Can Animals Be “Citizens”?

A Political Theory of Animal Inclusion

in Human Societies
-NAMANA SRIDEVI

Abstract

The question of whether animals can be considered “citizens” challenges deeply entrenched
anthropocentric notions of political membership and moral worth. This research explores the
emerging political theory of animal inclusion, with a central focus on the work of Sue Donaldson
and Will Kymlicka in Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights. Moving beyond traditional
animal rights approaches that emphasize welfare or intrinsic value, this study critically examines
the possibility of extending political concepts such as citizenship, sovereignty, and denizenship
to non-human animals. Through a theoretical analysis of classical and contemporary political
theories, including liberalism, communitarianism, and posthumanism, the paper reconsiders the
foundations of citizenship by asking: what does it mean to belong to a political community, and
can non-human animals be legitimate members of such a community?

The research categorizes animals into domesticated, wild, and liminal groups, evaluating distinct
models of inclusion appropriate to each. It interrogates the ethical, legal, and institutional
implications of recognizing animals not merely as dependents but as co-members in shared
societies. While acknowledging the challenges posed by animals’ lack of verbal agency and
political participation, the paper argues that reimagining citizenship through a lens of care,
representation, and interdependence is both ethically justified and politically necessary.
Ultimately, this study contributes to broader debates on justice, inclusion, and the boundaries of
the political, suggesting that the future of democratic societies may depend on how expansively
we define community and responsibility across species lines.
Introduction
In recent decades, the ethical treatment of non-human animals has become a pressing issue
across disciplines, including philosophy, law, and environmental studies. However, political
theory—concerned traditionally with power, justice, rights, and membership—has only relatively
recently begun to engage seriously with the question of animals' place within the political
community. This engagement marks a shift from merely addressing animals as ethical subjects
deserving of compassion or welfare protections to asking deeper questions about their potential
inclusion as political subjects. Can animals be considered members of a political community?
Should they have political rights or representation? These questions disrupt long-standing
assumptions that the political domain is an exclusively human affair.

Historically, animals have been viewed in instrumental terms, valued primarily for their utility to
human beings. This perspective, deeply embedded in Western thought, can be traced back to
classical philosophy. Aristotle, for instance, argued that animals exist for the sake of humans,
placing them outside the sphere of moral and political consideration. In the Enlightenment,
thinkers like Descartes reinforced a mechanistic view of animals as automata—beings without
minds, souls, or the capacity to suffer in a morally relevant way. As a result, animals were denied
moral and political agency and were treated as property under law—a status that persists in many
legal systems today.

This traditional view cast animals as passive beneficiaries of human decisions rather than as
rights-holders or participants in social life. While humans could be bound by moral duties to treat
animals "humanely," these duties were often conceived as flowing from human values rather
than from any rights animals might hold independently. This dynamic placed animals in a
vulnerable and dependent position—protected, if at all, only to the extent that human interests or
sympathies aligned with their well-being.

The rise of the animal rights movement in the 20th century challenged this status quo.
Philosophers such as Peter Singer and Tom Regan brought renewed attention to the ethical
consideration of animals. Singer’s utilitarian argument in Animal Liberation (1975) emphasized
animals’ capacity to suffer as a morally relevant criterion for equal consideration. Regan, on the
other hand, asserted that animals are "subjects-of-a-life" and thus possess inherent rights that
must be respected. These ethical arguments prompted a growing societal recognition of animal
suffering and the development of animal welfare laws across the globe.

Despite this progress, mainstream political theory has remained hesitant to fully integrate
animals into the concept of political community. Rights were discussed in moral or legal
contexts, but rarely in terms of political membership. The frameworks of justice, democracy, and
citizenship continued to exclude non-human beings, largely due to the assumption that political
participation requires capacities—such as rationality, language, and moral responsibility—that
animals are thought to lack. Thus, even progressive advances in animal protection tended to
reinforce the idea that animals are objects of moral concern rather than active participants in
society.

