Argument: Russia’s involvement in World War I placed immense strain on the country’s political system, society, and

economy, contributing significantly to revolutionary unrest.

Evidence:
• Tsar Nicholas assumed supreme control of the army in 1915, left tsarina Alexandra in charge, who was
inexperienced
• She dismissed 12 ministers in 18 months, known as the Ministreal Leapfrog, led to weakened control
• The Duma reconvened in 1916, and the Kadet leader, Pavel Milyukov, openly ctiricized and accused the
government of 'stupidity and treason' in a speech.
• 2.8 million spldiers died in 1917, 1.5 million deserted
• in 1916, Petrograd and Moscow recieved only 1/3rd of their grain, cost of food and fuel grew by 400%
• the trans-siberian railway was insuffiecient, coal and iron production plummeted (1916)
• Wages remained stagnant and bread prices rose 5 fold from 1914-17, severe winter in 1916-17 worsened food
shortage
• The battle of Tannenberg in 1914, 78,000 killed, 92,000 captured, Masurian Lakes lost 12,000 troops, Brusilov
Offensive has 500,000 casualties.
Historians:
• Orlando Figes: the war was a catalyst for unrest as it exposed the monarchy's weaknesses
• Sheila Fitzpatrick: war deepened social divisions and fostered mass resentment
• Christopher Read: The economic strain destabalised and radicalised the urban working class
Evaluation: (comparison, weigh, importance, perspectives)
• Political impact :
◦ Nicholas II's decision to assume supreme command exposed his political incompetence and by leaving the
inexperienced Tsarina in charge, weakened his own authority at a time of antional crisis
◦ The speech highlights the growing discontent of Russia's political elite, and the progressive Bloc's demand for
constitutional reforms challenged autocratic rule and reinforced the view that ww1 undermined monarchy's political
stability, in addition to Duma's refusal to disband.
◦ However, this evidence understates role of pre-existing political weakness, as the autocratic tendencies had
alienated liberal politicians, plus Rasputins influence may have been over-exaggerated by opponents of the Tsar .
◦ The evidence aligns well with Orlando Figes’ interpretation that the war exposed deep-seated flaws in the
monarchy’s political structure, yet fails to fully consider the long-term impact of pre-war discontent.
• Social Impact:
◦ the figures of casualties underscore the scale of military failures and their impact on public morale, also the
war's direct effect on civillian living standards
◦ how rural harship radicalized a key social group that had
◦ The evidence could further emphasize the role of urban workers, who played a crucial role in strikes and
protests. While food shortages are mentioned, the impact of deteriorating living conditions on working-class
-

activism is understated.
◦ The argument does not address the psychological impact of war trauma, which historians like Peter Holquist
argue was critical in fostering unrest among soldiers and civilians.
◦ This evidence effectively supports Sheila Fitzpatrick’s argument that the war deepened existing social divisions,
turning localized discontent into mass revolutionary unrest.
• Economic Impact
◦ The inclusion of hyperinflation (e.g., bread prices increasing fivefold by 1917) effectively demonstrates how the
government’s poor economic management compounded social hardship.
◦ The description of Russia’s rail network collapse and industrial decline effectively illustrates how the war
intensified economic instability, particularly by stalling coal and iron production.
◦ The mention of grain requisitioning policies highlights the state’s role in worsening rural hardship, which
contributed to peasant unrest.
◦ Additionally, the economic crisis was not solely war-induced; weaknesses in Russia’s pre-war economy (e.g.,
reliance on foreign loans and outdated industry) are not sufficiently acknowledged.
◦ The evidence effectively supports Christopher Read’s view that economic hardship was the most immediate
factor in turning public frustration into active revolutionary unrest.
◦ The evidence highlights key defeats at Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes, effectively illustrating the extent of
Russia’s military weaknesses early in the war.
◦ The Brusilov Offensive is an excellent example of how Russia’s short-term military successes came at the cost
of enormous casualties, further eroding public morale.
◦ The evidence highlights the critical breakdown of army discipline, as seen in the 1.5 million desertions,
underscoring the army’s diminishing loyalty to the Tsarist regime.
◦ The evidence strongly supports Evan Mawdsley’s argument that the war’s military failures eroded confidence in
the Tsar and directly contributed to the army’s refusal to suppress the February 1917 revolution.
◦ The evidence is highly effective in linking military disasters to the collapse of public morale and the
government’s diminishing authority.
◦ The evidence aligns well with the view of historians like Leon Trotsky, who emphasized that the February
Revolution’s spontaneous nature resulted from the accumulated pressures of war rather than deliberate
revolutionary planning.
◦ The most convincing aspect of the evidence is how World War I exacerbated existing tensions rather than
creating them entirely.
◦ The war was not the sole cause of revolution but played a decisive role in tipping Russia’s unstable system into
collapse.
• Judgement: While the war was not the root cause of revolution, it was the critical factor that transformed
discontent into decisive political action
 4 2 .

the
ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS
february repotution
February Revolution itself was but led to NicholasIt's
=>
Argument :
The spontaneous ultimately
abdication .

