Conflicts Challenges Strategies

For Civil Service Mains Examination

GS PAPER-III

+91 9696249603 PCS SIMPLIFIED

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INDEX
Sr. No. TOPIC PAGE No.

1. Internal Security: Overview 2-42

2. Linkages Between the Development and Spread of 43-46

Extremism

3. Linkages Between Organised Crimes and Terrorism 47-54

4. Role of Media and Social Networking Sites in Internal 55-58

Security Challenges
5. Cybersecurity 59-70

6. Money Laundering and its Prevention 71-76

7. Border Management in India 77-85

8. Various Security Agencies and Their Mandate 86-91

9. INTERNAL SECURITY PREVIOUS YEAR’S 92-94

QUESTIONS
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INTERNAL SECURITY: OVERVIEW

• Internal security refers to the measures and strategies adopted by a state to maintain law and order,
safeguard sovereignty within its borders, and protect citizens from threats originating internally.
• It comes under the purview of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA).
• In contrast, external security focuses on safeguarding the nation from threats such as military
aggression, and geopolitical challenges. This responsibility lies with the Ministry of Defence.

Internal vs. External Security

Parameter Internal Security External Security

Origin Within the country’s borders. Outside the country’s borders.

Entities Domestic individuals, groups, or elements. Foreign actors, governments, or entities.

Involved

Nature Socio-political unrest, organized crime, Cross-border terrorism, military threats,

terrorism. espionage.

Impact Stability and law enforcement. Sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Major Internal Security Problems in India

1. Terrorism: Hinterland terrorism incidents such as 26/11 Mumbai attacks and Pathankot attack.
2. Jammu & Kashmir Militancy: Fueled by cross-border infiltration and radicalization.
3. Insurgency in Northeast: Involving groups in Assam, Manipur, Nagaland, etc.
4. Left-Wing Extremism (LWE): Naxalism affecting states like Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Odisha.
5. Organized Crime: Nexus with terrorism, including money laundering and hawala operations.
6. Communalism: Instances like the Gujarat riots (2002) and their impact on social harmony.
7. Caste and Ethnic Tensions: Sikh-Hindu conflicts in the 1980s, Dalit issues.
8. Cybercrime: Threats such as the Wannacry ransomware attack.
9. Border and Coastal Security: Smuggling, illegal immigration, and infiltration threats.
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Factors Contributing to Internal Security Problems

1. Socio-Economic Disparities: Inequalities in development, unemployment, and poverty.
2. Regional Disparities: Neglect of Northeast and tribal areas.
3. Political Instability: Lack of governance and corruption.
4. Demographic Pressures: Illegal immigration and overpopulation in border areas.
5. Technological Vulnerabilities: Cyber threats and inadequate digital infrastructure.

Introduction to National Security Doctrine (NSD)

NSD is a stated principle of government policy outlining the country’s vision, objectives, and the broad
framework of actions required to ensure the security of its people and territory against all types of crises.
• Scope:
o Encompasses military, diplomatic, economic, and social policies.
o Aims to protect and promote national security interests.
o Helps in identifying and prioritizing geopolitical interests.
• Current Status in India: Despite facing various internal and external security threats, India does not
have a formal National Security Doctrine. The lack of coordination during crises such as the Uri,
Pathankot, and Pulwama attacks has reignited the debate about the necessity of such a doctrine.

Need for a National Security Doctrine

1. Constitutional Mandate:
o National Security is a subject under the Union List (7 th Schedule) of the Indian Constitution.
o It places a constitutional obligation on the government to ensure the safety and security of its
citizens.
2. Addressing Adhoc-ism:
o India has a history of reactive responses to crises such as militancy, insurgency, and terrorist
attacks (e.g., 26/11 Mumbai, Pathankot, Pulwama).
o NSD would replace ad hoc measures with a structured and proactive approach.
3. Strategic Approach:
o India is often criticized for lacking a strategic mindset.
o NSD can define long-term goals, thereby fostering a culture of strategic planning and
preparedness.
4. Coordinated Response and Accountability:
o Eliminates confusion regarding responsibilities among various agencies during security threats.
o Establishes a clear command and control structure.
o Example: Lack of coordination delayed the neutralization of terrorists during the Pathankot
attack.
5. Deterrence Effect:
o A well-defined doctrine enhances the deterrence capabilities of the state.
o Facilitates credible and effective responses to threats from state and non-state actors.
6. Policy Consistency:
o Ensures a consistent national security policy irrespective of the political regime.
o Avoids frequent changes in strategies for dealing with Pakistan, China, LWE, and J&K
insurgency.
7. Tackling Global Threats:
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o As India’s geopolitical interests expand, NSD would provide a framework to protect assets and
citizens abroad.
8. Enhancing Global Profile:
o Defines India’s role in global security.
o Reinforces the country’s commitment to protecting life, liberty, and national interests.

Challenges in Formulating a National Security Doctrine

1. Consensus Among Security Agencies:
o Coordination among multiple agencies (e.g., IB, RAW, NIA) can be challenging.
o Lack of established hierarchies, as seen during the Pathankot attack.
2. Political Consensus:
o Differing views among political parties on handling threats from Pakistan, China, and other
neighbors.
o Resistance to a unified approach due to ideological and regional biases.
3. Changing Geopolitical Realities:
o Rapid shifts in global alliances and regional politics (e.g., China post-Galwan Valley
confrontation, Nepal’s Kalapani dispute).
o New governments in neighboring countries like Maldives and Bhutan frequently alter diplomatic
dynamics.
4. Dynamic Threat Landscape:
o Emerging threats such as cyber warfare, economic coercion, and transnational organized crime.
o Non-traditional threats like pandemics and climate-induced security risks.
5. Institutional Limitations:
o Overlapping jurisdictions and limited resources.
o Resistance to change from entrenched bureaucracies.
6. Public Awareness and Participation:
o Limited public discourse on national security.
o Balancing transparency with the need for confidentiality in security matters.

Proposed Framework for NSD

1. Vision Statement:
o Articulate India’s core national security interests and strategic goals.
2. Risk Assessment:
o Identify internal and external threats.
o Prioritize based on severity and likelihood.
3. Integrated Approach:
o Foster collaboration between military, diplomatic, economic, and social agencies.
o Create unified command structures for better coordination.
4. Technology Integration:
o Leverage emerging technologies like AI, big data, and drones for intelligence and surveillance.
o Strengthen cybersecurity infrastructure.
5. Capacity Building:
o Enhance capabilities of law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
o Modernize equipment and infrastructure.
6. Community Engagement:
o Promote public awareness of security challenges.
o Encourage citizen participation in ensuring safety and resilience.
7. Global Partnerships:
o Strengthen ties with international organizations and allies.
o Participate actively in multilateral security forums.
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India’s internal and external security challenges necessitate a cohesive and comprehensive National Security
Doctrine. While formulating such a doctrine involves overcoming significant political, institutional, and
geopolitical challenges, its benefits far outweigh the hurdles. NSD would provide a strategic framework for
consistent policies, coordinated responses, and effective deterrence, enhancing India’s stature as a secure and
responsible global power.

Role of Non-State and State Actors in Internal Security

Threats
Threats destabilize a nation’s political, economic, and social systems. Both non-state and state actors contribute
to these threats through direct and indirect means. Both non-state and state actors often work in tandem, creating
a complex web of security challenges Examples include state-sponsored terrorism where state actors indirectly
support non-state groups.

Non-State vs. State Actors:

• Non-State Actors: Independent organizations or individuals not officially representing a sovereign
government.
• State Actors: Entities or groups directly backed by a government, often engaging in activities to further
their strategic interests.

Non-State Actors
• Definition: Individuals or organizations that exert influence on domestic or international events without
formal state backing.
• Role in Internal Security:
o Operate independently or in loose networks.
o Can destabilize society by engaging in criminal activities, terrorism, or propaganda.

Examples and Actions

1. Terrorist Groups:
o Examples: Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Hizbul Mujahideen.
o Characteristics:
▪ Many have transnational networks.
▪ Linked with external state actors.
▪ Responsible for numerous attacks on Indian soil aimed at creating instability.
o Impact: Undermine national security, Create a climate of fear and disrupt peace.
2. Organized Crime Syndicates:
o Activities:
▪ Engage in drug trafficking, human trafficking, counterfeit currency, and other illicit
activities.
▪ Often have nexus with terrorist outfits to finance operations.
o Impact:
▪ Finance criminal enterprises.
▪ Weaken law enforcement and judicial processes.
3. Left-Wing Extremism (LWE):
o Characteristics:
▪ Engage in propaganda, violence, and misinformation campaigns.
▪ Aim to destabilize regions by hindering development.
o Impact:
▪ Disrupt socio-economic progress in underdeveloped areas.
▪ Create prolonged insurgencies and foster local grievances.
4. Insurgency in Northeast India:
o Drivers: Inter-tribal conflicts, unemployment, and illegal migration.
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o Impact:
▪ Create a breeding ground for insurgent groups.
▪ Often evolve into organized, quasi-industrialized insurgency with long-term
consequences.
5. Drug Trafficking:
o Context: India’s proximity to the Golden Triangle (Myanmar, Laos, Thailand) and Golden
Crescent (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran) increases vulnerability.
o Methods: Use of land, sea, and air routes.
o Impact: Funds other criminal and terror activities, Causes social and health issues.
6. Human Trafficking:
o Forms: Commercial sexual exploitation, bonded labor, and forced migration.
o Scale: Estimated 20–65 million affected individuals.
o Impact: Severe social and humanitarian consequences.
7. Cyber Threats:
o Actors: Hacktivists, cyber criminals, and digital extremist groups.
o Methods: Cyberattacks, data breaches, and disinformation campaigns.
o Impact: Threaten national infrastructure and disrupt digital economies.
8. Religious and Communal Extremism:
o Characteristics: Groups promoting violence based on religious or communal ideologies.
o Impact:
▪ Lead to internal conflicts and social polarization.
▪ May have financial and ideological support from external sources.
9. Environmental and Climate Factors (Indirect Influence):
o Impact:
▪ Natural disasters and climate-induced resource scarcity can lead to social unrest.
▪ While not traditional actors, they create conditions that may be exploited by non-state
criminal networks.
State Actors
Definition and Role
• Definition:
o Entities backed by a sovereign state, engaging in actions that can undermine another nation’s
internal security.
• Role in Internal Security:
o Direct involvement through support to insurgencies, cyber warfare, and economic destabilization.
o Often use proxy groups to achieve strategic objectives without direct confrontation.
Examples
1. Pakistan:
o State-Sponsored Terrorism: Supports groups like LeT and JeM to foment insurgency in Jammu
& Kashmir and other regions.
o Proxy Warfare: Uses terror proxies to create instability.
o Economic Destabilization: Engages in counterfeit currency circulation and drug trafficking to
weaken the economy.
o Notable Incident: 26/11 Mumbai attacks were linked to state-sponsored networks.
2. China:
o Support to Insurgent Groups: Provides financial aid and arms to insurgents (Naga, Mizo,
Meitei), Extended moral and material support for Maoist and other insurgencies.
o Border Aggression: Incursions in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh.
o Cyber Warfare:
▪ Conducts cyberattacks to disrupt India’s infrastructure. 2020 Mumbai Power Grid
Incident, Recorded Future's 2021 report linked Chinese state-sponsored group RedEcho
to malware targeting India's power grid.
▪ 2013 DDoS and Website Defacements: Several Indian government sites were targeted
during heightened border tensions.
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▪ APT Espionage Campaigns: Cyberattacks aimed at infiltrating Indian defense and
research sectors.
▪ COVID-19 Probing: Increased attacks on healthcare and vaccine research institutions.
o Proxy War: Alleged involvement in fomenting the Naxalite crisis.
3. Bangladesh:
o Illegal Immigration: Large-scale demographic shifts in Northeast India due to porous borders.
o Smuggling and Trafficking: Facilitates smuggling of goods, humans, and drugs.
o Strategic Concerns: Growing extremism and potential radicalization affecting Indian border
states.
4. Myanmar:
o Insurgent Support: Provides safe havens for insurgent groups and facilitates drug trafficking.
o Rohingya Crisis: Spillover effects impacting communal harmony and security in India.
o Drug Trafficking: Links with drug cartels of the Golden Triangle.
5. Sri Lanka:
o Tamil Refugee Issues: Spillover effects from the Tamil civil war affecting internal security.
o Maritime Security Threats: Chinese influence in Hambantota port raises regional security
concerns.
o Fishermen and Refugee Concerns: Affect maritime and border security dynamics.

Naxalism:
Location & Socioeconomic Context: Originated in the Naxalbari region of West Bengal (1967).
• Key Grievances: Exploitation of poor peasants and tribal communities by landlords, moneylenders, and
corrupt officials.
• Catalyst: Communist revolutionaries led by Charu Mazumdar mobilized the discontented masses against
“class enemies.”
Initial Uprising (1967):
• Violent attacks on landlords and moneylenders.
• Triggered state retaliation, which led to a cycle of violence.
• Even though it was contained locally within weeks, it inspired similar movements in other parts of India.

Naxal Demand and Ideology:

• View the Indian government as “semi-colonial, feudalistic, and imperialist.”
• Aim to overthrow it and establish a communist regime 7odelled after Maoist China.
• Use of Violence:
o Inspired by the phrase “revolution through the barrel of a gun.”
o Embrace violent means to achieve systemic change.
Red Corridor:
• The region heavily affected by Naxal (Maoist) activities.
• Spread from a single district (Naxalbari) to over 180 districts by 2009; has since reduced.

Geographical Spread and Present Extent

• Early Focus: West Bengal.
• Expansion: Underdeveloped rural/tribal areas in Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Maharashtra, Andhra
Pradesh, Telangana, and Odisha.
• Urban Ambitions: Attempts have been made to extend influence to urban areas.
• Current Status:
o Peak: ~180 districts across 10 states (around 2009).
o Latest Reports: Most intense Naxal activity is now limited to around 25 “highly affected” districts
and a total of ~70 “affected” districts.
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Phases of Naxalism

Phase 1 (1967–1971): Early Expansion

• Key Leader: Charu Mazumdar (died 1971).
• Organization: Under CPI (M-L).
• Focus: Agrarian and tribal issues, workers’ rights.
• Regions: West Bengal, Odisha, Chhattisgarh, Bihar.
• Outcome: Death of Charu Mazumdar led to fragmentation of CPI (M-L).
Phase 2 (1980–2004): Consolidation
• Key Groups:
o Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) in Bihar.
o People’s War Group (PWG) in Andhra Pradesh.
• Issues:
o Agrarian conflicts, displacement due to development projects, increasing inequality, caste
conflicts.
• Expansion: Spread into Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Maharashtra, Odisha, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu.

Phase 3 (2004–2009): Rapid Expansion

• Merger: PWG + MCC + other groups formed CPI (Maoist).
• Issues: Displacement, tribal rights, underdevelopment, unemployment.
• Notable Feature: Significant geographical expansion, especially in central and eastern India.

Phase 4 (2009–Present): Decline

• State Response: Heightened security measures and developmental initiatives.
• Current Spread: Concentrated in parts of Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Telangana,
and Kerala.
• Trend: Overall decrease in violence and influence (reduced to around 70 affected districts).
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Current Status of LWE Spread

• Overall Decline:
o Reduction in LWE activities began in 2011 and has continued steadily.
o Total districts affected by LWE have sharply declined to 70 districts in 10 states—a three-decade
low.
o Only 25 districts in eight states are classified as “most affected.”
• Reduction in Violence and Fatalities:
o Incidents of violence: Reduced by 70%, from 2,258 in 2009 to 665 in 2020.
o Deaths (security forces and civilians): Decreased by 80%, from 1,005 in 2010 to 183 in 2020.
o The last six years (2015–2020) saw 47% fewer incidents compared to 2009–2014.
• Factors Contributing to the Decline:
o Recruitment & Leadership:
▪ Decline in Maoist recruitment; leadership is aging.
▪ Party ideology has lost appeal among younger cadres, restricting the movement’s spread.
o Operational Disruptions:
▪ Enhanced intelligence sharing between agencies.
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▪ Disruption of logistics chains (weapons, money, food).
▪ Recruitment now mainly confined to Chhattisgarh.
• State-Specific Improvements:
o Bihar:
▪ Previously widespread support; now, only 10 districts affected (shed six districts).
o Odisha:
▪ Effective action by the Special Operations Group (SOG) reduced affected districts from 15 to
10.
o Jharkhand:
▪ Improvement noted with a decrease from 19 to 16 affected districts.
o Chhattisgarh:
▪ Continues to have significant activity with 14 affected districts.
o Kerala & West Bengal:
▪ Kerala remains at 3 affected districts; West Bengal at 1.
o Madhya Pradesh:
▪ Now has 3 affected districts, compared to 2 earlier.

Left-Wing Extremism (Naxalism) in India: Causes & Factors:

1. Land-Related Factors
• Evasion of Land Ceiling Laws: Rich landowners bypass land ceiling limits, worsening inequality.
• Special Land Tenures: Exemptions for certain tenures block equitable redistribution.
• Encroachment of Public Lands: Powerful groups occupy govt./community lands (e.g., waterbodies),
depriving marginalized communities.
• Tribal Land Rights Neglect:
o Poor enforcement of Fifth Schedule laws (tribal land transfer prohibited to non-tribals).
o Lack of legal titles for landless cultivating public land.
o Traditional tribal land rights (e.g., forest rights) not recognized.
2. Displacement & Livelihood Issues
• Forced Displacement:
o Tribal communities displaced by industries, dams, and infrastructure projects.
o Polavaram Dam displaced 1.6 lakh tribals
o Inadequate Rehabilitation: No compensation or resettlement (e.g., Polavaram Dam, mining in
Chhattisgarh). Netarhat Firing Range (Latehar): Army project displaced 52 villages (1990s).
• Livelihood Crisis:
o Loss of Traditional Jobs: Forests/mining disrupt tribal occupations (e.g., shifting agriculture).
o Food Insecurity: Leaky PDS and corruption worsen hunger in Naxal zones.
o Deprived Commons: Loss of access to forests, waterbodies, and grazing lands.
3. Social Exclusion & Discrimination
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• Denial of Dignity: Caste-based discrimination (untouchability) and tribal marginalization.
• Weak Legal Protection: Poor enforcement of SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act, Bonded Labour Abolition
Act.
4. Governance Failures
• Corruption & Absenteeism:
o Poor healthcare/education services; absent public officials in remote areas.
o Police Brutality: Fake encounters, arbitrary arrests alienate locals.
• Electoral Politics: Local governance hijacked by elites; panchayats fail to represent tribals.
• Slow Development: Delayed schemes (e.g., roads, schools); benefits siphoned by middlemen.
5. Environmental Degradation
• Resource Exploitation: Mining (e.g., Bailadila iron ore), deforestation, and pollution destroy tribal
ecosystems.
o CBI in 2014 has registered a preliminary enquiry against unknown officials of ministry of
environment and forest and and Power Limited for alleged irregularities in the granting clearance for
diversion of Saranda forest land in Jharkhand for mining purposes.
• Marginalization: Loss of forests/wetlands pushes tribals into poverty.
6. Political Neglect
• Tribal Exclusion: No participation in decision-making (e.g., mining approvals).
• Unimplemented Laws: Fifth Schedule, PESA Act ignored; industrial interests prioritized.
7. Administrative Lapses
• Govt. Vacuum: No state presence in remote areas → Naxals set up parallel governance.
• Inefficient Bureaucracy: Unmotivated officials; poor implementation of development projects.
• Naxal Propaganda: Exploit state failures to radicalize youth (e.g., "state vs. people" narrative).
8. External Factors
• Mining Mafia Nexus: Politicians-bureaucrats-mafia collude to exploit resources (e.g., coal in Jharkhand).
• Foreign Support: Suspected covert aid from China via Nepal/Maoist links.

Government’s Approach and Action Plan to Curb LWE

1. Holistic Approach
• Multi-Pronged Strategy: Combines security, development, governance reforms, and tribal rights protection
in LWE-affected areas.
• Constitutional Framework:
o State Responsibility: ‘Police’ and ‘Public Order’ are State subjects.
o Central Support: GoI supplements State efforts through National Policy & Action Plan (NPAP)
focusing on security, development, and local rights.
• Core Objective: Address root causes (poverty, lack of infrastructure, tribal alienation) while modernizing
security forces.
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2. Security Measures
Operational Strategies
• Ban on CPI (Maoist): Designated a terrorist organization under UAPA (1967).
• Forces Deployment:
o Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) and India Reserve (IR) Battalions (67 battalions sanctioned; 53
raised).
o Special Forces: Greyhounds (Telangana), Black Panthers (Odisha), COBRA (CRPF).
• Intelligence Strengthening:
o Multi-Agency Centres (MAC/SMACs) for real-time data sharing.
o Joint Command Centres in Jagdalpur (Chhattisgarh) and Gaya (Bihar).
• Counter-IED Measures:
o SOPs for handling IEDs; specialized training for CAPFs and police.
• Modernization of Police:
o Funding for training, weapons, and infrastructure under Modernization of Police Forces Scheme.
o Special Infrastructure Scheme (SIS): Fortification of 250 police stations (206 completed by 2024).

Coordination & Civic Engagement

• Inter-State Collaboration: Regular meetings among bordering states (e.g., Chhattisgarh-Odisha).
• Civic Action Programs (CAP): Health camps, seed distribution, and community outreach by security forces to
build trust.

3. Development Initiatives
Infrastructure & Connectivity
• Road Projects:
o Road Requirement Plan-I (RRP-I): 5,148 km roads and 8 bridges completed.
o Road Connectivity Project: 12,163 km sanctioned; 8,904 km completed.
• Digital Connectivity:
o LWE Mobile Tower Project: 13,412 towers installed (Phases I & II).
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• Electrification: Deen Dayal Upadhyay Gram Jyoti Yojana (DDUGJY) for rural power access.
Social & Economic Programs
• Employment: MGNREGA (rural jobs), Pradhan Mantri Kaushal Vikas Yojana (PMKVY) (skill
development).
• Education: Eklavya Model Residential Schools (EMRS) and Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA).
• Special Central Assistance (SCA): ₹3,450 crore released for infrastructure in LWE districts.

4. Tribal Empowerment
• Legal Safeguards:
o PESA Act 1996 and Forest Rights Act (FRA): Protect land rights and promote self-governance.
• Resource Rights:
o District Mineral Foundation (DMF): Ensures tribal communities benefit from local mineral wealth.
o Integrated Action Plan (IAP): Funds for healthcare, education, and livelihoods.
• Youth Engagement:
o Tribal Youth Exchange Programme (TYEP): 25,880 tribal youth trained (2006–23) in skill
development and cultural exposure.

5. SAMADHAN Doctrine
The SAMADHAN Doctrine is a comprehensive tactical framework formulated by the Ministry of Home Affairs to
counter Left Wing Extremism (LWE). It emphasizes a strategic blend of leadership, intelligence, technology, and
financial control to effectively curb extremist activities.

6. Rehabilitation & Reintegration

• Surrender Policy: Financial aid (up to ₹5 lakh), vocational training, and housing support for surrendered
militants.
• Perception Management: Media campaigns and street plays to counter Maoist propaganda.

7. Outcomes & Progress

• Reduced Violence (2013–2023):
o 48% drop in incidents (1,136 to 594).
o 65% fewer deaths (397 to 138).
• Geographic Containment: Violence limited to 25 districts (91% of incidents in 2023).
o Most Affected States: Chhattisgarh (63% of violence), Jharkhand (27%).
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8. Financial Commitments
• Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme: ₹400 crore released (2023–24).
• Special Infrastructure Scheme (SIS): ₹1,160 crore allocated (till 2026).
• Assistance to Central Agencies (ACALWEMS): ₹100 crore for helicopters and infrastructure (2023–24).

9. Monitoring & Review

• MHA Oversight: Regular reviews by Home Minister, Home Secretary, and Special Secretary.
• Media Plan Scheme: Counter-propaganda efforts extended till 2025–26.

10. Way Forward

• Focus Areas:
o Strengthen grassroots democracy (PESA/FRA implementation).
o Accelerate road/telecom connectivity in remote areas.
o Address inter-state coordination gaps.
• Goal: Sustain decline in LWE influence through security-development synergy and tribal inclusion.

Critical Analysis of the State's Approach Towards Naxalism

1. Coordination Challenges
• Inter-State Coordination Issues: Fragmented efforts due to reluctance among state security forces to share
intelligence.
• State-Central Disparities: Overdependence on the central government by some states; a lack of proactive
state leadership in addressing Naxalism.
2. Rehabilitation and Surrender Policy Weaknesses
• Inadequate Rehabilitation Focus: Surrender policies often neglect effective rehabilitation and resettlement,
leading to recidivism among former Naxalites.
3. Civilian–Security Establishment Disconnect
• Lack of Synchronization: Civil administration and security forces are not in sync; regions cleared of Naxal
presence suffer from neglect, which allows re-emergence of Naxalite influence.
• Protection of Development Projects: Insufficient security protection for newly developed infrastructure
leads to its destruction or capture by Naxalites.