This context sets the stage for a more radical rethinking of animals’ status in political theory.
Scholars like Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka have advanced the debate by proposing a
political model of animal inclusion. In their groundbreaking work Zoopolis: A Political Theory
of Animal Rights (2011), they argue that justice for animals requires more than ethical concern or
welfare protections—it requires reimagining animals as members of a shared political
community. By introducing the idea of animal citizenship, Donaldson and Kymlicka shift the
discourse from compassion to inclusion, from charity to justice.

This paper builds upon that emerging discourse, investigating the plausibility and implications of
treating animals as political subjects. It explores whether and how animals might be incorporated
into political frameworks—not just as beings to be protected, but as entities with rights, interests,
and forms of membership within human societies. This shift challenges us to reconsider
foundational assumptions in political theory about who counts, who belongs, and what it means
to be a citizen.

Research Problem

The conventional boundaries of political community have long been drawn around human
beings, grounded in attributes such as rationality, autonomy, language, and moral agency.
Citizenship, as a core political concept, is typically defined by participation in civic life, legal
recognition, and shared membership in a political order. Under this paradigm, non-human
animals are categorically excluded. Despite the development of animal welfare laws and ethical
theories advocating for better treatment of animals, political theory has remained resistant to the
idea of granting animals a place within the political sphere.

This research problematizes that exclusion by asking: Can animals be conceptualized as

members of a political community? If animals are sentient beings with interests, emotional
lives, and the capacity to suffer, does justice require us to recognize them not only as moral
subjects but also as political subjects? What would such recognition entail? The problem
becomes more pressing as animals live increasingly complex lives within human societies—
working as service animals, inhabiting cities, and being embedded in agricultural and domestic
settings. Yet they remain legally and politically invisible, often treated as property or passive
beneficiaries of human benevolence.

The research thus seeks to challenge and expand the framework of political inclusion,
questioning whether animals can possess a form of membership within human political
communities—particularly through concepts like citizenship, sovereignty, and denizenship.

Objectives

1. To explore the idea of animal citizenship

This objective involves analyzing theoretical models that reimagine animals as members
of political communities, especially the framework proposed by Donaldson and
Kymlicka in Zoopolis. The research will consider how citizenship—traditionally based
on active participation and mutual obligation—can be reconceptualized to include non-
human beings. It will also examine how different categories of animals (domesticated,
wild, liminal) might be integrated in different ways.
2. To assess whether political rights or responsibilities can be extended to animals
This includes evaluating the feasibility and ethical justification of granting animals
certain political rights (e.g., protection, representation, consideration in policymaking). It
also involves investigating whether animals can or should bear political responsibilities,
or whether human proxies (such as guardians or advocates) might fulfill these roles on
their behalf. This objective aims to critically engage with the tensions between animals'
capacities and the demands of political life.

Research Questions

1. What would it mean for an animal to be a citizen?

2. How do existing political theories accommodate or reject this idea?
3. What are the implications for human-animal relationships and policy?

Literature Review

1. Traditional Theories of Citizenship

Historically, the concept of citizenship has been deeply rooted in anthropocentric frameworks,
with political participation, rationality, and speech acting as key criteria for inclusion. These
classical ideas, found in the works of Aristotle, Hobbes, and Rousseau, established citizenship as
an exclusive human privilege and reinforced the boundary between humans and all other species.

Aristotle, in Politics, asserted that humans are “political animals” because of their capacity for
logos—reason and speech—which allows them to deliberate about justice and the common good.
He considered slavery and hierarchy natural, extending this logic to human-animal relations.
Animals, lacking rational deliberation, were placed outside the realm of the polis. They were not
seen as capable of self-rule or mutual cooperation, but as natural instruments for human use.

