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2025 Supreme(CHH) 17
2025 CGHC 3659
2025:CGHC:3659 A FR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No.
B 554 of 2024
1 - M/s Coolage Through Proprietor James K. Wargis S/o Late C.J. Wargis, Aged About 54
Years, Through Power Of Attorney Holder Shri Sajal James Wargis S/o James K. Wargis
Aged About 27 Years, R/o House No.30/442, Tatyapara, Kankali Hospital, Near
Brahmanpara, Sadar Bazar Road, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus
1 - M/s Anil Refrigeration Work Through Proprietor Suresh Kumar S/o A. Appu Kuttan,
C
Aged About 60 Years, R/o Plot No. B/175, Smriti Nagar, Street No.7, New Nehru Nagar,
Bhilai, District Durg, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent For Appellant : Mr. Pravin Kumar
Tulsyan, Advocate For Respondent : Ms. Seema Verma, Advocate appears on behalf of Mr.
Jitendra Gupta, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas
Cases Referred:
Kalamani Tex v. P. Balasubramanian, (2021) 5 SCC 283
Guneet Bhasin Vs. State of NCT of Delhi & Anr. & Ors., CRL.M.C. 4100/2022 & CRL.M.A.
16919/2022(Stay)
E Mohd. Yunus Malik Vs. State of U.P. and Another
India Cements Investments Services Limited Vs. T. P. Nallusamy, Crl. A. No. 13 of 2014
Neutral Citation No. 2017(1) MLJ(Crl)689
Order :
F (Narendra Kumar Vyas, J.)
1. The appellant has filed present acquittal appeal under Section 378(4) of the Criminal
Procedure Code by which learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur in Criminal Case
No. 5175 of 2019 has acquitted the accused for commission of offence under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 ( in short “the N.I. Act, 1881”).
G
2. The brief facts reflected from the record are that the appellant is running business of Air
Conditioners and spare parts. It is also the case of the complainant that accused had purchased
spare parts through different invoices for Rs. 10,61,196/- and has given cheques of Rs.
8,20,000/- out of which one cheque bearing No. 490039 of Rs. 3,00,000/- drawn at State Bank
of India Branch, Smriti Nagar, Bhilai was dishonored and returned to the appellant with
H endorsement that the said cheque was dishonored due to “insufficient fund” in the account on
26.06.2019. The complainant has sent legal notice (Exhibit P/3) on 04.07.2019 to accused
demanding amount of cheque to the tune of Rs. 3,00,000/- which was neither replied nor the
amount was given though notice was served upon him, therefore, he has filed an application
under Section 138 of the the N.I. Act, 1881.
I 3. The appellant/complainant to substantiate his claim has exhibited documents namely
dishonored cheque (Ex. P/1), cheque return memo (Ex. P/2), Legal Notice (Ex. P/3), postal
receipt (Ex. P/4), consignment (Ex. P/5), invoice (Ex. P/6 to Ex. P/17), delivery memo (Ex. P/18
to Ex. P/28). The appellant/complainant examined himself by way of an affidavit under Section
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145 of the the N.I. Act, 1881 reiterating the stand taken in the complaint. The witness was
extensively cross- examined by the accused wherein the complainant has categorically stated
that he has sent the material to the accused to tune of Rs. 10,61,196/- out of which the accused
A
has given a cheque amounting to Rs. 8,20,000/- on various dates, but he has denied the fact
that the entire amount of Rs. 8,20,000/- has been received by him out of which one cheque of
Rs. 3,00,000/- was dishonored due to insufficient fund. He has also denied that he has claimed
excess amount after receiving the amount of Rs. 10,61,196/-.
