released in 2013, Floyd committed his life to church and to the uplifting of
other men broken down by drugs, poverty, and violence. Floyd acknowl-
edged the mistakes he made, the poor decisions. In a video he posted on
social media aimed at convincing young people to put down their guns, he
explained: “I got my shortcomings and my flaws. I ain’t better than nobody
else.”3 But Floyd also acknowledged the lack of opportunities available for
Black men such as himself. And through his selfless dedication to others,
Floyd found meaning in life. Moving between Houston and Minneapolis,
Floyd immersed himself in a Christian program that provided drug reha-
bilitation and job placement services for men like himself.
Sometime in April 2020 Floyd contracted Covid-­19; while he recovered
physically, the economic costs were difficult. Like so many other people

107
108 · Whose Lives Matter?

throughout the United States, Floyd found himself unemployed and strug-
gling to survive.
On May 25, 2020, Floyd bought a pack of cigarettes at Cup Foods, a
small grocery store in Minneapolis. According to the store owner, Mike
Abumayyaleh, Floyd was a regular and never caused any problems. How-
ever, on this day, Abumayyaleh wasn’t at work and the store employee
did not recognize Floyd. During the transaction, the employee suspected
Floyd was using a counterfeit $20 bill and, following protocol, called the
police. Shortly thereafter, two police officers arrived. Floyd was sitting with
two other men in a car parked nearby.4
The two officers approached Floyd and ordered him to show his hands.
For reasons unclear, one of the officers, Thomas Lane, had his weapon
drawn. Floyd, unsure why he was being detained and fearful of being
killed, didn’t move. The officers then forcibly removed Floyd from the car
and handcuffed him. Now, secured in custody, Floyd apologized repeat-
edly and asked why he was being arrested. The officers informed him he
was suspected of passing counterfeit bills. It was then, as the officers at-
tempted to place Floyd in the police car, that the struggle ensued. Floyd
claimed that he was claustrophobic. Other officers arrived, including
Derek Chauvin, who pulled Floyd—­still handcuffed—­to the ground, pin-
ning him on his stomach. For nine minutes and twenty-­nine seconds,
Chauvin kneeled on Floyd’s neck. And more than twenty times, Floyd
cried out that he couldn’t breathe. Slowly suffocating, Floyd pleaded; he
begged; he called out to his dead mother. All the while, Chauvin—­assisted
by three other officers—­kept the pressure on Floyd’s neck. Floyd struggles
to say, “You’re going to kill me.” Chauvin replies: “Then stop talking, stop
yelling. It takes a heck of a lot of oxygen to talk.” Floyd says again, “Can’t
believe this, man. Mom, love you. Love you. Tell my kids I love them.
I’m dead.”5
In the aftermath of the police killing of George Floyd, demonstrations
sprang up in Minneapolis and numerous cities across the country.6 Ac-
cording to data provided by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data
Project (ACLED), between May 26 and August 22, 2020, an estimated 7,750
demonstrations in more than 2,400 sites in all 50 states arose in peaceful
outpourings of grief and anger.7 In total, more than 26 million people par-
ticipated in protests throughout the United States, standing side-­by-­side in
solidarity for justice. It is significant, also, that these protests occurred dur-
ing a period of marginal labor revival.8 Both 2018 and 2019, for example,
 Whose Lives Matter? · 109

witnessed a small and significant uptick in major strikes. Thus, whereas in

2017 the United States experienced only seven major strikes—­the second
lowest number of such occurrences since records were first kept in 1947—­
in 2018 there were twenty such strikes and in 2019 there were twenty-­five.
Remarkably, there were major strikes by public school teachers, health-care
providers, and social assistance workers, such as those providing child care
and home health assistance, and these were held in many “unexpected” lo-
cations, such as Arizona, Oklahoma, West Virginia, Kentucky, and North
Carolina.9 Certainly, as Michael Yates explains, these numbers are a far
cry from the heyday of labor activity. Between 1947 and 1982, by way of
illustration, the number of major strikes per year never fell below 145,
with a high of 470 strikes registered just in 1952.10 Yates’s point remains
valid, however: the taking to the streets of workers across the country is
not inconsequential. Tellingly, this is the face of the working class in the
twenty-­first-­century United States. As Peter Hudis writes, the protests did
not detract from the class struggle but instead enhanced it, by bringing
into view the deadly ramifications of life under capitalism. Indeed, Hudis
concludes, that is why so many people from diverse backgrounds joined
the protests, including working-­class whites.11
The protests that emanated from the brutal killing of Floyd resonated
also with broader social justice movements beyond the United States. The
protests surrounding the violent death of Floyd must be understood in the
centuries-­long and brutal history of white supremacy and racial capital-
ism, a global history in which the lives of Blacks and so many other people
of color have—­in the words of Martha Biondi—­become characterized by
a social condition of disposability.12 Indeed, reflective of the political eco-
nomic pandemic known as capitalism, hundreds of thousands of people
engaged in solidarity protests around the world.13 Spanning six continents,
protests erupted in over fifty countries and territories. In Chile, for ex-
ample, La Primera Línea, a collective of people dedicated to challenging
police violence in that country, issued an open letter in solidarity against
police violence and white supremacy. “We are a group of friends,” the letter
affirms, “writing to all of you in the US about our experience of what such
a revolt can look like as it stretches on for months.”14 The letter continues:
“When the governments declare [a] state of emergency and call on the mili-
tary and citizens alike in an attempt to force a return to normalcy . . . [they]
attempt to portray a world of clear divisions—­between peaceful protestors
and criminal delinquents, between normalcy and crisis, between human
110 · Whose Lives Matter?

rights and national security, between good cops and bad apples.”15 Simi-
larly, in Kurdistan, the Kurdistan Women’s Communities (KJK) released a
detailed statement on the murder of Floyd and expressed solidarity in the
face of racism and nationalism.16 Drawing parallels with ongoing violence
directed toward Kurdish communities, the statement reads, in part:

We unequivocally condemn this blatant racially motivated violence

perpetrated by the state and express our deepest condolences to
the family and friends of George. This crime is neither the first nor,
unfortunately, will be the last of its kind. . . . Not a day passes when
Kurdish people are not attacked and murdered for simply being
Kurdish. Everywhere, particular communities are declared as en-
emies and attacked. We must not dismiss these kinds of atrocities as
individual acts. We have to look at them in the overall context of so-
cial conditions. Nationalism and racism must be challenged critically
and fought effectively in the context of the nation-­state and capi­
talism realities. Racism and nationalism are an extremely efficient
ideological instrument of state, power and domination systems.

These two statements, and dozens more, issued separately but in soli­
darity across the continents, exemplify the connections made by those
who dare to say “enough” to ongoing injustices wrought by racial capital-
ism on a global scale. The KJK, for example, affirm that “the main issues
of our time are, climate catastrophe, environmental destruction, war, pov-
erty, flight displacement, pandemics and many more have their origin in
power and domination.”17
The brief but meaningful life of Floyd was conditioned by a lifetime of
systemic racism. It is notable that not only disenfranchised and precarious
Black people in the United States, such as George Floyd, but marginal-
ized peoples the world over are portrayed especially within far-­right, con-
servative quarters as disposable and, by implication, undeserving of care.
On this point, Blacks are rarely members of the working class but instead
inhabit the ranks of the underclass. As such, Black men such as Floyd are
almost invariably portrayed as irresponsible, work-­shy freeloaders and/
or violent thugs and criminals who refuse to abide by the law. Rarely are
Black men such as Floyd portrayed sympathetically, as alienated subjects
struggling against racism and class exploitation, struggling to achieve and
to provide a meaningful life for their families in a precarious economy.
 Whose Lives Matter? · 111

To this end, the objectives of this penultimate chapter are twofold. First,
I excavate the ideological construction of the white alienated subject within
the context of white supremacy and racial capitalism.18 This is a necessary
step, for notions of the working class “go to the heart of our conception of
the socialist idea.”19 By extension, the emancipatory potential of the alien­
ated working class remains central to the transformation of capitalism into
something else, something more meaningful, that is, something that fa-
cilitates those actions which advance and do not inhibit the life and well-­
being of others. And yet, alienation is frequently discussed in the abstract,
as a condition of particular social conditions unique to the capitalist mode
of production. On this point, the scholarship on alienation frequently fails
to adequately engage with racism, or does so only as an addendum. For
example, we speak of alienation but, in the context of Black workers, we
qualify Black alienation. Alienation in and of itself remains marked by an
uncritical and unchallenged whiteness and, subsequently, “acts as the un-
seen, normative category against which differently racialized groups are
ordered and valued.”20 Simply put, an uncritical deployment of alienation
operates as a fundamentally white concept.21
In practice, the white alienated subject (as an abstract figure) is called
upon to do some heavy lifting for the maintenance of white supremacy. Here,
as the argument goes, economic hardships experienced by members of the
white working class emerge from a constellation of factors tied directly to the
legislation and institutionalization of “reverse racism,” that is, practices such
as affirmative action and liberal immigration policies. In actuality, the con-
servative agenda does not redress the economic challenges of the working
class, white or otherwise, but instead privileges the exceptionally wealthy.
However, symbolically, the concern expressed by these commentators over
the plight of the mythical “blue-­collar” worker who desires nothing other
than to receive a fair wage for a fair day’s work belies a countermovement
enacted to push back political, economic, and social gains achieved by the
broader civil rights movement. Deliberately ignored by these commentators
is the heterogeneity of the working class and especially the existence of Black
and Brown exploited and alienated subjects.
To this end, the racial formation of the white alienated subject must
be understood in a dialectic relationship to its Other, for the alienated
white worker has always been framed and has derived meaning from its
racialized position in society—­for no matter how bad life may be for the
alienated white subject, it was always valued above that of the nonwhite.22
112 · Whose Lives Matter?

This brings us to the second objective of this chapter, that is, to consider
the emancipatory potential of the Black Lives Matter movement as a chal-
lenge to the idolatry of the white alienated subject.23 My intention here
is not to provide a chronology of the movement; for this, I defer to the
insightful accounts provided by Barbara Ransby and Keeanga-­Yamahtta
Taylor, among others. Rather, I consider the Black Lives Movement—­and
the racist All Lives Matter countercampaign—­as paradigmatic of the wider
struggle for social justice and emancipation under conditions of neoliberal
racism. Accordingly, I forward the argument that the Black Lives Matter
movement illustrates the promise and potential of emancipatory struggles
centered on the belief that meaningful life is possible, but this requires a
collective engagement with the alienating structures and social relations of
oppression that foster indifference, intolerance, and capacity to hurt.

Neoliberal Racism in the United States

Neoliberalism, broadly understood, refers to a set of political-­economic
ideas and practices that emerged in the late 1970s with the intent to restore
and consolidate elite class power.24 As David Harvey explains, neoliberal-
ism “is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that
proposes that human well-­being can best be advanced by liberating indi-
vidual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional frame-
work characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and
free trade.”25 Notably, neoliberalism entailed also shifting the balance of
power and interests within the bourgeoisie from production activities to
institutions of finance capital. In this way, financial power could be used
to discipline working-­class movements.26 Effectively, neoliberalism con-
stitutes an explicit attack on the working poor through the dismantling of
welfare programs, job-­protection legislation, trade unionism, and worker
collective action.27
The consequences have been shocking. In 1968, the top-­earning 20 per-
cent of households accounted for 43 percent of the country’s income, while
those in the lower four income quintiles accounted for 56 percent. In 2018,
however, households in the top fifth of earners brought in 52 percent of all
income, more than the lower four-­fifths combined. And among the top 5
percent of households—­that is, those with incomes of around $250,000—­
their share of all income rose from 16 percent in 1968 to 23 percent in
2018.28 Crucially, there is also a value gap between whites and Blacks in the
 Whose Lives Matter? · 113

United States. In 2020, for example, the median net worth of white house-
holds ($170,000) was about 10 times the median worth of Black households
($17,600). In addition, the median income for Black households ($41,000)
was about 60 percent less than that of whites ($71,000); the poverty rate
for Blacks (21 percent) was more than double that of whites (8 percent);
and Black workers were 60 percent less likely than whites to have health
insurance.29
Bluntly, neoliberalism at its core is a class-­based project engendered
to redistribute wealth from lower classes to economic elites.30 And to this
end, neoliberalism has been grievously successful. Indeed, since 1975, an
estimated $50 trillion have been redistributed upwards. As Nick Hanauer
and David Rolf explain, the top 1 percent’s share of total taxable income
has more than doubled, from 9 percent in 1975, to 22 percent in 2018, while
the bottom 90 percent have seen their income share fall, from 67 percent
to 50 percent; this represents a direct transfer of income from the vast ma-
jority of working Americans to a handful at the very top.31
That said, neoliberalism is not monolithic and, indeed, one of neo­
liberalism’s enduring features is that it can be applied selectively and tai-
lored to fit specific sociospatial conditions.32 To that end, I heed the call
of David Roberts and Minelle Mahtani who argue that current conceptu-
alizations of neoliberalism require more precise articulations that move
beyond simply citing the eruptions of, for example, race/racism, that
result from neoliberal practice, toward actually shaking the racist foun-
dations that saturate neoliberalism.33 In other words, racism is neither
epiphenomenal nor ancillary to neoliberalism but instead foundational.
This holds tremendous importance for our subsequent interrogation of
the white alienated subject, if only because members of the so-­called white
working class often vote against their own economic interests. Why is this?
To begin, we need to acknowledge that subjects in a purely capitalist
society must be capable of participating in at least some components of
capitalist market, since survival depends on being able to buy at least the
basic necessities.34 In the United States, for instance, to be jobless is ef-
fectively a death sentence, for without a job the likelihood of obtaining
adequate housing and health care is nearly impossible. Indeed, even with
a job—­given the paltry minimum wages paid to workers in this country—­
one’s vulnerability to premature death remains higher than that of work-
ers in other so-­called advanced economies. Adam Shah, for example,
writes, “The long-­term systemic reason that working people are willing
114 · Whose Lives Matter?

to accept jobs that cannot provide enough income to cover basic needs
is because they are unable to organize and demand higher wages.” He ex-
plains: “Unionization is clearly tied to higher and more equal wages. The
real disincentive working people face is that if they try to assert their right
to collective bargaining, they often are quickly fired even though such fir-
ing is technically illegal.”35 And the consequences of losing one’s job—­for
simply demanding better wages and working conditions—­are devastating:
loss of income, loss of housing, loss of health insurance, and food insecu-
rity.36 However, as the aforementioned economic indicators suggest, white
workers, while still grossly exploited, are relatively better off than most
Black people and other minority populations. White workers, effectively,
stand to benefit under the present system of racial capitalism and, for rea-
sons discussed later, actually tend to vote against their class interests. In
fact, that there is no sustained class struggle in the United States is not
happenstance.37 As Jeffrey Reiman and Paul Leighton explain, “For the
vast majority, the many millions struggling hard to satisfy basic needs, to
acquiesce to the vast wealth of a small minority, it is necessary that the
majority come to believe that these disparities are justified, that the present
order is the best that human beings can accomplish, and that they are not
being exploited by the have-­plenties. In other words, the system requires
an effective ideology to fool enough of the people enough of the time.”38
That ideology is white supremacy.39
Although often associated with hood-­wearing members of the Ku Klux
Klan or skinheads affiliated with neo-­Nazi hate groups, white supremacy—­
especially among critical race scholars—­has a more expansive meaning.
For Frances Lee Ansley, for example, white supremacy refers “to a political,
economic, and cultural system in which whites overwhelmingly control
power and material resources, conscious and unconscious ideas of white
superiority and entitlement are widespread, and relations of white domi-
nance and non-­white subordination are daily re-­enacted across a broad
array of institutions and social settings.”40 To this end, white supremacy
serves several interrelated functions, paramount of which is the fostering
of white privilege. Scholars have long documented the salience of white
privilege in U.S. society. As Laura Pulido describes, “In the US in the
1990s, the concept of white privilege emerged as a popular way to explain
how white people benefitted simply from being white.”41 Peggy McIntosh,
for example, likened white privilege to an “invisible package of unearned
assets” that white people can utilize every day, often without even being
 Whose Lives Matter? · 115

aware of their privilege.42 Here, whites derive material—­and emotional—­

benefits from the simple fact that they are defined as white.
The discussion from chapter 3 bears repeating from a broader perspec-
tive than Trump’s campaign rhetoric. An early and important conception
of white privilege is W. E. B. Du Bois’s articulation of what he termed the
“psychological wages” of whiteness. Writing in the 1930s, Du Bois ex-
plained that although white workers historically received low wages, they
“were compensated in part by a sort of public and psychological wage.”43
Du Bois elaborates: “They were given public deference and titles of cour-
tesy because they were white. They were admitted freely with all classes
of white people to public functions, public parks, and the best schools.”44
In short, white workers were offered the opportunity to cash in on their
privilege of simply being white in a society founded upon racial preju-
dice, discrimination, and violence. This explains, in large part, why even
marginalized and impoverished white people continually vote against
their economic self-­interests and support elite class rule, for exploited and
alienated white workers stand to benefit in a racist, capitalist society solely
because of their whiteness. As Du Bois well understood,

the plight of the white working class throughout the world today is
directly traceable to Negro slavery in America, on which mod-
ern commerce and industry was founded, and which persisted
to threaten free labor until it was partially overthrown in 1863.
The resulting color caste founded and retained by capitalism was
adopted, forwarded and approved by white labor, and resulted
in subordination of colored labor to white profits the world
over. Thus the majority of the world’s laborers, by the insistence
of white labor, became the basis of a system of industry which
ruined democracy.45

Consequently, from this vantage point, white privilege persists, in part,

because it operates through collective inaction, that is, a society structured
around racial domination need only be unopposed to continue. In other
words, a shared indifference among a majority of white people is enough
to maintain the racist status quo. Martin Luther King Jr. was well aware of
this problem. In a speech delivered at the National Cathedral, Washington,
D.C., on March 31, 1968, King declared: “And it may well be that we will
have to repent in this generation. Not merely for the vitriolic words and the
116 · Whose Lives Matter?

violent actions of the bad people, but for the appalling silence and indif-
ference of the good people who sit around and say, ‘Wait on time.’ ”46 King
was well aware of the power of indifference, that is, of the moral blind-
ness afflicting so many white (and nonwhite) people. One does not have
to commit overtly racist acts or pledge membership to a white nationalist
group to allow racism to flourish; one needs only to stand in silence.
However, while white privilege remains an important analytic frame to
analyze taken-­for-­granted benefits and protections afforded to whites, the
concept of privilege emphasizes the social condition of whiteness, rather
than the institutions, practices, and processes that produce this condition
in the first place.47 Accordingly, critical scholars increasingly emphasize
white supremacy to capture the reality that racism operates as a process
that is constantly reconfigured through ongoing struggle.48 As Zeus Leon-
ardo writes, “In order for white racial hegemony to saturate everyday
life, it has to be secured by a process of domination, or those acts, deci-
sions, and policies that white subjects perpetuate on people of color.”49
As such, “white supremacy more precisely describes and locates white ra-
cial domination by underscoring the material production and violence of
racial structures and the hegemony of whiteness in settler societies.”50 It
is for this reason that Ruth Wilson Gilmore powerfully defines racism as
“the state-­sanctioned or extralegal production and exploitation of group-­
differentiated vulnerability to premature death.”51
Crucially, the shifting terrain of the political economy of the United
States, namely, the active forwarding of neoliberalism, has been made pos-
sible by a deliberate transformation of race and racism. Pulido explains
that “in order for neoliberalism to be considered legitimate, the social for-
mation must not be seen as racist.”52 Simply put, the neoliberal order is
predicated on the whitewashed liberal subject, the belief that all workers
enter the market on a level playing field, and that racist institutions have
been relegated to the past. Consequently, observed inequalities—­such as
the racial wealth gap—­are dismissed as the unfortunate outcome of bad
decisions by irresponsible people, who just happen to be disproportion-
ately nonwhite. As such, Pulido concludes, “there is a refusal to grapple
with structural racism to personal prejudice and racial hostility.”53 This
is manifest in the widespread belief among many whites that the United
States has entered into an era of postracism.
Currently, in the United States, neoliberal racism is marked, first and
foremost, by an active suppression of race as a legitimate topic or term of
public discourse and public policy.54 Programs designed to remedy rac-
 Whose Lives Matter? · 117

ism, such as affirmative action and desegregation, consequently are them-

selves the objects of critique, drawing cries of “reverse racism.”55 Likewise,
the mass demonstrations against police violence and the affirmation that
Black Lives Matter are distorted and reconfigured as part of a nefarious
anti­white agenda promoted by ungrateful Black people and traitorous lib-
eral whites. How this sordid state of affairs has come into existence—­and
how the figure of the white alienated subject factors into the demand that
Black Lives Matter—­occupies the remainder of this chapter.

Nixon and the Southern Strategy

From the 1940s onward, Keynesian economics guided the U.S. economy
and delivered high rates of economic growth. In the aftermath of the Great
Depression and the Second World War, the U.S. government assumed a
more active and interventionist role in the U.S. economy. Policymakers ac-
cepted that the federal government “should focus on full employment, eco-
nomic growth, and the welfare of its citizens; and that state power should
be freely deployed, alongside of or, if necessary, intervening in or even sub-
stituting for market processes to achieve these ends.”56 All that was needed
for the system to work, Chris Harman explains, was for the government to
disregard outdated free market orthodoxies and to intervene in economic
life to raise the level of spending on investment and consumption.57 As a
result, a suite of Keynesian regulatory, fiscal, and monetary policies were
initiated, thus marking a class compromise between capital and labor, as
the government established standards for the social wage by constructing
a variety of health, education, and welfare systems.58
During these years, investment accelerated, real incomes rose, some-
thing like full employment was made possible, and working-­class insti-
tutions, such as labor unions and left-­leaning political parties, exerted a
very real influence on policies that led to an expansion of what was called
the welfare state of pension, social, and health provisions.59 Notably, these
extended into the public sphere and effected race relations in significant
ways. As Joshua Inwood explains, the federal government, for the first
time since the end of the Civil War, began to incorporate the labor and
political aspirations of Black Americans more fully into the political life of
the nation.60 Consequently, for a brief period in U.S. history overt white
supremacy gave way to an ideology of racial liberalism whereupon the fed-
eral government shifted from largely ignoring the plight of Black citizens
to selectively working to secure basic social and civil rights.61
118 · Whose Lives Matter?

With the passage of a series of civil rights bills in the late 1950s and
early 1960s—­coupled with the momentous 1954 Supreme Court ruling in
Brown v. Board of Education—­key artifacts of white supremacy were chal-
lenged, notably efforts to promote integration in housing and education.
However, as Rod Bush explains, economic advances for Blacks were slow
and uneven. He explains that economic improvement “accrued only to
those Blacks who were able to enter middle-­class occupations and thus take
advantage of the ‘integration’ and the liberal employment practices that the
turbulence of that era produced. For the lower stratum of the Black popu-
lation the main benefit was liberal welfare practices, which enabled them
to survive despite widespread unemployment and underemployment.”62
The shift to racial liberalism, however minimal in actual, material ef-
fect, did result in a sea change in societal attitudes. On the one hand, the
rhetoric of political and economic rights raised Black people’s expectations
while, on the other hand, these same conditions heightened white people’s
uncertainties regarding their privileged position in society.63 Wedded to a
belief that success or failure is reducible to a zero-­sum game, many whites
in particular feared that any advance for Blacks would entail also a setback
for the white race. In addition, the struggle over civil rights fractured the
platform of the national Democratic Party. As Kevern Verney explains,
the Northern wing of the party, sensitive to the voting power of grow-
ing inner-­city Black populations, argued for a more liberal stance on civil
rights issues; in contrast, Southern Democrats were strongly opposed to
any changes in the status quo. Consequently, this division circumscribed
the political agenda of Democratic leaders and shaped the contours of the
civil rights movement.
Between 1963 and 1968, the administrations of John F. Kennedy and
Lyndon B. Johnson had responded to the Black struggle for equality by
pushing important civil rights legislation: the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Twenty-­fourth Amendment abolishing the
poll tax, and the Open Housing Bill of 1968.64 In response, however, many
white voters—­long accustomed to the psychological wages of whiteness
and the advantages of white privilege—­expressed intolerance and anger
toward these legislative actions. As Alexander explains, “Poor and working
class whites had their world rocked by the Civil Rights Movement. White
elites could send their kids to private schools and give them all of the ad-
vantages wealth has to offer. But poor and working class whites were faced
with social demotion. It was their kids who might be bused across town,
 Whose Lives Matter? · 119

and forced to compete for the first time with a new group of people they
had long believed to be inferior for decent jobs and educational opportu-
nities.”65 Indeed, Republican strategists gambled that a perceived growing
racial resentment among Democratic voters could be channeled to their
political advantage.66 It was a gamble that paid off.
In the lead-­up to the 1968 presidential election, Richard Nixon and his
staff devised a racially divisive campaign strategy, known as the “Southern
Strategy,” to entice poor and working-­class whites to switch political loyal-
ties to the Republican Party.67 Kevin Phillips’s well-­known political mani-
festo The Emerging Republican Majority (1969) served as a basic point of
departure.68 According to Phillips, the Southern white Democrats had be-
come so angered and alienated by the Democratic Party’s support for civil
rights reforms, such as desegregation and busing, that those voters could
be easily persuaded to switch parties if their racial resentments could be
maintained.”69 Of the strategy, Phillips explained: “From now on, the Re-
publicans are never going to get more than 10 to 20 percent of the Negro
vote and they don’t need any more than that. . . . [But] Republicans would
be shortsighted if they weakened enforcement of the Voting Rights Act.
The more Negroes who register as Democrats in the South, the sooner
the Negrophobe whites will quit the Democrats and become Republicans.
That’s where the votes are.”70 John Ehrlichman, special counsel to Nixon,
was equally blunt, stating unequivocally: “We’ll go after the racists.”71
The Southern Strategy relied on the use of coded language to appeal
to, and thus persuade, white voters to support the Republican agenda.
More precisely, potent political symbolism was required that played upon
cultural conservatism while sidestepping the more volatile issues of em-
ployment or wages. Lee Atwater, a Republican political consultant and
strategist, explained in an infamous 1981 interview the basis of the South-
ern Strategy:

The key is how you handle the race thing. In other words, you start
out, you start out in 1954 by saying “nigger, nigger, nigger,” [but] by
1968 you can’t say nigger, that hurts you, backfires, so you say stuff
like “forced bussing,” “states rights,” and all that stuff. At this point,
you’re getting so abstract now, you’re talking about cutting taxes,
by this time you’re talking about all these economic things, and the
by-­product of them is, blacks get hurt worse than whites. What I
am saying is, that if it is getting this abstract, and that coded, then
120 · Whose Lives Matter?

we’re doing away with the racial problem, because obviously sit-
ting around saying, we want to cut taxes, is much more abstract
than even the bussing thing, and a hell of a lot more abstract than
“­nigger, nigger.”72

In key respects, the Southern Strategy was at its core a blue-­collar strat-
egy with an implicit nod to narratives of white alienation. On this point, “it
was neither the entire working class nor its material grievances on which
the administration would focus; rather, it was the ‘feeling of being forgot-
ten’ among white male workers that Nixon and his advisors would seek to
tap.”73 With the promotion of the Southern Strategy, Nixon recast the ways
in which (white) workers appeared in American politics. More precisely,
Nixon helped push the concept of worker out of the realm of production,
with obvious implications for labor’s inability to cultivate a collective pro-
letarian consciousness.74 In doing so, Nixon effectively transformed the
public identity of the working class “from economics to culture, from
workplace and community to national pride.”75 No longer confined meta-
phorically to the spaces of the factory, the (white) alienated subject co-
alesced to form a group-­in-­fusion, united in their opposition toward a
supposed reverse racism championed by liberals. In the process, Nixon
simultaneously marginalized the strength of labor as a political force and
greatly foreclosed even further the possibility of solidarity among Black
and white workers.
Nixon’s approach to the white working class was always more ideal than
material, that is, by “making workers’ economic interests secondary to an
appeal to their allegedly superior moral backbone and patriotic rectitude.”76
As Jefferson Cowie explains, Nixon sought to mobilize their whiteness and
their machismo in the face of societal unrest while neglecting ways to im-
prove conditions for the working class.77 Notably, one of Nixon’s fundamen-
tal beliefs had always been that the appearance of action was as important,
if not more important, than the reality of action.78 To this end, Nixon was
highly adept and skillful in the politics of language. As Murray Edelman
explains, “If political language both excites and mollifies fears, language is an
integral facet of the political scene: not simply an instrument for describing
events but itself a part of events, shaping their meaning and helping to shape
the political roles officials and the general public play.”79
An additional component of Phillips’s argument—­and thus to the South-
ern Strategy—­was to look beyond the Southern white voter, alienated by
 Whose Lives Matter? · 121

the Democrats’ commitment to racial equality, and to entice the support

of the Northern alienated industrial worker. The problem, Phillips antici-
pated, “was that working-­class voters feared that a Republican adminis-
tration would do away with popular New Deal programs—­from social
security to collective bargaining. If Nixon could dispel the notion that his
party and his presidency were antiworker, cleverly manipulate the race
issue, and peg the label of ‘elitism’ on liberals, it followed that he could
build a post–­New Deal coalition that transcended the Southern Strategy.
By co-­opting the northern blue-­collar worker, the Southern Strategy, in
essence, would become a national strategy.”80 The genius of the strategy
was that “policy and rhetoric would be formulated that did not require
federal expenditures or even wage increases—­the politics of recognition
and status would be enough.”81
To this end, the Republican Party appealed to the racism of alienated
working-­class whites, a group long accustomed to the durability of their
privileged status and security, through an aggressive and complimentary
law and order campaign. Always careful to publicly avoid overtly racist
terminology, Nixon declared a “War on Crime,” a calculated move that si-
multaneously negated the economic focus of Johnson’s previous “War on
Poverty” and underscored the apparent social threat to (white) Americans
and their way of life. As such, hand-­in-­hand with the idolization of the white
worker was the demonization of all Blacks. Building on centuries of racist
caricatures, the Southern Strategy introduced a litany of figures discursively
birthed to instill fear, intolerance, and animosity among white voters.
The conservative architects of the Southern Strategy were exception-
ally prescient in their evaluation of the (white) American psyche. Kevin
Phillips, in particular, understood that the strategy “could point the way
toward long-­term political realignment and the building of a new Repub-
lican majority, if Republicans continued to campaign primarily on the
basis of racial issues, using coded antiblack rhetoric.”82 And from Nixon
onward, Republican office-­holders and candidates have largely remained
faithful to the skeletal features of the Southern Strategy: racial polariza-
tion, law and order platforms, and the idolization of the white alienated
subject. Indeed, this potent mixture would help usher a broader neoliberal
agenda designed to crush labor and advance the interests of capital on a
scale unimaginable.
By the end of the 1960s, signs of a serious economic crisis of capital
accumulation were everywhere apparent.83 The halcyon days of postwar
122 · Whose Lives Matter?

prosperity were over. Profitability in the major economies began to fall and
deep recessions in the 1970s jeopardized the U.S. economy. Capital values
were destroyed as old plants in old industries were closed; companies went
bankrupt; and mass unemployment reduced labor costs and weakened the
ability of trade unions to block reductions in wages and working condi-
tions.84 In the process, as Cowie and Boehm summarize, “Family income
was falling for the first time since the Depression, stagflation unhinged the
Keynesian success formula, global manufacturing and competition under-
mined U.S. economic hegemony, deindustrialization and de-­unionization
shook the bedrock of working-­class success, and a tax system losing its
progressive structure justified a revolt against public spending. These fac-
tors led to a profound sense of insecurity as the economic structure of
blue-­collar communities began to crumble.”85
Many middle-­and upper-­income white families did experience eco-
nomic retrenchment; however, that these hardships occurred in the midst of
political (but not necessarily economic) gains achieved by African Ameri-
cans, women, and other minority groups did not go unnoticed. Indeed, for
many white families, their worsening economic position was seemingly
matched by their declining racial position, that is, their economic status was
undermined precisely as their white-­privileged and dominant position in
the racial pecking order was challenged.86 In reality, of course, all members
of the working class were hurting. However, white workers stood to lose not
only real income but also the equally valuable psychological wages of white-
ness promised by a system of racial capitalism.

Reagan, Racism, and the Neoliberal Turn

As a potential antidote to threats to the capitalist social order, Harvey
writes, neoliberalism had long been lurking in the wings of public pol-
icy.87 Since the high-­water mark of the antipoverty programs associated
with Johnson’s Great Society in the 1960s, for example, conservative policy
makers had launched attacks on the existence of the economic safety net
as a whole.88 Strongly opposed to Keynesian state interventionist poli-
cies, proponents of neoliberalism resented a progressive tax system that
financed the government’s social contract with the middle and working
classes—­and the poor—­in terms of providing a welfare state set of social
programs that gave them both a safety net and educational and other op-
portunities for social advancement.89
 Whose Lives Matter? · 123

The first tentative steps toward a neoliberal agenda did not go unchal-
lenged. As Harvey describes, a wave of labor militancy swept through
the advanced capitalist world during the late 1970s and early 1980s, as
working-­class movements sought to preserve the gains they had won in
early decades.90 In the United States, for example, the biggest strike wave
in postwar history rocked the country between 1968 and 1974, including
a series of wildcat strikes, democratization and reform movements within
the unions, revolts against automation, and new organizing efforts that fre-
quently built upon a promising base of women, minorities, and students.91
In response, the Reagan administration drew upon Nixon’s playbook
and initiated a revanchist political and economic campaign informed by
the Southern Strategy. On the one hand, the Republican Party sought an
alliance with the Christian Right and, on the other hand, appealed to the
cultural nationalism of the white working class.92 As Harvey explains, this
political base, collectively “could be mobilized through the positives of re-
ligion and cultural nationalism and negatively through coded, if not bla-
tant, racism, homophobia, and anti-­feminism.”93 Hence, the Republican
Party intensified the public perception that government-­supported social
programs enacted by the Democrats unfairly benefited Black people and
other minorities and thus kept white voters’ anger directed away from
Republican federal policy and toward a palpable intolerance of people of
color. Seeking to crush labor’s organizations and institutions, Reagan dis-
connected even further Nixon’s brand of white, blue-­collar identity politics
from organized labor’s economic demands.94 Indeed, as Alexander writes,
“the late 1960s and early 1970s marked the dramatic erosion in the belief
among working-­class whites that the condition of the poor, or those who
fail to prosper, was the result of a faulty economic system that needed to
be challenged.”95 Gorged on a diet of individualism, white privilege, and
anti-­Black rhetoric, there could be no proletarian-­led revolution among
white workers.
Effectively, neoliberalists encouraged the white alienated subject to think
of itself as an entrepreneurial subject, that is, a subject capable of con-
tributing to the restoration of the United States in the face of frighten-
ing social and economic change.96 Years later, President Donald Trump
would echo this strategy, calling upon his supporters to “Make America
Great Again” (MAGA). Under Reagan, though, the entrepreneurial sub-
ject symbolized an ideal of self-­mastery but also embodied the notion of
sacrifice of self on behalf of duty, honor, and integrity.97 To this end, the
124 · Whose Lives Matter?

alienated-­cum-­entrepreneurial subject exemplified the patriotism, nation-

alism, and sense of loyalty demanded of the Republican party, that is, vital
traits necessary to stem the onslaught of advances made by women, mi-
norities, gays and lesbians, or any other group that didn’t conform to their
vision of America.
During this period, conservatives gave lip service to the goal of racial
equality but actively resisted—­and scaled back—­desegregation, busing,
and civil rights enforcement.98 In addition, while also paying lip service
to the white alienated subject, proponents of the neoliberal agenda effec-
tively dismantled those structures and institutions that provided a modi-
cum of stability and security to the working class as a whole. This was
accomplished through a deliberate strategy of coded language and the pro-
motion of a so-­called color-­blind legislative agenda. Indeed, as Goldfield
explains, “Reagan became the respectable proponent of racist populism,
all the while claiming that he was merely for fairness, opposing granting
of special privileges to women and racial minorities, be it in hiring, college
admission, busing, or welfare.”99
Wielded by conservative neoliberals, modalities of difference such as
race do not predetermine one’s success, as each individual is ostensibly
evaluated solely in terms of his or her economic contribution to society.100
The neoliberal subject, albeit alienated, is one who takes personal responsi-
bility for its actions, a subject who prioritizes self-­sufficiency and eschews
governmental assistance. More precisely, the white neoliberal subject be-
lieves in the infallibility of a color-­blind meritocracy; that those who work
hard will be rewarded and those who shun their responsibilities will suf-
fer the economic consequences. To this end, conservative (and a growing
number of liberal) politicians, pundits, and media outlets manufactured
and subsequently idolized the vaunted lunch-­box-­toting, blue-­collar white
factory worker as the personification of American exceptionalism: that in-
dustrious, square-­jawed member of the working class who comes to work
every day to provide for his wife and children in the face of a crumbling
economy wrought by misguided race-­and gender-­based policies. If the
figure of the industrious white worker was cast in the cauldron of genocide
and slavery, its modern features of fortitude and patriotism were polished
in the crucibles of neoliberalism.
And the iconography of the white alienated subject was pervasive.
Blue-­collar themes permeated popular culture, in both film and song, as
the neoliberal agenda surged forward. And while the reality of the working
 Whose Lives Matter? · 125

class was multiracial, the idea of the working class in the popular idiom
was, by the 1980s, firmly entrenched as a repository for patriarchy and
racism.101 Indeed, as Jefferson Cowie and Lauren Boehm explain, the idea
of the “ ‘working class’—­a term that had too long been defined as white
and male in popular discourse despite the much more complex reality—­
had evolved into a label for a hardened form of white, male identity poli-
tics. The working class became, in essence, negatively defined: an ‘other’
dwelling outside of the new politics built by and upon minorities, women,
youth, and sexuality.”102 As Alexander concludes, Republicans “repeatedly
raised the issue of welfare, subtly framing it as a contest between hard-
working, blue-­collar whites and poor blacks who refused to work.”
Out of the maelstrom of Reagan’s revised and revanchist Southern
Strategy emerged alongside the figure of the downtrodden but deserving
white worker a motley assortment of other racially coded Black figures,
notably the “welfare queen” and the “deadbeat dad.”103 Collectively, these
figures became as crucial to the neoliberal agenda as the mythology and
idolization of the hard-­working white American. The welfare queen, for
example, was born during Reagan’s 1976 presidential campaign. In Feb-
ruary of that year, Ann Cammett explains, Reagan called attention to a
woman in Chicago who seemed to embody the failings of federal assis-
tance programs. Reagan fumed:

She has 80 names, 30 addresses, 12 Social Security cards and is col-

lecting veterans’ benefits on four non-­existing deceased husbands.
And she’s collecting Social Security on her cards. She’s got Medic-
aid, getting food stamps, and she is collecting welfare under each of
her names. Her tax-­free cash income alone is over $150,000.104

Throughout his campaign and into his presidency, Reagan embellished the
narrative of the welfare queen. And although ridden with inaccuracies,
“Reagan’s anecdotal ‘welfare queen’ was solidified as the public’s stereo-
type of poor Black mothers.”105 As Cammett concludes, Reagan’s tale of
the welfare queen resonated with many white Americans who were recep-
tive to the belief that the government was privileging nondeserving loafers
over hardworking people like them; in short, the story confirmed many
white Americans’ common sense of outrage over the deterioration of their
country.106
Conservative politicians recentered the white alienated subject into the
126 · Whose Lives Matter?

core of U.S. politics and, in so doing, “flags, God, guns, heterosexuality,

and whiteness had eclipsed the economic politics of labor rights, wages,
unions, and working conditions as the focal points for enough of working-­
class identity to swing the balance of the nation.”107 Here, the importance
of the figure of the (white) alienated subject becomes apparent, in that
the hardworking neoliberal subject is transformed into the downtrodden,
(white) alienated subject not because of exploitation inherent to capital-
ism but instead arising from the actions of irresponsible people of color
and of unfair governmental policies that privilege minorities. According
to this racial logic, every dollar siphoned off by undeserving (Black) wel-
fare queens is a dollar lost to the more deserving members of the (white)
working class. Thus, financial losses experienced by white workers were
stoked by members of the Reagan administration to fuel a growing resent-
ment among whites toward Blacks, Hispanics, and other minorities. In-
deed, the neoliberal turn was made possible because of racial politics.108 In
turn, however, the racial politics of neoliberalism required the idolatry of
a mythical (white) alienated subject who suffered not because of structural
exploitation inherent to capitalism but because of the alleged delinquency
of nonwhites.
In reality, neoliberal policies harmed both white and nonwhite workers;
but the former tended to blame neither the (mostly) conservative politi-
cians who advanced the neoliberal agenda nor the capitalists who ben-
efited from the economic restructuring. Rather, white workers regularly
blamed (nonwhite) immigrants and Black and Latinx people. Similarly,
although the majority of public assistance recipients were white, welfare’s
association with Blacks in the public imagination drove policy around
poverty issues as a whole.109 Impoverished white workers—­including
those who benefit from social welfare programs—­readily subscribed to
the racial and racist coding of poverty. Poor whites were members of the
deserving but downtrodden working class; poor nonwhites were nothing
more than members of the cheating underclass. By claiming the status of
a hard worker, Claudine Pied identifies, poor and working-­class whites
aligned themselves with the industrious American who faces tough times
but picks him-­or herself back up and keeps going.110 Poor white workers
in this way can position themselves as victims of deindustrialization and
representatives of a national solution (hard work), rather than sources of
culture of poverty.111
Reagan’s highly racialized appeals, targeted to poor and working-­class
 Whose Lives Matter? · 127

whites, were nearly always accompanied by promises to be tougher on

crime and to enhance the federal government’s role in combating crime.112
The racially coded welfare queen, for example, served to criminalize Black
mothers as habitually exploiting illegally the welfare program and other
government-­sponsored programs. To this end, welfare and crime were two
pages of the same Republican playbook.
Drug-­related crimes were in decline when, in 1982, Reagan initiated
the nationwide and federally supported War on Drugs. However, as Alex­
ander clarifies, “from the outset, the war had little to do with drug crime
and much to do with racial politics.”113 She expounds: “The War on
Drugs proved popular among key white voters, particularly whites who
remained resentful of black progress, civil rights enforcement and affir-
mative action. . . . The War on Drugs, cloaked in race-­neutral language,
offered whites opposed to racial reform a unique opportunity to express
their hostility towards blacks and black progress, without being exposed to
the charge of racism.”114 Collectively, the coded images of welfare queens,
deadbeat dads, and crack whores provided justification for the expansion
of an aggressive law enforcement and the criminal justice system that dis-
proportionately targeted poor people and minorities.115
The “habitat” of these racially coded figures was codified by neoliberal-
ists in the racist “broken windows” thesis. Originating in the early 1980s,
the broken windows thesis was (and is) part and parcel of the increased
“tough on crime” stance long favored by conservative politicians, designed
to solicit support among mostly white voters for a suite of right-­wing ini-
tiatives. Writing in The Atlantic Monthly, two conservative pundits, James
Wilson and George Kelling, sketched the outlines of a criminological theory
that justified an aggressive policing practice.116 Briefly, the thesis premises
that neighborhoods that fail to fix broken windows display a lack of infor-
mal social control and thereby unwittingly invite the criminally minded
into their midst. Accordingly, the presence of broken windows is symbolic
of a degenerative environment that is the breeding ground for increased
crime.117 Tellingly, for Wilson and Kelling, the threat to the general public
is embodied by so-­called low-­level offenders: panhandlers, drunks, ad-
dicts, rowdy teenagers, prostitutes, loiterers, and the mentally disturbed.
Indeed, Wilson and Kelling concede that these are not necessarily violent
people—­nor have they necessarily committed a crime. However, and col-
lectively, they constitute “disreputable or obstreperous or unpredictable
people” and require a police response equal to that of felony offenders.
128 · Whose Lives Matter?