Thomas Hobbes, in Leviathan, offered a more mechanistic view of human nature but still
excluded animals from political society. For Hobbes, citizenship emerged from a social
contract—a rational agreement among individuals to create a sovereign authority. Since animals
could neither enter nor understand such a contract, they were automatically excluded from
political consideration.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, though sympathetic to the idea of moral concern for animals,
ultimately emphasized rational will and collective autonomy as the basis for political
community. His notion of the “general will” demanded a capacity for self-legislation and moral
agency that animals were assumed not to possess.

These theorists helped crystallize a conception of citizenship rooted in distinctly human traits,
laying the groundwork for modern political systems that view animals as legally protected
objects rather than rights-bearing members of a political society.

In the modern era, liberalism and civic republicanism have continued this tradition, albeit in
more nuanced ways. Liberal political thought, as seen in John Locke, John Rawls, and others,
centers on individual rights, autonomy, and consent. Liberalism tends to define justice as fairness
between rational individuals who can pursue their own conceptions of the good life. Since
animals are seen as lacking rationality or autonomy, they are excluded from the liberal subject
pool.

Civic republicanism, on the other hand, emphasizes civic virtue, collective self-rule, and the
duties of participation. While this framework is less individualistic than liberalism, it also
assumes a certain level of deliberative capacity and public reasoning—capacities not ascribed to
animals. Thus, even though republican thought is more community-oriented, it still draws the
line of membership around human abilities and responsibilities.

In both liberal and republican models, citizenship is anthropocentric, tightly linked to rational
deliberation, legal consent, and moral reciprocity. These criteria, while effective for structuring
human governance, systematically exclude non-human beings from political inclusion,
regardless of their sentience, sociality, or dependency.
2. Animal Rights and Ethics

The rise of animal ethics in the late 20th century began to challenge this exclusion, though early
theorists focused primarily on moral—not political—consideration.

Peter Singer, in his seminal work Animal Liberation (1975), laid the foundation for the modern
animal rights movement. A utilitarian, Singer argued that the capacity to suffer—not
rationality—should be the basis for moral consideration. If a being can experience pain and
pleasure, its interests must be considered equally with similar interests of humans. For Singer,
speciesism—the idea that humans are inherently superior—was analogous to racism or sexism.

While groundbreaking, Singer’s approach remains rooted in welfare ethics. His focus is on
reducing suffering, not granting animals autonomy or rights akin to political membership.
Animals, in his view, are moral patients, not moral or political agents.

Tom Regan, in The Case for Animal Rights (1983), took a more radical stance. Drawing on
deontological ethics, Regan argued that animals are “subjects-of-a-life”—they have beliefs,
desires, perceptions, and a sense of the future. This gives them inherent value and entitles them
to moral rights, including the right not to be used as means to an end. Unlike Singer, Regan
viewed the use of animals in farming and experimentation as inherently unjust, not just
problematic when it causes suffering.

However, like Singer, Regan did not extend these rights into the political domain. His theory
emphasized moral rights rather than civic status or political inclusion. The framework stopped
short of imagining animals as members of a political community with whom we share
obligations of citizenship and justice.

A significant shift came with Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, particularly in

Frontiers of Justice (2006). Nussbaum criticized traditional contractarian and utilitarian models
for excluding the most vulnerable—infants, the disabled, and non-human animals. Her
capabilities theory emphasized the ability to flourish according to one’s species-specific
capacities. For animals, justice would require enabling them to live lives in accordance with their
natural behaviors and needs.

Nussbaum thus provided a more relational and pluralistic view of justice that acknowledges
species difference without denying rights. However, she still stops short of proposing political
inclusion in the strict sense of citizenship, focusing more on state responsibilities to ensure
animal welfare through just institutions.
3. Zoopolis by Donaldson and Kymlicka: A Political Theory of Animal Rights

Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka’s Zoopolis (2011) represents a paradigm shift in how animals
are theorized within political philosophy. Rather than focusing solely on moral status or welfare,
they argue that justice for animals requires their inclusion in political frameworks. This involves
recognizing animals as members of society with different forms of citizenship, depending on
their relationship with human communities.

