i UNIT 16 NATIONALISM AND THE NATION-

, STATE
Structure
k

P6.0 Objectives
16.1 Introduction
16.2 The Meaning of Nationalism
16.3 Idea of Nationalism and Nation-State
16.4 Stages in the Development of Nationalism
16.4.1 Nationalism before 1789: Proto-nationalism
16.4.2 Modem Nationalism: the Nineteenth Century

16.5 How Nationalism and the Modern State Create the Nation-State
16.5.1 Absolutism and Modem State
16.5.2 Modem State and System of States
, .16.5.3 Nations and Nation-States
16.6 Relation between Democratic and Nationalist Mobilizations
16.6.1 Liberal Democracies and Nationalism
16.6.2 Factors Affecting National Mobilization and Democratization
16.6.3 Ethnic-Linguistic Basis of Nationalism in the Late Nineteenth Century
16.6.4 Nationalist Movements and Democracy
16.7 Nat~onalism,and Social Class: Germany and Britain
16.8 Italian Nationalism and Popular Mobilization
16.9 Phases of National Identity Development : Eastern Europe
16.9.1 Cultural Nationalism: Phase A and B ..
16.9.2 Spread of National Idea and Nationalism
16.10 Let Us sum Up
16.11 Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises

16.0 OBJECTIVES
After reading this Unit you shall be ahle to learn:
how the ideas of nationalism evolved in Europe;
the role of nationalism and modern state in creating the nation-state;
the role of language and democratic politics in mobilizing people and fostering the
growth of nationalism and nation-state; and
phases in development of national identities in some Eastern European countries.

16.1 INTRODUCTION
National~smis a modern phenomenon. Even though its idea can be traced back in time,
national~smin the modern sense emerged only during the eighteenth century in western Europe.
During the 19th and 20th centuries it spread throughout the world. Natioeism aligned with
the modern state in g~vingrise to nation-state. In certain cases, the modern state fostered a
sp~ritof ~iat~onalismto provide Ule people inhahiting its boundaries with a viable nationalist
ideology. Both together gave rise popular mobilizations which further strengthened the state
and helped the formation of nation-states.
The Nation-State System
THE MEANING OF NATIONALISM
In March 1882. during a lecture at the Sorbonne, the French orientalist and historian Ernest
Renan argued that the nation was a spiritual community which wished to uphold its sense of
unity through a day to day vote of confidence. In a tract entitled Marxism and the National
Question, Joseph Stalin argued that "A nation is a historically constituted, stable community
of people, formed on the basis of cotnmon language, territory, economic life and psychological
make-up manifested in a common culture". Though Renan offered an 'idealist' definition of
the nation as against the 'materialist' analysis of Stalin, it is interesting that both authors
believed that there was nothing eternal or everlasting about nations. Nations had a beginning
and they would also have an end.
Hans Kohn, regarded as one of the founders of the academic study of nationalism, argues that
"nationalities are products of the living forces of history, and therefore always fluctuating never
rigid." Nationalities are not identical with clans, tribes or folk-groups nor are they the simple
outcome of common descent or common habitat. Kohn argues: "Ethnographic groups like
these existed throughout history, from earliest times on, yet they do not form nationalities; they
are nothing but 'ethnographic material'. out of which under certain circumstances a nationality
might arise. Even if a nationality arises, it may disappear again, absorbed into a larger or new
nationality".
Kohn argued that "both the idea and the form of nationalism were developed before the age
of nationalism". The idea of nationalism was traceable to the ancient Hebrews and Greeks. The
idea of the chosen people, the consciousness of national history and national Messianism were
three traits of nationalism which emerged with the ancient Jews. But he ackonowledges that
,despite their "fierce nationalist ideology", the Greeks lacked "political nationalism" and there
was only a brief period of patriotism during the Persian Wars.
Although it is'possible to trace the idea of the nation to the earliest times and certainly to the
16th century - as in the case of the German word Volk for people - there is considerable
unanimity among historians that nationalism is a modern concept. Despite other disagreements,
scholars like Benedict Anderson. Ernest Gellner and Eric Hohsbawm agree that nationalism is
a phenomenon which emerged in the eighteenth century in western Europe and-then spread
during the 19th and 20th centuries to other parts of the world. It is the considered view of
historians that nationalism in the modern sense emerged with the growth of industrial
-
capitalism or print capitalism and was then sustained by a variety of factors by notions
of community based on language, ethnicity or religion or by the rivalry and competition
among states and imagined communities.
Within the Marxist tradition, the definition of the nation has evolved from the writings of Marx
and Engels, through Lenin and Stalin, to those of Hobsbawm. Broadly speaking, within this
tradition the nation is regarded as a historically evolved phenomenon which emerges only with
decline of feudalism and the rise of capitalism. Trihes, clans and peoples existed prior to t t ~ e
emergence of capitalism but it was because of new economic relations produced by the emergence
of the capitalist mode of production that nations were created. Nationalism was regarded as an
ideological construct which enabled the bourgeoisie to identify its interests as a class with the
interests of the whole society.
Hobsbawm also emphasises that nations and nationalist aspirations have to he examined in "the
context of a particular stage of technological and economic development." Though essentially
constructed from above, nationalism cannot be understood uriless it is also analysed from
below" in terms of the assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people
which, are not necessarily national and still less nationalist".

16.3 IDEA OF NATIONALISM AND NATION-STATE

The modern concept of the nation emerged during the Age of Revolution, the American
Revolytion of 1776 and the French Revolution of 1789. In America political discourse did not
emphasize the unitary aspect of nationalism - the Americans were concerned with the inalienable
rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, with the proper relation between the American
union and the states and with development of a liberal capitalist society. By contrast in France
the nation was conceived as "one and indivisible". The idea of the nation was inextricably
linked up with mass participation, citizenship and collective sovereignty of the people or of a
given nationality. Hobsbawm draws a distinction between the revolutionary democratic and the NatioMHsrn amd the NatiaaStDte
i~atioilalistconception of the nation. In the revolutionary democratic view of the nation the
sovereign citizen people within a state constituted a nation in relation to others whereas in the
natiol~alistview the "prior existence" of some distinguishing features of a community, setting
il apart from others, was necessary to constitute a nation. The French insistence on linguistic
uniformity after the Revolution was quite strong but the Revolution itself recorded how few
people actually spoke it. In the revolutionary French concept of the nation, the willingness to
speak French - by non-French speakers in France - was one of the conditions for full French
citizenship.
111the case of Italy the only basis for unification and nationalism was the Italian language. In
1860 when Italian unification was achieved only two and a half percent of the population used
the language for everyday purposes. The prophet of Italian nationalism, the leader of Young
Italy. Mazzini. believed that the popular sovereignty of the nation must be indivisible and that
various proposals for a federal Italy were mere mechanisms for ensuring the longevity of local
raling classes. Mazzini also believed that the Italian people had to be 'formed' so as to
overcome the division of Italy, although he had a mystical faith in the sanctity and unity of the
popular will. Mazzini argued that writers must "explore the needs of the peoples" so that Italian
literature could inspire and revive the nation. Literature could precede and help to shape
political development.

The growth of nationalism can be broadly divided into two phases. The first phase occurs
before the late 18th century when certain preliminary notions of national unity can be said to
have existed. Its chronology varies from one country to another, but these ideas of geographical
or cultural unity were only precursor to the modem nationalism. The latter takes shape only
in the wake of French Revolution, except perhaps in the cases of Britain and France where the
nation-huilding exercise had been going on since 16th century and 17th century respectively.