Ostensibly focused on the physical environment, the broken windows

thesis is in the end about “bothersome” and “disorderly” human behav-
ior.118 As such, the thesis aligns readily with the moral conservatism and
backlash against the myriad social justice movements of the preceding
decades. For conservatives, the increased tolerance of divorce, abortion,
homosexuality, drugs, sexual promiscuity—­all seemingly promoted by the
civil rights movements, the women’s rights movement, and the gay lib-
eration movement—­foretold a catastrophic downfall of American society.
Urban decline, as manifest by the presence of broken windows, was but
the most visible evidence of societal breakdown. For conservatives, the
impoverishment especially of the inner city—­coded language for Black
communities—­stood in stark contrast with an idealized community, that
is, a respectable, white, middle-­class, nuclear family–­oriented society.
The broken windows thesis effectively aligned with and underscored
an “accumulated resentment and rage associated with middle-­class frus-
tration in the face of severe economic recession and governmental retrac-
tion.”119 It justified also a shift in law enforcement away from a historical
emphasis on felony arrests and toward misdemeanor offenses that, ac-
cording to the thesis, if left neglected would spiral into more significant
problems.120 As Bench Ansfield writes, “Through the vector of the broken
window, infrastructural decay interlaced with social and racial degenera-
tion, and the two lent meaning to each other. These images called to mind
infrastructural failure, death, and dying, an affective repertoire that con-
jured fears of racial and national degeneration.”121
The broken windows thesis supported also a new and aggressive po-
licing practice known as zero tolerance. The term originated as a compo-
nent of federal and state drug enforcement practices in the 1980s but, in
the 1990s, expanded to “denote a sharp, severe, and highly punitive re-
action to any form of behavior deemed illegal, malicious, or anti-­social
to the surrounding community, even those infractions considered to be
relatively minor.”122 New York City served as the model for zero tolerance
policing. Under the direction of Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, the police and
other authorized entities were given extreme leeway in their attempt to
deal forcefully with those people—­street peddlers, panhandlers, prosti-
tutes, squeegee cleaners, street artists—­who (from the standpoint of con-
servatives) posed a threat to the quality of urban life.123 Subsequently, as
Katharyne Mitchell identifies, “the state-­directed assault on New York’s
urban disorder between 1994 and 2001 was reflected in increased policing
 Whose Lives Matter? · 129

and anti-­homeless laws, and also in higher stop-­and-­frisk incidents and

arrest rates for misdemeanors such as unlicensed vending, panhandling,
public drunkenness, and other petty crimes.”124 In turn, statistics on ar-
rests and convictions fueled the discourse of Black (and other minority)
criminality. Unlike their white counterparts, Black men and women were
viewed not as struggling members of the alienated working class but in-
stead as being naturally criminal and prone to violence. Unlike their white
counterparts, Black men and women were undeserving of assistance, and
their presence required a tough police response. No matter that govern-
mental investigations, judicial findings, anecdotal accounts, and state-
ments by law enforcement officials provided overwhelming evidence of the
prevalence of profiling in the day-­to-­day policing of the United States.125
The image of the Black thug reflected the fears and anxieties of many white
people, rich and poor alike, who resented the gains, however minimal, that
had been achieved through the civil rights movement.
The War on Drugs, coupled with aggressive policing in predominantly
minority communities and harsh sentencing laws, set the stage for the
massive expansion of the U.S. prison system and, in the end, the dispro-
portionate incarceration of mostly Black and Brown people.126 Indeed,
as Alexander writes, “In less than two decades, the prison population
quadrupled, and large majorities of poor people of color in urban areas
throughout the United States were placed under the control of the crimi-
nal justice system or saddled with criminal records for life. Almost over-
night, huge segments of ghetto criminals were permanently relegated to a
second-­class status, disenfranchised, and subjected to perpetual surveil-
lance and monitoring by law enforcement agencies.”127 By the turn of the
twenty-­first century, for example, Black men constituted approximately 12
percent of the U.S. population and approximately 13 percent of its drug
users, but accounted for 33 percent of all drug-­related arrests, 62 percent of
drug-­related convictions, and 70 percent of drug-­related incarcerations.128
Similarly, Black women were imprisoned at a rate eight times that of white
women, and were ten times as likely to be reported to child welfare agen-
cies for prenatal drug use—­even though the same proportion of Black and
white women use drugs while pregnant.129 As of 2018, African Americans
continue to comprise a disproportionate share of the prison population.
For example, African Americans comprised 33 percent of the sentenced
population although they made up only 12 percent of the total adult U.S.
population; whites, conversely, accounted for 30 percent of inmates yet
130 · Whose Lives Matter?

comprised 63 percent of the adult population. Black men are especially

likely to be incarcerated: in 2018, there were 2,272 inmates per 100,000
Black men; this compares with 1,018 inmates per 100,000 Hispanic men
and just 392 inmates per 100,000 white men.130
The neoliberal state has an investment in fueling the fear of crime, that is,
of convincing the public of imminent danger to self and property by over-
stating the threat of crime and creating the false impression that all citizens
are equally at risk of victimization.131 In other words, with veiled refer-
ences to a universal shared mortality—­“We are all at risk”—­proponents
of a revanchist neoliberal policing platform sought to unite the public
in its opposition to a common threat, one that was more often than not
embodied in the form of Black and Brown criminals. The overall objec-
tive, Philomena Mariani makes clear, has been “to sell the public on the
idea that policing and punishment are the solution to all social-­economic
problems.”132 Thus, rather than investing in educational or welfare pro-
grams, monies were (and are) directed toward law enforcement agencies
and the criminal justice system, notably, prisons. In addition, given the
long-­standing representation of Blacks and other minorities as criminals,
the disparities in arrest and incarceration rates are viewed by many whites
as reflecting reality rather than systemic discrimination.133
The consequences are far-­reaching. As Angela Davis explains, “The
prison industrial system materially and morally impoverishes its inhabit-
ants and devours the social wealth needed to address the very problems
that have led to spiraling numbers of prisoners. As prisons take up more
and more space on the social landscape, other government programs that
have previously sought to respond to social needs . . . are being squeezed
out of existence. The deterioration of public education, including prioritiz-
ing discipline and security over learning in public schools located in poor
communities, is directly related to the prison ‘solution.’”134 “Prisons do not
disappear problems,” Davis concludes, “they disappear human beings.”135
Crucially, Davis concludes, “the practice of disappearing vast numbers of
people from poor, immigrant, and racially marginalized communities has
literally become big business.”136
The deleterious consequences of an aggressive and discriminatory sys-
tem of law enforcement, including racial profiling, surveillance, and de-
tention, both on individuals and collectively within communities of color
have been many. Here, though, I want to underscore that the mass incar-
ceration of especially Black and Brown effectively benefits a racial capital-
 Whose Lives Matter? · 131

ism predicated on white supremacy. As Earl Smith and Angela Hattery

neatly explain, though prisons serve several functions, including provid-
ing punishment and housing those who are adjudicated as requiring sepa-
ration from the larger social world, a key purpose of the prison-­industrial
complex is not the rehabilitation of inmates but the removal of unexploit-
able labor from the free labor market and the transformation of that labor
so that it can be extracted.137 In turn, white workers—­and especially white
men—­implicitly or explicitly benefit from the incarceration of hundreds of
thousands of African American men, for high levels of imprisonment ef-
fectively remove African American men from the competitive labor force,
and upon release they are disenfranchised in the political system and fre-
quently made permanently unemployable.138
However, the economic benefits to racial capitalism in general, and to
white workers in particular, extend beyond the lucrative profits accruing
from prison labor. As Becky Pettit and Carmen Gutierrez explain, “Mass
incarceration, and other forms of criminal justice contact, from police
stops to community-­based supervision, generate consequences related to
employment, wages, political engagement, health, neighborhood stability,
and a host of other considerations.139 Pettit and Gutierrez, for example,
detail that the removal through incarceration of a large segment of earners
reinforces existing income and wealth disparities; incarceration has dam-
aging effects on the health of families and communities; felony convic-
tions have devastating effects on the level of voting, political engagement,
and overall trust in the legal system within communities.140 Overall, they
conclude, “the costs of mass incarceration are not simply collateral conse-
quences for individuals but are borne collectively, most notably by African
Americans [and other persons of color] living in acutely disadvantaged
communities that experience high levels of policing and surveillance.”141
As Pettit and Gutierrez write, diminished employment opportunities,
bouts of unemployment, and lost wages influence economic security and
self-­sufficiency for individuals who have been incarcerated as well as for
their families and children.142
In addition, the inherent exploitation of capitalism is augmented in
race-­and gender-­specific ways by a criminal justice system guided by
an ideology of white supremacy that mediates one’s vulnerability to pre­
mature death through physical violence. As Priscilla Bustamante, Gaurav
Jashnani, and Brett Stoudt explain, “the implementation of broken win-
dows policing, with an emphasis on low-­level arrests and frequent police
132 · Whose Lives Matter?

stops, means that those living in low-­income communities of color are

regularly exposed to police presence and contract.”143 This in and of itself
elevates dramatically the likelihood of confrontations with law enforce-
ment officers and the very real possibility of premature death at the hands
of state-­sanctioned violence, as demonstrated by the police killings of Mi-
chael Brown, Laquan McDonald, Tamir Rice, Walter Scott, Freddie Gray,
Philando Castile, Breonna Taylor, George Floyd, and so many others.
In bringing this section to a close, we are mindful of Roberts and
Mahtani’s premise that, in trying to understand the connection between
race and neoliberalism, it is important to examine not just the momen-
tary eruptions of race or racism that seemingly result from neoliberal
policy reforms, and instead consider racism as an organizing principle
of society that neoliberalism reinforces and modifies.144 In the decades
following Reagan’s racist War on Drugs, for example, Alexander relates,
“black drug dealers and users became regulars in newspaper stories and
saturated the evening TV news—­forever changing our conception of who
the drug users and dealers are.”145 Now, in the minds of many white vot-
ers, crime—­and especially violent crime—­is equated with Blackness. In
turn, this semantic connection enables whites to overwhelmingly support
the ongoing militarization of law enforcement and the gutting of social
programs. Thus, neoliberalism effectively masks racism through its value-­
laden moral project: camouflaging race-­connected practices in an alleg-
edly color-­blind meritocracy, making possible a utopian vision of society
that is nonracialized.146 Simply put, Black people are held to be uniquely
and directly responsible for their own poverty and imprisonment and,
indirectly, responsible for the financial hardships of demoralized but re-
sponsible alienated white workers struggling to survive. From this van-
tage point, the white alienated subject personifies precarity, a condition
wrought by racialized welfare cheats and undocumented workers who un-
fairly take advantage of “liberal” systems that no longer reward hard work
and individual responsibility. As such, class solidarity will always be lim-
ited until Black people (and other minority populations) are not fictional-
ized as ontologically criminal.147

The Fallacy of Postracial Neoliberalism

On November 4, 2008, millions of people celebrated the election of Barack
Obama, the first Black president of the United States. However, as Luigi
 Whose Lives Matter? · 133

Esposito and Laura Finley foreshadowed, Obama’s victory—­undeniably

a milestone in U.S. history—­further legitimized a problematic discourse
on racial relations that emerged in the aftermath of the civil rights move-
ment.148 Specifically, Obama’s success confirmed for many whites the
transcendence of racism in society and as such justified the color-­blind
ideology championed since the Reagan administration.
Context matters. When Obama took office, Blacks in the United States
compared to whites were three times more likely to live in poverty; nearly
twenty times more likely to be incarcerated for illegal drug use; more likely
to receive substandard health care, even among Black patients whose income
and health insurance policies were comparable to their white counter­parts;
twice as likely to be unemployed; less likely to graduate from high school
and attend college; six times more likely to be victims of homicide; and
more likely to be steered into subprime mortgages and lose their homes.149
And yet, as Esposito and Finley write, many whites subscribed to the nar-
rative of color-­blindness as a means of explaining away these inequalities
as products of racially neutral considerations, such as differences in life-
styles, individual determination, financial literacy, personal responsibility,
and moral values.150 Indeed, Smith writes, “the comparatively sanguine
perceptions of white Americans about the state of racial equality in the
face of yawning racial gaps in income, wealth, and employment is indica-
tive of white privilege’s ‘scheme of irrelevance’ regarding the needs and
interests of racial minorities.”151 In other words, many white Americans ex-
pressed a profound indifference to the suffering of Black people, choosing
either to ignore the obvious inequalities or to blame African Americans
for their plight.
Initially, for many white Americans, Obama seemingly personified the
can-­do attitude of the liberal subject, that hard work and perseverance are
the keys to success in the United States. In so doing, Obama was portrayed
as a Black man who overcame his Blackness. This, of course, presupposes
that Blackness is a de facto source of shame and pathology that must be
abandoned or transformed to fit the normative standards of acceptabil-
ity defined and demanded by white society.152 However, Obama’s success
heralded another, more disturbing trend among much of the white popu-
lation. As Juliet Hooker explains, prior to 2008, the presumed whiteness
of the presidency had been symbolic reassurance that political power re-
mained in the grasp of white people.153 For many whites, Obama embodied
the symbolic loss of white privilege. To that end, a pervasive explanation
134 · Whose Lives Matter?

for white racial resentment in the Obama era—­a narrative that appeared
frequently both in far-­right forums but also in many mainstream media
outlets—­is that it was driven by working-­class whites who felt left behind
economically and alienated from the political process.154 Hence, according
to these accounts, the simmering intolerance of white people—­frustrated
by a sense of unfilled entitlement—­was expressed most directly at the bal-
lot box in subsequent elections.
White backlash, Terry Smith explains, has been a recurring and trans-
formative feature of American politics since the Reconstruction era.
However, the Obama presidency generated an unprecedented white voter
backlash. Since 2008, Democrats lost 69 House seats, 13 Senate seats, 910
state legislative seats, 30 state legislative chambers, and 11 governorships.
As Smith concludes, whites rebelled not just against Obama and his party,
but against the ideal of racial equality that Obama’s election symbolized.155
This is, arguably, most apparent in the phenomenal rise of the so-­called
Tea Party movement during the Obama administration.156
The purported genesis of the Tea Party was the economic recession
of 2007–­2008. Ostensibly, extreme far-­right members of the Republican
party railed against the expanding national debt, rising taxes, and the
specter of universal health care. To this end, the Tea Party positioned itself
as a champion on the alienated working class in the abstract. In practice,
however, the Tea Party was openly racist in its opposition to the Obama
administration. Posters and placards at Tea Party rallies, for example, regu­
larly demeaned Obama in racial terms; often, the president was depicted
as a monkey or a half-­naked African witch doctor. Confederate battle
flags were ever-­present and Nazi symbols were not uncommon. Indeed,
despite repeated claims of race neutrality, the movement attracted numer-
ous white nationalists and anti-­immigrant activists.157 Effectively, the Tea
Party moved many white voters from an attitude of racial indifference
to intolerance and outright hostility. As Smith details, in 2008—­prior to
Obama’s election—­only 26 percent of whites could recall a specific inci-
dent in which they were discriminated against because of their race. In
other words, for the vast majority of whites, racial discrimination was a
nonissue and, accordingly, they could remain largely indifferent to broader
conversations on race relations in the United States. However, by 2014, a
majority of white Americans agreed with the sentiment that discrimina-
tion against whites was a serious problem, even more so than discrimina-
tion against Blacks. This attitude was expressed most strongly among many
 Whose Lives Matter? · 135

conservative whites but especially those who identified with the Tea Party
movement. Indeed, 76 percent of white Tea Party supporters believed that
racial discrimination against whites was a significant problem.158 In addi-
tion, Tea Party members were far more likely than other white Americans
to reject discrimination as contributing to the economic plight of Black
people and to believe that Blacks simply do not try hard enough. In the
twisted logic of white supremacy, federal, state, and local programs un-
fairly benefit undeserving and irresponsible Blacks at the expense of white
workers—­despite the fact that white Americans, on the whole, are eco-
nomically better off than Blacks. And it was in this context the Tea Party
paved the way for a revanchist white supremacist presidency.
In June 2015 the real estate mogul and celebrity icon Donald Trump
announced his candidacy for president of the United States. He began
his presidential bid with a polemical speech describing the United States
as a failed country beset with innumerable problems. For Trump, these
problems were embodied especially by undocumented Mexican work-
ers, whom he described as nothing more than rapists, criminals, and drug
dealers.159 In blunt and blatant terms, Trump’s comments revealed in no
uncertain terms the nature and strategy of his campaign: over the next 18
months he refined his appeal and extended his racist rhetoric toward Black
inner-­city residents, Muslims, and other nonwhite immigrant groups.160
In addition, Trump’s campaign slogan of “Make America Great Again”
was crafted to appeal to the powerful image of the white working class. As
Douglas Schrock and colleagues identify, Trump’s rhetoric underscored
the decline of blue-­collar jobs and portrayed (falsely) that the economy
was in a precipitous downfall.161 Indeed, Trump effectively capitalized on
the “left behind” thesis, the carefully crafted narrative that supposed ad-
vancements experienced by Blacks, Hispanics, and other minority groups
came at the expense of white workers. However, under Trump’s tutelage,
the superior productivity of the white working class would literally make
American great again.
Trump to that end repeatedly expressed sympathy for the white working
class and tapped into existing feelings of alienation, fear, and vulnerability.
In the process, however, Trump signaled his commitment to whiteness as
a whole.162 And the mainstream media, knowingly or not, underscored
Trump’s racist message. As Hugh Gusterson explains, news programs con-
sistently put disproportionate weight on a single narrative thread: the role of
free trade and factory closings in alienating a postindustrial white working
136 · Whose Lives Matter?

class; in this respect, the media inadvertently reproduced the discourse

of Trump.163 Throughout the presidential campaign of 2016 and into the
Trump presidency, for example, the narrative of the (white) working class
was a common refrain among the media and many commentators—­both
to the left and right of the political spectrum. For conservative pundits
especially, the white alienated subject was (and is) called upon to do the
heavy lifting of white supremacy, that is, to stand in for all the perceived
ills confronting and upending the privileges of whiteness. Media outlets,
in turn, reified the mythology of the beaten down blue-­collar worker—­
portrayed almost exclusively as a white man, while the precarious condi-
tions of African Americans and other minority groups were downplayed
or disregarded.
However, Trump’s message was not directed exclusively or even pri-
marily toward actual members of the white working class but instead to the
white community in general, for the mythology of the industrious, gritty
blue-­collar worker is a powerful elixir of white supremacy: The Rust Belt
steel worker, the Appalachian coal miner, the Midwestern farmer. That is,
Trump had no intention to actually help white workers. Rather, Trump
capitalized on the value of white supremacist ideology and parlayed the
myth of the heroic but embattled blue-­collar worker into political victory.
As Schrock and his coauthors document, by emphasizing the decimation
of blue collar jobs, Trump’s rhetoric represented the economy as losing
ground in ways that could evoke both anxiety or fear among the (white)
working class and sympathy among the less precarious white population
for their plight.164 In short, Trump tapped into the discontent and aliena­
tion of the white working class in the abstract, blamed Blacks and other
people of color for their problems, and pledged salvation through the
restoration of supremacy for all whites. Hence, Trump’s repeated attacks
against Obama reinforced the intolerance and resentment expressed by
many whites who steadfastly believed the false narrative that Obama was
looking out for African Americans and, in so doing, enacted tyrannical
policies that marginalized members of the white working class.
Simply put, modern political conservativism’s success—­including the
rise of Trumpism—­is dependent in part on the mobilization of far-­right
and fringe groups that push the boundaries of the conservative flank of
the political spectrum, including anti-­immigrant, gun rights, and “pa-
triot” groups.165 In doing so, the white alienated subject appears as the
foot soldier of the conservative agenda, for this figure embodies the idea
 Whose Lives Matter? · 137

that members of the white working class are denied the opportunity to live
a flourishing, meaningful life because of unfair competition promulgated
by liberal and progressive forces. Consequently, any exclusionary focus on
the white working class—­and especially of the white alienated subject—­
risks exculpating the much larger portion of Trump’s coalition who are
white and middle class or white and well off.166 The primary beneficiary
of Trumpism is not the downtrodden white worker, but white supremacy.
From the standpoint of many white people, racism is thoroughly ratio-
nal and its perpetuation desirable, both for material and meaningful rea-
sons. Indeed, as Eduardo Bonilla-­Silva explains, given that white people’s
subject positions are fundamentally built on notions of freedom and of
being self-­made, as hard-­working people in opposition to racial Others
whom they see as lazy and undeserving, their support for Trump makes
emotional sense. They love Trump not just because he promised them jobs
and a border wall; rather, Trump relates to many whites because he of-
fers “emotional appeasement.”167 Thus, as Hooker explains, many Trump
supporters, some of whom erupted in outbursts of white rage, expressed
feeling empowered by his unequivocal embrace of white nativism and his
populist, xenophobic, and racist appeals targeting Latino immigrants, Mus-
lims, and Black Lives Matter protestors.168
Evocative of the white backlash of the 1970s and 1980s, the spectacle
of Trumpism—­from red MAGA hats to patriotic flags emblazoned with
the Trump name flown on pickup trucks—­pays homage to the mythical
white alienated subject as the proud defender of traditional American val-
ues. In reality, the Trump administration consistently initiated policies or
eliminated those programs that would effectively benefit exploited workers
of all subject positions. In fact, Trump and the Republican-­led Senate al-
most exclusively legislated policies that worked against the working class,
all the while championing the mythology of the (white) alienated subject.
To this end, Trumpism was but the latest iteration of neoliberal capital-
ism, as large corporations sought to ensure that the majority of economic
gains are absorbed by executives and shareholders and not employees.169
Notably, the Trump administration derailed an Obama-­era plan to ex-
tend overtime protections to workers; undermined efforts to hold busi-
nesses liable for wage violations against contract and franchise workers;
ended a requirement that contractors meet federal labor standards; sided
with corporate interests to let companies force workers into mandatory
arbi­tration agreements; made it easier for employers to eliminate unions;
138 · Whose Lives Matter?

empowered employer discrimination by revoking civil rights protections;

reversed protections against pesticides and chemicals in the workplace;
and reduced overall workplace safety enforcement.170 Collectively, the
Trump administration weakened the legal rights of the working class, in-
creased their overall precarity, and gutted health and safety regulations,
all of which contribute to their increased precarity and vulnerability to
premature death.
That a sizeable portion of the white working class continued to support
Trump throughout his presidency and after is indicative of the power of
white supremacy and their internalization of the alienated subject. Simply
put, many white workers cling to the rhetoric used so effectively by Nixon,
Reagan, Trump, and other politicians, namely, that economic losses expe-
rienced by hard-­working white people are caused by economic gains en-
joyed by undeserving Black people and other minorities. The fight against
a livable minimum wage, for example, is camouflaged as “a reactionary,
anti-­Black working-­class movement” in that “raising the federal minimum
wage would incommensurately benefit Black workers because they are
overrepresented among low-­wage workers.”171 Consequently, the racism,
misogyny, and xenophobia of Trumpism portends a particularly virulent
form of racial nostalgia that magnifies symbolic Black gains into occasions
of white dislocation and displacement.172
From this vantage point, Trump’s overt racism—­and his popularity
among predominantly white voters—­is actually a reversal of the Southern
Strategy, in that increasingly coded language is discarded in favor of overt
racist statements. In other words, Trump normalized overt white suprem-
acy. In addition, the vehemence and virulence on display among many
Trump supporters both during and after the election is testimony to how
deeply white supremacy is rooted in U.S. society. Indeed, Cheryl Matias
and Peter Newlove caution that the United States, under Trump, entered
a “moment of emboldened en/whitening epistemology that is character-
ized by the perverse re-­appropriation of civil rights and socially just ter-
minologies and concepts—­once used to support the rights of People of
Color—­to instead strengthen White nationalism.”173 They explain: “By
self-­aggrandizing and perversely re-­packaging Whiteness as an ideology
that has been discriminated against or victimized by diversity or political
correctness, Trump offered racists a way of justifying discrimination to-
ward women, People of Color, immigrants, and Muslim Americans.” And,
as we will see, it is this emboldened whiteness that underscored the intol-
 Whose Lives Matter? · 139

erance and hatred of many whites toward the simple demand that Black
lives matter.

Making Black Lives Matter

On February 26, 2012, George Zimmerman shot and killed Trayvon Mar-
tin, a seventeen-­year-­old African American who was visiting his father
in Sanford, Florida. Prior to the shooting, Zimmerman—­a neighborhood
watch captain—­called 911 to report a “suspicious person.” The dispatcher
instructed Zimmerman to not approach the person, but Zimmerman dis-
regarded the orders. What happened next remains unclear. Shots rang out
and someone screamed “Help, help!” What is certain is that Martin lay
dead on the ground.174 In response, over the following days and weeks, ral-
lies took place in cities across the country demanding justice for Trayvon
Martin. Zimmerman, however, repeatedly claimed self-­defense, arguing
that Martin had violently attacked him. It was not until six weeks later
that Zimmerman was finally indicted and made to stand trial on charges
of second-­degree murder. The racially charged trial, however, resulted in a
six-­person jury acquitting Zimmerman on all charges.
When acts of horrific violence go unpunished, Cazenave explains, they
have an impact that extends beyond any particular incident.175 So it was
in the aftermath of the Zimmerman verdict, for the acquittal reignited
feelings of anger and disillusionment throughout the Black community,
which, in turn, inspired action and activism.176 Alicia Garza, a young and
queer African American woman, was one such person. On the day the ver-
dict was announced, Garza was at a bar in Oakland, California. Despite
her youth, Garza was a long-­time activist in the Bay area. An advocate
for domestic workers and for queer and transgender rights, Garza had
also engaged in the struggle against police brutality and anti-­Black rac-
ism. After the verdict came out, Garza explains, she was momentarily at a
loss for words. She recalls: “We had nothing to say to each other, so most
of us turned to social media for an understanding of what other people
were saying to help us form our thoughts and make sense of the emotions
that we were feeling that moment. I went on to my Facebook and I saw a
whole number of things on my timeline that were related to this verdict,
and I saw a whole lot of things that disturbed me.”177 In response, Garza
began to express her feelings with posts: “the sad part is, there’s a section
of America who is cheering and celebrating right now. and that makes me
140 · Whose Lives Matter?

sick to my stomach. WE GOTTA get it together y’all.” Later, she continued:

“btw stop saying we are not surprised. that’s a damn shame in itself. I con-
tinue to be surprised at how little Black lives matter. And I will continue
that. stop giving up on black life.” She concluded with the simple, heartfelt
affirmation: “black people. I love you. I love us. Our lives matter.”178
For Garza, two disturbing trends were all too apparent. On the one
hand, she decried the “social justice cynicism” surrounding the Zimmer-
man verdict—­that justice always eludes Black people killed by police or
vigilantes in the United States—­and, on the other hand, she denounced
the “respectability politics” that premised Black people could overcome
their oppression by working harder and conforming to white America.
She later explained, “I was really tired of this narrative that blames black
people for conditions that we didn’t create. It felt like a dismissal of the real
tragedy: that black life doesn’t matter in this country.”179
In response to Garza’s post, her friend Patrisse Cullors created the
hashtag #BlackLivesMatter. Cullors, herself a queer African American
woman, was a graduate of the University of California at Los Angeles
and had been organizing in the LGBT community for many years. Cul-
lors posted: “declaration: black bodies will no longer be sacrificed for the
rest of the world’s enlightenment. i am done. i am so done. trayvon, you
are loved infinitely. #blacklivesmatter.”180 Two days later, Garza, Cullors,
and their friend Opal Tometi, through social media, began to transform
their emotions into a movement.181 Hoping to foster meaningful change
through peaceful protest, Garza, Cullors, and Tometi issued a call for di-
rect action.182 As Chase explains, “The importance and significance of
the early BLM social media posts reveal much of why the movement be-
came a center-­point of traditional and social media coverage in America.
The combination of love and anger, and the feeling that racial tensions had
reached a breaking point, was shared by people throughout the nation.”183
It was the killing in Ferguson, Missouri, of Michael Brown, however,
that galvanized the nascent Black Lives Matter movement.184 On August 9,
2014, Darren Wilson, a white police officer, pulled up in his squad car next
to eighteen-­year-­old Michael Brown and his friend, Dorian Johnson, who
were walking in the middle of the road instead of on the sidewalk. After
the initial stop, Wilson determined that Brown was a robbery suspect who
stole cigarillos from a local convenience store. What happened next re-
mains unclear. According to some witnesses, Wilson became aggressive,
while others claim that Brown was initially confrontational. Wilson then
 Whose Lives Matter? · 141

opened fire, Brown ran, turned around, and Wilson fired again. Wilson later
claimed self-­defense, arguing that Brown was charging at him. Brown died
about 150 feet away from Wilson; the unarmed youth was shot six times.185
Subsequently, in the aftermath of the shooting, members of the Ferguson
Police Department broke protocol and let Brown’s body lie visible for hours
in the middle of the street. For Cazenave, this was symbolic, in that the
police seemingly wanted to send a message of terror to other community
members.186
That the response of law enforcement was predicated on intimidation
is hardly surprising. The Ferguson Police Department (FPD), as later in-
vestigations revealed, had a sordid history of fomenting racial terror and
violence. Indeed, the U.S. Department of Justice concluded in 2014 that the
FPD—­and the Ferguson Municipal Court—­routinely violated the consti-
tutional rights of African Americans. In a review of over 35,000 pages of
police records and hundreds of interviews, investigators determined that
Ferguson police officers as a matter of practice stopped African Americans
without reasonable suspicion, arrested them without probable cause, and
used unreasonable force against them.187
The death of Brown and, later, the failure of a grand jury to indict Wilson,
became the catalyst for weeks of demonstrations and protests in Fergu-
son and beyond.188 Initially, community members came together to hold a
candlelight vigil both in memory of Brown and in solidarity against con-
tinual police and vigilante killings of African Americans. In turn, seem-
ingly looking to provoke a response from the peaceful protestors, police
forces routinely arrived in armored vehicles with riot gear, tear gas, flash-­
bang grenades, sound cannons, and guns equipped with rubber bullets.189
Members of the Black community, however, refused to be intimidated and
continued to demand that Black Lives Matter. As Ransby explains, the
“Ferguson uprising, an organic mass rebellion sparked by Brown’s death
at the hands of a notoriously racist local police force, was a defining mo-
ment” in that protestors “defied state power and exposed what many out-
side the Black community would rather ignore—­the violent underbelly of
racial capitalism and systemic racism.”190
Ferguson was a microcosm of the violence of racial capitalism and
systemic racism. In 1990, for example, Ferguson was a middle-­class com-
munity with a population about three-­quarters white; by 2010, the popula-
tion was two-­thirds black, unemployment had exceeded 13 percent, and
the number of residents living in poverty had doubled in the span of a
142 · Whose Lives Matter?

decade.191 Thus, according to Ransby, “while Brown’s killing was the cata-
lyst, the Black working class of Ferguson was angry about much more, and
their anger resonated and reverberated around the country and beyond.”192
Indeed, as Taylor details, Black protestors subsequently unmasked the
kleptocracy at the heart of municipal operations in Ferguson, revealing
that the FPD expressly and routinely targeted the Black population as the
major source of revenue. Black households, in turn, were inundated with
fines, fees, citations, tickets, and arrests for minor violations to such an
extent that the revenues generated were the town’s second leading source
of revenue.193 To this end, vigilante violence and state-­sanctioned killings
by law enforcement officers worked to uphold a racially unjust system that
marginalized and further exploited African Americans.
For many white people weaned on decades of racist War on Drugs rheto­
ric, Ferguson symbolized yet another example of the inherent criminal-
ity of Blacks. As Bryan Adamson documents, in recounting the Ferguson
events, the “media hewed to a pro-­majoritarian orthodoxy that privileged
stability over dissent, and allowed audiences to ignore the role structural
racism and bias may have played in Brown’s death and the grievances
demonstrators sought to surface.”194 Indeed, rather than understanding
the protests as a manifestation of economic anxiety experienced by alien-
ated workers, Blacks themselves were blamed for their problems. Taylor
elaborates: “Explanations for Black inequality that blame Black people for
their own oppression transforms material causes into subjective causes.
The problem is not racial discrimination in the workplace or residential
segregation: it is Black irresponsibility, erroneous social mores, and gen-
eral bad behavior.”195 The Black Lives Matter movement emerged, in part,
to challenge these explanations.
From the outset, the Black Lives Matter movement was conceived as an
intersectional effort to call attention to the vulnerability of being Black in
the United States. As Garza explains, “Black Lives Matter is an ideological
and political intervention in a world where Black Lives are systematically
and intentionally targeted for demise. It is an affirmation of Black folks’
contributions to this society, our humanity, and our resilience in the face of
deadly oppression”196 To this end, the affirmation that Black Lives Matter
is simultaneously a demand for radical transformation of those structures
and institutions that result in the premature deaths of African Americans
and a demand to enjoy the right to live a flourishing life and to find mean-
ing in a shared humanity.
 Whose Lives Matter? · 143

Demanding accountability for state-­sanctioned violence, Black Lives

Matter activists utilize a variety of tactics, including marches, rallies, and
“die-­ins.” However, social struggles are inherently spatial struggles and, to
this point, a highly effective technique of BLM activists has been to oc-
cupy public spaces: highways, intersections, sporting events, retail stores,
malls, campaign events, police stations, and municipal buildings.197 These
techniques are extremely effective in that they literally disrupt the flow
of capital, that is, they interrupt the everydayness of the economy. Such
disturbances not only force people to take notice; they also visibly demon-
strate the connection between police violence and racial capitalism. This,
for the supporters of the Black Lives Matter activists, is vital, for the overall
message is that the harmful conditions experienced by African Americans
are both structural and systemic.
Weeks prior to the killing of Brown, for example, New York City Po-
lice officer Daniel Panteleo choked to death Eric Garner, a forty-­three-­
year-­old African American husband and father of six; four days before
Brown’s death, John Crawford III, a twenty-­two-­year-­old, unarmed Afri-
can American man, was killed in a Wal-­Mart in a suburb of Dayton, Ohio,
while he talked on the phone with the mother of his children; two days after
Brown’s murder, police in Los Angeles shot Ezell Ford, a twenty-­five-­year-­
old, unarmed African American man after an unprovoked investigative
stop; and the following day, in Victorville, California, Dante Parker, a thirty-­
six-­year-­old African American man, was detained while riding a bicycle by
police on suspicion of burglary and tasered multiple times before dying
in police custody.198 These were not isolated events, activists stressed; nor
were these the consequence of a few “bad apples” as conservative pundits
would have it. Indeed, it is especially common for white pundits to dismiss
police violence as abnormalities—­if such violence is even acknowledged.
Many whites, for example, will single out a particular case and attempt to
either portray the Black victim as somehow ­responsible—­he was probably
in the act of committing a crime ­anyway—­or claim that the offending po-
lice officer was merely a bad apple. Both arguments effectively counter the
demonstrable evidence that police violence against African Americans and
other persons of color is a systemic problem, rooted in the institutional and
legislative structures of the United States. As Cazenave explains, “Such kill-
ings are often symptomatic of much larger systemic operations that go way
beyond and much deeper than just the attitudes and actions of a few rogue
individuals.”199
144 · Whose Lives Matter?