Way Ahead
Political Solutions
• Activate Tribal Advisory Councils:
o Functionalize councils under the Fifth Schedule to ensure tribal concerns are integrated into
governance.
• Strengthen Forest Rights Act (FRA), 2006:
o Reform FRA to truly empower tribal communities and prevent bureaucratic exploitation.
• Enact Strong Anti-Corruption Legislation:
o Tackle corruption among officials and politicians to build local trust.
• Dialogue with Marginalized Groups:
o Initiate sincere, continuous dialogue (with help from civil society) to bridge gaps between government
and local populations.
Administrative Solutions
• Selective and Motivated Postings:
o Deploy experienced, committed officers to Naxal-affected districts with special incentives.
• Community Involvement in Development:
o Engage local communities in planning and implementation of development projects to foster
ownership.
• Upgrade State Security Forces:
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o Enhance training and equipment specifically tailored for counter-insurgency.
• Uniform Surrender and Rehabilitation Policy:
o Develop a central model policy to standardize rehabilitation and ensure smooth reintegration of
surrendered Naxalites.
Conclusion
• Existing Gaps:
o Lack of coordination, weak rehabilitation efforts, and disconnect between civilian administration and
security forces hinder lasting progress.
• Learning from Success:
o The Andhra Pradesh model demonstrates that combining law and order measures with socio-
economic development can effectively counter Naxalism.
• Future Focus:
o Political, administrative, and socio-economic reforms are essential to address underlying grievances
and achieve lasting peace in affected regions.

5th Schedule of Indian Constitution Provisions

The Fifth Schedule of the Constitution provides for the administration and governance of Scheduled Areas and
Scheduled Tribes, ensuring their rights and interests are protected.

Key Provisions of the Fifth Schedule

Article 244(1): Administration of Scheduled Areas

• Applies to all states except Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, and Mizoram (covered under the Sixth Schedule).
• Provides special administrative provisions to protect tribal interests.

Declaration of Scheduled Areas

• The President can:
o Declare any area as a Scheduled Area.
o Alter boundaries, increase or decrease its size, or remove its status after consulting the Governor.

Executive Powers of the State & Centre

• The State Government administers Scheduled Areas.
• The Governor submits annual reports to the President on their administration.
• The Central Government can issue directions to the State for better governance of Scheduled Areas.
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Tribes Advisory Council (TAC)

• Mandatory in states with Scheduled Areas; optional in states with Scheduled Tribes but no Scheduled
Areas.
• Comprises 20 members, ¾ from Scheduled Tribes in the State Legislature.
• Advises on tribal welfare and policy implementation.

Governor’s Powers over TAC

• Determines the number of members, mode of appointment, and chairperson.
• Frames rules for meetings and procedures.

Laws Applicable to Scheduled Areas

• The Governor can:
o Exempt or modify any law of Parliament or State Legislature in Scheduled Areas.
o Frame regulations (after consulting TAC) to:
▪ Protect tribal land (restrict transfers between non-tribals).
▪ Regulate land allotment to tribal communities.
▪ Control money-lending practices to prevent exploitation.

PESA Act, 1996 & Scheduled Areas

The Panchayat (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (PESA) extends Panchayati Raj provisions to
Scheduled Areas with special safeguards for tribal autonomy.

States with Fifth Schedule Areas

• 10 states: Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh,
Maharashtra, Odisha, Rajasthan, and Telangana.

Challenges in Implementation
1. Limited Powers of TAC: Lacks legislative and executive powers like Autonomous District Councils (Sixth
Schedule).
2. Unclear Composition & Role: No clarity on the remaining ¼ members of TAC.
3. Governor’s Discretionary Powers: Ambiguity on whether the Governor can act independently or on
ministerial advice.
4. Encroachment of Tribal Lands: Weak land protection leads to exploitation by non-tribals.
5. Political Interference: State governments often frame TAC rules, allowing political manipulation.

Steps for Effective Implementation

• Strengthening Institutional Mechanisms: Empower TACs with legal authority.
• Inclusive Development: Ensure tribal representation in policy-making.
• Better Resource Allocation: Increased funding for infrastructure, education, and healthcare.
• Capacity Building: Skill development & awareness programs for tribal communities.
• Decentralization of Power: Strengthen tribal self-governance and local institutions.
• Policy Reforms & Transparency: Clear guidelines on Governor’s powers, Stronger land protection laws.
• Attitudinal Shift in Governance: Central & state governments must prioritize tribal welfare over
bureaucratic hurdles.

Critical analysis of PESA Act 1996

The Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (PESA) was enacted on December 24, 1996, to grant
self-rule to tribal communities in Fifth Schedule Areas. It was a response to long-standing tribal demands for
autonomy, protection of land rights, and preservation of cultural identity.
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The Act extends 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments to tribal areas, giving Gram Sabhas key powers to
manage resources and governance.

Why Was PESA Needed?

• Historical Marginalization – Tribals were excluded from mainstream political and economic systems.
• Loss of Land & Resources – Large-scale displacement due to industrial and infrastructure projects.
• Weak Local Governance – Existing laws failed to recognize the unique socio-cultural systems of tribals.

Key Provisions of PESA Act

1. Empowering the Gram Sabha (Village Assembly)

• The Gram Sabha is the primary decision-making body in Scheduled Areas.
• It identifies development projects, approves plans, and ensures resource management.
• It must be consulted before land acquisition, mining, or any development activity in Scheduled Areas.
2. Decentralized Governance
• Village-level institutions like Gram Panchayats and Panchayat Samitis get more powers.
• They manage natural resources, regulate trade, control local markets, and resolve disputes.
3. Land & Resource Rights
• Tribals have ownership rights over minor forest produce, water bodies, and local minerals.
• Land cannot be transferred to non-tribals without Gram Sabha approval.
4. Protection of Tribal Culture
• The Act preserves traditional governance systems and social customs.
• It prohibits any external interference in tribal traditions.
5. Financial Autonomy
• Direct fund transfers to Gram Panchayats for development projects.
• Panchayats can levy and collect taxes, improving financial self-sufficiency.

Impact of PESA Act

• Empowerment of Tribal Communities – Gave tribals a legal say in governance.
• Protection of Land & Forest Rights – Prevented forced displacement.
• Preservation of Tribal Culture – Strengthened indigenous traditions.
• Improved Access to Basic Services – Boosted education, healthcare, and drinking water facilities.
• Decentralization of Power – Strengthened grassroots democracy.

Challenges in Implementation
• Limited Coverage – Tribals in non-Scheduled Areas don’t get PESA benefits.
• Lack of Awareness – Many tribal communities are unaware of their rights.
• Resource Constraints – Gram Sabhas lack funds and trained personnel.
• Political Interference – Decisions of Gram Sabhas are often overruled.
• Legal Conflicts – Overlaps with Forest Rights Act, Wildlife Protection Act, etc.
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PESA is a landmark law that recognizes tribal autonomy and self-governance. However, its full potential remains
unrealized due to poor implementation. Strengthening awareness, resource allocation, and political commitment is
crucial to ensuring the true empowerment of tribal communities.

Insurgency vs Militancy vs Terrorism

• Insurgency and militancy and terrorism are forms of extremism.
• They seek sovereignty and freedom of control from external forces.
• They target State, use violence, symbols of the State, security forces, etc.

1. Insurgency
• Organized armed rebellion against a recognized authority (e.g., government) to achieve political/ideological
goals of separatism, autonomy, or political change.
• Key Traits:
o Large-scale, sustained conflict with control over territory.
o Uses guerrilla warfare, propaganda, and sometimes terrorism.
o Aims to replace or reform the existing system.
• Example: Naxalite Movement in India (Maoist insurgency), Kashmir Insurgency (some groups seek
independence or merger with Pakistan), Taliban in Afghanistan (initially an insurgency against foreign forces
and Afghan govt.)
2. Militancy
• The use of violent, aggressive tactics to further political, ideological, or religious objectives.
• Key Traits:
o Narrower scope than insurgency; may lack territorial control.
o Targets state forces, symbols, or rival groups (not always civilians).
o Can be part of insurgencies or operate independently.
o More region-specific than insurgency.
o May be linked to larger political movements but often lacks a structured military strategy.
o Primarily uses hit-and-run tactics and small-scale armed attacks.
• Example: Khalistani Militancy in Punjab (1980s-90s). Militant groups in the Northeast India (e.g., ULFA,
NSCN). Militant farmer movements or extremist labor unions.
3. Terrorism
• Definition: Use of violence or intimidation against civilians/non-combatants to instill fear and achieve
ideological/political objectives.
• Key Traits:
o Deliberate targeting of civilians to spread terror.
o No territorial control; relies on asymmetrical tactics (bombings, hijackings).
o May lack a clear political structure (e.g., lone-wolf attacks).
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• Example: 26/11 Mumbai Attacks (Lashkar-e-Taiba), ISIS and Al-Qaeda attacks globally, Suicide bombings
by Boko Haram in Nigeria.

Bottomline:
• Insurgency = War against the state.
• Militancy = Aggressive armed activism. Militants use force to further a cause, but their scope is more
localized.
• Terrorism = Fear-driven violence against civilians. Terrorists seek to spread fear among civilians and
destabilize societies.

Key Differences Between Insurgency and Militancy

While both insurgency and militancy involve organized violence for political, social, or ideological goals, they differ
in their objectives, tactics, and recruitment strategies.

1. Objectives

• Insurgency: Focuses on broader political goals like overthrowing the government, gaining autonomy, or
driving social change. Example: Naxalite movement or Naga insurgency.
• Militancy: Often driven by ideological or religious objectives with an emphasis on immediate political
grievances or revenge. Example: ISIS or Khalistan-linked militant activities.

2. Tactics

• Insurgency: Utilizes guerrilla warfare, hit-and-run tactics, and sabotage to exhaust state forces. They may
also provide social services to gain local support.
• Militancy: Primarily employs acts of terrorism such as bombings, assassinations, and hostage-taking to instill
fear and force political concessions.

3. Recruitment

• Insurgency: Draws support from marginalized local populations, promising political representation or
economic upliftment.
• Militancy: Often recruits based on ideological or religious sentiments, leveraging radicalization through
social media, religious institutions, or community networks.

4. Scope

• Insurgency: Tends to operate on a larger scale with organized structures resembling a parallel government in
some cases.
• Militancy: Usually functions in smaller, decentralized cells with an emphasis on rapid, disruptive actions.

Overlap and Blurred Lines

• In some cases, insurgent groups may adopt militant tactics, especially in response to aggressive state actions
or evolving conflict dynamics. This merging often leads to increased radicalization and heightened violence.

Example Distinction

• Naxalite Movement (Insurgency): Focuses on overthrowing the Indian state through prolonged guerrilla
warfare.
• ISIS (Militancy): Pursues extreme ideological goals using terrorist tactics to spread fear and chaos.

Insurgency in North Eastern Region (NER)

• Composition & Diversity:
o 8 States: Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, and Tripura.
 P a g e | 20
o Ethnic Diversity: Over 200 ethnic groups with distinct languages, dialects, and socio-cultural
identities.
• Geographical & Demographic Data:
o Area: Covers 7.97% of India’s geographical area.
o Population: Accounts for 3.78% of India’s population (Census 2011 figures available for each state).
o International Borders: Total 5,484 km, shared with:
▪ Bangladesh: 1,880 km
▪ Myanmar: 1,643 km
▪ China: 1,346 km
▪ Bhutan: 516 km
▪ Nepal: 99 km
• Security Challenges:
o Terrain & Socio-Economic Factors: Rugged terrain, underdevelopment, and historical issues
(language/ethnicity, tribal rivalry, migration, control over local resources).
o Insurgent Activities: Presence of various Indian Insurgent Groups (IIGs) maintaining safe havens in
neighboring countries, leading to violence and extortion.

Regional Security and Development Dynamics in NE

Overall Security Situation
• Positive Trends (Since 2014):
o 71% reduction in insurgency incidents.
o 60% reduction in Security Forces casualties.
o 82% reduction in civilian deaths.
• 2023 Data Highlights:
o 243 insurgency-related incidents in the NE.
o Casualties: 38 civilians and 8 Security Force personnel.
o Outcomes: 40 insurgents neutralized, 407 arrested, 147 arms recovered.
o 1,595 insurgent cadres surrendered with 459 arms.

List of Insurgent/Extremist Groups of Northeast Declared as “Unlawful Associations”

and “Terrorist Organizations” Under Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
State Organisation

Assam • United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)

• National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)

Manipur • People’s Liberation Army (PLA)

• United National Liberation Front (UNLF)
• Manipur Peoples’ Liberation Front (MPLF)

Meghalaya • Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA)

Tripura • All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF)

Nagaland • National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang) [NSCN/K]

State-Wise Security Profile

• Assam:
o Key Groups:
▪ ULFA (I) (formed 1979)
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▪ Bodo, Karbi, Adivasi, Dimasa National Liberation Army/Dimasa Peoples’ Supreme Council
(DNLA/DPSC) (The group claimed that it is committed to revamp the national struggle and
fight for the liberation of a sovereign, Independent Dimasa Nation.)
o Major Movements & Issues:
▪ Self-determination (Assamese/ULFA)
▪ Demand for Bodoland (Bodo, All Bodo Student Unions)
▪ AASU: Expelling outsiders, addressing illegal immigration
▪ Assam Accord (1985): Citizenship and immigration
▪ NRC implementation per SC order
o Memorandum of Settlement (MoS) Agreements:
▪ Bodo (27.01.2020): 1,615 cadres surrendered
▪ Karbi (04.09.2021): 1,000+ cadres surrendered
▪ Adivasi (15.09.2022)
▪ DNLA (27.04.2023)
▪ ULFA (29.12.2023): Disbanded on 23.01.2024
▪ Special Development Packages (SDPs) for Bodo, Karbi, Adivasi, Dimasa
▪ 2002-03: Cooperation agreements with Bhutan and Bangladesh
• Tripura:
o 2015: AFSPA was removed, resulting in a return to normalcy and a largely peaceful environment.
The state is predominantly Bengali-dominated.
o Peace Agreement: MoS with NLFT/SD (National Liberation Front of Tripura): Signed on
10.08.2019, Resulted in the surrender of 88 cadres.
o Development Initiatives: Special Economic Development Package (SEDP): Initiated to foster
economic growth and stability.

• Meghalaya:
o The region is generally peaceful.
o Bru Rehabilitation Program
o Relocation & Housing: 6,935 Bru families have been relocated to 12 designated resettlement
sites, 6,206 houses have been completed as part of this initiative.
o Immigration: There are ongoing concerns regarding the immigration of outsiders.
o Ethnic Conflicts & Statehood Demands:
▪ Tensions exist between the Khasis and the Garos.
▪ There is a demand for a separate state called Garoland.
o Security Measures: Only limited areas are under the provisions of ASFPA (Armed Forces
Special Powers Act).

• Nagaland:
• NSCN Factional Split: Major factions: NSCN (IM) and NSCN (K). Other factions currently under
ceasefire.
• Geographic Base: Active groups are predominantly based in Myanmar.
• Distinct Identity: They maintain a separate flag and constitution.
• Incident Statistics (2023)
▪ 35 insurgency incidents reported.
▪ 1 civilian death recorded.
▪ 161 insurgents arrested.
▪ 68 arms recovered from operations.
• Support from China:
o Both NSCN factions receive backing from China.
o Paresh Baruah is reportedly hiding in China.
• Demands & Future Needs
• Greater Nagalim: The insurgent groups demand an expanded Naga homeland.

• Arunachal Pradesh:
o Indigenous Insurgency: No active indigenous insurgent groups.
o Spill-Over Effects: Affected by insurgency spill-over from NSCN and ULFA in border areas,
Considered a safe haven for insurgents.
o Incident Statistics (2023)
▪ 13 incidents recorded.
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▪ Casualties: 2 civilians and 1 SF personnel killed.
▪ 42 cadres surrendered.
o Recent Concerns: Growing worry about insurgent activities spilling in from neighboring states.

• Manipur:
o Insurgent & Ethnic Landscape
o Multiple Insurgent Groups:
▪ Involvement of Meitei, Naga, Kuki, Zomi, and Hmar insurgent factions.
o Ethnic Dynamics:
▪ Meitei tribes dominate the valley, controlling the state's politics and economics.
▪ Ongoing tensions: Nagas and Kukis versus Meitis, along with the Kukiland demand.
▪ More than 40 ethnic groups vie for dominance in the region.
o Ethnic Violence & Incident Overview
▪ Notable Ethnic Conflict:
• Violence between Meitei and Kuki communities on 03.05.2023.
▪ 2023 Violence Statistics:
• Manipur accounted for 77% of NE violent incidents (187 out of 243 incidents).
• Outcomes:
o 33 insurgents killed
o 184 insurgents arrested
o 80 cadres surrendered
o Peace Processes & Agreements
▪ Historic Peace Accord:
• A peace accord with the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) was signed on
29.11.2023.
• This accord is partly attributed to mitigating the effects of insurgency spillover from
Nagaland.
o Underlying Challenges
▪ Economic & Employment Issues: Lack of employment opportunities exacerbates regional
tensions.
▪ Security Force Conduct: Reports of high-handedness by security forces add to grievances.
▪ Agricultural Challenges: The practice of Jhum cultivation remains a significant problem
affecting local livelihoods.

• Sikkim & Mizoram:

o Insurgency Status: Both regions are free from insurgency.
o Historical Timeline
o 1960s Onward: Political and social changes began in this era.
o Mizoram-Specific Context
▪ Integration with Assam:
• Mizoram was once part of Assam.
• Experienced a severe famine during which many locals died.
▪ Rise of the Mizo National Front (MNF):
• Led by Lal Denga, the MNF emerged to address regional grievances.
▪ Mizo Accord (1986):
• Signed between the Government of India, Mizoram state, and the MNF.
• This accord paved the way for Mizoram as a separate state.

Causes of rise of insurgency in the North East

1. Historical Factors

• Colonial Legacy:
o Many North East regions were not directly governed by the British, creating a sense of alienation
from post-colonial Indian governance.
o This historical disconnect has fueled persistent insurgent sentiments.

2. Geographical Factors
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• Challenging Terrain:
o Rugged hills and dense forests provide ideal conditions for guerrilla warfare, complicating state
control.
• Porous Borders:
o Shared borders with Myanmar, Bangladesh, Bhutan, and China enable insurgents to access safe
havens and engage in cross-border smuggling.
• Infrastructure Development Challenges:
o Difficult terrain hampers the construction and maintenance of infrastructure, isolating the region from
the rest of India.

3. Socio-Economic Factors

• Lack of Industrialization:
o Economic underdevelopment and scarce industrial opportunities result in high unemployment,
particularly among the youth, making insurgent recruitment easier.
• Deficient Infrastructure:
o Inadequate access to education, healthcare, and electricity reinforces dissatisfaction with the state and
contributes to anti-government sentiments.

4. Political Factors

• Unmet Political Aspirations:

o Many ethnic groups feel their political aspirations are ignored or suppressed by both Union and state
governments.
• Ethnic Diversity & Resource Competition:
o The region's diverse ethnic landscape, combined with limited resources, spurs inter-ethnic rivalries
and conflict.
• Boundary Disputes:
o Unresolved territorial disputes among states further exacerbate tensions and contribute to insurgent
violence.

5. Psychological and Cultural Factors

• Neglect by Mainstream Media:

o Limited media coverage of North East issues, along with experiences of racial discrimination, creates
a sense of psychological isolation.
• Culture of Violence:
o Decades of conflict have normalized violent methods as acceptable means of resolving disputes.

6. External Factors

• Foreign Influence:
o Allegations persist that external actors, particularly China and Pakistan’s ISI, provide arms, training,
funds, and safe havens, sustaining insurgent activities.

The insurgency in North East India stems from a complex interplay of historical marginalization, geographical
isolation, socio-economic deprivation, political grievances, cultural alienation, and external interference.
Addressing these root causes through holistic development, inclusive political processes, and enhanced
border management is key to resolving the insurgency and bringing lasting peace to the region.

Consequences of insurgency
The ongoing insurgency in North East India has resulted in widespread negative impacts across multiple dimensions,
affecting not only the local population but also the nation at large.
1. Internal Displacement:
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• Displacement of Population: Insurgency-induced conflicts have led to mass displacement of communities,
forcing many to leave their homes and livelihoods behind, creating refugee-like situations within their own
country.
2. Psychological Impact:
• Public Psyche Wounded: The frequent occurrences of kidnapping, extortion, and killings have instilled a
pervasive sense of fear and insecurity among the population. The constant threat of violence has scarred the
collective psyche of the region.
3. Human Rights Violations:
• Violation of Civilian Rights: Innocent civilians have become victims of human rights abuses by both
insurgents and security forces. Extra-judicial actions by security forces have been common due to the
inefficiency of the criminal justice system in handling insurgency.
4. Impact on Development:
• Infrastructure Damage: Insurgents frequently target critical infrastructure such as gas pipelines, railways,
and hospitals, disrupting development projects and creating a challenging environment for economic
progress.
• Diversion of Development Funds: A significant portion of development funds is often siphoned off by
insurgent groups, depriving the region of much-needed financial resources for growth.
5. Economic Consequences:
• Business Failure: Many businesses have either collapsed or left the region due to constant extortion by
insurgent groups, leading to a shrinking of the local economy.
• Decline in Tourism: The tourism industry in the region has suffered significantly, depriving the area of
potential employment opportunities and constructive engagement for the youth.
6. Strategic Setback:
• Hindrance to Look East Policy 2.0: Insurgency has jeopardized India’s plans to strengthen links with
South East Asia, including its "Look East Policy 2.0," impacting economic and strategic goals.

Steps Taken to Overcome Insurgency

1. Law and Order Initiatives:
• Legal Measures: Laws like the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) and Armed Forces Special
Powers Act (AFSPA) have been enforced to support security efforts.
• Surrender and Rehabilitation Policy: The government has introduced a model surrender-cum-
rehabilitation policy, adopted by several states, offering incentives to insurgents willing to surrender.
• Counter-Insurgency Operations: Operations led by capable forces like the Assam Rifles have helped tackle
insurgency on the ground.
• Technology for Surveillance: Border surveillance has been enhanced through Comprehensive Integrated
Border Management System (CIBMS), along with the introduction of helicopter services for logistical
support.
• International Cooperation: Joint operations like Operation All Clear (2003) between India and Bhutan
have successfully targeted insurgents, and bilateral cooperation with countries like Bangladesh has curbed
external support for insurgency.

2. Developmental Initiatives:
• Dedicated Ministry: The formation of the Ministry of Development for North East Region (DoNER)
ensures a focused approach to the region’s development.
• Infrastructure Projects: Large-scale projects like the Trilateral Highway and the Kaladan Multimodal
Transport Project aim to improve connectivity and spur economic development.
• Economic Missions: Schemes like the National Bamboo Mission and the National Horticulture Mission
seek to bring sustainable economic growth while preserving the environment.
• Border Trade Initiatives: The promotion of border haats and the establishment of Integrated Check Posts
(ICPs) with Bangladesh encourage cross-border trade and strengthen cultural ties.

3. Cultural and Integration Efforts:

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• Act East Policy: The Look East Policy has evolved into the Act East Policy, focusing on deeper economic
and cultural ties with South East Asia.
• Cultural Integration Programs: Various cultural festivals and university programs aim to integrate the
distinct culture of the North East with the rest of India.

Government Measures to Deal with Insurgency in NER

• Policy for talks / negotiation with such groups which categorically abjure violence, lay down arms and seek
solutions for their problems peacefully within the framework of the Constitution of India.
• Those who are not in talks are being dealt with by the Central Armed Police Forces, Armed Forces and the
State Police through Counter-Insurgency Operations.