=> Evidence :

23rd Cinternational Women's Day) thousands of women in petrograd marched to

February 1917
>
-

protest bread shortages , 25th fel , 200

, 000 workers were on strike , bringing the city to
stand still Not organised by political
a .

parties , emerged from widespread crustration.

the petrograd Garrison mutinied 66, 000 soldiers deserted
> 28 seb
arming protestors w
-

, ,
& ,

40 ,000 rides
(spontaneous , driven by soldier's anger at poor condicious lack of
Good
,
,

prolonged was cervice.

>
-
No
revolutionally readership the Bolshevik Central Committee discouraged Tsue's
, ,

misinformed and late reply to mutinies allowed unrest to escalate

> Duma's Provisional Committee formed assume control of the government
27Sebruary 1917 to
-

,
was .

-> Minnail Rodzianpo (Duma Chairman) warned Nick monarchy won't survive
, he abdicated at

Iskov Nied to nominate his his brother for trone , but ended300 years of Romanov rule.
,

>
-

Historian Perspectives :

> Orlando Figes "a series of unplanned leaderless uprisings" that

caught revolutionary
-
:

,
.
groups off-gaued
Christopher Read Army's detection was pivotal , without in Nick may have suppressed the
>
- :

revolts like in 1905

> Richard Pipes : Nicholas It's political incompetence ensured revolution's success
-

=> Evaluation :

>
-
The fact that female textile workers initiated the
protests underscores the spontaneous
nature of the unrest
,
as women were not traditionally seen as
politically active .
>rapid escalation of strikers demonstrates frustration with bread shortages inflation
-

,
and social grievances
> Orlando Figes' claim oversimplices
-
the situation
,
as Bolshevik readers played some

organizing workers during the protests.

role in

The evidence strongly supports the argument that the revolution was spontaneous in
-

its
origins , however pre-existing social tensions ,
and radicalization created an

environment where workers could easily protest.

->
Christopher head's view overlooks the fact that discontent within the military was

Inevitable given the

mounting casueties and inadequate supplies.
evidence effectively emphasizes Nick's political
misjudgement-failing recognize that his
>
-
The to

authority was
collapsing while me amy desested
Progressive Bloc's constitutional reform
broader political failings particularly rejection of
>
-
His -
his the

demands -
had aread alienated the political elike by 1915.
> the
-

puma's refusal to dissolve proved that even conservative political figures had abandonedtheir support
>
this argument Duna membic still hoped preserve monarchy under a constitutional
-

however overlooks that some to

cramework

Revolution's rapid Nick's

=> final
judgement : the
February spontaneous characte was
key to it's escalation
,
but

abdication calculated response pressure from and conservative elite's

was a to both
revolutionally forces
disorder
who sought to stabalize Russia amid
growing
 argent : The creation of the
faced immediate
Provisional Government attempted to Stabilize Russia
but
challenges .
-

=> EVIDENCE
>
-
the provisional Government emerged from Duma's provisional committee on 2 march 1917
octoberists and kadels leaders of movement
>
mainly the zecusto
-

,
> universal freedom of speech
-

sufferage abolition of ocurana

-

, ,
> 1st warch
petrograd Soviet issued order no 1 undermined govt control over al
my
-
.
:

Government had effective means to reinforce decisions

>
-

no .

> the
April crisis (mass process) in petrograd forced was minister to resign
-

-new
govt under Alexander Kerensky lauched the rune opensive resulted ,
in 400000
casualties and mass desertionstriggered
(late 1917 1 5 mil had deserted) .

,
.

> factories closed and

unemployment as
railway collapsed.
-

>
-
provisional gove refused to issue land reform , wanted constituent assembly to deal wit
.
>
maich-out 1917 , cases of land seizures reported (land , perce , bread
-

1000 were .

>
-

Lenin's April
thesis in 1917 increased membership to 350000 slogans)
>
General Law Kornilov (the Koruilov aflair 1917) was crushed by the red guard (Bolsher,
-

=> HISTORIAN PERSPECTIVES

> Richard Pipes Ph lacked mass support dominated
by liberal elikes instead of
-
:
,
the
representing working class
> Orlando Figes a
government without power that only existed at the
mercy of the
-
:

soviets
>
-

Christophel Read :
Describes the provisional Government's failure to adress land reform as
a fatal miscalculation" pushed rural Russia into unrest
revolutionary
.
that

=> ENALUATION OF EVIDENCE

dominance of middle-class politicians alienated which limited

key social groups
>
-

the ,

PG's ability gail widespread support

to
the
> the
presence of Alexander Keneusky (socialist revolutionaly) temporarily improved
-

pa's credibility.
>
-
Pipes' conservative stance emphasises the government's clike
,
middle class characte,
which evidence from accounts of disillusionment
aligns with primary contemporary among
soldiers .