16.4.1 Nationalism Before 1789 :Proto-nationalism

In the historical literature, the emergence of the modern nation aid nationalism is in the late
18th Century. Nationalism acquires a more democratic character in the period of mass politics
in the late 19th Century. However, there is some emphasis on looking back into the medieval
past to understand issues in post-medieval Europe in some recent work.
Several 19th Century observers believed that elements of nationalism emerged in the medieval
period - a sense of ethnic or linguistic or national identity. This can be called a form of
patriotism or of protonationalism. The 19th century ~ r e n c hhistorian and politician Guizot
believed that the Hundred Years War between England and France (1337-1453) - provoked by
-the claim of the king of.England to fhe throne of France - brought together the nobility,
burghers and peasantry in a common desire to defeat the foreigner who h b attacked and
pldndered France. Though modern historians regard this as a period of crises marked by war,,
plague a11d famine, it did create a sense of patriotism. In a later period the growth of monarchy
took place which brought about the creation of a unified French state. Though some historians
have emphasized that France was a geographical reality which did not depend on the role of
the centralizing monarchy this geographical determinism is not very convincing. Geographically
speaking there was no Gallo-Roman predestination of France and there were no real natural
frontiers of France. The state of France was the accidental creation of history and there could
well have h e n a southern Mediterranean France, a Franco-English empire or even a Burgundian
France
The struggle of free peasants living in the rural communities and of the large towns against
feudaf tutelage from the 13th century onwards helped in the emergence of Swiss national
co~~sciousness. The four different nationalities which created amodern state in 1648 managed
to create a distinct Swiss national consciousness only by 1848 after the victory of the liberals
and the drafting of a new federal constitution.

16.4.2 Modern Tkationalism :The 19th Century

The 19th century is regarded as a century of nationalism - a period in which the idea of the
nation and nation state based oh Britain and France was generalized and perceived as the
The Nation-State System universal principle for modern societies. Friedrich List in The National System of Political
Economy (London 1885) stated that, "a large population and an extensive territory endowed
with manifold national resources, are essential requirements of the normal nationality .... A
nation restricted in the numher of its population and in territory, especially if it has a separate
language, can only possess a crippled literature, crippled institutions for promoting art and
science. A small state can never hring to complete perfection within its territory the various
branches of production". In practice, the principle of nationality applied only to nationalities
of a certainsize in the liberal period of nationalism hecause of this faith in the benefits of large
scale states. It is this tacit liberal assumption of a certain size of states which Hohsbawm calls
the "threshold principle" of nationality which the liheral hourgeoisie broadly endorsed from
about 1830 to 1880. It is this threshold principle of nationality which is shared by figures as
far apart as John Stuart Mill, Friedrich Engels and Mazzini. It is this principle which explains
why Mazzini, the apostle of nationalism, did not support the cause of Irish independence. The
principle of national self-determination in the period of Mill and Mazzini was therefore
substantially different from that in the period of the American President, Woodrow Wilson.
Mazzini's map of Europe drawn up in 1857 hased on nations included only a dozen states and
federations. By contrast the Europe refashioned after World War I1 on the basis of the right to
national self-determination had 26 nation states. In the post World War I1 period 42 regionalist
movements have heen identified in Western Europe alone.
The big change in the attitude towards nationality and nationalism came about in the late 19th
century with the growth of mass political movements in the era of democratic politics. After
1880 the debate ahout the national question becomes important with the need to mobilize
voters for different political parties and to gain adherents for new ideologies whether among
socialists or minor linguistic and national groupings. In the later stage of mass politics and
national movements, the state played an active role. Colonel Pilsudski, the liberator of Poland,
in fact observed, "It is the state which makes the nation and not the nation the state". Whatever
view one takes of the relation between nation and state, it was electoral democracy which
untiermined the liberal theory of the nation.

16.5 HOW NATIONALISM AND THE MODERN STATE

CREATE THE NATION STATE
Nationalism as an ideal began to grow in the 19th century based on the ideas of the French
revolution and the consequences of Napoleonic military victories and the political realignments
which these victories produced. The simplification of the political map of Europe by the
reduction in the number of states within the German Empire; the quickening of the pulse of
Spanish nationalism during the military campaigns of the Peninsular War; and the rise of
Italian and German nationalism based on the inspiration of the French armies, the Napoleonic
role in nation-state building and the contagion of revolutionary and democratic ideas helped to
spread the gospel of nationalism in Europe. It appealed to the intelligentsia and the bourgeoisie
which spearheaded the movement for Italian and German unification. Mass politics in the late
19th cenhlry was to give an additional fillip to liationalism specially in Eastern Europe. a
region which was relatively hackward compared to the more industrialized parts of Western
Europe.

16.5.1 Absolutism and Modem State

The absolutist states, particularly in Western Europe played an important role in the gradual
transition from feudalism to capitalism. The dynastic rulers of Europe in the 16th century md
17th centuries were responsible for the creation of centralized states with subst-antial standing
armies. The ahsolutist states claimed rights to taxation and d monopoly over the legitimate use
of force within the houndarles of the state. The emergence of strong centralized states was the
product of wars anlong the ahsolutist rulers; the growth of state taxation was linked to the costs
of waging such wars; and the prime objective of the mercantilist policies of absolutist rulers
was to enhance the economic power and therehy the rnilitary power of their states vis--vis other
states. The wars of the 16th and 17th centuries acct:lerated "all the Suiidamental state-making
processes". In the economic and military competition of this period, most of the 500 or so
political entities or states perished but the political unification of Italy and Germany was
possible only with the einergence of nationalist ideology in the 19th century.
Tilly observes. "the European state-nraking proccss ni~li~liii~c,l i l i ~crlltlr~.:!i vari;~tionwithin Natiunalism and the Nationatate
states and maximised the variation ;unong st;~lcs".Tlle uliliil;il/aiii!li of ~;~!e~-nal ~ultilrdiv;lriiltion
within states was accomplished by tlie centraliz,~tion01' h{;lt8.t power 21s well as the tlevelopn~cut
of a concept of sovereignty ivhich was ahsolurc ;~n(lindivi\ihlc. l'llc centralizing tmonarchs
~iic(1LO overcome obstacles in the way of cxcrcising so\,~,rcignrighis hy local and regional
assemblies or by the aristocracy, clergy 01 hourpeoisie. I!lt:n~atcly ir \\ils thc 'revolutions troln
hclow' in Holland, England and France which removed !hi: hxriers i n the way of the ~ n o d e r ~ ~
state. It was only the bourgeoise revolutions - in the Asc 01' Rcvcllltt~ons---which iin;~llyled
to the rise of the modern capitalist state.

16.5.2 Modern States and System of States

One can approach t h e study of the system of states u h i c h emerged frnnl the period of
the 16th and 17th century onwards in terms 01' the dcvclol,~ncnL of rhc economy - in
terms of capitalist development and its unevcn spread across E ~ l r o p cduring the 19th
century.
The development of iildustrialization in Britain during !he la[' 18th century Icd t o tlie
gradual expansion of industries in Europe over t t ~ ccoursc o l the 19th cerltur). 7 ' 1 1 prclcchs ~
W;IS uneven a ~ l dthe late industrializing cvul~trieshad certaio ~lixailve1l1qc.sit1 cc-~~:ipcting
with those who had established a lead in industrial l~rr~duction. Gcrscllcrlkroi! ,~rguedin his
book Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective that i l l coul~tricslike Germany
and Russia which hegan to industrialize later [hail Brit;tin -- the first industrial r~ation-
the role of the state was much greater. To compensntc for a l ; ~ ! sLarl ~ :he state played an
active role i n creating appropriate c o n d ~ r i o ~for
~ sr a p ~ di n d u s t r l ; ~ l l ~ a t ~5).o rcrcatirlg
~ '1 systcm
of tariff protection and aiding a process of cartellizatioil ol' induslr!~. There was a greater
degree of concentration of capital in Germany and ;I n ~ u c hstrollgel- nexus hetween hanks
and industrial firms than obtained in the case 01' Rrit;~in.Thc d ( ~ c l r 01'i ~l'rcc ~ ~ tratle liberal
capitalism as propounded by Britain was challenged hy the (2el.nia1i c c o ~ l o n ~ i sFriedrich l
List to enahle the German economy to develop behind 1,roteclionis~walls and to catch "11
with Britain. The businessmen and industrialists favoured polit~cal unil~c;itic~l~ hcc;iusc
their self-interest as a class was linked with the creation 01' a n a t i o ~ ~ anlarket l for German
entrepreneurs. In the perception of the Gernlai~hourgeoisie the c r c a ~ ~ o01' n a German
national state was a necessary precondition for Gerrna~ie c o i ~ n n ~ idevclopmcnt. c The
economic challenge presented by England had a no less e ~ i d u r i ~i~llpact ~g on German
nationalism than the political challenge thrown down hy Napuleunic France. regardless ot
distinctions between Germans based on ecunomiL: and political idi-ills , ;I German national
state was regarded generally a s an essential condition for econollllc progress. The German
nation state was created by a revolution from ahove, I'ollowinr the wars ol' 1864.1866 and
1870-71. hy Bismarck and the Prussian Army.