Security and Counter-Insurgency Measures

• Central Assistance & Deployment:
o Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs):
▪ Deployed for both internal security and border guarding.
▪ Deployment Figures:
▪ 344 companies for border guarding.
▪ 684 companies for internal security and counter-insurgency operations.
o India Reserve Battalions (IRBs):
▪ 62 battalions sanctioned for NE States.
▪ Distribution: Assam, Manipur, Tripura (11 each); Arunachal Pradesh & Nagaland (7 each);
Meghalaya (6); Mizoram (5); Sikkim (4).
• Legislative Measures:
o Banning Insurgent Groups:
▪ 16 insurgent organizations declared “unlawful associations” and/or “terrorist organizations”
under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), including specific groups like
ATTF, NLFT in Tripura, and Meitei extremist outfits in Manipur.
o Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA):
▪ Gradual removal of AFSPA from most districts:
▪ Assam: Remains in 4 districts.
▪ Manipur: AFSPA in 19 Police Station areas across 7 districts.
▪ Nagaland: AFSPA in 18 Police Station areas across 8 districts.
▪ Arunachal Pradesh: Reduced to 3 PS areas in Namsai district (plus in Tirap,
Changlang, Longding).
• Intelligence & Coordination:
o Multi-Agency Centres (MACs) & State MACs (SMACs):
▪ Facilitate round-the-clock intelligence sharing.
o Inter-State Coordination:
▪ Regular meetings and collaboration among bordering districts of NE States.
o Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs):
▪ Implemented for tackling Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).
• Negotiations & Surrender:
o Dialogue Policy:
▪ Central Government conducts talks/negotiations with insurgent groups willing to renounce
violence.
o Surrender-cum-Rehabilitation Policy:
▪ In force since 1998 (revised in 2018 for six NE States except Sikkim and Mizoram).
▪ Benefits to Surrendered Insurgents:
▪ Immediate grant of ₹4 lakh (in fixed deposit for 3 years as collateral for loans).
▪ Stipend of ₹6,000 per month for 3 years.
▪ Incentives for surrendering arms/ammunition.
▪ Vocational training and rehabilitation camp funding.
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▪ 90% reimbursement of rehabilitation expenditure under the SRE scheme.
o Civic Action Program in Northeast:
▪ To take the local populace in confidence and boost the image of armed forces for among the
common people, Army and Central Paramilitary Forces conduct Civic Action Program.
▪ Under this Program, various welfare / developmental activities are undertaken.
o Central Scheme for Assistance to Civilian Victims (CSACV)
▪ Provide financial assistance to families of civilian victims of terrorist, communal, LWE
violence, cross-border firing, and IED blasts.

Reimbursement and Financial Support

• Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme:
o Covers costs such as:
▪ Raising IR battalions.
▪ Logistics for CAPFs/Army.
▪ Ex-gratia payments and relief to victims.
▪ Honorarium for Village Guards/Defence Committees.
▪ Maintenance of camps for suspended insurgent groups.
▪ Rehabilitation of surrendered insurgents.
▪ POL (petrol, oil, lubricants) expenditure during operations.
o Implemented: In all NE States except Mizoram and Sikkim.
• Helicopter Subsidy Scheme:
o Improves connectivity in remote areas.
o Covers 75% of operation cost (post recovery of passenger fees or flat 20% of actual cost).
o Annual flying hour limits imposed.
o Additional helicopter sanctioned for Manipur in February 2024.

Conclusion
• Holistic Security Framework:
o The government’s multi-pronged strategy in the NE integrates robust security measures, intelligence
sharing, inter-state coordination, modernized police forces, and targeted developmental initiatives.
• Positive Outcomes:
o Significant reductions in insurgency incidents, casualties, and an increase in the surrender of insurgent
cadres.
• Focus Areas for Continued Efforts:
o Rehabilitation and reintegration of surrendered insurgents.
o Enhancing connectivity and infrastructure.
o Continued community outreach and civic action.
o Strict regulation of arms and continuous monitoring of security dynamics.

Reasons for Decline in Insurgency in Recent Years:

• Loss of Local Support: Insurgent groups have gradually lost momentum due to a decline in local support as
communities tire of the protracted conflict.
• Internal Disputes: Government efforts have succeeded in creating divisions among insurgent groups, further
weakening their influence.
• Diplomatic Success: India's diplomatic efforts have been successful in cutting off external support for
insurgents, particularly through cooperation with Bangladesh, Bhutan, and other neighboring countries.
• Peace Talks: The government has had success with peace accords, such as the 3rd Bodo Accord (2022),
Bru-Reang Agreement (2020), and the Karbi Anglong Agreement (2021), fostering political stability and
reducing violence.
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Way Forward:
• Enhanced Connectivity: Improving infrastructure and transportation links to integrate the North East with
the rest of India is critical.
• Strengthening Democratic Institutions: Reinforcing Gram Sabhas and autonomous councils will address
the political aspirations of various ethnic groups.
• Sustainable Development: Promoting eco-friendly industries such as horticulture and tourism will provide
employment while protecting the environment.
• Accountability and Governance: Establishing better accountability mechanisms for officials will improve
governance in the region.
• Gradual Repeal of AFSPA: Slowly withdrawing AFSPA in regions where insurgency has declined can help
build trust between the state and local populations.
• Speeding Up Infrastructural Projects: Removing bottlenecks in ongoing development projects will
accelerate the region’s economic progress.
• Upgrading Border Security: Enhancing security and surveillance in border areas will prevent illegal
immigration and cross-border insurgency.

Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA), 1958

1. Introduction
• AFSPA is a law enacted by Parliament that grants special powers to the armed forces in "disturbed
areas" to maintain public order.
• Recent controversy:
o Nagaland killings (by Assam Rifles) led to renewed calls for repeal from Naga groups and the
CMs of Nagaland and Meghalaya.

2. AFSPA's Geographic Scope

• Currently applicable in parts of the Northeast:
o Assam, Manipur, Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh (3 districts).
• Repealed from:
o Tripura (2015)
o Meghalaya (2018)
• Past Applications:
o Punjab (1983) → Later repealed.
o Jammu & Kashmir (1990) → Still in force.

3. Objective of AFSPA
• Based on Article 355 of the Constitution:
o The Union has a duty to protect states from internal disturbances.
o Enables the Central Government to declare disturbed areas and deploy armed forces.

4. Key Provisions of AFSPA

(A) Declaration of Disturbed Areas (Section 3)

• Governor or Central Government can declare any region as a "disturbed area."

• Reason: Presence of a dangerous situation requiring military deployment.

(B) Special Powers Granted to Armed Forces (Section 4)

1. Use of Force
o Can fire upon or use force, even if it causes death, after due warning.
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2. Destruction of Suspected Locations
o Can destroy arms dumps, hideouts, fortified positions, training camps.
3. Arrests Without Warrant
o Can arrest anyone suspected of committing a cognizable offense.
o Use of force allowed if required.
4. Search & Seizure
o Can enter & search premises without a warrant.
o Can seize arms, ammunition, explosives.
5. Vehicle/Vessel Check
o Can stop & search vehicles/vessels suspected of carrying armed militants.
6. Handover to Police
o Any arrested person must be presented to the police with least delay.

(C) Legal Immunity for Armed Forces

• No prosecution, suit, or legal proceeding can be initiated against army personnel without prior sanction
from the Central Government.

5. Arguments in Favor of AFSPA

• Necessary for National Security – Helps counter insurgents.
• Maintains Force Morale – Soldiers need protection from legal harassment.
• Prevents Insurgents from Gaining the Upper Hand – Critical in conflict zones.
• Legal Framework for Armed Forces in Civilian Areas – Without it, army intervention is restricted to
external threats.

6. Arguments Against AFSPA

• Human Rights Violations – Immunity encourages abuse.
• Radicalization of Locals – Leads to alienation in conflict regions.
• Supreme Court’s Observation (2016) – Armed forces cannot escape investigation for excesses.
• No Long-Term Solution – Insurgencies persist despite decades of AFSPA.

7. Checks & Balances on AFSPA

(A) Supreme Court Verdict (1998)

• AFSPA upheld as constitutional but with conditions:

o Periodic review every 6 months.
o Minimal force should be used.
o State consultation desirable before declaring an area "disturbed."

(B) Santosh Hegde Commission (Manipur, 2013)

• AFSPA impedes peace efforts in J&K and Northeast.

• Recommended:
o Review every 6 months to assess necessity.
o Time-bound decision (3 months) on prosecuting accused officers.
o No blanket immunity for security personnel.

(C) BP Jeevan Reddy Commission (2004)

• Recommended AFSPA repeal and inclusion of necessary provisions in UAPA (1967).

• Grievance redressal mechanisms in every district where AFSPA is enforced.

(D) Second Administrative Reforms Commission

• Recommended scrapping of AFSPA to reduce alienation in Northeast India.

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• Proposed an alternative policing model under UAPA (1967).

8. Way Forward
• Increased Transparency – Military must investigate violations and punish offenders.
• Periodic Review – Disturbed area status should be reassessed every 6 months.
• Balancing Security & Human Rights – AFSPA should be modified to ensure strict accountability.
• Trust-Building Measures – Encourage civilian-police cooperation over excessive militarization.

Terrorism
• Systematic use of violence to create a climate of fear in a population to achieve a particular political
objective.
• Unlawful use or threatened use of violence against civilians, often to fulfill political, religious, or
ideological goals.

2nd Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) Recommendations on

Defining Terrorism
The 2nd ARC Report suggests the following key elements in defining terrorism:

1. Use of Firearms, Explosives, or Lethal Substances

o Acts causing or likely to cause damage to life, property, and essential infrastructure.
o Includes installations with military significance.
2. Assassination or Attempted Assassination of Public Functionaries
o The intent must be to threaten India’s integrity, security, and sovereignty.
o Aimed at overawing public functionaries or terrorizing the population.
3. Detention, Kidnapping, or Threats to Life
o Forcing the government to act or abstain from acting in a specific manner.
o Example: Hostage crises, political abductions.
4. Providing or Facilitating Material Support for Terrorism
o Financial, logistical, or material aid to terrorist activities.
o Example: Terrorist funding networks, money laundering for terror groups.
5. Possession of Certain Arms and Membership in Terrorist Organizations
o Possession of banned weapons, explosives, or training in terrorism.
o Membership in designated terrorist groups leading to loss of life, injury, or property damage.

Challenges in Defining Terrorism

Despite being a global phenomenon, there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism due to the following
reasons:
1. Subjectivity in Perception:
o A ‘terrorist’ in one country may be considered a ‘freedom fighter’ in another.
o Some distinguish between revolutionary violence (aimed at overthrowing oppressive regimes) and
terrorism (aimed at spreading fear and chaos).
o Example: Armed resistance against colonial rule was seen as justified struggle by some but labeled
terrorism by others.
2. State-Sponsored Terrorism:
o Some states encourage, finance, or execute terrorism using clandestine agencies or hired agents
to:
▪ Destabilize another country’s government.
▪ Assassinate political leaders of rival states.
▪ Engage in proxy wars without direct involvement.
o Example: Pakistan’s ISI supporting terror groups in India.
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Terrorism in India
Jammu and Kashmir Militancy
Roots of Insurgency in J&K
• Began in late 1940s when Pakistan attacked India to capture Jammu & Kashmir.
• Persistent secessionist movements within J&K, aided and abetted by Pakistan.
• Post-1971 war: Secessionist activities reduced but resurfaced in the 1980s with large-scale infiltration and
insurgency.
• 1990s:
o Large-scale deployment of security forces to combat insurgency.
o Rise of Islamist fundamentalism and Al-Qaeda-inspired groups.
o Pakistan-based terror groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Harkat-
ul-Mujahideen (HuM), HUJI, and Al-Badr became active.
o Formation of JeM by Masood Azhar, who was released during IC-814 hijacking negotiations.

Government Measures to Handle Insurgency

1. Border Security Measures:
o Strict monitoring of cross-border terrorism through military operations.
o Abrogation of Article 370 and 35A (2019): Transformed J&K into two Union Territories (J&K
and Ladakh).
2. Democratic and Administrative Reforms:
o Local body elections re-established grassroots democracy in J&K and Ladakh.
o Direct elections for Panchayati Raj system to ensure accountability.
3. Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs):
o Cross-LoC trade and travel initiatives between J&K and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK).
4. PM’s Development Package for J&K (2015):
o ₹80,000 crore package for infrastructure and economic growth.

Current Security Situation in Kashmir

• Reduction in violence: North Kashmir, once a terrorist stronghold, is witnessing low levels of insurgency.
• South Kashmir remains a concern, but overall, infiltration attempts and terror recruitment have dropped.
• Terrorist recruitment declined from 143 in 2021 to 50 in 2022 (April).
• Terrorist activities have shifted:
o North Kashmir: Majority of terrorists are Pakistani nationals.
o South Kashmir: Majority of terrorists are local recruits.

Evidence of Reducing Terrorism in J&K

1. Falling local support for militants: Fewer instances of civilians helping terrorists escape or engaging in
stone-pelting.
2. No iconic status for terrorists: Unlike in the past (e.g., Burhan Wani case), no current militant figure has
attained mass following.
3. Elimination of terror leadership: Top militant commanders neutralized.
4. Limited geographical spread of militancy: Insurgency largely confined to Shopian and certain areas of
South Kashmir.

Strategic Shifts in Militancy

• Lack of experienced militant leadership due to elimination of senior commanders.
• Recruitment shift:
o Earlier: Age group 25-30 years.
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o Now: School dropouts and younger recruits (adolescents).
• Foreign militant activities:
o Pakistani terrorists operating in Srinagar with support from Overground Workers (OGWs).
• Use of new tactics:
o Drones to smuggle weapons and cash.
o Attempt to revive terrorism in previously peaceful areas (Reasi, Doda, Kishtwar).
• Radicalized individuals based in Pakistan are now acting as terror handlers.
• Bodies of killed militants not returned to prevent funeral gatherings from becoming radicalization events.

Challenges and Areas of Concern

1. Youth Radicalization via Social Media:
o Pakistani handlers use social media to influence Kashmiri youth.
o Instant recruitment tactic: New recruits ordered to commit violence immediately.
2. New Phase of Militancy (Post-2014):
o Radicalization through increased social media access (from 25% in 2010 to 70% in 2015).
o Rise of Islamist groups like Ansar Ghazwa-ul-Hind and Islamic State.
o Messaging apps (WhatsApp, Telegram) used for recruitment and attack coordination.
3. Surge in Local Militancy (2014-2020):
o Increase in Kashmiri youth joining militant groups.
o 2017: Indian Armed Forces launched ‘Operation All Out’ to eliminate terrorist networks.

Causes of Terrorism in India

Causes of Terrorism in India
1. Historical Factors

• Past Injustices & Distorted History:

o Regions historically alienated or marginalized have nurtured long-standing resentments.
• Examples:
o Jammu & Kashmir: Disputed interpretations of the Instrument of Accession among India, Pakistan,
and Kashmiri separatists.
o Northeast India: British colonial policies isolated the region from the mainstream nationalist
movement, contributing to insurgencies.

2. Religious Fundamentalism

• Exploitation of Religion for Terror:

o Certain agencies use religion to radicalize and mobilize people.
• Example:
o ISI’s 1991 Initiative: Prior to the Babri Masjid demolition, Pakistan’s ISI attempted to unite
Khalistani separatists in Punjab with Jammu & Kashmir terrorist groups to form a larger anti-India
front.

3. Ethnic Conflicts

• Ethnic Divisions Fuel Violence:

o Terrorism can stem from demands for separate political or cultural recognition based on ethnic
identity.
• Examples:
o Naga Insurgency (Nagaland)
o Mizo Insurgency (Mizoram)

4. Political Factors

• Lack of Political Representation:

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o Communities feeling excluded from governance may resort to violence as a means of asserting their
identity and rights.
• Examples:
o Northeast India (Pre-Statehood Reforms): Different ethnic groups within regions formerly part of
Assam demanded their own political representation.
o Mizo Insurgency: Resolved after the Mizo Accord (1986) granted statehood and political rights.

5. Human Rights Violations & Security Excesses

• Harsh Military Responses & Civilian Alienation:

o Excessive force by security agencies can provoke or exacerbate terrorism.
• Examples:
o AFSPA: Its alleged misuse in Jammu & Kashmir and Northeast India has contributed to community
grievances.
o Rohingya Crisis (Myanmar): Human rights abuses have led to radicalization and insurgent
activities.

6. Economic Factors

• Underdevelopment & Poverty:

o Economic disparities create fertile ground for extremist ideologies.
• Key Issues:
o Unequal distribution of resources
o Lack of jobs and opportunities
o Marginalized communities are more vulnerable to radicalization.
• Examples:
o Maoist/Naxalite Movement: Exploits economic discontent in economically backward central Indian
tribal areas.
o Development Divide: Notable disparities between regions (e.g., Northeast vs. the rest of India) and
between urban and rural areas.

7. Cross Border Terrorism and Support from State Actors

• External Influence on Terrorism:

o Cross-border terrorism, often supported by state actors, adds a complex external dimension to
domestic terrorism.
• Key Points:
o Cross Border Terrorism: Involvement of external groups or individuals operating from neighboring
countries to destabilize India.
o State Actor Support: Alleged backing from state actors (such as Pakistan and other external powers)
that provide arms, training, funds, or safe havens to terrorist groups, further exacerbating the threat.

Kinds of Terrorism

1. State-Sponsored Terrorism
State-sponsored terrorism refers to government support of violent non-state actors engaged in terrorism in other
countries.

Characteristics:
• Used as a deliberate instrument of foreign policy.
• Aimed at achieving clear foreign policy objectives, rather than merely grabbing media attention.
• Operates under fewer constraints, causing greater casualties.
• A cost-effective alternative to war, making accountability difficult.

Examples:
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• Pakistan’s Proxy War in India: Support to terrorist organizations like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-
Mohammed (JeM), etc.
• Cold War Era: The U.S. supported anti-communist rebels, including the Mujahideen during the Soviet-
Afghan War.
• Soviet Union: Also engaged in funding and supporting armed groups in rival states.
• Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Sudan, and Libya: Have been accused of sponsoring terrorism against their
adversaries.

2. Terrorism by Non-State Actors

Non-state actors engage in terrorism to influence national or international politics without formal state affiliation.

Characteristics:
• Operate independently but often receive indirect support from enemy states.
• Provide states with deniability.

Examples:
• Naxalites in India
• Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)
• Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
• 26/11 Mumbai Attacks: The role of Pakistan's ISI in supporting non-state actors is well-documented.

3. Ideology-Oriented Terrorism
A. Left-Wing Terrorism
• Driven by Marxist and communist ideologies, targeting the ruling elite.
• Seeks to overthrow capitalist systems through violent revolution.
• Examples: Maoists in India and Nepal.

B. Right-Wing Terrorism
• Aims to maintain the status quo or return to a perceived "ideal past."
• Often associated with nationalist, racist, or xenophobic ideologies.
• Examples:
o Nazi Germany under Hitler.
o Fascists in Italy under Mussolini.
o White supremacy movements like the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) in the U.S.

C. Religious Terrorism
• Driven by the belief that violence is a divine duty or sacramental act.
• Example: Jihadi terrorism in various parts of the world.

D. Ethno-Nationalist Terrorism
• Involves violence by ethnic groups demanding separate statehood or dominance.
• Examples:
o Tamil Nationalist groups in Sri Lanka.
o Insurgent groups in Northeast India.
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New Front Terror Organisations & Hybrid Terrorism

1. Targeted Killings and New Front Terror Organizations

• Since the 2019 constitutional reforms in J&K, many new terrorist organizations have emerged with secular-
sounding names, such as:
o The Resistance Front
o Anti-Fascist Force
o Kashmir Tigers
• Other Islamist-named groups include:
o Al Qisaas
o Al Jehad
o Muslim Janbaz Force
o Markazul al Arshad
• Most of these are fronts for existing terrorist organizations like:
o Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)
o Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM)
o Hizbul Mujahideen

Targeted Killings
• Security personnel, Kashmiri Pandit government employees, and migrants have been specifically targeted in
J&K.
• Objective: To create fear and disrupt communal harmony.

2. Hybrid Terrorists: The Changing Face of Terrorism

Hybrid terrorists do not follow conventional structures and operate differently from traditional terrorist groups.

Characteristics:
• Operate in small, loosely structured cells.
• Avoid social media exposure (unlike past terrorist groups).
• Lack advanced training—limited to using handguns and escaping.
• Target soft victims (unarmed civilians, off-duty security personnel).
• Not capable of large-scale or complex attacks.

Modus Operandi of Hybrid Terrorists:

• They lead normal lives—often students, professionals, or government employees.
• They have no criminal records and live with their families.
• They get "activated" for a single operation and then go back to normal life, making identification difficult.
• Supported by white-collar overground workers (teachers, civil servants, lawyers, journalists, businessmen).
o These overground workers provide financial, ideological, and logistical support.

Radicalisation & Information Warfare

1. Radicalisation
• Biggest threat to Kashmir’s security and stability.
• The decline of 'Kashmiriyat' has led to the rise of more fundamentalist interpretations of Islam.

Jamaat-e-Islami Ban (2019)

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• Banned for five years under anti-terror laws.
• Accused of being "in close touch" with militant outfits and escalating the secessionist movement.
• The ban helped to some extent, but radicalization remains a challenge.

Factors Contributing to Radicalisation:

• External influences (funding and ideology from Pakistan & Gulf nations).
• Social media propaganda distorting Kashmir’s syncretic ethos.

2. Information Warfare
• Information warfare plays a key role in radicalization and propaganda.
• Pakistan and Turkey actively support propaganda against India.
• Tactics used in information war:
o Spreading fabricated stories to manufacture victimhood.
o Amplifying small incidents and blowing them out of proportion.
o Eliminating any Kashmiri who challenges the Pakistani narrative.
o Using social media platforms, online magazines, and pamphlets (in Hindi and other languages) to
spread jihadist propaganda.

Objective of Information Warfare:

1. Create international sympathy for separatist movements.
2. Demonize India's actions in Kashmir.
3. Instigate local youth into militancy by fostering resentment.
4. Use collateral damage incidents (security check-posts, anti-terror operations) to fuel anger.

New Means of Terrorism

1. Environmental Terrorism
• Intentional damage to the environment to create large-scale destruction.
• Example: Saddam Hussein’s detonation of over 1,000 oil wells during the Gulf War of 1991.

2. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs)

Weapons that can cause indiscriminate large-scale damage.

A. Chemical Weapons
• Includes toxic chemicals like ricin, sarin, botulinum toxin, and nerve agents.
• Example: Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) restricts their use.

B. Nuclear Weapons
• Terrorist groups seek nuclear materials, but enrichment complexities limit access.
• Example: Al-Qaeda's attempts to acquire nuclear weapons.

C. Biological Weapons (Bioterrorism)

• The deliberate release of viruses or bacteria to cause disease.
• Examples:
o Theoretical link between COVID-19 and bio-warfare suspicions.
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o Anthrax attacks in the U.S. (2001).

3. Cyber Terrorism
Terrorism involving cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure.

Functions of Cyber Terrorism:

• Used for recruitment, propaganda, and coordination.
• Targets IT systems to cause loss of integrity, availability, and confidentiality.

Outcomes of Cyber Terrorism:

• Loss of Integrity: Data manipulation, fraud, or misinformation.
• Loss of Availability: Disruption of essential services.
• Loss of Confidentiality: Unauthorized information disclosure.
• Physical Destruction: Cyber-attacks on power grids, transportation, etc.

4. Suicide Terrorism
• Attacks where terrorists willingly sacrifice their lives to inflict maximum damage.

Examples:

• 1991: First suicide attack in Kashmir by Fedayeen.

• 2001: Attack on the Indian Parliament, nearly leading to war with Pakistan.
• 2002: Attack on Akshardham Temple, Gujarat.
• Rajiv Gandhi & Beant Singh assassinations involved suicide bombers.

5. Terrorism in the Hinterland

Refers to terrorism in urban and non-border areas within a country.

Examples:

• 1993 Bombay Blasts

• 2001 Parliament Attack
• 2016 Pathankot Attack

Effects of Terrorism
Terrorism has far-reaching consequences that impact a country’s economy, society, governance, and politics. It
disrupts development, weakens governance structures, and creates psychological trauma among citizens. Below is an
analysis of its key effects:

1. Economic Effects
a) Disruption of Economic Activities
• Conflict and terrorism have hindered the economic growth of regions like Jammu & Kashmir.
• The industrial sector remains underdeveloped due to constant instability.
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b) Damage to Property
• 9/11 attacks caused massive destruction of lives and infrastructure, with the Twin Towers reduced to
rubble.
• Blasts in Indian cities like Delhi and Mumbai have resulted in significant loss of property and human
lives.

c) Higher Expenditure on Defence and Security

• Terrorism increases defence spending, diverting funds from developmental activities.
• India’s defence budget is the 7th largest globally, and it is the 2nd largest arms importer—a direct result
of security challenges.

d) Increased Market Uncertainty

• Financial markets react negatively to terrorist incidents.
• After 26/11, Mumbai’s stock markets opened 1.5% lower, and after 9/11, global markets took months to
recover.

e) Decline in Investments
• Investors hesitate to invest in terror-prone countries due to uncertainty.
• However, strategic projects like CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) show that foreign
investments may still flow in, despite terrorism, if other economic incentives exist.

2. Psychological Effects
• Survivors and affected families suffer from acute stress disorder (ASD) and post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD).
• Psychological trauma lingers for years, impacting both victims and witnesses.

3. Political Effects
a) Non-engagement of Youth in Politics
• Radicalization leads to youth disengagement from politics and involvement in militant groups.
• Example: Youth in Kashmir are often misled by terror propaganda.
• The killing of Burhan Wani (2016) and low voter turnout in the 2017 Srinagar by-polls highlight
disillusionment with democracy.

b) Erosion of Credibility of Elected Representatives

• In the Srinagar Lok Sabha by-polls of 2017, turnout was only 7.14%, raising doubts about the legitimacy of
elected leaders.