4. The accused examined himself as DW-1 and also examined under Section 313 of Cr.P.C.
B
before the trial Court who has denied the allegations and also stated that he has given one
cheque as security as he used to purchase the material from the complainant and no liability
exists against him. He has stated that he has put signature in the cheque, but all the entries
have been recorded by other person. The witness was cross-examined by the complainant
wherein he has admitted that whatever material he has purchased from the complainant he
C takes a cash memo and voluntarily stated that he used to give receipt in his letter pad which is
exhibited as Exhibit D-1 to D- 30. He has voluntarily stated that it is a delivery memo. The
witness has also admitted that he has received legal notice (Exhibit P/3) and admitted that since
he has not given the reply, therefore, he has not produced the same. He has also admitted that
in exhibit D-1 to D-30 it is not mentioned that the complainant has received the payment of
material mentioned in these documents. He has also admitted that in exhibit D-1 to D-30 he
D
has not put his signature and voluntarily stated that the complainant’s person used to give
delivery memo and collect the cash money. He has also admitted that he has submitted a
complaint before Police (Exhibit D-32) wherein he has mentioned about 5 cheques, but he has
not mentioned the cheque numbers. He has voluntarily stated that for every financial year one
cheque was given to the accused as security, but has not returned the same.
E
5. Learned trial Court after appreciating the evidence the material has dismissed the complaint
by recording its finding that the complainant is unable to prove that the accused has given a
cheque towards any liability, therefore, it has decided the issue No. 1 against the complainant
and also decided the issue No. 2 against the complainant on the count that the bank slips do
not bear official seal of the bank and the signature of any officer of the bank, as such no
F presumption can be raised about the presentation and dishonor of the cheque for maintaining
the complaint under Section 138 of the the N.I. Act, 1881 accordingly it has dismissed the
complaint. Being aggrieved with this order, present acquittal appeal has been filed by the
complainant.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that learned trial Court without
G appreciating the evidence and material on record and cogent material was placed by the
complainant to prove that the cheque was given not as a surety but in lieu of some liability
which is paramount consideration for attracting Section 138 of N.I. Act, 1881 has dismissed
the complaint. He would further submit that so far the return memo does not bear the
signature of the bank stamp, therefore, the finding recorded by the learned trial Court that it
cannot be a banking record as per Section 146 of the the N.I. Act, 1881 is also illegal,
H
erroneous and would pray for allowing the appeal.
7. Per contra learned counsel for the respondent would submit that learned trial Court after
appreciating the evidence and material on record has recorded its finding that the complainant
has not proved the case beyond reasonable doubt that cheque was given in lieu of any liability
has rightly dismissed the complaint. She would further submit that as per Section 146 of the
I
N.I. Act, 1881 until and unless the bank returning memo bears seal and signature of the bank
it cannot be termed as record. Thus, she would submit that the returning memo is very well
generated and fabricated document by the complainant. As such the trial Court has not
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committed any illegality in not believing upon the said documents and would pray for
dismissal of the acquittal appeal.
A 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.
9. From above submission the points required for determination of this Court are
I. whether the complainant is able to prove that the cheque was given towards any liability or
not?
B
II. Whether the trial Court was justified in dismissing the complaint by not relying upon the
cheque returning memo as it does not bear seal and signature of the bank official to attract
Section 146 of the N.I. Act, 1881?
10. To appreciate the point No. 1 framed by this Court, it is expedient for this Court to go
C through the evidence brought on record. The complainant in his examination in chief as
provided under Section 145 of N.I. Act, 1881 has categorically stated in paragraph 2 that he
has supplied the spare parts to the accused through various invoices which is valued at Rs.
10,61,196/- and the accused has given cheque of Rs. 8,20,000/- on various dates, out of which
one cheque of Rs. 3 lakhs dated 26.06.2019 bearing No. 490039 when presented in the Union
Bank where the complainant is maintaining his account was dishonored and returned to the
D complainant on 27.06.2019 dishonored due to “insufficient fund” in the account. The witness
was cross- examined by the accused and in paragraph 31 he has denied that the cheque was
given as security and in paragraph 30 he has also denied that he has received entire money of
Rs. 8,20,000/-. The witness has also exhibited the Delivery Challans before the trial Court
(Exhibit P/18 to P/28) and Invoices (Exhibit P/6 to P/17), but there is no cross- examination on
the aspect for which material he has made payment to the complainant to establish that cheque
E
was given as security not to discharge liability.