In Italy the Idea of nationalism was associated with thc literary Italiall of D a n ~ e ,and tllc
youthful idealism of Mazzini's Young ltaly before i t alas linkecl lo thc economic iclcology of
the hourgeoisie

During t h e 1840s a programme for economic ~ ~ n i f i c a t i owas

n propagated by j o ~ ~ ~ . r ~ a l i s t s
and intellectuals. This new ideology was linked to [he interesis 01'rhea I I ; I S ~ C I I LItalian
bourgeoisie as well as the growing success of the German customs u11ic:n !he Zullverein.
T h e Austrian opposition to t h e integration O f the Italian railway - to Ihe linking of the
Piedmontese and Lombard railway system fuelled the growth of e c o ~ ~ o n nationalism. ~ic
There was, however, no agenda of the Italian industrialists which championed railway.
huilding, customs union, common currency and the creation of a nationa! rn;lrket. The
Piedmontese were perceived as rivals by the Milanese i n d ~ ~ s t r i ; ~ l iand
s t s the latter in fact
favoured integration with the larger German market. Industrialists were too weak to
profit from the widening of markets and often had genuine reasons to fear the growth of
competition. Eve11 commercial interests were not always in favour 01. the economic
unification of Italy. In fact, landlords and farmers engaged in production for the market
favoured unification most consistently. Cavour, Minghetti in Bologna and Ricasvli in
Tuscany, all improving landlords and moderate liberals, played a leading role in Italian
national unification. In Italy the weakness of the bourgeoisie gave greater salience to the
r o l e of the landlords and urban professionals in the movement ~ o w a r k . e c o n o n i i c
unification.
The Nation-State System 16.5.3 Nations and Nation-States
Modern states, nations and nationalism are all territorial in the sense that they claim or are
based on specific geographical areas. In the 19th century, the idea spread that the state and
the nation should "coincide geographically in the nation state". The modern state is often
called the "territorial state" since it has a clearly demarcated territory in which it claims
sovereign rights over all its citizens. Nati onalism is a territorial ideology which is internally
unifying and externally divisive. As an ideology nationalism discourages conflicts based on
social class or status within a nation but enhances @e differences between different peoples
and nations
Authorities as different as Max Weber and Lenin have argued that nations and nationalism have
to be seen" primarily in political terms in relation to statehood". Nationalism is an ideology
which links culturally and historically defined territorial communities called nations, to political
statehood. Nationalism as an ideology may produce a demand for an independent state,
transformation of a pre-existing state, or merely an attempt to seek political legitimacy for state
policy in the higher interests of the nation, i.e. national interest.
Three ways in which nationalism has shaped the modern state have been identified. In the
older states like England and France the rise of nationalism was linked to the development
of more democratic relationships between the state and civil society. Secondly, nationalism
furthers the internal unification of culturally and economically diverse regions into a more
hbmogenous state territory. Finally, nationalism divides one political community or nation
from another and even determines the geographical boundaries of the nation in many
cases.
Nationalism can support both movements of unification and separation. In Italy and Germany,
nationalism and the state created a new nation state. In Scandinavia, nationalism produced the
separation of Norway from Sweden. In the case of Poland, there was both separation and
unification which created the Polish nation state. In the late 19th century the doctrine of
. national self-determination was the basis for creating new nation-states based on language, on
an invented national language, ethnicity or common culture and tradition. The +nationalism of
Greece, Czechoslovakia and Ireland emerged before the emergence of these nation states which
gained their freedom from the multi-national empires within which they had blossomed. These
new nation states were carved out of the Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary and Britain
respectively. As the idea of nationalism spread to Central and Eastern Europe - in regions with
! little industrialization and weak bourgeoisies the role of the lower middle class and the peasantry
in the shaping of nationalism increased. As a result of the growth of industrialization, of h e
rise of the working class and socialism, and of inter-imperialist rivalries, nationalism became
associated with conservative and right wing ideologies not just with the republican ideas of the
French Revolution.

Check Your Progress 1

1) Answer the following in 'yes' or 'no'
a) Nationalism existed since time immemorial.
b) The French Revolution had no role to play in spreading the idea of nationalism.
c) Britain and France were the first nation-states. ..
d) Language played an important role in the growth of nationalism.
2) When did the idea of nationalism develop? Answer Ih 100 words with examples.
3) Discuss in 100 words the role of nationalism and nlodern states in the development,of Nationalism abd the NationState
nation-states.

NATIONALIST MOBILIZATIONS
In this section we are going to discuss the relationship between various popular mobilizatioiis
and the rise of nationalism.

16.6.1 Liberal Democracies and Nationalism

The French Revolution with its ideals of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity and the-Rightsof Man
served as a source of inspiration for all subsequent democratic and popular movements. The
Jacobins inspired the radicals in the 19th cenlury throughout Europe. In fact, the ideal-type of
the bourgeois revolution was derived from the experience of the French Revolution. Although
recent historians have questioned the significance of the bourgeois revolution for economic
growth in France even the revisionists concede that it gave a tremendous impetus to democratic
movements and radical ideas. Although the democratization of France took place gradually,
and the French Revolutions of 1830 and 1848 and the Paris Commune of 1871 are part of the
gradual process of democratization of French politics and society, the significance of the
radicalism of the years 1792-95 cannot be denied.
The radicalization of French politics during the years 1792195 was spearheaded by the sans-
culottes who were adversely effected by war, poor harvests food shortages, price rise and
collapse of the currency. The sans-culottes were the politically active groups in the towns who
had been adversely effected by the war and economic crises. Shopkeepers, artisans, wage-
earners and the unemployed who have been designated sans-culottes not only favoured price-
control and rationing but also believed in the sovereignty of people and the principles of direct
democracy.
After the invasion of France in August 1792 and the execution of the King a new constitutional
convention was elected by universal adult male suffrage. Once the tide of war against France
had abated by 1794 the Jacobin societies and militia were brought under control as also the
local government assemblies. The phase of direct democracy dominated by ideas about egalitarian
distribution of property, revolutionary justice and a right to subsistence came to an end.
Owing to the failure of the liberal democratic state to kinction adequately during 1795-1799,
France was taken over by the military led by Napoleon. The divisions among the electorate and
the lack of consensus about the public good within the state, and the successful military
exploits of French republican armies helped them to achieve political ascendancy for the
French military. Napoleon subsequently became emperorof France and produced an Imperial
constitution in 1804. Although the Napoleonic dictatorship was a retreat from the ideals of the
Revolution it is equally me that his military exploits and conquests simplified the political
map of Europe and spread the ideas of nationalism and democracy among the conquefed
people. The Congress of Vienna not only wished to contain France but through the Metternich
systenl the conservative European Powers - represented by Prussia, Austria and Russia -
sought to restrict the spread of both democratic and nationalist ideas. The Concert of Europe
actively tried to suppress all liberal and nationalist movemeiitS in Europe which threatened the
duminant ~ositionof the autocratic rulers. There were revolutions in Spain, Greece and Italy
The Nation-State Systen~ in 1820. A far more serious outbreak of revolutions affected France, Germany Belgium and
Po1a1:il in 1830. Middle class radicals and peasants and workers produced a revolution which
won independe~lcefor Belgium. Despite the systematic efforts to suppress democracy in Europe
tllc spread of liberal ideas could not he held back indefinitely.
'Tl:'!::.
revolutions of 1848 which engulfed most of Europe led to an accelerated movement
I( is ards democracy and nationalism. It brought Napoleon 111 to power in France, hastened the
liiii lcation of Germany and Italy and stirred national sentiments in the multi-national Austriai
empire. The process of democratization in the first half of the 19th century was accelerated not
i 111.~by revolutions but by a gradual process of socio-economic change, that is the growth of
ii:~iastriesand the new social classes of the bourgeoisie and workers. There was also the growth
(1:' i i ! ~modern state and bureaucracy which led to the development of official languages and
!I;:. :8:owth of public eilucation. There was Lhe growth of the press which fostered both democratic
;~:!iinationalist ideas in Europe as the nuillher of publications and the size of the reading public
!.!r~:\+~ steadily. The policies of the state became matters of public concern as public instruction
L I ~ I public
;~ employment increased the size of the liberal nliddle class and as political movements
01' different strata began to confront the state. In Britain where there was no revolution during
thc 19th century inspired by the French Revolution there was the growth of the Chartist
nlovement and the widening of the franchise by the Reform Acts of 1832 and 1867. In Britain
no1 only did the Indusuial Revolution lead to the development of capitalism largely on the
hisis of private capi1:ilist accumulation but also gave civil society a decisive advantage in its
riLl:itionshipwith the British state. Neverheless, the British ruling class and the state represented
a ~ompronlisebetween the rising bourgeoisie and the older aristocracy. The capacity of Britain's
polilical elite to adapt Lo the changing nature of civil society or the balance of social classes
11:ls been observed by liberal and Marxist alike. Some have seen it as the creation of class
alliances essential to perpetuate the dominance of the successful commercial landowners, the
I tying industrialists and finally the finance capitalists based on the export of capital and invisibles.
Cain and Hopkins have developed the concept of a 'gentlemanly elite' to explain the successful
coalition of social classes which ruled Bricain from 1688 onwards right until the mid 20th with
l l ~ edominant elenlent changing with the economic transformation of Britain. While Cain and
Hopkins regar'd Brilain's economic performance as satisfactory given its size and resources
olhers who have argued that Britain failed in the late Victorian period and did not respond
satisfactorily to the second industrial revolution of the late 19th century argue that the absence
of a bourgeois revolution and of industrial capitalist influence on the British state led to the
retardation of the British economy. Perry Anderson developed this point in his analysis of the
late 20th century crisis of the British economy in terms of the antiquity of the British state and
its management of relationship between social classes. whatever this skillful British management
of social and class conflict might have meant for Britain's economic growth it enabled the
successful devdopment of British denlocracy based on a progressive extension of the franchise.
It also enabled a successful integration of the working class and the ordinary British citizen in
British society. Even the British labour movement accepted the ideals of the British nation, the
value of preserving the nlonarchy and the British empire.