4. Governance Effects
a) Erosion of Faith in Government
• In conflict zones like Kashmir, people lose trust in state institutions, leading to anti-government protests
and unrest.
• Example: Frequent incidents of stone-pelting in Kashmir show discontent with governance.

b) Deterioration of Law and Order

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• Terrorism weakens law enforcement by increasing attacks on police and security forces.
• Example: Kashmir and Left-Wing Extremism (LWE) areas have witnessed a rise in attacks on police
personnel.

5. Social Effects
a) Disintegration of Society
• Terrorism creates deep divisions within society, forcing people to flee their homes.
• Example:
o Kashmiri Pandit exodus (1990s) due to insurgency.
o Tribal communities in Naxal-affected areas suffer harassment from both Maoists and security
forces.

b) Atmosphere of Fear, Suspicion, and Panic

• People live in a constant state of fear, affecting daily life and social harmony.

Anti-Terror Laws in India

India has enacted several stringent anti-terrorism laws, though some were later repealed due to concerns over
misuse of power.

1. National Security Act (NSA), 1980

• Empowers the Union or State governments to detain individuals who pose a threat to national security.

2. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), 1967

• Allows the government to declare organizations as unlawful if they engage in terrorist activities.
• Expanded through amendments to strengthen counter-terrorism measures.

3. Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), 2002

• Enacted after IC-814 hijacking (1999) and Parliament attack (2001).
• Challenged in Supreme Court (PUCL vs Union of India) but upheld with restrictions.
• Later repealed in 2004 due to alleged misuse by some state governments.

26/11 and Changes Thereafter

The 26/11 Mumbai attacks marked a watershed moment in India's security landscape. The scale, planning, and
execution of the attack prompted sweeping reforms in India's counterterrorism framework.

Key Measures Taken After 26/11

1. National Investigation Agency (NIA) Act, 2008
• Established NIA as a central agency for counterterrorism investigations.
• Aims to maintain high international standards in investigating national security threats.
• Serves as a deterrent for existing and potential terror groups.
• Functions as a storehouse of terror-related intelligence for better coordination.
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2. National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID)
• A post-26/11 intelligence mechanism that integrates multiple databases to track terror suspects.
• Uses Big Data & analytics to process information from:
o Immigration records
o Banking transactions
o Telecom data
o Law enforcement agencies
• Bridges the gap in real-time intelligence sharing, which was a major failure during 26/11.

3. Establishment of Four National Security Guard (NSG) Hubs

• NSG, originally set up in 1984, was decentralized after 26/11.
• Four regional NSG hubs established in:
o Mumbai
o Kolkata
o Chennai
o Hyderabad
• Ensures faster response time for counterterrorism operations.

4. Counterinsurgency & Anti-Terrorism (CIAT) Schools

• 20 schools established across states affected by insurgency and terrorism.
• Trains police personnel to combat terrorism and Naxalism.
• States with operational CIAT schools:
o Assam, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, Manipur, Nagaland, West Bengal, Tripura.

5. Amendments to Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA)

• Expanded in 2008 & 2012 to tackle terrorism financing.
• Strengthened punishment for raising terror funds.
• Included offences by companies, societies, and trusts.
• Strengthened India's compliance with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

6. Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) Reorganization

• Revamped in 2009 to streamline intelligence sharing.
• Functions under the Intelligence Bureau (IB).
• Collects terror-related intelligence from all agencies and shares it with state authorities.

7. Strengthening Coastal & Maritime Security

• Indian Navy designated as the lead agency for coastal security.
• Coastal Security Scheme introduced:
o 64 coastal police stations operationalized.
o 47 interceptor boats provided to coastal states and UTs.
• National Committee for Strengthening Maritime and Coastal Security (NCSMCS) formed, headed by the
Cabinet Secretary.
• Modern surveillance systems deployed:
o 74 Automatic Identification System (AIS) receivers for gapless coastal coverage.
o Coastal patrolling by Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Police increased.

8. National Police Mission (NPM)

• Aims to modernize and reform policing to handle asymmetric warfare and urban terrorism.
• Focuses on:
o Specialization in counterterrorism and insurgency.
o Strengthening metropolitan and rural policing.
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o Promoting community policing & gender sensitization.
o Harnessing technology for policing.

9. Better Equipment for Security Forces

• Coastal security reviewed and enhanced.
• Coastal states & UTs provided with modern boats and equipment.

10. Anti-Terrorism Squads (ATS) to Deradicalize Youth

• ATS teams set up in multiple states with a focus on deradicalization.
• Aim to prevent youth from being recruited into terrorist organizations.

The 26/11 attacks forced India to redefine its counterterrorism approach. The measures taken have significantly
strengthened India's intelligence-sharing, rapid response, coastal security, and counterterrorism infrastructure.
While challenges remain, these steps have enhanced India's preparedness against future threats.

Terror Financing
1. Importance of Countering Terror Financing (TF)

• Terrorism relies on financial resources for recruitment, planning, and execution.

• Cutting off financial flows is essential to weakening terrorist networks.

2. Sources of Terror Financing

A. External Sources

• Counterfeit Currency: Fake Indian Currency Notes (FICN) produced in Pakistan and smuggled through
Nepal, Bangladesh, and Myanmar.
• Drug Trafficking (Narco-Finance): Afghanistan is a major opiate hub, with Pakistani groups exploiting drug
money for TF.
• Charities, NGOs & Donations:
o Radical charities and NGOs (e.g., Jamaat-ud-Dawa) collect funds under the guise of social work.
o Religious donations (Zakat) are sometimes diverted for TF.
o Funds flow into India through hawala networks, cash transactions, and legal banking routes.
• Diaspora Contributions:
o Some extremist elements within the diaspora financially support terrorist groups.
o Post-disaster relief efforts (e.g., after the 2005 Pakistan earthquake) have been misused for TF.
• Remittances:
o Gulf-based financiers have supported groups like SIMI & Indian Mujahideen.
o Large foreign remittance inflows into Kerala have raised concerns.
• State Sponsorship:
o Pakistan’s ISI directly funds terrorist activities, including the 26/11 Mumbai attacks.
o Uses charities, drug trafficking, counterfeiting, and zakat for TF.

B. Internal Sources

• Extortion & Illegal Taxation:

o Maoist and Northeastern insurgent groups impose levies on businesses, transport, and government
projects.
o Contracts are awarded to sympathizers to divert government funds.
• Crime-Based Funding:
o Human trafficking, arms smuggling, and gold smuggling generate revenue.
o Criminal syndicates like Dawood Ibrahim’s network engage in illegal trade to finance terrorism.
• Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs):
o Casinos, real estate, and precious metals trade are exploited to launder TF money.
o Lack of regulation enables benami transactions and money layering.
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3. India’s Response to Terror Financing

A. Legal Framework & Enforcement Agencies

• Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002:

o Prevents money laundering and confiscates illicit funds.
o Requires reporting of suspicious transactions to Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU-IND).
• Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), 1967 (Amended 2013):
o Covers proceeds of terrorism, fundraising by individuals or groups, and TF by companies, societies,
and trusts.
• National Investigation Agency (NIA):
o Established a Terror Funding and Fake Currency (TFFC) Cell to investigate TF cases.
• Enforcement Directorate (ED):
o Investigates financial crimes linked to TF and coordinates internationally.
• Combating Financing of Terrorism (CFT) Cell (MHA, 2011):
o Coordinates with intelligence and enforcement agencies to combat TF.

B. International Cooperation

• Financial Action Task Force (FATF):

o India is a full member and follows FATF recommendations to curb TF.
• Eurasian Group (EAG) & Asia Pacific Group (APG):
o India collaborates on anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terror financing (CFT) measures.

C. Policy Interventions

• Demonetization (2016):
o Aimed to curb black money and terror financing.
o Though not a complete solution, it disrupted hawala and counterfeit currency networks.
• Regulation of NGOs & Donations:
o Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act (FCRA) monitors foreign funding of NGOs.
• Suspicious Transaction Reporting & Financial Intelligence:
o Banks and financial institutions required to report high-risk transactions.
o FIU-IND tracks and analyzes financial data related to TF.

4. Holistic Strategy for Combating Terror Financing

1. Preventing Terrorists from Raising, Moving, and Using Funds:
o Stricter banking regulations, NGO audits, and financial tracking.
2. Targeted Financial Sanctions:
o Blacklisting TF networks under UAPA & FATF guidelines.
3. Protecting Vulnerable Sectors:
o Tightening regulations on real estate, casinos, and hawala transactions.
4. Enhancing International Cooperation:
o Strengthening intelligence-sharing with global partners.

Counter-Terrorism Strategy
1. Preparedness Against Terrorism
• Intelligence Gathering: Crucial for prevention; NATGRID aids intelligence collation post-26/11.
• Training: CIATs established for counterterrorism training.
• Mock Drills: Regular security drills in vulnerable areas to minimize casualties.
• Securing Key Installations: Protection of army bases, police stations, and national buildings (e.g.,
Pathankot, Uri attacks).
2. Counter-Terrorism Operations
• Rapid Response: NSG plays a key role, but SOPs need standardization (e.g., Pathankot operation).
• Investigations: NIA is the primary agency; needs strengthening for better prosecution.
• Prosecution: Speedy and fair trials; false cases should be prevented.
3. Comprehensive Strategy to Counter Terrorism
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• Multi-Pronged Approach: Socio-economic development and security must go hand in hand.
• Political Consensus: National strategy with state-specific plans for effective implementation.
• Good Governance & Development: Clean, corruption-free administration for effective policy
execution.
• Rule of Law: Government agencies must operate within legal frameworks, enacting new laws if needed.
• Countering Subversion: Address terrorist and Maoist propaganda using psychological warfare and
media management.
• Legal Framework: Special laws required to prosecute terrorists, ensuring safeguards against misuse.
• Capacity Building: Strengthening intelligence, security agencies, civil administration, and society.
• Crisis Management: A strategy covering prevention, mitigation, relief, and rehabilitation.
4. Role of Citizens, Civil Society & Media
• Education:
o Addresses root causes of alienation and discord.
o Madrassas should promote the true essence of Islam to counter jihadist propaganda.
o Changing mindsets through education to foster peace.
• Civil Society:
o Recognized in the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2006).
o NGOs & local groups can provide grassroots intelligence.
o Advisory role in awareness campaigns and community healing.
• Media:
o Can shape public opinion positively or negatively.
o Terrorists exploit media coverage for publicity.
o A responsible media policy should ensure transparency, fairness, and self-restraint.
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LINKAGES BETWEEN THE DEVELOPMENT

AND SPREAD OF EXTREMISM
• Extremism refers to a situation where an individual or a group possesses extreme views and thoughts
without the scope of entertaining the views of others.
• People with an extremist ideology do not refrain from taking extreme actions including resorting to
violence to achieve their objectives.
• Extremism can manifest itself in various forms including left-wing extremism (LWE), religious
fundamentalism, communalism, Nazism, Fascism and insurgency.
• Development can be defined as the process of expanding people’s capabilities and choices.

Development means a qualitative change which is always value positive.

• This means that development cannot take place unless there is an increment or addition to the existing
conditions.
• Development occurs when positive growth takes place.
• Yet, positive growth does not always lead to development.
• Development occurs when there is a positive change in quality.

Relationship between underdevelopment and Extremism:

• It is a Bidirectional relationship where one leads to another. This is a vicious cycle.

How Extremism Results in Underdevelopment?

Direct destruction:
• Extremist violence: Attacks on infrastructure like schools, hospitals, and businesses cripple communities
and hamper economic progress.
o Naxalite-Maoist Insurgency: Attacks on infrastructure in Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Odisha. For
instance, in 2021, Maoists burned a school in Sukma, Chhattisgarh, and frequently sabotage railway
tracks to disrupt government operations.
o Kashmir Conflict: Militant attacks on businesses and telecom infrastructure, such as the 2022
targeted killing of non-local laborers and traders, crippling economic activity.
• Displacement and migration: People fleeing violence lose homes, livelihoods, and access to essential
services, further straining resources.
o Kashmiri Pandit Exodus (1990s): Over 300,000 Hindus fled Kashmir due to militant threats,
losing homes and livelihoods.
o Northeast Displacement: Ethnic clashes in Manipur (2023) and Assam (Bodo conflicts) forced
thousands into camps, straining resources in cities like Guwahati.
• Disruption of trade and investment: Instability and insecurity scare away investors and businesses,
hindering economic growth.
o Jammu & Kashmir Tourism Decline: Militancy reduced tourist footfall from 1.2 million
(2012) to near-zero during peak conflict periods.
o Mining in Red Corridor: Rich mineral reserves in Dantewada (Chhattisgarh) remain untapped
due to Maoist threats, deterring companies like NMDC.

Indirect impacts:
• Increased militarization: Governments divert resources from development towards security, neglecting
crucial sectors like education and healthcare.
o Heavy military presence diverts funds from development. Reimbursement under the Security
Related Expenditure (SRE) scheme is recurring and continuous in nature. In last 05 years Rs.
1685.65 crore have been released to the Left Wing Extremism (LWE) affected states.
 P a g e | 44
• Eroding trust and social cohesion: Fear and division make it difficult for communities to cooperate and
work together for progress.
o Manipur Ethnic Clashes (2023): Meitei-Kuki violence disrupted cooperative farming and trade.
• Restrictions on freedom and education: Extremism often seeks to control information and suppress
dissent, hindering critical thinking and innovation.
o Internet Shutdowns in Kashmir: Frequent blackouts (e.g., post-2019 Article 370 revocation) limit
access to education and dissent.
o Attacks on Schools: Maoists bomb government schools in Jharkhand to oppose "state
propaganda," depriving children of education.
• Psychological trauma: Violence and fear leave deep scars on individuals and communities, hindering
their ability to participate in development efforts.
o Nearly 1.8 million adults (45% of the population) in the Kashmir Valley show symptoms of
significant mental distress according to a comprehensive mental health survey conducted by the
medical humanitarian organisation Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without Borders (MSF)
between October and December 2015.
• Radicalization of youth: Young people exposed to extremist narratives lose opportunities for education
and positive engagement, perpetuating the cycle of violence.
o Kashmir Militancy: Burhan Wani’s death (2016) spurred youth recruitment into groups like
Hizbul Mujahideen.
o Online Radicalization: Kerala cases (e.g., 2016 ISIS recruitment) show vulnerable youths
targeted via social media.
• Environmental degradation: Conflict often leads to unsustainable resource exploitation and pollution,
harming the environment and impacting livelihoods.
o Illegal Mining in Bastar: Maoists exploit forests for funding, causing deforestation.
o Oil Spills in Assam: ULFA militants sabotage pipelines, polluting ecosystems (e.g., 2020
Dibrugarh spill affecting Brahmaputra tributaries).

How underdevelopment leads to Extremism?

Seeds of Discontent:
• Poverty and lack of opportunity: Poverty, unemployment and pessimism makes individuals more
susceptible to radical narratives offering quick solutions.
o Naxalite Recruitment in Jharkhand: Poor tribal youth in mineral-rich but underdeveloped districts
like Palamu join Maoist groups due to unemployment and lack of alternatives.
• Unequal distribution of resources: Feelings of injustice and resentment fuels anger and can make
individuals receptive to ideologies promising to overthrow the existing order.
o Bastar, Chhattisgarh: Tribal communities displaced by mining projects (e.g., Bailadila iron ore
mines) see profits flow to corporations while they remain impoverished, fueling support for
Maoist "resistance."
o Assam Tea Gardens: Workers in British-era plantations live in poverty , while profits go to
absentee owners, creating resentment exploited by groups like ULFA.
• Lack of education and critical thinking skills: Limited education makes individuals more vulnerable to
manipulation and propaganda. They might struggle to critically evaluate information and fall prey to
extremist messages that exploit their emotions and biases.
o Rumors in Jharkhand: Uneducated villagers in Gumla district believed fake WhatsApp forwards
about child kidnappers in 2017, leading to mob lynchings and communal tension.

Broken Ground:
• Weak governance and corruption: When institutions fail to address people's concerns and corruption
runs rampant, trust erodes. This creates a vacuum where extremist groups can promise security and
justice, even if through violent means. Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup
 P a g e | 45
o MGNREGA Scams in Odisha: Funds meant for rural employment are siphoned by corrupt
officials, leaving villagers jobless and angry. Maoists exploit this to recruit (e.g., Koraput
district).
• Discrimination and marginalization: Feeling excluded based on religion, ethnicity, or other factors
breeds alienation and fuels the perception of "us vs. them." This makes individuals more likely to join
groups claiming to champion their identity and fight for their rights.
• Conflicts and instability: Ongoing violence and insecurity create chaos and fear. This breakdown of
social order weakens communities and provides extremist groups with opportunities to recruit and
expand their influence.
o Manipur Ethnic Violence (2023): State failure to address Kuki-Meitei tensions led to arson and
displacement, allowing militant groups (e.g., KNA, UNLF) to expand recruitment.

Solutions:
1. Economic Development
• Skill India with Localized Vocational Hubs
o Implementation: Partner with industries to design
region-specific training (e.g., agri-tech in Punjab,
handicrafts in Kashmir, mining safety in
Jharkhand).
o Example: Telangana’s "KCR Kit" for ITI
graduates includes tools and stipends to start
micro-enterprises.
• Land Rights and Resource Equity
o Implementation: Expedite Forest Rights Act (2006) claims for tribal communities in Maoist-affected
states (Chhattisgarh, Odisha) to reduce alienation.
• SMEs with Conflict-Zone Incentives
o Implementation: Tax holidays and subsidies for SMEs in Jammu & Kashmir, Northeast, and Red
Corridor districts.
2. Social Development
Strategic Actions:
• Universal Basic Services with Conflict Sensitivity
o Implementation: Expand Ayushman Bharat to include trauma care in conflict zones (e.g., mobile
clinics in Manipur).
• Social Inclusion via Grassroots Platforms
o Implementation: Revive "Peace Committees" with mixed ethnic/religious representation (e.g.,
Nagaland’s tribal councils).
• Youth Engagement Beyond Tokenism
o Implementation: Expand "Yuva Sangam" to include conflict-zone youth in national exchange
programs.
3. Governance & Justice
Strategic Actions:
• Anti-Corruption with Tech-Driven Transparency
o Implementation: Mandate social audits for schemes like MGNREGA in high-risk districts using
blockchain (e.g., Andhra’s "Real-Time Monitoring System").
• Decentralized Conflict Resolution
o Implementation: Train panchayats in mediation for land disputes and ethnic tensions (modeled on
Kerala’s "Janamaithri" police initiative).
• Fast-Track Courts for Hate Crimes
o Implementation: Special NIA courts for communal violence and extremist crimes to deter impunity.

4. Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)

Strategic Actions:
• Counter-Narratives via Local Influencers
 P a g e | 46
o Implementation: Engage Sufi clerics in Kashmir, tribal elders in Bastar, and YouTube creators to
debunk extremist propaganda.
• Community-Led Deradicalization
o Implementation: Kerala’s "Pravasalokam" model: Use returned ISIS families to educate villages on
extremism’s pitfalls.
• Sports as a Bridge
o Implementation: Build sports academies in conflict zones (e.g., football in Manipur, cricket in
Kashmir).

Contextual, Sustainable & Collaborative Strategies

• Data-Driven Targeting
o Use the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) to map extremism-prone districts (e.g., 30 "Red
Zones") and allocate resources proportionally.
• Long-Term Infrastructure for Trust
o Deploy the "Aspirational Districts Program" in conflict regions with 10-year commitments (e.g.,
Kupwara in J&K, Sukma in Chhattisgarh).
• Public-Private-People Partnerships (PPPP)
o Replicate "SAMADHAN" (Naxal strategy) for Northeast insurgency: Combine Army, state police,
NGOs (e.g., Ramakrishna Mission in Assam), and corporates (e.g., Tata’s skill centers in Jharkhand).
• Gender-Inclusive Approaches
o Train women’s SHGs as "peace ambassadors" (e.g., "Nari Shakti" in Chhattisgarh blocked Maoist
recruitment in 40 villages).

By investing in sustainable development, promoting good governance, fostering social inclusion, and countering
violent extremism, we can break the cycle of underdevelopment and extremism, creating a more peaceful and
prosperous future for all.
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LINKAGES BETWEEN ORGANISED CRIMES

AND TERRORISM
Organised Crime:
Organized crime refers to criminal activities that are planned, directed, and carried out by structured groups,
often with a focus on generating profits or power through illicit activities like trafficking, money laundering, or
extortion.

Characteristics of the Organized crime syndicates:

• Continuity:
o Operates beyond the lifetime of individual members.
o Structured to survive changes in leadership.
• Structure:
o Organized as a collection of hierarchically arranged interdependent offices dedicated to specific
functions.
o Can be highly structured or somewhat fluid, but ranks are based on power and authority.
• Membership:
o Restricted to individuals sharing common traits (ethnicity, criminal background, or interests).
o New members are rigorously vetted for worth and loyalty.
o Membership rules include secrecy, a readiness to act for the group, and a commitment to protect
the group.
o In return, members receive economic benefits, prestige, and protection from law enforcement.
• Criminality:
o Relies on continuous criminal activities to generate income (e.g., supplying illegal goods, murder,
intimidation, bribery).
o Involvement may span both legitimate and illegitimate businesses.
o Continuing criminal conspiracy is an inherent part of organized crime.
• Violence:
o Violence or the threat of it is used internally to maintain discipline and externally to protect the
group's economic interests.
o Members are expected to commit, condone, or authorize violent acts.
• Power/Profit Goal:
o Aims to maximize profits and gain political power.
o Political power is often achieved through corruption of public officials and association with
"protectors."

Corrupt public officials, attorneys, and businessmen protect the criminal group through abuses of status or
privilege. Their efforts insulate the group from civil and criminal government actions. Central tool of protection
is Corruption along with a network of corrupt officials shields the group from the justice system.

Differences Between Organized Criminal Groups and Terrorist Groups

1. Motives & Objectives

• Organized Criminal Groups: Aim to gain and enlarge their own profit and achieve economic power,
eventually legalizing these profits.
• Terrorist Groups: Act on idealistic goals aimed at reforming social reality and accomplishing particular
political aims.

2. Methods & Means

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• Organized Criminal Groups: Use smaller arms and relatively lesser violent means, Their criminal
activities are aimed at generating income through various illicit means (e.g., bribery, smuggling).
• Terrorist Groups: Use extremely violent methods, Employ forbidden and socially unacceptable means
to achieve their political goals.

3. Visibility of Activities

• Organized Criminal Groups:

o Secrecy: They operate underground and keep their activities hidden.
o They do not publicly reveal their goals or political aspirations.
• Terrorist Groups:
o Openness: They openly declare their goals and claim responsibility for attacks.
o This is done to gain support from specific target groups and to signal their determination.

4. Relationship with the State

• Organized Criminal Groups:

o Parallel Operation: They work alongside the state without direct confrontation.
o They rely on infiltration, bribery, and maintaining selective antagonism to certain government
levels.
• Terrorist Groups:
o Confrontational: They have an antagonistic relationship with the state.
o Their aim is to challenge and change the existing government structure.

Similarities Between Organized Crime and Terrorism

• Criminal Means & Societal Impact:
o Both use criminal methods to achieve their objectives.
o Their actions are harmful to society.
• Member Profiles & Recruitment:
o Both groups tend to recruit members from marginalized social groups burdened by social or
political frustrations.
o Members are often attracted by excitement, thrill, and risk-taking, and tend to reject conventional
societal norms.
• Legal Consequences & Technological Use:
o Both are illegal and punishable by law.
o They often use the latest technological developments for novel, high-tech forms of criminal
activity.
• Planning & Internal Discipline:
o Both engage in detailed planning and preparation for their illegal activities.
o They maintain strict internal discipline with rigorous rules and an internal punishment system for
disobedience.
• Secrecy, Violence & Intimidation:
o Both operate in secrecy and confidentiality.
o They use violence and the threat of violence to achieve their goals and to intimidate others.
• Interconnection & Overlap:
o The similarities between them make organized crime and terrorism often interchangeable and
intertwined.
o Some terrorist groups finance their activities through organized crime, while some criminal
organizations develop political ambitions and use terrorism to achieve them.

Growing Proximity Between Organized Criminal Groups and Terrorist

Groups
Key Factors Driving the Proximity
 P a g e | 49
• Globalization:
o Enhanced interactions and improved working relationships due to globalization.
• Technology:
o Rapid spread of technology has accelerated the linking process between the two.
• Funding Shifts:
o The global war on terror and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan reduced
traditional funding for terror groups, pushing them to rely on criminal funds.
o After 9/11 attacks increased scrutinuy on state sponsored terrorism pushed terrorists to seek
funding from other sources.
o Criminal activities generate funds that can be laundered by organized crime to finance terrorism.
• Mutual Expansion:
o Organized criminal groups see cooperation as a way to expand their global reach.
o Terrorist groups benefit from alternative funding sources provided by organized criminals.