11. The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 has been enacted to define and amend the law
relating to Promissory Notes, Bills of Exchange and Cheques. Various provisions have been
incorporated under the Negotiable Instruments Act regarding Presumptions as to Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 and Section 139 makes it ample clear that a person to sign a cheque and
F
makes it over the payee remains liable unless he adduced evidence to rebut the presumption
that cheque has been issued for a debt or in discharge of liability. It is also well settled position
of law that even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and handed over by the accused which
is towards payment, would attract presumption under Section 139 of N.I. Act, 1881, in absence
of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt. Thus, it
G is incumbent upon the accused to rebut the presumption by leaving cogent evidence by
demonstrating that he has already paid towards entire liability of Rs. 10,61,196/- or the
material valued at Rs. 10,61,196/- was not supplied by the complainant. The accused should
have demonstrated that in view of any understanding between the complainant and the
accused, the cheques were given as security, no such material has been placed on record. Thus,
it is quite vivid that the complainant is able to prove that cheque was given toward liability.
H
Thus, the finding of the learned trial Court that the cheque was not given for any liability, is
contrary to the evidence, material placed on record and also against the law laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Kalamani Tex v. P. Balasubramanian reported in (2021) 5
SCC 283
“14. Adverting to the case in hand, we find on a plain reading of its judgment that the trial
I
Court completely overlooked the provisions and failed to appreciate the statutory
presumption drawn under Section 118 and Section 139 of NIA. The Statute mandates
that once the signature(s) of an accused on the cheque/negotiable instrument are
Page No. 3 of 8
established, then these ‘reverse onus’ clauses become operative. In such a situation, the
obligation shifts upon the accused to discharge the presumption imposed upon him. This
point of law has been crystalized by this Court in Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel v. State of
A
Gujarat in the following words: (SCC pp. 120-21, para 18)
“18. In the case at hand, even after purportedly drawing the presumption under Section
139 of the NI Act, the trial court proceeded to question the want of evidence on the part
of the complainant as regards the source of funds for advancing loan to the accused and
want of examination of relevant witnesses who allegedly extended him money for
B
advancing it to the accused. This approach of the trial court had been at variance with the
principles of presumption in law. After such presumption, the onus shifted to the accused
and unless the accused had discharged the onus by bringing on record such facts and
circumstances as to show the preponderance of probabilities tilting in his favour, any
doubt on the complainant's case could not have been raised for want of evidence
C regarding the source of funds for advancing loan to the appellant-accused.”
12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court again in case Rajesh Jain vs Ajay Singh reported in 2023 (10)
SCC 148 has held in paragraphs 33 to 44 which reads as under:
“33. The NI Act provides for two presumptions: Section 118 and Section 139. Section 118
D of the Act inter alia directs that it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that
every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration. Section 139 of the Act
stipulates that 'unless the contrary is proved, it shall be presumed, that the holder of the
cheque received the cheque, for the discharge of, whole or part of any debt or liability'. It
will be seen that the 'presumed fact' directly relates to one of the crucial ingredients
necessary to sustain a conviction under Section 138.
E
34. Section 139 of the NI Act, which takes the form of a ‘shall presume’ clause is
illustrative of a presumption of law. Because Section 139 requires that the Court ‘shall
presume’ the fact stated therein, it is obligatory on the Court to raise this presumption in
every case where the factual basis for the raising of the presumption had been established.
The rules discussed hereinbelow is common to both the presumptions under Section 139
F and Section 118 and is hence, not repeated- Reference to one can be taken as reference to
another But this does not preclude the person against whom the presumption is drawn
from rebutting it and proving the contrary as is clear from the use of the phrase ‘unless
the contrary is proved’.
35. The Court will necessarily presume that the cheque had been issued towards discharge
G of a legally enforceable debt/liability in two circumstances. Firstly, when the drawer of the
cheque admits issuance/execution of the cheque and secondly, in the event where the
complainant proves that cheque was issued/executed in his favour by the drawer. The
circumstances set out above form the fact(s) which bring about the activation of the
presumptive clause. [Bharat Barrel Vs. Amin Chand] [(1999) 3 SCC 35]
H
36. Recently, this Court has gone to the extent of holding that presumption takes effect
even in a situation where the accused contends that 'a blank cheque leaf was voluntarily
signed and handed over by him to the complainant. [Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar11].
Therefore, mere admission of the drawer's signature, without admitting the execution of
(2019) 4 SCC 197 the entire contents in the cheque, is now sufficient to trigger the
I presumption.