The authors propose a differentiated model of animal citizenship, drawing on multicultural

and pluralistic theories of justice. Just as modern democracies recognize different modes of
political belonging for indigenous groups, immigrants, and citizens, so too can animals be
categorized according to their social proximity and dependency.

• Domesticated animals (e.g., dogs, cats, farm animals) are seen as co-citizens. They live
in human societies, depend on human institutions, and participate (albeit non-verbally) in
shared lives. As co-citizens, they are entitled to care, representation, protection, and
inclusion in decisions that affect them.
• Wild animals are considered sovereign communities. They live independently of
humans and should be allowed to govern themselves. Human intervention should be
minimal, respecting their autonomy and territorial integrity.
• Liminal animals (e.g., pigeons, raccoons, urban foxes) are treated as denizens—
residents within human spaces who do not seek close integration but deserve legal rights
and respectful coexistence.

This three-part model blends political theory with practical ethics, offering a framework that is
both inclusive and responsive to species difference. It transforms the animal question from one
of charity or welfare to one of political justice, arguing that non-human animals can and should
be incorporated into democratic societies through innovative forms of representation and
institutional reform.

4. Critiques of Animal Citizenship

Despite its innovative vision, the theory of animal citizenship has faced significant criticism,
particularly concerning its feasibility, philosophical grounding, and potential anthropomorphism.

A key critique centers on anthropomorphism—the risk of projecting human experiences and

values onto animals. Critics argue that applying a human-centric concept like “citizenship” to
animals ignores fundamental differences in cognition, communication, and agency. Terms like
“co-citizen” may romanticize human-animal relationships while overlooking the reality of
asymmetry and dependency.
Furthermore, the theory has been challenged on grounds of agency and reciprocity. Citizenship
is traditionally associated with participation, deliberation, and mutual obligation. Animals, it is
argued, cannot fulfill these duties or participate in the processes of law-making, voting, or public
discourse. This raises concerns about the coherence of extending political rights to beings who
cannot shoulder responsibilities or give consent.

Some critics suggest that representation or guardianship on behalf of animals risks reinforcing
paternalism, reducing animals once again to passive objects. Others question the practicality of
implementing such models in real-world policy, given the institutional and societal challenges
involved.

Still, defenders of animal citizenship argue that many human citizens—such as infants, people
with cognitive disabilities, or the elderly—also lack full agency, yet are considered full members
of society. Political theory has evolved to accommodate human diversity; it must now do the
same across species lines.

Theoretical Framework

1. Political Theory

Political theory provides the normative and philosophical background for understanding the
principles of inclusion, justice, and membership. Within this tradition, liberalism and
communitarianism offer contrasting perspectives on how political communities are formed and
who gets to be included.

Liberalism, particularly in the tradition of John Rawls, emphasizes individual autonomy,

rational agency, and equality before the law. Liberal justice is primarily procedural and is built
around the idea of a social contract among free and equal persons. From this standpoint,
membership in a political community is based on one’s capacity for rational deliberation and
moral responsibility—criteria that have historically excluded animals. Liberalism tends to see
justice as fairness, but only among beings capable of reciprocal cooperation. While liberalism
can justify animal welfare protections (e.g., preventing cruelty), it often stops short of advocating
for inclusion or rights based on political equality.

In contrast, communitarianism emphasizes the social embeddedness of individuals, arguing that

identity, values, and duties emerge within specific cultural and moral contexts. Thinkers like
Charles Taylor and Michael Sandel critique liberalism’s abstract individualism and argue for the
moral importance of community membership and shared narratives. This lens opens up new
possibilities for thinking about animals—not as isolated beings—but as co-inhabitants of shared
spaces and relational networks. If membership and belonging are based on lived interdependence
rather than rational consent, then animals (especially domesticated and liminal ones) may be seen
as morally and politically relevant members of the community.

Together, liberal and communitarian traditions raise fundamental questions about who can be
included in a just society, and on what grounds. These questions are central to debates over
whether animals can (or should) be included as members of political communities.