Threats Posed by These Linkages

• Weak Governance:
o Developing countries with weak rule of law are particularly vulnerable to penetration by these
networks.
o Such linkages can lead to state co-option or further weakening of governance.
• Economic & Security Impact:
o Undermines stability and free markets.
o Promotes excessive corruption in governance.
o Example: In Somalia, the control of territory and illegal activities by both groups acts as a force
multiplier, making it harder for security agencies to intervene.
• Resource Sharing & Operational Synergy:
o Close cooperation leads to the sharing of resources, making the combined entities more
dangerous.
o Organized criminal groups provide steady alternate funding, complicating counter-terrorism
efforts.
o Their strong alliance makes it increasingly difficult for law enforcement to capture and dismantle
them.

Linkages Between Organized Crime and Terrorist Groups:

The nexus between terrorism and organized crime poses a significant challenge for India. Following 9/11, the UNSC
recognized this link, highlighting how terrorism's political motives often intertwine with organized crime's profit-
driven nature. While terrorism is overt and violent, organized crime is usually covert and non-violent, yet both may
collaborate or overlap in roles. Increasing scrutiny of state-sponsored terrorism post-9/11 forced terrorist groups to
rely more on criminal activities for funding. These activities include the hawala system, misuse of charities, credit
card fraud, and illegal arms sales. Advances in technology, social media, and the dark web have further strengthened
this crime-terror nexus, often extending across borders. For instance, in Europe, data reveals that 50-80% of IS recruits
had a criminal background.

I. Understanding the Linkages

1. Coexistence:
o Both groups may exist in the same region without formal collaboration.
o Despite differing objectives, they sometimes maintain distance.
2. Cooperation:
o Formal partnerships may arise, with organized crime groups supplying forged documents, sim cards,
mobile phones, vehicles, and arms.
o These groups also assist terrorists with funding and trafficking routes for logistical support.
Examples:
• 2004 Madrid Attacks: Eastern European criminal groups provided support to Al-Qaeda.
• 1993 Bombay Blast: Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) received aid from a criminal cell (D Company).
3. Confluence (Merging of Roles):
 P a g e | 50
o Criminal groups may engage in terrorism, while terrorist organizations may adopt criminal activities.
Examples:
• Taliban: Controls poppy production, blending drug trade with terrorism.
• ISIS: Involved in selling oil on international black markets.

II. Financial Support for Terrorism

1. Shift in Funding Sources:
o As traditional funding sources face global restrictions, terrorists increasingly rely on organized crime
profits.
2. Mechanisms of Financial Support:
o Arms Trade & Money Laundering: Profits from criminal activities are funneled into terrorist
operations.
Examples:
• Taliban: Financed heavily through opium production.
• FARC (Colombian Terrorist organization): Used drug trafficking, kidnapping, and
extortion to sustain its activities.
III. Major Forms of Criminal-Terrorist Linkages
1. Narco-Terrorism:
o Combines drug trafficking with terrorist activities, funding extremist groups.
o Impacts security, governance, and law enforcement worldwide.
Examples:
• Taliban: Profits from opium trade in Afghanistan's Helmand province.
• Hezbollah: Involved in global drug trafficking and money laundering.
• LeT (India-specific): Linked to the drug trade in Kashmir to fund militant operations.
2. Human Trafficking:
o Generates revenue and recruits vulnerable individuals for terrorist activities.
o Exploits vulnerable populations for labor, exploitation, and radicalization.
Examples:
• Boko Haram: Engaged in kidnapping women and girls for forced labor and ransom.
• Rohingya Crisis (India-specific): Raises concerns about terrorist recruitment and
exploitation.
3. Arms Trafficking:
o Provides terrorist groups with access to firearms, explosives, and enhanced operational capabilities.
o Contributes to regional instability by fueling conflicts.
Examples:
• Al-Shabaab: Smuggles weapons to sustain violence in Somalia.
• LeT and JeM (India-specific): Acquire weapons via trafficking networks from Pakistan for
attacks in Jammu and Kashmir.
4. Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources:
o Generates revenue for terrorist groups and expands their influence in conflict zones.
o Exploits power vacuums and destabilizes regions.
Examples:
• DRC Armed Groups: Control and exploit minerals like tantalum, tin, tungsten, and gold to
finance violence.
• Coal Smuggling in Jharkhand (India-specific): Naxalite-Maoist groups extort coal mine
owners, funding their insurgent activities.
IV. Technology and Globalization
• Advances in communication, technology, and open borders have enhanced criminal-terrorist cooperation.
• These developments enable resource sharing, coordinated attacks, and expanded operational reach.
 P a g e | 51
Linkages Between Organized Criminal Groups and Terrorist Groups in
India
Organized crime and terrorism in India often intersect through various criminal activities and financial networks.
Their connections vary by region and can be seen in direct cooperation, functional convergence, or indirect support.

Regional Linkages

Naxal-Affected Areas

• Extortion & Threats:

o Naxal groups routinely extort and threaten public officials in their areas.
• Illegal Economic Activities:
o They protect and support illegal mining operations and are involved in significant cannabis
production and trade.
o Engage in narco-trafficking, human trafficking, and wildlife trafficking.
• Cross-Border Movement:
o Provide support for moving between India and Myanmar.
• Criminal Diversification:
o Some formal insurgents are increasingly engaging in organized criminal activities like abductions
and extortion.

Kashmir

• External Funding:
o Militancy in Kashmir is primarily funded by external state funds rather than through organized
crime.
• Criminal Activities:
o Terror groups in Kashmir are involved in narco-trafficking and smuggling fake currency.
• Operational Support:
o Organized crime supports terror groups with ground workers who help with logistics, fundraising,
propaganda, recruitment, and planning of attacks.
• Counterfeit Operations:
o Terrorists play a major role in circulating counterfeit currency that fuels terrorism and spreads to
other parts of India.

North-East India

• Funding Through Crime:

o Extortion is the key funding mechanism, alongside widespread kidnapping.
• Additional Criminal Activities:
o Human trafficking, drug trafficking, and gun running are common.
• Economic Exploitation:
o Militant groups manipulate local economies by threatening or bribing government officials,
ensuring that essential commodities (e.g., rice, fuel) reach them to be sold at inflated prices.

Maoist-Affected Regions

• Extortion & Robbery:

o Extortion is a common practice, and there are instances of bank robberies to raise funds.
• Agricultural Levies:
o Reports indicate that drug-yielding crops are also targeted for revenue.
• Evolving Dynamics:
o Some insurgent groups, including factions like the Indian Mujahideen, have morphed into crime
syndicates, shifting from ideological to profit-driven operations.

Financial and Logistical Support

 P a g e | 52
• Money Laundering & Counterfeit Currency:
o Organized crime’s methods such as money laundering and the production of counterfeit currency
are used to finance terrorist activities.
• Cross-Border Networks:
o Cooperation between groups facilitates resource sharing and logistical support across borders,
especially between India and neighboring countries.
• Shared Resources:
o Criminal expertise and networks, including forged documents, vehicles, and arms, support both
organized crime and terrorism.

Steps Taken to Tackle Organized Crime

Indian Initiatives

• Anti-Trafficking & Human Trafficking Measures:

o Anti-Trafficking Nodal Cell:
▪ Established by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) as a focal point for coordinating
actions against human trafficking.
o NGO-Run Shelter & Rehabilitation Programs:
▪ Ujjawala Program: Provides support and rehabilitation for female sex trafficking
victims.
▪ Swadhar Program: Offers rehabilitation for women in difficult circumstances.
o International Agreements:
▪ Signed with countries such as Bangladesh, Nepal, and Bahrain to curb trafficking
activities.
• Drug Trafficking Measures:
o Statutory Acts:
▪ NDPS Act (1985) and the Prevention of Illicit Trafficking of Narcotics Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act (1988) address various aspects of the drug problem.
o Operation Dhvast (2023):
▪ A joint operation by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) with Punjab and Haryana
Police that busted a nexus involving terrorists, gangsters, drugs, and arms trafficking.
o International Conventions:
▪ India is a signatory to:
▪ Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs (1962)
▪ UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971)
▪ UN Convention against Illicit Trafficking of Narcotics Drugs, Psychotropic
Substances (1988)
▪ Supports global efforts led by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).
• Legislative Measures on Trafficking of Persons:
o The Trafficking of Persons (Prevention, Protection and Rehabilitation) Bill, 2021:
▪ Establishes Authorities: Sets up investigation and rehabilitation bodies at district, state,
and national levels.
▪ Anti-Trafficking Units: Formed to rescue victims and investigate trafficking cases.
▪ Rehabilitation Committees: Provide care and rehabilitation for rescued victims.
▪ Protection Homes: Mandated to offer shelter, food, counseling, and medical services.
▪ Special Courts: Designated courts in each district aim to complete trafficking trials
within a year.
• Other Measures:
o Maharashtra Control of Organized Crime Act (MCOCA), 1999:
▪ Implemented in Maharashtra and Delhi to combat notorious gangsters and organized
crime syndicates, even though there is no comprehensive national law on organized
crime.

Global Initiatives

• United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC):

 P a g e | 53
o Adoption & Purpose:
▪ Adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 55/25; it is the primary international
instrument to combat transnational organized crime.
o Commitments for Ratifying States:
▪ Create domestic criminal offenses (e.g., participation in an organized criminal group,
money laundering, corruption, obstruction of justice).
▪ Establish frameworks for extradition, mutual legal assistance, and law enforcement
cooperation.
▪ Enhance training and technical assistance to build the capacity of national authorities.
o Supplementary Protocols:
▪ Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children.
▪ Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air.
▪ Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and
Components, and Ammunition.

Challenges in Combating Organized Crime

1. Inadequate Legal Framework
• Limited Legislation: Only a few states (e.g., Delhi, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Karnataka) have specific laws
targeting organized crime.
• Insufficient Provisions: The Indian Penal Code is not fully equipped to address the complex challenges
posed by organized crime.
• Structural Limitations:
o Laws often target individuals rather than the organized criminal groups as a whole.
o Hierarchical insulation makes it difficult to obtain proof against top leadership.
• Judicial Hurdles: Slow trial processes and low conviction rates contribute to public apathy and reduced
cooperation.
2. Weak Enforcement Agencies
• Capability Issues: State police forces suffer from poor training and shortages of arms and ammunition.
• Inter-Agency Coordination: There is a lack of cooperation and coordination among various agencies
(e.g., CBI, NCD, ED, state police).
• Resource Constraints: Fiscal limitations have led to underfunding and inadequate training, hampering
effective law enforcement.
• Special Cells: Although some states have set up specialized units, these efforts are insufficient to tackle
the scale of organized crime.
3. Technological Advancements
• New-Age Crimes: The rise of technology has enabled sophisticated forms of organized crime, such as
cyber fraud.
• Enforcement Gaps: Law enforcement agencies currently lack the capacity and technical expertise to
counter these high-tech crimes effectively.
4. Lack of International Cooperation
• Transnational Nature: Organized crime has become increasingly transnational.
• Coordination Challenges: Poor coordination between international and domestic security agencies
hampers efforts to combat cross-border criminal activities.
5. Vested Interests
• Corruption and Protection: Corrupt politicians, mining mafias, and other vested interests hinder strict
action against organized crime.
• Criminal-Political Nexus: The strong linkages between criminal syndicates and government officials
allow these groups to operate with relative impunity.
6. Public Awareness Issues
• Low Awareness: A general lack of public awareness about the impact of organized crime undermines
community resistance.
 P a g e | 54
• Media Influence: Glorification of organized criminals in popular media and cinema encourages
recruitment and romanticizes criminal lifestyles.

Way Ahead in Combating Organized Crime

Policy & Legislative Initiatives
• Model Law: The center may enact a model law for organized crime, which states can adopt with suitable
amendments.
• Specialized Legislation: Strengthen existing laws (e.g., MCOCA, Gangster Act) to specifically target
organized crime enterprises.
• Cryptocurrency Regulation: Enact laws to regulate cryptocurrency to restrict its use in terror financing.
Coordination & Institutional Framework
• Nodal Agencies:
o Create a nodal agency to coordinate state police and central agencies, improving inter-agency
cooperation.
• Specialized Units:
o Set up organized crime cells at district levels and dedicated wings in city police organizations.
• National-Level Body:
o Establish a national body to collect, analyze, and share intelligence on international and domestic
criminal gangs.
International Cooperation
• Extradition & Legal Assistance:
o Enter into extradition arrangements and mutual legal assistance agreements with other countries for
streamlined prosecution.
• Strengthening Interpol:
o Enhance Interpol’s role to disrupt links between organized crime and terrorism.
• Global Coordination:
o Recognize that organized crime is transnational and foster global cooperation similar to efforts against
human trafficking and drug smuggling.
Enhancing Enforcement Capabilities
• Training & Resources:
o Provide adequate training and resources to state security agencies to handle modern, high-tech crimes.
• Border Management:
o Strengthen border controls to prevent cross-border movements of organized criminals and terror
groups.
• Capacity Building:
o Develop military and intelligence expertise to disrupt terrorist support networks and exchange
personnel and intelligence with other states.
Public Awareness & Media Sensitization
• Media Portrayal:
o Sensitize popular media and cinema to avoid glorifying organized criminals.
• Community Engagement:
o Involve citizens through workshops, seminars, and media campaigns to build public opposition
against organized crime.
Further Steps & Global Perspective
• Addressing Globalization:
o Adapt national and international legislation to keep pace with evolving crime and terrorism driven by
globalization.
• Mutual Cooperation:
o Ensure joint action among national and international institutions, with a unified approach to disrupt
the links between terrorism and organized crime.
• Holistic Approach: Combine data exchange, intelligence sharing, and integrated legal frameworks to combat
both organized crime and terrorism effectively.
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ROLE OF MEDIA AND SOCIAL NETWORKING

SITES IN INTERNAL SECURITY CHALLENGES

Media refers to the diverse array of channels, tools, and institutions used to communicate information,
entertainment, education, and cultural content to audiences. It encompasses both traditional forms (e.g., print
newspapers, television, radio) and modern digital platforms (e.g., social media, streaming services, websites).

Role of Media in Creating Challenges to India’s Internal Security

• Sensationalization of National Security Issues: News channels often dramatize security matters, creating
public panic and pressuring political and security agencies. This exaggeration can unintentionally serve
terrorist objectives by inciting further violence, especially when amplified through social media.
• Irresponsible Coverage of Anti-Terror Operations and Conflicts: Live or overly detailed reporting of
operations—such as during the 26/11 Mumbai attacks or surgical strikes on insurgents—can compromise the
safety of security personnel and jeopardize ongoing investigations. Withholding critical operational details is
essential to protect lives and maintain effective security measures.
• Stereotyping Leading to Social Conflicts: Biased reporting that targets individuals or groups based on
religion, ethnicity, or nationality fuels prejudice and discrimination, deepening societal divisions and
potentially sparking communal conflicts.
• Propagation of Fake News and Speculation: Unverified information and rampant rumors distort public
perception, erode trust in institutions, and can lead to widespread misinformation. This underscores the need
for rigorous fact-checking and improved media literacy.
• Reporting on Sub-Judice Matters: Media trials that prematurely label individuals as guilty or innocent can
undermine the judicial process and influence public opinion, thereby affecting the integrity of legal
proceedings.
• Lack of Sensitivity in Covering Victims of Terror and Heinous Crimes: Overly graphic or sensationalized
portrayals of victims’ suffering not only invade privacy but also add to the trauma of victims and their
families, highlighting the need for compassionate and respectful reporting.

How Media Can Enhance Internal Security

• Public Awareness and Educational Campaigns: Media can effectively educate citizens about security
threats such as cybercrimes and terrorism, and guide them on self-protection and community safety measures.
• Timely Information Sharing: Providing real-time alerts and accurate updates on potential security threats or
natural disasters helps coordinate community and governmental responses efficiently.
• Community Engagement: By fostering dialogue and building trust among diverse communities, media can
help prevent radicalization and address local grievances before they escalate into security challenges.
• Crime Prevention Initiatives: Encouraging public participation by reporting on criminal activities and
appealing for information about suspects strengthens community-based crime deterrence.
• Countering Extremist Propaganda: Media can debunk extremist narratives and expose hidden motives,
promoting narratives of peace and inclusivity while reinforcing societal resilience.

Best Practices of Media Regulation Around the World

• Clear Legal Frameworks: Countries like the USA and Canada have enacted laws (e.g., the Espionage Act of
1917 and the Security of Information Act) to limit the disclosure of sensitive information that could harm
national security.
• Independent Regulatory Bodies: Agencies such as the FCC (USA), Ofcom (UK), and CRTC (Canada)
ensure that media adhere to standards that protect national interests while balancing freedom of expression.
• Ethical Guidelines and Professional Standards: Organizations like the Society of Professional Journalists
(SPJ) in the USA and the National Union of Journalists (NUJ) in the UK provide clear ethical guidelines.
Broad principles such as accuracy, impartiality, sensitivity, and avoidance of glamorization, speculation, and
stereotypes are essential for responsible reporting. Regular training for journalists on these ethical standards is
also crucial.
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Democratic nations must balance press freedom with media regulation to prevent internal security challenges. This
balance can be achieved through clear legal frameworks, independent oversight, strict adherence to ethical journalism,
and robust public education on media literacy, ensuring that the media serves as a tool for informed, responsible, and
security-enhancing communication.

Role of Social Media in Creating Challenges to India’s Internal Security

• Social media can be defined as a group of interactive web 2.0 internet-based applications that
facilitate the sharing of ideas, thoughts, and information by people.
• It is different from traditional media in the sense that it has a broader reach and allows two-way
communication and instant exchange of information.
• Some examples of social media platforms include Twitter, Facebook, WhatsApp, etc.

Challenges Posed by Social Media to India’s Internal Security

• Freedom of Expression vs. Hate Speech:
o Social media serves as an equaliser, guaranteeing the fundamental right to free expression
regardless of class, creed, or geography.
o However, in the guise of free speech, these platforms also allow misinformation and hate to
flourish, often blurring the line between legitimate expression and hate speech.
o Political groups may mobilise genuine religious sentiments to manufacture “offendedness,”
exacerbating communal tensions and dividing society along religious lines.
• Hate Speech and Communal Disturbances:
o Platforms can propagate hate speech that incites communal tensions and riots.
o Examples:
▪ The 2020 Delhi riots were triggered by misinformation and hate speech.
▪ In 2017, militants in a Philippine city were radicalised via social media.
• Spread of Fake News:
o Unverified information and fake clips create panic and confusion among citizens.
o Example:
▪ The 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots were sparked by fake clips circulating on the internet.
• Online Radicalisation and Terrorism:
o Social media acts as an echo chamber for extremists, enhancing opportunities for radicalisation.
o Terrorist organisations use these platforms for propaganda, recruitment, indoctrination, terror
financing (often through cryptocurrencies), and even coordinating cyberattacks and physical
operations.
o Examples:
▪ A 2017 London terrorist attack was carried out by an individual radicalised through
YouTube and Facebook.
▪ In 2016, 22 people from Kerala were reported missing after joining ISIS in Syria and Iraq
via platforms like Facebook and WhatsApp.
▪ Indian jihadist groups utilise apps like WhatsApp for coordination—Kashmiri radicals,
for instance, create groups to organise protests.
▪ Following Burhan Wani’s death and the Uri attack, numerous Facebook pages emerged
calling for retaliation.
▪ LeT used Google Earth to study Mumbai before the 2008 terrorist attacks.
▪ ISIS runs its global movement online using banned YouTube channels, multilingual
online magazines, and anonymity measures like VPNs.
• Propaganda and Extremist Narratives:
o Extremist groups—including the Islamic far right, Christian far right, Buddhist far right, and
Hindu far right—exploit social media to spread extremist ideologies and misinformation.
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o These narratives are designed to widen support bases, create divisive political agendas, and
perpetuate a cycle of “offendedness.”
o Examples:
▪ Naxalite groups have used social media to spread false information about government
schemes.
▪ In 2018, the NIA arrested five Maoist operatives in Jharkhand for being radicalised via
social media.
• Targeting Security Personnel:
o Doxing on social media exposes the identities of security personnel and their families,
significantly increasing their risk of attack.
o Example:
▪ In September 2020, terrorists in Jammu & Kashmir released a hit list of police officers
and their families, urging attacks.
• Cyberbullying and Harassment:
o Social media is used to spread false information and rumours that lead to cyberbullying, with
women often facing sexual harassment online.
• Cybercrimes:
o Cybercriminals exploit these platforms to steal personal and sensitive data.
o Example:
▪ In 2020, a Chinese hacker group was accused of stealing sensitive data of Indian citizens
through fake social media profiles.
• Foreign Interference in Democratic Processes:
o Foreign actors may manipulate domestic political processes using social media.
o Example:
▪ The Cambridge Analytica scandal involved using Facebook data to influence voting
behaviour during the 2014 general elections.
• Promotion of Obscenity:
o The dissemination of pornography and obscenity on social media can adversely affect children’s
psychological well-being.
• Algorithmic Echo Chambers:
o Platform algorithms often distort realities and create echo chambers where like-minded users
reinforce hateful beliefs and misinformation.

Social Media as a Tool for Promoting Internal Security

• Bridging the Trust Deficit:
o Social media enhances the reach of security agencies, helping to bridge trust gaps by keeping
citizens informed and dispelling rumours.
• Enhancing Community Policing:
o Empowers citizens to act as the “eyes and ears” for law enforcement.
o Examples:
▪ The Boston Police Department effectively used social media during the 2013 Boston
Marathon bombings.
▪ London police leveraged these platforms during the 2011 London riots.
▪ Open-source intelligence from social media helps track missing and wanted persons.
• Managing Public Perception:
o Platforms enable security agencies to counter extremist propaganda and disseminate accurate
information to shape public perception.
• Facilitating Feedback and Accountability:
o Social media provides a channel for citizens to offer feedback, enhancing the transparency and
accountability of security agencies.
• Crisis Management:
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o Crucial for coordinating rescue and relief operations during emergencies.
o Example:
▪ The Kerala state government used social media effectively during the 2018 floods.
• Strengthening Border Security:
o Agencies like the BSF monitor social media posts to detect and track suspicious activities near
national borders.

Measures to Counter Social Media–Related Internal Security Challenges

and Online Radicalisation
• Educational Awareness & Collaboration:
o Launch programs to inform citizens about misinformation, extremist content, and online
radicalisation.
o Collaborate with social media platforms to detect and remove objectionable content.
• Strengthening Cyber Laws:
o Amend the IT Act-2000 to curb misinformation, hate speech, and extremist propaganda.
• Engaging Civil Society:
o Support organisations in monitoring false information and running public awareness campaigns.
• Indigenous Counter-Radicalisation Programmes:
o Develop tailored counter-narratives (political, religious, social) to combat jihadist radicalisation.
• Specialised Task Forces & Research Wings:
o Establish units within government departments and think tanks, and train personnel for
implementation in schools, prisons, and seminaries.
• International Cooperation & Legislation:
o Work with the global community to enact laws targeting extremist groups, even if they do not engage
in overt violence.
• Preventing Communal Tensions & Mistrust:
o Address communal violence proactively and prevent a climate of mistrust amid rising extremist
activities.
• Academic Research & Countering Indoctrination:
o Promote secular studies of religion to counter false indoctrination with precise, scientific methods.
• Enhancing Cyber Counter-Radicalisation:
o Build a strong online presence against extremist narratives, especially in regional languages.
• Revitalising Sociocultural Ethos:
o Strengthen social fabric and common cultural values to enhance resilience against extremism and
terrorism.
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CYBERSECURITY

According to the IT Act 2000, Cyber security refers to securing computer devices, networks, and
information stored on them from unauthorized access, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction.

1. India's Vulnerability to Cyber Crimes

• Cyber crimes increased 4 times between 2016-2020 (NCRB).
• India reported an 11% rise in cyber crimes in 2020 alone.
• 68% of private organizations in India faced ransomware attacks.
• Among the top 5 targets in the Asia-Pacific region, especially for cyber espionage.
• Cyber threats to financial institutions remain a major concern (2022 report).
• Cyber crimes caused ₹1.25 lakh crores loss in 2019.
• Internet penetration rose from 4% (2007) to 45% (2021), increasing cyber risks.
• E-Governance expansion has exposed citizens to new cyber threats.
• Notable Cyber Attacks:
o Zomato data breach (user data leaked).
o AIIMS server attack (disruption of healthcare services).
o JNPT port cyberattack (logistics disruption).