Importantly, the Black Lives Matter movement calls attention to the

fact that it is not just Black men who are routinely detained, arrested, and
killed. Black women and Black trans folk are exceptionally vulnerable to
violence, although their plight is too often neglected. As Taylor writes,
“Police also view Black women’s lives with suspicion and ultimately as
less valuable, making their death and brutalization more likely, not less.
It is hardly even newsworthy when Black women, including Black trans-
women, are killed or violated by law enforcement—­because they are gen-
erally seen as less feminine or vulnerable.”200 During a Trans Liberation
Tuesday demonstration held in San Francisco in August 2015, for example,
Garza explained: “We understand that, in our communities, black trans
folk, gender-­nonconforming folk, black queer folk, black women, black
disabled folk—­we have been leading movements for a long time, but we
have been erased from the official narrative.”201
The efforts of Black Lives Matter coincide with parallel movements,
notably the #SayHerName campaign initiated in 2015. In that year, the
African American Policy Forum, a New York-­based racial justice think
tank cofounded by the Black feminist legal theorist Kimberlé Crenshaw,
coined the Twitter hashtag #SayHerName also in an effort to call attention
to the voices and faces of the numerous Black women who were recently
killed by the police—­deaths that were relatively ignored by the public and
the mainstream media.202 #SayHerName makes intersectional mobiliza-
tion part of its agenda with affirmations of commitment to issues of mem-
bers of many subgroups within the Black community, including women,
LGTBQ members, and the differently abled.203
Collectively, movements such as Black Lives Matter and #SayHerName
mark concerted efforts to decenter the racial, gendered, and sexual pre-
sumptions of the alienated subject, that is, to direct attention to the exploi-
tation and oppression of all persons of color, but especially those of the
working class. In doing so, a narrative centered on Black women and trans
folk serves as both an antisexist and antiracist effort to illuminate how
social issues, such as police violence and the school-­to-­prison pipeline,
impact more than just straight cis Black men.204 Accordingly, these activ-
ists acknowledge the unequal vulnerability to a life cut short by, especially,
police and vigilante violence; but it also calls out the structural conditions
that contribute to health-­related premature death, such as the lack of ad-
equate medical care or health insurance. To this end, these movements
must also be seen as part of a long-­standing and fiercely contested struggle
 Whose Lives Matter? · 145

over the ability of African Americans to lead meaningful lives free from
premature death.
Within three years Black Lives Matter transformed into a nationwide
movement and, according to Juliet Hooker, marks an “important inflection
point” in U.S. racial politics.205 As Hooker writes, “the protests signaled a
potential moment of Black political radicalization, when pragmatic forms
of Black politics principally aimed at descriptive representation have been
overshadowed by a vocal movement seeking to dismantle some of the key
pillars of contemporary white supremacy: mass incarceration, violent po-
licing, a biased criminal justice system, and the pervasive criminalization
of Black life.”206 The Black Lives Matter movement, however, should not
be seen in isolation from a centuries-­long struggle against systemic rac-
ism and violence in the United States, but instead as the latest iteration
in the effort to “preserve Black life in the face of white supremacist vio-
lence.”207 This is a history that includes, among other activities, the anti-
lynching crusades of Ida B. Wells, the Negro Silent Protest Parade of 1917,
the protests surrounding the Scottsboro Boys case of the 1930s, the 1951
We Charge Genocide Campaign petition by the Civil Rights Congress, and
the actions of the Deacons for Defense and the Black Panthers during the
civil rights era.208 Garza and her cofounders of Black Lives Matter readily
acknowledge this debt—­but also underscore how they depart from previ-
ous movements. As Garza explains, “We don’t see ourselves as a trend, we
certainly don’t see ourselves as a brand, and of course we don’t see our-
selves as a hashtag.” For Garza, Black Lives Matter is part of an emerging
social movement which has “many tributaries.” She elaborates: Black Lives
Matter is “not the leader of [the] movement for black liberation. It is one
contribution to a broader movement for social justice and social transfor-
mation.”209 She continues:

Black Lives Matter is a unique contribution that goes beyond

extrajudicial killings of Black people by police and vigilantes. It
goes beyond the narrow nationalism that can be prevalent within
some Black communities, which merely call on Black people to
love Black, live Black and buy Black, keeping straight cis Black men
in the front of the movement while our sisters, queer and trans and
disabled folk take up roles in the background or not at all. Black
Lives Matter affirms the lives of Black queer and trans folks, dis-
abled folks, Black-­undocumented folks, folks with records, women
146 · Whose Lives Matter?

and all Black lives along the gender spectrum. It centers those that
have been marginalized within Black liberation movements. It is a
tactic to (re)build the Black liberation movement.210

Tometi echoes these sentiments. “Black Lives Matter is often called a

‘civil rights’ movement,” she explains, but hastens to add, “to think that
our fight is solely about civil rights is to misunderstand the fundamen-
tal aspirations of this movement.”211 For Tometi, the struggle is “for full
civil, social, political, legal, economic, and cultural rights.” To this end,
the Black Lives Matter movement, as Tometi underscores, “is beyond just,
‘Stop killing us, we deserve to live.’ ” Rather, it marks an effort for uncondi-
tional emancipation where Blacks and other oppressed peoples are able to
live a meaningful, flourishing life—­a point effectively captured by Tometi:
“We deserve to thrive, and this requires the full acknowledgement of the
breadth of our human rights.”212
To this end, the Black Lives Matter movement is intimately part of a
much longer geographic struggle informed by Black radicalism.213 How-
ever, as Cedric Robinson is quick to explain, Black radicalism “is not a
variant of Western radicalism whose proponents happen to be Black.
Rather, it is a specifically African response to an oppression emergent from
the immediate determinants of European development in the modern era
and framed by orders of human exploitation woven into the interstices of
European social life from the inception of Western Civilization.”214 Per-
sonified by Paul Robeson, Claude McKay, Richard Wright, and C. L. R.
James, among many others, Black radicalism constitutes a particular way
of understanding revolutionary consciousness, one that centrally prefig-
ures Black workers. As Kelley writes, the demands for Black emancipation
and self-­determination is “not simply a matter of guaranteeing democratic
rights or removing the barriers to Black political and economic power.”215
Instead, Black radicalism “is about promoting and supporting an inde-
pendent Black radical movement that [can] lead the way to a revitalized
international working-­class assault on racial capitalism.”216
Accordingly, while a prominent concern of the Black Lives Matter
movement is the abolition of state-­sanctioned violence, the defunding of
law enforcement agencies, and the dismantling of the carceral state, these
alone are insufficient. Additional demands—­not reforms—­are necessary
to address the vulnerability of Black and Brown people, women, trans-
gender people, and the disabled. As such, Black Lives Matter activists
 Whose Lives Matter? · 147

have called for “investment in solutions like quality education, restorative

justice, mental and emotional health support, and job opportunities.”217
For Tometi, at a most basic level, the Black Lives Matter agenda “is for
all people” and once achieved “will create an inclusive democracy that
guarantees freedom and justice for all.”218 This requires, in turn, the ar-
ticulation of specific Black geographies. Not to be confused with Trump’s
ham-­fisted calls to make America great again, the notion of Black geog-
raphies signifies an attempt, as Katherine McKittrick explains, to locate
and draw on “black histories and black subjects in order to make visible
social lives which are often displaced, rendered ungeographic.”219 Camilla
Hawthorne elaborates, noting that “the deadly entanglements of white su-
premacy, capitalism, settler colonialism, patriarchy, and heteronormativity
today call for careful attention to the connections between space, place,
and power.”220
Reflective of these social and spatial goals, the epistemological orien-
tation of Black Lives Matter is explicitly geographic and intersectional.
Indeed, for Tometi, “This period in history is a celebration of intersection-
ality, which mandates that the full breadth of our humanity be acknowl-
edged and embraced. This means that queer, trans, migrant, formerly
incarcerated, disabled and all of us who find ourselves unapologetic about
our complexity are more committed than ever to champion the scope of
the human rights agenda that we deserve.”221 Notably, as Garza explains,
“Our work is heavily influenced by [Kimberlé] Crenshaw’s theory. People
think that we’re engaged with identity politics. The truth is that we’re doing
what the labor movement has always done—­organizing people who are at
the bottom.”222 Here, it is worth quoting Garza at length:

When we say Black Lives Matter, we are talking about the ways
in which Black people are deprived of our basic human rights
and dignity. It is an acknowledgement [that] Black poverty and
genocide is state violence. It is an acknowledgement that 1 million
Black people are locked in cages in this country . . . is an act of
state violence. It is an acknowledgment that Black women continue
to bear the burden of a relentless assault on our children and our
families and that assault is an act of state violence. Black queer and
trans folk bearing a unique burden in a hetero-­patriarchal society
that disposes of us like garbage and simultaneously fetishizes us
and profits off of us is state violence; the fact that 500,000 Black
148 · Whose Lives Matter?

people in the US are undocumented immigrants and relegated to

the shadows is state violence; the fact that Black girls are used as
negotiating chips during times of conflict and war is state violence;
Black folks living with disabilities and different abilities bear the
burden of state-­sponsored Darwinian experiments that attempt to
squeeze us into boxes of normality defined by White supremacy is
state violence. And the fact is that the lives of Black people—­not
ALL people—­exist within these conditions is [a] consequence of
state violence.223

Of the vulnerability of Black people to premature death, Garza under-

scores the supposition that “when Black people get free, everybody gets
free.”224 In other words, Garza and members of the Black Lives Movement
recognize the emancipatory potential of Blacks and other minorities in a
class-­divided society mediated by white supremacy. This requires, how-
ever, a sensitivity to the world-­making and meaning-­making potential of
the human species-­being. She explains: “#BlackLivesMatter doesn’t mean
your life isn’t important—­it means that Black lives, which are seen without
value within White supremacy, are important to your liberation. Given the
disproportionate impact state violence has on Black lives, we understand
that when Black people in this country get free, the benefits will be wide
reaching and transformative for society as a whole.”225
Notably, Garza affirms the revolutionary aspirations—­and potential—­
­of the Black Lives Matter movement in terms not unlike the proletarian
revolution of Marx and his interlocutors. However, the central figure is
not the lunch-­box-­toting factory worker but instead the undocumented
Latinx workers harvesting crops in California, the second-­generation
Haitian man driving a bus, and the queer Black woman teaching in an
inner-­city school. As Taylor identifies, “the Black Lives Matter movement
has the potential to make deeper connections to and create relationships
with organized labor.”226 She elaborates that “Black workers continue to be
unionized at higher rates than white workers. The reason is simple: Black
union workers make far above and beyond what nonunion Black workers
make, in salary and benefits. Black workers also tend to be concentrated
in the sectors most under attack by the state—­federal, state, and local gov-
ernment, including education and other municipal jobs.”227 That said, the
relationship of the Black Lives Matter movement to white working-­class
and poor people remains unclear.228
 Whose Lives Matter? · 149

For those on the left, there are signs of optimism. Throughout the United
States, many of the protests condemning police violence witnessed sig-
nificant working-­class participation. Indeed, working-­class members of all
racial, gendered, and sexual subject positions rose up in solidarity with
Black workers to protest against state-­sanctioned violence. Throughout
June 2020, more than six hundred strikes or work stoppages were carried
out. For example, on June 9, the day of Floyd’s funeral, Black dockwork-
ers in Charleston, South Carolina, shut down the country’s fourth busiest
port in a show of camaraderie with the Black Lives Matter movement. This
was part of a nationwide effort initiated by the International Longshore
Association—­a union that is 65 percent Black.229 Impressive as these num-
bers are, they are perhaps just the tip of the iceberg, for the tally is likely an
undercount of the full scale and scope of labor-­led protests. According to
Mike Elk, many workers, often in nonunionized workplaces, are organiz-
ing through social media wildcat strikes, work stoppages, and other non-
traditional forms of resistance. In doing so, however, many white labor
leaders fail to understand this new form of labor movement; these actions,
in addition, are often unreported in the media, thereby contributing to an
underestimation of their significance.
One event that did garner more attention was the momentous Strike
for Black Lives held on July 20, 2020. Composed of workers representing
dozens of unions and social justice organizations, a series of coordinated
protests were staged in more than twenty-­five cities across the United
States. Standing alongside members of the Service Employees Interna-
tional Union (SEIU), the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, and the
American Federation of Teachers, were members of the Fight for 15, United
Farm Workers, the National Domestic Workers Alliance, the Movement
for Black Lives, and the Poor People’s Campaign. Collectively, participants
protested not only police violence and racial injustice but also the Trump
administration’s mishandling of the Covid-­19 pandemic.230 As Mary Kay
Henry, president of the SEIU, explains, “Across the country, people are
gaining a new understanding that it is impossible to win economic justice
without racial justice. That health care for all, fair immigration policies,
and bold action on climate change all require racial justice.”231
The Strike for Black Lives and countless other strikes, stoppages, and
demonstrations reflect the actually existing conditions of labor across the
United States and challenge the myth of the white working class promoted
by so many pundits, politicians, academics, and journalists. And these
150 · Whose Lives Matter?

workers are making the connections. Mary Kay Henry, for example, ex-
plains: “This is a unique and hopeful moment in our movement’s history,
because in organizing this strike with our partners, we found broad accep-
tance and acclamation that now is the time to take large-­scale action to de-
mand that corporations and government do more to dismantle structural
racism and protect Black lives. We are all clear that until Black communi-
ties can thrive, none of us can win.”232 This is a common refrain; and one
that resonates with Marx’s premise that the proletariat in solidarity can
form an effective adversary to capitalism. This requires, though, recogni-
tion of the heterogeneity of labor and the intersectionality of alienation,
exploitation, and oppression. Unfortunately, for many whites accustomed
to a privileged position within the labor movement, this does not always
sit well.
White-­dominated union leadership mostly ignored the wave of strikes
that pulsed across the country over the summer of 2020.233 Mike Duff, a
sixty-­year-­old Black and longtime labor activist, worries about the lack
of support from many traditional and well-­established unions, many of
which fail to take seriously the heterogeneity both of the protesters and the
methods employed. He explains that the lack of support from white labor
leaders “reinforces the idea that some white labor activists see issues solely
in terms of class and underemphasize the impact of race in labor con-
flict.” He continues: “Some people who feel the white labor establishment
is overly focused on class to the exclusion of race and this quibbling in an
academic way over the definition of work stoppages when Black, working-­
class people feel they are engaging in work stoppages feed into their [class
reductionist] narrative.”234 In short, the contributions of Black members of
the working class are discounted and seen not as viable, effective, or proper
forms of labor activism.
Indeed, the overall response of the establishment form of labor has
been lukewarm at best. In the aftermath of Floyd’s death, for example, the
AFL-­CIO and many national labor unions issued statements in support of
the protests and in opposition to systemic racism. Beyond these platitudes,
little material support was forthcoming. As Alexia Fernández Campbell
finds, leaders of the country’s labor unions mostly “tiptoed” around the
subject, and for reasons not wholly unexpected.235 Markedly, the leader-
ship of the AFL-­CIO was hesitant to critique law enforcement agencies, for
the fact that police unions routinely negotiate collective bargaining agree-
ments that make it nearly impossible to discipline law enforcement officers
 Whose Lives Matter? · 151

who maim or kill Blacks and other persons of color.236 Complicating the
issue, also, is the reality that the livelihood of some workers, notably prison
guards, depends on the carceral state.237
Still, Garza speaks to the optimism of the present moment, noting that
young people especially “are making the connection between racism, pov-
erty, and police and state violence.” She elaborates that ongoing protests
and demonstrations highlight “an opportunity for us to make sure we’re
addressing issues of racism in our communities and connecting racism to
poverty and exploitation.” Indeed, as Garza reaffirms, in many respects the
Black Lives Matter movement is “really the face of the new labor move-
ment.”238 To this end, “Although African American workers have launched
multiple movements for living wages, reparations, and an end to economic
exploitation, the lack of support from the labor movement has restricted
access to the benefits of democracy.”239
Indeed, around the world, as detailed earlier, those committed to social
justice and the building of antiracist and antisexist societies make these
connections and express solidarity through an ethos of care. In their state-
ment of support, for example, the KJK concludes: “It is time to declare a
meaningful war on this oppressive system in its entirety. This means that
we have to understand and lead the fight against White Supremacy, nation-
alism, sexism and capitalism as one. We have to stand-­up for an alternative
system which values differences as the richness of society working towards
a mosaic-­like cohesion of diversity to unite our struggles. Simply, people
should not be regarded as inferior just because of their skin color, gen-
der, ethnic and religious identity. Let’s build our free life beyond the state,
power and hierarchy through democratic structures of self-­organization
and self-­determination.”240
But many white Americans did not—­and still do not—­make the connec­
tion. Indeed, many white Americans continue to take these killings in
stride. Conditioned to accept the disposability of Black lives, the lack of di-
rect action on the part of many whites revealed the pervasive indifference
to Black people’s heightened vulnerability to premature death—­and not
just at the hands of the police. Indeed, decades of strategically deployed
color-­blind ideology conditioned white Americans to remain apathetic at
best to the plight of Blacks and other persons of color. As Tony Brown
and colleagues explain, racial apathy “taps white indifference and noncha-
lance. Racial apathy represents whites covering their eyes when asked to
view their privilege.”241 To this end, to be indifferent, that is, to express
152 · Whose Lives Matter?

racial apathy, to the Black Lives Matter movement is to be indifferent to

the underlying conditions that gave rise to the movement, notably racial
inequalities, widespread police brutality, and a criminal justice system
geared toward the profitable incarceration of (predominantly) persons of
color and of working-­class whites.
For many white people, therefore, the killing of Brown, Floyd, and so
many other persons of color illustrates not systemic racism but—­at most—­
the actions of a few bad apples. Accordingly, the demands among the Black
Lives Matter protestors are misguided and misplaced, for all that is re-
quired is better training programs among law enforcement agencies. Any-
thing beyond these individual-­level reforms would constitute preferential
treatment and thus go against their cherished myth of color-­blind meri-
tocracy. Consequently, the failings of Blacks and other persons of color—­
even their failure to avoid premature death at the hands of the police—­is
the result of their own bad decisions and behavior. George Floyd would be
alive if he had obeyed Derek Chauvin’s warnings; Michael Brown would
be alive if he hadn’t stolen cigarillos; Travyon Martin would be alive if he
hadn’t attacked George Zimmerman; and so on and so on.
The Black Lives Matter movement challenges these assumptions and, in
doing so, troubled many white people and forced them out of their emo-
tional comfort zone. With the ongoing and national coverage of the Black
Lives Matter movement, inaction and indifference became more problem-
atic. Certainly, many white people expressed outrage at racial injustice and
joined in solidarity with the protesters; others, however, expressed intol-
erance and hatred toward the protesters. For these whites, the visibility
of protests was discomforting to the point of anger. On this point, Robin
DiAngelo introduces the concept of “white fragility,” that is, an emotional
state in which even a minimum amount of racial stress becomes intoler-
able and potentially triggers a range of defense behaviors, including the
capacity to hurt.242 Accustomed, for example, “to the false notion that we
live in a color-­blind society, whites are protected from feeling discomfort,
shame, or personal responsibility for the realities of racism.”243 The Black
Lives Matter movement made this all but impossible. As such, many white
people read into the affirmation that Black Lives Matter is a threat to the
value of white lives, that is, they interpreted a Black-­affirming statement as
being antiwhite.244 To this end, the very phrase “Black Lives Matter” elicits
tremendous anger and scorn among many whites, most notably among
 Whose Lives Matter? · 153

conservative whites.245 Social media platforms, for example, Facebook,

were (and remain) awash with vitriolic messages and conspiracy theo-
ries denouncing the Black Lives Matter movement as violently antiwhite.
Members of these online communities have used profane slurs to refer to
Black people and protestors, calling them “animals,” “thugs,” and worse;
some have argued that protestors were paid to go to demonstrations; and
still others have suggested that even the death of Floyd was staged.246
Drawing on a deep well of negative images of Black people, demon­
strations by Black Lives Matter activists were (and are) portrayed by
right-­wing pundits and politicians as criminal, that is, as lawless, violent
gatherings.247 At a rally in support of the police in Philadelphia, for ex-
ample, the police union president described Black Lives Matter activists
as “a pack of rabid animals.” Such dehumanizing language not only denies
the constitutional right afforded to African Americans to make claims on
the state but also minimalizes the human and civil rights abuses directed
against African Americans.248 And this response is not unique. Despite
substantial data indicating that the vast majority of Black Lives Matter
demonstrations are peaceful, a substantial number of people, but especially
white people, believe that “most protesters are trying to incite violence or
destroy property.”249 In June 2020, several surveys indicated disapproval
with the demonstrations. According to one poll, for example, only 17 per-
cent of respondents believed the actions of the protesters were fully jus-
tified, 37 percent felt the actions were partially justified, and 38 percent
said they weren’t justified at all; and in a separate poll, fully 55 percent of
respondents supported the use of the U.S. military to quell the demonstra-
tions.250 By September 2020, a near-­majority, 47 percent, of whites polled
registered their opposition to the Black Lives Matter movement.251
That such a white backlash materialized in light of the Black Lives Matter
movement is hardly surprising. On the one hand, as Barbara Applebaum
explains, white privilege “insulates white people in a protected cocoon of
comfort that creates an expectation of comfort.”252 In other words, white
privilege provides not only meaning in life but also offers emotional stabil-
ity. Confronted with the demand that Black Lives Matter, white people’s
complacency toward and complicity in the perpetuation of structures
and institutions that fostered unequal vulnerabilities to premature death
among persons of color became untenable. However, on the other hand,
white supremacists and members of other far-­right hate groups launched
154 · Whose Lives Matter?

an insidious disinformation campaign to smear both the protesters and

the overall Black Lives Matter movement. The Anti-­Defamation League
(ADL), for example, documented several organized disinformation cam-
paigns aimed at spreading a “deliberate mischaracterization of groups or
movements [involved in the protests], such as portraying activists who
support Black Lives Matter as violent extremists or claiming that antifa
[protesters who are antifascist] is a terrorist organization coordinated or
manipulated by nebulous external forces.”253 As the ADL finds, these false
claims were promoted with the clear intention to sow fear and division,
while also undermining protesters’ efforts to build coalitions and bring
about lasting structural change.254 In addition, in many instances where
protests became violent, documented evidence revealed that much vio-
lence was initiated by agents provocateurs, that is, white supremacists and
law enforcement officers posed as Black Lives Matter protesters and en-
gaged in acts of physical violence and property destruction.255 These ac-
tions, in turn, were disseminated via social media to supposedly prove the
violent extremism of the Black Lives Matter movement.
No longer able to remain indifferent to racism, many white people
registered their intolerance toward Black Lives Matter protests through
a reframing of the narrative, notably, through the counterclaim that All
Lives Matter. Superficially, the slogan “All Lives Matter” appears to share
the recognition of humanity’s shared mortality. This aligns readily with
the belief in a color-­blind ideology and a postracial society, whereby all
people in society—­as liberal subjects—­are afforded equal opportunities.
That some succeed (like Trump) and others fail (like Floyd) is conditioned
not by racial hierarchies and structural and social relations of oppression
but through hard work and diligence. However, as Garza explains, to adopt
the counternarrative of All Lives Matter is to “perpetuate a level of White
supremacist domination by reproducing a tired trope that we are all the
same, rather than acknowledging that non-­Black oppressed people in this
country are both impacted by racism and domination, and simultaneously,
BENEFIT from anti-­Black racism.”256 To do so, Garza continues, is to “lose
the ways in which the state apparatus has built a program of genocide and
repression mostly on the backs of Black people—­beginning with the theft
of millions of people for free labor—­and then adapted it to control, mur-
der, and profit off of other communities of color and immigrant commu-
nities.”257 In the end, the counterclaim that All Lives Matter is far from a
 Whose Lives Matter? · 155

universal appeal to human rights or shared mortality; rather, it is a racist

attempt to usurp solidarity centered around the challenge to confront a
rampant anti-­Blackness that conditions institutions such as law enforce-
ment and the carceral state.
For those who profess that All Lives Matter, the financial precarity of Af-
rican American workers is conveniently downplayed, in that the concerns
expressed by supporters of the Black Lives Matter movement are prefigured
as anything but economic. Thus, dismissing the realities of institutional and
structural racism that severely circumscribes the economic opportunities
of Blacks, critics portray unemployed and underemployed Blacks as lazy
and irresponsible. Indeed, the undeserving poor Black remains juxtaposed
against the deserving white alienated subject, a strategic move made pos-
sible by the decades-­long promotion of the white alienated subject as the
epitome of neoliberal ideology. Accordingly, as Cowie and Boehm explain,
“as class was reified as a white, male construct, the problems of women and
minorities tended to be isolated outside of the economics of class, limited to
issues specific to relatively classless understandings of race and gender.”258
Thus, arguments that underscore the increased precarity of Black and
Brown members of the working class are rejected in favor of arguments that
place economic hardships squarely on the backs of poor people of color.
That the response to a movement created to bring attention to the dispro-
portionate violence and premature death faced by Black people should be
the slogan “All Lives Matter” reveals how white grievance is in many ways
constituted in response to symbolic losses.259 If one’s meaning in life is tied
to white privilege, any attempt to challenge that hegemony will potentially
be met with intolerance and likely violent opposition. As demonstrated in
myriad surveys, whites tend not to understand their group’s position in a
purely relative manner and, consequently, fail to infer their group’s under
advantages arising from Blacks’ unfair disadvantages.260 This, ultimately,
plays into the notion of zero-­sum game, for in the twisted logic of white su-
premacy, the demand to protect Black lives can only come at the expense of
saving white lives. On this point, the meaning of All Lives Matter operates
in a different register than Black Lives Matter. As Daniel Shore explains, the
slogan “All Lives Matter” “recasts the demand for equal treatment as a de-
mand for special treatment, the demand for full inclusion in the law’s pro-
tections as a violation of the law’s universality.”261 In so doing, of course, the
All Lives Matter countermovement belies its racist intent, that is, to deploy
156 · Whose Lives Matter?

coded language in an effort to dismiss challenges to the preservation both

of white privilege and white supremacy.
Thus, for those seeking to contest or to subvert the emancipatory aims
of Black Lives Matter, the ambiguity of All Lives Matter is key to its politi-
cal appeal. Unlike more overt racist dog whistles, All Lives Matter speaks
openly to the existence of an ostensibly race-­neutral liberal subject and
thus offers its supporters plausible deniability when confronted with al-
legations of racism.262 Appeals that All Lives Matter are framed also as
recognition that people regardless of skin color are vulnerable to possible
premature death via physical or structural violence. To this end, the sub-
ject position of All Lives Matter is the liberal subject in that all humans
are ostensibly the same. The liberal subject, we recall, is an abstract figure
premised on a denial of difference. Indeed, as Berg reminds us, “to even
raise the specter of ‘racial difference’ is itself read as an act of racism.”263 In
this way, the liberal subject—­and especially its neoliberal counterpart—­is
blamed for its own failings. Poor people, for example, are poor because
they have not responsibly participated in the “land of opportunity.” How-
ever, just as the (neo-­)liberal subject is racially coded, so too the lives in
All Lives Matter. For underlying the criticism of Black Lives Matter is a
deflection of responsibility away from structural and institutional forms
of oppression and toward the lives of Black people. In a color-­blind soci-
ety, maimed and murdered Blacks are responsible for their being shot. If
Floyd was shot by the police, so supporters of All Lives Matter maintain,
he must have been doing something illegal. Alternatively, he should have
obeyed the orders of the police. Either way, victims are blamed for their
own premature deaths.
Garza and other members of the Black Lives Movement were well
aware of a potential white backlash.264 Writing in 2014, Garza explained:
“We completely expect those who benefit directly and improperly from
White supremacy to try and erase our existence.”265 Garza expounds: “Un-
fortunately, when something becomes a signifier for a movement, it can
also become a brand and that gets commercialized and has its content
stripped from it. So while we know what people are talking about, others
who are still learning about the Black Lives Matter movement might not
understand what’s problematic about it.”266 On this point, Garza stresses
that “We’re not saying Black lives are more important than other lives, or
that other lives are not criminalized and oppressed in various ways. We
remain in active solidarity with all oppressed people who are fighting for
 Whose Lives Matter? · 157

their liberation and we know that our destinies are intertwined.”267 She
continues: “Centering Black lives is not an act of violence or hatred against
whites. This is about acknowledging that the system already treats white
lives as far more valuable and more worthy of protection, safety and a
higher quality of life than we are.”268 Garza, in fact, captures Eddie Glaude’s
concept of the “value gap.”269 For Glaude, the value gap refers to the idea
that “no matter our stated principles or how much progress we think we’ve
made, white people are valued more than others in this country, and that
fact continues to shape the life chances of millions of Americans.”270 No-
tably, Glaude underscores the fact that it isn’t just about equality or fair-
ness; instead, it is the unyielding truth that white supremacy increases the
vulnerability of Black people and other minorities in the United States to
premature death.

Conclusions
The term working class is a shifting signifier and acquires considerable
purchase in popular and political discourse.271 When the working class
is portrayed as comprising white people, alienation, as a concept and a
condition of the working class, becomes whitened. And when alienation
is understood as class struggle, it is a struggle among and between white
workers. In other words, appeals to the unstated whiteness of the work-
ing class simultaneously masks four centuries of white supremacy while
championing the heroics of the white worker. As such, white people (but
especially white men) become the star players of America’s fabled history
as they heroically struggle against all odds in the face of growing adversity
personified by nonwhite outsiders. This is why an intersectional approach
toward alienation is required. In concrete terms, the alienated subject
can be racist or the subject of racist attacks; the alienated subject can be
misogy­nist or the subject of misogynist attacks; and the alienated subject
can be the perpetrator or recipient of homophobic, xenophobic, Islam-
ophobic attacks. There is no homogenized alienated subject beyond the
abstract, for alienation is necessarily embodied and experienced spatially
in a plurality of forms, mediated by one’s subject position. And from this
vantage point, the alienated subject, in the abstract, embodies both a ca-
pacity to hurt and to be hurt.
My argument is not to downplay the importance of class analyses and
of the practice of the proletariat. The working class retains a pivotal role
158 · Whose Lives Matter?

in the abolition of exploitation and oppression; indeed, were this not the
case, there would be no need to suppress labor through antiunion legisla-
tion or the elimination of workers’ rights. No, capitalists are well aware
of the centrality of labor, of the need to appropriate surplus value through
the exploitation of workers, but also of the ever-­present threat of labor
unrest. For these reasons, it is not coincidental that from Reagan onward,
a generation of neoliberalists have co-­opted and conned the working-­class
subject, offering it adulations with one hand while picking its pockets with
the other. And here, racism, patriarchy, and other forms of oppression are
used to divide the working class—­to great effect. Casting the white alienated
subject (in the abstract) as the embodiment of patriotism and national­ism,
neoliberalists simultaneously portray other working-­class members as
perpetual outsiders, because of their ancestry, gender, sexuality, or citizen-
ship status. To this end, the maintenance of white supremacy (and patri-
archy) is a necessary condition for the reproduction of capitalism just as
much as the reproduction of capitalism necessitates the continuance of
white supremacy. The problem of our present moment is an inability or
unwillingness of people conditioned to accept the predominance of white-
ness to see people like George Floyd as an alienated subject, a precarious
worker living within intersecting structures of oppression.
In the United States, a society founded upon settler colonialism and ra-
cial capitalism, ideologies of white supremacy have historically prevented,
and continue to prevent, the establishment of a class-­conscious revolu-
tionary movement.272 Indeed, as Inwood explains, “Whenever African
Americans and other minority groups have achieved civil rights progress
or when whites perceive their position in society as vulnerable, there has
been an upsurge in white supremacist violence and opposition to the legal
progress of people seen as socially suspect or material threats to the United
States’ racial and gendered hierarchy.” In this fashion, the white alienated
subject serves as a touchstone, an abstract ideal of American traditional
values. Championed especially but not exclusively by Nixon, Reagan, and
Trump, the white alienated subject provides symbolic sanctuary for a
white working class seemingly embattled by external forces.273 As Cowie
and Boehm explain, politicians and pundits “tapped into the material, so-
cial, and moral concerns of the white, male working class, but actively and
strategically reformulated what it meant to be working class by seeking to
move the ground of resentments away from the economics of class and
onto social issues.”274
 Whose Lives Matter? · 159

Within racial capitalism, there is little incentive for the white (and male)
alienated subject to demand progressive change, for the privileges of its
whiteness (and maleness) surpass, both materially and meaningfully, any
economic exploitation that it might experience. From Reconstruction to
the right-­wing populisms of today, white wage laborers have always, in the
end, sought not to topple but to be favored and accommodated by a capi-
talist class that nonetheless exploits them.275 To be sure, the white alien-
ated subject may want higher wages or even better working conditions, but
the struggle to achieve these improvements often comes at the expense of
nonwhites. Consequently, the white alienated subject is alternatively indif-
ferent to (that is, professing a belief in a color-­blind society) race problems
or intolerant of racial Others and corresponding race-­based policies and
programs. In part, the reaction depends on the particular group forma-
tion in which the alienated subject finds itself. At a sporting event, for ex-
ample, the white alienated subject can easily cheer for its favorite team
alongside persons of color; in so doing, the white alienated subject can de-
clare an indifference to race. Indeed, the white alienated subject may trot
out the weary—­but often effective—­claim that it has many Black friends,
as evidenced by the shared participation at the event. However, in other
domains—­perhaps when talking with other like-­minded subjects—­the
white alienated subject will express feelings of intolerance of, for exam-
ple, undocumented (and nonwhite) migrants or of the stereotypical (and
Black) welfare queen who is taking advantage of the system and is effec-
tively preventing whites from advancing economically.
The Black Lives Matter movement captures, I believe, the spirit, power,
and optimism of spontaneous participatory democracy envisioned by Marx
and other socialists; of the strength of grassroots mobilization able to chal-
lenge the hegemony of racial capitalism and white supremacy. Indeed, the
vehemence directed against Black Lives Matter by conservative politicians
and pundits demonstrates both the potency of collective action and the
fragility of white supremacy. Throughout the 1980s, as Rod Bush explains,
the epicenter of Black activism passed from the radicals (for example Mal-
colm X, Mumia Abu-­Jamal, Kathleen Cleaver, Huey Newton) to elected
officials.276 A movement that served as a “wellspring of radical ideologies
among the Black working class and its organic intellectuals” gradually gave
way to a more sedate movement, one that appealed to, and was more toler-
able for, white people.277 Indeed, for Bush, “The repression of the radical
wing of the Black Power movement was accompanied by the co-­optation of
160 · Whose Lives Matter?

its more moderate elements, who were opposed to the system’s racism but
thought the system could be reformed if Blacks were admitted to the sys-
tem commensurate with their qualifications.”278 From Ferguson onward,
however, the pendulum is perhaps swinging back. Keeanga-­Yamahtta Tay-
lor, for example, finds that “the young people of Ferguson had great rev-
erence and respect for the memory of the civil rights movement, but the
reality is that its legacy meant little in their everyday lives.”279 She explains,
on the one hand, that this new generation of activists “bring new ideas,
new perspectives, and often, new vitality to the patterns and rhythms of
activism” while, on the other hand, “the tactical and strategic flexibility
of the youth activists flowed from a developing politics that could not be
constrained by a narrow agenda of voter registration or a simple electoral
strategy.”280 Arguably more important, however, is the recognition, as Tay-
lor writes, that the emerging politics are “embodied by the emergence of
young Black women as a central organizing force.”281
The centrality of the Black Lives Matter movement to the current po-
litical movement cannot be ignored by the revolutionary Left. That said,
there remain many ardent socialists who fear the political power of move-
ments such as Black Lives Matter, for these appear as diversionary to the
task at hand, namely, the transformation of the alienated subject through
class struggle. Cedric Johnson, for example, worries that an overemphasis
of the centrality of racism obscures the class relations at the root of eco-
nomic inequality.282 However, if self-­emancipation through collective self-­
determination of the working class is foundational to the struggle against
capitalism, then it is indispensable for progressives to acknowledge the
shifting demographic composition of class and class relations. As Benja-
min Balthaser and Bill Mullen explain, this requires comprehension of the
upsurge in wildcat strikes, teacher walkouts, organizing in the informal
sector, the superexploitation of Black, immigrant, and women workers in
the care economy; in short, virtually, everything.283 In the end, it is likely
the face of the proletarian struggle of the twenty-­first century is not that
of the white alienated subject but instead the face of a working-­class queer
Black woman.
 5

The Emancipated Subject

“In the social production of their existence,” Marx writes, people “inevi-
tably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will,
namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the devel-
opment of their material forces of production.”1 In this well-­known pas-
sage, Marx affirms that people’s choices are circumscribed by structural
and social relations that precede them, that is, antecedent forms of social
organization. This does not mean that our lives are determined but instead
that our everyday lives are conditioned historically and geographically.
Erich Fromm expands upon this point, noting that “the mode of life, as it
is determined for the individual by the peculiarity of an economic system,
becomes the primary factor in determining his whole character structure,
because the imperative need for self-­preservation forces him to accept the
conditions under which he has to live.”2 Here, Fromm underscores the ma-
teriality of everyday life, notably that one’s awareness of premature death
that might occur in the absence of the basic necessities that make life possible
impel people to conform to, or subject themselves to, those structural and
social relations in existence. Under the capitalist mode of production, if
one is precluded access to the means of production the only legal recourse
is to obtain waged employment. That said, Fromm quickly qualifies his
statement, clarifying, “This does not mean that [an individual] cannot try,
together with others, to effect certain economic and political changes.”3 In
other words, resistance is possible; and this resistance happens in solidar-
ity with other, like-­minded individuals.
In this concluding chapter I consider the emancipatory promise and
potential of the alienated subject. Drawing insight and inspiration from
ongoing efforts to promote an ethics of care, I reconsider Fromm’s radical
conception of productive love. Redolent of the spirit of the Black Lives
Matter movement, an ethics of care centered on productive love provides a
way forward, a path toward the emancipatory aspirations of a society that
enables all to live meaningful, flourishing lives. This requires, however, an

161
162 · The Emancipated Subject

attentiveness to the siren’s call of immature love, that is, a sadomasochistic

relationship among people mediated by the false promises of capitalism.
I begin, therefore, with a brief recapitulation of the meaninglessness of
life in capitalism, followed by a repositioning of the alienated subject as
sadomasochist. I then proceed to a reevaluation of freedom, necessity, and
living as a framework for my forwarding of a loving, emancipated subject.

The Meaninglessness of Capitalism

As Todd May explains, meaningfulness is a human product but also a so-
cial product; our values, our morals, our sense of justice, are constrained,
not necessarily by the material world but instead by the social relations in
which we interact. To this end, the practices that emanate from particular
social and spatial relations mediate what—­and how—­we value in, or give
meaning to, society. Of these practices and relations, Fromm introduces
the concept of “social character.” Itself an expansion of Marx’s notion of
social formation, the concept of social character refers to those traits of a
social group which have developed as the result of the basic experiences
and mode of life common to that group.4 Fromm in fact believed that
Marx’s focus on the process of production in shaping needs had unearthed
the fundamental basis of a dynamic social psychology that would interpret
material human needs and motivations as mediated by the social structure
of a society.5
Stated differently, the concept of social character provides insight into
how shared ideologies that reflect particular modes of production are pro-
duced and reproduced. Indeed, as Jason Read reminds us, every mode of
production necessarily presupposes and reproduces particular forms of
sociality and subjectivity.6 Differences in the social character of societies,
to this end, are fundamentally the result of adaptions to different modes
of production, that is, how people live throughout their day-­to-­day inter­
actions within different structural and social relations of production, dis-
tribution, and consumption. In chapter 2, for example, we saw how the
shaping of the human being under capitalism, that is, the real subsumption
of society, is mediated by the market-­logics of capitalism. In other words,
whereas capitalism is a social and economic system based on a combi-
nation of private ownership of property, self-­interested pursuit of such
property, the exchange of goods and services, and the market as means
of determining prices of goods and services, capitalism also encourages
 The Emancipated Subject · 163

endless consumption, entrenches inequalities, discourages community-­

mindedness, and privileges individual rather than social freedom.7 The
neoliberal subject, on this point, embodies economic rationalism, compe-
tition, entrepreneurialism, individualism, and independence; these values,
in turn, are represented as the antithesis of governmental responsibilities
for equitable and meaningful living conditions and care of the individual,
the household, or social groups.8 In turn, these values which are mediated
by one’s position in society inform both materially and symbolically every-
day social interactions, often with grave consequences.
Capitalism, to this end, is inherently alienating and sadomasochistic.
As Lynn Chancer writes, “The relationship between worker and capital-
ist is inclined in a highly symbiotic direction, creating a literally life-­and-­
death situation: the worker requires the job for his or her subsistence or
the subsistence of his or her family; the capitalist requires the worker’s
labor and acquiescence to the relations of production in order to be able
to subsist qua capitalist.”9 Both worker and capitalist, in their unique ways,
are alienated, subject to the mastery of dead labor over living labor. On the
one hand, the capitalist worships the commodity and becomes dependent
upon its continual exchange for his or her biological and class reproduc-
tion, while, on the other hand, the worker likewise remains dependent on
the commodity for his or her own survival. Chancer elaborates: “Because
capitalism makes the worker’s ability to survive contingent not only upon
his or her labor but on agreement to workplace conditions imposed from
above without equal participation or consent, a worker’s worth is never
accepted and taken for granted simply because he or she exists and is a
human being. Rather, value, worth, and legitimacy of self must constantly
be earned, proved, sought, deserved. They are, as it were, conditional upon
the approval of [someone or something else], in this case, the capitalist.”10
The struggle between capital and labor, Fromm cautions, “is much more
than the conflict between two classes, more than their fight for a greater
share of the social product. It is the conflict between two principles of value:
that between the world of things, and their amassment, and the world of life
and its productivity.”11 Effectively, all social relations that comprise the capi-
talist mode of production are mediated by the vulnerability of pre­mature
death, that is, life itself is conditional upon the workings of capitalism.
However, ideologies of individualism and competition work against the
forwarding of solidarity and cooperation. In the United States, especially,
the discourse of “rugged individualism” instills values that go against the
164 · The Emancipated Subject

fact that humans are social beings, conditioned to lead communal lives.
The alienated subject in the abstract loses sight of this condition, believing
instead that the ability to lead a flourishing life is a solitary activity or, at
most, an activity circumscribed by members of one’s own (and selective)
subject position. Simply put, as Rainer Funk concludes, “The fact that we
do not experience the emptying and devaluation of the subject, as well as
the dependency on the market as something abnormal anymore is a central
indication of what Fromm . . . calls ‘the pathology of normalcy.’ ”12 Capital-
ism appears as a source of comfort: it provides employment, and with this,
wages to purchase goods and services we want. And capitalism provides
consumers with a seemingly endless choice of wants. In actuality, capital-
ism deceives and distorts; commodities control us.
Capitalism is stultifying and deadens the possibilities and potentialities
of living a flourishing, meaningful life. The negative freedom offered by
capitalism, Fromm posits, has brought a false sense of independence and
rationality and, in the process, conditioned people to find meaning in iso-
lation. This isolation does not necessarily translate as physical isolation;
it refers, rather, to an emotional estrangement that affects one’s everyday
life.13 Consequently, Fromm maintains that the social character of capi-
talism is that of “marketing,” that is, a character orientation grounded in
the “experience of oneself as a commodity and of one’s value as exchange
value.”14 For Fromm,

The modern market is no longer a meeting place but a mechanism

characterized by abstract and impersonal demand. One produces
for this market, not for a known circle of customers; its verdict is
based on laws of supply and demand; and it determines whether
the commodity can be sold and at what price. No matter what
the use value of a pair of shoes may be, for instance, if the sup-
ply is greater than the demand, some shoes will be sentenced to
economic death; they might as well not have been produced at all.
The market day is the “day of judgement” as far as the exchange
value of the commodities is concerned.15

Fromm’s assertion has ominous implications for the alienated subject

who has nothing to sell but its own labor-­power. Given that one’s sense of
worth is conditioned under capitalism by market forces seemingly beyond
one’s control, Fromm argues that “one’s self esteem is bound to be shaky
 The Emancipated Subject · 165

and in constant need of confirmation by others.”16 Effectively, the alien-

ated subject seeks an escape from its mundane, practico-­inert life, that is,
a search for meaning in places beyond the work site. However, meaning
remains mediated by those attitudes and beliefs that emanate from capital-
ism. Fromm continues: “One is driven to strive relentlessly for success, and
any setback is a severe threat to one’s self-­esteem; helplessness, insecurity,
and inferiority feelings are the result. If the vicissitudes of the market are
the judges of one’s values, the sense of dignity and pride is destroyed.”17
Meaningful life under capitalism, as such, is fetishized and experienced
in accordance to the market logic of exchange-­value. Indeed, Fromm
highlights the “burden of being unemployed,” whereby “to have a job—­
regardless of what kind of a job it is—­seems to many all they could want
of life and something they should be grateful for.” Such is the mindset of
the alienated subject under neoliberalism who—­aware of its vulnerability
to premature death for fear of being unemployed—­willingly submits to
the precarity of an economic system oriented not to its own survival but
instead toward the survival of the system.
In describing the rise of Nazism in Germany, for example, Fromm ex-
plains that millions of ordinary Germans were simply indifferent; they
were not supporters of the Nazi ideology—­but neither were they out­
spoken critics or resisters. Largely unaffected by the rising tide of intoler-
ance and hatred, many Germans chose to look away. The Holocaust, as
Elie Wiesel affirms, was made possible by indifference. Speaking before the
United States Senate, Wiesel explains that “indifference can be tempting—­
more than that, seductive. It is so much easier to look away from victims.
It is so much easier to avoid such rude interruptions to our work, our
dreams, our hopes. It is, after all, awkward, troublesome, to be involved in
another person’s pain and despair. Yet, for the person who is indifferent,
his or her neighbors are of no consequence. And, therefore, their lives are
meaningless. Their hidden or even visible anguish is of no interest. Indif-
ference reduces the other to an abstraction.”18
For many people in the United States, ongoing police violence, pan-
demics, the devastation of climate change and of environmental degrada-
tion are interruptions in their comfortable, consuming lives; the victims
are mere abstractions, faceless and nameless. It is easier to do nothing, to
say nothing, to feel nothing. And in doing nothing, the status quo remains
and the misery and suffering and premature death of those rendered more
vulnerable by unjust structural and social relations continues. As Wiesel
166 · The Emancipated Subject

concludes, “to be indifferent to that suffering is what makes the human

being inhuman.”19
For Fromm, pervasive feelings of indifference contribute to a “path­
ology of normalcy.” More precisely, Fromm argues that an “insane society”
produces alienated subjects, and that capitalism is insanity par excel-
lence.20 How else are we to explain the cruelty and callousness of the Trump
administration’s response to both the global pandemic and rampant po-
lice violence? A sane society, conversely, is that which corresponds to the
needs of humanity, that is, a society conditioned by concern, empathy, and
a respect for humanity’s mutual dependency with each other and the Earth
we inhabit. A sane society is one that fosters a flourishing life for all. For
alienated subjects, however, such a society appears utopian, the stuff of un-
realistic dreams of idealists or “social justice wingnuts.” Worse yet, a sane
society appears to the alienated subject as weak, its members irrespon-
sible and indolent. And for this alienated subject, indifference may readily
transform into intolerance and, subsequently, the need to foster meaning
in life elsewhere. Here, Fromm underscores the fact that the need to de-
fend oneself against the loneliness and meaningless of society can take the
form of submission to a powerful being (masochism) or of exerting con-
trols over a relatively powerless party (sadism).21 In other words, meaning
in life is sought through the simultaneous “longing for submission and lust
for power.”22 This has grim implications, however, for as Fromm warns, a
principal avenue of escape for the sadomasochist is the gravitation toward
authoritarianism. This is a key insight, as I develop in the following sec-
tion, whereby I reposition the alienated subject as sadomasochist, that is,
as one who is not indifferent to but instead intolerant of others and, as
such, is readily capable of, and willing to, hurt others.