>
-

this view is criticized by revisionist critics like Shield Fitzpatrick ; who arge the full
of the sal PG a breid
gave the moment of
legitimacy I

>
-

figes highlights how these veforms failed to address the

agent socio-economic crisis
Russia faced , abolition of onhand suggests a genuine attempt at stabalization
reforms created
>
Early public reaction was generally positive , suggesting a
temporary
-

sense of hope
ideals over immediate socio-economic relief ,
-
by prioriting liberal the
government
alienated workers and peasants
>
-
Order no I ensured that soldiers
.
weakened PG
obeyed only soviet approved orders ,

ability to control and made it dependent on the Soviet's approval for key decisions
> some historians argue that the Soviet initially aimed to cooporate o the PG (1917)
.

-
I. The Formation and Initial Aims of the Provisional Government

The evidence presented highlights the Provisional Government’s origins as a liberal reformist body composed primarily of Kadets
and Octobrists. While this was a genuine attempt to stabilize Russia through constitutional reform, it is critical to evaluate the
limitations inherent in the Provisional Government’s composition and its relationship with the Petrograd Soviet.
Strengths of the Evidence
• The reference to Prince Lvov, Pavel Milyukov, and Alexander Kerensky is useful as it demonstrates the Provisional
Government’s ideological diversity — combining moderate liberal elements with socialist voices like Kerensky.
• Historian Richard Pipes’ argument that the Provisional Government lacked mass support is valuable. Pipes’ conservative
stance emphasizes the government’s elite, middle-class character, which alienated the working class and peasants. This aligns
with primary evidence from contemporary accounts of disillusionment among soldiers and workers.
Limitations of the Evidence.
• Pipes’ view is criticized by revisionist historians like Sheila Fitzpatrick, who argue that initial public optimism following the fall
of the Tsar gave the Provisional Government a brief window of legitimacy. While Pipes highlights weaknesses in mass support,
Fitzpatrick’s analysis suggests that public sentiment was initially hopeful, weakening the claim that the government was “doomed
from the start.”
• Additionally, the presence of Kerensky — a socialist — within the government complicates Pipes’ argument that it was
solely dominated by liberal elites. Kerensky’s background in socialist activism gave the government some credibility with workers
and soldiers.
Critical Analysis
While the Provisional Government had ideological diversity, it ultimately struggled to win over key demographics like peasants,
workers, and soldiers, limiting its stabilizing efforts. Pipes’ emphasis on elite dominance is persuasive but requires nuance — the
Provisional Government was not inherently doomed, but its limited social base created a fragile foundation.

II. Key Reforms Introduced to Restore Stability

The Provisional Government’s early reforms were commendable in their liberal intent, including amnesty for political prisoners,
freedom of speech, and steps toward universal suffrage.
Strengths of the Evidence
• Orlando Figes’ argument that these reforms were well-intentioned but ineffective is highly credible. As a historian known for
his detailed social analysis, Figes effectively highlights how these reforms failed to address the urgent socio-economic crisis Russia
faced.
• The abolition of the Okhrana and promises of democratic elections were significant steps toward modernizing Russia’s
political landscape — measures that suggested a genuine attempt at stabilization.
Limitations of the Evidence
• Figes’ interpretation risks underestimating the Provisional Government’s initial success in improving civil liberties. Early
public reaction was generally positive, suggesting that the reforms created a temporary sense of hope. However, this optimism
quickly dissipated as food shortages, war, and land crises deepened.
• The reforms’ focus on political freedoms rather than economic stability reflects a crucial miscalculation — by prioritizing
liberal ideals over immediate socio-economic relief, the government alienated workers and peasants.
Critical Analysis
The Provisional Government’s reforms were progressive but ultimately insufficient. Figes’ critique effectively emphasizes that these
reforms overlooked Russia’s deeper structural crises. While the government’s liberal principles were an attempt to stabilize Russia,
their focus on political freedoms rather than urgent economic concerns limited their success.