16.6.2 Factors Affecting National Mobilization and Democratization

As the 19th century advanced, the idea of democracy, despite the reactionary role of the
Concert of Europe and the Holy Alliance. grew in popularity. This was associated with the
growth of liberal capitalism in Britain and France. It is customary to contrast the experience
of the first wave capitalisms of Britain and France with those of Germany and Italy which were
late industrializers or part of the second wave. Before going into this issue let us observe the
general consequences of economic development, modernization and democratization.
As the economy developed new social classes, of which the emergence of the working class
in particular posed new problems for the 19th century modernizing states and the liberal
bourgeoisie. After the 1832 Reform Act in Britain the stniggle of the liberal middle class parted
company with the struggles of the working classes. The inclusion of the propertied middle
classes within the fril~eworkof electoral democracy was typically achieved in several European
states by the mid 19th century. It was the emergence of the labour and socialist movement in
the late 19th century which affected the balance of social forces. The rise of the Social Democratic
Party in Germany during the late 19th century affected the position of the liberal bourgeoisie
vis-a-vis the conservatives in German politics and society. Mass participation - even the
participation of a broad based socialist party - did not successfully democratize German society,
though the extent of pre-World War I German conservatism has been exaggerated.
Nationality and Language md the Nation-State
Natio~n:ilisn~

The modernization of states was accompanied hy the developnient of a centralized

administration and a large bureaucracy based on rational-legal principles. p i s process was
i~ccompaniedby the development of a national language, of a language of administration and.
not merely local communication. The choice of a dialect or language as the medium of official
communication led to puhlic or state support for its propagation, specially through the school
system. The growth of a professional middle class and of modern st:lte hureaucracies were
hased on the growth o f moclern universities, law and journalism. The expansion of the secondary
school system and the state choice of the official or national language in schools became a
sonrce of great conflict among rival ethnic linguistic groups within multi-ethnic states like
Austria-Hungary and in Eastern Europe in general. In earlier periods language had heen less
divisive hecause literacy levels were very low. the elite inass relationship was not based on
regular interaction, and the state did not seek legitimation on the hasis of some form of
representative government. The controversies ahout language in the 19th century were ahout
"school and office?" and linguistic nationalism was linked to the growth of modern bureaucracy
and the aspirations of a rising class of the petty hourgeoisie seeking johs and cultural influence.
Laywage becane an issue in intcmational politics with the dispute hetween the Danes ilnd the
Germans over Schleswig-Holstein and of the Germans and French over the Rhine frontier during the
1840s. Even more significant was the increasing importance of language as a factor in the emergence
of nationality conflicts in the late 19th cenhuy. The modern state and its administrative innovations
L1.1emselvessharpened a sense of linguistic identity anlong the general popdation. The statisticians and
census data collectors from the 1860s onwards sought data on language. For the development of a
s e w oClin@~istic nationalism the distinctions dehated by the International Statistical Congress or h e
slatislicians of the Hahsburg empire were of little practical inlporkance. Language itself was undergoing
change and the choice of a language of puhlic use depended on several criteria e.g. the Iiu~guageof
stale ;uld school, the mother tongue, the 'family tongue' or language usually spoken at home. As
Hohsbawm observes, "In truth, by asking the language question censuses for the first time forced
everyone to choose not only a nationality?but a linguistic nationality".
Nationalism, State and Class
In older states like Britain and France a state- hased patriotism itself encouraged a sense of
nationalism during the course of the 19th century. The processes which turned subjects into
citizens helped to ellcourage a sense of nationalism 2nd patriotism in several states. Popular
perceptions of natural-cultural differences or distinctions. political and national characteristics
contributed to hoth nationalism and national chauvinism in the late 19th century in countries
regardless of whether they were liberal capitalist states like Britain or second wave lale
industrializing stales like Germany. The patriotism of the working classes in Europe did ]lot
deny the chasm hetween classes but affirmed its loyalty to the nation state. The most significant
ill~~strationof this is the manner in which the working class and socialist parties of the Second
I~iternalional which had repeatedly passed political resolntions condemning the idea of an
imperialist war and emphasizing the international character of the struggle of the socialist
parties very quickly identified with their nations and their national interest once the First
World War broke out. Despite being opposed to the ruling classes and imperialist cliques of
their respective societies the workers and socialist parties patriotically marched into the
Grcal War of 1914-18. Leiiin could not believe his eyes when he read that the German Social
Democrats - the largest socialist party in Europe which controlled ahout one-thicd of the vote
ill Gcrrnany - had voted for war credits no sooner than the war was declared. Later day
observers have aclaiowledged that the Socialists and Marxists had ~~nderestimat~d the powcr
of natiorialism a ~ i dthe piltriotism of the working classes, even of those groups who professed
socialisill and identified with the social democratic parties.
Nationalism, Empire and Imperial Rivalry
The gradual extension of the franchise and the efforts of liheral states like Britain, modernizing
stales like Germany, or survival strategies of autocracies like Tsarist Russia to gain legitimacy
and popular support, produced a form of patriotism. National pride and national identification
was also encouraged hy overseas expansion, hy the material and psychological rewards which
inlperial possessions brought to countries like Britain, France, and even Holland and Spain. In
Britain a sensc of national identification was encouraged not only hecause of the "peculiarities"
of the English and the glorious tradition of free horn Englishmen, hut also hecause of pride in
a world wide empire. Britain's pride in its industrial achievements were celebrated during the
Induslr~alExhibilion of 185 1 anii its sense of inlperial grealncss hy colourful pagc-ants like :hc.
The Nation-State System Coronation of Queen Victoria and the Irnperlal Durhar in India in 1877. Although there was
a sense of Scottish nationalisin which developed in the 18th and 19th centuries after the Union
of 1707, economic developn~entdeepened the diversity of regions and social classes within
Scotland. Scottish workers, Highland crofters, and hard pressed tenants were at loggerheads
with Scottish landlords, and Scottish nationalism was a weak and ineffective force. The Scots
played such a great role in both the acquisition and management of the Empire that "their self-
esteem and sense of identity may have been fortified rather than weakened by the imperial
adventure, even though the bulk of its profits ended in London." However, as Victor Kiernan
argues, the Welsh. unlike the Scots, "showed no love of army or empire".
The policies of the state designed to achieve greater legitimacy and support for state policies,
the spontaneous and state-sponsored support for imperial exploits and colonial profits
encouraged a sense of national pride. Some of this form of patriotism was reflected in jingoistic
responses in Britain to the Boer war fought against the settlers in South Africa at the end of
the 19th century, in 1898-1902, In the late 19th century, as imperialist rivalries among the
European powers increased, it was possible to deflect attention from domestic economic
difficulties or class conflicts. Though the partition of Africa was accomplished without any
war between the European powers, the struggle for overseas markets, raw materials, and
opportunities for investment, together with territorial expansion, encouraged identification
with the nation state among a broad section of the population. A military adventure or successful
commercial achievements overseas always helped to rally support for 19th century states
whether among countries with a large overseas empire like Britain or with very limited
overseas influence like Germany. Part of the nationalism of the 19th century was linked to the
economic and military rivalry of Britain and Germany, th; naval building competition between
these two Powers and the general desire of the more right wing governments in Germany and
Italy to catch up with the British and French who had industrialized early and thus acquired
vast colonial possessions. The aggressive nationalism of the conservative regimes in the late
industrializing countries like-Germany helped to rally support for the regime and to encourage
nationalist sentiment throughout Europe. The speech by the German Emperor, William 11, at
Tangiers in Morocco in 1905, induced widespread fear in France, encouraged particularly by
the large number of French newspapers. French anxiety about Germany's hostility towards
France and the memories of the defeat of France at Sedan in the Franco-German War in 1870
helped to create a sense of national unity which was able to transcend domestic conflicts in
times of acute crisis. Although France was divided into two antagonistic blocs and although
ideological and political differences did not vanish with the outbreak of World War I, the
French nation was united in the war against Germany. The Natioilalists got an opportunity to
regain French greatness: the Catholics to prove their patriotic credentials, the socialists to
defend the principles of the French Revolution. The period from 1890 to 1914 is often called
the period of armed ipeace" based on the creation of rival military and diplomatic alliances,
between contenders for industrial and military supremacy and for colonial possessions and
profits. The memorialization of malor events in national calendars by school texts and nationalist
newspapers, the reactions of press and public to diplomatic military rivalry encouraged both
the spontaneous and slate sponsored s ~ ~ p p ofor
r t the nation-state in 19th century Europe.

