PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS

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C.M. Tran and C.T. Chong

Department of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, National University of Singapore 2

Science Drive 2, Singapore 117543

ABSTRACT

The modern development of Set Theory raises many questions with philosophical nature.
Attempts to find a general methodology to answer those questions from outside of set theory
meet the Problem of Epistemology in Philosophy of Mathematics. This report starts by
summarizing questions in set theory and sketching the difficulties in finding a philosophically
satisfying account of mathematical truth that can possibly give answer to those questions.
We argued that the dogma Power Set of Natural Number being a collection is a barrier
toward a solution for the Epistemology Problem. With the removal of that dogma, we
propose an account of truth that may both satisfy the Epistemology concern as well as
make sense questions in Set Theory.

SET THEORY AND THE EPISTEMOLOGY PROBLEM

We give a sketch of the complicated relation between Set Theory and the Epistemology
problem.
Arise from the modern study of Set Theory are questions with philosophical nature—
Is the Axioms system consistent? Do undecidable statements, like Continuum Hypothesis
(CH), have determinate truth value and how to find these truth value? How to interpret
the results in set theory about higher infinity?
In contrast, the ultimate goal of Philosophy of Mathematics is to find an account of
truth that harmonizes with the general theory of truth and the general theory of knowledge.
In [Benacerraf 1973], Paul Benacerraff suggested that such an account must satisfies two
conditions: (1) It must include a semantic theory that homogeneous to the semantic of
general language, and (2) It must explain the way the truth is obtained in a causal manner.
Set theory is largely based on Gödel’s Platonism [Godel 1964], which asserts that there
is an objective Concept of Set, that will give determinate answer to undecidable questions
in Set Theory. Gödel suggestion, which has great influence on the development of modern
set theory, is to use a method in a similar manner to science to discover this truth value.
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The three steps of the method are: (1) Consider natural axiom candidates, (2) Test them
by extrinsic evidences that are intuitive (3) Use the theory enriched with the accepted new
axioms to decide undecidable questions. The account is criticized due to the fact that Gödel
could not explain explicitly how we can use our intuition to test the extrinsic evidences.
The general trend in Philosophy of Mathematics is more toward application and Anti
realism. Two of the notable philosophical stand points are Quinean Realism, which suggests
that the existence of mathematical object should be accepted but only due to the fact it
give us best explanation for our experience, and Intuitionism, which suggest that only
mathematical objects that can, in principle, observed by the mind exist. Accepting this
view points, however, means abandoning set theory.
One of the notable suggestion come form Penelope Maddy[Maddy 1997]. Maddy pro-
pose a form of naturalism, where set theory should be justified in its own practice and
subjected to neither any external philosophical view point nor its role in science. Maddy
went on demonstrate that certain undecidable question may find answer within the natu-
ralism methodology.
In general, the picture between Set Theory and Epistemology Problem is rather com-
plicated. Motivated by the fact that set theorists can not have their intuition from the real
higher world of infinity, we went on finding an account that can support truth in Set Theory
and simultaneously explain the way knowledge is obtained.

UNREALITY OF REAL NUMBER

We identify one of the possible reasons for the epistemology problem of set theory to
be the dogma that there is a collection of all subsets of Natural Number or in other words
there is a collection of all Real Number.
Our discussion starts from the epistemology concerns toward the concept of Uncount-
ability. An anti-epistemology fact about uncountable set is that there is no method to
track each member of a uncountable set. Beside that, we also have observation based on
a corollary of the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem in Model Theory[Marker 2002], that any
countable description of an uncountable structured is reflected within a countable model.
Other than that, in daily mathematical practice, we learn about uncountable structure by
a countablization procedure, for instance, we do not learn about all real functions but just
small class of function like continuous function or measurable functions. Furthermore, in set
theory, countability is not absolute in different transitive models. In general, the concept of
Uncountability is epistemology unwanted.
Tracing the relation of the concept of Uncountability to the concept of Power Set, we
argue that this relation is intrinsic. We then consider arguments that supports the Power
Set Axiom, which include Cantor Finiteness, Limitation of size, Iterative Conception of Sets,