The Alienated Subject as Sadomasochist

The alienated subject, in the abstract, is one who is completely estranged
from its own desires, from other humans, and from humanity itself; the
alienated subject inhabits a material, social world in which everyday, nor-
mal functioning is incompatible with the capacity to live a meaningful,
flourishing life.23 Accordingly, Fromm postulates, the alienated subject,
the “insane” subject, is “one who has completely failed to establish any
kind of union, and is imprisoned, even if he is not behind barred win-
dows.”24 To this end, the alienated subject yearns for fulfillment, for a sense
 The Emancipated Subject · 167

of belonging, to participate in meaningful social relations. That it does so

within the social character of capitalism, however, mediates the outcome
of its attempt to overcome its sense of estrangement. In societies marked
and marred by racial capitalism, for example, this mediation appears in the
form of white supremacy.
In this penultimate section, following Fromm, Chancer, Sandra Lee
Bartky, and others, I elaborate a political philosophy of sadomasochism
and, more precisely, reposition the alienated subject as sadomasochist, a
subject position prone to authoritarianism. We have seen, for example,
that members of the working class feel not only dependent but extremely
dubious about their sense of worth, forever hoping to find recognition or
meaning that has seemingly been denied.25 This follows, Chancer explains,
because “the social psychological ramifications under capitalism of an om-
nipotent orientation toward exchange value is that we evaluate everything,
including ourselves, with greater regard to meaning for them than for us.
How can we best sell ourselves, we wonder, best package ourselves in order
to obtain a particular job.”26 Even the capitalist is subject to these demands,
compelled as he or she is to out-­compete or out-­consume other capitalists.
To this end, workers and capitalists both seek external confirmation and so
sacrifice even more their sense of autonomy. In other words, the alienated
subject regardless of personal wealth exhibits a tendency to give up the in-
dependence of its own individual self and to fuse its self with somebody or
something else in order to acquire the strength which it feels is lacking.27
In Sartrean terms, we may surmise that the alienated subject pledges itself,
for example, to a group and its leader in an attempt to derive meaning in
life. As Fromm explains, “the sadomasochist person is always character-
ized by his attitude toward authority. He admires authority and tends to
submit to it, but at the same time he wants to be an authority himself and
have others submit to him.”28
Sadism and masochism are not exclusive subject positions but instead
two sides of the same coin. In other words, the alienated subject as sado­
masochist demonstrates the intersectionality of multiple subject positions
and the contingency of myriad and interlocking structures and social
relations of oppression. On the one hand, the alienated subject attempts
to transcend its sense of estrangement by becoming part of somebody or
something larger than itself, that is, by its submission to a person, a group,
or an institution.29 Feelings of loss, inferiority, powerlessness, insignifi-
cance, of being under attack, or of being left behind all contribute to the
168 · The Emancipated Subject

desire to be part of something larger, that is, to submit oneself to a person,

a movement, or an ideology, such as Trump and Trumpism. As Cheryl
Matias and Ricky Allen explain, “Masochists doubt their capabilities. They
give up freedom to decide for themselves, be responsible for their own fate,
and contribute creatively to the betterment of humanity, all in the name of
their compulsion not to be alone.”30 Under conditions of racial capitalism,
for example, white privilege affords for many white people emotional com-
fort, clarity, stability, and meaning in an otherwise meaningless, precari-
ous, and chaotic society. In doing so, however, the white alienated subject
as masochist invariably exchanges class solidarity for racial privilege, for
as the white alienated subject willingly submits to the privileges of being
white, it does so at its own class expense. That is, the white alienated sub-
ject implicitly submits to the desires of the more powerful capitalist and,
subsequently, deepens its own estrangement, for, as Fromm concludes,
“every act of submissive worship is an act of alienation and idolatry.”31
On the other hand, the alienated subject can try to find meaning through
the domination of another, by having power over another. As sadist, the
alienated subject “needs the person over whom he rules, he needs him
very badly, since his own feeling of strength is rooted in the fact that he
is the master over someone.”32 Trump, through his narcissism, embodies
the need to attain meaning in life through sadism. His incessant rallies;
his demeaning of women, African Americans, Hispanics, and the differ-
ently abled; and his greed all testify to his need to dominate. However,
although extreme in his sadism, Trump is not that exceptional. Thus,
the white alienated worker, while submitting to, pledging to, an author-
ity figure such as Trump who embodies and channels white supremacy,
also seeks meaning through its domination of other people seen as racially
inferior and threatening. Insecure in its own precarious class position, the
exploited white member of the working class is able to cash in the psycho-
logical wages of whiteness and thus (attempt to) exert racial dominance
over Blacks and other people of color. So too the misogynist seeks to find
meaning in an uncertain existence through the control over women. In so
doing, the racist or misogynist alienated subject finds security in associa-
tion with other like-­minded individuals. As Fromm concludes, the attempt
to overcome feelings of isolation and powerlessness are matched with an
attempt to become part of something bigger and more powerful; and this
subjugation can assume the form of a person, an institution, the nation,
and so on. Regardless of the focus of subjugation, “one surrenders one’s own
 The Emancipated Subject · 169

self and renounces all strength and pride connected with it, one loses one’s
integrity as an individual and surrenders freedom; but one gains a new se-
curity and a new price in the participation in the power in which one sub-
merges.”33 The alienated subject as sadomasochist is thus saved from the
doubts and insecurities of an uncertain world; its submission to a power
greater than itself allows it to simultaneously dominate others seen as weak
or threatening.
This configuration of the sadomasochist effectively captures the au-
thoritarian tendency of alienated subjects. Authoritarianism, Matthew Mac-
Williams explains, “is best understood not as a policy preference, the way
we talk about lower taxes or strong defense, but rather as a world view
that can be ‘activated’ in the right historical moment by anyone with a
big enough megaphone who is willing to play on voters’ fears and inse-
curities.”34 This is extremely salient, for authoritarian leaders cut across
both the political spectrum and socioeconomic divisions, such as educa-
tion, income, age, and even ethnicity.35 In the broadest sense of the term,
authoritarians are described as rigid thinkers who perceive the world in
black-­and-­white terms.36 MacWilliams continues: “Uniformity and order
are authoritarian watch words. Authoritarians obey. They seek order. They
follow authoritarian leaders. They eschew diversity, fear ‘the other,’ act ag-
gressively toward others, and, once they have identified friend from foe,
hold tight to their decision.” In short, authoritarians are, in Sartre’s ter-
minology, members of sworn groups and thus are intolerant of those per-
ceived as outside their own narrowly circumscribed group of like-­minded
individuals. Alienated subjects are emotive subjects. It is precisely for this
reason that Fromm warns of “the readiness [of the alienated subject] to ac-
cept any ideology and any leader, if only he promises excitement and offers
a political structure and symbols which allegedly give meaning and order
to an individual’s life.”37 In other words, authoritarian leaders capitalize on
the alienation of their subjects in pursuit of their own agendas.
Trump, as such, is a prototypical authoritarian figure. Throughout his
presidential election campaign and subsequent administration, Trump’s
incessant rhetoric and behavior electrified many Americans predisposed
to authoritarianism and activated by feelings of alienation. They rallied
to his banner—­literally—­and obediently followed his lead.38 Of Trump’s
rise to the presidency, Daniel Burston writes that “millions of Americans
elected a candidate who rose to fame as the host of a ‘reality TV’ show in
which he dominated, controlled, and humiliated prospective employees;
170 · The Emancipated Subject

who promoted ‘law and order’ while quoting Mussolini; a candidate whose
policy pronouncements frequently ignored (or negated) the US Consti­
tution; who thrives on tabloid style conspiracy theories; who lies and
fabricates freely, without inhibition or remorse; whose sexist, racist and
anti-­Semitic attitudes are plain to see; who retweets posts from white su-
premacist websites, and openly praises dictators like Vladimir Putin.”39
As Matt Karamazov sums up, “Modern propaganda is all about making
people love their servitude. You can give them stock options, a white picket
fence, fast food, and some trash TV, and most people will forget that they
have never been free.”40
That so many conservative voters flocked to an authoritarian figure
such as Trump is really no surprise. For although authoritarianism is not
limited to any one party, it is highly correlated with conservatism. Indeed,
surveys demonstrate repeatedly the preponderance of authoritarian at-
titudes among conservatives in general, and white conservatives specifi-
cally. One study, for example, found that 44 percent of white respondents
nationwide scored as “high” or “very high” authoritarians. And while there
were authoritarian voters in both political parties, more than 65 percent of
people who scored highest on the authoritarianism questions were Repub-
lican voters.41
American authoritarians, MacWilliams finds, overwhelmingly fear di-
versity, that is, they are most fearful of internal threats that they viewed as
undermining the stability of the social hierarchy that gives them mean-
ing in life—­a patriarchal, heterosexual, white America. As such, “they are
more likely to agree that increasing racial, religious and ethnic diversity
is a clear and present threat to national security. They are more fearful of
people of other races, and agree with the statement that ‘sometimes other
groups must be kept in their place.’ ”42 To this end, authoritarian voters
want a strong leader who promises to eliminate the threats, if necessary
by violence, in order to preserve the status quo. As Jennifer Mercieca
concludes, if there was a choice to be made between democracy and the
stability of the social hierarchy, authoritarian voters were likely to choose
stability over democracy.43 For example, only 49 percent of Trump sup-
porters agreed that the freedom of the press to criticize political leaders
is essential to maintaining a strong democracy; and only 69 percent of
Trump supporters thought it was very important that people have a right
to nonviolent protest.44 Conservative politicians, likewise, express authori-
 The Emancipated Subject · 171

tarian views, providing emotional ammunition to their supporters. Just

weeks before the 2020 presidential election, for example, Senator Mike Lee
posted on Twitter that “Democracy isn’t the objective; liberty, peace, and
[prosperity] are. We want the human condition to flourish. Rank democ-
racy can thwart that.”45 Here, Lee tapped into the emotional vulnerabilities
of an alienated populace and promised a meaningful life not through the
democratic process but rather through blind devotion to authoritarianism.
The rise of Trumpism effectively illustrates how generations of white
people internalized the hyperpatriotism of American exceptionalism and
took to heart the idolatry of the (white) working class. Trump routinely
pledged his love and devotion to this group and promised he would pro-
tect them from dangerous nonwhite Others. And although Trump was
disingenuous, often blatantly so, it mattered little to his followers who, in
turn, pledged their loyalty and support to the president. What truly mat-
tered was the restoration of an emotional void created by a perceived loss
of whiteness, patriarchy, and heteronormativity.
Crucially, as Amanda Taub explains, authoritarians frequently support
forceful, decisive action against people or ideas they perceive as threats
to their elevated positions. This often includes the threat or actual use of
physical violence, whether enacted by law enforcement agencies, private
militias, or vigilantes. Indeed, authoritarians are exceptionally capable
and willing to commit harm, that is, they embody the Sartrean notion of
the terror-­fraternity. On October 8, 2020, for example, six white militia
members were arrested for conspiring to kidnap Michigan’s Democratic
governor Gretchen Whitmer. Over a period of months, militia members
discussed the violent overthrow of local governments and talked about
“murdering . . . tyrants” or “taking” a sitting governor, in this case, Whit-
mer, and placing her on trial for “treason.” Indeed, one militia member said
of Whitmer, she “has no checks and balances at all. She has uncontrolled
power right now. All good things must come to an end.” In addition, two
of the alleged conspirators “agreed to unite others in their cause and take
violent action against multiple state governments that they believe are vio-
lating the U.S. Constitution.” The targeting of Whitmer was not random.
Over a period of several months, Whitmer was called out repeatedly by
Trump for her approach to the pandemic, specifically her promotion of
mask-­wearing regulations, social distancing, and sheltering in place. More
precisely, Trump goaded his supporters to “liberate Michigan.”46
172 · The Emancipated Subject

The authoritarian Trump supporter effectively captures the sadomaso­

chistic tendencies postulated by Fromm, namely, the masochistic devo-
tion to an authoritarian figure and the capacity to commit sadistic violence
against people deemed dangerous, inferior, or weak. To this end, Trump
was well aware of this power he held over his supporters, as demonstrated
by his infamous remark, “I could stand in the middle of Fifth Avenue and
shoot somebody. And I wouldn’t lose any voters, OK. It’s like incredible.”
This is why Trump’s rhetoric and style proved so intoxicating to his sup-
porters. As Taub explains, Trump’s willingness to flout all the conventions
of civilized discourse when it came to the minority groups that alienated
white people feared proved a benefit rather than a liability; hence, when
Trump decried Mexicans as rapists and criminals or spoke of massacring
Muslims with pig-­blood-­tainted bullets, he sent a message to his support-
ers that he would not let “political correctness” hold him back in attacking
those people they feared.47

Freedom, Necessity, and Living

Throughout his writings Marx is circumspect on the topic of unalienated
life. In part, this results from his dialectic epistemology. For Marx it was
improper to specify with any degree of certainty how a future postcapital-
ist society might appear or function. Nevertheless, scattered among his
writings are various clues that shed insight into his thinking. To this end,
much attention has focused on Marx’s forwarding of the “realms of free-
dom” and “realms of necessity.”48 Together, these concepts have generated
substantial debate among historians and philosophers; they are also of
considerable importance toward our understanding of the emancipation
of the alienated subject.
Briefly stated, the realm of necessity refers to work, while the realm
of freedom refers to time outside the working day.49 Beyond this simple
explanation, however, lies a more nuanced journey into the ideas and ide-
als of freedom, democracy, and labor. At issue is not merely how humans
spend their time, whether at work or at play, but instead how the temporal
and spatial allocations of productive and reproductive tasks impinge on
political participation and, equally importantly, on how individuals (and
society) may promote and lead an unalienated life. As Hägglund writes,
“Because we are living beings, we must work to maintain ourselves. Yet, all
the time we have is not necessarily required to ensure our biological sur-
 The Emancipated Subject · 173

vival and it is an open question for us what we should do with the surplus
of time.”50
Depending on the context, Marx uses the terms work and labor in pre-
cise ways. In reference to the realm of necessity, Marx refers to labor as that
directed toward satisfying the basic needs of society.51 This aligns with his-
torical materialism and Marx’s first premise: the production of food, water,
shelter, and clothing are necessary requirements for the biological, mate-
rial, and ideological reproduction of society. The realm of freedom would
thus appear to be in opposition to the realm of necessity. Indeed, one read-
ing would suggest that the realm of freedom equates with leisure, or time
away from the drudgery of work. As Jan Kandiyali explains, the “natural
temptation is to see the ‘realm of freedom’ and the ‘realm of necessity’ as
being opposed to one another, so that the contrast is between a ‘realm of
freedom,’ that comprises all that is free, and a ‘realm of necessity,’ compris-
ing its opposite, namely, alienation, unfreedom and such like.”52 This is
not Marx’s intention. Kandiyali suggests that Marx is actually positing two
realms of freedom: on the one hand, there is freedom as self-­determination,
understood as collectively determining one’s activity instead of being ruled
by external forces, and, on the other hand, freedom as self-­realization,
understood as the development of one’s distinctly human capacities and
potentialities.53
A materialist understanding of history holds that societies at a basic
level are concerned first and foremost with satisfying the conditions neces-
sary for life itself. In so-­called primitive societies, notably those character-
ized as “hunting and gathering,” labor is performed by humans, but it is
labor marked by necessity. Ollman explains, “Such labor is mere energy
expended to satisfy immediate physical needs and has little in common
with human productive activity.”54 In this context, human labor is largely
indistinguishable from that of animals; all species by necessity need to ac-
quire food and water and to seek shelter. In such a society, the human
condition is one of unfreedom, as everyday life is characterized by the pe-
rennial struggle to satisfy the most basic physical needs.55 Humans, how-
ever, have the capability of performing something else, namely, genuinely
creative work.56
Throughout human history the productive means of satisfying biologi-
cal needs have been transformed. Technological innovations, reconfigured
divisions of labor, and complex systems of barter and trade all steadily
distance humans from the realm of necessity. In other words, humans
174 · The Emancipated Subject

gradually, almost inexorably, become free from the physical constraints

of nature. Indeed, the dialectic relationship between humans and nature
is transformed. Eventually, under capitalism, the industrialization and au-
tomation of the labor process initiated unprecedented levels of productive
power. Paradoxically though, these transformations brought about a fun-
damental societal contradiction. Production under capitalism, it prom-
ises, can provide the means to humanize labor, to reduce the working day,
and to lead to greater leisure time.57 The accumulation of greater wealth,
likewise, promises a better quality of life, one where children will no lon-
ger go to bed hungry and paupers no longer die in the streets for lack of
housing. And yet, Marx observed, under capitalism, societal inequalities
became more pronounced as humans became alienated from their produc-
tive, creative, and meaningful activities. Humanity’s conscious activity in
a capitalist factory, Ollman writes, “can mean little more than being awake
and knowing that one is pulling a lever rather than turning a handle.”58
Hägglund echoes these remarks, noting, “Insofar as we spend our time
working a job that is not fulfilling but merely serves as a means for our
survival, our labor time is unfree, since we cannot affirm that what we do
is an expression of who we are. Instead of being free to engage the question
of what makes our life worth living—­the question of what we ought to do
with our time—­our lives are mortgaged to a form of labor that is required
for our survival.”59
Socialism, for Marx, transcends the stultifying condition of alienation
and provides the necessary freedom for the development of human crea­
tivity and personal fulfillment. In a postcapitalist society, the absence
of exploitative and oppressive relations will provide the opportunity to
fully cultivate one’s life activities and aesthetic endeavors.60 As Kandiyali
concludes, while the realm of necessity may be understood as a realm of
self-­determination, where men and women exercise control over their
economic activity, the realm of freedom is the realm of self-­realization,
the sphere of life where individuals develop their distinctly human pow-
ers and capacities.61 With the transcendence of capitalism, according to
Marx, both self-­determination and self-­realization become possible. Men
and women, while engaging in labor necessary for the production and
reproduction of society, exhibit self-­determination; they are no longer
subject to structures of domination imposed by a ruling class. Work is vol-
untary, communal, unalienated, and personally fulfilling. Moreover, men
 The Emancipated Subject · 175

and women are able to develop and express their creative capabilities and
potentialities.
Missing from this account, however, is an understanding that the alien-
ated subject embodies multiple subject positions, that the alienated sub-
ject is simultaneously a member of a particular class and also a member
of myriad other groups, some ephemeral, others more permanent. Both
white supremacy and patriarchy, for example, are enduring features of
many societies and, as such, continue to provide meaning for many people
in an otherwise meaningless world. For this reason, it is necessary to ex-
pand upon Marx’s lead and to reconsider the power and promise of pro-
ductive activity of the emancipated subject

Love and the Emancipated Subject

Marx’s understanding of revolutionary transformations is fundamentally
that of grassroots democracy. On this point, Fromm argues for an expanded
concept of revolution, of the need to address, in contemporary terminol-
ogy, the intersectionality of sadomasochism embodied in the alienated
subject, that is, sexism, racism, nationalism, and other forms of oppression
that mediate the capacity to foster a meaningful life free from prejudice,
hatred, and violence.
The alienated person is lacking a sense of self; this lack of self creates
deep anxiety.62 It is experienced in many ways: as a sense of loss, of isola-
tion, of powerlessness, and of meaninglessness. Regardless, alienation ap-
pears much as the late arrival of a bus, as something disruptive that impels
one to act, but often in harmful ways. The alienated subject, for example,
might engage in maladaptive practices that effectively reproduce alien-
ation. Consequently, “the realization of the submissive (masochistic) or
the domineering (sadistic) passion never leads to satisfaction.”63 To that
end, neither sadism nor masochism offers a path toward emancipation,
either for one’s self or for that of humanity. Consequently, for Fromm, the
“art of loving” holds emancipatory promise for the alienated subject.
Fromm is far from alone in affirming the power of love. bell hooks,
for example, contends, “Without love, our efforts to liberate ourselves and
our world community from oppression and exploitation are doomed.”64
She elaborates, “As long as we refuse to address fully the place of love in
struggles for liberation we will not be able to create a culture of conversion
176 · The Emancipated Subject

where there is a mass turning away from an ethic of domination.”65 In

other words, the transformation of the alienated subject into an eman-
cipated subject is doomed to failure without an explicit forwarding of an
ethics of love. It is notable that the emancipatory promise of love figures
prominently within the Black Lives Matter movement, as illustrated by
Alicia Garza’s affirmation that Black Lives Matter was addressed as “A Love
Letter to Black People.” Indeed, as Hebah Farrag and Ann Gleig observe
of the Black Lives Matter movement, “Since its inception, BLM organiz-
ers have expressed their founding spirit of love through an emphasis on
spiritual healing, principles, and practices in their racial justice work.”66
It may be difficult to see how love offers emancipatory hope. So fully
subsumed is society to the market logic of capital that even our attitudes
toward love are increasingly commodified. And yet, bell hooks writes:
“Though many folks recognize and critique the commercialization of love,
they see no alternative. Not knowing how to love or even what love is,
many people feel emotionally lost; others search for definitions, for ways
to sustain a love ethic in a culture that negates human value and valorizes
materialism.”67 In short, love is experienced as alienating and, as such,
deepens feelings of aloneness and meaninglessness.
For this reason, Fromm differentiates between “immature” and “ma-
ture” forms of love.68 The former refers to that love experienced by sadists
and masochists; in other words, alienation is manifest as a form of im-
mature love. The masochist, for example, escapes from unbearable feel-
ings of isolation, powerlessness, and meaninglessness by making him-­or
herself part and parcel of another person or group. Finding no meaning
in work, the alienated subject looks beyond the job site and submits to a
domineering, authoritative figure for guidance and purpose. As Eduardo
Bonilla-­Silva explains, poor and working-­class whites, among others, love
Trump not just because of class concerns seemingly addressed by Trump’s
populism—­bringing jobs back, draining the swamp, and dealing with
coastal elites who do not represent “real” Americans. Instead, many white
people loved Trump precisely because he validated and vowed to protect
their white privilege.69 Trump promised white people tangible ways—­
such as the building of a wall and the imposition of immigration bans—­to
uphold a particular way of life in which meaning is derived from their
vaunted position in the racial hierarchy of the United States. For white
alienated subjects, the persona of Trump and their love for him offered
emotional salvation in an uncertain world.
 The Emancipated Subject · 177

Sadism is also a form of immature love. The sadist wants to escape from
his or her aloneness and sense of imprisonment by making another person
submit to their relative power; in the process, the sadist acquires meaning
through his or her ability to command, exploit, hurt, and humiliate.70 This
is seen especially in the sadistic actions of the alienated capitalist class. As
Bertell Ollman writes, “The outstanding qualities which Marx observes in
capitalists are greed, cruelty and hypocrisy.”71 Ollman elaborates, “Greed
is seen as the motive of most capitalist actions, cruelty as its all too willing
handmaiden, and hypocrisy as the mask capitalists wear to hide their mo-
tives and means from others.”72 By way of illustration, consider the actions
of the meatpacking industry during the Covid-­19 pandemic. Meatpack-
ing plants—­despite being viral hotspots—­were pressed to remain open by
Trump and Republican politicians. On the one hand, this decision, coupled
with efforts to deny workers’ compensation for employees who became ill,
laid bare the perverted greed of the employers. On the other hand, the
political spectacle of forcing workers to choose between an avoidable risk
and of losing a job revealed a sadism indifferent to employees’ vulnerabil-
ity to premature death. In his executive order, for example, Trump for-
warded the argument that “it is important that processors of beef, pork,
and poultry . . . in the food supply chain continue operating and fulfilling
orders to ensure a continued supply of protein for Americans. . . . For ex-
ample, closure of a single large beef processing facility can result in the
loss of over 10 million individual servings of beef in a single day.”73 Nota-
bly, Trump failed to address the working conditions of the employees; nor
did he frame his executive order as a response to the potential dismissal
of workers during an economic downturn. Indeed, as Steven Greenhouse
observes, what made Trump’s order especially disdainful toward work-
ers’ well-­being was that “it treats workers and worker health as an after-
thought. It’s all about production; the workers are forgotten, invisible cogs
in Trump’s political machinations.”74 In other words, workers—­for Trump
and his followers—­were inconsequential beyond their productive func-
tions to ensure a continual supply of commodities for abstract consumers.
In opposition to immature forms of love are those Fromm describes as
mature. Mature love, in this sense, is an active power in humanity, that is,
it is productive. However, we should quickly clarify that productivity in
this context should not be confused with productive labor in a capitalist
sense. Fromm postulates that the active character of productive love im-
plies certain basic elements: care, responsibility, respect, and knowledge.75
178 · The Emancipated Subject

Admittedly, on a superficial read, these elements are suggestive of neolib-

eralism, notably responsibility, which can be understood as being a respon-
sible, productive worker, and respect, implying a deference to authority.
However, Fromm clarifies how these elements provide the scaffolding for
a radical ethics of love that transcends the market-­oriented relations of
capitalism and offers a path toward emancipation. Care, to begin, indi-
cates an active concern for the life and well-­being of another. As Lydia
Wood and colleagues write, “Care is essential to the creation and mainte-
nance of nurturing relations that support well-­being and are fundamental
to a socially just society.”76 Responsibility, following Fromm, refers to one’s
ability to be able and ready to respond to, that is, to care for, the needs of
another. Far from a self-­centered quality—­of being responsible for one’s
self—­responsibility in this account is entirely selfless and underscores our
capacity to help others. Respect entails also a selfless quality, here referring
to the ability to see a person as they are, that is, to be aware and accepting
of their unique individuality. Respect, simply put, implies the absence of
prejudice and bigotry. To respect a person is to know a person, that is, to
have an empathetic knowledge of the other. As Fromm explains, “Care
and responsibility would be blind if they were not guided by [empathetic]
knowledge.”77
Thus conceived, mature love, or what Fromm describes also as “genu­
ine love,” becomes an “expression of productiveness”; love is an active
striving for the well-­being and flourishing of the loved person, grounded
in one’s own capacity to love. Matias and Allen echo these sentiments and
call for “a humanizing love, one where those involved in personal or col-
lective relationships give love so as to foster the mutual growth and heal-
ing of one another depending on their respective relational needs within
traumatizing systems of oppression.”78 As a mode of life, productive, or
humanizing, love is premised on the act of giving.79 Here, also, language
matters. Indeed, the act of giving as productive love has a meaning quite
specific in the context of emancipatory possibilities. For Fromm, giving
does not equate with the act of sacrificing something, or letting go. It is
not the same as giving up when one faces defeat; nor is it the same as giving
away something and thus being deprived. Rather, “giving is the highest
expression of potency” for “in the act of giving lies the expression of my
aliveness.”80 To this end, the productive and loving act of giving provides
meaning in life in solidarity. This stands in contrast to the deadening form
of commodified love inherent to capitalism.
 The Emancipated Subject · 179

Self-­emancipation of the alienated subject is a necessary condition for

the transformation and eventual overcoming of capitalism. However, as the
human species-­being is inherently a social and spatial being, this means
that self-­emancipation is simultaneously mediated by the concrete so-
cial and spatial relations in which the alienated subject inhabits. In other
words, we need to direct attention toward the mutual co-­constitution
of emancipation, that is, to always bear in mind that revolutions are so-
cial and spatial phenomena. Self-­emancipation can only appear through
communal action grounded in place. An exclusive focus on individuality,
for example, as expressed by neoliberalist ideology, mitigates against the
transformation of capitalism.
To this end, scholars have advanced the notion of an “ethics of care”—­a
guiding principle premised on the notion that all relational practices
should be done in a more care-­full way, with an emphasis on interdepen-
dence and the values of caring.81 Notably, as Joan Tronto writes, to place
care at the center of human life requires that we rethink many of the as-
sumptions that we make about social and political theory.82 Indeed, Tronto
continues, “Care may be ubiquitous in human life, but it has remained hid-
den from the conceptual lenses of social and political thought.”83 On this
point, let me be as clear as possible. If we posit the human condition in
accordance with liberalism, that is, as composed of autonomous, rational
actors pursuing their own goals and maximizing their interests, alienation
appears as the negation of these self-­interests. The path toward emancipa-
tion, subsequently, would appear to consist of bringing about a material
reality that restores the pursuit and maximization of the liberal subject’s
self-­interests. If, however, we begin with the supposition that humans are
interdependent rather than independent, we begin from the standpoint
that people are always and already enmeshed in relationships of care.84
Alienation, therefore, is understood as the negation of caring relation-
ships; the alienated subject is alienated precisely because its everyday life
is removed from the ethical interdependency of being human. The path
toward emancipation, consequently, entails the restoration of these rela-
tions, that is, an ethics of care.
As Victoria Lawson writes, “care ethics begin from the deeply social
character of our existence and the ways that caring relations of dependency,
frailty, grief and love all shape the ways we reason and act in the world.”85
For these reasons, an awareness of our shared but uneven vulnerability to
premature death must figure prominently toward the emancipation of the
180 · The Emancipated Subject

alienated subject. To be aware of one’s possible death is to be aware of the

possible death of others; a shared mortality is accompanied by the realiza-
tion that our lives are dependent on the actions and inactions of ourselves
and others; that is, conditions that make possible for the provisioning of
food and water, and the avoidance of violent conditions, both structural
and physical, that threaten our well-­being. Framed in the positive, the
manner in which we choose to produce our lives may either complement
or hinder the reproduction of others’ lives. From this, meaningful life can
be fostered through those care-­full practices that advance and do not in-
hibit the flourishing of others. The alienated subject as sadomasochist, for
example, is unable to love on equal human terms but instead expresses a
love conditional upon its relative position within hierarchical systems of
oppression.86
A similar ethics of care guided Fromm throughout his life and in-
formed much of his work. Heavily influenced by Rabbi Nehemiah Nobel,
himself a student of the socialist and neo-­Kantian Herman Cohen, Fromm
advocated a humanism built around three basic elements.87 First, it is im-
perative for those who stand for ideals of progressive change to practice
these in their daily lives; second, one has to take seriously the questions
and needs of others and to provide help and guidance; and third, that no
ideal can be reached through raw power.88 Instead, love, humility, and the
embrace of justice through solidarity mark the proper path.89 Notably,
Fromm underscores the need to see love as the capacity to love, rather than
merely being in love.90 Taking this as our cue, we need to think through
the transformation of the alienated subject’s capacity to hurt into a capacity
to love. For unlike sadomasochistic relations, as Matias and Allen explain,
those in a humanizing relation give love to nurture and strengthen the
other depending on their situated and relative needs.91 This raises, in turn,
crucial questions of practice, for as Lawson explains, care ethics cannot
be practiced in the abstract because they focus on specific sites and social
relations. On this point, we return to—­and elaborate upon—­Marx’s dis-
tinction between realms of necessity and realms of freedom.
Strangely, the Covid-­19 pandemic in the United States generated heated
debate over something seemingly as benign (yet life saving) as wearing
a mask and, in doing so, underscored the contestation surrounding the
very idea of freedom. Coronaviruses, such as Covid-­19, are respiratory
pathogens, and the use of masks helps prevent the spread of the disease.
However, despite repeated calls by scientists, medical doctors, and public
 The Emancipated Subject · 181

health specialists to wear masks (coupled with a suite of other precaution-

ary measures), Trump and many other (mostly) Republican and conserva-
tive politicians and pundits refused to wear masks or impose compulsory
regulations that would require the wearing of masks. Consequently, many
people throughout the United States—­but predominantly conservatives—­
equated the wearing of masks as a forfeiture of their freedoms.92 Indeed,
not only were people intolerant toward the use of masks, many resorted
to physical violence in an effort to “protect their freedom” to not wear a
mask. Across the country, people were verbally and physically assaulted
as they enforced mask-­wearing guidelines. In Michigan, for example, a
security guard at a Family Dollar store was shot to death by three family
members who refused to wear masks.93
As Robert Kane explains, freedom is a word with many meanings, and
there are many different notions of freedom.94 For our immediate task,
three usages are especially helpful, all of which can be promoted or dis-
couraged within Marx’s realms of freedom and necessity. First, we can
consider the freedom of self-­realization, that is, “the power or ability to do
what we want or will to do, which entails an absence of external constraints
or impediments preventing us from realizing our wants and purposes in
action.”95 This form of freedom aligns with our commonsense understand-
ing and is manifest in the guarantee of surface freedoms, such as being
free to go where we please and live as we choose. Protests against the
wearing of masks or of sheltering-­in-­place were directed toward surface
freedoms associated with personal gratification and pleasure, for example,
going to bars or restaurants or public beaches. However, the freedom of
self-­realization has a deeper connotation, one that informs also our un-
derstanding of productive activities, both at work and beyond. Here, free-
dom of self-­realization refers to our ability to “see ourselves both in the
purpose of our occupation and in the social conditions of the labor that
sustains our lives; to recognize our own commitment to freedom in the
institutions on which we depend and to which we contribute.”96
A second form of freedom is the freedom of reflective self-­control. Kane
defines this as “the power to understand and reflectively evaluate the rea-
sons and motives one wants to act upon, or should act upon, and to control
one’s behavior in accordance with such reflectively considered reasons.”97
This conception of freedom, central to Marx’s realm of freedom, calls to
question the sadomasochist. For example, the masochist who surrenders
his or her freedom to an authoritarian figure exhibits an absence of critical
182 · The Emancipated Subject

self-­reflection. Religion, for example, limit’s one’s behavior to the extent

that one acts in accordance with the dictates of one’s God or place of wor-
ship. To this end, feelings of alienation, manifest in the realm of necessity,
inhibit one’s freedom of reflective self-­control in the realm of freedom,
such that the actions of the alienated subject as sadomasochist are medi-
ated by its acquiescence to some other object or idol. In this way, the alien-
ated subject, lacking a freedom of reflective self-­control, finds immature
love through an escape from freedom.
The freedom of reflective self-­control provides an ethical context for
subsequent decisions on how or how not to act. In turn, the morality of
concrete freedoms provides a basis for our third and final form of freedom,
the freedom of self-­perfection. For Kane, this is “the power to understand
and appreciate the right reasons for action and to guide one’s behavior in
accordance with the right reasons.”98 In other words, the freedom of self-­
perfection is a normative freedom—­it is emancipatory—­and informs our
interactions with others. Following Susan Wolf, we realize that freedoms
of self-­perfection both are relational and provide meaning in life. She ex-
plains, “By living in a way that is partly occupied by and directed toward
the preservation or promotion or creation of value that has its source out-
side of oneself, one does something that can be understood, admired or
appreciated from others’ point of view.”99 To this end, one’s awareness of
death mediates that which is important and, in doing so, conditions also
our wanting to preserve life. This follows from the realization that our lives
are dependent on the actions or inactions of others; for the provisioning of
food and water, for example, and the avoidance of or response to vulner-
abilities to our well-­being, such as illness or physical violence. As Hägg­
lund affirms, “Acting on behalf of the one you love is not an alien purpose
but the expression of a commitment in which you can recognize yourself,
since caring for the interests and the well-­being of the other is part of your
own understanding of who you are.”100 Likewise, we realize that certain
actions (freedoms of reflective self-­control) we may take, or fail to take,
could lead to the harm of others. Framed in the positive, the manner in
which we choose (freedoms of self-­perfection) to produce our own lives
may either compliment or hinder, constrain or impede, the reproduction
of others’ lives. From this, we understand that meaning in life is cultivated
through those freedoms, those actions and inactions that advance and do
not inhibit the life and flourishing of others. Hence, the reproduction of
meaningful life—­not just biological life—­is understood as a social good.
 The Emancipated Subject · 183

So what about regulations to wear masks? Most people would probably

agree that public orders to wear masks manifest as potential constraints
on one’s superficial freedoms. Such regulations are understood as coercive
measures and, consequently, are perceived as constraints on the exercise of
free will. But what precisely is being limited? Simply wearing a mask does
not prevent one from enjoying a meal with friends at the local Applebee’s,
nor does wearing a mask prevent one from getting a haircut. However,
exposing other people to a potentially life-­ending or life-­harming disease
does negatively constrain or impede their well-­being and ability to not die
a premature death. In short, the selfish (and sadistic) exercise of one’s free-
dom of self-­realization, without the associated exercise of one’s freedom
of reflective self-­control and freedom of self-­perfection, contributes to a
pervasive attitude of indifference to or intolerance of others and, often,
is manifest in the capacity to hurt others. Simply put, freedom in capi-
talism is understood by alienated subjects largely through the fetishized
lens of the commodity. Lacking the freedom of reflective self-­control,
the alienated subject believes that freedom of consumption stands for a
deeper, more meaningful freedom of self-­perfection. Hence, the alienated
subject is willing (impelled) to freely sacrifice civil liberties and thus risk
pre­mature death or, as corollary, cause the premature death of others for
the sake of momentary pleasures. As Fromm concludes, “In an alienated
society the mode in which people express their will is not very different
from that of their choice in buying commodities. They are listening to the
drums of propaganda and facts mean little in comparison with the sugges-
tive noise which hammers at them.”101 It is ironic—­and tragic—­that alien-
ated subjects as sadomasochists, such as many Trump supporters, adopt a
fatalistic attitude toward Covid-­19, that is, an attitude that whatever hap-
pens, happens. Indeed, as Trump infamously remarked in response to the
rising death toll of the pandemic, “They are dying, that’s true. And you
have—­it is what it is.”102
In the end, how we lead our lives in the realm of freedom is inseparable
from how we live our lives in the realm of necessity.103 If, for example,
we lovingly cooperate within the realm of necessity with each other in a
nonexploitative and nonoppressive way, we may likewise cultivate a com-
munal sense of love that extends to the realm of freedom. Likewise, the
cultivation of our capacity to love within the realm of freedom, that is,
in our everyday activities and aesthetic endeavors, helps us revalue our
understanding of productive activity within the realm of necessity. Here,
184 · The Emancipated Subject

the ongoing efforts of the Black Lives Matter movement underscore the
praxis of social organizing, that is, grounded actions—­rallies, protests, so-
cial media campaigns—­coupled with theory. For the multiple Black Lives
Matter campaigns, both in the United States and those inspired around the
world, initiate particular historically and geographically specific actions as
informed by concrete knowledges of intersecting oppressions.