16.6.3 Ethnic-Linguistic Basis of Nationalism in the Late 19th Century

By the late 19th century the processes of modernization and homogenization had produced a
sense of natioilalism in the older states and those large states which had achieved unification
by then. The idea of unitary ilationalism often produced a counter-nationalism among groups
- ethnic or linguistic - which felt either oppressed or excluded by a process of natioyalist
homogenization. Natio~lalisin in the period 1880-1914 was no longer constrained by the
'threshold principle' which had limited the demands for nation states earlier. Any body of
people claiming to he a natlon could claim the right to national self-determination. In these
"non-state" ~iationalismsthe ethnic linguistic criterion for defining nationalism became a
decisive, probahly sole, consideration. In Hobsbawm's view the late emergence of the ethnic-
linguistic criterion in defining nations is insufficiently acknowledged in the literature on
nationalism. Although linguistic and cultural revival movements grew in Europe between the
1780s and 1840s it was only a hody of agitators who created a national idea in the second
phase of the national movement. Only in the third stage, according to Hroch did mass support
for nationalism emerge in late 19th century European nationalist movements.
The reasons for the iilcreasii~greadiuess of real and imagined communities to makc claims of
nationhood arid natiouil self-determinat~onwas hecausc of the pace of change. econclmk
distress and large scale migrations of peoples in this period. Traditional groups felt threatened . Nationalism and the Nation-State
by the pace of modernization. Educated middle strata with modest incomes - journalists, school
teachers and petty officials were the torchbearers of linguistic nationalism. Migration produced
friction and conflicts between groups unused to coexistence with different groups. It was the
nationalist, petty bourgeoisie which played a major role in the emergence of the new ethnic
linguistic nationalism as well as the chauvinist and right wing movements within the older
nation states. Contrary to conventional views Hobsbawm argues that in practice it was hard to
separate the support which the masses gave to socialism, nationalism or religion since they had
"several attachments and loyalties simultaneously, including nationality". Mass movements
could simultaneously express aspirations conventionally regarded as incompatible. The
movements which were making class appeals were later in post World War I Europe the basis
for mass based national movements. Hobsbawm, however, overestimates the significance of
the perspective of 1917 - of social transformation based on revolutionary or primarily class
based movements - for the assessment of nationalism in post War Europe. The oppressed
nationalities of Eastern Europe did become independent states based on Wilson's support for
the principle of national self-determination hut it is hardly possihle to assert that significant
numbers had dreamed of both social revolution and national independence. The collapse of the
helligerent states first led to isolated and short-lived revolutionary upsurges and then to fascist
and right wing movements. Nevertheless the relation between revolutionary movements and
the desire for social transformation requires a more elahorate analysis.