2. Citizenship Theory

Citizenship theory provides a more focused conceptual toolkit for analyzing political
membership. Traditionally, citizenship is defined by a combination of membership, rights,
duties, and participation within a political community. It is the status that marks an individual
as a legitimate subject of justice, entitled to state protection and participation in political
decision-making.

Classical models of citizenship—such as those proposed by T.H. Marshall—emphasize civil,

political, and social rights as sequential developments. In modern democratic societies,
citizenship also implies participation in the public sphere, a sense of belonging, and mutual
obligations among members. These assumptions have reinforced exclusive boundaries,
typically based on nationality, legal recognition, and cognitive capacity.

However, critical theorists—especially those working in feminist, disability, and postcolonial

studies—have challenged the narrow criteria of inclusion. They argue that citizenship should
not be contingent on linguistic ability, productivity, or rationality, but rather on shared
vulnerability, relational interdependence, and historical marginalization. These critiques open the
door to rethinking citizenship in ways that may accommodate animals.

Newer frameworks, such as differentiated citizenship and cosmopolitan citizenship, allow for
more nuanced and pluralistic forms of belonging. For instance, Donaldson and Kymlicka’s
Zoopolis draws on these theories to propose that animals could be included through relational
categories (e.g., co-citizens, denizens, sovereigns), depending on their proximity to human
societies. This reimagines the political community not as a fixed group of rational agents, but as
a dynamic and diverse network of beings with different forms of membership and entitlements.

3. Intersection with Animal Studies

The emerging field of critical animal studies provides the bridge between traditional political
theory and the ethical inclusion of animals. This intersection is shaped by posthumanism, which
critiques the anthropocentric assumptions embedded in modern Western thought. Posthumanist
theorists argue that the human-animal divide is both scientifically outdated and ethically
arbitrary. Instead, they advocate for multispecies justice, a framework that recognizes the
interdependence of human and non-human life in shared ecosystems, cities, and institutions.

Central to this shift is the move from moral status to political status. Earlier animal ethics, such
as those developed by Singer and Regan, focused on moral standing—whether animals deserved
our compassion, respect, or non-harm. However, moral status does not automatically translate
into political recognition. A being can be morally important and yet remain politically invisible.
The political turn in animal studies—exemplified by Zoopolis—insists that animals are not just
subjects of ethical concern but are also subjects of justice. They live within human political
orders, are affected by human institutions, and have interests that must be represented in law and
policy.

This framework draws inspiration from both feminist care ethics and postcolonial critiques,
which emphasize the structural dimensions of injustice and the importance of voice,
representation, and relational ethics. Rather than asking whether animals can speak or reason
like humans, it asks what forms of inclusion and protection justice demands, given the realities
of shared existence and dependency.

In this way, the intersection of political theory, citizenship theory, and animal studies generates a
robust framework for questioning the boundaries of political community and advocating for an
expanded concept of citizenship that includes non-human animals in meaningful, non-
anthropocentric ways.

Methodology

This study employs a qualitative theoretical analysis, focusing on the conceptual development
of animal citizenship through close textual analysis of key works in political theory and animal
ethics. Core texts include classical theories of citizenship by Aristotle, Hobbes, and Rousseau,
liberal and communitarian frameworks by Rawls and Sandel, and critical animal studies
literature, especially Zoopolis by Donaldson and Kymlicka. These texts are examined to trace the
evolution of inclusion and exclusion in political communities and to identify normative
frameworks that could accommodate non-human animals as members.

A comparative approach is also used, drawing parallels between the historical struggles of
marginalized human groups (such as women, children, the disabled, and racial minorities) for
citizenship rights and the emerging discourse on animal inclusion. This comparison helps to
highlight how once-excluded groups were gradually integrated into political frameworks despite
lacking traditional markers of citizenship (e.g., rational agency, productivity). The aim is not to
equate human and animal experiences but to explore how political theory has expanded over
time to recognize different kinds of agency, dependency, and vulnerability. Together, these
methods enable a nuanced and critical examination of the theoretical foundations and
implications of animal citizenship.