Conclusions
On the eve of the 2020 presidential election, chaos reigned in the United
States. The Covid-­19 pandemic, ignored, downplayed, or simply misman-
aged from the beginning, continued to spike throughout the country. Over
7.5 million persons were infected, with a death toll in excess of 200,000.
The Trump administration had, by this point, washed its hand of the whole
affair, thereby consigning millions more to the possibility of premature
death. The economy, apart from a widely vacillating stock market, remained
in shambles. Nearly 30 million people were receiving unemployment bene­
fits, including over 14 million receiving so-­called Pandemic Unemploy-
ment Assistance. These numbers do not include an additional 12 million
workers who were still waiting to receive any assistance of any type because
they fell through the cracks of a mismanaged and, simply put, uncaring
government. In July, a program that authorized an additional $600 weekly
for the unemployed expired and neither the Republican-­dominated Sen-
ate nor the Trump administration were motivated to provide any further
assistance. Republican politicians overwhelmingly favored a “skinny”
stimulus package, at most, that would provide a one-­time $1,200 payment
for all Americans making $75,000 or less in adjusted gross income. The
Democrat-­led House of Representatives had passed the HEROES Act
in May. This $3 trillion package included $500 billion for states, $365 bil-
lion for local governments, $20 billion for tribal communities, and $20
billion for Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands; an additional
$755 million was allocated for coronavirus aid. Provisions also called for
additional funds for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program in an
effort to reduce food insecurity. It died in the Senate.
And while the working class, collectively, suffered and struggled, the
wealthy prospered and flourished at their expense. Indeed, the deliberate
responses of the Trump administration and Republican-­controlled Senate
to the Covid-­19 pandemic obscenely exacerbated inequality in the United
 The Emancipated Subject · 185

States. Throughout the first half of 2020, the top 1 percent of Americans
tallied a combined net worth of $34.2 trillion, with the 50 richest people
in the country accounting for almost $2 trillion. Conversely, the poorest
50 percent held just $2.08 trillion, that is, just 1.9 percent of all household
wealth.104 Stated more bluntly, just 50 people in the United States con-
trolled more wealth than more than 165 million people in total. Moreover,
the struggles were experienced differently within the working-­class popu-
lation. Minorities continued to suffer disproportionately, both from the
ravages of the pandemic and the precarity of the economy. In August 2020,
the white unemployment rate had fallen to 7.3 percent. The unemploy-
ment rate for persons of color, however, remained stubbornly high: Black
unemployment rate was at 13 percent, the Hispanic rate at 10.5 percent,
and Asian Americans at 10.7 percent. Overall, white Americans held 83.9
percent of the country’s wealth, compared, for example, with 4.1 percent
for Black households.105 These disparities underscored the bifurcated eco-
nomic recovery during the pandemic, wherein the wealthy did very well
while the condition of the working poor worsened. As Matthew Yglesias
explains, if you worked in an office and owned stock or a home, things
were bouncing back after the initial financial jolt in March and April; for
those who lacked assets, however, especially those persons of color deemed
essential workers, vulnerability increased precipitously. The failure of gov-
ernment to respond to these people, Aaron Coleman concludes, left millions
with no aid at all, abandoned to suffer the effects of high unemployment in
an unprecedented recession, all the while faced with the mortal uncertain-
ties of a deadly virus.106
And despite the inevitable onset of media fatigue, protests and demon-
strations against police violence continued.107 From California to Maine,
Minnesota to Texas, thousands of people continued to rally in opposition
to the oppression and impunity of law enforcement specifically, but also to
the everyday vulnerability of people of color to exploitation and systemic
racism, sexism, and xenophobia. As Oluchi Omeoga, cofounder of Black
Visions Collective, explains, “We are in the biggest social movement this
country has ever seen. When we say this is what will be written in the his-
tory books, it’s not an exaggeration. The folks calling for change in this
moment are the folks who are going to be on the right side of history.”108
Omeoga is not alone in his optimism. Peter Hudis, for example, sug-
gests that the United States is at a turning point—­a crossroads. “These
massive and ongoing protests,” he writes, “are defined by the clash between
186 · The Emancipated Subject

two absolute opposites—­the forces of death embodied in police murder,

racism, misogyny, environmental destruction, and the domination of dead
labor (or capital) over living labor—­and the forces of life, embodied in
those aspiring for human emancipation.”109 Accordingly, we are in a posi-
tion to take stock of what truly matters in life, to reevaluate progressive
efforts to promote a just, caring, and loving society. As Benjamin Balthaser
and Bill Mullen conclude, “Conventional assessments of what constitutes
socialism and socialism from below in the U.S. in this historical moment
need to begin with participatory observation of how in fact socialism is
being conceived of, thought of, debated, and most importantly practiced
by a new, radicalized generation.”110 On this point, the Black Lives Mat-
ter protests in particular seem to embody the spirit of Marx’s postulation
of spontaneous, worker-­led revolutionary movements. As Paul D’Amato
explains, the form of social organization expressed by Marx and Engels,
notably in the Communist Manifesto, sees the proletariat neither as mere
participants in the struggle, nor as an elite that dictates to the masses;
rather, the proletariat act as comrades in struggle.111 D’Amato continues:
Marx’s notion of the “workers’ party acts not only to disseminate socialist
ideas, but is involved directly in every struggle. Moreover, it doesn’t offer
utopian descriptions of the socialist future, but rather gathers together and
distills the most important historical lessons of past struggles, in order that
those experiences can provide lessons for future struggles.”112 Perhaps no
better description fits the deliberate approach of organizing undertaken
by the various branches of the Black Lives Matter movement. Indeed, the
Black Lives Matter movement, collectively, aligns with centuries of social-
ist movements that have long sought to build a society in which people
could exercise choice over how to achieve human flourishing and utilize
their talents in ways that brought meaningful cooperation but without ex-
ploiting others.113
The working class must remain central to any political left formation
and the struggle to overcome the deadening effects of capitalism, if only
because of their unique structural ability to impose economic costs on
capitalists and to disrupt society at large by collectively withdrawing their
labor.114 That said, we should be mindful that Marx’s own faith in the
emancipatory promise and potential of the proletariat was always tenden-
tial, conditioned upon myriad determinations, not least of which were the
noticeable social divisions within the working class itself. In other words,
we must resist the idolatry of the mythical (white) alienated subject, espe­
 The Emancipated Subject · 187

cially as this figure remains co-opted by the capitalist class. Inheritors of

the Marxist tradition—­as well as its detractors—­have long favored or
feared the working class as agents of revolutionary change. And yet, in the
end, emancipation from the structures and relations of oppression and
exploitation, if it is to happen, may not in actuality be led by the iconic
“mallet-­wielding man” as Holly Lewis so memorably describes. Rather, it
might appear through the actions of queer Black women.
Peter Lamb, on this point, explains that socialism remains a critical ele­
ment in the struggle against alienation and exploitation; however, he cau-
tions that “socialists should recognize the need to combine with other
movements fighting oppression in contemporary capitalist society, with-
out assuming that socialism should hold precedence.”115 For this reason,
an intersectional approach is required that, in positioning the proletariat
as revolutionary subject, is sensitive to the myriad and ambiguous subject
positions of the alienated population in total. Simply put, as Karen Sacks
concludes, one should not expect to find any generic worker or essen-
tial worker, or for that matter, working-­class consciousness; for not only is
class experienced in historically and geographically specific ways, but it is
also experienced in race-­specific and gender-­specific ways, among many,
many others.116
At a minimum, any progressive move forward demands a critical and
self-­reflective decentering and renouncement of the whiteness, the male-
ness, the heteronormativity, and the citizenship of the alienated subject
both in theory and practice. As Brian Jones explains,

If millions of working-­class white people learn to see racism as a

pervasive evil—­if they learn to see it in their kids’ curriculum, if
they see it in the little jokes at work, if they see it in the president’s
policies, in the unfairness of hiring and firing happening right in
front of them, in the zoning of their neighborhood, of their school,
in the country’s history, if they see a black athlete kneeling during
the national anthem and think, “right on!,” then we will have a
chance at building a movement that takes seriously the idea that
an injury to one really is an injury to all.117

Efforts to promote class emancipation that fail to address interlocking

systems of oppression, including but not limited to racism, sexism, homo­
phobia, transphobia, and xenophobia are inescapably incomplete and
188 · The Emancipated Subject

inadequate. If, as Marx argues, political emancipation is a necessary but

insufficient path toward human emancipation, it holds also that human
emancipation without political emancipation for the marginalized is not
possible. It is therefore not a matter of privileging class over race, sex, or
gender but rather of recognizing, as Kimberlé Crenshaw, Patricia Hill Col-
lins, and others do, the intersectionality of these structures of oppression.
It is a matter of recognizing the materiality of social and spatial struggle, of
the need to place human needs above profits and property, that is, the ne-
cessity to allow for the sustenance of life free from want and harm. Fromm
concludes: “If I love, I care—­that is, I am actively concerned with the other
person’s growth and happiness; I am not a spectator. I am responsible, that
is, I respond to his needs, to those he can express and more so to those he
cannot or does not express. I respect him, that is, I look at him as he is,
objectively and not distorted by my wishes and fears.”118 In the end, the
emancipated subject is one who is neither indifferent to the suffering of
others nor is intolerant of others; the emancipated subject is one who finds
meaning in its generative, that is, life-­fulfilling and loving, capacity to heal
rather than hurt, and to care rather than cause harm.
Acknowledgments

Where do we find meaning in life? When I was much younger, home for me
provided comfort; so too did spending my summer days playing baseball
and riding bicycles with my friends. Travel was important, and I have fond
memories of drinking hot chocolate with my parents as we sat around a
campfire, with snow-­capped peaks silhouetted by the fading evening light
behind us. Now, looking back, I appreciate how fortunate I was. There
were hardships and challenges, to be sure, although for the most part my
parents kept these from me. I did not comprehend, then, the downside
of academia, of entrenched sexism and of the precarious employment of
being an adjunct instructor. Now, having survived many years as a profes-
sor, I understand better the difficult life choices my parents made, and how
these shaped my own life. Now, when I think about finding meaning in
life, and what it means to have a meaningful life, my thoughts turn to an
uncertain future. This manuscript is, in large part, written in response to
my concerns.
I am deeply appreciative of Jason Weidemann, for his support and
guidance of this project, from our early conversations (conducted in per-
son) to the final product (confirmed via Zoom). Heartfelt thanks are ex-
tended to Ana Bichanich, Zenyse Miller, Haley Bennett, and the entire staff
at the University of Minnesota Press, to Kristine Hunt who copyedited
the manuscript, and to those scholars who reviewed the initial prospectus
and those who read the completed manuscript. At every stage, countless
individuals—­some known, many anonymous—­provided critical feedback,
constructive criticism, and invaluable support. Any remaining errors, of
course, remain mine.
Throughout my tenure at Kent State University, I have been fortunate to
work with, and learn from, countless students—­friends—­who have sharp-
ened my thinking and honed my writing, including Gabriela Brindis Alva-
rez, Sutapa Chattopadhyay, Jaerin Chung, Alex Colucci, Gordon Cromley,
Christabel Devadoss, Hanieh Hajj Molana, Sam Henkin, Donna Houston,
Olaf Kulke, Josh Inwood, Sokvisal Kimsroy, Robert Kruse, Gabe Popescue,

189
190 · Acknowledgments

Mark Rhodes, Stian Rice, Andy Shears, Dave Stasiuk, and Rachel Will. I
have also benefited from conversations, both formal and informal, in per-
son and virtual, from innumerable scholars over the years, including Stu-
art Aitken, Derek Alderman, Noel Castree, Thom Davies, Michael Dear,
Stuart Elden, Salvatore Engel-­Dimauro, Jim Glassman, Audrey Kobayashi,
Don Mitchell, Heidi Nast, Chris Philo, Laura Pulido, Curt Roseman, Ian
Shaw, and Simon Springer. None of this work would be possible without
the generosity of these scholars who, over the years, offered their wisdom
and tolerated my queries, which, retrospectively, must appear terribly
pedantic.
I thank my family for their encouragement: first and foremost, my par-
ents, Dr. Gerald Tyner and Dr. Judith Tyner, for their inspiration and en-
couragement over the years, for the sacrifices they made as I pursued my
dreams. I thank also my daughters, Jessica and Anica Lyn, for their sense
of humor, particularly when the days seemed cloudy; my wife and life part-
ner, Belinda, who continues to provide emotional support and, if needed,
a sharp kick to my shins, when books and papers begin to topple over on
the dining room table—­your love and care, to our family, is boundless, and
I am forever in your debt; and of course, to Carter and Bubba, our five-­
year-­old and two-­year-­old rescue dog and cat, respectively, who provide
us all with meaning in life. My final thanks, however, extend beyond 3,000
miles away, to my sisters-­in-­law, Meredith, Benilda, and Janet. All three are
front-­line medical personnel, and throughout the pandemic, while I was
privileged to shelter in place, they risked their lives to selflessly help others.
I am truly in awe of them, for who they are and of the personal sacrifices
they have made and continue to make. Collectively, they embody an ethos
of care and an unyielding capacity to help and to heal. And so, to Meredith,
Benilda, and Janet, I warmly dedicate this book.
Notes

Introduction
1. Initially health experts sought to link the illnesses to previous diseases,
such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and Middle East respira-
tory syndrome (MERS). In 2002 a SARS outbreak in China sickened over 8,000
people and resulted in nearly 800 deaths. Doctors, however, ruled out both SARS
and MERS as possible causes. See Yan-­Rong Guo, Qing-­Dong Cao, Zhong-­Si
Hong, Yuan-­Yang Tan, Shou-­Deng Chen, Hong-­Jun Jin, Kai-­sen Tan, De-­Yun
Wang, and Yan Yan, “The Origin, Transmission and Clinical Therapies on
Corona­virus Disease 2019 (Covid-­19) Outbreak—­An Update on the Status,” Mili­
tary Medical Research 7, no. 11 (2020): 1–­10; Erin Schumaker, “Mysterious Pneu-
monia Outbreak Sickens Dozens in China,” ABC News, January 6, 2020, https://
abcnews.go.com/Health/mystery-pneumonia-outbreak-sickens-dozens-china/
story?id=68094861.
2. Erin Schumaker, “Timeline: How Coronavirus Got Started,” ABC News,
April 23, 2020, https://abcnews.go.com/Health/timeline-coronavirus-started/story
?id=69435165.
3. Schumaker, “Timeline.”
4. Yasmeen Abutaleb, Josh Dawsey, Ellen Nakashima, and Greg Miller, “The
U.S. Was Beset by Denial and Dysfunction as the Coronavirus Raged,” Washing­
ton Post, April 4, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2020/
04/04/coronavirus-government-dysfunction/?arc404=true.
5. In December 2019 Trump was impeached by the Democrat-­controlled
House of Representatives, although the Republican-­controlled Senate acquitted
Trump in the first week of January. Trump framed Covid-­19—­when he acknowl-
edged it at all—­as simply another weapon in the arsenal of his political oppo-
nents. This would prove a dangerous narrative in the coming months.
6. Other Republican politicians—­although publicly supporting Trump’s
dismissal of the virus—­in private also took the warnings seriously. That is, seri-
ously enough to recognize an opportunity for quick and easy riches. Having been
briefed on the threat posed by Covid-­19 in a closed door meeting, Senators Rich-
ard Burr (R-­NC) and Kelly Loeffler (R-­GA), among others, benefited from stock
trades worth millions of dollars, selling off shares of stock that would be adversely
affected by a virus-­induced slowdown of the economy. See Robert Faturechi and

191
192 · NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

Derek Willis, “On the Same Day Sen. Richard Burr Dumped Stock, So Did His
Brother-­in-­Law. Then the Market Crashed,” ProPublica, May 6, 2020, https://
www.propublica.org/article/burr-family-stock; Rebecca Shabad, “Woodward:
‘The President of the United States Possessed the Specific Knowledge That Could
Have Saved Lives,’ ” NBC News, September 14, 2020, https://www.nbcnews.com/
politics/2020-election/woodward-president-u-s-possessed-specific-knowledge-
could-have-saved-n1240006; Peter Wade, “New Audio: While Trump Defended
Sharing ‘Fire Fauci’ Tweet, He Told Woodward Virus ‘Is the Plague,’ ” Rolling
Stone, September 15, 2020, https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/
new-audio-while-trump-shared-fire-fauci-tweet-he-told-woodward-virus-is
-plague-1059787/; and Susan B. Glasser, “ ‘It Was All About the Election’: The
Ex-­White House Aide Olivia Troye on Trump’s Narcissistic Mishandling of
Covid-­19,” New Yorker, September 18, 2020, https://www.newyorker.com/news/
letter-from-trumps-washington/it-was-all-about-the-election-the-ex-white
-house-aide-olivia-troye-on-trumps-narcissistic-mishandling-of-covid-19.
7. Quoted in Jonathan Chait, “Trump: I Was Right, Coronavirus Cases ‘Will
Go Down to Zero, Ultimately,’ ” New York Magazine, April 28, 2020, https://
nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/04/trump-coronavirus-cases-will-go-down-to
-zero-ultimately.html.
8. Libby Cathey and Ben Gittleson, “Pence to Lead US Response to Corona-
virus as Trump Urges Americans to Prepare,” ABC News, February 26, 2020,
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-announces-news-conference-coronavirus
-cdc-days-mixed/story?id=69228747.
9. Katherine Eban, “ ‘That’s Their Problem’: How Jared Kushner Let the
Markets Decide America’s COVID-­19 Fate,” Vanity Fair, September 17, 2020,
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2020/09/jared-kushner-let-the-markets-decide
-covid-19-fate.
10. Toluse Olorunnipa, Josh Dawsey, Chelsea Janes, and Isaac Stanley-­Becker,
“Governors Plead for Medical Equipment from Federal Stockpile Plagued by
Shortages and Confusion,” Washington Post, March 31, 2020, https://www
.washingtonpost.com/politics/governors-plead-for-medical-equipment-from
-federal-stockpile-plagued-by-shortages-and-confusion/2020/03/31/18aadda0
-728d-11ea-87da-77a8136c1a6d_story.html.
11. Olorunnipa, Dawsey, Janes, and Stanley-­Becker, “Governors Plead.”
12. Upwards of 19 percent of Latinx workers and 17 percent of Black work-
ers were unemployed compared with whites, of whom about 14 percent were
unemployed. These job losses, moreover, occurred as Latinx households, espe-
cially, were still recovering from a devastating recession in 2007–­2008. During
that calamity, the Latinx community lost 66 percent of its household wealth; the
pandemic, however, quickly decimated most gains achieved over the past decade.
See Suzanne Gamboa, “Latinos Hardest Hit by Coronavirus Job Losses, with a
 NOTES TO INTRODUCTION · 193

Staggering 18.9% Unemployed,” NBC News, May 8, 2020, https://www

.nbcnews.com/news/latino/latinos-hardest-hit-coronavirus-job-losses
-staggering-18-9-unemployed-n1202881; Suzanne Gamboa, “Latinos Still Have
Highest Unemployment Rate, as Joblessness Drops Slightly,” NBC News, June 5,
2020, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/unemployment-still-highest
-among-latinos-joblessness-drops-slightly-n1225861; Alexia Fernández Campbell,
“Even with Positive Jobs Report, Latinas Still Hardest Hit by Covid-­19 Slowdown.
Here’s Why,” Public Integrity, June 5, 2020, https://publicintegrity.org/health/
coronavirus-and-inequality/even-with-positive-jobs-report-latinas-still-hardest
-hit-by-covid-slowdown-heres-why/.
13. APM Research Lab Staff, “The Color of Coronavirus: Covid-­19 Deaths by
Race and Ethnicity in the U.S.,” APM Research Lab, September 16, 2020, https://
www.apmresearchlab.org/covid/deaths-by-race.
14. Kevin B. Anderson, “On the Battle of Ideas: Responding to the New
World of COVID-­19, Economic Crisis, and Anti-­Racist Uprisings,” International
Marxist-­Humanist, July 22, 2020, https://imhojournal.org/articles/on-the-battle
-of-ideas-responding-to-the-new-world-of-covid-19-economic-crisis-and-anti
-racist-uprisings.
15. Heather Brown, “Covid-­19 Lays Bare Capitalism’s Deference to Profits Over
Lives,” International Marxist-­Humanist, March 25, 2020, https://imhojournal.org/
articles/covid-19-lays-bare-capitalisms-deference-to-profits-over-lives.
16. Vicky Ward, “How the Very Rich are Different in the Covid-­19 Fight,”
CNN, April 5, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/05/opinions/coronavirus
-wealthy-false-security-vicky-ward-opinion/index.html.
17. James A. Tyner, Violence in Capitalism: Devaluing Life in an Age of Respon­
sibility (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2016); James A. Tyner, Dead Labor:
Toward a Political Economy of Premature Death (Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press, 2019).
18. Adam Jeffery, “Scenes of Protests Across the Country Demanding States
Reopen the Economy amid Coronavirus Pandemic,” CNBC, April 18, 2020,
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/18/coronavirus-scenes-of-protests-across-the
-country-demanding-states-reopen-the-economy.html.
19. Matthew Valasik, “Why Are White Supremacists Protesting to ‘Reopen’ the
U.S. Economy?,” Salon, April 30, 2020, https://www.salon.com/2020/04/30/why
-are-white-supremacists-protesting-to-reopen-the-us-economy_partner/. See
also Marcie Bianco, “Michigan Coronavirus Protestors Shout ‘Liberty!’—­as
Right-­Wing Rhetoric Weaponizes Freedom,” NBC News, May 14, 2020, https://
www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/michigan-coronavirus-protesters-shout
-liberty-right-wing-rhetoric-weaponizes-freedom-ncna1206596.
20. Stephen Sorace, “Protestors Rally Against Washington’s Coronavirus
Stay-­at-­Home Order: ‘Give Me Liberty or Give Me Covid 19,’ ” Fox News, April 20,
194 · NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

2020, https://www.foxnews.com/us/washington-coronavirus-protest-inslee-stay
-at-home.
21. Steve Benen, “Texas’ Dan Patrick: ‘There are More Important Things than
Living,” MSNBC, April 22, 2020, https://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/
texas-dan-patrick-there-are-more-important-things-living-n1189811).
22. Zygmunt Bauman, Mortality, Immortality and Other Life Strategies (Stan-
ford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992), 50.
23. Frank I. Michelman, “The Subject of Liberalism,” Stanford Law Review 46,
no. 6 (1994): 1807–­33; at 1813.
24. Daniel Rueda Garrido, “Deaths of the Subject and Negated Subjectivity in
the Era of Neoliberal Capitalism,” tripleC 17, no. 1 (2019): 159–­84.
25. Greta Bird, “The White Subject as Liberal Subject,” ACRAWSA E-­Journal
4, no. 2 (2008): 1–­14.
26. Lisa Lowe, “History Hesitant,” Social Text 33, no. 4 (2015): 85–­107; at 90.
27. Lowe, “History Hesitant,” 90.
28. Lowe, “History Hesitant,” 91.
29. Eduardo Bonilla-­Silva, “Feeling Race: Theorizing the Racial Economy of
Emotions,” American Sociological Review 84, no. 1 (2019): 1–­25; at 14.
30. Sean Sayers, Marx and Alienation: Essays on Hegelian Themes (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), x.
31. Christian Fuchs, “Donald Trump: A Critical Theory-­Perspective on
Authoritarian Capitalism,” tripleC 15, no. 1 (2017): 1–­72; Paul Bleakley, “Situation-
ism and the Recuperation of an Ideology in the Era of Trump, Fake News and
Post-­Truth Politics,” Capital & Class 42, no. 3 (2018): 419–­34; David Norman Smith
and Eric Hanley, “The Anger Games: Who Voted for Donald Trump in the 2016
Election, and Why?,” Critical Sociology 44, no. 2 (2018): 195–­212; Robert J. Antonio,
“Reactionary Tribalism Redux: Right-­Wing Populism and De-­Democratization,”
Sociological Quarterly 60, no. 2 (2019): 201–­9. For a critique of this position, see
Eduardo Bonilla-­Silva, Racism without Racists: Color-­Blind Racism and the Persis­
tence of Racial Inequality in America, 5th ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield,
2018).
32. Bonny Wells, “Whose Land are We Fighting For? A Critique of Leftist
Attempts to Engage the ‘White Working Class,’ ” Tubman Brown Organization,
January 12, 2018, https://tubmanbrownorganization.wordpress.com/2018/01/12/
whose-land-are-we-fighting-for-a-critique-of-leftist-attempts-to-engage-the
-white-working-class/).
33. Katherine J. Cramer, The Politics of Resentment: Rural Consciousness in
Wisconsin and the Rise of Scott Walker (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2016); Justin Gest, The New Minority: White Working Class Politics in an Age of
Immigration and Inequality (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); Arlie R.
Hochschild, Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American
 NOTES TO INTRODUCTION · 195

Right (New York: New Press, 2016); James D. Vance, Hillbilly Elegy: A Memoir of a
Family and Culture in Crisis (New York: HarperCollins, 2016).
34. Diana C. Mutz, “Status Threat, Not Economic Hardship, Explains the 2016
Presidential Vote,” PNAS 115, no. 19: E4330–­E4339. See also Christine J. Walley,
“Trump’s Election and the ‘White Working Class’: What We Missed,” American
Ethnologist 44, no. 2 (2017): 231–­36.
35. Nate Silver, “The Mythology of Trump’s ‘Working Class’ Support,”
FiveThirtyEight, May 3, 2016, https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-mythology
-of-trumps-working-class-support/.
36. Gurminder K. Bhambra, “Brexit, Trump, and ‘Methodological Whiteness’:
On the Misrecognition of Race and Class,” British Journal of Sociology 68, no. S1
(2017): S214–­S232; at S226.
37. Eduardo Bonilla-­Silva, “ ‘Racists,’ ‘Class Anxieties,’ Hegemonic Racism,
and Democracy in Trump’s America,” Social Currents 6, no. 1 (2019): 14–­31; at 20.
38. Bhambra, “Brexit, Trump,” S226.
39. See for example Audrey Kobayashi and Linda Peake, “Racism Out of
Place: Thoughts on Whiteness and an Antiracist Geography in the New Mil-
lennium,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 90, no. 2 (2000):
392–­403; Patricia Daley, “Lives Lived Differently: Geography and the Study of
Black Women,” Area 52 (2020): 794–­800; and Azeezat Johnson, “Throwing Our
Bodies Against the White Background of Academia,” Area 52 (2020): 89–­96.
40. Eduardo Bonilla-­Silva, “Toward a New Political Praxis for Trumpamerica:
New Directions in Critical Race Theory,” American Behavioral Scientist 63, no. 13
(2019): 1776–­88; at 1781.
41. Peter Goodwin, “Where’s the Working Class?” tripleC 16, no. 2 (2018):
535–­45, at 535.
42. David W. Lovell, Marx’s Proletariat: The Making of a Myth (New York:
Routledge, 1988), 13.
43. Lovell, Marx’s Proletariat, 11.
44. Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, trans. Rodney Livingston
(London: Merlin, 1971).
45. Rashad Shabazz, Spatializing Blackness: Architectures of Confinement and
Black Masculinity in Chicago (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2015); LaToya
E. Eaves, “Black Geographic Possibilities: On a Queer Black South,” Southeastern
Geographer 57, no. 1 (2017): 80–­95; Peter Hopkins, “Social Geography I: Inter­
sectionality,” Progress in Human Geography 43, no. 5 (2019): 937–­47.
46. Garrido, “Deaths of the Subject,” 160.
47. Douglas Burnham and Peter Lamb, The First Marx: A Philosophical Intro­
duction (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), 116.
48. W. E. B. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in America, 1860–­1880 (New York:
Free Press, 1998 [1935]).
196 · NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

49. John Fischer, Death, Immortality, and Meaning in Life (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2020), 5.
50. Erik Olin Wright, “The Continuing Relevance of the Marxist Tradition for
Transcending Capitalism,” tripleC 16, no. 2 (2018): 490–­500; at 491.
51. Wright, “The Continuing Relevance,” 492.
52. Joshua Inwood, “White Supremacy, White Counter-­Revolutionary Politics,
and the Rise of Donald Trump,” Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space
37, no. 4 (2019): 579–­96; at 589.
53. Brown, “Covid-­19 Lays Bare Capitalism’s Deference.”
54. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 799.
55. Anderson, “On the Battle of Ideas.”
56. Martin Hägglund, This Life: Why Mortality Makes Us Free (London: Profile
Books, 2019), 13.
57. Karl Marx, “Alienation in the Productive Process,” in Karl Marx: Selected
Writings, 2nd ed., ed. David McLellan (New York: Oxford University, 2000),
547–­50; at 548.
58. Ellen Meiksins Wood, Empire of Capital (London: Verso, 2003), 9. There
is of course no monolithic “capitalist” mode of production. As Geoff Mann
succinctly writes, “capitalism does not look the same everywhere you go.” See
Geoff Mann, Disassembly Required: A Field Guide to Actually Existing Capitalism
(Baltimore, Md.: AK Press, 2013), 12.
59. Michael Heinrich, An Introduction to the Three Volumes of Karl Marx’s
Capital (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2012), 181.
60. Hartley Dean, “Eudaimonia and ‘Species Being’: A Marxist Perspective,”
in Handbook of Eudaimonic Well-­Being, ed. Joar Vittersø (Cham, Switzerland:
Springer International, 2016), 507–­20; at 512.
61. Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, trans. Martin
Milligan (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1988). See also Bertell Ollman,
Alienation: Marx’s Conception of Man in Capitalist Society, 2nd ed. (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1976), 136.
62. Gajo Petrović, “Alienation,” in A Dictionary of Marxist Thought, 2nd ed.,
ed. Tom Bottomore (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1991), 11–­16; at 14.
63. Epifanio San Juan Jr., “Problems in the Marxist Project of Theorizing
Race,” Rethinking Marxism 2, no. 2 (1989): 58–­80; Kobayashi and Peake, “Rac-
ism Out of Place”; David Camfield, “Elements of a Historical-­Materialist Theory
of Racism,” Historical Materialism 24, no. 1 (2016): 31–­70; Caroline Faria and
Sharlene Mollett, “Critical Feminist Reflectivity and the Politics of Whiteness
in the ‘Field,’ ” Gender, Place & Culture 23, no. 1 (2016): 79–­93; Ashley Bohrer,
“Inter­sectionality and Marxism: A Critical Historiography,” Historical Material­
ism 26, no. 2 (2018): 46–­74; Sharlene Mollett and Caroline Faria, “The Spatialities
of Intersectional Thinking: Fashioning Feminist Geographic Futures,” Gender,
 NOTES TO INTRODUCTION · 197

Place & Culture 25, no. 4 (2018): 565–­77; Caroline Faria and Sharlene Mollett,
“ ‘We Didn’t Have Time to Sit Still and be Scared’: A Postcolonial Feminist Read-
ing of ‘An Other Geography,’ ” Dialogues in Human Geography 10, no. 1 (2020):
23–­29; Sean Walton, “Why the Critical Race Theory Should Not be Dismissed by
Neo-­Marxists: Lessons from Contemporary Black Radicalism,” Power and Educa­
tion 12, no. 1 (2020): 78–­94.
64. Keeanga-­Yamahtta Taylor, From #BlackLivesMatter to Black Liberation
(Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2016); Barbara Ransby, Making All Black Lives Mat­
ter: Reimagining Freedom in the 21st Century (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2018).
65. Willie Jamaal Wright, “As Above, So Below: Anti-­Black Violence as Envi-
ronmental Racism,” Antipode 53, no. 3 (2021): 791–­809.
66. Katherine McKittrick, Demonic Grounds: Black Women and the Cartogra­
phies of Struggle (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), xiv.
67. McKittrick, Demonic Grounds, xiv.
68. McKittrick, Demonic Grounds, xv.
69. An engagement with Fromm is not without its challenges. For more
in-­depth discussions on the benefits and limitations of Fromm, see Mauricio
Cortina, “The Greatness and Limitations of Erich Fromm’s Humanism,” Con­
temporary Psychoanalysis 51, no. 3 (2015): 388–­422; at 389; and Lynn S. Chancer,
“Feminism, Humanism, and Erich Fromm,” in Erich Fromm’s Critical Theory:
Hope, Humanism, and the Future, ed. Kieran Durkin and Joan Braune (London:
Bloomsbury Academic, 2020), 101–­14.
70. Lynn S. Chancer, Sadomasochism in Everyday Life: The Dynamics of Power
and Powerlessness (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1992), 10.
71. Chancer, Sadomasochism, 16.
72. Carl Ratner, “Pathological Normalcy: A Construct for Comprehending
and Overcoming Psychological Aspects of Alienation,” Humanistic Psychologist
42 (2014): 298–­303; at 298.
73. Eric Fromm, The Sane Society (New York: Henry Holt, 1990 [1955]), 6.
74. Neal Harris, “Reconstructing Erich Fromm’s ‘Pathology of Normalcy’:
Transcending the Recognition-­Cognitive Paradigm in the Diagnosis of Social
Pathologies,” Social Science Information 58, no. 4 (2019): 714–­33; at 719.
75. Eric Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion: My Encounter with Marx and
Freud (London: Abacus, 1983 [1962]), 15.
76. See for example David Conradson, “Geographies of Care: Spaces, Prac-
tices, Experiences,” Social & Cultural Geography 4, no. 4 (2003): 451–­54; Victoria
Lawson, “Geographies of Care and Responsibility,” Annals of the Association of
American Geographers 97, no. 1 (2007): 1–­11; Joshua F. J. Inwood, “Searching for
the Promised Land: Examining Dr. Martin Luther King’s Concept of the Beloved
Community,” Antipode 41, no. 3 (2009): 487–­508; Victoria Lawson, “Instead of
198 · NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

Radical Geography, How About Caring Geography?” Antipode 41, no. 1 (2009):
210–­13; Carey-­Ann Morrison, Lynda Johnston, and Robyn Longhurst, “Criti-
cal Geographies of Love as Spatial, Relational and Political,” Progress in Human
Geography 37, no. 4 (2012): 505–­21; Joshua F. J. Inwood, “Love and the Other:
A Response to Morrison et al. (2012),” Progress in Human Geography 37, no. 5
(2013): 721–­23; Carey-­Ann Morrison, Lynda Johnston, and Robyn Longhurst,
“ ‘It’s Complicated’: Love, Selves and Others—­A Response to Inwood,” Progress
in Human Geography 37, no. 5 (2013): 724–­26; Andrew Power and Edward Hall,
“Placing Care in Times of Austerity,” Social & Cultural Geography 19, no. 3 (2018):
303–­13; and Lydia Wood, Kate Swanson, and Donald E. Colley III, “Tenets for a
Radical Care Ethics in Geography,” ACME: An International Journal for Critical
Geographies 19, no. 2 (2020): 424–­47.

1. A Flourishing, but Mortal Life

1. Bertell Ollman, Alienation: Marx’s Conception of Man in Capitalist Society,
2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 151.
2. Ollman, Alienation, 134.
3. James C. Klagge, “Marx’s Realms of ‘Freedom’ and ‘Necessity,’ ” Canadian
Journal of Philosophy 16, no. 4 (1986): 769–­78; at 769. See also Aaron Jaffe, “From
Aristotle to Marx: A Critical Philosophical Anthropology,” Science & Society
80, no. 1 (2016): 56–­77; at 58. See also Norman Geras, Marx and Human Nature:
Refutation of a Legend (London: Verso Books, 1983); John G. Fox, Marx, the
Body, and Human Nature (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Chris Byron,
“Essence and Alienation: Marx’s Theory of Human Nature,” Science & Society 80,
no. 3 (2016): 375–­94; Hartley Dean, “Eudaimonia and ‘Species Being’: A Marxist
Perspective,” in Handbook of Eudaimonic Well-­Being, ed. Joar Vittersø (Cham,
Switzerland: Springer International, 2016), 507–­20; Karsten J. Struhl, “Marx and
Human Nature: The Historical, the Trans-­Historical, and Human Flourishing,”
Science & Society 80, no. 1 (2016): 78–­104; Jamie Morgan, “Species Being in the
Twenty-­First Century,” Review of Political Economy 30, no. 3 (2018): 377–­95; and
Nguyen Anh Quoc, “Karl Marx’s Theory of Human Nature,” European Journal of
Social Sciences Studies 4, no. 4 (2019): 200–­209.
4. Martin Hägglund, This Life: Why Mortality Makes Us Free (London: Profile
Books, 2019), 20.
5. Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, trans. Martin
Milligan (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1988), 19.
6. See, for example, Sven-­Eric Liedman, A World to Win: The Life and Works
of Karl Marx, trans. Jeffrey N. Skinner (London: Verso, 2018), 15.
7. Egidijus Mardosas, “Marxist and Aristotelian Ethics,” Filosofija Sociologija
27, no. 3 (2016): 214–­21; at 215.
 NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 · 199

8. Karl Marx, Capital, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Penguin, 1990), Vol-
ume 1, 811.
9. Hägglund, This Life, 22.
10. Mardosas, “Marxism and Aristotelian Ethics,” 216.
11. Morgan, “Species Being,” 386.
12. Peter Goodwin, “Where’s the Working Class? tripleC 16, no. 2 (2018):
535–­45; at 535.
13. Leslie Stevenson, David L. Haberman, Peter M. Wright, and Charlotte
Witt, Thirteen Theories of Human Nature (New York: Oxford University Press,
2018), 3.
14. Stevenson et al., Thirteen Theories, 97.
15. Stevenson et al., Thirteen Theories, 91.
16. Stevenson et al., Thirteen Theories, 105.
17. Cornelius Castoriadis, “From Marx to Aristotle, from Aristotle to Us,”
Social Research 45, no. 4 (1978): 667–­738; George E. McCarthy, “German Social
Ethics and the Return to Greek Philosophy: Marx and Aristotle,” Studies in Soviet
Thought 31, no. 1 (1986): 1–­24; George E. McCarthy, ed., Marx and Aristotle:
Nineteenth-­Century German Social Theory and Classical Antiquity (Lanham, Md.:
Rowman & Littlefield, 1992); Nathaniel Cline, William McColloch, and Kirsten
Ford, “An Aristotelian View of Marx’s Method,” Working Paper, No. 2011–­08,
University of Utah, Department of Economics; Sabeen Ahmed, “Communism
as Eudaimonia: An Aristotelian Reading of Human Emancipation,” International
Journal of Philosophy & Social Values 1, no. 2 (2018): 31–­48; Jonathan E. Pike,
From Aristotle to Marx: Aristotelianism in Marxist Social Ontology (New York:
Routledge, 2019).
18. Ahmed, “Communism as Eudaimonia,” 31.
19. Mardosas, “Marxism and Aristotelian Ethics,” 215.
20. See, for example, Timothy D. Roche, “Ergon and Eudaimonia in Nicoma-
chean Ethics I: Reconsidering the Intellectualist Interpretation,” Journal of the
History of Philosophy 26, no. 2 (1988): 175–­94; Deborah Achtenberg, “On the
Metaphysical Presuppositions of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics,” Journal of
Value Inquiry 26 (1992): 217–­340; and Rachel Barney, “Aristotle’s Argument for
a Human Function,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 34 (2008): 293–­322.
21. Thomas Nagel, “Aristotle on Eudaimonia,” Phronesis 17, no. 3 (1972):
252–­59; at 253.
22. Roche, “Ergon and Eudaimonia,” 178; Achtenberg, “On the Metaphysical
Presuppositions,” 330.
23. Roche, “Ergon and Eudaimonia,” 183.
24. Mardosas, “Marxism and Aristotelian Ethics,” 215.
25. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, including Theses on
Feuerbach (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus, 1998), 37.
200 · NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

26. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, 76–­77.

27. Thomas E. Wartenberg, “ ‘Species-­Being’ and ‘Human Nature’ in Marx”
Human Studies 5, no. 1 (1982): 77–­95; at 79.
28. Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, 37.
29. Ian G. R. Shaw and Marv Waterstone, Wageless Life: A Manifesto for a
Future Beyond Capitalism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2019), 7.
30. Wartenberg, “ ‘Species-­Being,’ ” 80.
31. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, 77.
32. Struhl, “Marx and Human Nature,” 84.
33. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, 77.
34. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 284.
35. Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, 49.
36. Morgan, “Species Being,” 387.
37. Isidor Wallimann, Estrangement: Marx’s Conception of Human Nature and
the Division of Labor (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1981), 12.
38. Nagel, “Aristotle on Eudaimonia,” 257.
39. Wartenberg, “ ‘Species-­Being,’ ” 94.
40. Ted Benton, “Humanism = Speciesism: Marx on Humans and Animals,”
Radical Philosophy 50 (1988): 4–­18; David Sztybel, “Marxism and Animal Rights,”
Ethics and the Environment 2, no. 2 (1997): 169–­85; Katherine Perlo, “Marxism
and the Underdog,” Society & Animals 10, no. 3 (2002): 303–­18; Ted Benton,
“Marxism and the Moral Status of Animals,” Society & Animals 11, no. 1 (2003):
73–­79; Renzo Llorente, “Reflections on the Prospects for a Non-­Speciesist Marx-
ism,” in Critical Theory and Animal Liberation, ed. John Sanbonmatsu (Lanham,
Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2011), 121–­35. For counterarguments, see Ryan
Gunderson, “Marx’s Comments on Animal Welfare,” Rethinking Marxism 23,
no. 4 (2011): 543–­48 and John Bellamy Foster and Brett Clark, “Marx and Alien-
ated Speciesism,” Monthly Review 70, no. 7 (2018): 1–­20.
41. Todd May, Death (Durham, UK: Acumen, 2009), 25.
42. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, 165; Foster and Clark, “Marx
and Alienated Speciesism,” 4.
43. Foster and Clark, “Marx and Alienated Speciesism,” 4.
44. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, 76.
45. Foster and Clark, “Marx and Alienated Speciesism,” 4–­5.
46. Paul Burkett, “Ecology and Marx’s Vision of Communism,” Socialism and
Democracy 17, no. 2 (2003): 41–­72; Paresh Chattopadhyay, “Worlds Apart: Social-
ism in Marx and in Early Bolshevism,” Economic and Political Weekly 40, no. 53
(2005): 5629–­34; Paresh Chattopadhyay, “Passage to Socialism: The Dialectic
of Progress in Marx,” Historical Materialism 14, no. 3 (2006): 45–­84; Paresh
Chattopadhyay, “The Myth of Twentieth-­Century Socialism and the Continuing
Relevance of Karl Marx,” Socialism and Democracy 24, no. 3 (2010): 23–­45; and
 NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 · 201

Michael D. Yates, “Nothing to Lose but Their Chains,” Monthly Review 70, no. 5
(2018): 15–­29.
47. Brett Clark and John Bellamy Foster, “The Dialectic of Social and Ecologi-
cal Metabolism: Marx, Mészáros, and the Absolute Limits of Capital,” Socialism
and Democracy 24, no. 2 (2010): 124–­38; at 125.
48. John Bellamy Foster, “Marx and the Rift in the Universal Metabolism of
Nature,” Monthly Review 65, no. 7 (2013): 1–­19; at 5.
49. John Bellamy Foster and Brett Clark, “Marxism and the Dialectics of Ecol-
ogy,” Monthly Review 68, no. 5 (2016): 1–­17; at 11; Brett Clark and John Bellamy
Foster, “Ecological Imperialism and the Global Metabolic Rift: Unequal Exchange
and the Guano/Nitrates Trade,” International Journal of Comparative Sociology 50,
nos. 3–­4 (2009): 311–­34; at 314.
50. Brett Clark and Richard York, “Rifts and Shifts,” Monthly Review 60, no. 6
(2008): 13­–­24; at 14–­15.
51. John Bellamy Foster and Brett Clark, “The Expropriation of Nature,”
Monthly Review 69, no. 10 (2018): 1–­27; at 1.
52. John Bellamy Foster, “Marx’s Theory of Metabolic Rift: Classical Foun-
dations for Environmental Sociology,” American Journal of Sociology 105, no. 2
(1999): 366–­405; at 383.
53. Marx, Capital, Volume III, 949.
54. Clark and Foster, “The Dialectic of Social and Ecological Metabolism,” 129.
55. Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, 43.
56. Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, 570.
57. Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (New York:
International, 1970), 20.
58. Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, 37.
59. Struhl, “Marx and Human Nature,” 83.
60. Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, 37.
61. Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, 42.
62. Struhl, “Marx and Human Nature,” 84.
63. Karl Marx, “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,” in Karl Marx:
Selected Writings, 2nd ed., ed. David McLellan (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2000), 329–­55; at 329.
64. Struhl, “Marx and Human Nature,” 81.
65. Struhl, “Marx and Human Nature,” 86.
66. Sébastien Rioux, “Embodied Contradictions: Capitalism, Social Repro-
duction and Body Formation,” Women’s Studies International Forum 48 (2015):
194–­202; at 195. See also Reecia Orzeck, “What Does Not Kill You: Historical
Materialism and the Body,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 25
(2007): 496–­514.
67. Rioux, “Embodied Contradictions,” 195.
202 · NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

68. John M. Fischer, Death, Immortality, and Meaning in Life (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2020), 2.
69. There is a vast literature on meaningful life; the following accounts have
been helpful in shaping my understanding: Viktor E. Frankl, Man’s Search for
Meaning (Boston: Beacon, 2006); Susan Wolf, Meaning in Life and Why it Matters
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010); and Thaddeus Metz, Meaning
in Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
70. Dean, “Eudaimonia and ‘Species Being,’ ” 50; see also Struhl, “Marx and
Human Nature,” 90.
71. James Daly, Marx: Justice and Dialectic (London: Greenwich Exchange,
1996), 117; Mardosas, “Marxism and Aristotelian Ethics,” 220.
72. Patrick O. Nyabul and Joseph W. Situma, “The Meaning of Eudemonia in
Aristotle’s Ethics,” International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 2, no. 3 (2014):
65–­74; Joar Vittersø (ed.), Handbook of Eudaimonic Well-­Being (Cham, Swit-
zerland: Springer International, 2016); Richard Kim, “Well-­Being, Eudaimonia,
and Nature-­Fulfillment,” in Aristotelian Naturalism, ed. Martin Hähnel (Cham,
Switzerland: Springer International, 2020), 371–­85.
73. Todd May, A Significant Life: Human Meaning in a Silent Universe (Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 4; Dean, “Eudaimonia and ‘Species
Being,’ ” 508.
74. Kim, “Well-­Being, Eudaimonia,” 372.
75. Richard M. Ryan and Frank Martela, “Eudaimonia as a Way of Living:
Connecting Aristotle with Self-­Determination Theory,” in Handbook of Eudai­
monic Well-­Being, ed. Joar Vittersø (Cham, Switzerland: Springer International,
2016), 109–­22; at 110.
76. Dean, “Eudaimonia and ‘Species Being,’ ” 508. As Dean notes, Aristotle
further distinguished between free men, on the one hand, and women and slaves
on the other.
77. Dean, “Eudaimonia and ‘Species Being,’ ” 508.
78. Kim, “Well-­Being, Eudaimonia,” 376.
79. Ryan and Martela, “Eudaimonia as a Way of Living,” 110.
80. Ryan and Martela, “Eudaimonia as a Way of Living,” 110.
81. Kim, “Well-­Being, Eudaimonia,” 376.
82. Ryan and Martela, “Eudaimonia as a Way of Living,” 110.
83. Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, 42.
84. Liedman, A World to Win, 457.
85. Dean, “Eudaimonia and ‘Species Being,’ ” 512.
86. May, A Significant Life, 5.
87. Jaffe, “From Aristotle to Marx,” 59.
88. Walliman, Estrangement, xx.
89. Walliman, Estrangement, xx.
 NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 · 203

90. Dean, “Eudaimonia and ‘Species Being,’ ” 509.

91. Sandro Mezzadra, In the Marxian Workshops: Producing Subjects, trans.
Yari Lanci (London: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2018), xv.
92. Fischer, Death, 105.
93. Todd May, Death (Durham, UK: Acumen, 2009), 7.
94. May, Death, 7. There is speculation as to the awareness of death in
non­human animals. Certainly, many nonhuman animals are aware of danger
and also mourn their dead. This is not the same as having an awareness of the
certainty, and finitude, of death itself. Regardless, whether nonhuman animals
are aware of death is beside the point. If we learn that dogs or whales are aware
of death, this does not change the fact that human awareness of death greatly
informs human societal organization.
95. Zygmunt Bauman, Mortality, Immortality, and Other Life Strategies (Stan-
ford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992), 9.
96. Olivia Stevenson, Charlotte Kenten, and Avril Maddrell, “And Now the
End Is Near: Enlivening and Politizising the Geographies of Dying, Death and
Mourning,” Social & Cultural Geography 17, no. 2 (2016): 153–­65; at 157. See also
Philippe Ariès, Western Attitudes Toward Death: From the Middle Ages to the
Present (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975); Philippe Ariès,
The Hour of Our Death (New York: Vintage, 1981); Allan Kellehear, A Social His­
tory of Dying (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); James D. E. Watson,
“The Harm of Premature Death: Immortality—­the Transhumanist Challenge,”
Ethical Perspectives 16, no. 4 (2009): 435–­58; Hans Ruin, Being with the Dead:
Burial, Ancestral Politics, and the Roots of Historical Consciousness (Stanford,
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2018).
97. Bauman, Mortality, 4.
98. Timothy C. Baker, Writing Animals: Language, Suffering, and Animality in
Twenty-­First Century Fiction (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 109.
99. Judith Butler, Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable? (London: Verso
Books, 2009); Avril Maddrell and James D. Sidaway (eds.), Deathscapes: Spaces
for Death, Dying, Mourning and Remembrance. (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2012).
100. Martha C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hel­
lenistic Ethics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2013), 229.
101. Alan Segal, Life After Death: A History of the Afterlife in Western Religion
(New York: Doubleday, 2010).
102. Colleen McDannell and Bernhard Lang, Heaven: A History (New Haven,
Conn.: Yale University Press, 2001).
103. Samuel Scheffler, Death and the Afterlife (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2016), 68.
104. May, Death, 36.
105. Watson, “The Harm of Premature Death,” 438.
204 · NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

106. Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, 47; Joseph Fracchia, “Beyond the
Human-­Nature Debate: Human Corporeal Organization as the ‘First Fact’ of
Historical Materialism,” Historical Materialism 13, no. 1 (2005): 33–­62; at 48.
107. Bauman, Mortality, 5.
108. Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, 47.
109. Fracchia, “Beyond the Human-­Nature Debate,” 48.
110. May, Death, 11.
111. Karl Marx, Grundrisse, trans. Martin Nicolaus (New York: Penguin Books,
1973), 604.
112. Marx, Grundrisse, 609.
113. Bauman, Mortality, 4.
114. Bauman, Mortality, 4.
115. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, 21.
116. Fischer, Death, 81.
117. May, Death, 28.
118. Fischer, Death, 40; Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1979), 9.
119. Brooke A. Trisel, “What Is Premature Death?” Minerva—­An Internet Jour­
nal of Philosophy 11 (2007): 54–­82; Zohreh Bayatrizi, Life Sentences: The Modern
Ordering of Mortality (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 2008); and
Stephen Hetherington, “Where Is the Harm in Dying Prematurely? An Epicurean
Answer,” Journal of Ethics 17 (2013): 79–­97.
120. Watson, “The Harm of Premature Death,” 443.
121. Watson, “The Harm of Premature Death,” 443.
122. Bayatrizi, Life Sentences, 53; Zohreh Bayatrizi, “Erasing Death: The Science
That Is Rewriting the Boundaries between Life and Death,” Canadian Studies in
Population 42, nos. 3–­4 (2015): 111.
123. Bayatrizi, Life Sentences, 54.
124. Trisel, “What Is Premature Death?,” 61.
125. Ruth Wilson Gilmore, “Fatal Couplings of Power and Difference: Notes on
Racism and Geography,” Professional Geographer 54, no. 1 (2002): 15–­24; at 16.
126. James A. Tyner and Joshua Inwood, “Violence as Fetish: Geography, Marx-
ism, and Dialectics,” Progress in Human Geography 38, no. 6 (2014): 771–­84; at 774.
127. James A. Tyner, Dead Labor: Toward a Political Economy of Premature
Death (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2019), 10.
128. Emma W. Laurie and Ian G. R. Shaw, “Violent Conditions: The Injustices
of Being,” Political Geography 65 (2018): 8–­16; at 15.
129. Butler, Frames of War, 25. See also Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Pow­
ers of Mourning and Violence (London: Verso, 2004).
130. Christopher Harker, “Precariousness, Precarity, and Family: Notes from
Palestine,” Environment and Planning A 44 (2012): 849–­65; at 859.
 NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 · 205

131. Sean Hill II, “Precarity in the Era of #BlackLivesMatter,” Women’s Studies
Quarterly 45, nos. 3–­4 (2017): 94–­109; at 100.
132. Kimberlé Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity,
and Violence against Women of Color,” Stanford Law Review 43, no. 6 (1991):
1241–­300.
133. Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins,” 1245.
134. Sharlene Mollett and Caroline Faria, “The Spatialities of Intersectional
Thinking: Fashioning Feminist Geographic Futures,” Gender, Place & Culture:
A Journal of Feminist Geography 25, n. 4 (2018): 565–­577; at 567.
135. Martha A. Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the
Human Condition,” Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 20, no. 1 (2008): article 2
(22 pp.), at 10.
136. Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject,” 2.
137. Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject,” 2–­3.
138. Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject,” 10.
139. Kathryn A. Gillespie and Patricia J. Lopez, “Introducing Economies
of Death,” in Economies of Death: Economic Logics of Killable Life and Griev­
able Death, edited by Patricia J. Lopez and Kathryn A. Gillespie (New York:
Routledge, 2015), 1–­13; at 8. See also Sharon D. Jones-­Eversley, Johnny Rice II,
A. Christson Adedoyin, and Lori James-­Townes, “Premature Death of Young
Black Males in the United States,” Journal of Black Studies 51, no. 3 (2020): 251–­72.
140. Wartenberg, “ ‘Species-­Being,’ ” 95.
141. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, 73.
142. Morgan, “Species Being,” 391.
143. Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, 37.
144. Wartenberg, “ ‘Species-­Being,’ ” 88.
145. Wartenberg, “ ‘Species-­Being,’ ” 88.
146. Morgan, “Species Being,” 386.