16.6.4 Nationalist Movements and Democracy

The nation and nationalism as an idea has been identified with the people, popular sovereignty.
and democratic rights. Rousseau's concept of General Will, of the Rights of Man, of the right
to elect governments on the basis of universal adult male franchise constituted some of the
democratic ideas which animated politics in the 19th century. Although the French Revolution
was an important influence on national movements in the 19th century, towards the late 19th
century there was an illiberal or right wing shift in the nature of nationalist politics. This
rightward shift within nationalist politics took place even while the level of mass participation
based on regular elections increased. In fact the reason for this growth in right-wing orientation
of nationalism was the fear of popular participation in politics, specially hy the working class
and the left -wing or socialist parties. The liberal intelligentsia and middle class which had
championed a republican or liberal nationalism in the first half of the 19th century made a
compromise with the conservative landowners and dynastic states after the defeat of the
revolutions of 1848. It was the liberals who compromised first to achieve national unification
and subsequently to cope with the political challenge of the working classes and the socialist
parties. Ideologies of race and empire buttressed the conservative version of nationalism.
Although less strident in their support for social imperialism and social Darwinism the working
class and even socialist supporters were not immune to such influences.
The relation between democratic and popular movements and nationalism and national
movements has always been complex. In the late 18th century Britain, Linda Colley has shown
that while the common people were in favour of a national mobilization of resoirrces and
manpower in the struggle against revolutionary and Napoleonic France, the ruling class and the
British state were reluctant to unleash popular energies which,might endanger their local
dominance. On the other hand, the resistance to the French Revolution in the Vendee - as well
as in Brittany - was a rejection of orders from Paris and of military conscription. It was not
only fomented by the local aristocracy and priesthood hut had deep-rooted support within the
Frcnch countryside. The ideals of the French revolution did not commaild universal respect and
the armies of revolutionary France, specially Napoleonic armies, were plagued by desertions.
Although Mazzini had espoused democratic ideals and proposed a people's war of national
liheration, the Italian liberals were unable to enthuse the masses and were confined to thc:
towns. Though Mazzini derived his notion of peoples war from the Spanish war of 1808-13
he .tailed to learn from this war the major role played by the clergy in winning over the
peaants to the cause of Spanish nationalism. Carlo Pisacane, a Neapolitan who had played a
m:ijor role in the defense of the Roman Rep~lblicand who believed that the Italian leadership
had lagged behind popular initiative and that Garibaldi had failed to produce a true revolutionary
army, was himself slaughtered by local peasants at Sapri in 1857 together with his own small
revolutionary force. In Italy the relation hetween the national movenlent for political unificaticn
and popular participation was so weak that Massimo (I'Azeglio chserved : "We have made
Iti~ly,now we have to make Italians".
The Nation-State System
16.7 NATIONALISWI AND SOCIAL CLASS : GERMANY
AND BRITAIN
It was the revolutions o i 1848 that rr.vt.:~led tlic weakness of the liberal bourgeoisies in Europe.
It compelled the liberals in Germany !o accept a compromise with the Prussian state and led
to the ascendancy of Piedmont-Sard~nlain Italy. In Europe the revolutions of 1848 revealed
the elncrgenci? o f nationalist sentiment wit.hin the Habsburg Empire and Eastern Europe, the
emergence of working class and soci:llist ideology thr0~ghi)utEurope, and the differences
within the lihctal de~nocraticmovcn~ci~t which separated the middle classes from the workers,
peasants. and urban poor. During the i 838 revolutions in Europe the struggles, of the poor and
of the middle classes 11atl distinc~fc;~!.:iresand objectives which were apparent. The middle
ciasses were wiiling to side w ~ t ht.ollsi!l;lativc Prussia or the En~perorof the French, Napoleon
111, ralhcr tha~iaccept a pealer I>;ILL' !i! change.
In Germany, liberal nationalisw whicli had a11 anti-feudal orientation acquired anti-clerical and
anti-socialist overtones during thc Kut~tirkanlpf.While anti-clericalism was partly progressive
in its support for enlightenment ra~ion:llicm.it also was regressive in so far as it criticized the
"black horde of Romans wirhoul a ~,~i!~:~rla~ld". D\!ring the years 1870-1878 the anti-clerical
clement in bourgeois nationalism prepar::d the hasis i'or the conflict with the Social Democratic
party and movement after 1-878. TICncw right-wil;g nationalism which emerged i11 the late
1870,s was hostile to left-wing liherals 1.; well as Social Dernocrats. In this new phase of right-
wing nationalism Pri.rssi;ln largc laiidr~~ii~~::;
and snlall n~anufacturersweighed down by economic
con~pctitionactively hegan to cclll;thor;i~~~ with induslrialists favouring protectionist economic
policies. In the ccononiii cris~so f t h ~ i.2;'Os
: lnarkerl by slower growth and international price
deflation, social tensions multiplied 2 n d -.-indicatedh4arxist theories about capitalism and class
struggle. Thc middle classes both old sol! tlcs~v7the latter consisting of white collar zmployers
and officials, became anxior.ls to prescr..c their econl)n~icand socia1 standing as well as to
distance thernselves I'rnnl Marxist intcr~l.~~ionalism. Winkler states, "Iu the late 1870s to be a
nationalist no longer nearit being anti-feu!!..,!but instearl anti-internationalist, and very frequently,
anti-senlil.icW.
In Germany iiheralisni was not very strci:lgI and though there was indeed a silent bourgeois
revolution in Germany in the 19th centurj-. the traditinns of political democracy were weaker
than in Britain and Fraucc. The weaknch.; of liberal den~ocraliclnovcments in 19th century
Germany certainly led ti) h e growth of righi wing nationalism and the containment of Socialist
Democracy. It is significant that the only way ?he litlcral ,sociologist Max Weber thought it
~,ossibleto reduce the power of the Junkers mil the a1ithrlrit;uian s!ate was to adopt a prestigious
German world policy.
Successfill ovcmens expansion was supported by the right wing to secure economic benefits
\vHich would not only henefit business~nen.;lnd middle class colonial officials, but also the
industrial working class, at least in the exlxv-t industries. Whether or not a labour aristocracy
arose in countries with substantial ojrerseas tl.ade arid investments or not, it is true that economic
prosperity and cheap co!onial and overseas produce improved the lot of the industrial workers
and the common people in metropolitan coi~ntricslike Britain, Francc and Germany. Though
recent expats like Davis and Huttenback have m'gucd that ktle return on overseas and specifically
colonial investments was not very high in the case of British f o r e i ~ ninvestments, cheap food
and raw materials from overseas did have s o n ~ ehzneficial consequences. The popular support
for overseas expansion and investments was only at~ot~f
chauvinism and ideology, but also
allout cconornic rewar:ls. Although recent writers like Patrick O'Brien have returned to old
Cohdenite free trade arguinents ahout the ecoliornic irrelevance of empire to Britain there is
st111 1n11ch nierit in thi: sociill class analysis o f the motivat~onsfor imperial expansioll and an
assessment of' the econc~;~iz benefits o i empire. In any case the improvement in the living
standards of workers and urban consumers in the industrial nations like Britain and Germany
did help in eel-opting the labour movements in these corrntries. The reformist trade unionism
in Britain and the combinat~onof repression and co-optation in Bismarckian Germany diluted
the challenge of' lahour and left wing opposition to ideologies of race, empire and right wjng
nationalism. 111Brita~nthe tianchise was extended in 1867 and 1884 to incorporate most adult
maies into a refr~rn~ist parlia~nentarydemocracy. Repressive laws in Germany against trade
unions and socialist political parties between 1878-1890 were combined with progressive
weifare legislation, the I-Iohenzollcrn emperor's 'social inessage' of 1881 and a system of
social insurance for (he workers. Though thc SPD grew tunder a repressive and right wing
regime its weaknesses cannot be attributed to such restrictive conditions alone. Critics of the Nationalism and the NatioaState
SPD have argiied that though the party vote grew from 5,50,000 in 1884 to 2 million in 1898
to nearly 4 million by 1913 it was a party which had been weakened by its social limitations
and ideological beliefs. The party had become a prisoner of parliamentary democracy, its
leaders and sections of the workers had acquired nliddle and lower iniddle class incomes and
values and the party's beliefs were debilitated by revisionism and economism. Therefore, the
enthusiastic participation of the SPD and its supporters in the Kaiser's war in 1914 is not a
matter of such great surprise. Furthermore by an analysis of the failings of the SPD we get an
idea of one of the ideological and political factors which allowed German right-wing nationalism
to retain its political ascendancy despite powerful countervailing forces which emerged in
German politics and society. The German right-wing was able to forge an alliance of landowners,
industrialists and middle class to hold in check the growth of the liberal iniddle class, workers
and socialism but this cannot be regarded as an inevitable outcome of Germany's authoritarian
lnodernization and political unification.

16.8 ITALIAN NATIONALISM AND POPULAR

MOBILIZATION
In Italy the participation of the masses and the peasantry was limited because of the conservatism
of the rulers of states, the reluctance of the landlords to grant concessions to the peasants to
draw them into the national movement, the inability of the intelligentsia and the revolutionaries
to bridge the gap between the town and country and the fear of radical change which affected
the elite which dominated Italy in the 19th century.
It has been argued by Coppa that the 1848 war was an "ideological war" on the Italian side.
In the War against Austria, Garibaldi's volunteers and Milanese revolutionaries fought with the
troops from Piedmont, the Papal States, Tuscany and Naples.
Yet the participation of the rulers was born out of fear of revolution or the force of public
opinion. In the failure of the Republic in Venice and Rome is to be found further evidence of
the failure of the Mazzinian ideals of people's war. In the period 1859-61 the motives of
Cavour were "patriotic rather than nationalist" since his objective was to secure a dominant
position for Piedmont more than an ideological commitment to Italian unification. The successful
'scuthern initiative' of Garibaldi produced a revolution in Sicily and after his victory in Naples
he seemed to have willing1 accepted an auxiliary role in the process of Italian unification
7 .
which Cavour had assigned to b m . Garibaldi had accepted the need to work with the monarchy
long before he launched his movement. It was thus possible to unify Italy both by force and
popular consent as manifested in plebiscites. The centralized form of government of the new
Italian state alienated opinion in both Naples and Sicily. A,war with brigands in the Neapolitan
provinces between 1861 and 1865 represented the sense of alienation felt in the Italian south
from the new centralized Italian nation state. The fact that only a tiny minority of 2.5% spoke
Italian at the time of unification, that over 100,000 troops had to be deployed to establish
control over the turbulent south soon after unification, the fact that Cavour had to instrucl his
agents in Central Italy to conduct plebiscites to demonstrate that the people endorsed the
decisions of their assemblies to enter into a union with Piedmont, the fact that Napoleon I11
of France and Cavour of Piedmont conspired to ensure that the plebiscite in the Romagna and
the Duchies went in favour of Piedmont, and in Nice and Savoy in favour of the French,
revealed the insufficiency of mass participation in the process of Italian unification.
In Italy the divisions between the more industrialized north, the less developed central region
and the neglected and backward south actually intensified after the Italian unification. The
Italian south remained an alienated, almost colonized, region. The Italian unificition, due more
to military success and international diplomacy rather than people's war or mass struggles, was
based on the lowest possible mobilization of the masses required for achieving independence
and unification. Even after the creation of the Kingdom of Italy the politics of the nation was
dominated by political parties with narrow social bases and limited contact with the Italian
masses. The extension of the franchise, the spread of public education, the growth of industries
and towns in Italy was slower than in France and Germany. For these reasons the politics of
Italy was regarded as a form of 'trasfonnismo' in which despite frequent political realigwnts
and changes there was little substantial change. In Gramsci's words, the process of Italian
~ n ~ c a t i owas
n a form of passive revolution in which the Italian elite had mobilized the Italian
niasses only to the extent necessary to achieve the political objective of national unification and 17
The Nation-State System
 11ldepende.ncefrom Austria. The democratic mobilization of the masses was slow and the Nationalisnl and the Nation-!''-"
absence of organic intellectuals in Italy impeded the development of more radical movements.
Wit,h the growth of industries, workers organisations, and socialism, the conservative politicians
of Italy and the landowners and lower middle class in particular, felt endangered. In fact the
economic development of ltaly and the growth of civil society and democratic values was so
slow and inadequate that the crisis after World War 1 created the conditions for the growth of
fascism and Mussolini's victory. The post-war crisis led to a Pastist victory despite the fact that
ltaly had played a less significant role in the war and had joined late. Italian democracy
'
developed slowly even after unification and Italian nationalism did not succeed in winning
over the Italians in the south.