37. As soon as the complainant discharges the burden to prove that the instrument, say a
cheque, was issued by the accused for discharge of debt, the presumptive device under
Page No. 4 of 8
Section 139 of the Act helps shifting the burden on the accused. The effect of the
presumption, in that sense, is to transfer the evidential burden on the accused of proving
that the cheque was not received by the Bank towards the discharge of any liability. Until
A
this evidential burden is discharged by the accused, the presumed fact will have to be
taken to be true, without expecting the complainant to do anything further.
38. John Henry Wigmore12 on Evidence states as follows:
“The peculiar effect of the presumption of law is merely to invoke a rule of law
B compelling the Jury to reach the conclusion in the absence of evidence to the contrary
from the opponent but if the opponent does offer evidence to the contrary (sufficient to
satisfy the Judge's requirement of some evidence), the presumption 'disappears as a rule of
law and the case is in the Jury's hands free from any rule.” 12 Rules of Evidence- The
Hidden Origin of Modern Law.
C
39. The standard of proof to discharge this evidential burden is not as heavy as that
usually seen in situations where the prosecution is required to prove the guilt of an
accused. The accused is not expected to prove the non-existence of the presumed fact
beyond reasonable doubt. The accused must meet the standard of ‘preponderance of
probabilities’, similar to a defendant in a civil proceeding. [Rangappa vs. Mohan (AIR
D 2010 SC 1898)]
40. In order to rebut the presumption and prove to the contrary, it is open to the accused
to raise a probable defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability
can be contested. The words ‘until the contrary is proved’ occurring in Section 139 do not
mean that accused must necessarily prove the negative that the instrument is not issued in
E discharge of any debt/liability but the accused has the option to ask the Court to consider
the non-existence of debt/liability so probable that a prudent man ought, under the
circumstances of the case, to act upon the supposition that debt/liability did not exist.
[Basalingappa Vs. Mudibasappa (AIR 2019 SC 1983) See also Kumar Exports Vs.
Sharma Carpets (2009) 2 SCC 513]
F 41. In other words, the accused is left with two options. The first option-of proving that
the debt/liability does not exist-is to lead defence evidence and conclusively establish with
certainty that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt/liability. The second option
is to prove the non-existence of debt/liability by a preponderance of probabilities by
referring to the particular circumstances of the case. The preponderance of probability in
favour of the accused's case may be even fifty one to forty nine and arising out of the
G entire circumstances of the case, which includes: the complainant's version in the original
complaint, the case in the legal/demand notice, complainant's case at the trial, as also the
plea of the accused in the reply notice, his 313 statement or at the trial as to the
circumstances under which the promissory note/cheque was executed. All of them can
raise a preponderance of probabilities justifying a finding that there was ‘no
H
debt/liability’. [Kumar Exports and Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC 513]
42. The nature of evidence required to shift the evidential burden need not necessarily be
direct evidence i.e., oral or documentary evidence or admissions made by the opposite
party; it may comprise circumstantial evidence or presumption of law or fact.
43. The accused may adduce direct evidence to prove that the instrument was not issued in
I
discharge of a debt/liability and, if he adduces acceptable evidence, the burden again shifts
to the complainant. At the same time, the accused may also rely upon circumstantial
evidence and, if the circumstances so relied upon are compelling the burden may likewise
Page No. 5 of 8
shift to the complainant. It is open for him to also rely upon presumptions of fact, for
instance those mentioned in Section 114 and other sections of the Evidence Act. The
burden of proof may shift by presumptions of law or fact. In Kundanlal's case- (supra)
A
when the creditor had failed to produce his account books, this Court raised a
presumption of fact under Section 114, that the evidence, if produced would have shown
the non-existence of consideration. Though, in that case, this Court was dealing with the
presumptive clause in Section 118 NI Act, since the nature of the presumptive clauses in
Section 118 and 139 is the same, the analogy can be extended and applied in the context
B of Section 139 as well.