2. The Alienated Subject

1. Zygmunt Bauman, Consuming Life (Malden, Mass.: Polity, 2007).
2. Nolen Gertz, Nihilism (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2019), 132–­33.
3. Gertz, Nihilism, 135.
4. John Holloway, “Read Capital: The First Sentence or, Capital Starts
with Wealth, Not with the Commodity,” Historical Materialism 23, no. 3 (2015):
3–­26; at 5.
5. Chris Byron, “Essence and Alienation: Marx’s Theory of Human Nature,”
Science & Society 80, no. 3 (2016): 375–­94; at 385.
6. Karl Marx, Grundrisse, trans. Martin Nicolaus (New York: Penguin Books,
1973), 488.
206 · NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

7. Marx, Grundrisse, 488.

8. Holloway, “Read Capital,” 6.
9. Holloway, “Read Capital,” 7.
10. Holloway, “Read Capital,” 7.
11. Bauman, Consuming Life, 87.
12. Douglas Burnham and Peter Lamb, The First Marx: A Philosophical Intro­
duction (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019), 21.
13. Burnham and Lamb, The First Marx, 68.
14. István Mészáros, Marx’s Theory of Alienation (London: Merlin, 1970);
Richard Schacht, Alienation (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1970); Bertell
Ollman, Alienation: Marx’s Conception of Man in Capitalist Society, 2nd ed. (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1976); Isidor Wallimann, Estrangement: Marx’s
Conception of Human Nature and the Division of Labor (Westport, Conn.: Green-
wood, 1981); and Sean Sayers, Marx and Alienation: Essays on Hegelian Themes
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
15. Sandra Lee Bartky, Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenol­
ogy of Oppression (New York: Routledge, 1990), 34.
16. Gajo Petrović, “Marx’s Theory of Alienation,” Philosophy and Phenomeno­
logical Research 23, no. 3 (1963): 419–­26; at 426.
17. Bartky, Femininity and Domination, 32.
18. Ian G. R. Shaw and Marv Waterstone, Wageless Life: A Manifesto for a
Future beyond Capitalism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2019), 49.
19. Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume I, trans. Ben
Fowkes (New York: Penguin Books), 875.
20. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 915.
21. Epifanio San Juan Jr., “From Race to Class Struggle: Marxism and Critical
Race Theory,” Nature, Society, and Thought 18, no. 3 (2005): 333–­53; at 341.
22. San Juan Jr., “From Race to Class,” 343 and 350.
23. Mészáros, Marx’s Theory of Alienation, 63–­64.
24. Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (New York:
International, 1970), 20.
25. John Haldon, “Mode of Production, Social Action, and Historical Change:
Some Questions and Issues,” in Studies on Pre-­Capitalist Modes of Production,
ed. Laura da Graca and Andrea Zingarelli (Boston: Brill, 2015), 204–­36; at 209;
A Haroon Akram-­Lodhi and Cristobal Kay, “Back to the Future? Marx, Modes of
Production and the Agrarian Question,” in Critical Perspectives on the Agrarian
Transition, ed. B. B. Mohanty (London: Routledge, 2016): 71–­94; at 46.
26. Marx, A Contribution, 20.
27. Edgar Illas, “Base and Superstructure,” in The Bloomsbury Companion to
Marx, ed. Jeff Diamanti, Andrew Pendakis, and Imre Szeman (London: Blooms-
bury Academic, 2019), 267–­72; at 268.
 NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 · 207

28. Illas, “Base and Superstructure,” 268.

29. Haldon, “Mode of Production,” 208.
30. Haldon, “Mode of Production,” 210.
31. Haldon, “Mode of Production,” 210.
32. Illas, “Base and Superstructure,” 268.
33. Marx, A Contribution, 21.
34. Marx, A Contribution, 21.
35. Akram-­Lodhi and Kay, “Back to the Future,” 46.
36. Marx and Engels, German Ideology, 38.
37. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 125.
38. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 163.
39. Michael Heinrich, An Introduction to the Three Volumes of Karl Marx’s
Capital (New York: Monthly Review, 2004), 72.
40. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 164–­65.
41. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 126.
42. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 140.
43. Heinrich, An Introduction, 58.
44. Joseph Choonara, A Reader’s Guide to Marx’s Capital (London: Book-
marks, 2017), 21.
45. Choonara, A Reader’s Guide, 22.
46. Choonara, A Reader’s Guide, 25.
47. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 247.
48. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 247.
49. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 203.
50. Bobby Wilson, “Race in Commodity Exchange and Consumption:
Separate but Equal,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 95, no. 3
(2005): 587–­606; at 589.
51. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 248.
52. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 248.
53. Lange, “Capital,” 274.
54. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 248.
55. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 250.
56. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 251.
57. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 251.
58. David Harvey, A Companion to Marx’s Capital (New York: Verso, 2010), 85.
59. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 254.
60. Lange, “Capital,” 275.
61. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 1038.
62. Murray E. G. Smith, “Productivity, Valorization and Crisis: Socially Neces-
sary Unproductive Labor in Contemporary Capitalism,” Science & Society 57,
no. 3 (1993): 262–­93; at 265.
208 · NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

63. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 1039.

64. Smith, “Productivity, Valorization,” 265–­66.
65. Smith, “Productivity, Valorization,” 266.
66. Immanuel Wallerstein, “Ecology and Capitalist Costs of Production: No
Exit,” in Ecology and the World System, ed. Walter L. Goldfrank, David Goodman,
and Andrew Szasz (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1999): 3–­12. See also Gerard
Strange, “Capitalism, Valorization and the Political Economy of Ecological Cri-
sis,” Capital & Class 24, no. 2 (2000): 55–­80.
67. Michael Hardt and Toni Negri, “The Multiplicities within Capitalist Rule
and the Articulation of Struggles,” tripleC 16, no. 2 (2018): 440–­48; at 441.
68. Hardt and Negri, “The Multiplicities within Capitalist Rule,” 441.
69. Hardt and Negri, “The Multiplicities within Capitalist Rule,” 441.
70. Hardt and Negri, “The Multiplicities within Capitalist Rule,” 441.
71. Burnham and Lamb, The First Marx, 29
72. Fracchia, “The Capitalist Labour-­Process,” 43.
73. Fracchia, “The Capitalist Labour-­Process,” 43.
74. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 300.
75. Paul D’Amato, The Meaning of Marxism (Chicago: Haymarket Books,
2006), 56.
76. Ernest Mandel, An Introduction to Marxist Economic Theory (New York:
Pathfinder, 1969), 17.
77. Mandel, Introduction to Marxist Economic Theory, 17.
78. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (London:
Verso, 2012), 42.
79. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 376.
80. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 377.
81. Prabhat Patnaik, “Contemporary Imperialism and the World’s Labor
Reserves,” Social Scientist 35, no. 5–­6 (2007): 3–­18; at 3.
82. Michael McIntyre, “Race, Surplus Population and the Marxist Theory of
Imperialism,” Antipode 43, no. 5 (2011): 1489–­515.
83. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 380.
84. See for example James A. Tyner, Dead Labor: Toward a Political Economy
of Premature Death (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2019), 54.
85. Shaw and Waterstone, Wageless Life, 24.
86. John Bellamy Foster, Robert W. McChesney, and R. Jamil Jonna, “The
Global Reserve Army of Labor and the New Imperialism,” Monthly Review 63,
no. 6 (2011): 1–­31; at 9.
87. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 795.
88. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 796.
89. Foster et al., “Global Reserve Army,” 10.
90. As Denning (2010: 87) writes, Marx was no sympathizer of the lumpenpro­
 NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 · 209

letariat. Indeed, in his support of the proletariat, the “legitimate” moral working
class, Marx viewed the lumpenproletariat as an unproductive, parasitic layer of
society.
91. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 797.
92. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 797.
93. Tony C. Brown, “The Time of Globalization: Rethinking Primitive Accu-
mulation,” Rethinking Marxism 21, no. 4 (2009): 571–­84; at 574.
94. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 784.
95. Mandel, Introduction to Marxist Economic Theory, 30.
96. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 129.
97. Moishe Postone, Time, Labor, and Social Domination: A Reinterpretation of
Marx’s Critical Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 193.
98. Alex Callinicos, The Revolutionary Ideas of Karl Marx (Chicago: Haymar-
ket Books, 2011), 137.
99. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 1024.
100. Choonara, A Reader’s Guide, 64.
101. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 275.
102. Choonara, A Reader’s Guide, 64.
103. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 275.
104. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 275.
105. Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, trans. Martin
Milligan (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 1988), 86.
106. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, 20.
107. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 436–­37.
108. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 1034–­35.
109. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 1035.
110. Burnham and Lamb, The First Marx, 53.
111. Burnham and Lamb, The First Marx, 115.
112. Lynn S. Chancer, Sadomasochism in Everyday Life: The Dynamics of Power
and Powerlessness (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1992), 33.
113. Jake Sherman, Meridith McGraw, and Quint Forgey, “Schumer Urges
Trump to Invoke Defense Production Act to Rush Medical Equipment to Provid-
ers,” Politico, March 20, 2020. https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/
story/2020/03/20/schumer-urges-trump-to-invoke-defense-production-act-
to-rush-medical-equipment-to-providers-1268366; Eric Schlosser, “America’s
Slaughterhouses Aren’t Just Killing Animals,” The Atlantic, May 12, 2020,
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/05/essentials-meatpacking
-coronavirus/611437; Michael Grabell, Claire Perlman, and Bernice Yeung,
“Emails Reveal Chaos as Meatpacking Companies Fought Health Agencies over
Covid-­19 Outbreaks in Their Plants,” ProPublica, June 12, 2020, https://www
.propublica.org/article/emails-reveal-chaos-as-meatpacking-companies-fought
210 · NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

-health-agencies-over-covid-19-outbreaks-in-their-plants; Kimberly Kindy,

“More than 200 Meat Plant Workers in the U.S. Have Died of Covid-­19. Federal
Regulators Just Issued Two Modest Fines,” Washington Post, September 13, 2020,
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/more-than-200-meat-plant-workers-in
-the-u-s-have-died-of-covid-19-federal-regulators-just-issued-two-modest-fines/
ar-BB18ZqQK.
114. Kindy, “More than 200 Meat Plant Workers.”
115. Schlosser, “America’s Slaughterhouses.”
116. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (London:
Verso, 2012), 42.
117. Schlosser, “America’s Slaughterhouses.”
118. Ollman, Alienation, 131.
119. Brett Clark and John Bellamy Foster, “Ecological Imperialism and the
Global Metabolic Rift: Unequal Exchange and the Guano-­Nitrates Trade,” Inter­
national Journal of Comparative Sociology 50, nos. 3–­4 (2009): 311–­34; at 313.
120. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 548.
121. Clark and Foster, “Ecological Imperialism,” 314.
122. Marx, Grundrisse, 88.
123. John Bellamy Foster and Brett Clark, “The Expropriation of Nature,”
Monthly Review 69, no. 10 (2018): 1–­27; at 3.
124. Paul Burkett, “Nature’s ‘Free Gifts’ and the Ecological Significance of
Value,” Capital & Class 68 (1999): 89–­110; at 95.
125. Marx, Grundrisse, 471.
126. Marx, Grundrisse, 489.
127. Ollman, Alienation, 134.
128. Ollman, Alienation, 136; Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts.
129. Shaw and Waterstone, Wageless Life, 45.
130. Shaw and Waterstone, Wageless Life, 45.
131. Wallimann, Estrangement, 12.
132. Ollman, Alienation, 136.
133. Shaw and Waterstone, Wageless Life, 45.
134. Marx, Capital, Volume 1, 271.
135. Marx, Capital, Volume 1, 272.
136. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, 74; italics in the original.
137. Ollman, Alienation, 136.
138. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (New York:
Verso, 2012), 43–­44.
139. Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume I, trans. Ben
Fowkes (New York: Penguin, 1990), 548.
140. Ben Highmore, Everyday Life and Cultural Theory: An Introduction (New
York: Routledge, 2002), 7.
 NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 · 211

141. Marx, Capital, Volume I, 548.

142. Ben Hamper, Rivethead: Tales from the Assembly Line (London: Fourth
Estate, 1992), 95.
143. Lisa Marie Cacho, Social Death: Racialized Rightlessness and the Criminali­
zation of the Unprotected (New York: New York University Press, 2012), 33.
144. Ben Highmore, Everyday Life and Cultural Theory: An Introduction (New
York: Routledge, 2002), 8.
145. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, 77.
146. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, 72.
147. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, 73
148. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, 79.
149. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, 79–­80.
150. Chancer, Sadomasochism, 33–­34.
151. Wallimann, Estrangement, 33.
152. Martin Hägglund, This Life: Why Mortality Makes Us Free (London: Profile
Books, 2019), 23.
153. Shaw and Waterstone, Wageless Life, 48.
154. Joel Kovel, The Enemy of Nature: The End of Capitalism or the End of the
World? (London: Zed Books, 2007), 69.
155. Ollman, Alienation, chapter 23; Bradley Harris, “Alienation of the Capital-
ist Class: Toward a More Careful Reading of Marx,” Social Praxis 7, nos. 1–­2
(1980): 77–­90.
156. Karl Marx, “The Holy Family,” in Karl Marx: Selected Writings, 2nd ed., ed.
David McLellan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 146–­70; at 148.
157. Sandra Lee Bartky, Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenol­
ogy of Oppression (New York: Routledge, 1990), 23.
158. Tyner, Dead Labor, 33 passim.
159. Harcourt, Illusion of Free Markets, 34.
160. Bauman, Consuming Life, 123.
161. Martha A. Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the
Human Condition,” Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 20, no. 1 (2008): article 2
(23 pp.), at 10.
162. Zygmunt Bauman and Leonidas Donskis, Moral Blindness: The Loss of
Sensitivity in Liquid Modernity (Malden, Mass.: Polity, 2013), 7.
163. Hardt and Negri, “The Multiplicities within Capitalist Rule,” 441–­442;
see also Toni Negri, Marx Beyond Marx: Lessons on the Grundrisse (New York:
Autonomedia, 1991).
164. Hardt and Negri, “The Multiplicities within Capitalist Rule,” 442.
165. Hardt and Negri, “The Multiplicities within Capitalist Rule,” 442.
166. Herbert Marcuse, One-­Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of
­Advanced Industrial Society (Boston: Beacon, 1964).
212 · NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

167. David Harvey, “Universal Alienation,” tripleC 16, no. 2 (2018): 424–­39;
at 426.
168. Harvey, “Universal Alienation,” 427.
169. Harvey, “Universal Alienation,” 429.
170. Harvey, “Universal Alienation,” 429.
171. Chancer, Sadomasochism in Everyday Life, 94.
172. Hardt and Negri, “The Multiplicities within Capitalist Rule,” 443.
173. Eric Williams, Capitalism & Slavery (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1944); Manning Marable, How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black
America (Boston: South End, 1983); John Ashworth, Slavery, Capitalism, and Poli­
tics in the Antebellum Republic: Volume 1: Commerce and Compromise, 1820–­1850
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and Edward E. Baptist, The Half
Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of American Capitalism (New York:
Basic Books, 2014).
174. Nathan McClintock, “Urban Agriculture, Racial Capitalism, and Resis-
tance in the Settler-­Colonial City,” Geography Compass 12, no. 6 (2018): e12373.
See Cedric Robinson, Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983).
175. McClintock, “Urban Agriculture.”
176. Laura Pulido, “Geographies of Race and Ethnicity II: Environmental
Racism, Racial Capitalism and State-­Sanctioned Violence,” Progress in Human
Geography 41, no. 4 (2017): 524–­33; at 526–­27.
177. Pulido, “Geographies of Race,” 527.
178. Robinson, Black Marxism, 9.
179. Hardt and Negri, “The Multiplicities within Capitalist Rule,” 443.
180. Robin D. G. Kelley, “What Did Cedric Robinson Mean by Racial
Capitalism?” Boston Review, January 12, 2017, https:bostonreview.net/race/
robin-d-g-kelley-what-did-cedric-robinson-mean-racial-capitalism.
181. Hardt and Negri, “The Multiplicities within Capitalist Rule,” 443.
182. See for example Heidi Hartmann, “The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism
and Feminism: Towards a More Progressive Union,” Capital & Class 3, no. 2
(1979): 1–­33; Valeria Bryson, “Marxism and Feminism: Can the ‘Unhappy Mar-
riage’ be Saved?” Journal of Political Ideologies 9, no. 1 (2004): 13–­30.
183. Hardt and Negri, “The Multiplicities within Capitalist Rule,” 444.
184. Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, 67.
185. Anne Bonds and Joshua Inwood, “Beyond White Privilege: Geographies
of White Supremacy and Settler Colonialism,” Progress in Human Geography 40,
no. 6 (2016): 715–­33; at 720.
186. Bonds and Inwood, “Beyond White Privilege,” 720.
187. Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, 67.
 NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 · 213

188. Erik Olin Wright, “The Continuing Relevance of the Marxist Tradition for
Transcending Capitalism,” tripleC 16, no. 2 (2018): 490–­500; at 491.
189. Members of the capitalist class also understood this and so countered
these possibilities with the threat of unemployment or state-­sanctioned police
repression.
190. Burnham and Lamb, The First Marx, 99.
191. David W. Lovell, Marx’s Proletariat: The Making of a Myth (New York:
Routledge, 1988), 216.
192. Lovell, Marx’s Proletariat, 216.
193. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, 19.
194. Michael D. Yates, “COVID-­19, Economic Depression, and the Black Lives
Matter Protests,” Monthly Review, September 1, 2020, https://www.monthlyreview
.org/2020/09/01/covid-19-economic-depression-and-the-black-lives-matter-protests.
195. APM Research Lab Staff, “The Color of Coronavirus: Covid-­19 Deaths by
Race and Ethnicity in the U.S.,” September 16, 2020, https://www.apmresearchlab
.org/covid/deaths-by-race.
196. Heather Brown, “Covid-­19 Lays Bare Capitalism’s Deference to Profits
Over Lives,” The International Marxist-­Humanist, March 25, 2020, https://
imhojournal.org/articles/covid-19-lays-bare-capitalisms-deference-to-profits
-over-lives.
197. Mike Ludwig, “Essential Sanitary Workers Strike for Hazard Pay and
PPE in New Orleans,” Truthout, May 15, 2020, https://truthout.org/articles/
essential-sanitary-workers-strike-for-hazard-pay-and-ppe-in-new-orleans/.
198. Michael Sainato, “Strikes Erupt as US Essential Workers Demand
Protection Amid Pandemic,” The Guardian, May 19, 2020, https://www
.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/19/strikes-erupt-us-essential-workers
-demand-better-protection-amid-pandemic.
199. Roland Simon, “Self-­Organization is the First Act of the Revolution; It
then Becomes an Obstacle Which the Revolution Has to Overcome,” Libcom.Org,
April 30, 2017, https://libcom.org/library/self-organisation-is-the-first-act-of-the
-revolution-it-then-becomes-an-obstacle-which-the-revolution-has-to-overcome.
200. Simon, “Self-­Organization.”
201. Hardt and Negri, “The Multiplicities within Capitalist Rule,” 445.

3. The Intersectionality of Alienation

1. Ebony Bowden, “Trump Blasts Biden, Appeals to Working-­Class Voters at
Ohio Rallies,” New York Post, September 21, 2020, https://nypost.com/2020/09/21/
trump-blasts-biden-while-appealing-to-working-class-voters-in-ohio/. Trump’s
phrase of being “stabbed in the back” is especially telling, as it evokes the Nazi
214 · NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

refrain that Jewish people stabbed the German nation-­state in the back and
betrayed them in the First World War.
2. And yet, many journalists, including those affiliated with more “repu-
table” presses, such as the New York Times, steadfastly refused to call out Trump’s
racism.
3. A. Mechele Dickerson, “America’s Uneasy Relationship with the Working
Poor,” Hastings Law Journal, 51, no. 1 (1999): 17–­72; at 17.
4. W. E. B. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in America (New York: Free Press,
1998 [1935]), 700.
5. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, 700.
6. Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, ed. Maurice
Dobb (New York: International, 1970), 21.
7. Charles A. Barone, Radical Political Economy: A Concise Introduction (New
York: Routledge, 2015), 8. See also John Molyneux, “The Working Class,” Irish
Marxist Review 7, no. 20 (2018): 5–­8.
8. Peter Knapp and Alan J. Spector, Crisis and Change Today: Basic Questions
of Marxist Sociology, 2nd ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011), 110.
9. Henri Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life, Volume II: Foundations for a
Sociology of the Everyday, trans. John Moore (New York: Verso, 2002), 209.
10. See, for example, David Harvey, Seventeen Contradictions and the End of
Capitalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
11. Harvey, Seventeen Contradictions, 4.
12. Harvey, Seventeen Contradictions, 4.
13. Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume I, trans. Ben
Fowkes (New York: Penguin, 1990), 723.
14. See, for example, Michael Löwy, The Theory of Revolution in the Young
Marx (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2005); Guido Starosta, Marx’s Capital: Method
and Revolutionary Subjectivity (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2016); and Douglas
Burnham and Peter Lamb, The First Marx: A Philosophical Introduction (London:
Bloomsbury Academic, 2019).
15. Jan Kandiyali, “Freedom and Necessity in Marx’s Account of Commu-
nism,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22, no. 1 (2014): 104–­23; at 109.
16. Lynn S. Chancer, Sadomasochism in Everyday Life: The Dynamics of Power
and Powerlessness (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1992), 33.
17. Karl Marx, “General Rules of the International Workingmen’s Association,
October 1864,” https://www.marxists.org/history/international/iwma/documents/
1864/rules.htm.
18. Karl Marx, Early Writings (New York: Penguin, 1970), 348.
19. Marx, “General Rules.”
20. Ian Fraser and Lawrence Wilde, The Marx Dictionary (New York: Con-
tinuum, 2011), 166.
 NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 · 215

21. Andrew Bowie, Introduction to German Philosophy: From Kant to Haber­

mas (Malden, Mass.: Polity, 2003), 118.
22. Alicja A. Gęścińska and Steven Lepez, “Freedom as Praxis: A Comparative
Analysis of August Cieszkowski and Nikolaj Berdjaev,” Studies in East European
Thought 62, no. 1 (2010): 109–­23; at 113. See also Lawrence S. Stepelevich, “August
von Cieszkowski: From Theory to Praxis,” History and Theory 13, no. 1 (1974):
39–­52; and Daniel Kubat, “Marx and Cieszkowski,” American Slavic and East
European Review 20, no. 1 (1961): 114–­17.
23. Gęścińska and Lepez, “Freedom as Praxis,” 113.
24. Gęścińska and Lepez, “Freedom as Praxis,” 115; Kubat, “Marx and Ciesz-
kowski,” 115.
25. Quoted in Gęścińska and Lepez, “Freedom as Praxis,” 115.
26. Marx draws heavily on these philosophers, sometimes in agreement, often
in dissent, and scholars continue to debate the degree of influence on Marx. Of
this vast literature, see for example Zyi Rosen, “The Influence of Bruno Bauer on
Marx’s Concept of Alienation,” Social Theory and Practice (1970): 50–­68; D. A.
Strickland and Kyriakos Kontopoulos, “Ideology and Praxis: Fichte to Marx,”
Il Politico (1973): 99–­122; Tom Rockmore, “Activity in Fichte and Marx,” Idealistic
Studies 6, no. 2 (1976): 191–­214; Lawrence S. Stepelevich, “Max Stirner and Ludwig
Feuerbach,” Journal of the History of Ideas (1978): 451–­63; Hans-­Martin Sass,
“The ‘Transition’ from Feuerbach to Marx: A Re-­interpretation,” Studies in Soviet
Thought 26, no. 2 (1983): 123–­42; Widukind De Ridder, “Max Stirner, Hegel and
the Young Hegelians: A Reassessment,” History of European Ideas 34, no. 3 (2008):
285–­97; Jacob M. Held, “Marx via Feuerbach: Species-­Being Revisited,” Idealistic
Studies 39, no. 1/3 (2009): 137–­48; and Jan Kandiyali, ed., Reassessing Marx’s Social
and Political Philosophy: Freedom, Recognition, and Human Flourishing (New
York: Routledge, 2018).
27. Bowie, Introduction to German Philosophy, 122.
28. Bowie, Introduction to German Philosophy, 124.
29. Karl Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach,” https://www.marxists.org/archive/
marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm.
30. Douglas Burnham and Peter Lamb, The First Marx: A Philosophical Intro­
duction (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019), 187.
31. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, 74.
32. Erich Fromm, The Sane Society (New York: Henry Holt, 1955), 109–­10.
33. Sandro Mezzadra, In the Marxian Workshops: Producing Subjects, trans.
Yari Lanci (London: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2018), xv.
34. André Gorz, “Sartre and Marx,” New Left Review 37, no. 5 (166): 33–­52;
George J. Stack, “Sartre’s Dialectic of Social Relations,” Philosophy and Phenom­
enological Research 31, no. 3 (1971): 394–­408; Robert W. Connell, “Class, Patriar-
chy, and Sartre’s Theory of Practice,” Theory and Society 11, no. 3 (1982): 305–­20;
216 · NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

Tony Stigliano, “Jean-­Paul Sartre on Understanding Violence,” Crime and Social

Justice 19 (1983): 52–­64; Iris Marion Young, “Gender as Seriality: Thinking about
Women as a Social Collective,” Signs 19, no. 3 (1994): 713–­38; Kevin Boileau,
“How Foucault Can Improve Sartre’s Theory of Authentic Political Community,”
Sartre Studies International 10, no. 2 (2004): 77–­91; Mark Boyle, “Sartre’s Circular
Dialectic and the Empires of Abstract Space: A History of Space and Place in
Ballymun, Dublin,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 95, no. 1
(2005): 181–­201; Mark Boyle and Audrey Kobayashi, “Metropolitan Anxieties: A
Critical Appraisal of Sartre’s Theory of Colonialism,” Transactions of the Institute
of British Geographers 36, no. 3 (2011): 408–­24; Gavin Rae, “Sartre, Group Forma-
tions, and Practical Freedom: The Other in the Critique of Dialectical Reason,”
Comparative and Continental Philosophy 3, no. 2 (2011): 183–­206; and Peter
Caws, “Sartre’s Theory of Groups,” in Jean-­Paul Sartre: Key Concepts, ed. Steven
Churchill and Jack Reynolds (New York: Routledge, 2014), 184–­194.
35. Jean-­Paul Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason, trans. Alan Sheridan-­
Smith (New York: Verso, 1991 [1960]). It is important to clarify that Sartre, in
his Critique, reinterprets Marx’s account of alienation as a condition of material
scarcity. I do not follow Sartre in this account.
36. Stack, “Sartre’s Dialectic,” 394.
37. Stack, “Sartre’s Dialectic,” 395.
38. Young, “Gender as Seriality,” 718.
39. Young, “Gender as Seriality,” 718.
40. Young, “Gender as Seriality,” 724.
41. Ben Highmore, Everyday Life and Cultural Theory: An Introduction (New
York: Routledge, 2002), 8.
42. Highmore, Everyday Life, 9.
43. Susan Stewart, On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the
Souvenir, the Collection (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1993), 14.
44. Highmore, Everyday Life, 8.
45. Alyson Cole and Estelle Ferrarese, “How Capitalism Forms Our Lives,”
Journal for Cultural Research 22, no. 2 (2018): 105–­12; at 107.
46. Cole and Ferrarese, “How Capitalism Forms Our Lives,” 107.
47. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (London:
Verso, 2012), 38.
48. Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity (Cambridge, Mass.: Polity, 2000).
See also Zygmunt Bauman and Mark Haugaard, “Liquid Modernity and Power:
A Dialogue with Zygmunt Bauman,” Journal of Power 1, no. 2 (2008): 111–­30.
49. Raymond L. M. Lee, “Bauman, Liquid Modernity and Dilemmas of Devel-
opment,” Thesis Eleven 83 (2005): 61–­77; at 65.
50. Peter Abrahamson, “Liquid Modernity: Bauman on Contemporary Wel-
fare Society,” Act Sociologica 47, no. 2 (2004): 171–­79; at 171.
 NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 · 217

51. Raymond L.M. Lee, “Reinventing Modernity: Reflexive Modernization vs

Liquid Modernity vs Multiple Modernities,” European Journal of Social Theory 9,
no. 3 (2006): 355–­68; at 357.
52. Abrahamson, “Bauman, Liquid Modernity,” 177.
53. Henri Lefebvre, Everyday Life in the Modern World, trans. Sacha Rabino-
vitch (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1984), 21.
54. Caws, “Sartre’s Theory of Groups,” 185.
55. Gill Valentine, “The Geography of Women’s Fear,” Area 21, no. 4 (1989):
385–­90; Rachel Pain, “Space, Sexual Violence and Social Control: Integrating
Geographical and Feminist Analyses of Women’s Fear of Crime,” Progress in
Human Geography 15, no. 4 (1991): 415–­31; Clare Madge, “Public Parks and the
Geography of Fear,” Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie 88, no. 3
(1997): 237–­50; Robin Law, “Beyond ‘Women and Transport’: Towards New
Geog­raphies of Gender and Daily Mobility,” Progress in Human Geography 23,
no. 4 (1999): 567–­88; and Erica Wilson and Donna E. Little, “The Solo Female
Travel Experience: Exploring the ‘Geography of Women’s Fear,’ ” Current Issues
in Tourism 11, no. 2 (2008): 167–­86.
56. Law, “Beyond ‘Women and Transport,’ ” 570.
57. Stigliano, “Jean-­Paul Sartre,” 57.
58. Raewyn W. Connell, “Class, Patriarchy, and Sartre’s Theory of Practice,”
Theory and Society 11, no. 3 (1982): 305–­20; at 309.
59. Connell, “Class, Patriarchy,” 309.
60. Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason, 67.
61. Caws, “Sartre’s Theory of Groups,” 187.
62. Caws, “Sartre’s Theory of Groups,” 187.
63. Caws, “Sartre’s Theory of Groups,” 188.
64. Caws, “Sartre’s Theory of Groups,” 188.
65. Stack, “Sartre’s Dialectic,” 400.
66. Caws, “Sartre’s Theory of Groups,” 188.
67. Connell, “Class, Patriarchy,” 310.
68. Swathi Shanmugasundaram, “Trump Cites Hate Group at Conservative
Political Action Conference,” Southern Poverty Law Center, March 04, 2019,
https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2019/03/04/trump-cites-hate-group
-conservative-political-action-conference.
69. Shanmugasundaram, “Trump Cites Hate Group.”
70. Young, “Gender as Seriality,” 735; Caws, “Sartre’s Theory of Groups,” 189.
71. Caws, “Sartre’s Theory of Groups,” 189.
72. Rae, “Sartre, Group Formations,” 196.
73. Caws, “Sartre’s Theory of Groups,” 190.
74. Eduardo Bonilla-­Silva, “Feeling Race: Theorizing the Racial Economy
of Emotions,” American Sociological Review 84, no. 1 (2019): 1–­25; Eduardo
218 · NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

Bonilla-­Silva, “Toward a New Political Praxis for Trumpamerica: New Directions

in Critical Race Theory,” American Behavioral Scientist 63, no. 13 (2019): 1776–­88.
75. Bonilla-­Silva, “Toward a New Political Praxis,” 1779.
76. Bonilla-­Silva, “Toward a New Political Praxis,” 1779
77. Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason, 437–­44. Here, Sartre uses the term
“traitor”; I prefer the term “enemy.”
78. Right-­wing extremist violence has increased dramatically in the
twenty-­first century, but especially in the United States, which has seen a
1,450 percent increase in far-­right attacks between 2007 and 2017. By far,
white supremacists and other far-­right groups commit the vast major-
ity of extremist-­related murders in the United States. See Kennett Werner,
“White Supremacists Committed Most Extremist Killings in 2017, ADL Says,”
NBC News, January 18, 2018, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/
white-supremacists-committed-most-extreme-killings-2017-adl-says-n838896.
79. Jesse J. Norris, “Why Dylann Roof Is a Terrorist under Federal Law, and
Why It Matters,” Harvard Journal on Legislation 54 (2017): 501–­41; at 504.
80. Carla Herreria, “El Paso Shooting Suspect May Have Shared Anti-­
Immigrant Manifesto Before Attack,” Huffpost, August 4, 2019, https://www
.huffpost.com/entry/patrick-crusius-manifesto-el-paso-shooting_n_
5d460ba5e4b0aca3411ec308; Brett Barrouquere and Hatewatch Staff, “El Paso
Shooting Suspect May Have Authored Manifesto Containing White Nationalist
Talking Points,” Southern Poverty Law Center, August 3, 2019, https://www
.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2019/08/03/el-paso-shooting-suspect-may-have
-authored-manifesto-containing-white-nationalist-talking.
81. Berrouquere and Hatewatch Staff, “El Paso Shooting.”
82. Jacob Ware, “Siege: The Atomwaffen Division and the Rising Far-­Right
Terrorism in the United States,” ICCT Policy Brief (The Hague, Netherlands:
International Centre for Counter-­Terrorism, 2019), 4.
83. Peter Baker and Michael D. Shear, “El Paso Shooting Suspect’s Manifesto
Echoes Trump’s Language,” New York Times, August 4, 2019, https://www
.nytimes.com/2019/08/04/us/politics/trump-mass-shootings.html.
84. Raw, “Sartre, Group Formations,” 201.
85. Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason, 443–­44.
86. Caws, “Sartre’s Theory of Groups,” 190.
87. Mezzadra, In the Marxian Workshops, xvi.
88. Peter Goodwin, “Where’s the Working Class?,” tripleC 16, no. 2 (2018):
535–­45; at 541.
89. Goodwin, “Where’s the Working Class?,” 543.
90. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, 19.
91. See, for example, Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, “Beyond
 NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 · 219

‘­Identity,’ ” Theory and Society 29, no. 1 (2000): 1–­47; Jeff McMahan, The Ethics
of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life (New York: Oxford University Press,
2002); and Steven Luper, The Philosophy of Death (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2009) for considered arguments on the relative merits of
these terms.
92. Catherine Belsey, Poststructuralism: A Very Short Introduction (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2002), 52.
93. Avtar Brah and Ann Phoenix, “Ain’t I a Woman? Revisiting Intersectional-
ity,” Journal of International Women’s Studies 5, no. 3 (2004): 75–­86; at 76.
94. Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, trans. Charles Lam Markmann
(New York: Grove, 1967), 113–­14.
95. For a more thorough analysis of this passage, see Sylvia Wynter, “Towards
the Sociogenic Principle: Fanon, Identity, the Puzzle of Conscious Experience,
and What It Is Like to Be ‘Black’,” in National Identities and Sociopolitical Changes
in Latin America, ed. M. F. Durán-­Cogan and A. Gómez-­Moriana (New York:
Routledge, 2001), 30–­66.
96. Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings,
1972–­1977, trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, and Kate Soper, ed.
Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 155.
97. Paola Rebughini, “Subject, Subjectivity, Subjectivation,” Sociopedia.Isa
(2014): 1–­11; at 4.
98. Rebughini, “Subject,” 4.
99. Sylvia Wynter, “Ethno or Socio Poetics,” Alcheringa 2 (1976): 78–­94; at 83.
100. Orisanmi Burton, “To Protect and Serve Whiteness,” North American
Dialogue 18, no. 2 (2015): 38–­50; at 41.
101. Kimberlé Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity
Politics, and Violence against Women of Color,” Stanford Law Review 43, no. 6
(1991): 1241–­99; at 1244.
102. Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins,” 1244.
103. Elena Ruíz, “Framing Intersectionality,” in The Routledge Companion to
Philosophy of Race, ed. Paul C. Taylor, Linda Martín Alcoff, and Luvell Anderson
(New York: Routledge, 2017), 335–­48; at 336.
104. Ruíz, “Framing Intersectionality,” 336.
105. The Combahee River Collective Statement was written in 1977 primarily
by Barbara Smith, Beverly Smith, and Demita Frazier; it was first published as
“A Black Feminist Statement,” in Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Social­
ist Feminism, ed. Zillah Eisenstein (New York: Monthly Review, 1978), 210–­18.
Quotations here appear from a 2014 reprint of the chapter. See Combahee River
Collective, “A Black Feminist Statement,” Women’s Studies Quarterly, 42, nos. 3–­4
(2014): 271–­80.
220 · NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

106. Combahee River Collective, “A Black Feminist Statement,” 273.

107. Combahee River Collective, “A Black Feminist Statement,” 274.
108. Terrion L. Williamson, “Why Did They Die? On Combahee and the
Seriali­zation of Black Death,” Souls 19, no. 3 (2017): 328–­41; at 329.
109. Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny (New York:
W.W. Norton, 2006), 4–­5.
110. Combahee River Collective, “A Black Feminist Statement,” 274.
111. Combahee River Collective, “A Black Feminist Statement,” 274.
112. Sumi Cho, Kimberlé Crenshaw, and Leslie McCall, “Toward a Field of
Intersectionality Studies: Theory, Applications, and Praxis,” Signs 38, no. 4 (2013):
785–­810; at 788.
113. Combahee River Collective, “A Black Feminist Statement,” 273.
114. Keeanga-­Yamahtta Taylor, “Until Black Women Are Free, None of Us
Will Be Free,” New Yorker, July 20, 2020, https://www.newyorker.com/news/
our-columnists/until-black-women-are-free-none-of-us-will-be-free.
115. Taylor, “Until Black Women Are Free.”
116. Bohrer, “Intersectionality and Marxism,” 69.
117. Combahee River Collective, “A Black Feminist Statement,” 274.
118. Michael Löwy, The Theory of Revolution in the Young Marx (Chicago:
Haymarket Books, 2005),
119. David W. Lovell, Marx’s Proletariat: The Making of a Myth (New York:
Routledge, 1988), 222.
120. Löwy, The Theory of Revolution, viii.
121. Epifanio San Juan Jr., “From Race to Class Struggle: Marxism and Critical
Race Theory,” Nature, Society, and Thought 18, no. 3 (2005): 333–­53; at 340.
122. San Juan Jr., “From Race to Class Struggle,” 340.
123. Zygmunt Bauman, Work, Consumerism and the New Poor (Buckingham,
UK: Open University Press, 1998), 97.
124. Heather Brown, “Covid-­19 Lays Bare Capitalism’s Deference to Profits Over
Lives,” International Marxist-­Humanist, March 25, 2020, https://imhojournal.org/
articles/covid-19-lays-bare-capitalisms-deference-to-profits-over-lives.
125. Brown, “Covid-­19 Lays Bare Capitalism’s Deference.”
126. Abdul El-­Sayed, “Coronavirus Is Exploiting an Underlying Condition: Our
Epidemic of Insecurity,” The Guardian, March 19, 2020, https://www.theguardian
.com/commentisfree/2020/mar/19/coronavirus-insecurity-anxiety-us-epidemic.
127. Whitney N. Laster Pirtle, “Racial Capitalism: A Fundamental Cause of
Novel Coronavirus (COVID-­19) Pandemic Inequities in the United States,”
Health Education & Behavior 47, no. 4 (August 2020): 504–­8.
128. Michael D. Yates, “COVID-­19, Economic Depression, and the Black Lives
Matter Protests,” Monthly Review, September 1, 2020, https://www.monthly
 NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 · 221

review.org/2020/09/01/covid-19-economic-depression-and-the-black-lives
-matter-protests.
129. Abdul El-­Sayed, “Communities Enduring Racism & Poverty Will Suffer
Most Due to Covid-­19,” Democracy Now!, March 31, 2020, https://www
.democracynow.org/2020/3/31/abul_el_sayed_epidemic_of_insecurity.
130. Yates, “COVID-­19, Economic Depression.”