16.9 PHASES OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

DEVELOPMENT: EASTERN EUROPE
- - - ~ ~- ~ ~ ~~ - - - - - --- - - - -~ - - - - -

The study of nationalism in the &all states of Eastern Europe hy Miroslav Hroch yielded the
notlon of three phases in the development of national movements. In the first stage or phase
A there was primarily an emphasis onculture: literature and folklore; in phase B pioneers of
the national idea and its publicists occupied centre-stage. It was only in the third stage. - phase
C - that the national movements acquired mass support on any significant scale. There may
be problems with this schema but it is a suitable point of departure for the study of nationalism
in Eastern Eur.ope. It may be more useful to club phase A & B together for our purposes.

16.9.1 Cultural Nationalism : Phase A and B

The development of a European romantic perception of the natural and untainted peasantry and
a serious study of folklore by the late 18th cenlury provided a basis for many a national
movement in Eastern Europe by the late 19th century. The cultural and linguistic revival
movements in Europe between the 1780s and 1840s were the handiwork of scholars and ruling
elites anxious to preserve and develop national tradition'of some forgotten people or peasants
! and were sometimes the product of foreign scholars and elites. However, the language based
i
cultural revivalism of this early phase has also been regarded as a conscious act of constructiilg
a 'national' language rather than rescuing an ancient tongue and culture. Cultural nationalists
chose one among several dialects to produce a national language, standardization of grainmar
and additions to vocabulary being matters of lesser importance. Literary Bulgarian was based
on the West Bulgarian idiom; literary Ukrainian on its south eastern dialects; Lithuanian was
based on one of two dialects and Latvian on one of three. While many of the East European
languages developed or constructed their literary language somewhere hetween the late 18th
and 19th centuries! literary Hungarian emerged in the 16th century.
Although the Croats spoke three dialects, the Croat proponent of Illyrianism, Ljudevic Gal
(1809-72) switched to Stokavian in 1838 since this was also the major dialect of the Serbs.
This was a conscious effort to unite the southern Slavs. Although Serbo-Croat developed as
ol:e literary language, the Catholic Croats used Roman characters while the Orthodox Serbs
used Cyrillic ones. In the case of Slovak, the choice of one dialect chosen about 1790 had l o
be abandoned in favour of another a few decades later as the basis for literary Slovak. In
eastern Europe - specially south eastern Europe - the ethnic and linguistic diversity was greater
than in the rest of Europe, specially western Europe, and awareness of distinct linguistic
cultural identity emerged late. The Magyars, however, prohably had a distinct sense of themselves
as an ethnic group with a language of their own even in the 13th century. In fact not only the
Magyars, but the Czechs and the Poles too had developed a distinct identity based on ethnicity
or language but their concept of the nation did not include the peasants and the common
people.
i Czech Nationalism
The emergence of a common Czech national feeling is attributable to the fear of competition
for senior posts from immigrant German clerics felt by the native clergy. The influx of German
colonists into Bohemia in the 12th century where they were. successfully engaged in mining
and handicraft production, led to the emphasis on language hy the Czechs in order to draw a
distinction between themselves and the Germail foreigner The existence of a reasonably strong
state and the attachment to their language gave the Czechs a sense of common identity even
in the Middle Ages. During the Hussite era language, origin and faith bound the Czech nation.
The ati ion-state System The Czechs did not have their own independent state during the 18th and 19th centuries. As
a consequence, the i~ohilityspoke German, Spanish or French, the townsmen German, leaving
only the peasantry and the urban poor to speak the Czech language. The development of
capitalism and the migration of Czech workers into towns created the basis for modern Czech
nationalism. The revival of Czech language and literature was taken up by the intelligentsia in
the late 18th century, by the sons of clerks, handicraftsmen and servants who had received
university education. In the 1780s Czech language and theatre was patronized even by craftsmen
and workers. The objective of the rising Czech intelligentsia was to "acquire equal rights for
the modern Czech nation with that of the German nation in the Czech Lands". Over the first
half of the 19th century, the Czech intelligentsia, drawn mainly from small town craftsmen's
families, promoted Czech as the language of instruction in schools. By using newspapers,
theatres and public discussions, the Czech cause was promoted and linked with Slav solidarity.
The Czechs who constituted about 70% of the population in Bohemia and Moravia in the mid
19th century had almost no political rights while the Germans had full political rights. Discussions
in public houses and the Czech debates over the internal conditions in Russia and Germany led
the intelligentsia to opi for equality with the Germans in the Czech lands within the Austrian
framework. In Austria it would be possible to live with other Slavs - Poles, Serbs, Slovaks,
Croats - affording both safety in numbers and a better chance for the Czechs to achieve their
rights than under the more authoritarian Tsarist autocracy or more homogenizing German
Empire. Tlie Germanization of the Elbe Slavs was a factor influencing Czech thinking on their
attitude towards political union with Germany. These factors shaped the political concept of
Austroslavism whch emerged in the 1840s. The doctrine wanted to transform the Austrian
absolutist state into "a federal state of nations enjoying equal rights".
Hungarian Nationalism
In the case of Hungary national awakening among Hungarians took place at about the same
time as among other ethnic groups in the late 18th century. Niederhauser distinguishes between
two phases in the national movements, the cultural and the political. During the cultural
nationalist phase the national language is created from among numerous dialects and a
historical consciousness emerged. In the political phase demands for local autonomy and the
use of the national language in administration eventually creates a nation state. In Hungary,
&verse ethnic groups existed - conquering Hungarian tribes settled amongst Slavonic tribes,
German settlers, and Turkish ethnic groups; Vlachs in Transylvania added to Hungary's ethnic
mix. Ottoman occupation from 1541 until the end of the 17th century of the central part of
, Hungary affected the ethnic balance just as the subsequent Habsburg policy of introducing
German settlers in Southern Hungary. Only the Magyars and the Croats had produced a
significant feudal elite in Hungary together with a legal political life in the Diets, though
Transylvania had its own Diet.