44. Therefore, in fine, it can be said that once the accused adduces evidence to the
satisfaction of the Court that on a preponderance of probabilities there exists no
debt/liability in the manner pleaded in the complaint or the demand notice or the
affidavit-evidence, the burden shifts to the complainant and the presumption 'disappears'
C and does not haunt the accused any longer. The onus having now shifted to the
complainant, he will be obliged to prove the existence of a debt/liability as a matter of fact
and his failure to prove would result in dismissal of his complaint case. Thereafter, the
presumption under Section 139 does not again come to the complainant's rescue. Once
both parties have adduced evidence, the Court has to consider the same and the burden of
proof loses all its importance. [Basalingappa vs. Mudibasappa, AIR 2019 SC 1983; See
D
also, Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan (2010) 11 SCC 441] Our Analysis.”
13. From the abovestated legal position and evidence brought on record by the complainant as
well as the accused, it is quite vivid that accused is unable to rebut the presumption by
adducing some evidence on the principle of probabilities also as the accused has nowhere
clarified that for which material mentioned in the exhibit P/1 to P/30 he has made payment.
E
The learned trial Court ignoring the evidence of the complainant that he has admitted in his
examination-in-chief that the accused has given cheques of Rs. 8,20,000/- out of them one
cheque for Rs. 3 Lakhs was dishonored which remained unshaken in the cross-examination of
the complainant. The record of the case demonstrates that the accused is unable to rebut that
the amount of Rs. 8,20,000/- has been paid to the complainant and the trial Court
F unnecessarily examined the fact that out of Rs. 10,61,196/-, Rs. 8,20,000/- has been paid, as
such only Rs. 2,41,196/- is payable therefore, the cheque of Rs. 3 lakhs is a security amount.
Even the trial Court has failed to consider that the accused has nowhere taken a defense that
he has to pay only Rs. 2,41,196/- and the cheque of Rs. 3 lakhs has been given towards security
and unnecessarily struggle to record a finding that the complainant has not given any
explanation how the liability of Rs. 3 lakhs is accrued against the accused. Thus, the finding of
G the learned trial Court that complainant is unable to prove that the cheque of Rs. 3 lakhs was
given towards any liability is erroneous finding of the facts deserves to be set aside by this
Court, and accordingly it is set aside.
14. To appreciate the point No. 2 framed by this Court, it is expedient for this Court to go
through the provisions of Sections 118, 139 and 146 of the N.I. Act, 1881, which are
H reproduced below:
Section 118 of the N.I. Act, 1881:
“118. Presumptions as to negotiable instruments.—Until the contrary is proved, the
following presumptions shall be made:— (a) of consideration:—that every negotiable
I instrument was made or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument, when it
has been accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted, indorsed, negotiated
or transferred for consideration;
Page No. 6 of 8
(b) as to date:—that every negotiable instrument bearing a date was made or drawn on
such date;
A (c) as to time of acceptance:—that every accepted bill of exchange was accepted within a
reasonable time after its date and before its maturity;
(d) as to time of transfer:—that every transfer of a negotiable instrument was made before
its maturity;
B (e) as to order of indorsements:—that the indorsements appearing upon a negotiable
instrument were made in the order in which they appear then on;
(f) as to stamp:— that a lost promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque was duly
stamped;
C (g) that holder is a holder in due course:—that the holder of a negotiable instrument is a
holder in due course: provided that, where the instrument has been obtained from its
lawful owner, or from any person in lawful custody thereof, by means of an offence or
fraud, or has been obtained from the maker or acceptor thereof by means of an offence or
fraud, or for unlawful consideration, the burden of proving that the holder is a holder in
due course lies upon him.”
D
Section 139 of the N.I. Act, 1881:
“139. Presumption in favour of holder.—It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is
proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in section
138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.”
E
Section 146 of the N.I. Act, 1881:
“146. Bank’s slip prima facie evidence of certain facts.—The Court shall, in respect of
every proceeding under this Chapter, on production of Bank's slip or memo having
thereon the official mark denoting that the cheque has been dishonoured, presume the
F fact of dishonour of such cheque, unless and until such fact is disproved.”