2. Various Cyber Threats Faced by India

a) Cyber Crimes
• Crimes using cyberspace as a tool or target.
• Indian IT Act, 2000 lacks a specific definition but covers key cyber crimes.
Key Sections of IT Act, 2000
• Section 67 – Punishment for transmitting obscene content.
• Section 66B – Receiving stolen computer resources.
• Section 66C – Identity theft.
• Section 66E – Privacy violation (unauthorized transmission of private content).
Recent Cyber Crime Cases
• 2021: Phishing scam targeted Myntra users for account updates.
• 2021: Ransomware attack on Air India, demanding $5 million ransom.
• 2021: Bollywood celebrity social media accounts hacked.
• 2020: Online bullying led to a suicide case in Mumbai.
b) Cyber Terrorism
• Definition: Use of cyberspace for terrorist activities, including:
o Planning and executing attacks.
o Radicalization & recruitment.
o Spreading propaganda & fake news.
o Raising funds for terror activities.
o Disrupting critical infrastructure.
Key Cyber Terrorism Incidents
• 2000: Japan – A terror group used software to track police vehicles.
• 2013: Muzaffarnagar riots fueled by fake video clips.
• 2020: Mumbai power grid cyberattack, allegedly by China.
Why Terror Groups Prefer Cyber Attacks?
• Low-cost alternative to traditional terrorism.
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• Difficult to trace attackers.
• Can be executed remotely without physical risk.
• Can disrupt essential services (e.g., power grids, airports).
c) Cyber Warfare
• State-sponsored cyber attacks to target another country's infrastructure.
• Methods:
o Cyber Espionage – Spying on adversaries.
o Cyber Attacks – Damaging networks, stealing sensitive data.
o Cyber Sabotage – Disrupting power grids, military systems.
Notable Cyber Warfare Incidents
• 2009: GhostNet cyber-espionage operation (targeted Dalai Lama, allegedly by China).
• 2014: Operation Desert Eagle (targeted Israeli military).
• 2017: Ukraine power grid attack (linked to Russian hackers).
• 2017: Kudankulam nuclear plant attack (Dtrack malware, suspected North Korea involvement).
• 2020: Wiper malware in Ukraine (to hinder defense efforts).
• US & Israel: Developed Stuxnet virus to disrupt Iran’s nuclear facility.

Types of Cybersecurity Threats

1. Malware (Malicious Software)
• Definition: Any harmful program or file that damages or disrupts systems.
• Effects:
o Steals, encrypts, or deletes sensitive data.
o Alters or hijacks core computing functions.
o Monitors user activities without permission.

Types of Malware

Type Description Example

Virus Infects files and spreads when executed. Stuxnet (Targeted Iranian nuclear
plants).

Worm Self-replicates without a host program. Conficker Worm.

Trojan Disguised as a legitimate program but performs malicious Xafecopy (Bypasses CAPTCHA).
actions.

Spyware Secretly monitors user activity & steals information. Pegasus (Developed by NSO
Group).

Ransomware Encrypts files & demands payment for decryption. WannaCry, Locky Ransomware.

Crypto- Uses a victim’s system to mine cryptocurrency, slowing -

jacking performance.

2. Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) Attack

• Definition: Overloads a system by sending excessive requests, crashing the target server.
• Working:
o Malware infects multiple devices, creating a botnet.
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o The botnet floods a server with requests, causing failure.
• Unlike hacking, it does not steal data but disrupts services.
3. Buffer Overflow
• Definition: When a program writes more data than a buffer can hold, causing crashes or system control
takeover.
• Risks:
o Allows attackers to execute malicious code.
o Can compromise data confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

4. Bots and Botnets

• Bot: Malicious software that takes control of a device.
• Botnet: A network of infected devices used for cyberattacks (DDoS, spam, fraud).
5. Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attacks
• Definition: A hacker secretly intercepts and alters communication between two parties.
• Used for:
o Stealing login credentials & financial details.
o Altering transactions in real-time.

6. Phishing & Spear Phishing

Type Description Example

Phishing Fraudulent emails that trick users into revealing sensitive Fake banking emails requesting login
information. details.

Spear Attackers pose as trusted contacts (vendors, auditors) to Business Email Compromise (BEC)
Phishing hack businesses. scams.

7. Web Crawler (Spider)

• Definition: An automated program that systematically browses websites.
• Uses:
o Positive: Search engine indexing, website maintenance.
o Negative: Can be used for scraping sensitive data from sites.
8. Hacktivism
• Definition: Using hacking techniques for political or social activism.
• Examples:
o Blocking government websites.
o Leaking classified data.
o Defacing websites with political messages.

9. Social Engineering
• Definition: Manipulating people into revealing confidential information.
• Example:
o Fake social media profiles impersonating friends to trick users into transferring money.

10. Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)

• Definition: Long-term unauthorized access to a system for stealing sensitive data.
• Key Traits:
o Stays hidden for months/years.
o Targets government, corporate, and research institutions.
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11. Darknet & Dark Web
• Darknet: A hidden network requiring specialized software like Tor to access.
• Uses:
o Legal: Secure communication (journalists, whistleblowers).
o Illegal: Drug trade, weapons, human trafficking, cybercrime markets.

Deep Web vs. Dark Web: Key Differences

Aspect Deep Web Dark Web

Definition Part of the internet that is not indexed by search A hidden part of the internet requiring
engines. special software to access.

Accessibility Requires login credentials, subscriptions, or Requires Tor browser or other

permissions. anonymizing tools.

Content Medical records, academic databases, confidential Illegal black markets, hacked data
Examples corporate pages, government records, paywalled exchanges, anonymous forums, illicit
sites. trade.

Size ~96-99% of the internet. Estimated to be ~5% of the total

internet.

Legality Mostly legal (private and protected data). Mostly illegal (used for illicit activities).

Users Businesses, universities, government agencies, Hackers, criminals, whistleblowers,

individuals accessing private data. journalists.

Usage Secure information storage, private communication, Anonymity-focused activities, including

internal business networks. illegal trade and cybercrime.
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Impact of Cyber Attacks

Aspect Description

Loss of Integrity Unauthorized changes to data or IT systems lead to fraud, errors, and loss of
trust.

Loss of Availability Disruptions in mission-critical IT systems make them unavailable to users.

Loss of Confidentiality Unauthorized disclosure of sensitive data can threaten national security and
public trust.

Physical Destruction Cyber-attacks can cause actual physical damage (e.g., Stuxnet worm targeting
Iranian nuclear facilities).

Impact on Data Affects Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA Triad) of

information.

Impact on Critical Information Cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure (e.g., Mumbai power grid attack by
Infrastructure (CII) China) can disrupt essential services.
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Financial Loss India was the 2nd most cyber-attack affected country (2016-2018) per Data
Security Council of India.

Impact on National Security Cyber warfare and espionage can destabilize peace and security in a country.

Challenges to Cyber Security

1. Legal Challenges
• Outdated cyber laws and lack of dedicated procedural laws for IT offences.
• Reliance on archaic laws like the Indian Evidence Act for cybercrime trials.
• Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) guidelines exist but lack legal backing.
2. Institutional Challenges
• Multiple agencies handle cyber security, but lack of coordination leads to duplication of efforts.
• State police lack awareness of IT Act 2000 provisions.
3. Infrastructural Challenges
• India imports 70% of its telecom equipment, making it vulnerable to security risks.
• Most forensic labs in India are ineffective for cybercrime investigations.
• Tech companies store data on foreign servers, making it difficult for Indian agencies to access.
• Low R&D spending in cyberspace weakens India’s cyber preparedness.
4. Human Resource Challenges
• Police agencies lack technical expertise to enforce cyber laws.
• Shortage of skilled cyber security professionals in both government and private sectors.
• Public awareness of cyber security is low, increasing vulnerability to cyber threats.

INDIA'S CYBER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

Agency/Initiative Function & Importance

NCIIPC (National Critical Information - Nodal agency (established in 2013) to protect critical infrastructure
Infrastructure Protection Centre) from cyberattacks.
- Identifies risks, develops strategies, and coordinates responses with
stakeholders.

CERT-In (Indian Computer - National cyber emergency response agency working 24x7 to
Emergency Response Team) detect, prevent, and mitigate cyber threats.
- Coordinates with Sector-CERTs (banking, power, healthcare, etc.).

National Cyber Security Coordinator - Senior officer responsible for formulating & implementing cyber
security policy.
- Ensures coordination between government and private agencies.
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National Cyber Crime Coordination - Investigates cyber crimes with national security implications.
Center (MHA) - Coordinates with law enforcement agencies for prosecution.

Defense Cyber Agency (2019, MoD) - Ensures security of military networks and systems.

NTRO (National Technical Research - Cyber intelligence & threat monitoring for national security.
Organization)

IT Act, 2000 (Amended 2008) - Governs electronic data, digital signatures, transactions, and
cybercrimes.

Cyber Crisis Management Plan - Outlines emergency response strategies for cyber incidents.
(CCMP)

Sectoral Guidelines - RBI (2016) for banks.

- IRDA (2017) for insurance companies.

Cyber Security Awareness & Exercises

Initiative Purpose

CyberX 2021 Tested preparedness of ministries & departments for cyberattacks.

SHIELD (2019) Simulated cyberattacks on critical infrastructure.

Cyber Surakshit Bharat (2019) Trained 10,000 personnel in government & private sector.

RBI’s UDAAN Exercise Cyber drills for banks to test response strategies.

CYBER SECURITY PREPAREDNESS

Aspect Details

Global Cyber Security Index (ITU) India ranked 23rd among 165 countries—indicating strong efforts but
room for improvement.

Section 66F (IT Act) Cyber Terrorism – Covers data breaches, infrastructure disruption, theft
of sensitive data, and provides lifetime imprisonment as punishment.

National Cyber Security Policy 2013 Established NCIIPC, workforce training, and cyber crisis management.
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NCIIPC (National Nodal Agency) Functions under NTRO, secures critical information infrastructure.

CERT-In Leads national cyber emergency response and oversees sectoral

CERTs.

Cyber Surakshit Bharat (2018) Awareness & training initiative for Chief Information Security Officers
(CISOs) in government departments.

National Cyber Coordination Generates situational awareness of cyber threats for proactive action.
Centre (NCCC)

Cyber Swachhta Kendra Botnet cleaning & malware analysis center under Digital India
initiative (CERT-In).

Information Security Education & Training programs for cyber security professionals.
Awareness (ISEA)

S3WAAS (Secure, Scalable & Government cloud-based secure website hosting.

Sugamya Website as a Service)

TECHSAGAR (Cyber Capabilities Developed by NCSC & DSCI—provides data on IoT, AI, and cyber
Portal) capabilities in India.

Data Security Council of India NASSCOM-led industry body focusing on data protection & cyber
(DSCI) security awareness.

CYBER SECURITY INITIATIVES (As Per MHA report)

Cybersecurity Initiatives by the CIS Division
1. Overview of the CIS Division
• Implements National Information Security Policy and Guidelines (NISPG) to secure government IT
infrastructure.
• Conducts cybersecurity risk assessments and coordinates cyber crime prevention efforts.
• Oversees Cyber Crime Prevention Against Women and Children (CCPWC) and Indian Cyber Crime
Coordination Centre (I4C) schemes.
• Manages cyber forensic laboratories, audits, lawful interception, and international cybersecurity
collaborations.
2. Cyber Crime Prevention Against Women and Children (CCPWC) Scheme
• Budget: ₹223.198 crore.
• Objectives: Prevent cyber crimes targeting women and children.
• Key Components:
o Online Cyber Crime Reporting Portal: (cybercrime.gov.in) + Helpline 1930 for reporting cases.
o Cyber Forensic Labs: 33 labs established, ₹132.82 crore allocated.
o Training Programs: Over 24,600 officials trained in cyber crime investigation.
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o R&D Initiatives: Six research projects on cyber crimes against women and children.
o International Collaboration: MoU with NCMEC, USA; 6.9 million cyber tips processed, 13,770
FIRs filed.
o Awareness Campaigns: Cyber safety handbooks, radio programs, SMS outreach.
Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (I4C) Scheme
• Budget: ₹340 crore.
• Objective: Centralized coordination to combat cyber crimes.
• Key Components:
o National Cyber Crime Threat Analytics Unit: Monitors cyber threats.
o National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal: Citizen complaint platform.
o National Cyber Crime Training Centre: Capacity-building for law enforcement.
o Cyber Research & Innovation Centre: Develops tools to prevent cyber crimes.
o Joint Cyber Crime Coordination Teams: Data sharing among State LEAs.
o National Cyber Forensic Laboratory (Investigation): Provides forensic support.
Major Initiatives under I4C
1. Cybercrime Threat Analytics:
o 178 cybercrime advisories, 36 technical analysis reports issued.
o Investigations led by CBI, ED, SFIO, and State Police.
o National Counter Ransomware Task Force (NCRTF) established.
2. National Cybercrime Reporting Portal (NCRP) (Launched: 2019):
o Features: Complaint tagging, automated chatbot Vani-CyberDost, Helpline 1930, suspect tracking.
o Integration: NPCI for financial fraud tracing, NCMEC for missing children.
3. Financial Cyber Fraud Management System:
o Over ₹16 billion saved; 5.75 lakh victims helped.
o API integration with NPCI for faster fraud detection.
4. SIM/IMEI Blocking System:
o Over 4.29 lakh mobile numbers blocked for cyber fraud.
5. Interstate Cybercrime Linkages (JMIS):
o 7.59 lakh linkages identified; cyber criminals traced across states.
6. Joint Cyber Coordination Teams (JCCT):
o Regional coordination teams in Jamtara, Mewat, Hyderabad, Chandigarh, etc.
7. Cybersecurity Awareness & Capacity Building:
o Training Programs: Over 91,500 police officers trained via CyTrain platform.
o Specialized courses on cryptocurrency crimes, cyber hygiene, and AI-based threats.
o Cyber Jaagrookta Diwas observed monthly.
o UGC introduces cybersecurity syllabus for colleges.
o G20 conference on cybercrime and security.
8. National Cybercrime Forensic Laboratory (NCFL) (Delhi):
o Provided 9,700+ forensic services for digital investigations.
9. National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID):
o Integrates intelligence data from 11 security agencies and 10 data providers.

National Cyber Security Policy 2013

The National Cyber Security Policy (NCSP) 2013 was launched by the Department of Electronics and
Information Technology (DeitY) to protect India's public and private infrastructure from cyber threats.
It aims to safeguard sensitive information, including:
• Personal data (citizens' information)
• Financial & banking data
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• Sovereign data
The policy defines cyberspace as a complex environment of people, software, and global ICT infrastructure,
requiring robust cybersecurity measures.

Objectives of the Policy

1. Secure Cyber Ecosystem
o Foster trust in IT systems and transactions.
o Enhance IT adoption across all economic sectors.

2. Cyber Security Assurance Framework

o Establish security standards for products, processes, technology, and people.
o Ensure compliance with global security norms.

3. Strengthened Regulatory Framework

o Secure cyberspace infrastructure through stronger regulations.

4. 24x7 Cyber Threat Monitoring

o Establish National & Sectoral response mechanisms.
o Ensure predictive, preventive, protective, and recovery measures.

5. Integrity of ICT Products & Services

o Develop testing & validation infrastructure for ICT security.

6. Cybersecurity Workforce Development

o Train 500,000 cybersecurity professionals in 5 years.

7. Encouraging Security Compliance in Businesses

o Offer fiscal benefits for cybersecurity adoption.

8. Protection of Personal Data & Privacy

o Secure information during storage, processing, and transmission.

9. Cybercrime Prevention & Law Enforcement

o Strengthen cybercrime investigation, forensics, and prosecution.

Key Strategies for Implementation

1. Creating a Secure Cyber Ecosystem
2. Establishing an Assurance Framework
3. Promoting Open Standards in Cybersecurity
4. Strengthening Cybersecurity Regulations
5. Early Warning Systems for Security Threats
6. Securing E-Governance Infrastructure
7. Protecting Critical Information Infrastructure (CII)
8. Encouraging R&D in Cybersecurity
9. Managing Supply Chain Cybersecurity Risks
10. Human Resource Development in Cybersecurity
11. Enhancing Cybersecurity Awareness
12. Strengthening Public-Private Partnerships (PPP)
13. Developing International Cybersecurity Cooperation
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14. Implementing a Priority-Based Approach for Policy Execution

Salient Features
1. 24×7 Cyber Threat Response System
o National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (NCIIPC) to protect critical
sectors.
o CERT-In designated as the nodal agency for cyber crisis management.
2. Threat Intelligence & Crisis Management
o Mechanism to identify, analyze, and respond to cyber threats.
3. Public-Private Partnerships (PPP)
o Enhanced collaboration with industries & academia for cyber defense.
4. R&D and Advanced Cybersecurity Technologies
o Establish Centres of Excellence for cutting-edge research.
5. Cybersecurity Workforce Development
o Cyber training for law enforcement agencies.
o Encourage businesses to appoint a Chief Information Security Officer (CISO).
6. Incentives for Cybersecurity Adoption
o Fiscal benefits for businesses implementing cybersecurity standards.

Challenges & Issues with the Policy

1. Lack of Provisions for Emerging Technologies
o Risks related to Cloud Computing, AI, and IoT not adequately addressed.
2. Social Media Threats
o No robust mechanism to tackle misuse by criminals & anti-national elements.
3. Cybercrime Tracking & Forensics
o Need for cybercrime tracking systems & forensic capabilities.
4. Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
o Dependence on foreign cybersecurity solutions poses risks.
5. Privacy vs. National Security Debate
o The policy lacks a clear strategy to balance privacy rights and national security.

Need for Policy Review & Updates

1. Policy Formulated in Response to 2013 NSA Surveillance Scandal
o Needs an update to address new cyber threats.
2. India Among Top 10 Cyber-Attack Targeted Nations
o WannaCry, Petya Ransomware, and Pegasus Spyware highlight vulnerabilities.
3. Increasing Digitalization
o Digital India initiative and growing online transactions need stronger cybersecurity.
4. Better Coordination Among Agencies Needed
o Multiple agencies handle cybersecurity with overlapping roles.
5. Shortage of Cybersecurity Professionals
o India's cyber workforce is insufficient to counter growing threats.
6. Weak Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Mechanisms
o More engagement needed between government and private sector.
7. Enhancing Civil-Military Cooperation
o Cybersecurity should be integrated into national security & defense strategies.
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Way Forward
1. Increased Budgetary Allocation for Cybersecurity
• India should allocate 0.25% of its annual budget for cybersecurity, with a roadmap to increase it to 1% in
the future.
• Additional funding is necessary to enhance cybersecurity infrastructure, research capabilities, and
workforce training.
2. Strengthening Cybersecurity R&D and Industry-Academia Collaboration
• Boost research and development (R&D) to develop indigenous cybersecurity solutions.
• Enhance cooperation between industry and academic institutions to foster innovation in cyber defense
technologies.
3. Building a Robust Cybersecurity Workforce
• Strengthen the workforce by including officers from the Indian Engineering Services (IES) cadre in
cybersecurity roles.
• Conduct nationwide cybersecurity training programs to educate both professionals and the general public
on cyber threats and protection strategies.
4. Regular Cybersecurity Drills and Preparedness
• Government and private agencies should conduct frequent cybersecurity drills to simulate and counter
cyberattacks.
• Establish a National Cyber Emergency Response Framework to deal with large-scale attacks.
5. Updating the National Cyber Security Policy (NCSP) 2013
• The existing NCSP 2013 needs urgent revision to address modern cybersecurity challenges such as:
o AI-based cyber threats
o Cloud security risks
o Ransomware and malware attacks
o Cyber terrorism and state-sponsored attacks
6. Action Plan for State-Sponsored Cyber Attacks
• The government should develop a strategic action plan to counter state-sponsored cyber warfare.
• Focus on protecting critical government and private sector infrastructure from foreign cyber intrusions.
7. Establishing an SOS Lockdown Policy for National Security
• Implement a mechanism to immediately disconnect nuclear grids, power grids, financial institutions, and
satellite communications from the internet in case of a major national security breach.
8. Strengthening Cybersecurity Laws and Judicial Reforms
• Introduce new cybersecurity laws to tackle contemporary threats like data theft, hacking, and digital
fraud.
• Reduce the burden on the judiciary by fast-tracking cybercrime cases and enhancing investigative
capabilities.
9. Enforcing Cybersecurity Standards for the Private Sector
• Cybersecurity guidelines must be mandated for private companies, especially those handling sensitive user
data.
• Develop a standard compliance checklist for businesses to adhere to.
10. Promoting International Cybersecurity Cooperation
• Strengthen bilateral and multilateral collaborations for cyber intelligence sharing.
• Establish joint task forces with international agencies to track and combat global cyber threats.
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MONEY LAUNDERING AND ITS

PREVENTION
1. Money Laundering: The process of "cleaning" illegally earned money by disguising its criminal
origins.
• Purpose:
o To make illicit proceeds appear as if they were obtained through legal sources.
• Common Among:
o Organized criminals involved in drug trafficking, arms smuggling, bribery, extortion, cyber
crimes, etc.
• Origin of Term:
o Derived from gangster Al Capone’s practice of using his laundromats to launder cash.

2. Primary Objectives of Money Laundering

1. Hide the Source:
o Conceal the illegal origin of funds.
2. Enjoy the Illicit Earnings:
o Enable criminals to use and invest their “cleaned” money without suspicion.

3. The Process of Money Laundering

A. Placement
• Definition:
o Introducing illicit funds into the formal financial system.
• Risks:
o Considered the riskiest stage due to high potential for detection.
• Techniques Used:
o Structuring/Smurfing:
▪ Breaking large cash amounts into smaller deposits across multiple bank accounts.
o Instrument Purchase:
▪ Buying bank drafts to deposit in various locations.
o Asset Acquisition:
▪ Purchasing luxury items such as gold, gems, watches, cars, and real estate.
o Currency Exchange:
▪ Converting funds into foreign currencies through private exchange dealers.
B. Layering
• Definition:
o Moving money through a series of complex transactions to obscure its origin.
• Techniques Used:
o Multiple Transactions:
▪ Shifting funds through various accounts and jurisdictions.
o Cross-Border Transfers:
▪ Utilizing international movements to distance funds from their source.
o Hawala Transactions:
▪ Informal value transfer system that bypasses official channels.
o Cryptocurrency Investments:
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▪ Using digital currencies to mask money trails.
o Asset Transactions:
▪ Repeated buying and selling of luxury assets.
C. Integration
• Definition:
o Reintroducing laundered funds into the legitimate economy.
• Techniques Used:
o False Export Invoices: Creating fraudulent invoices to justify large cash flows.
o Shell Companies: Setting up fake businesses to mix illegal funds with legal income.
o False Loans/FDI: Generating bogus loans or foreign investments to integrate funds.

Impact of Money Laundering

• Money laundering cleans illicit funds to disguise their criminal origins.
• Once integrated into the financial system, these funds destabilize the economy and foster various legal, social,
and political ills.
Economic Impact
• Policy Distortion:
o Inaccurate estimation of circulating money complicates the setting of policy rates.
• Market Volatility:
o Causes fluctuations in stock markets and exchange rates.
• Inflation:
o Mismatches in supply and demand can lead to rising prices.
• Reputation Damage:
o Financial institutions (e.g., banks) may suffer reputational harm.
• Trade Distortion:
o Laundered money is often used to purchase luxury items, skewing trade balances.
• Unfair Competition:
o Legitimate businesses face disadvantages, hindering innovation and entrepreneurship.
• Revenue Loss:
o Often accompanies tax and duty evasion, depriving public sectors of key revenues.
Social Impact
• Inequality:
o Enhances wealth disparity, promoting an unequal society.
• Criminal Empowerment:
o Provides resources for expanding illegal activities (e.g., drug trade, corruption).
• Terrorism Funding:
o Enables easier movement and use of funds for sponsoring terrorist acts.
• Erosion of Ethics:
o Material wealth overshadows moral values, affecting societal norms.
Political and Administrative Impact
• Corruption:
o Increases the likelihood of corrupt practices in politics and public administration.
• Criminalization of Politics:
o Money becomes a decisive factor in elections, undermining democratic processes.
• Misinformation:
o Facilitates activities like fake news and paid news, which further distort public opinion.
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Challenges & Way Ahead in Combating Money

Laundering in India
I. Traditional Challenges
1. Technological Gap:
o Enforcement agencies struggle to keep pace with rapidly evolving technologies that facilitate money
laundering.
2. Fragmented Agencies:
o Multiple agencies (investigation, intelligence, etc.) operate without adequate coordination, while
criminals work in unison.
3. Weak Regulatory Compliance:
o Increased competition in the banking sector has led to relaxed KYC norms and reduced vigilance.
4. Vested Interests:
o Political, bureaucratic, and criminal influences hinder effective investigation and enforcement.
5. International Secrecy Laws:
o Strict financial and banking secrecy in some countries enable creation of anonymous accounts,
impeding cross-border AML efforts.

II. New Challenges

1. Cryptocurrency:
o Offers required anonymity for laundering funds; global lack of regulation and understanding enhances
its misuse.
o In 2019, illicit funds laundered via crypto rose significantly.
2. Digital Transactions:
o Widespread online financial transactions make it harder for security agencies to detect suspicious
patterns.
3. Globalization & Communication:
o Rapid cross-border money transfers and modern communication networks facilitate money
laundering.
4. Specialized Shell Companies:
o Entities that set up shell companies and sophisticated networks operate across jurisdictions,
challenging law enforcement.