4. Whose Lives Matter?

1. Manny Fernandez and Audra D. S. Burch, “George Floyd, From ‘I Want
to Touch the World’ to ‘I Can’t Breathe,’ ” New York Times, July 29, 2020, https://
www.nytimes.com/article/george-floyd-who-is.html; “George Floyd: What Hap-
pened in the Final Moments of His Life,” BBC News, July 16, 2020, https://www
.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52861726; Toluse Olorunnipa and Griff Witte,
“Born with Two Strikes: How Systemic Racism Shaped Floyd’s Life and Hobbled
His Ambition,” Washington Post, October 8, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost
.com/graphics/2020/national/george-floyd-america/systemic-racism/.
2. Fernandez and Burch, “George Floyd.”
3. Quoted in Olorunnipa and Witte, “Born with Two Strikes.”
4. “George Floyd: What Happened”; Minyvonne Burke, “Owner of Minne-
apolis Grocery Store Says He Told Employee ‘Call the Police on the Police’ as She
Witnessed George Floyd Death,” NBC News, May 29, 2020, https://www.nbcnews
.com/news/us-news/owner-minneapolis-grocery-store-says-he-told-employee
-call-police-n1216461.
5. Burke, “Owner of Minneapolis Grocery Store”; “George Floyd: What
Happened.”
6. On April 20, 2021, Derek Chauvin was found guilty for the murder of
George Floyd. Chauvin was convicted on three counts: second-­degree murder,
third-­degree murder, and second-­degree manslaughter.
7. ACLED, “Demonstrations & Political Violence in America: New Data for
Summer 2020, https://acleddata.com/acleddatanew/wp-content/up-
loads/2020/09/ACLED_USDataReview_Sum2020_SeptWebPDF_HiRes.pdf. The
protests, moreover, were overwhelmingly peaceful—­despite the rhetoric of the
Trump administration, spokespersons of which continually portrayed the
protests as “Leftist” extremists, anarchists, thugs, and criminals. Indeed, in the
few instances of violence reported, these more often than not followed an
excessive police presence, including the deployment of Special Weapons and
Tactics (SWAT) units of law enforcement and the National Guard. To take one
incident, on May 31, 2020, in Las Vegas, Nevada, a peaceful protest was shattered
when members of the Las Vegas Metro Police Department and SWAT unit
222 · NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

released tear gas and fired rubber bullets at both protestors and journalists. See
for example “SWAT, Police Uses Tear Gas and Rubber Bullets on Las Vegas Strip
Protesters,” MSNBC News, June 1, 2020, https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/
dozens-of-black-lives-matter-protesters-gather-on-las-vegas-strip-for-george
-floyd/ar-BB14QQR3.
8. Nor should the fact be lost that the demonstrations surrounding the public
lynching of Floyd occurred in the midst of a global pandemic. Many of those
protesting were among the most vulnerable to Covid-­related premature death.
9. Michael D. Yates, “COVID-­19, Economic Depression, and the Black Lives
Matter Protests,” Monthly Review, September 1, 2020, https://www.monthly
review.org/2020/09/01/covid-19-economic-depression-and-the-black-lives
-matter-protests.
10. Yates, “COVID-­19, Economic Depression.”
11. Peter Hudis, “The Seeds of Revolution Have Sprouted: What Is to Be
Done?” New Politics, August 6, 2020, https://newpol.org/the-seeds-of-
revolution-have-sprouted-what-is-now-to-be-done/.
12. Martha Biondi, “From Hope to Disposability,” In These Times, August 19,
2013, https://inthesetimes.com/article/from-hope-to-disposability-50-years-after
-march-on-washington.
13. “International Solidarity with the Minneapolis Uprising,” CrimethInc.,
June 2, 2020, https://crimethinc.com/2020/06/02/international-solidarity-with-
the-minneapolis-uprising-demonstrations-graffiti-hacking-and-riots-on-six
-continents.
14. “From Chile to Minneapolis: An Open Letter,” CrimethInc., June 3, 2020,
https://crimethinc.com/2020/06/03/from-chile-to-minneapolis-an-open-letter
-global-solidarity-with-the-rebellion-against-police-and-white-supremacy. See
also Syrine Attia, “Front-­Line Activists ‘Primera Linea’ Protect Chile’s Protestors,
but Some Criticize Their Methods,” The Observers, January 3, 2020, https://
observers.france24.com/en/20200103-frontline-activists-primera-linea
-protecting-protesters-chile-santiago-super-heroes.
15. “From Chile to Minneapolis.”
16. “KJK: The Murder of George Floyd Is Not an Isolated Incident,” ANF
News, May 31, 2020, https://anfenglishmobile.com/news/kjk-the-murder-of
-george-floyd-is-not-an-isolated-incident-44166.
17. “KJK: The Murder of George Floyd is Not an Isolated Incident.”
18. David Gillborn, “The White Working Class, Racism and Respectability:
Victims, Degenerates and Interest-­Convergence,” British Journal of Educational
Studies 58, no. 1 (2010): 3–­25; Gurminder K. Bhambra, “Brexit, Trump, and
‘Methodological Whiteness’: On the Misrecognition of Race and Class,” British
Journal of Sociology 68, no. S1 (2017): S214–­S232; Hugh Gusterson, “From Brexit
to Trump: Anthropology and the Rise of Nationalist Populism,” American Ethnol­
 NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 · 223

ogist 44, no. 2 (2017): 209–­14; Douglas Schrock, Benjamin Dowd-­Arrow, Kristen
Erichsen, Haley Gentile, and Pierce Dignam, “The Emotional Politics of Making
America Great Again: Trump’s Working Class Appeals,” Journal of Working-­Class
Studies 2, no. 1 (2017): 5–­22; Aurelien Mondon and Aaron Winter, “Whiteness,
Populism and the Racialization of the Working Class in the United Kingdom and
the United States,” Identities 26, no. 5 (2019): 510–­28.
19. David W. Lovell, Marx’s Proletariat: The Making of a Myth (New York:
Routledge, 1988), 4.
20. Anne Bonds and Joshua Inwood, “Beyond White Privilege: Geographies
of White Supremacy and Settler Colonialism,” Progress in Human Geography 40,
no. 6 (2016): 715–­33; at 717.
21. Minelle Mahtani, “Challenging the Ivory Tower: Proposing Anti-­Racist
Geographies within the Academy,” Gender, Place & Culture 13, no. 1 (2006):
21–­25; Lawrence D. Berg, “Geographies of Identity I: Geography—­(Neo)
Liberalism—­White Supremacy,” Progress in Human Geography 36, no. 4 (2012):
508–­17; Minelle Mahtani, “Toxic Geographies: Absences in Critical Race Thought
and Practice in Social and Cultural Geography,” Social & Cultural Geography 15,
no. 4 (2014): 359–­67; and Caroline Faria and Sharlene Mollett, “Critical Feminist
Reflexivity and the Politics of Whiteness in the ‘Field,’ ” Gender, Place & Culture
23, no. 1 (2016): 79–­93.
22. W. E. B. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in America (New York: Free Press,
1998 [1935]), 700.
23. Russell Rickford, “Black Lives Matter: Toward a Modern Practice of Mass
Struggle,” New Labor Forum 25, no. 1 (2016): 35–­42; Garrett Chase, “The Early
History of the Black Lives Matter Movement, and the Implications Thereof,”
Nevada Law Journal 18, no. 3 (2018): 1091–­112; Keeanga-­Yamahtta Taylor, From
#BlackLivesMatter to Black Liberation (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2016); Bar-
bara Ransby, Making All Black Lives Matter: Reimagining Freedom in the Twenty-­
First Century (Oakland: University of California Press, 2018).
24. Siddhant Issar, “Listening to Black Lives Matter: Racial Capitalism and
the Critique of Neoliberalism,” Contemporary Political Theory 20 (2021): 48–­71.
See also Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy, Capital Resurgent: Roots of the
Neoliberal Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004); David
Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
25. Harvey, A Brief History, 2.
26. David Harvey, The New Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2003), 63.
27. Nik Theodore, “Closed Borders, Open Markets: Day Laborers’ Struggle for
Economic Rights,” in Contesting Neoliberalism: Urban Frontiers, ed. Helga Leitner,
Jamie Peck, and Eric Sheppard (New York: Guilford, 2007), 250–­65; at 252–­53.
28. Katherine Schaeffer, “6 Facts About Economic Inequality in the
224 · NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

U.S.,” Pew Research Center, February 7, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/

fact-tank/2020/02/07/6-facts-about-economic-inequality-in-the-u-s/.
29. Tami Luhby, “US Black-­White Inequality in 6 Stark Charts,” CNN, June 3,
2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/03/politics/black-white-us-financial
-inequality/index.html. See also Howard Gold, “The Racial Wealth Gap Is at
the Heart of America’s Inequality,” Market Watch, July 15, 2020, https://www
.marketwatch.com/story/the-racial-wealth-gap-is-at-the-heart-of-americas
-inequality-2020–07–15.
30. Issar, “Listening to Black Lives.”
31. Nick Hanauer and David M. Rolf, “The Top 1% of Americans Have Taken
$50 Trillion from the Bottom 90%—­and That’s Made the U.S. Less Secure,” Time,
September 14, 2020, https://time.com/58888024/50-trillion-income-inequality
-america.
32. Joshua F. J. Inwood, “Neoliberal Racism: The ‘Southern Strategy’ and the
Expanding Geographies of White Supremacy,” Social & Cultural Geography 16,
no. 4 (2015): 407–­23; at 409–­10. See also Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell, “Neoliber-
alizing Space,” Antipode 34, no. 3 (2002): 380–­404.
33. David J. Roberts and Minelle Mahtani, “Neoliberalizing Race, Racing
Neoliberalism: Placing ‘Race’ in Neoliberal Discourses,” Antipode 42, no. 2 (2010):
248–­57; at 255.
34. Robert Albritton, Let Them Eat Junk: How Capitalism Creates Hunger and
Obesity (New York: Pluto, 2009), 47.
35. Adam Shah, “The 1 Percent’s Attack on Unemployment Benefits Is a Sign
of Our Broken Democracy,” Inequality.Org, July 21, 2020, https://inequality.org/
research/crisis-unemployment-benefits/.
36. Shah, “The 1 Percent’s Attack.”
37. Joshua Simon, “A Conversation with Karl Marx (1818–­1883) on Why There
Is No Socialism in the United States,” in The Return of the Theorists: Dialogues
with Great Thinkers in International Relations, ed. Richard N. Lebow, Peer
Schouten, and Hidemi Suganami (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 134–­42.
38. Jeffrey Reiman and Paul Leighton, The Rich Get Richer and the Poor
Get Prison: Ideology, Class, and Criminal Justice, 10th ed. (New York: Pearson,
2013), 198.
39. Laura Pulido, “Geographies of Race and Ethnicity I: White Supremacy
vs White Privilege in Environmental Racism Research,” Progress in Human
Geography 39, no. 6 (2015): 809–­17; Andrea Gibbons, “The Five Refusals of White
Supremacy,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 77, nos. 3–­4 (2018):
729–­55.
40. Frances Lee Ansley, “White Supremacy (and What We Should Do About
It),” in Critical White Studies: Looking Behind the Mirror, ed. Richard Delgado and
Jean Stefancic (Philadelphia, Penn.: Temple University Press, 1997), 592–­95; at 592.
 NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 · 225

41. Pulido, “Geographies of Race and Ethnicity I,” 810.

42. Peggy McIntosh, “White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Ac-
count of Coming to See Correspondences through Work in Women’s Studies,” in
Critical White Studies: Looking Behind the Mirror, ed. Richard Delgado and Jean
Stefancic (Philadelphia, Penn.: Temple University Press, 1997), 291–­99; at 291.
43. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, 700.
44. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, 700.
45. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, 30.
46. Martin Luther King Jr., “Remaining Awake through a Great Revolution,”
archived at the Martin Luther King, Jr. Research and Education Institute at Stan-
ford University, at https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/king-papers/publications/
knock-midnight-inspiration-great-sermons-reverend-martin-luther-king-jr-10.
47. Bonds and Inwood, “Beyond White Privilege,” 716.
48. Sean Walton, “Why the Critical Race Theory Concept of ‘White Suprem-
acy’ Should Not Be Dismissed by Neo-­Marxists: Lessons from Contemporary
Black Radicalism,” Power and Education 12, no. 1 (2020): 78–­94; at 81.
49. Zeus Leonardo, “The Color of Supremacy: Beyond the Discourse of ‘White
Privilege,’ ” Educational Philosophy and Theory 36, no. 2 (2004): 137–­52; at 137.
50. Bonds and Inwood, “Beyond White Privilege,” 716.
51. Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposi­
tion in Globalizing California (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 28.
52. Pulido, “Geographies of Race and Ethnicity I,” 811.
53. Pulido, “Geographies of Race and Ethnicity I,” 811.
54. Darrel Enck-­Wanzer, “Barack Obama, the Tea Party, and the Threat of
Race: On Racial Neoliberalism and Born Again Racism,” Communication, Culture
& Critique 4, no. 1 (2011): 23–­30; at 24.
55. Enck-­Wanzer, “Barack Obama,” 25.
56. Harvey, A Brief History, 10.
57. Chris Harman, Zombie Capitalism: Global Crisis and the Relevance of Marx
(Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2010), 161–­62.
58. Harvey, A Brief History, 10–­11.
59. Michael Roberts, The Long Depression: How It Happened, Why It Hap­
pened, and What Happens Next (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2016), 59; Harvey,
A Brief History, 11–­12; Harman, Zombie Capitalism, 162.
60. Joshua Inwood, “Contextualizing the State Mode of Production in the
United States: Race, Space, and Civil Rights,” Environment and Planning A 45
(2013): 2120–­34; at 2122.
61. Inwood, “Contextualizing the State,” 2123.
62. Rod Bush, We Are Not What We Seem: Black Nationalism and Class
Struggle in the American Century (New York: New York University Press, 2000),
156.
226 · NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

63. Kevern Verney, Black Civil Rights in America (New York: Routledge,
2000), 38.
64. Bruce H. Kalk, “Wormley’s Hotel Revisited: Richard Nixon’s Southern
Strategy and the End of the Second Reconstruction,” North Carolina Historical
Review 71, no. 1 (1994): 85–­105; at 87.
65. Michelle Alexander, “The New Jim Crow,” Ohio State Journal of Criminal
Law 9, no. 1 (2011): 7–­26; at 15–­16.
66. Alexander, “The New Jim Crow,” 16. See also Terry Smith, “White Backlash
in a Brown Country,” Valparaiso Law Review 50, no. 1 (2015): 89–­132.
67. Michael D. Forster and Tim Rehner, “The White Male Southern Demo-
crat: Endangered Species or Already Extinct?,” Race, Gender & Class 18, nos. 3–­4
(2011): 230–­37.
68. Cowie, “Nixon’s Class Struggle,” 260.
69. Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in an Age of
Colorblindness (New York: New Press, 2010), 45.
70. Quoted in Forster and Rehner, “The White Male Southern Democrat,” 233.
71. Quoted in Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 44.
72. This statement appears in an infamous 1981 interview conducted with
Alexander Lamis, a political scientist at Case Western Reserve University. A
full audio recording is available at http://www.thenation.com/article/170841/
exclusive-lee-atwaters-infamous-1981-interview-southern-strategy#
73. Jefferson Cowie, “Nixon’s Class Struggle: Romancing the New Right
Worker, 1969–­1973,” Labor History 43, no. 3 (2002): 257–­83; at 264.
74. Cowie, “Nixon’s Class Struggle,” 282.
75. Cowie, “Nixon’s Class Struggle,” 282.
76. Cowie, “Nixon’s Class Struggle,” 258.
77. Cowie, “Nixon’s Class Struggle,” 258.
78. Cowie, “Nixon’s Class Struggle,” 269.
79. Murray Edelman, Political Language: Words that Succeed and Policies that
Fail (New York: Academic, 1977), 4.
80. Cowie, “Nixon’s Class Struggle,” 260.
81. Cowie, “Nixon’s Class Struggle,” 264.
82. Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 44–­45.
83. Harvey, A Brief History, 12.
84. Roberts, The Long Depression, 61.
85. Jefferson Cowie and Lauren Boehm, “Dead Man’s Town: ‘Born in the
U.S.A.,’ Social History, and Working-­Class Identity,” American Quarterly 58, no. 2
(2006): 353–­78; at 371.
86. Inwood, “Neoliberal Racism,” 410.
87. Harvey, A Brief History, 19.
88. Ann Cammett, “Deadbeat Dads & Welfare Queens: How Metaphor Shapes
 NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 · 227

Poverty Law,” Boston College Journal of Law and Social Justice 34, no. 2 (2014):
233–­66; at 235.
89. Noel A. Cazenave, Killing African Americans: Police and Vigilante Violence
as a Racial Control Mechanism (New York: Routledge, 2018), 40.
90. Harvey, The New Imperialism, 63.
91. Cowie and Boehm, “Dead Man’s Town,” 357.
92. Harvey, A Brief History, 49–­50.
93. Harvey, A Brief History, 50.
94. Cowie, “Nixon’s Class Struggle,” 283.
95. Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 47.
96. Roger Foster, “Social Character: Erich Fromm and the Ideological Glue of
Neoliberalism,” Critical Horizons 18, no. 1 (2017): 1–­18.
97. Foster, “Social Character,” 8.
98. Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 47.
99. Goldfield, The Color of Politics, 314.
100. Roberts and Mahtani, “Neoliberalizing Race,” 253.
101. Cowie and Boehm, “Dead Man’s Town,” 357.
102. Cowie and Boehm, “Dead Man’s Town,” 358.
103. Shawn A. Cassiman, “Resisting the Neo-­Liberal Poverty Discourse: On
Constructing Deadbeat Dads and Welfare Queens,” Sociology Compass, 2 no. 5
(2008): 1690–­700.
104. Quoted in Cammett, “Deadbeat Dads & Welfare Queens,” 255.
105. Nikita McMillian, “From Loving Mother to Welfare Queen to Drug Ad-
dict: Lebron v. Secretary of Florida Department of Children and Families and the
Evolving Public View of the Poor as a Class of Sub-­Humans with Sub-­Rights,”
Mississippi College Law Review 35, no. 1 (2016): 197–­239; at 211.
106. Cammett, “Deadbeat Dads & Welfare Queens,” 245.
107. Cowie and Boehm, “Dead Man’s Town,” 358.
108. Lester K. Spence, “The Neoliberal Turn in Black Politics,” Souls 14, nos. 3–­4
(2012): 139–­59; at 144.
109. Cammett, “Deadbeat Dads & Welfare Queens,” 236.
110. Claudine M. Pied, “The Problem People and the Hard Workers: White-
ness and Small Town Response to Economic Decline,” Identities 26, no. 1 (2019):
33–­50; at 41.
111. Pied, “The Problem People,” 46.
112. Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 49.
113. Alexander, “The New Jim Crow,” 16.
114. Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 54.
115. Reiman and Leighton, The Rich Get Richer.
116. James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, “Broken Windows,” Atlantic
Monthly March (1982): 29–­38, http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/print.198203/
228 · NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

broken-windows. See also Steve Herbert, “Policing the Contemporary City: Fix-
ing Broken Windows or Shoring Up Neo-­Liberalism?” Theoretical Criminology 5,
no. 4 (2001): 445–­66; Steve Herbert and Elizabeth Brown, “Conceptions of Space
and Crime in the Punitive Neoliberal City,” Antipode 38, no. 4 (2006): 755–­77.
117. Herbert, “Policing the Contemporary City,” 446; Herbert and Brown,
“Conceptions of Space,” 759.
118. Herbert and Brown, “Conceptions of Space,” 759.
119. Marilyn A. Papayanis, “Sex and the Revanchist City: Zoning Out Pornog-
raphy in New York,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 18 (2000):
341–­53; at 342.
120. Herbert, “Policing the Contemporary City,” 446.
121. Bench Ansfield, “The Broken Windows of the Bronx: Putting the Theory
in its Place,” American Quarterly 72, no. 1 (2020): 103–­27; at 111.
122. Katharyne Mitchell, “Zero Tolerance, Imperialism, Dispossession,” ACME
An International Journal for Critical Geographies 10, no. 2 (2011): 293–­312; at 295.
123. Katherine Beckett and Theodore Sasson, The Politics of Injustice: Crime
and Punishment in America, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 2004), 134;
Neil Smith, “Global Social Cleansing: Postliberal Revanchism and the Export of
Zero Tolerance,” Social Justice 28, no. 3 (2001): 68–­74; at 69.
124. Mitchell, “Zero Tolerance,” 296.
125. John A. Powell and Eileen B. Hershenov, “Hostage to the Drug War: The
National Purse, the Constitution and the Black Community,” U.C. Davis Law Re­
view 24, no. 3 (1991): 557–­616; David Rudovsky, “Law Enforcement by Stereotypes
and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops and Searches without Cause,” University
of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 3, no. 1 (2001): 296–­366; Katherine
Beckett, Kris Nyrop, and Lori Pfingst, “Race, Drugs, and Policing: Understanding
Disparities in Drug Delivery Arrests,” Criminology 44, no. 1 (2006): 105–­37.
126. Victor J. St. John and Vanessa Lewis, “ ‘Vilify Them Night after Night’:
Anti-­Black Drug Policies, Mass Incarceration, and Pathways Forward,” Harvard
Kennedy School Journal of African American Policy 20 (2019): 18–­29; at 22.
127. Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 237–­38.
128. Kathleen R. Sandy, “The Discrimination Inherent in America’s Drug War:
Hidden Racism Revealed by Examining the Hysteria over Crack,” Alabama Law
Review 54, no. 2 (2003): 665–­94; at 671.
129. Sandy, “The Discrimination Inherent,” 672.
130. John Gramlich, “Black Imprisonment Rate in the U.S. Has Fallen by a
Third since 2006,” Pew Research Center, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/
2020/05/06/share-of-black-white-hispanic-americans-in-prison-2018-vs-2006/.
131. Philomena Mariani, “Overview: Law, Order, and Neoliberalism,” Social
Justice 28, no. 3 (2001): 2–­4; at 3.
132. Mariani, “Overview,” 3.
 NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 · 229

133. Sandy, “The Discrimination Inherent,” 684.

134. Angela Y. Davis, “Masked Racism: Reflections on the Prison Industrial
Complex,” Lola Press 12 (2000): 52.
135. Davis, “Masked Racism,” 52.
136. Davis, “Masked Racism,” 52.
137. Earl Smith and Angela J. Hattery, “Incarceration: A Tool for Racial Segre-
gation and Labor Exploitation,” Race, Gender & Class 15, nos. 1–­2 (2008): 79–­97;
at 90.
138. Smith and Hattery, “Incarceration,” 84.
139. Becky Pettit and Carmen Gutierrez, “Mass Incarceration and Racial
Inequality,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 77, nos. 3–­4 (2018):
1153–­82; at 1155. See also Naomi Murakawa, “Mass Incarceration Is Dead, Long
Live the Carceral State,” Tulsa Law Review 55, no. 2 (2020): 251–­62.
140. Pettit and Gutierrez, “Mass Incarceration,” 1153.
141. Pettit and Gutierrez, “Mass Incarceration,” 1153.
142. Pettit and Gutierrez, “Mass Incarceration,” 1162.
143. Priscilla Bustamante, Gaurav Jashnani, and Brett G.Stoudt, “Cumulative
Dehumanization in Everyday Policing: The Psychological, Affective, and Mate-
rial Consequences of Discretionary Arrests,” Analyses of Social Issues and Public
Policy 19, no. 1 (2019): 305–­48; at 329.
144. Roberts and Mahtani, “Neoliberalizing Race,” 254.
145. Alexander, “The New Jim Crow,” 17.
146. Roberts and Mahtani, “Neoliberalizing Race,” 253.
147. Williams, “Racial Mythologies,” 838.
148. Luigi Esposito and Laura L. Finley, “Barack Obama, Racial Progress, and
the Future of Race Relations in the United States,” Western Journal of Black Stud­
ies 33, no. 3 (2009): 164–­75; at 165.
149. Esposito and Finley, “Barack Obama,” 165–­66.
150. Esposito and Finley, “Barack Obama,” 166.
151. Smith, “White Backlash,” 102–­3.
152. Esposito and Finley, “Barack Obama,” 169.
153. Juliet Hooker, “Black Protest/White Grievance: On the Problem of White
Political Imaginations Not Shaped by Loss,” South Atlantic Quarterly 116, no. 3
(2017): 483–­504; at 488. Likewise, the presidential campaign of Hillary Clinton in
2016 threatened the bastions of male supremacy.
154. Hooker, “Black Protest,” 491.
155. Smith, “White Backlash,” 91–­92.
156. Luigi Esposito and Laura L. Finley, “Barack Obama, Racial Progress, and
the Future of Race Relations in the United States,” Western Journal of Black Stud­
ies 33, no. 3 (2009): 164–­75; Luigi Esposito, “White Fear and US Racism in the Era
of Obama: The Relevance of Neoliberalism,” Theory in Action 4, no. 3 (2011): 1–­24;
230 · NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

Leonard Zeskind, “A Nation Dispossessed: The Tea Party Movement and Race,”
Critical Sociology 38, no. 4 (2011): 495–­509; and Adolphus G. Belk, “Fire on the
Right: The Tea Party vs. Barack Obama,” Souls: A Critical Journal of Black Politics,
Culture, and Society 14, nos. 1–­2 (2012): 77–­87.
157. Hooker, “Black Protest,” 489; Belk, “Fire on the Right,” 79; Zeskind, “A Na-
tion Dispossessed,” 500.
158. Smith, “White Backlash,” 90.
159. Banu Gökariksel and Sara Smith, “ ‘Making America Great Again?’: The
Fascist Body Politics of Donald Trump,” Political Geography 54 (2016): 79–­81;
Lindsay Pérez Huber, “ ‘Make America Great Again!’: Donald Trump, Racist
Nativism and the Virulent Adherence to White Supremacy amid U.S. Demo-
graphic Change,” Charleston Law Review 10, no. 2 (2016): 215–­50; Henry A.
Giroux, “White Nationalism, Armed Culture and State Violence in the Age of
Donald Trump,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 43, no. 9 (2017): 887–­910; Banu
Gökariksel and Sara Smith, “Intersectional Feminism beyond U.S. Flag Hijab
and Pussy Hats in Trump’s America,” Gender, Place & Culture 24, no. 5 (2017):
628–­44; George F. McHendry Jr., “White Supremacy in the Age of Trump: An
Introduction to a Special Issue of the Journal of Contemporary Rhetoric,” Journal
of Contemporary Rhetoric 8, nos. 1–­2 (2018): 1–­5; Joshua Inwood, “White Su-
premacy, White Counter-­Revolutionary Politics, and the Rise of Donald Trump,”
EPC: Politics and Space 37, no. 4 (2019): 579–­96.
160. Inwood, “White Supremacy,” 580.
161. Douglas Schrock, Benjamin Dowd-­Arrow, Kristen Erichsen, Haley
Gentile, and Pierce Dignam, “The Emotional Politics of Making America Great
Again: Trump’s Working Class Appeals,” Journal of Working-­Class Studies 2, no. 1
(2017): 5–­22.
162. Schrock et al., “The Emotional Politics,” 7.
163. Gusterson, “From Brexit to Trump,” 210.
164. Schrock et al., “The Emotional Politics,” 9.
165. Smith, “White Backlash,” 108.
166. Terry Smith, Whitelash: Unmasking White Grievance at the Ballot Box
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 34.
167. Eduardo Bonilla-­Silva, “Feeling Race: Theorizing the Racial Economy of
Emotions,” American Sociological Review 84, no. 1 (2019): 1–­25; at 8.
168. Hooker, “Black Protest,” 493.
169. Saharra Griffin and Malkie Wall, “President Trump’s Anti-­Worker
Agenda,” Center for American Progress, August 28, 2019, https://www.american
progress.org/issues/ext/2019/08/28/478978/president-trumps-anti-worker
-agenda/. See also Shanna Devine, “Workers Left Behind under Trump’s OHSA,”
Public Citizen, 2018, https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/uploads/migration/
trump-leaves-workers-behind-report.pdf.
 NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 · 231

170. Griffin and Wall, “President’s Trump’s Anti-­Worker Agenda.” The Trump
administration also targeted for discrimination specific populations beyond the
normative white working class. For example, the administration erected barriers
to prevent people with disabilities from working and exposed LGBTQ Americans
to employer discrimination.
171. Augustus C. Wood III, “The Crisis of the Black Worker, the U.S. Labor
Movement, and Democracy for All,” Labor Studies Journal 44, no. 4 (2019):
396–­402; at 398.
172. Hooker, “Black Protest,” 485.
173. Cheryl E. Matias and Peter M. Newlove, “Better the Devil You See, Than
the One You Don’t: Bearing Witness to Emboldened En-­Whitening Epistemology
in the Trump Era,” International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education 30,
no. 10 (2017): 920–­28; at 921.
174. “Trayvon Martin Shooting Fast Facts,” CNN, June 5, 2013, https://www
.cnn.com/2013/06/05/us/trayvon-martin-shooting-fast-facts/index.html.
175. Cazenave, Killing African Americans, 6.
176. Chase, “The Early History,” 1096.
177. Jennings Brown, “One Year After Michael Brown: How a Hashtag
Changed Social Protest,” Vocativ, August 7, 2015, https://www.vocativ.com/
news/218365/michael-brown-and-black-lives-matter/index.html; Jelani Cobb,
“The Matter of Black Lives,” New Yorker, March 7, 2016, https://www.newyorker
.com/magazine/2016/03/14/where-is-black-lives-matter-headed.
178. Cobb, “The Matter of Black Lives.”
179. Brown, “One Year After Michael Brown.”
180. Brown, “One Year After Michael Brown.”
181. Brown, “One Year After Michael Brown.”
182. Alicia Garza, “A Herstory of #BlackLivesMatter Movement,” Feminist Wire,
October 7, 2014, https://thefeministwire.com/2014/10/blacklivesmatter-2/.
183. Chase, “The Early History,” 1096.
184. Cazenave, Killing African Americans, 9.
185. Cazenave, Killing African Americans, 9–­10; Jennifer Chernega, “Black
Lives Matter: Racialized Policing in the United States,” Comparative American
Studies 14, nos. 3–­4 (2016): 234–­45; German Lopez, “Why Was Michael Brown
Shot?” Vox, January 27, 2016, https://www.vox.com/2015/5/31/17937818/
michael-brown-police-shooting-darren-wilson.
186. Cazenave, Killing African Americans, 9.
187. United States Department of Justice, “Justice Department Announces
Findings of Two Civil Rights Investigations in Ferguson, Missouri,” March 4,
2015, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-findings
-two-civil-rights-investigations-ferguson-missouri. The complete “Investigation
of the Ferguson Police Department” is found at https://www.justice.gov/sites/
232 · NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_
department_report_1.pdf.
188. German Lopez, “What Were the 2014 Ferguson Protests About?” Vox,
January 27, 2016, https://www.vox.com/2015/5/31/17937764/ferguson
-missouri-protests-2014-michael-brown-police-shooting.
189. Chernega, “Black Lives Matter,” 235.
190. Ransby, Making All Black Lives Matter, 6.
191. Denver Nicks, “How Ferguson Went From Middle Class to Poor in a
Generation,” Time, August 18, 2014, https://time.com/3138176/ferguson
-demographic-change/.
192. Ransby, Making All Black Lives Matter, 6.
193. Taylor, From #BlackLivesMatter, 155.
194. Bryan Adamson, “Thugs, Crooks, and Rebellious Negroes: Racist and Ra-
cialized Media Coverage of Michael Brown and the Ferguson Demonstrations,”
Harvard Journal on Racial & Ethic Justice 32 (2016): 189–­278; at 191.
195. Taylor, “From #BlackLivesMatter,” 24.
196. Garza, “A Herstory.”
197. Rickford, “Black Lives Matter,” 36.
198. Taylor, From #BlackLivesMatter, 156; Cazenave, Killing African Americans,
8 passim.
199. Cazenave, Killing African Americans, 11.
200. Taylor, From #BlackLivesMatter, 164.
201. Cobb, “The Matter of Black Lives.”
202. Ileana Jiménez, “#SayHerName Loudly: How Black Girls Are Leading
#BlackLivesMatter,” Radical Teacher 106 (2016): 87–­96; at 87; Armond R. Towns,
“Geographies of Pain: #SayHerName and the Fear of Black Women’s Mobility,”
Women’s Studies in Communication 39, no. 2 (2016): 122–­26; at 122.
203. Melissa Brown, Rashawn Ray, Ed Summers, and Neil Fraistat, “#SayHer-
Name: A Case Study of Intersectional Social Media Activism,” Ethnic and Racial
Studies 40, no. 11 (2017): 1831–­46; at 1833.
204. Brown et al., “#SayHerName,” 1833.
205. Hooker, “Black Protest,” 483.
206. Hooker, “Black Protest,” 483–­84.
207. Rickford, “Black Lives Matter,” 37.
208. Rickford, “Black Lives Matter,” 37.
209. Brown, “One Year After.”
210. Garza, “A Herstory.”
211. Opal Tometi and Gerald Lenoir, “Black Lives Matter Is Not a Civil
Rights Movement,” Time, December 10, 2015, https://time.com/4144655/
international-human-rights-day-black-lives-matter/.
212. Tometi and Lenoir, “Black Lives Matter.”
 NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 · 233

213. Rod Bush, We Are Not What We Seem: Black Nationalism and Class
Struggle in the American Century (New York: New York University Press, 1999);
Dean E. Robinson, Black Nationalism in American Politics and Thought (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Darryl C. Thomas, “Black Studies
and the Scholarship of Cedric Robinson,” Race & Class 47, no. 2 (2005): 1–­22;
Katherine McKittrick, Demonic Grounds: Black Women and the Cartographies of
Struggle (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006); Laura Pulido, Black,
Brown, Yellow, and Left: Radical Activism in Los Angeles (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2006); Ahmed Shawki, Black Liberation and Socialism (Chicago:
Haymarket Books, 2006); David Scott, “On the Very Idea of a Black Radical Tra-
dition,” small axe 40 (2013): 1–­6; Laura Pulido and Juan De Lara, “Reimagining
‘Justice’ in Environmental Justice: Radical Ecologies, Decolonial Thought, and the
Black Radical Tradition,” Environment and Planning E: Nature and Space 1, nos.
1–­2 (2018): 76–­98.
214. Robinson, Black Marxism, 73.
215. Robin D.G. Kelley, Freedom Dreams: The Black Radical Imagination (Bos-
ton: Beacon, 2002), 54.
216. Kelley, Freedom Dreams, 54.
217. Tometi and Lenoir, “Black Lives Matter.”
218. Tometi and Lenoir, “Black Lives Matter.”
219. Katherine McKittrick, Demonic Grounds: Black Women and the Cartog­
raphies of Struggle (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), x. See
also Adam Bledsoe, LaToya E. Eaves, and Brian Williams, “Black Geographies in
and of the United States South,” Southeastern Geographer 57, no. 1 (2017): 6–­11;
Camilla Hawthorne and Kaily Heitz, “A Seat at the Table? Reflections on Black
Geographies and the Limits of Dialogue,” Dialogues in Human Geography 8, no. 2
(2018): 148–­51; Douglas Allen, Mary Lawhon, and Joseph Pierce, “Placing Race:
On the Resonance of Place with Black Geographies,” Progress in Human Geog­
raphy 43, no. 6 (2019): 1001–­19; Adam Bledsoe and Willie Jamaal Wright, “The
Pluralities of Black Geographies,” Antipode 51, no. 2 (2019): 419–­37; and Camilla
Hawthorne, “Black Matters Are Spatial Matters: Black Geographies for the
Twenty-­First Century,” Geography Compass 13 (2019): e12468.
220. Hawthorne, “Black Matters.”
221. Tometi and Lenoir, “Black Lives Matter.”
222. Cobb, “The Matter of Black Lives.”
223. Garza, “A Herstory.”
224. Garza, “A Herstory.”
225. Garza, “A Herstory.”
226. Taylor, From #BlackLivesMatter, 185.
227. Taylor, From #BlackLivesMatter, 185.
228. Rickford, “Black Lives Matter,” 38.
234 · NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

229. Mike Elk, “How Black & Brown Workers Are Redefining Strikes in the
Digital COVID Age,” Payday Report, July 8, 2020, https://paydayreport.com/
how-black-brown-workers-are-redefining-strikes-in-a-digital-covid-age/.
230. Bryce Covert, “Across the Country, Essential Workers are on Strike for
Black Lives,” Vox, July 20, 2020, https://www.vox.com/the-goods-2020/7/20/
21327424/strike-for-black-lives-essential-workers-covid-19-racism.
231. Quoted in Covert, “Across the Country.”
232. Quoted in Covert, “Across the Country.”
233. Elk, “How Black & Brown Workers.”
234. Elk, “How Black & Brown Workers.”
235. Alexia Fernández Campbell, “As Protests Grow, Big Labor Sides with Police
Unions,” Public Integrity, June 5, 2020, https://publicintegrity.org/inequality
-poverty-opportunity/as-protests-grow-big-labor-sides-with-police-unions/.
236. Yates, “COVID-­19, Economic Depression.”
237. Rickford, “Black Lives Matter,” 38.
238. Quoted in Julia Wong, “As Ferguson ‘Weekend of Resistance’ Begins,
Organizers Weigh How to Turn a Moment into a Movement,” In These Times, Oc-
tober 10, 2014, http://inthesetimes.com/article/from-a-moment-to-a-movement.
239. Wood, “The Crisis of the Black Worker,” 398.
240. “KJK: The Murder of George Floyd Is Not an Isolated Incident.”
241. Tony N. Brown, Asia Bento, Quintin Gorman Jr., Lydia Koku, and Julian
Culver, “ ‘Who Cares?’: Investigating Consistency in Expressions of Racial Apathy
among Whites,” Socius 5 (2019): 1–­10; at 2.
242. Robin DiAngelo, “White Fragility,” International Journal of Critical Peda­
gogy 3, no. 3 (2011): 54–­70; at 54.
243. Uma M. Jayakumar and Annie S. Adamian, “The Fifth Frame of Color-
blind Ideology: Maintaining the Comforts of Colorblindness in the Context of
White Fragility,” Sociological Perspectives 60, no. 5 (2017): 912–­36; at 915.
244. Ashley Atkins, “Black Lives Matter or All Lives Matter? Color-­Blindness
and Epistemic Injustice,” Social Epistemology 33, no. 1 (2019): 1–­22; at 6.
245. Rickford, “Black Lives Matter,” 39.
246. Amanda Seitz, “Facebook Groups Pivot to Attacks on Black Lives Matter,”
Associated Press, July 5, 2020, https://apnews.com/ca8c15794c65b1ae8e176
deb9be5d718.
247. Teri A. McMurty-­Chubb, “#SayHerName #BlackWomensLivesMatter:
State Violence in Policing the Black Female Body,” Mercer Law Review 67, no. 3
(2016): 651–­706; at 702.
248. Geoff Ward, “Living Histories of White Supremacist Policing: Towards
Transformative Justice,” Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race 15, no. 1
(2018): 167–­84; at 171.
 NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 · 235