Analysis and Discussion

Redefining Citizenship for Non-Human Beings

The traditional notion of citizenship—based on rational agency, deliberation, and legal

participation—has historically excluded non-human animals due to their lack of language and
abstract reasoning. However, political theory has already undergone several expansions to
include marginalized human groups who were once deemed unfit for citizenship, such as
women, children, and the disabled. These shifts have demonstrated that citizenship is not a static
concept but an evolving one, shaped by changing understandings of justice, community, and
moral worth.

Redefining citizenship for animals involves rethinking its core features. Citizenship is typically
structured around membership, rights, duties, and participation. For animals, this structure must
be recalibrated. Membership can be determined by species' proximity and relational
embeddedness in human societies. Rights would be tailored to animals' capacities and interests—
for instance, the right to bodily integrity, habitat, and freedom from exploitation. Duties would
not rest on animals but on human institutions to ensure justice on their behalf. Participation,
while not direct, could occur through guardianship models, in which human representatives
advocate for animals’ interests in policymaking bodies.

Moreover, political representation for animals can draw on existing practices in human
governance. For example, children and persons with cognitive disabilities often participate
through guardians or legal proxies. This model of substituted agency recognizes the moral and
political relevance of individuals even when they cannot speak for themselves. For animals, this
means appointing legal guardians—veterinarians, ecologists, animal rights advocates—to
represent them in public forums, urban planning, and legislative processes. Thus, representation
does not necessitate voice in the literal sense but demands institutional recognition of interests
and harms.

Types of Animal-Political InclusionDonaldson and Kymlicka’s Zoopolis presents a nuanced

framework for animal inclusion, dividing animals into three political categories: domesticated
animals as co-citizens, wild animals as sovereign communities, and liminal animals as denizens.
This typology provides a differentiated model of justice, which accounts for the varying
relationships between humans and animals.

Domesticated animals, such as pets, farm animals, and service animals, have been deeply
integrated into human societies through centuries of cohabitation, labor, and emotional bonds. As
such, they can be granted co-citizenship. This entails not just welfare protections but recognition
as members of a shared community. Responsibilities to them include healthcare, non-exploitative
living conditions, and space for social and emotional expression. Co-citizenship also requires
transforming institutions—abolishing exploitative industries (e.g., factory farming) and fostering
interspecies communication through body language, behavioral signals, and care routines.

Wild animals should be regarded as sovereign communities. They do not depend on humans for
survival and thrive in autonomous ecosystems. The appropriate political response is non-
interference: respecting their territory, avoiding habitat destruction, and refraining from imposing
human values or systems on them. Sovereignty also requires international cooperation to protect
migratory routes and combat climate change. Intervention is warranted only when human
activity has caused harm, and even then, with caution and respect for wild autonomy.

Liminal animals—such as pigeons, raccoons, or stray dogs—occupy spaces between human and
wild environments, often living in cities without human invitation or full domestication.
Donaldson and Kymlicka argue for granting them denizenship, akin to long-term residents who
are not full citizens but have recognized rights and protections. Urban planning should
incorporate shelters, safe corridors, and waste management practices that acknowledge the
presence of these animals as urban dwellers rather than pests.

Practical and Ethical ImplicationsThe practical implications of this reimagined citizenship are
vast. In animal welfare law, a citizenship-based model would move beyond preventing cruelty to
ensuring conditions for flourishing. This could involve banning exploitative practices in
agriculture, mandating access to veterinary care, and creating legal standards for animal housing
that reflect emotional and social needs.

In urban planning, recognizing liminal animals as denizens would alter how cities are designed.
Infrastructure could include wildlife crossings, nesting areas, and public education on cohabiting
with non-human neighbors. Zoning laws might protect urban forests and green corridors to
facilitate safe animal movement.