III. Immediate Challenges Faced by the Provisional Government

1. The ‘Dual Power’ Conflict with the Petrograd Soviet
The evidence highlights the Soviet’s Order No. 1 as a pivotal moment that directly undermined the Provisional Government’s
authority.
Strengths of the Evidence
• Figes’ argument that the Provisional Government became “a government without power” is compelling, as Order No. 1
ensured that soldiers obeyed only Soviet-approved orders. This severely weakened the Provisional Government’s ability to enforce
control.
• The Soviet’s dominance over the army effectively rendered the Provisional Government dependent on the Soviet’s approval
for key decisions.
Limitations of the Evidence
• Figes’ portrayal of the Provisional Government as powerless risks oversimplifying the situation. While Order No. 1
diminished their control over the military, the Provisional Government retained some influence over administrative and legal
reforms.
• Some historians argue that the Soviet initially aimed to cooperate with the Provisional Government rather than undermine it
directly. The early months of 1917 saw instances of dual power functioning with minimal conflict.
Critical Analysis
Order No. 1 undeniably undermined the Provisional Government’s authority and significantly weakened its stabilizing efforts. Figes’
argument remains persuasive, but his portrayal of the government as entirely powerless overlooks its continuing efforts to enact
reforms and stabilize Russia.
2. Continuation of the War
The Provisional Government’s decision to continue fighting World War I had catastrophic consequences.
Strengths of the Evidence
• Richard Pipes’ argument that continuing the war alienated key social groups is highly convincing. Pipes emphasizes that
soldiers, already weary and disillusioned, rapidly turned against the government after the disastrous June Offensive.
• The April Crisis and subsequent resignations of Milyukov and Guchkov further underscore the growing public hostility.
Limitations of the Evidence
• Pipes’ view underestimates the geopolitical pressures on the Provisional Government. Russia’s alliance obligations with Britain
and France made immediate withdrawal politically and diplomatically challenging.
• Some historians, like Christopher Read, argue that Kerensky’s decision to continue the war was rooted in a belief that military
success could strengthen the government’s credibility — an attempt to stabilize the nation that ultimately failed.
Critical Analysis
The decision to continue the war was a major error that undermined the Provisional Government’s efforts to stabilize Russia. Pipes’
emphasis on public alienation is convincing, though Kerensky’s motives — despite being flawed — reflected a calculated attempt to
consolidate authority.

3. Economic Collapse
The evidence highlights persistent food shortages, rising inflation, and industrial decline as major destabilizing factors.
Strengths of the Evidence
• Sheila Fitzpatrick’s analysis effectively connects economic instability to rising Bolshevik support. The link between inflation,
food scarcity, and worker unrest highlights the Provisional Government’s inability to address practical concerns.
Limitations of the Evidence
• Fitzpatrick’s Marxist-leaning perspective emphasizes social unrest but underplays the broader international context. Russia’s
economic struggles were exacerbated by wartime pressures and global supply chain disruptions, not solely by government
inefficiency.
Critical Analysis
Economic collapse was a central factor in destabilizing the Provisional Government. Fitzpatrick’s argument is compelling, but the
Provisional Government’s failures were partly due to factors beyond its control.

4. The Land Reform Crisis

The Provisional Government’s failure to implement land reform significantly damaged its support among the peasantry.
Strengths of the Evidence
• Christopher Read’s characterization of this failure as “a fatal miscalculation” accurately reflects the urgency of land issues in
1917 Russia. The government’s indecisiveness gave the Bolsheviks a powerful rallying point.
Limitations of the Evidence
• Some historians argue that the Provisional Government’s reluctance stemmed from its commitment to democratic processes
— an attempt to stabilize Russia through constitutional order rather than rash decisions.
Critical Analysis
Read’s argument effectively highlights the Provisional Government’s failure to recognize the political urgency of land reform. This
miscalculation allowed the Bolsheviks to exploit growing rural discontent.

5. The Kornilov Affair

The Kornilov Affair fatally damaged the Provisional Government’s credibility.
Strengths of the Evidence
• Pipes’ assessment that the Kornilov Affair “doomed the Provisional Government” is persuasive. Kerensky’s decision to arm the
Bolsheviks inadvertently strengthened his political rivals.
Limitations of the Evidence
• Pipes’ emphasis on Kerensky’s failure risks overlooking Kornilov’s intentions. Some historians argue that Kornilov acted
independently rather than in collaboration with Kerensky, weakening the claim that Kerensky’s leadership alone was responsible.
Critical Analysis
The Kornilov Affair was a turning point that empowered the Bolsheviks. Pipes’ analysis is compelling, though it is important to
recognize that the Provisional Government’s weaknesses had been accumulating long before the coup.

Conclusion
While the Provisional Government attempted to stabilize Russia through liberal reforms and democratic principles, it faced immediate
and insurmountable challenges. The combined impact of Order No. 1, economic instability, the continuation of war, and land crises
severely undermined its authority. The Kornilov Affair delivered a final blow by legitimizing the Bolsheviks as defenders of the
revolution. Overall, the evidence suggests that while the Provisional Government’s efforts were sincere, its structural weaknesses and
poor decision-making rendered stabilization impossible.