249. Geoffrey Skelley, “How Americans Feel About George Floyd’s Death and
the Protests,” FiveThirtyEight, June 5, 2020, https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/
how-americans-feel-about-george-floyds-death-and-the-protests/.
250. Skelley, “How Americans Feel.”
251. Civiqs, “Do You Support or Oppose the Black Lives Matter Movement,”
September 23, 2020, https://civiqs.com/results/black_lives_matter?uncertainty=
true&annotations=true&zoomIn=true&net=true&race=White.
252. Barbara Applebaum, “Comforting Discomfort as Complicity: White Fra-
gility and the Pursuit of Invulnerability,” Hypatia 32, no. 4 (2017): 862–­75; at 866.
253. ACLED, “Demonstrations & Political Violence in America”; Anti-­
Defamation League, “ADL Debunk: Disinformation and the BLM Protests,”
https://www.adl.org/resources/reports/adl-debunk-disinformation-and-the
-blm-protests.
254. Anti-­Defamation League, “ADL Debunk.”
255. ACLED, “Demonstrations & Political Violence in America.” For a specific
example, see Josh Skluzacek, “Affidavit: Hell’s Angels Member Believed to be
‘Umbrella Man’ Spotted Inciting Violence During George Floyd Protests,” KSTP,
July 28, 2020, https://kstp.com/news/affidavit-hells-angels-member-believed-to
-be-umbrella-man-spotted-inciting-violence-during-floyd-protests-/5809447/.
256. Garza, “A Herstory.”
257. Garza, “A Herstory.”
258. Cowie and Boehm, “Dead Man’s Town,” 358.
259. Hooker, “Black Protest,” 494.
260. Eric D. Knowles and Brian S. Lowery, “Meritocracy, Self-­Concerns, and
Whites’ Denial of Racial Inequity,” Self and Identity 11 (2012): 202–­22.
261. Daniel Shore, “The Form of Black Lives,” PLMA 135, no. 1 (2020): 175–­79;
at 178.
262. Shore, “The Form of Black Lives,” 178.
263. Berg, “Geographies of Identity,” 511.
264. That the media continually and, arguably, willfully misrepresents the aspi-
rations of the Black Lives Matter movement contributes to the backlash of many
whites. In an analysis of seven major newspapers, for example, Joy Leopold and
Myrtle Bell documented that much of the coverage of the Ferguson protests failed
to adequately explain the reasons for the protests and, in doing so, facilitated the
construction of negative stereotypes about the larger Black Lives Matter move-
ment. Notably, they conclude, “While many articles mentioned the deaths of
unarmed Blacks at the hands of police, according to the publicized objectives and
intentions of the BLM, these tragic incidents are just one aspect of a larger system
of discrimination, racism, and injustice in the USA that the movement seeks to
change.” See Joy Leopold and Myrtle P. Bell, “News Media and the Racialization
236 · NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

of Protest: An Analysis of Black Lives Matter Articles,” Equality, Diversity and

Inclusion: An International Journal 36, no. 8 (2017): 720–­35; at 730. The seven
newspapers analyzed include the New York Post, the New York Times, USA Today,
the Wall Street Journal, the Los Angeles Times, the Chicago Tribune, and the
St. Louis Post-­Dispatch.
265. Garza, “A Herstory.”
266. Brown, “One Year After.”
267. Garza, “A Herstory.”
268. Alicia Garza, “Black Lives Matter 101,” May 5, 2017, https://aliciagarza.com/
black-lives-matter-101/.
269. Eddie S. Glaude Jr., Democracy in Black: How Race Still Enslaves the
American Soul (New York: Broadway Books, 2016).
270. Glaude, Democracy in Black, 31.
271. David Gillborn, “The White Working Class, Racism and Respectability:
Victims, Degenerates and Interest-­Convergence,” British Journal of Educational
Studies 58, no. 1 (2010): 3–­25; at 3.
272. Erik Olin Wright, “The Continuing Relevance of the Marxist Tradition for
Transcending Capitalism,” tripleC 16, no. 2 (2018): 490–­500; at 493.
273. Cowie and Boehm, “Dead Man’s Town,” 369.
274. Cowie and Boehm, “Dead Man’s Town,” 369.
275. Baker, “Democracy, Class,” 150.
276. Bush, We Are Not What We Seem, 224.
277. Bush, We Are Not What We Seem, 229.
278. Bush, We Are Not What We Seem, 230.
279. Taylor, From #BlackLivesMatter to Black Liberation, 161.
280. Taylor, From #BlackLivesMatter to Black Liberation, 162–­63.
281. Taylor, From #BlackLivesMatter to Black Liberation, 163.
282. Cedric Johnson, “Who’s Afraid of Left Populism,” New Politics 17, no. 2
(2019), https://newpol.org/issue_post/whos-afraid-of-left-populism/. For
thoughtful essays on the promise of solidarity among radical movements, see
Chris Maisano, “No, the Racial Justice Protests Are Not at Odds with Class
Politics,” Jacobin, June 26, 2020, https://jacobinmag.com/2020/06/ross-douthat
-nyt-racial-justice-protests-bernie-sanders/; and Curt Ries, “Our Path Forward
After Bernie Must Include Rank-­and-­File Unionism and Class-­Struggle Elec-
tions,” Jacobin, August 9, 2020, https://jacobinmag.com/2020/08/bernie
-sanders-campaign-unions-class-struggle.
283. Benjamin Balthaser and Bill V. Mullen, “Rethinking Socialism from Below
in the Age of Covid-­19 and Black Lives Matter,” New Politics, June 30, 2020.
https://newpol.org/rethinking-socialism-from-below-in-the-age-of-covid-and
-black-lives-matter/.
 NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 · 237

5. The Emancipated Subject

1. Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (New York:
International, 1970), 20.
2. Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York: Henry Holt, 1969 [1941]),
16. See also Lawrence J. Friedman, The Lives of Erich Fromm: Love’s Prophet (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2013); and Mauricio Cortina, “The Greatness
and Limitations of Eric Fromm’s Humanism,” Contemporary Psychoanalysis 51,
no. 3 (2015): 388–­422.
3. Fromm, Escape from Freedom, 16.
4. Fromm, Escape from Freedom, 276.
5. Roger Foster, “Social Character: Erich Fromm and the Ideological Glue of
Neoliberalism,” Critical Horizons 18, no. 1 (2017): 1–­18; at 3.
6. Jason Read, The Micro-­Politics of Capital: Marx and the Prehistory of the
Present (Albany: State University of New York, 2003), 135.
7. Peter Lamb, Socialism (Medford, Mass.: Polity, 2019), 2.
8. Linda McDowell, “Work, Workfare, Work/Life Balance and an Ethic of
Care,” Progress in Human Geography 28, no. 2 (2004): 145–­63; at 146.
9. Lynn Chancer, Sadomasochism in Everyday Life: The Dynamics of Power
and Powerlessness (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1992), 34.
10. Chancer, Sadomasochism in Everyday Life, 35.
11. Eric Fromm, The Sane Society (New York; Henry Holt, 1990 [1955]), 95.
12. Rainer Funk, Erich Fromm: His Life and Ideas (New York: Continuum
International, 2000), 11.
13. Similar ideas are captured by David Riesman’s The Lonely Crowd, Herbert
Marcuse’s One-­Dimensional Man, and Jean-­Paul Sartre’s concept of the practico-­
inert in his Critique of Dialectical Reason. See David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1950); Herbert Marcuse, One-­
Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (Boston:
Beacon, 1991 [1964]); Jean-­Paul Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason, trans. Alan
Sheridan-­Smith (New York: Verso, 1991 [1960]).
14. Erich Fromm, Man for Himself: Towards a Psychology of Ethics (New York:
Rinehart, 1947), 68.
15. Fromm, Man for Himself, 68.
16. Fromm, Man for Himself, 72.
17. Fromm, Man for Himself, 72.
18. Elie Wiesel, “The Perils of Indifference,” http://www.historyplace.com/
speeches/wiesel.htm.
19. Wiesel, “The Perils of Indifference.”
20. Fromm, The Sane Society; Eric Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion: My
238 · NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

Encounter with Marx and Freud (London: Abacus, 1983 [1962]); Erich Fromm,
The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness (New York: Henry Holt, 1988 [1973);
Erich Fromm, The Art of Loving (New York: Harper Perennial, 2006 [1956]).
21. Lynn S. Chancer, “Feminism, Humanism, and Erich Fromm,” in Erich
Fromm’s Critical Theory: Hope, Humanism, and the Future, ed. Kieran Durkin
and Joan Braune (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020), 101–­14; at 105.
22. Fromm, Escape from Freedom, 4.
23. Neal Harris, “Reconstructing Erich Fromm’s ‘Pathology of Normalcy’:
Transcending the Recognition-­Cognitive Paradigm in the Diagnosis of Social
Pathologies,” Social Science Information 58, no. 4 (2019): 714–­33; at 719–­20.
24. Fromm, The Sane Society, 30.
25. Chancer, Sadomasochism in Everyday Life, 35.
26. Chancer, Sadomasochism in Everyday Life, 36.
27. Fromm, Escape from Freedom, 140.
28. Fromm, Escape from Freedom, 162.
29. Fromm, The Sane Society, 30.
30. Cheryl E. Matias and Ricky Lee Allen, “Loving Whiteness to Death:
Sadomasochism, Emotionality, and the Possibility of Humanizing Love,” Berkeley
Review of Education 4, no. 2 (2013): 285–­309; at 291.
31. Fromm, The Sane Society, 123.
32. Fromm, Escape from Freedom, 144.
33. Fromm, Escape from Freedom, 154.
34. Matthew C. MacWilliams, “Trump Is an Authoritarian. So Are Millions
of Americans,” Politico, September 23, 2020, https://www.politico.com/news/
magazine/2020/09/23/trump-america-authoritarianism-420681.
35. Amanda Taub, “The Rise of American Authoritarianism,” Vox, March 1,
2016, https://www.vox.com/2016/3/1/11127424/trump-authoritarianism.
36. Matthew C. MacWilliams, “Who Decides When the Party Doesn’t? Au-
thoritarian Voters and the Rise of Donald Trump,” PS: Political Science & Politics
49, no. 4 (2016): 716–­21; at 717.
37. Fromm, Escape from Freedom, 255.
38. MacWilliams, “Who Decides,” 720.
39. Daniel Burston, “ ‘It Can’t Happen Here’: Trump, Authoritarianism and
American Politics,” Psychotherapy and Politics International 15, no. 1 (2017): e1399.
40. Matt Karamazov, “Erich Fromm on the Alienation of Modern Man,”
Medium, August 24, 2016, https://medium.com/@MattKaramazov/erich
-fromm-on-the-alienation-of-modern-man-cdcb46d7e934.
41. Jennifer Mercieca, “Authoritarian Voters Pushed Trump to Victory. Can
They Do It Again?” The Guardian, July 15, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/
us-news/2020/jul/15/authoritarian-voters-donald-trump-election.
 NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 · 239

42. MacWilliams, “Trump Is an Authoritarian.”

43. Mercieca, “Authoritarian Voters.”
44. Mercieca, “Authoritarian Voters.”
45. Mike Lee (@SenMikeLee), Twitter, October 7, 2020, 11:24 pm, https://
twitter.com/senmikelee/status/1314089207875371008?lang=en.
46. Paul Egan and Tresa Baldas, “Militia Group Plotted to Kidnap Michigan
Gov. Gretchen Whitmer, Feds Say,” Detroit Free Press, October 8, 2020, https://
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2020/10/08/governor-gretchen
-whitmer-kidnap-plot-militia/5921409002/; “6 People Charged in Plot to Kidnap
Michigan Gov. Whitmer,” Associated Press, October 8, 2020, https://apnews.com/
article/michigan-checks-and-balances-archive-gretchen-whitmer-da09ca66cd8d
5f36722021d3593425ff?.
47. Taub, “The Rise of American Authoritarianism.”
48. Gajo Petrović, “Marx’s Theory of Alienation,” Philosophy and Phenom­
enological Research 23, no. 3 (1963): 419–­26; Sean Sayers, “Creative Activity and
Alienation in Hegel and Marx,” Historical Materialism 11, no. 1 (2003): 107–­28;
Jan Kandiyali, “Freedom and Necessity in Marx’s Account of Communism,”
­British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22, no. 1 (2014): 104–­23.
49. Kandiyali, “Freedom and Necessity,” 107.
50. Martin Hägglund, This Life: Why Mortality Makes Us Free (London:
­Profile, 2019), 22.
51. Kandiyali, “Freedom and Necessity,” 107.
52. Kandiyali, “Freedom and Necessity,” 108.
53. Kandiyali, “Freedom and Necessity,” 109.
54. Bertell Ollman, Alienation: Marx’s Conception of Man in Capitalist Society,
2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 81.
55. Kandiyali, “Freedom and Necessity,” 109.
56. Contemporary scientists, from anthropologists to zoologists, may take
issue with Marx’s distinction between humans and animals; this is not the place
to engage in a lengthy philosophical reflection on the veracity of Marx’s claims,
most notably his premise that humans are unique in their creative potential. The
salience of Marx’s assertion is how these ideas were—­or were not—­incorporated
in the corpus of Marxist political philosophy and how these translated into the
policies and programs of actually existing communist societies.
57. Kandiyali, “Freedom and Necessity,” 109.
58. Ollman, Alienation, 114.
59. Hägglund, This Life, 23.
60. Ollman, Alienation, 116.
61. Kandiyali, “Freedom and Necessity,” 110.
62. Fromm, The Sane Society, 204.
240 · NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

63. Fromm, The Sane Society, 31.

64. bell hooks, Outlaw Culture: Resisting Representations (New York: Rout-
ledge, 1994), 243.
65. hooks, Outlaw Culture, 243.
66. Hebah H. Farrag and Ann Gleig, “Far from Being Anti-­Religious, Faith
and Spirituality Run Deep in Black Lives Matter,” The Conversation, September
14, 2020, https://theconversation.com/far-from-being-anti-religious-faith-and
-spirituality-run-deep-in-black-lives-matter-145610.
67. hooks, Outlaw Culture, 246.
68. Fromm, The Art of Loving, 17.
69. Eduardo Bonilla-­Silva, “Toward a New Political Praxis for Trumpamerica:
New Directions in Critical Race Theory,” American Behavioral Scientist 63, no. 13
(2019): 1776–­88; at 1781.
70. Fromm, The Art of Loving, 19.
71. Ollman, Alienation, 155.
72. Ollman, Alienation, 155.
73. “Executive Order on Delegating Authority Under the DPA with Respect
to Food Supply Chain Resources During the National Emergency Caused by
the Outbreak of COVID-­19,” April 28, 2020, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
presidential-actions/executive-order-delegating-authority-dpa-respect-food
-supply-chain-resources-national-emergency-caused-outbreak-covid-19/.
74. Steven Greenhouse, “Trump Is Marching Meatpacking Workers Off to
Their Deaths,” The Guardian, April 30, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2020/apr/30/trump-executive-order-meat-processing
-workers-coronavirus.
75. Fromm, The Art of Loving, 24.
76. Lydia Wood, Kate Swanson, and Donald E. Colley III, “Tenets for a
Radical Care Ethics in Geography,” ACME: An International Journal for Critical
Geographies 19, no. 2 (2020): 424–­47; at 428.
77. Fromm, The Art of Loving, 27.
78. Matias and Allen, “Loving Whiteness to Death,” 286.
79. Fromm, The Art of Loving, 19.
80. Fromm, The Art of Loving, 21–­22.
81. Andrew Power and Edward Hall, “Placing Care in Times of Austerity,”
Social & Cultural Geography 19, no. 3 (2018): 303–­13; at 306. For helpful introduc-
tions, see Joan C. Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic
of Care (New York: Routledge, 1993); and Marian Barnes, Care in Everyday Life:
An Ethic of Care in Practice (Bristol, UK: Policy, 2012).
82. Joan C. Tronto, “Care as a Basis for Radical Political Judgements,” Hypa­
tia 10, no. 2 (1995): 141–­49; at 142.
83. Tronto, “Care as a Basis,” 142.
 NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 · 241

84. Tronto, “Care as a Basis,” 142.

85. Victoria Lawson, “Instead of Radical Geography, How About Caring
Geog­raphy?” Antipode 41, no. 1 (2009): 210–­13; at 210.
86. Matias and Allen, “Loving Whiteness to Death,” 291.
87. Friedman, The Lives of Erich Fromm, 10–­11; Cortina, “The Greatness and
Limitations,” 390.
88. Friedman, The Lives of Erich Fromm, 11.
89. Friedman, The Lives of Erich Fromm, 11; Cortina, “The Greatness and Limi-
tations,” 390.
90. Fromm, The Art of Loving, 1.
91. Matias and Allen, “Loving Whiteness to Death,” 291.
92. Scottie Andrew, “The Psychology Behind Why Some People Won’t Wear
Masks,” CNN, May 6, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/06/health/why
-people-dont-wear-masks-wellness-trnd/index.html.
93. Alec Snyder, Mirna Alsharif, and Theresa Waldrop, “Three Family Mem-
bers Charged in Shooting Death of Security Guard Who Told a Customer to
Put on a Face Mask,” CNN, May 5, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/04/us/
michigan-security-guard-mask-killing-trnd/index.html.
94. Robert A. Kane, A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2005), 163.
95. Kane, A Contemporary Introduction, 163.
96. Hägglund, This Life, 24.
97. Kane, A Contemporary Introduction, 165.
98. Kane, A Contemporary Introduction, 168.
99. Susan Wolf, Meaning in Life and Why It Matters (Princeton, N.J.: Prince­
ton University Press, 2010), 28–­29.
100. Hägglund, This Life, 23.
101. Fromm, The Sane Society, 186.
102. Rebecca Shabad, “ ‘It Is What It Is’: Trump in Interview on COVID-­19
Death Toll in U.S.,” NBC News, August 4, 2020, https://www.nbcnews.com/
politics/donald-trump/it-what-it-trump-interview-covid-19-death-toll-u
-n1235734.
103. Hägglund, This Life, 25.
104. Ben Steverman and Alexandre Tanzi, “The 50 Richest Americans Are
Worth as Much as the Poorest 165 Million,” Bloomberg, October 8, 2020, https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-08/top-50-richest-people-in-the-us
-are-worth-as-much-as-poorest-165-million.
105. Steverman and Tanzi, “The 50 Richest Americans.”
106. Matthew Yglesias, “What’s Really Going On with the Economy,” Vox,
September 10, 2020, https://www.vox.com/21425031/economic-growth
-unemployment; Aaron Ross Coleman, “Congress’s Failure to Pass Stimulus
242 · NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

Has Had a Devastating—­and Predictable—­Effect on Minority Groups,” Vox,

­September 14, 2020, https://www.vox.com/21433055/congresss-failure-second
-stimulus-devastating-effect-on-minorities-unemployment-covid-bill.
107. Christopher Luu, “Black Lives Matter Protests Continue after Breonna
Taylor Decision,” InStyle, September 24, 2020, https://www.instyle.com/news/
black-lives-matter-protests-continue.
108. Quoted in Luu, “Black Lives Matter Protests.”
109. Peter Hudis, “The Seeds of Revolution Have Sprouted: What Is Now to be
Done?” New Politics, August 6, 2020, https://newpol.org/the-seeds-of-revolution
-have-sprouted-what-is-now-to-be-done/.
110. Benjamin Balthaser and Bill V. Mullen, “Rethinking Socialism from Below
in the Age of Covid-­19 and Black Lives Matter,” New Politics, June 30, 2020,
https://newpol.org/rethinking-socialism-from-below-in-the-age-of-covid-and
-black-lives-matte/.
111. Paul D’Amato, The Meaning of Marxism (Chicago: Haymarket Books,
2006), 114.
112. D’Amato, The Meaning of Marxism, 114.
113. Lamb, Socialism, 15.
114. Curt Ries, “Our Path Forward After Bernie Must Include Rank-­and-­File
Unionism and Class-­Struggle Elections,” Jacobin, August 9, 2020 at https://
jacobinmag.com/2020/08/bernie-sanders-campaign-unions-class-struggle
­(accessed October 12, 2020).
115. Lamb, Socialism, 34.
116. Karen Brodkin Sacks, “Toward a Unified Theory of Class, Race, and Gen-
der,” American Ethnologist 16, no. 3 (1989): 534–­50; at 542.
117. Brian Jones, “Continuing the Discussion on Black Politics,” New Politics 17.
no. 4 (2020), https://newpol.org/issue_post/continuing-the-discussion-on
-black-politics/.
118. Fromm, The Sane Society, 33.
Index

ableism, 4, 14, 39, 71, 75 104, 111–­13, 117, 120–­21, 123–­26, 132,
absolute surplus value. See value 136–­38, 155, 158–­59, 168, 186–­87
abstraction, 28, 47, 68 alienated subjectivities, 67–­72, 175
Abu-­Jamal, Mumia, 159 alienation: concept of, 13, 44–­46,
activity: cooperative, 22; as ergon, 23, 61–­65, 81, 111; decentering, 17–­18;
31; free, 65, 173; human, 29, 30, 35, emancipation and, 12, 21, 72, 87, 96,
47, 83, 174; and logos, 26; mean- 174, 187; everyday life and, 86–­87,
ingful, 36; passive, 82; productive 179; everyday use of, 10; as imma-
activity, 16, 23–­24, 26, 28, 32 36, 57, ture love, 162, 176; intersectionality
60–­62, 65, 72, 77, 81, 175, 183; self-­ and, 13, 74, 96–­103, 104, 150, 157;
affirming, 16 liberalism and, 11; and meaningful
Adamson, Bryan, 142 life, 30–­33, 87; ontology of, 13, 41,
ageism, 1 59, 69; theory of, 16
Alexander, Michelle, 118, 123, 125, 127, All Lives Matter, 18, 112, 154–­56
129, 132 Anderson, Kevin, 3, 15
Alexander, Sadie, 100 Anlage, 24
alienated existence, 41, 61, 65. See non- Ansley, Frances Lee, 114
alienated existence anti-­Black, 18, 99, 123, 138–­39, 154–­55
alienated subject: as abstraction, 17, antiracist, 83, 96, 102, 144, 151
58–­68, 92–­93, 97, 100, 157–­58, 164, antisexist, 96, 144, 151
166; as emancipated subject, 14, 15, Applebaum, Barbara, 153
16, 18, 22, 72, 81–­83, 96–­97, 160, 161, appropriation, 60
167, 172, 175–­76, 179; as emotive Aristotle, 23, 25–­26, 31
subject, 93; as estranged subject, 12, Asian American, 13, 185
78–­79, 167; everyday life and, 19, 48, authoritarianism, 166–­71
58, 83, 96, 100, 179; as intersectional
subject, 13, 76–­77, 97, 100, 102, 144, Balthaser, Benjamin, 160
157, 175; meaningful life and, 44, Bartky, Sandra Lee, 44, 66, 167
93–­94, 105, 168; ontology of, 8–­9, Bauman, Zygmunt, 7, 34, 36, 43–­44,
97, 102; as sadomasochist, 162, 67, 86, 104
166–­72, 180, 182; social groups and, Bayatrizi, Zohreh, 37
83–­84, 96; as subaltern, 10; white- Beale, Francis, 100
ness and, 10, 12, 14, 18, 69, 71, 76, 93, Belsey, Catherine, 98

243
244 · INDEX

Biondi, Martha, 109 citizenship, 5, 18, 101, 158, 187

Black feminism, 100, 144. See also Cleaver, Kathleen, 159
feminism Cole, Alyson, 86
Black geographies, 147 Coleman, Aaron, 185
Black Lives Matter, 18, 112, 140–­61, 176, collectives, 83, 87, 93, 101
184, 186 Collins, Patricia Hill, 96, 188
Black men, 102, 107, 110, 129–­30, colonialism, 9, 11, 18, 45. See also settler
144–­45 colonialism
Black radicalism, 146 color-­blind ideology, 9, 11, 124, 132–­33,
Black Visions Collective, 185 151–­52, 154, 156, 159
Black women, 100–­102, 129, 144, 147, Combahee River Collective, 100–­103
160, 187 commodity, 41, 48–­50, 56, 61, 65,
Bohrer, Ashley, 102 163–­64, 183
Bonilla-­Silva, Eduardo, 9, 12, 93, 137, contradictions, 55, 77–­78, 87, 96, 99, 104
176 Cooper, Anna Julia, 100
Bowie, Andrew, 80 Covid-­19, 1–­8, 15, 37, 51, 58, 73, 78,
“Broken Windows” thesis, 127–­28, 131 86–­87, 104–­5, 107, 149, 177, 180,
Brown, Heather, 3, 15, 73, 104 183–­84
Brown, Michael, 132, 140–­41, 143, 152 Crawford, III, John, 143
Brown, Tony, 151 Crenshaw, Kimberlé, 39, 96, 100, 144,
Burston, Daniel, 169 147, 188
Burton, Orisanmi, 99 critical race theory, 96, 114
Bush, Rod, 159–­60 Cullors, Patrisse, 140
Butler, Judith, 39
Byron, Chris, 43 D’Amato, Paul, 186
dead labor, 4–­5, 63, 163, 186
Cacho, Lisa Marie, 63 death: abstract, 37; awareness of, 7, 16,
Campbell, Alexia Fernández, 150 22, 34–­36, 72, 180; life and, 26, 30,
Camus, Albert, 34 59, 163; meaningfulness and, 30,
capacity to hurt, 5, 13–­15, 19, 69, 83, 34, 82; slow, 63. See also premature
112, 152, 157, 180, 183 death
capital accumulation, 5, 8, 22, 28, 33, determination: collective, 81, 90, 102;
52–­55, 65, 68, 70–­71, 73, 99, 121, 174 self-­, 9
Castile, Philando, 132 dialectic, 26–­27, 30, 60, 83, 111, 172, 174
Caws, Peter, 88, 95 DiAngelo, Robin, 152
Cazenave, Noel, 139, 141, 143 Dickerson, Mechele, 75
Chancer, Lynn, 19, 58, 64, 70, 79, 163, Du Bois, W. E. B., 76, 115
167
Choonara, Joseph, 49 El-­Sayed, Abdul, 105
Cieszkowski, August von, 80 emancipation: alienation and, 87, 172,
cis [cisgender], 12, 97, 101, 144–­45 175; defined, 12, 74; human, 81, 186,
 INDEX · 245

188; political, 188; proletarian, 72, 175; sadomasochism and, 166–­72;

79, 83, 187; racism and, 146; revo- social character and, 162–­64
lutionary, 19; self-­, 12, 80, 82, 90, Funk, Rainer, 164
96–­97, 104, 160, 179; workplace, 82
Epicurus, 26 Garner, Eric, 143
ergon. See activity Garza, Alicia, 139–­40, 142, 144–­45,
ethics of care, 14, 20, 161, 179, 180 147–­48, 151, 154, 156–­57
eudemonia, 31–­32 gender, 5, 17, 39, 45, 68, 71, 76, 84, 87,
existentialism, 34, 61, 92 93, 100–­104, 124, 131, 144, 151, 155,
exploitation, 5, 12–­13, 20, 27–­28, 33, 45, 158, 187–­88
51, 56–­57, 66, 72–­73, 79, 81, 83, 90, Gertz, Nolen, 43
93, 96–­97, 102–­3, 107, 110, 116, 126, Gillespie, Kathryn, 40
131, 150–­51, 158, 175, 185, 187 Gilmore, Ruth Wilson, 38, 116
expropriation, 28, 60 Gimenéz, Martha, 96
everyday life, 13, 19, 34, 85–­87, 116, 161, Goodwin, Peter, 12, 96
164, 173, 179 grassroots democracy, 175
Gray, Freddie, 132
Fanon, Frantz, 98–­99 groups: formation, 77, 84–­85, 87,
feminism/feminist, 20, 71, 74, 83, 88, 89–­90, 95–­96, 101, 104, 159; group-­
96, 98, 100–­102, 144. See also Black in-­fusion, 90–­92; practico-­inert, 88,
feminism 165; series, 88–­90, 92; sworn, 92–­93,
Ferguson, 140–­42, 160 95, 169
Ferrarese, Estelle, 86 Gusterson, Hugh, 135
Fineman, Martha, 39, 67
Fischer, John, 13–­14, 30, 36 Hägglund, Martin, 16, 21–­22, 65, 122,
Floyd, George, 107–­10, 132, 149–­50, 174, 182
152–­54, 156, 158 Haldon, John, 47
Ford, Ezell, 143 Hamper, Ben, 63
Foster, John Bellamy, 27 Hardt, Michael, 68, 71, 74
Foucault, Michel, 99 Harker, Christopher, 39
fraternity-­terror, 93, 95, 171 harm: death and, 37–­38, 59; defined, 5;
free will, 9, 32, 88, 98, 183 doing, 93, 171, 182, 188
freedom: alienation and, 44; as self-­ Harman, Chris, 117
determination, 173–­74; as self-­ Harvey, David, 50, 69, 78, 112, 122–­23
realization, 173–­74, 181; liberal, 9; Hattery, Angela, 131
of reflective self-­control, 181; of Hawthorne, Camilla, 147
self-­perfection, 182 Henry, Mary Kay, 149–­50
Fromm, Eric: alienation and, 19, 82, heteronormative, 18–­19, 147, 171, 187
183; death and, 161; humanism and, Highmore, Ben, 63, 85
180; love and, 175–­78, 188; realms Hill, Sean, 39
of, 172–­74, 181–­83; revolution and, Hispanics, 31, 94, 126, 135, 168
246 · INDEX

historical materialism, 16, 33, 52, 70, King, Martin Luther, Jr., 115–­16
172–­73; human nature and, 22–­30
Holloway, John, 43–­44 labor: as commodity, 52, 56, 61, 164;
homophobia, 14–­15, 70, 97, 123, 187 dead, 5; 63, 163, 186; disposable, 55,
Hooker, Juliet, 133, 137, 145 110; informal, 55; living, 5, 51, 53, 63,
hooks, bell, 175–­76 96, 163, 186; market, 57, 66, 83; nec-
Hudis, Peter, 185–­86 essary, 52, 53, 56; labor power, 16,
human emancipation. See 33, 46, 49–­57, 61, 63, 69, 78, 83, 164;
emancipation socially necessary, 56; reserve army,
human nature: alienation and, 17, 41, 54, 56; redundant, 5, 55; waged, 55,
42; death and, 33–­40; materialist 61, 66, 78, 81, 104, 161
account of, 22–­30 Lamb, Peter, 187
human needs, 28, 30, 48, 50, 104, 162, Latinx, 13, 58, 105, 126, 148
188 Laurie, Emma, 38
Lawson, Victoria, 179
identity: alienation and, 97; intersec- Lefebvre, Henri, 86–­87
tionality and, 104, 151; politics, 123, “Left Behind” thesis, 10–­11, 134–­35
125, 147; singular, 101, subjectivity Leighton, 114
and, 97; working-­class, 126 Leonardo, Zeus, 116
Indigenous peoples, 3, 45, 73, 105 Lewis, Holly, 96, 187
indifference, 2, 8, 10, 13–­15, 19, 66–­69, liberalism, 9, 117–­18, 179
74, 83, 104, 112, 115–­16, 133–­34, life: disposable, 109–­10, 151; flourish-
151–­52, 159, 165–­66, 183 ing, 7, 20–­22, 33, 68, 82, 86, 97, 100,
intersectionality, 39, 51, 74, 96–­103, 147, 103, 142, 146, 164, 144; meaningful,
150, 167, 175, 188 6, 13–­16, 22, 3033, 34–­36, 40–­41,
intolerance, 10, 13–­15, 19, 66, 69, 74, 83, 45–­46, 59, 98, 102, 110, 112, 137,
90–­93, 103–­5, 112, 118, 121–­23, 134, 164–­65, 171, 175, 180, 182; truncated
136, 152, 154–­55, 159, 165–­66, 183 life, 38–­40, 45, 53, 97, 100
Inwood, Joshua F. J., 115, 158 logos, 23, 25–­26
Lopez, Patricia, 40
James, C. L. R., 146 love: genuine, 178; immature, 162,
Johnson, Cedric, 160 176–­77, 182; mature, 177–­78
Jones, Brian, 187 Lovell, David, 12, 72, 103
Lowe, Lisa, 9
Kandiyali, Jan, 173–­74 Löwy, Michael, 104
Kane, Robert, 181–­82 Lukács, Georg, 12
Karamazov, Matt, 170 lumpenproletariat, 55, 80
Kelley, Robin D.G., 70, 146
Kierkegaard, Søren, 34 MacWilliams, Matthew, 169–­70
Kim, Richard, 31 Mahtani, Minelle, 113, 132
 INDEX · 247

Malcolm X, 159 shared, 7, 14, 16, 22, 39–­40, 66, 130,

Martin, Trayvon, 139, 152 154–­55, 179–­80
masochism, 19, 166–­68, 175–­76, 181
Matias, Cheryl E., 138, 168, 178, 180 Nagel, Thomas, 23
May, Todd, 32, 33–­34, 162 Native Americans, 13
McDonald, Laquan necessary labor: See labor.
McDougald, Elise, 100 necrocapitalism, 5
McIntosh, Peggy, 114 negation, 90, 99, 100, 102, 179
McIntyre, Michael, 54 Negri, Toni, 68, 71, 74
McKay, Claude 146 neoliberal subject. See subject
McKittrick, Katherine, 18, 147 neoliberalism: alienation and, 165, 178;
meaningful life: alienation and, 19–­20, racial capitalism and, 112–­17; racism
35, 40–­41, 44–­46, 59, 163–­65, 171, and, 122–­32; postracial, 132–­39
183; death and, 16, 22, 34, 36–­37; Newton, Huey, 159
empathy and, 8, 98, 161, 175, 180; Nixon, Richard M., 117–­22, 138, 158
everyday activities and, 7, 43, 86, nonalienated existence, 15, 72
89, 174; human nature and, 30–­33; nonhuman animals, 7, 9, 23, 25–­27, 31,
intersectionality and, 67; rac- 34, 39, 203n94
ism and, 137, 146; sado­masochism Nussbaum, Martha, 34
and, 166–­67; society and, 14, 44,
102, 182, 186; work and, 21–­22, Obama, Barack, 76, 132–­37
36, 61 Ollman, Bertell, 21, 173–­74, 177
meaninglessness, 162–­66 Omeoga, Oluchi, 185
Mercieca, Jennifer, 170
Mészáros, István, 46 Parker, Dante, 143
Mezzadra, Sandro, 33, 82, 96 participatory democracy, 159
metabolic rift, 28 pathology of normalcy, 164–­66
metabolism, 27, 59 Patnaik, Prahhat, 54
Michelman, Frank, 8 patriarchy, 13, 17, 19, 45, 66–­67, 71, 74,
misogyny, 14–­15, 69–­71, 91, 138, 157, 83, 97, 125, 147, 158, 171, 175
168, 186 personal responsibility, 68, 124, 133, 152
mode of life, 29, 47, 161–­62, 178 Phillips, Kevin, 119, 121
mode of production: capitalist, 5–­6, Pirtle, Whitney Laster, 105
15–­16, 19, 30, 35, 41, 45–­46, 48, 50, postracial ideology, 132–­39, 154
57, 68, 81, 85, 88, 97, 103, 161–­63; precarious, 4, 7, 39, 80, 105, 110, 136,
definition of, 46; exploitation and, 158, 168
52–­53, 81–­83; oppression and, 51, precarity, 11, 39, 132, 138, 155, 165, 186
64; racism and, 70–­71; subjectivity premature death, awareness of, 7, 36,
and 54 59, 145, 161; defined, 37–­38; indif-
mortality: Marxism and, 33–­40; ference to, 5, 40; political economy
248 · INDEX

of, 5; oppression and, 4, 144, 155, relative surplus value: See value
165, 183; racism and, 151–­156; state-­ revolution, 12, 21, 47, 57, 77, 79–­80, 90,
sanctioned, 106, 132; truncated 102, 104, 123, 148, 175
life and, 38–­40, 45, 53, 97, 100; Rice, Tamir, 132
vulnerability to, 4–­8, 14, 16–­17, 21, Rioux, Sébastien, 30
40, 53–­54, 67, 73, 100, 113, 116, 131, Roberts, David, 113, 132
138, 148, 163, 165, 177, 179 Robeson, Paul, 146
primitive accumulation, 70 Robinson, Cedric, 70, 146
proletariat: and intersectionality, Ruíz, Elena, 100
73–­74, 187; as abstraction, 73; as
alienated subject, 12, 22, 65, 79, 102; Sacks, Karen, 187
as revolutionary subject, 12, 14, 72, sadism, 166–­68, 175, 177
79, 81, 96, 103, 150, 186; as roman- sadomasochism, 19, 70, 167, 175
ticized subject, 12, 72; as working San Juan, Epifanio, Jr., 45, 104
class, 55 Sartre, Jean-­Paul: See fraternity-­terror;
Pulido, Laura, 70, 114, 116 groups
#SayHerName, 144
queer, 96, 139, 140, 144–­45, 147–­48, Scott, Walter, 132
160, 187 self-­determination. See determination
self-­emancipation. See emancipation
racial capitalism, 11, 14, 18, 58, 67, 70, “self-­made man,” 66
105, 109–­11, 114, 122, 131, 141, 143, self-­realization, 32, 90, 174, 181, 183
146, 158–­59, 167–­68 settler colonialism, 11, 18, 147, 158.
racism: alienation and, 45, 97, See also colonialism
111, 121, 175; capitalism and, 70, 71, sexism, 17, 39, 45, 75, 100, 102–­3, 151,
105; class and, 10, 67, 83, 110, 158, 175, 185, 187
160; ideologies of, 45, 84, 98; indif- sexuality, 5, 17–­18, 39, 71, 76, 84, 102,
ference and, 15, 154; institutional, 104, 125, 158
91, 155; intersectionality and, 70, Shah, Adam, 113–­14
83, 100–­103, 187; neoliberal, 112–­17, Shore, Daniel, 155
122–­32; reverse, 111, 117, 120; struc- Simon, Roland, 73
tural, 11, 17, 39, 67, 74, 105, 116, 142, Smith, Earl, 131
150, 155–­58; systemic, 100, 110, 141, Smith, Murray, 51
145, 150, 152, 160, 185 Smith, Terry, 133–­34
Ransby, Barbara, 18, 112, 141–­42 social justice, 97, 101, 109, 112, 128, 140,
Read, Jason, 162 145, 149, 151, 166
Reagan, Ronald, 122–­32, 138, 158 socially necessary labor: See labor
realm of freedom, 172–­74, 181–­83 solidarity: alienation and, 89, 163;
realm of necessity, 172–­74, 181–­83 Black Lives Matter and, 101–­2,
Rebughini, Paola, 99 108–­10, 141, 149–­50, 152, 156; care
Reiman, Jeffrey, 114 and, 151; class, 14, 74, 105, 132, 168;
 INDEX · 249

emancipation and, 96, 161; group, s­ upremacy and, 6, 11, 75, 135–­36,
90; meaningful life and, 178, 180; 138, 168; white working-­class and,
racism and, 105, 110, 120, 152, 155; 10–­12, 75–­76, 135–­36, 138, 171, 175
shared mortality and, 66; spatial, 81 truncated life, 38–­40, 45, 53, 97, 100
Southern Strategy, 117–­22, 123, 125, 138 Truth, Sojourner, 100
species-­being, 16, 23–­24, 34, 40–­41, 43,
48, 53, 61–­63, 77, 82, 148, 179 underclass, 67, 110, 126
Stack, George, 89
Stevenson, Olivia, 34 value: absolute surplus, 52–­53, 56–­57;
Stewart, Maria, 100 capitalism and, 8, 15, 32, 48; ex-
Stewart, Susan, 85 change, 32, 48–­49, 51, 60, 64, 77, 86,
subject: concept of, 97–­98; emanci- 164–­65, 167; relative surplus, 52, 56;
pated, 14–­16, 18, 22, 97, 99, 102, use, 48
162, 175–­84; laboring, 46–­58; Verney, Kevern, 118
liberal, 8–­11, 13, 17, 39, 67–­68, 76,
82, 83–­84, 95, 99–­100, 116, 133, wages of whiteness, 13–­14, 76, 115, 118,
154, 156, 163, 179; neoliberal, 124, 122, 168
126, 163; position, 13, 17, 45, 68, 74, Wallimann, Isidor, 33
96–­97, 100, 102–­3, 104, 137, 149, 167, War on Crime, 121
175, 187 War on Drugs, 127, 129, 132, 142
subsumption: formal, 52–­53, 55, 57, 70; Watson, James D. E., 37
labor and, 52, 56, 57, 68; real, 52, Wells, Bonny, 10
56–­57, 68, 70, 162 Wells, Ida B., 100, 145
subjectivity, 13, 16, 44, 81, 93, 99, 101, white backlash, 134, 137, 153, 156
103, 162 white fragility, 152
surplus populations, 54–­56 white privilege, 4, 13–­14, 66, 74, 84, 95,
114–­16, 118, 123, 133, 153, 155–­56,
Taub, Amanda, 171 168, 176
Taylor, Breonna, 132 white supremacy, 18–­19, 71, 95, 99, 109,
Taylor, Keeanga-­Yamahtta, 18, 102, 112, 111, 114–­18, 131–­39, 145, 147–­48, 151,
142, 144, 148, 160 155–­59, 167–­68, 175
thanatology, 33–­40 whiteness: alienation and, 111, 136;
Tometi, Opal, 140, 146–­47 anti-­Black violence and, 18, 99, 116;
transphobia, 15, 97, 187 capitalism and, 45, 99, 120, 159;
Tronto, Joan, 179 decentering of, 17, 187; ideology
Trump, Donald J.: alienation and, 69, of, 10, 71, 76, 98–­99, 103, 116, 126,
76, 93, 123, 125, 137, 158, 168, 176, 138; production of, 99, 157, 171;
183; as authoritarian, 169–­70, 172; normativity of, 11, 133, 135, 158. See
as racist, 91, 94, 98, 135, 138, 154, psychological wages of whiteness
168, 172; Covid-­19 and, 1–­3, 8, 58, Wiesel, Elie, 165–­66
149, 166, 177, 181, 183–­84; white Wolf, Susan, 182
250 · INDEX

Wood, Lydia, 178 Wright, Richard, 146

working class: African American, 110, Wynter, Sylvia, 99
129, 139–­57, 159, 185; alienation and,
12, 22, 67, 76, 111; class struggle and, xenophobia, 10, 12, 15, 70, 75, 97,
77–­83, 109; intersectionality and, 13, 137–­38, 157, 185, 187
17, 73–­74, 96–­103; mythology of, 11,
75, 82, 119–­22, 123–­26, 135, 138, 158; Yates, Michael, 72, 105–­6, 109
as proletariat, 12, 22, 55; as revolu- Young, Iris Marion, 84, 91
tionary class, 12, 14, 22, 72, 79–­81,
103, 160, 186–­87; whiteness and, zero tolerance, 128
10–­13, 58, 67, 69, 75–­76, 111, 168, 176 Zimmerman, George, 139–­40, 152
Wright, Erik Olin, 14, 72
JAMES A. TYNER is professor of geography at Kent State University and fel-
low of the American Association of Geographers. He is author of several
books, including War, Violence, and Population: Making the Body Count
and Dead Labor: Toward a Political Economy of Premature Death (Min-
nesota, 2019).