15. This Court while deciding the point No. 1 has already held that the cheque was given
towards liability not as security as the accused is unable to rebut the same and even to
substantiate his stand that the description made in the cheques has been written by another
person, no permissible evidence has been adduced. Thus, the presumption under Section 139 of
G N.I. Act, 1881 is held to be in favour of complainant, therefore, merely due to no seal and
signature of cheque return forwarding memo by the bank, the finding of the trial Court that no
presumption regarding dishonor of cheque can be drawn, is misconceived. Even otherwise, the
purpose of cheque return memo is to give the information of holder of the cheque that his
cheque on presentation could not be encashed due to various reasons as mentioned in the
cheque return memo. Even as per Section 146 of N.I. Act, 1881, the cheque return on
H presentation presumed the fact of dishonor of cheque unless and until such fact is disapproved.
It is pertinent to mention here that neither Section 138 nor 146 of the N.I. Act, 1881 prescribed
any particular form of cheque return memo, it is a nothing but a mere information given by
the due holder of a cheque that cheque has been returned as unpaid. If the cheque return memo
is not bearing any official stamp of the bank, it does not render the cheque return memo as
invalid or illegal. The cheque return memo is not document which required to be covered under
I
Bankers Book (Evidence Act), 1891 if there is any infirmity in the cheque return memo, it does
not render entire trial under Section 138 of N.I. Act, 1881 as nullity. The Hon’ble High Court
of Delhi in case of Guneet Bhasin Vs. State of NCT of Delhi & Anr. & Ors. In CRL.M.C.
Page No. 7 of 8
4100/2022 & CRL.M.A. 16919/2022(Stay) has taken same view.
16. High Court of Allahabad in case of Mohd. Yunus Malik Vs. State of U.P. and Another in
A application under Section 482 No. 41434 of 2022 in Neutral Citation no. 2023:AHC:140834
relying upon the judgment of Delhi High Court in case of Guneet Bhasin Vs. State of NCT of
Delhi and Others in paragraph 13 has held as under:
“From perusal of the same, it is apparently clear that if the cheque return memo is not
bearing any official stamp of the bank, it does not render the cheque as invalid or illegal.
B Further, if there is any infirmity in the cheque or letter,it does not render entire trial under
Section 138 of Act, 1881 as nullity.”
17. The High Court of Madras in case of India Cements Investments Services Limited Vs. T. P.
Nallusamy in Crl. A. No. 13 of 2014 Neutral Citation No. 2017(1) MLJ(Crl)689 in paragraph
56 reads as under:
C
“56. A perusal of the Judgment of the First Appellate Court in C. A. No. 1 of 2013 dated
08.11.2013 shows that the First Appellate Court had observed at paragraph 10 that in Ex.
P7 -Cheque, it was written as ‘21.1.2000’ and the last ‘0’ was corrected as ‘8’ mention of
on what date they were presented for collection. Moreover, the First Appellate Court
went on to add that to prove the written memos filed, the HDFC Bank Manager was not
D
examined to show how much amount was available in Respondent/Accused Account. In
this connection, though a stand is taken on behalf of the Appellant/Complainant that as
per Section 146 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the Manager of the Bank need not be
examined to speak about the written of three cheques etc., this Court is of the considered
opinion that the Appellant/Complainant ought to examine the concerned Bank Manager
E to substantiate his version of the case, In fact, the evidence of the Bank Manager in favour
of the Appellant/Complainant will strengthen its case.”
18. Considering the fact and law on the subject, it is quite vivid that the Learned trial Court
has failed to consider the fact that the appellant is able to prove that the cheque in question
was given towards discharge, as such this finding is quashed. So far as other finding that
F cheque forwarding memo does not bear the seal and signature of bank official, as such
presumption under Section 138 of N.I. Act, 1881 cannot be raised, is misconceived and
deserves to be set aside, and accordingly it is quashed.
19. Consequentially, the matter is remitted back to the trial Court only to prove that cheque
was presented before the bank and it has been dishonored due to “insufficient funds” in the
G account by examining the officer of the bank alongwith records maintained in the bank
including physical, computer generated record duly authenticated by the officer of the bank
who is well aware with the affairs of dishonor of the cheques of the bank.
20. Consequentially, the appeal is partly allowed and the matter is remitted back to the trial
Court for deciding the case as per the direction given by this Court in forgoing paragraphs.
H Since the parties have already appeared before this Court, no fresh notice is required to be
issued to the parties, the complainant and accused shall appear before the concerning trial
Court on 18.03.2025.
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