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Indispensability toward Real Number[Maddy 1983]. We argue that all those four argument
faces epistemology problem, and seems to suggest an incoherence of accepting the Power
Set Axiom.
We ignore the Cantor Finiteness Argument which is inapplicable in modern Set Theory.
Considering the Limitation of Size and Iterative Conception of Sets, we remark that they
have the same philosophy principle: simple operation does not change the nature of sets. We
argue that this philosophical principle suffers from the problem of vagueness. Furthermore,
we propose that the Power Set is not simple. Accepting Axiom of Power Set, we have
certain disharmony in the system. In addition to that, without the Indispensable toward
Real Number, these two arguments do not work properly.
Finally, consider the Indispensability argument. We need not have full real number for
practice in mathematics, much smaller class are suitable for that purpose. We only have the
full real number, with the Dedekind continuity intuition that for everyway we divide the set
of real number into two half, either the left half has a rightmost point or a right half has a
left most point . We argue that, the Dedekind continuity intuition that we have is just a
delusion, our imagination can not bring us that far.

TIME AND MATHEMATICAL OBJECTIVITY

We start by a discussion on the objectiveness and knowledge. We introduce the Golden

Rule of Objectiveness: If in the judgement, we never take in consideration a factor, then the
change of that factor does not influence the judgement. Applying this Golden Rule, we find
a very strong account of truth in mathematics that seems to satisfy the both the Benacerraf
style concerns.
We go on defining the objectiveness in mathematics. An mathematical concept is ob-
jective if it is independent of space, time and human language. Using the Golden Rule,
I justify that for a concrete number, the concept of that number is objective. With the
further assumption that time is homogeneous, I argue that the set of natural number is also
objective.
Based on this we, also try to give a more motivated picture why we choose uncountable
as the barrier of the understanding. Reflecting on the Cantor Diagonalization argument, we
remark that the concept computable uncountable (not computable), or ∆n uncountable all
are actually countable under higher oracles. This suggest us that if we take a fix uncountable,
there might be a higher concept of counting underwhich the fixed uncountable is actually
countable; this phenomenon is not imaginary but is what really happens in forcing when
we collapse cardinal. Noticing that the same phenomenon happens for the set of natural
number, which make us have nonstandard natural number. The natural number is however
supported by our belief on homogeneousity of time, while there seems no similar support

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for uncountability. Other than that, we also argue that the concept of uncountability is
contradictory in itself.
Finally, we suggest an understanding of the concept of uncountability in the meaning
of pattern. This understanding of uncountability may help many developments in relation
between set theory and recursion theory. There is also a possibility that under this meaning
of uncountability, Continuum Hypothesis might have an epistemology objective truth value.

CONCLUSION

We have observe the complicated relation between Set Theory and the Epistemology
Problem. The main obstacle to this problem seems to be the dogmatic view that there is
a collection of all Real Number (Power Set of Natural Number). With the definition of
the account of truth based on Objectiveness and the removal of the dogma that there is a
collection of all Real Number, statements in set theory might have objective truth values
which are Epistemologically explanatory. What we have done, is only at the philosophy
level; however, many implication of the view might be falsifiable based on the current study
of set theory. That will be topic for the future projects.

References
Benacerraf, P. (1973). Mathematical truth. In Benacerraf, P. and Putnam, H., editors,
Philosophy of mathematics, selected reading (1983), pages 403–20. Cambridge University
Press.

Godel, K. (1964). What is cantor’s continuum problem? In Benacerraf, P. and Putnam,

H., editors, Philosophy of mathematics, selected reading(1983), pages 470–85. Cambridge
University Press.

Maddy, P. (1983). Proper class. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 48(1):113–139.

Maddy, P. (1997). Naturalism in mathematics. The Clarendon Press, Oxford University

Press, New York, first edition.

Marker, D. (2002). Model Theory: An Introduction. Springer-Velag, first edition.