In agriculture, this model challenges the industrial farming paradigm. Recognizing farm animals
as co-citizens would necessitate radically different farming practices, prioritizing mutual benefit,
voluntary interaction, and enrichment. It may also prompt a shift toward plant-based food
systems and sanctuary models.

Ethically, the model challenges entrenched forms of paternalism. The idea of speaking for
animals, however well-intentioned, risks imposing human values. Therefore, ethical
guardianship must be informed by ethological research and animal behavior studies, ensuring
that decisions reflect animals’ species-specific preferences. Moreover, the concept of consent
must be reimagined. While animals cannot provide verbal consent, they can express willingness
or resistance through behavior. Recognizing these cues as meaningful is crucial for ethical
interspecies relationships.

Autonomy, particularly for wild and liminal animals, must be central. Policies should avoid
overreach and strive to empower animals to live according to their own nature. For domesticated
animals, autonomy involves providing choices within human environments—e.g., the freedom to
move, socialize, or decline interaction.

Feasibility and LimitsWhile the normative appeal of animal citizenship is strong, questions of
feasibility remain. Can political systems integrate non-verbal beings? The answer lies in how
political communities already incorporate members who lack conventional agency. Legal
innovations such as animal legal personhood, animal rights charters, and animal ombudsman
offices suggest that political systems can evolve to include animals.

Institutionally, significant changes would be needed. Constitutional recognition of animals as

members of the political community could provide a foundation. This might include animal
rights provisions, ecological stewardship clauses, and mandates for representation in relevant
government bodies. Interdisciplinary advisory councils, composed of scientists, ethicists, and
animal advocates, could guide policymaking.

Education systems would need to incorporate animal studies and interspecies ethics, fostering
empathy and responsibility from a young age. Public spaces and services—such as
transportation, housing, and emergency management—would have to accommodate animal
needs. For example, city plans could include accessible green spaces, animal evacuation
protocols, and inclusive infrastructure.

There are, however, limits to animal citizenship. Some animals may resist cohabitation, some
wild ecosystems may not tolerate human intervention, and some species may not thrive under
human-defined systems. Political inclusion must remain context-sensitive, avoiding one-size-fits-
all approaches. There is also a risk of co-optation, where the language of inclusion is used to
justify new forms of control or domestication. Safeguards against this must be built into any
institutional design.

Conclusion

The exploration of animal citizenship represents a transformative shift in the way political theory
engages with non-human life. Traditional frameworks that define citizenship in terms of
rationality, language, and active participation have long excluded animals, relegating them to the
realm of property or passive beneficiaries of human ethics. However, emerging interdisciplinary
approaches—particularly those influenced by posthumanism, animal ethics, and the political
theory of inclusion—demand a reevaluation of these boundaries.

As demonstrated through the work of Donaldson and Kymlicka, and supported by broader
theoretical and ethical inquiry, it is possible to imagine a political community where animals are
included based on their relationships with human societies and their own species-specific needs.
The typology of co-citizenship for domesticated animals, sovereignty for wild animals, and
denizenship for liminal animals provides a flexible and context-sensitive model of inclusion that
avoids the pitfalls of anthropomorphism and homogenization.

Practically, implementing animal citizenship would require major institutional innovations,

including legal recognition, guardianship models, participatory representation, and infrastructure
adapted to interspecies coexistence. Ethically, it would involve a deep commitment to
recognizing animals as beings with interests, preferences, and the capacity for suffering and
flourishing.

Yet, challenges remain. The feasibility of such a transformation depends on political will,
cultural change, and a reconfiguration of human-animal relationships across sectors such as
agriculture, urban planning, and law. While the concept is ambitious, it provides a compelling
vision of justice that aligns with broader movements toward ecological sustainability and social
inclusivity.

Ultimately, reimagining animals as citizens is not only a question of ethics but of democracy
itself. It challenges us to redefine who counts in our political communities and what kind of
world we aspire to build—one that is not limited by species, but enriched by the diversity of life
it contains.

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