III. Technological Interventions

1. Artificial Intelligence (AI):
o Income Tax Department uses AI to detect suspicious financial transactions.
2. Electronic KYC (e-KYC):
o Facilitates real-time electronic verification of individual credentials.
3. Digital Identity Services:
o Example: Singapore’s "my-info" for banking due diligence.
4. Enhanced Transaction Monitoring:
o Indian banks maintain detailed records and share data with security agencies to flag anomalies.

Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Measures

I. AML Laws in India
• Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA):
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o Primary law to combat money laundering.
o Empowers authorities to confiscate properties linked to illegal proceeds.
• Other Key Laws:
o Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA), 2000
o Benami Transactions Act, 1988
o Income Tax Act, 1961
o NDPS Act (Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances), 1985

II. Institutional Mechanisms in India

• Enforcement Directorate (ED):
o Nodal agency responsible for investigating AML offences.
• Financial Intelligence Unit – India (FIU-IND):
o Central agency under the Ministry of Finance that analyzes and disseminates information on
suspicious financial transactions.
• Reserve Bank of India (RBI):
o Regulates banks to ensure compliance with AML laws.
• Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI):
o Monitors secondary markets for suspicious activities.

III. International Initiatives to Combat Money Laundering

• UN Conventions:
o Convention Against Corruption (2000)
o Convention Against Transnational Organized Crimes
o International Convention for Suppressing the Financing of Terrorism (1999)
• FATF Membership:
o India is a full member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

IV. International Measures to Combat Money Laundering

1. Financial Action Task Force (FATF):
o G-7 initiative that sets AML standards, provides technical assistance, and can impose penalties on
non-compliant states.
2. Vineena Convention (1988)
3. UN Global Program Against Money Laundering
4. UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
5. Basel Statement of Principles
6. Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering
7. International Money Laundering Informational Network (IMPLIN):
o Facilitates real-time data sharing on transactions.
8. Egmont Group:
o Enhances international intelligence sharing among financial intelligence units (FIUs).

V. Key International Bodies Involved in AML

• International Money-Laundering Information Network (IMoLIN):
o UN-sponsored center assisting global law enforcement in money laundering investigations.
• Financial Action Task Force (FATF):
o Develops and enforces AML standards; also targets terrorist financing.
• United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC):
o Implements global programs against organized crime and money laundering.
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• INTERPOL:
o Accelerates information exchange among financial crime investigators.
• Global Financial Institutions:
o Institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, ECB, and ADB work with these bodies to address AML
and terrorist financing.
• Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) & Egmont Group:
o Foster continuous information exchange, training, and collaboration among FIUs worldwide.

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA)

1. Purpose and Objectives
• Purpose:
o To combat the criminal activity of money laundering—cleaning up illegally earned money to disguise
its criminal origin.
• Objectives:
o Prevent money laundering.
o Stop the channeling of illicit funds into illegal activities and economic crimes.
o Confiscate property derived from or used in money laundering.
o Address incidental matters related to money laundering.
2. Offences Covered
• Part A:
o Lists offences under various acts (e.g., IPC, NDPS Act, Prevention of Corruption Act, Antiquities
Act, Copyright Act, Trademark Act, Wildlife Protection Act, IT Act).
• Part B:
o Specifies offences from Part A with a value of Rs. 1 crore or more.
• Part C:
o Deals with trans-border crimes to tackle money laundering on a global scale.
3. Authorities and Investigation
• Enforcement Directorate (ED):
o Main agency responsible for investigating money laundering cases.
• Financial Intelligence Unit – India (FIU-IND):
o Receives, processes, and analyzes suspicious financial transactions.
o Coordinates with domestic and international agencies.
• Other Agencies:
o Local police, CBI, customs, SEBI, etc., investigate scheduled offences under their respective statutes.
4. Key Provisions
• Definition of Money Laundering:
o Encompasses any process or activity related to the proceeds of crime, including their concealment,
possession, acquisition, or use, and presenting them as untainted.
• Powers Granted to ED:
o Conduct searches, seizures, and arrests without needing a prior FIR or report under Section 157 of
CrPC.
o Attach and confiscate property derived from criminal activities.
• Special Courts and Adjudicating Authority:
o Facilitate speedy disposal of cases.
o Special Courts can restore confiscated assets during trial under amended Section 8(8).
• Reverse Burden of Proof:
o Under Sections 24 and 45, the accused is presumed involved in money laundering unless they prove
otherwise.
• Mandatory Compliance for Financial Institutions:
o Banks and crypto exchanges must report suspicious transactions as per Chapter 4 of PMLA.
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5. Penalties
• Imprisonment:
o Minimum 3 years up to 7 years of rigorous imprisonment.
• Fine:
o Fines can be imposed without any fixed upper limit (up to at least Rs. 5 lakh).
6. Amendments to PMLA Act 2019
• Expanded Scope of “Proceeds of Crime”:
o Now includes assets created, derived, or obtained from any criminal activity related to a scheduled
offence.
o Clarifies that money laundering is a continuous offence—as long as the proceeds are enjoyed, the
offence persists.
• Empowered Enforcement Directorate:
o Broadened search and arrest powers, allowing action without a prior FIR or warrant.
• Special Courts:
o Now empowered to restore confiscated assets during trial.
• Tough Bail Conditions:
o Bail provisions require a prosecutor's objection opportunity and court’s assurance that the accused is
unlikely to commit further offenses.
• Legislative Intent:
o Aimed to prosecute and attach all proceeds of crime—even assets located outside India.
7. Allegations of Misuse
• Confidentiality of ECIR:
o ED treats the Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR) as an internal document, not disclosing it
to the accused.
• Lack of Transparency:
o Accused often remain unaware of the allegations since the ECIR is not provided.
• No Distinction:
o The law does not differentiate between an accused and a witness when summoning individuals.
• Political Bias:
o Case selection by the ED is alleged to be influenced by political considerations.
8. Way Forward / Recommendations
• Regulatory Strengthening:
o Implement FATF recommendations in domestic laws.
o Empower regulators such as RBI and SEBI to monitor and detect money laundering.
• Organizational Enhancements:
o Establish a permanent cadre within the Enforcement Directorate.
• Technological Integration:
o Utilize Big Data analytics and Artificial Intelligence for transaction monitoring.
• Sectoral Action Plans:
o Develop targeted strategies for vulnerable sectors (e.g., narcotics, organized crime, educational
institutions).
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BORDER MANAGEMENT IN INDIA

I. Meaning of Border Management
• Border Security:
o Securing India's economic and physical frontiers against hostile elements.
o Hostile Elements Include: Drug traffickers, insurgents, terrorists, smugglers, infiltrators, and
illegal immigrants.
• Border Management:
o Definition: An integrated approach that combines:
▪ Border security (protection and surveillance)
▪ Improvement of border infrastructure (fencing, roads, floodlighting, outposts)
▪ Economic development in border areas (enhancing trade and cultural interaction with
neighboring countries)
▪ Administrative coordination among multiple agencies.
o Key Insight: When economic and administrative aspects are incorporated with security, the
approach transforms into comprehensive border management.

II. Issues Associated with Border Management

1. Artificial Boundaries and Porous Borders:
o Result in illegal immigration and create significant security challenges.
2. Ongoing Border Disputes:
o Persistent issues with neighboring countries add to instability.
3. Multiple Forces Operating:
o Overlapping functions among different security agencies can lead to inefficiencies.
4. Intelligence Sharing Gaps:
o Absence of a formal mechanism to share intelligence inputs among various agencies in border
areas.
5. Poor Infrastructure:
o Inadequate facilities, especially along borders with China, hinder effective management.
6. External Influences:
o External state actors and unstable neighborhoods (e.g., Myanmar, Bangladesh, Afghanistan) fuel
instability.
7. Local-Agency Mistrust:
o Lack of trust between local communities and security agencies can lead to support for hostile
elements.

III. Effects of Poor Border Management on India's Internal Security

1. Illegal Immigration:
o Particularly along the Indo-Bangladesh border, leading to demographic changes and internal
conflicts.
2. Weak Border Checks:
o Facilitate the nexus between insurgent groups, organized crime, and other hostile elements.
3. Stunted Economic Development:
o Slow progress frustrates local communities, making them vulnerable to insurgent influence.
4. Fake Currency Influx:
o High circulation of Fake Indian Currency Notes (FICN) affecting the economy.
5. Unrestricted Movement:
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o Porous borders allow insurgents easy to-and-fro movement, complicating security operations.
6. Trafficking:
o Increased prevalence of narcotics and arms trafficking damages national interests.

IV. Reforms Required for Border Management

• Deployment of Technology:
o Comprehensive Integrated Border Management System (CIBMS):
▪ Integrates manpower, sensors, networks, intelligence, and command-control systems.
▪ Advantages: Reduced risk to personnel, 24×7 surveillance, extensive reach.
▪ Limitations: Requires trained manpower, reliable infrastructure (electricity), and high
investment.
o Enhanced Surveillance:
▪ Use of drones, hybrid surveillance systems, and digital integration (Central Analysis
Centers linked to local command centers).
• Institutional Coordination:
o Develop formal mechanisms for intelligence sharing across administrative, security, and
diplomatic agencies.
• Infrastructure Development:
o Accelerate road, fencing, and outpost construction to bridge existing gaps.
• Economic Initiatives:
o Promote border area development programs to boost local economies and reduce insurgent
influence.
• Inter-Agency Collaboration:
o Adopt “One Border, One Border Guarding Force (OBOBGF)” principle for clear jurisdiction and
streamlined operations.

V. Overview of India’s Land Borders

• Total Land Border Length: 15,106.7 km
• Breakdown by Neighboring Country:
o Indo-Bangladesh: 4,096.7 km
o Indo-China: 3,488.0 km
o Indo-Pakistan: 3,323.0 km
o Indo-Nepal: 1,751.0 km
o Indo-Myanmar: 1,643.0 km
o Indo-Bhutan: 699.0 km
o Indo-Afghanistan: 106.0 km

VI. Department of Border Management

• Establishment: January 2004 under the Ministry of Home Affairs.
• Primary Mandate:
o Secure international land and coastal borders.
o Strengthen border policing and guarding.
o Develop border infrastructure (roads, fencing, floodlighting, Border Out Posts/Company
Operating Bases).
o Implement the Border Area Development Programme (BADP).
• Objectives:
o Interdict hostile elements while facilitating legitimate trade.
o Ensure coordinated action across administrative, diplomatic, security, intelligence, legal,
regulatory, and economic agencies.
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VII. Infrastructure and Initiatives for Border Management
A. Physical Infrastructure
1. Fencing and Floodlighting:
o Indo-Bangladesh Border:
▪ Total Length: 4,096.7 km.
▪ Physical fencing covers 3,196.705 km; ongoing replacement with new design.
▪ Floodlighting: 3,077.549 km sanctioned; 2,729.236 km completed.
▪ Challenges: Riverine areas, land acquisition issues, local protests.
o Indo-Pakistan Border:
▪ Fencing: 2,097.646 km sanctioned; 2,068.406 km completed.
▪ Floodlighting: 2,107.40 km sanctioned; 2,078.80 km completed.
2. Border Roads:
o Total Sanctioned Length: 4,223.04 km.
o Constructed Roads: 3,785.30 km.
o Purpose: Enhance communication and operational mobility in border areas.
3. Border Out Posts (BOPs) & Composite BOPs:
o BOPs: Serve as self-contained defence workstations.
▪ Example: 1,113 BOPs along the Indo-Bangladesh Border managed by BSF.
o Composite BOPs: 509 sanctioned across Indo-Pakistan and Indo-Bangladesh borders; 383
planned along the Indo-Bangladesh border.
B. Technological Integration
1. Comprehensive Integrated Border Management System (CIBMS):
o Objective: Integration of manpower, sensors, networks, intelligence, and command-control.
o Pilot Projects:
▪ Two 5 km segments along the Indo-Pakistan Border (in Jammu).
▪ One 61 km segment along the Indo-Bangladesh Border (in Dhubri, Assam).
2. Hybrid Surveillance Systems (India-Myanmar Border):
o Demarcation: 1,472 km demarcated out of 1,643 km.
o Pilot Projects: 1 km projects in Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur by Assam Rifles.
o Fencing Projects: 9.214 km at Moreh, Manipur (completed); additional 20.862 km awarded (in
progress).

VIII. Border-Specific Management

A. Indo-Bangladesh Border (IBB)
• Geography: Passes through West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, and Mizoram.
• Terrain: Plains, riverine belts, hills, jungles; densely populated.
• Initiatives:
o Fencing, floodlighting, roads, and numerous BOPs.
o Integration of non-physical (tech-based) barriers to complement physical measures.
B. Indo-Pakistan Border (IPB)
• Geography: Runs through Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab, Jammu & Kashmir, and Ladakh.
• Challenges: Varied terrain, terrorist infiltration, smuggling.
• Initiatives:
o Construction of BOPs, extensive fencing, floodlighting.
o Deployment of BSF and enhanced surveillance measures.
C. Indo-Myanmar Border (IMB)
• Geography: Passes through Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram.
• Initiatives:
o Demarcation, pilot hybrid surveillance projects.
o Fencing and road construction awarded to BRO.
D. Indo-China Border (ICB)
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• Initiatives:
o Development of border roads, foot tracks, helipads, acclimatization centres, and BOPs.
o Primarily focused in Ladakh and northern states (Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim,
Arunachal Pradesh).
E. Indo-Nepal Border
• Geography: Passes through Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal, and Sikkim.
• Challenges: Open border misuse by terrorists and criminals.
• Initiatives:
o Upgradation of 1,299.80 km of roads.
o Establishment of 539 BOPs.
F. Indo-Bhutan Border
• Geography: Passes through Assam, West Bengal, Arunachal Pradesh, and Sikkim.
• Initiatives:
o Establishment of 195 BOPs to counter open border misuse.
G. Indo-Afghanistan Border
• Note:
o Border length: 106.0 km.
o No detailed initiatives provided.

IX. Force Deployment & Organizational Responsibility

• One Border, One Border Guarding Force (OBOBGF):
o Each border segment is managed by a dedicated Border Guarding Force (BGF).
• Additional Responsibilities:
o Indian Army: Guards the Line of Control (LoC) along the Indo-Pakistan border.
o BSF: Manages key segments of the Indo-Pakistan and Indo-Bangladesh borders.
o ITBP: Collaborates with the Army along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China.
o Indian Navy & Coast Guard: Ensure maritime, coastal, and offshore security.

X. Umbrella Scheme: Border Infrastructure and Management (BIM)

• Approval: By Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) on 19.01.2022.
• Duration: Until 31.03.2026 (subject to further review).
• Cost: ₹13,020 crore.
• Scope:
o Infrastructure development along international borders.
o Strengthens overall border management through coordinated projects.

XI. Objectives of Border Management

• Primary Goals:
o Security: Secure borders from hostile elements and prevent infiltration, smuggling, and illegal
activities.
o Facilitation: Ensure smooth facilitation of legitimate trade and cross-border commerce.
• Key Functions:
o Construction and maintenance of physical infrastructure (roads, fences, BOPs, floodlighting).
o Deployment of specialized forces and technological systems (CIBMS, hybrid surveillance).
o Economic development and border area development programs (BADP) to uplift local
communities.
o Coordination among administrative, diplomatic, security, intelligence, legal, regulatory, and
economic agencies.
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XII. Conclusion
• Integrated Approach:
o Effective border management is a blend of physical security, technological integration, and socio-
economic development.
• Strategic Importance:
o Secures national frontiers, prevents hostile infiltration, and facilitates economic and cultural
exchange with neighboring countries.
• Ongoing Reforms:
o Continued emphasis on modernizing infrastructure, deploying advanced surveillance systems,
and ensuring inter-agency coordination to address emerging challenges.

BADP & Integrated Check Posts (ICPs)

I. Border Area Development Programme (BADP)
A. Overview and Objectives
• Implemented by:
o Department of Border Management, Ministry of Home Affairs.
• Scope:
o Covers 460 border blocks in 117 border districts across 16 States and 2 Union Territories
adjoining international borders.
• Aim:
o Address the special developmental needs and overall well-being of people residing near
international borders.
o Provide essential infrastructure by converging multiple schemes (Central/State/UT/local) and
adopting a participatory approach.
• Key Focus Areas:
o Improvement of roads, bridges, drinking water, health facilities, agriculture, and allied activities.
o Enhancement of social infrastructure in census villages, towns, and urban/semi-urban areas
within a 0–10 km (crow–fly) radius from the international boundary.
B. Funding Pattern and Allocation Criteria
• Funding Ratios:
1. North Eastern States, Himalayan States & Jammu & Kashmir:
▪ NE (Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim,
Tripura), Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, and UT of Jammu & Kashmir: Ratio of 90:10
(Centre:State/UT).
2. Other States (e.g., Bihar, Gujarat, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal):
▪ Ratio of 60:40 (Centre:State).
3. Union Territory of Ladakh:
▪ Centre share is 100%.
• Allocation Components:
1. Administrative Expenditure & Reserve Fund: Up to 10% of total annual allocation.
2. Additional Funding for Indo-China Border Areas: An extra 10% is allocated for projects in
border districts of Arunachal Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Ladakh, Sikkim, and Uttarakhand.
3. Remaining Funds Distribution:
▪ 80% of the total funds are divided in a 40:60 ratio:
▪ 40% allocated to eight NE States.
▪ 60% allocated to the remaining eight border States and two UTs.
• Allocation Parameters (each with 33% weightage):
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1. Length of the international border.
2. Area of the border belt (covering census villages, semi-urban and urban areas within 0–10 km).
3. Population of the areas within 0–10 km of the border.
C. Examples of Infrastructure Projects Under BADP
• Meghalaya:
o Suspension Foot Bridge at Gittingre over Rompa River, Block-Baghmara, South Garo Hills
(Completed in 2023–24).
• Ladakh (UT):
o Construction of a link road from Main Bridge to Buk Chushul, Leh, Block-Chushul, District –
Durbuk (Completed in 2023–24).
• Nagaland:
o Bailey Bridge Over Zungki River, Village-Tutheze, Block-Pungro, District – Kiphire (Completed
in 2023–24).

II. Integrated Check Posts (ICPs) & Land Ports Authority of India
(LPAI)
A. Land Ports Authority of India (LPAI)
• Establishment:
o Recommended by the Cabinet Committee on Security (2006) and formally established in 2012
under an Act of Parliament.
• Objective:
o Develop Integrated Check Posts (ICPs) to provide enhanced border infrastructure.
o House multiple regulatory agencies within one complex.
o Facilitate efficient movement of passengers and goods along international borders.
B. Infrastructural Facilities at ICPs
1. Trade Facilities:
o Warehouse/Refrigerated storage space.
o Duty-free shops, Forex services, cafeterias, parking.
o Cargo complexes, driver rest areas, electronic weighbridges.
o Inspection sheds, CCTV surveillance, and customs facilities.
2. Passenger Facilities:
o Bus services, waiting areas, ATMs, health checkup units.
o Trolley/wheelchair support, washrooms, parking, taxi services.
o Childcare rooms and immigration counters.
C. Operationalized ICPs (Examples)
• Locations and Dates of Operationalization:
o Attari (Punjab – Indo-Pakistan)
o Agartala (Tripura – Indo-Bangladesh)
o Petrapole (West Bengal – Indo-Bangladesh)
o Raxaul (Bihar – Indo-Nepal)
o Jogbani (Bihar – Indo-Nepal)
o Moreh (Manipur – Indo-Myanmar)
o Srimantpur (Assam – Indo-Bangladesh)
o PTB Dera Baba Nanak (Punjab – Indo-Pakistan)
o Sutarkandi (West Bengal – Indo-Bangladesh)
o Dawki (Meghalaya – Indo-Bangladesh)
o Rupaidiha (Uttar Pradesh – Indo-Nepal)
o Sabroom (Tripura – Indo-Bangladesh)
• Additional ICPs:
o 11 new locations identified for further development (e.g., Sunauli in UP, Banbasa in Uttarakhand,
Bhithamore in Bihar).
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o Many projects are in the development phase, with land acquisition and tendering processes
underway.
D. Additional Development and Upgradation Initiatives
• ICP Sutarkandi:
o Operational since 07.09.2019; ongoing work on boundary walls, earth filling, and facility
upgrades.
• Passenger Terminal Building (PTB) at Petrapole:
o Construction in progress (70% complete); expected to finish by August 2024.
• Radiation Detection Equipment (RDE):
o Installation at 8 ICPs currently under progress.
• BGF (Border Guard Force) Accommodation:
o New accommodations at ICPs such as Jogbani (inaugurated on 16.09.2023) and ongoing
construction at other sites.

III. Conclusion & Strategic Importance

• Integrated Approach:
o BADP and ICP development form a crucial part of India's comprehensive border management
strategy, which merges security, infrastructure development, and economic upliftment.
• Strategic Goals:
o Secure national borders against hostile elements and illegal activities.
o Enhance cross-border trade and cultural interactions.
o Improve living standards in border areas to reduce local grievances and insurgent influence.
• Ongoing Reforms:
o Emphasis on technological integration (e.g., CIBMS, hybrid surveillance, RDE).
o Continuous infrastructure upgrades and inter-agency coordination ensure that India's borders
remain secure, modern, and economically vibrant.

Vibrant Villages Programme (VVP)

A. Overview and Objectives
• Objective:
o Enhance vibrancy in selected border villages.
o Reverse outmigration by providing incentives and promoting local development.
• Scheme Type:
o Centrally Sponsored Scheme aimed at comprehensive development in 19 border districts across
46 blocks.
• Target Regions:
o Northern border states including Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh,
and the Union Territory of Ladakh.
B. Key Components and Activities
• Capacity Building:
o National-level workshops for state/district officials.
o Digital workflow for expediting village action plans.
• Infrastructure Development:
o Sanctioned projects for community halls, wayside amenities, tourist information centers,
viewpoints, and transit camps.
o Water harvesting and conservation structures (e.g., brushwood check dams).
• Connectivity:
o Road projects (e.g., 113 road projects worth ₹2,420.97 crore in Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, and
Uttarakhand).
• Cultural and Social Activities:
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o Fairs, festivals, health and veterinary camps, sports meets, and awareness programs.
o Visits by senior officers and Union Cabinet Ministers to assess progress.
• Financial Outlay:
o Approximately 203 projects with an outlay of around ₹114 crore under VVP.
o Additional convergence projects sanctioned with an outlay of approximately ₹501.47 crore.

Coastal Security
A. India's Coastline
• Total Length:
o Officially 7,516.6 km (under review with new measurements suggesting >11,000 km).
• Geographical Coverage:
o Borders three major water bodies:
▪ Bay of Bengal (East)
▪ Indian Ocean (South)
▪ Arabian Sea (West)
• Coastal States & Union Territories:
o States: Gujarat, Maharashtra, Goa, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Odisha,
West Bengal.
o UTs: Daman & Diu, Lakshadweep, Puducherry, Andaman & Nicobar Islands.
• Measurement Revision:
o New Terms of Reference by NMSC (National Maritime Search Committee) have led to re-
verification and an increase in the reported length.

B. Maritime and Coastal Security Set-Up

• Designated Authority:
o Indian Navy: Overall responsibility for maritime, coastal, and offshore security.
• Supporting Agencies:
o Indian Coast Guard (ICG):
▪ Also designated for coastal security in Territorial Waters.
▪ Director General of ICG functions as Commander Coastal Command for inter-agency
coordination.
o Coastal Police & Other Central/State Agencies: Complement the security framework.

C. Coastal Security Scheme (CSS)

• Objective:
o Strengthen the infrastructure of coastal state/UT police forces for effective patrolling and
surveillance—especially in shallow waters.
• CSS Phase-I (2005-06 to 2011):
o Outlay: ₹646 crore over 6 years.
o Assets Provided:
▪ 73 Coastal Police Stations (CPS)
▪ 97 check posts
▪ 58 outposts
▪ 30 barracks
▪ 204 interceptor boats, 153 jeeps, 312 motorcycles, and 10 Rigid Inflatable Boats (RIBs).
• CSS Phase-II (01.04.2011 to 31.03.2020):
o Outlay: ₹1,579.91 crore.
o Enhancements:
▪ Construction of 131 CPS, 60 jetties, 10 Marine Operational Centres.
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▪ Procurement of 131 four-wheelers and 242 motorcycles.
o Achievements:
▪ All 131 CPS operational, 37 jetties constructed, and functional Marine Operational
Centres established.