16.9.2 Spread of National Idea and Nationalism

Hobsbawm cites evidence to show that autonomous popular movements of national defense
against foreign invaders had ideologies which were "social and religious" rather than national.
In 15th and 16th century Europe peasants who felt betrayed by their nobles decided to take up
cudgels on behalf of their faith against invading Turks. A popular national patriotism could
arise in Hussite Bohemia or on the military frontiers of Christian states among armed peasant
groups, given sufficient freedom to enable them to combat invaders. The Cossacks are an
example. Protonational feeling existed among the Serbs because they had kept alive the memory
of the old Serb kingdom which was destroyed by the Turks. Some form of patriotism was kept
alive by the Serbian Church which had canonized the Serb kings. Although the Cossacks were
not drawn from any one ethnic group, they were united by beliefs. In 17th century Russia,
pressures from both Catholic Poland and Muslim Turks made religion and holy icons an
important element in popular national consciousness. It was only after the growth of a sense
of cultural nationalism based on a sense of language, culture and history that nationalism as
an idea influenced the smaller nationalities of Eastern Europe.
Czechoslovakia
The Czech politicians of the late 19th century produced no grand political schemes and had
to settle for small concessions. Economic and cultural advances in the Czech Lands meant that
the bourgeoisie had insufficient reason to support Czech nationalism. It was World War I which
.triggered nationalism in the Czech Lands as elsewhere in Europe. Wartime difficulties produced
unrest in the towns, desertions on the battlefield from 1915 onwards and Czech writers in 1917
published a manifesto supporting a future democratic Europe of free nations. Tomas Masaryk Nationalism and the NstionState
had pleaded for the independence of small nations in Europe i11 October 1915 and the rapid
political changes during World War I led to the realization of such dreams. In 1915 the demand
for an independent Czechoslovak state was made. Czech and Slovak military units joined the
enemies of Austria-Hungary during World War I and thus established their claims to recognition
by the victorious Entente powers. After a thousand years the Czech Lands were reunited with
Slovakia - the result of Czech nationalism, the effects of World War I on large dynastic states,
and President Wilson's support for national self-determination.
Hungary
In Hungary the creation of the Dual Monarchy appeased the Hungarians but aroused
national sentiment among the other nationalities. According to the official census between
1850 and 1910. conducted by the Hapsburgs, the Hungarians constituted an absolute majority
only from 1900 onwards. Even including Croatia in 1910, the Hungarians constituted only
51.5% of the whole population. Under the Nationality Act of 1868, the state gave non-
Magyars the right to schools in their mother tongue and the right to form banks and
economic associations but the idea of the nation-state demanded that the Hungarian nation
and its claims be placed uppermost. In 1883 the government which made Hungarian
compulsory by law in secondary schools. It was not to be compulsory in elementary
schools until 1907. Hungarian statesmen tried to assimilate the non-Magyar population by
means of the state language Hungarian. According to Peter Hanak, between 1890-1914, as
a result of modernization and industrialization, more than a million people were successfuily
assimilated by the Magyars. Budapest, which in the mid-19th century had a German speaking
and non-Magyar population, became a Hungarian speaking city by the early 20th century.
In fact Magyarisation became an essential precondition for economic success and social
mobility. Emigration to the United States was in fact encouraged by the government to
reduce the non-Magyar population. Approximately three million people migrated to the
USA, mainly Slovaks and Serbs.
The government could not however influence the economic performance of the various
nationalities. It could not thwart the rise of Romanian-owned savings banks. The Churches
supported secondary schools where students were taught in their mother tongues, Since the
Church prelates had representation in the Upper House, they could represent their
natioilalities there. All the Churches were considered 'national' Churches with the exception
of those of the Slovaks and Germans since these nationalities were divided on the basis
of faith between Catholicism and Lutheranism. The Orthodox Church took up the cause of
the Serbs and the majority of Romanians, and the Uniate Church for the Ruthenes and the
minority of Romanians. The high electoral census was intended not merely to keep out the
non-Magyars from the political system but also Magyar parties hostile to the regime. By
the early 20th century a new and more active political elite emerged among the Romanians
and Slovaks.
The break-up of the Hapsburg empire of Austria-Hungary led to the creation of new nation
states of Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia. Owing to the problems involved in
demarcating precise national frontiers - which plagued the post-war settlement - over three
million Magyars became a minority in the newly independent neighbouring states of a truncated
Hungary. It was a "great reversal of roles" which made the dominant Magyars a minority in
new states, since the Treaty of Trianon in 1920 forced one in three Magyars to live outside the
country. Hungarian ruling elites lost big estates, banks and factories, and therefore they used
discontent produced by the reduction of Hungary to one-third of its former size to mobilize
opposition to the unjust Treaty of Trianon. The conservative elites, utilizing this Treaty to
deflect popular discontent into nationalist channels, eventually carried Hungary into the camp
of fascist Germany and Italy during World War 11.
Poland
In Poland the nobility by the 18th century developed a sense of Polish identity based on the
acceptance of the Polish language and culture. The Polish nobility, constituting 8% of the
country's population, was large by European standards.. The peasants and even burghers were
not included i11 the political nation at the end of the 18th century.
As for the peasantry, they spoke Polish diaiects in the western provinces, Ruthenian dialects
in the east, and Lithuanian in the north-east. Language was not yet in the 18th century a basis
fiir national consciousness. The religious differences of the Polish population played a significant
:.... ati ion-state System role in this period. Peasailts did not have a developed national consciousness but they had
participated in the battle for Polish independence in the late 18th century. It was during the
19th century that abolition of serfdon1 and enfranchisement - the ending of villeinage - took
place at different points in time under the auspices of the three Great Powers - Prussia, Austria
and Russia, which had partitioned Poland among themselves in the 18th century. National
consciousness was speeded up by granting civil and democratic rights to burghers and later
Jews; by movements and parties demanding agricultural reform; and by the gradual elimination
of legal inequalities between classes.
The second half of the 19th century saw the emergence of a Belorussian and Ukrainian national
consciousness based on a lallguage and literature which resisted domination by Polish language
and literature. Polish writers from Belorussian lands also wrote in Belorussian and helped to
create a national literary tradition.
These differences of language were linked to social differences. Polish was linked to the nobility
and intelligentsia while Belorussian and Ukrainian consciousness emerged from within a plebeian
tradition opposecl to the Polish state. In so far as Polish was the language of the upper classes
or those seeki~~g upward mobility it was considered a natural step for the peasant to accept Polish
as the higher cultural language. Therefore Belorussian, Ukrainian and Lithuanian, regarded as
peasant languages, were considered inferior. While polish national consciousness had developed
as a response to oppressive German nationalism after the creation of an independent Poland in
1918 the nationalism of the Poles too, became oppressive towards minority groups
The Polish Republic which came into being in 1920 was a product of the revolutionary changes
which swept the whole of central and eastern Europe stirring the national consciousness of
several groups. In the new Polish state over one-third of the population was non Polish: the
Ukranians constituting 16% the Jews 10% and the Belorussians 6% of the population in 1931.
It was during the inter-war years that national consciousness developed among the LTkrainians
and Belorussians although simultaneously processes of assimilation were also at work and
many people "belonged to groups of intermediate or incipient national consciousness".
The growth of fascism intensified national antagonisms throughout Europe in the 1930s and
thus helped to undermine the settlement at Versailles based on the principle of national self-
determination at the end of World War I. The development of national movements and
nationalism in Eastern Europe during the inter-war period, the course of World War 11, and
the final post-war settlement devised at Tehran, Potsdam and Yalta by the victorious Allies,
shaped the post World War I1 map of nation states in Eastern Europe and the political map
of all Europe.

Check Your Progress 2

1) How did the liberal democratic ideas fostered the growth of nationalism in Europe?

2) What was the role of language in the development of nation-states?

......................1.1.........................................................................................................................
3. Discuss the emergence of nationalism in Eastern Europe in about 150 words. VaioPlinn and the Nation-State
............................................................................................................................................

16.10 LET US SUM UP

In the preceding discussion about nationalism and nation-state you have seen that in most cases
the nationalist idea preceded the growth of the nation-state. The democratization of polity in
Europe helped the popular mobilizations around the issues like language and empire-building
which strengthened the feeling of nationalism among people. The modern states also played
a crucial role in giving shape to nationalist feelings and forging the nation-states. We have also
discussed that in Eastern Europe, excepting Russia, the cultural issues proved to be more
important in giving rise to national sentiments.

16.11 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

EXEXCISES
Check Your Progress 1
1) (a) no; (b) no; (c) yes; (dl yes
2) See the sections 16.2 and 16.3
3) See section 16.5
Check Your Progress 2
1 ) See subsection 16.6.1
2) See subsections 16.6.2 and 16.6.3
3) See section 16.9