D. Other Coastal Security Initiatives

• Community Interaction Programmes (CIP):
o Purpose: Increase safety awareness among fishermen and enlist them as "eyes and ears" for
intelligence.
• Fishermen Biometric ID Cards:
o Mandate: All marine fishermen must carry a QR-enabled Aadhaar along with a Biometric ID
Card.
o Scale: Approximately 18.69 lakh Biometric ID Cards and 13 lakh QR-coded Aadhaar cards
issued.
• Tracking of Vessels/Boats:
o Implementation: Installation of ISRO-developed tracking devices on mechanized and non-
mechanized fishing boats.
o Features: Geo-fencing, weather information, alerts, and potential fishing zone data.
• Security of Non-major/Minor Ports:
o Total: 239 non-major ports.
o Guidelines: Revised security guidelines (issued on 15.03.2023) to ensure ISPS compliance.
• Security of Single Point Mooring (SPM):
o Definition: Offshore loading buoys serving as mooring points for tankers.
o Status: 26 SPMs in operation; SOP circulated for their security.
• Coastal Mapping:
o Process: Digitization of coastal infrastructure (e.g., police stations, fish landing sites, ports,
customs posts).
o Agency: BISAG-N (Bhaskaracharya National Institute for Space Applications and Geo-
Informatics) tasked with comprehensive mapping.
• Notification of Coastal Police Stations:
o Purpose: To deal with crimes in international waters (up to EEZ).
o Example Stations: Navibandar (Porbandar), Yellow Gate (Mumbai), Harbour Police Stations in
Mormugao, Mangalore, Fort Kochi, etc.
• National Academy of Coastal Policing (NACP):
o Location: Devbhumi Dwarka, Gujarat.
o Status: Interim campus functioning since 29.10.2018; 13 batches (1059 personnel) trained.
o Future Plans: Construction project approved with an estimated cost of ₹441.77 crore (2023–
2027).
• Joint Coastal Patrolling (JCP):
o Initiative: Coordinated patrolling by ICG and Coastal Police.
o Implementation Date: Commenced on 15.08.2020.
Outcome: Enhanced coordination and rapid response despite COVID-19 challenges.
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VARIOUS SECURITY AGENCIES AND THEIR

MANDATE
Understanding India’s Security Framework
India’s security architecture is a robust system designed to counter both external and internal threats. It comprises the
Indian Armed Forces, Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs), and the Strategic Forces Command, each with distinct
yet complementary roles in safeguarding the nation.

Law and Order: A State Responsibility with Federal Support

Law and order is primarily managed by state governments and union territories, with state police forces and
metropolitan units in major cities handling day-to-day policing. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) oversees
federal law enforcement agencies, ensuring coordination to strengthen internal security efforts.

Mandates and Ministerial Oversight

• External Security: The Ministry of Defence (MoD) leads, collaborating with the MHA to protect India from
external aggression.
• Internal Security: The MHA takes charge, supported by the MoD, to tackle issues like insurgency,
separatism, and civil unrest.

Categories of Security Forces

• Indian Armed Forces: Focus on external defense and territorial integrity.
• Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs): Known as paramilitary forces, they address internal security, law
enforcement, and border protection.
• Specialized Units: Elite forces trained for anti-terrorism, urban warfare, and VIP protection, equipped to
handle high-stakes operations.

Structure and Roles of the Indian Armed Forces

Overview of the Indian Armed Forces
The Indian Armed Forces are the backbone of national defense, consisting of:

• Indian Army: Manages land-based operations.

• Indian Navy: Protects maritime boundaries and interests.
• Indian Air Force: Ensures aerial defense. These branches are bolstered by the Indian Coast Guard,
paramilitary units, and other organizations. The President of India serves as the supreme commander, with the
Cabinet, through the MoD, setting defense policies and providing resources. The Government of India bears
ultimate responsibility for safeguarding the nation.

Indian Army
• Background: Known as Bhartiya Thal Sena, it traces its roots to the East India Company, evolving into the
British Indian Army and, post-independence, the modern Indian Army.
• Leadership: Commanded by the Chief of Army Staff (COAS).
• Scale: Recognized as the world’s second-largest active army.
• Mission: Protects India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity while aiding humanitarian efforts during natural
disasters.
• Special Forces: The Para Commandos undertake covert missions, counter-terrorism, counterinsurgency, and
disaster rescues.
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Indian Navy
• Overview: A three-dimensional force operating above, on, and below the sea to safeguard national interests.
• Leadership: Led by the Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS), supported by the Vice Chief (VCNS) and three
Principal Staff Officers at the Integrated Headquarters.
• Commands: Western (Mumbai), Eastern (Visakhapatnam), and Southern (Kochi) Naval Commands.
• Operational Reach: Features Western and Eastern Fleets and flotillas in Mumbai, Visakhapatnam, and Port
Blair.
• Tri-Service Command: The Andaman & Nicobar Command, India’s sole tri-service unit, defends the
Andaman and Nicobar Islands under a rotating Commander-in-Chief.
• Special Forces: The Marine Commando Force (MARCOS) excels in anti-terrorism, anti-piracy, and maritime
special operations.

Indian Air Force

• History: Established on October 8, 1932, it ranks fourth globally in size.
• Mission: Secures Indian airspace and conducts aerial operations during conflicts.
• Leadership: Commanded by the Chief of Air Staff (Air Marshal).
• Global Role: Participates in UN peacekeeping missions.
• Special Forces: The Garud Commando Force protects airfields, suppresses enemy air defenses, and conducts
search-and-rescue operations.

The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS): A Unifying Role

Origin and Establishment

Recommended in 2001 post-Kargil, the CDS role was formalized in 2019, with General Bipin Rawat as the first
appointee.

Responsibilities

• Operational Synergy: Enhances coordination among the three services.

• Advisory Role: Heads the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) and advises the Defence Minister.
• Jointness: Oversees tri-service organizations as COSC chairman.
• Theatre Commands: Drives integrated command structures across land, sea, and air.
• Nuclear Oversight: Manages the Strategic Forces Command within the Nuclear Command Authority.

Significance

The CDS fosters inter-service collaboration, expediting decision-making and bolstering military readiness.

Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs): Guardians of Internal Security

Overview

The CAPFs, primarily under the MHA (except Assam Rifles, operationally controlled by the MoD), are union police
forces that support state police in maintaining law and order. They include seven organizations, each led by a Director
General of Police:

1. Assam Rifles (AR): Guards Northeast borders and aids in disaster response.
2. Border Security Force (BSF): Secures land borders with Pakistan and Bangladesh.
3. Central Industrial Security Force (CISF): Protects critical infrastructure.
4. Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF): Tackles internal security challenges.
5. Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP): Guards the India-China border.
6. National Security Guard (NSG): Handles counter-terrorism operations.
7. Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB): Secures Indo-Nepal and Indo-Bhutan borders.
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Detailed Roles
• CRPF: Established in 1939, it manages riots, counters insurgency, protects VIPs, and supports disaster relief.
It played a key role in integrating princely states post-independence.
• BSF: Formed in 1965, it prevents smuggling and cross-border crimes in peacetime and supports the Army in
wartime with limited offensive actions and intelligence tasks.
• SSB: Created in 1963, it promotes security along Indo-Nepal and Indo-Bhutan borders, engaging 78,000
villages across 15 states as a “Peoples Force.”
• ITBP: Established in 1962, it secures the 3,488 km India-China border and serves as a first responder in
Himalayan disasters.
• NSG: Set up in 1984, it neutralizes terrorist threats, handles hijackings, and conducts bomb disposal, notably
during the 26/11 Mumbai attacks.

Challenges Facing CAPFs

• Operational Issues:
o States’ over-reliance on CAPFs, due to weak state police capacity, leaves little time for rest,
recuperation, or training between deployments.
o Poor coordination with state police hampers effectiveness.
o Border guarding forces (e.g., BSF, ITBP) are often diverted to other duties, diluting their focus.
o Multiple forces on the same border (e.g., BSF and SSB) create confusion and inefficiency.
• Human Resource Challenges:
o Over 84,000 vacant posts strain personnel, leading to denied leaves and stressful conditions.
o High suicide rates (436 cases in three years) and voluntary retirements (42,000 from 2010–2013)
reflect poor morale.
o Limited promotional avenues compared to IPS or armed forces, compounded by IPS officers leading
CAPFs, demotivate personnel.
• Infrastructural Gaps:
o Substandard food, medical facilities, and accommodation deflate motivation.
o Shortages of arms, ammunition, and vehicles hinder operational efficiency.

Key Institutions Strengthening Internal Security

National Investigation Agency (NIA)
• Established: Under the NIA Act, 2008.
• Role: Investigates terrorism-related cases, including terror financing and offenses listed in the Act’s schedule.
• Performance (as of 31.03.2024): Registered 598 cases, charge-sheeted 461, concluded 135 trials with 128
convictions, showcasing a high conviction rate.

National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID)

• Objective: Strengthens counter-terrorism via IT-based intelligence sharing.
• Functionality: Connects 11 central law enforcement agencies with 10 data providers for real-time access to
critical information.

Combating Financing of Terrorism (CFT) Cell

• Under: MHA.
• Functions: Develops policies on terrorist financing and Fake Indian Currency Notes (FICN), operates the
FICN Coordination Centre (FCORD) for inter-agency intelligence sharing, and supports the NIA’s Terror
Funding & Fake Currency (TFFC) Cell in investigations.

International Cooperation on Terror Financing

• India-Bangladesh MoU: Targets fake currency smuggling and circulation.
• Training Programs: Equips police to combat counterfeiting.
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• Global Role: India, a member of FATF (since 2010), EAG, APG, and BIMSTEC’s Sub-Group on Combating
Terrorism Financing, actively contributes to global anti-money laundering and CFT efforts.

Security of Holders of High Public Offices

• Threat Assessment: Continuously evaluated by MHA.
• Security Review: Overseen by a High-Level Committee, with regular advisories to states on official
movements.
• Special Training: Police commandos trained by NSG, BSF, ITBP, and CISF for VIP security duties.

Airport and Metro Security

• Airport Security:
o Strengthened with modern gadgets, improved procedures, and increased CISF deployment.
o Coordinated by MHA, Ministry of Civil Aviation, IB, and CISF, with Counter Terrorist Contingency
Plans (CTCP) for all airports.
• Metro Security:
o CISF manages Delhi Metro under a robust framework.
o Coordination exists for eight other metro systems, including Mumbai, Bangalore, Chennai, Kolkata,
Lucknow, Kochi, Jaipur, and Gurugram.

Security of Vital Installations

• Responsibility: Lies with Union Ministries, Departments, and state governments, guided by MHA advisories.
• CAPF Deployment: Provided on request; 766 installations categorized (A–E) by threat level.

Security of Religious Shrines

• Responsibility: Rests with state/UT administrations.
• MHA Role: Issues alerts and encourages security enhancements based on intelligence.

Security Clearance Mechanism

• Authority: MHA assesses risks for licenses and contracts in sensitive sectors.
• Purpose: Balances security with ease of doing business.
• Performance (2023–2024): Processed 1,199 clearance requests.

Other Institutions
• Intelligence Bureau (IB): Gathers domestic intelligence using technical and human sources.
• Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW): Monitors foreign threats, particularly from Pakistan and China.
• National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO): Provides technical intelligence under the National
Security Advisor since 2004.
• CERT-In: Mitigates cybersecurity threats.
• CCTNS: Digitally links police stations for crime tracking.

Government Initiatives and Policy Measures

• Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 2019 (UAPA): Allows designation of individuals as terrorists without
judicial process.
• SAMADHAN Strategy: A comprehensive approach to tackle Left-Wing Extremism (LWE) through
leadership, intelligence, and technology.
• National Policy and Action Plan (2015): Integrates development and security in LWE-affected areas.
• Modernisation of State Police Forces Scheme: Upgrades police infrastructure and capabilities.
• NATGRID: Ensures seamless data access for intelligence agencies.
• CERT-In and NCIIPC: Protect against cybersecurity threats and safeguard critical digital infrastructure.
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State Police: Challenges and Realities
Issues with State Police

• Human Resource Gaps:

o 5.6 lakh vacancies reported in 2014, with a police-to-population ratio of 120 per lakh (UN standard:
222), ranking India fifth-lowest among 71 countries.
o Unscientific recruitment, inadequate training, poor career progression, and a negative societal image
plague morale and self-perception.
• Operational and Infrastructure Challenges:
o BPRD data shows a 30% vehicle shortage and 76% weaponry deficit in Rajasthan.
o Of 17,000 police stations, 628 lack telephones, 2,700 lack CCTV, and forensic labs remain outdated
and understaffed.
o Political interference, poor investigation quality, and low conviction rates persist, with no clear
mechanism to address police misconduct.
o Appointments and postings driven by political considerations compromise independence.
• Structural Problems:
o No separation between investigation and law enforcement wings reduces accountability and
efficiency, as these require distinct skills.
o MoSPI highlights significant crime underreporting, reflecting public distrust or police suppression
tied to performance metrics.
o A top- and bottom-heavy hierarchy causes shortages in mid-level roles.
o Policing as a state subject leads to uneven reform implementation.

Intelligence Agencies in India

Key Agencies

1. Intelligence Bureau (IB):

o The world’s oldest intelligence agency, it detects domestic threats using technical and human
intelligence under the MHA.
o Originated during colonial rule.
2. Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW):
o Established to monitor Pakistan and China, it focuses on foreign intelligence.
3. National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO):
o Formed in 2004 under the National Security Advisor, it specializes in technical intelligence.

Challenges Facing Intelligence Agencies

• Infighting: Lack of legal frameworks and unclear role delineation cause overlapping functions, sparking turf
wars and credit disputes.
• Poor Coordination: Transnational threats (e.g., Pulwama attack) expose coordination failures between IB and
R&AW, weakening law enforcement.
• Lack of Oversight: Executive control invites allegations of misuse, with no parliamentary accountability.
• Transparency Deficit: Opaque functioning breeds corruption, nepotism, and fund misuse, exacerbated by
shortages of trained manpower, especially cybersecurity experts.
• Political Exploitation: Agencies are sometimes used for political purposes.
• Resource Constraints: Limited human resources hinder effectiveness.

Proposed Reforms
• Legal Framework: Legislation to define roles and ensure accountability.
• Recruitment Overhaul: Hire private-sector experts in IT, science, and technology.
• Unified Oversight: Centralize control under the National Security Advisor.
• Transparency: Promote openness with enhanced oversight and empowerment of officials.
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Special Operations Forces in India
National Security Guard (NSG)
• Foundation: Established in 1984 as a federal contingency force.
• Roles: Neutralizes terrorists, handles hijackings, conducts bomb disposal, and rescues hostages, notably
during 26/11.

Special Protection Group (SPG)

• Purpose: Protects the PM and former PMs since 1985, expanded post-1991.
• Collaboration: Works with IB and state police.

Indian Coast Guard (ICG)

• Role: Secures maritime zones, prevents smuggling, and aids in disaster response.

Forces Ensuring Internal Security

Central Industrial Security Force (CISF)
• Duties: Protects nuclear sites, airports, government buildings, and VIPs, with fire services at 115
establishments.

Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF)

• Role: Manages riots, counters insurgency, protects VIPs, and supports UN missions and disaster relief.

India’s security framework is a complex and dynamic tapestry, woven from the collective efforts of the Indian Armed
Forces, Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs), intelligence agencies, and state police, each tasked with protecting the
nation from a diverse array of threats. The Indian Armed Forces stand as a formidable shield against external
aggression, while the CAPFs and state police work tirelessly to maintain internal stability, supported by specialized
units and institutions like the NIA, NATGRID, and intelligence bodies such as IB and R&AW. Government initiatives
like UAPA, SAMADHAN, and police modernization schemes reflect a proactive approach to addressing emerging
challenges, from terrorism and Left-Wing Extremism to cyber threats and terror financing.

However, this robust system is not without its vulnerabilities. Overburdened CAPFs, understaffed state police forces,
and intelligence agencies hampered by infighting and a lack of legal oversight reveal significant operational,
structural, and resource-related gaps. High vacancy rates, inadequate infrastructure, and poor coordination between
agencies undermine efficiency, while political interference and low public trust further complicate the landscape.
These challenges highlight the urgent need for comprehensive reforms legal frameworks for intelligence agencies,
enhanced recruitment and training processes, and better integration of state and central forces to strengthen
accountability and effectiveness.

As India navigates an increasingly complex security environment, both domestically and globally, the synergy
between its various agencies will be paramount. By addressing these systemic issues and fostering a culture of
transparency, modernization, and collaboration, India can bolster its security apparatus to not only meet current
demands but also anticipate future threats. A resilient and adaptive security framework is essential to safeguarding the
nation’s sovereignty, integrity, and the well-being of its citizens in an ever-evolving world.
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PREVIOUS YEAR’S QUESTIONS- INTERNAL SECURITY

2023
Q1. साइबर अपराधोों से दे श की सुरक्षा को बडा खतरा है । इन अपराधोों से दे श को कैसे बचाया जा सकता है ?
Cyber crimes are a big threat to national security. How can a country be protected from these
crimes? (8)
Q2. भारतीय सुरक्षा बलोों को अधधक सशक्त कैसे बनाया जा सकता है ? अपने सुझाव दीधजये।
How can India's security forces be strengthened? Give your suggestions. (8)
Q3. आणधवक प्रसार के मुद्ोों पर भारत का दृधिकोण क्या है ? स्पि कीधजये ।
What is India's stand on the issues of nuclear proliferation? Explain. (8)
Q4. "अवैध धन स्थानान्तरण दे श की आधथिक प्रभुसत्ता के धलए गम्भीर खतरा है। सूचना और सोंचार प्रौद्योधगकी ने
इसे ज्यादा चुनौतीपूणि बना धदया है।" व्याख्या कीधजए।
"Money laundering poses a serious threat to a country's economic sovereignty. Information and
communication technology has made it more challenging." Explain. (12)
Q5. भारत तथा धवश्व में मीधिया से क्या सकारात्मक व नकारात्मक पररवतिन हुए है ? रािर ीय व अन्तराििरीय सुरक्षा में
मीधिया का क्या योगदान है ?
What positive and negative changes occurred due to the media revolution in India and around the
world? Explain the role of media in national and international security. (12)
2022
Q1. रािरीय सुरक्षा में धवज्ञान एवों प्रौद्योधगकी की भूधमका की धववेचना कीधजए ।
Discuss the role of science and technology in national security. (8)
Q2. भारत की रक्षा आवश्यकताओों को दृधिगत रखते हुये भारत सरकार की 'अधिवीर' योजना का धवश्लेषण
कीधजए।
Analyse Government of India's 'Agniveer' plan in the light of India's defence needs. (8)
Q3. सैन्य तथा असैन्य क्षेत्ोों में कृधत्म बुद्धि की भूधमका और प्रभावोों की ताधकिक व्याख्या कीधजए।
Explain logically the role and effects of artificial intelligence in military and civil sectors. (12)
Q4. स्वतोंत्ता के उपराोंत पू वोत्तर भारत में व्याप्त धवद्रोह की द्धस्थधत को धवस्तार से समझाइए।
Explain in detail the state of insurgency in North-Eastern India after independence. (12)
2021
Q1. धवद्रोह (धवप्लव) से क्या तात्पयि है ? व्याख्या कीधजए।
What is meant by insurgency? Explain. (8)
Q2. आों तररक सुरक्षा में मीधिया और सोशल नेटवधकिंग की भूधमका महत्वपूणि है। धवश्लेषण कीधजए।
Role of media and social networking is important in internal security. Analyse. (8)
Q3. आतोंकवाद और भ्रिाचार धकसी दे श की आों तररक सुरक्षा बाधधत करते हैं। समीक्षा कीधजए।
Terrorism and corruption hinder the internal security of any nation. Critically examine. (12)
Q4. धवधभन्न प्रकार के साइबर अपराधोों के बारे में बताइए। आप अपने को साइबर अपराधोों से कैसे सुरधक्षत रख
सकते हैं ?
What are various types of cyber crimes? How can you protect yourself against cyber crimes? (12)
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Q5. साइबर िोम पररयोजना क्या है ? भारत में इों टरनेट अपराध रोकने में यह कैसे उपयोगी है ? व्याख्या कीधजए।
Describe about Cyber Dome. Explain how it can be useful in controllign internet crimes in India.
(12)
Q6. नागररक सुरक्षा के प्रकार एवों कायों की धववेचना कीधजए। उत्तर प्रदे श में यह धकतना प्रभावी है ? उल्लेख
कीधजए।
Discuss the kinds and functions of civil defence. How much is it effective in Uttar Pradesh? Explain.
(12)
2020
Q1. भारत के सुरक्षा पररदृश्य में ररवॉल्यूश न इन धमलटर ी अफेयसि क्या है ?
What is 'Revolution in millitary affairs (RMA)' in security perspective of India? (8)
Q2. "नाको आतोंकवाद" भारत की आों तररक सुरक्षा के धलए खतरा है इसकी धववेचना कीधजए|
Narco terrorism is a threat to India's internal security. Discuss it. (8)
Q3. 'मनी लाोंधिर ों ग 'एवों मानव तस्करी की गैर परों परागत सुरक्षा चुनौधतयोों के रूप में समीक्षा कीधजए |
Analyse 'Money Laundering' and 'Human Trafficking' as a non-traditional security challenges. (8)
Q4. भारत में नक्सलवाद का सामना करने के धलए सरकार द्वारा उठाए गए कदमोों को समझाइये |
Explain the steps taken by the government to counter Naxalism in India. (12)
Q5. नाधभकीय प्रसार के मुद्ोों एवों धवद्यमान धनयोंत्ण तोंत् का धवस्तारपूविक वणिन कीधजए |
Describe in detail the issues of nuclear proliferation and existing control mechanism. (12)
Q6. भारत में उच्चतर रक्षा सोंगठन को समझाइये |
Explain the 'Higher defense organisation of India'. (12)
Q7. वतिमान भती सुरक्षा चुनौधतयोों में नाधभकीय हधथयार भारत की सुरक्षा प्रबोंधन में धकस प्रकार लाभदायक हो
सकता है ? इसको समझाइए|
At present in emerging security challenges, how nuclear weapons can be advantageous in India's
security management? Explain it. (12)
2019
Q1. आों तररक सुरक्षा के प्रधत खतरे के रूप में भ्रिाचार का धववेचना कीधजए |
Analyse corruption as a threat to internal security. (8)
Q2. भारतीय सोंसद के 'सशस्त्र सेना धवशेषाधधकार कानून' की आलोचना राज्योों द्वारा कठोरता एवों कभी-कभी
असोंवैधाधनकता के धलए की जाती रही है | धववेचना कीधजए|
Armed forces special powers act' of the parliament of India has come under criticism by the states as
being draconian and sometimes as un-constitutional. Examine analytically. (8)
Q3. धवगत दो दशकोों में अधनयोंधत्त ढों ग से बढ़ते अोंतररािरीय आतोंकवाद से धवश्व शाोंधत को गोंभीर खतरा पैदा हो गया
है| इससे धनपटने के धलए प्रतीक रािर को वैधश्वक स्तर पर एक साथ धमलकर लडना होगा |" इस कथन की
व्याख्या कीधजए|
"With unbrindled escalation in the international terrorism activities during the past two decades a
great threat looms large before world peace. Every Nation has to join hand in the Global fight unto
the last against it." Explain this statement. (12)
Q4. " नाधभकीय भयादोहन (परमाणु धनरोध) भीषण नरसोंहार वाले आणधवक हधथयारोों के प्रधतकार एकमात् कारगर
उपाय है ?" समझाइए |
Nuclear deterrence is the only effective alternative to counter the Deadly genocidal nuclear
weapons. Analytically explain this statement. (12)
Q5. "सोशल मीधिया को रािरीय सुरक्षा सोंवधिन के एक महत्वपूणि साधन के रूप में धकस तरह उपयोग में लाया जा
सकता है " समझाइए|
"How power social media can be utilised as a significant tool in strengthening national security"?
Explain. (12)
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Q1. साइबर सुरक्षा धवज्ञान क्या है ? इसका महत्व बताएों ।
What is Cyber Security Science? Mention its importance.
Q2. वामपोंथी उग्रवादी धवचारधारा से प्रभाधवत नागररकोों को सामाधजक और आधथिक सोंवृद्धि की मुख्यधारा में आने
की सुधारक रणनीधतयोों पर चचाि करें ।
Discuss the corrective strategies needed to win the Left Wing Extremism (LWE) Doctrine affected
citizens back into the mainstream of social and economic growth.
Q3. भारत की रािरीय रक्षा पररषद् ' पर प्रकाश िालें ।
Elaborate on the ‘National Defence Council’ of India.
.Q4. वैश्वीकरण के युग में रािरीय सुरक्षा की चुनौधतयोों की धववे चना कीधजए ।
Discuss the challenges of National Security in the age of globalization
Q5. वतिमान समय में उत्तर प्रदे श में कानून और व्यवस्था के धलए चुनौधतयााँ तथा उनके समाधान पर धटप्पणी
कीधजए।
Write a note on the challenges and their solutions for law and order in Uttar Pradesh at the present
time.