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Abrams’
Clinical Drug Therapy
Rationales for Nursing Practice
11th Edition
Abrams’
Clinical Drug Therapy
Rationales for Nursing Practice
11th Edition

GERALYN FRANDSEN, EdD, RN

Assistant Director of Nursing
Professor of Nursing
Catherine McAuley School of Nursing
Maryville University
St. Louis, Missouri

SANDRA SMITH PENNINGTON, PhD, RN

Executive Vice President of Institutional Effectiveness and Strategic
Initiatives
Rocky Mountain University of Health Professions
Provo, Utah
Professor Emeritus
Department of Nursing
Berea College
Berea, Kentucky
Executive Editor: Kelley Squazzo
Supervising Development Editor: Heather Rybacki
Editorial Coordinator: Jennifer DiRicco
Editorial Assistant: Leo Gray
Marketing Manager: Katie Schlesinger
Production Project Manager: Linda Van Pelt
Design Coordinator: Steve Druding
Art Director: Jennifer Clements
Manufacturing Coordinator: Karin Duffield
Prepress Vendor: SPi Global

Eleventh Edition

Copyright © 2018 Wolters Kluwer

Copyright © 2014, 2009 Wolters Kluwer Health | Lippincott Williams & Wilkins. Copyright ©
2007, 2004, 2001 by Lippincott Williams & Wilkins. Copyright © 1998 by Lippincott-Raven
Publishers. Copyright © 1995, 1991, 1987, 1983 by J. B. Lippincott Company. All rights
reserved. This book is protected by copyright. No part of this book may be reproduced or
transmitted in any form or by any means, including as photocopies or scanned-in or other
electronic copies, or utilized by any information storage and retrieval system without written
permission from the copyright owner, except for brief quotations embodied in critical articles and
reviews. Materials appearing in this book prepared by individuals as part of their official duties as
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permission, please contact Lippincott Williams & Wilkins at Two Commerce Square, 2001
Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19103, via e-mail at [email protected], or via our web site
at lww.com (products and services).

987654321

Printed in China

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Frandsen, Geralyn, editor. | Pennington, Sandra Smith, editor.
Title: Abrams’ clinical drug therapy : rationales for nursing pracice / [edited by] Geralyn
Frandsen, Sandra Smith Pennington.Other titles: Clinical drug therapy
Description: 11th edition. | Philadelphia : Wolters Kluwer Health, [2018] | Includes
bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2017034933 | ISBN 9781496347961
Subjects: | MESH: Pharmaceutical Preparations | Drug Therapy | Pharmacological Phenomena |
Nurses’ Instruction
Classification: LCC RM262 | NLM QV 55 | DDC 615.1/9—dc23 LC record available at
https://lccn.loc.gov/2017034933

This work is provided “as is,” and the publisher disclaims any and all warranties, express or
implied, including any warranties as to accuracy, comprehensiveness, or currency of the content
of this work.

This work is no substitute for individual patient assessment based upon healthcare professionals’
examination of each patient and consideration of, among other things, age, weight, gender,
current or prior medical conditions, medication history, laboratory data and other factors unique
to the patient. The publisher does not provide medical advice or guidance and this work is merely
a reference tool. Healthcare professionals, and not the publisher, are solely responsible for the use
of this work including all medical judgments and for any resulting diagnosis and treatments.

Given continuous, rapid advances in medical science and health information, independent
professional verification of medical diagnoses, indications, appropriate pharmaceutical selections
and dosages, and treatment options should be made and healthcare professionals should consult a
variety of sources. When prescribing medication, healthcare professionals are advised to consult
the product information sheet (the manufacturer’s package insert) accompanying each drug to
verify, among other things, conditions of use, warnings and side effects and identify any changes
in dosage schedule or contraindications, particularly if the medication to be administered is new,
infrequently used or has a narrow therapeutic range. To the maximum extent permitted under
applicable law, no responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to
persons or property, as a matter of products liability, negligence law or otherwise, or from any
reference to or use by any person of this work.

LWW.com
 I would like to
dedicate this book to my
husband and fellow
contributor, Gary. Without
his love, support, and
guidance, this book would
never have been
completed. I would also
like to dedicate this book
to our children, Claire and
Joe, and our son-in-law,
John. This edition could
not have been completed
without the help and
collaboration of my
coauthor, Dr. Sandy
Pennington. To you, my
friend, I tip my hat.
Geralyn Frandsen

I dedicate this
work to my children
Jennifer and Brad, whose
constant belief in the
power of family surrounds
me with deep gratitude. I
also dedicate this book to
my granddaughter
Liliana, whose smile,
laugh, and love make
every day a “happy day.”
It is my joy to share my
life with you all.
Sandy Pennington
Contributors

Lisa Albers, MSN, RN

Clinical Assistant Professor of Nursing
BSN Coordinator
Catherine McAuley School of Nursing
Maryville University
RN Staff Nurse
Cardinal Glennon Children’s Hospital
St. Louis, Missouri
Chapter 4: Pharmacology and the Care of Infants and Pediatric
Patients

Jennifer Brunworth, MSN, RN

Clinical Assistant Professor of Nursing
Catherine McAuley School of Nursing
Maryville University
St. Louis, Missouri
Chapter 26: Drug Therapy for Hypertension

Gary Frandsen, JD, MSN, RN

Assistant Professor of Nursing
University of Missouri
St. Louis, Missouri
Chapter 22: Drug Therapy for Tuberculosis and Mycobacterium
avium Complex Disease
Chapter 35: Nutritional Support Products, Vitamins, and Mineral
Supplements
Chapter 44: Drug Therapy to Regulate Calcium and Bone
Metabolism

Susan Golden, MSN, RN

Nursing Program Director
Nursing Faculty
Eastern New Mexico University–Roswell
Roswell, New Mexico
Chapter 49: Drug Therapy With Opioids

Jennifer Binggeli Miles, PharmD, MBA, BCPS

Director of Remote Order Entry Operations
Largo, Florida
Chapter 19: Drug Therapy With Aminoglycosides and
Fluoroquinolones
Chapter 20: Drug Therapy With Tetracyclines, Sulfonamides, and
Urinary Antiseptics
Chapter 31: Drug Therapy for Nasal Congestion and Cough
Chapter 50: Drug Therapy With Local Anesthetics
Chapter 51: Drug Therapy With General Anesthetics
Chapter 58: Drug Therapy for Substance Abuse Disorders

Vicki Moran, PhD, RN, CNE

Assistant Professor
School of Nursing
Saint Louis University
St. Louis, Missouri
41: Drug Therapy for Diabetes Mellitus
42: Drug Therapy for Hyperthyroidism and Hypothyroidism

Jacqueline R. Saleeby, PhD, RN, PMHCS

Associate Professor
Catherine McAuley School of Nursing
Maryville University
St. Louis, Missouri
Chapter 56: Drug Therapy for Psychotic Disorders

Sharon Souter, PhD

Professor
College of Nursing
University of Mary Hardin Baylor
Belton, Texas
 Chapter 37: Drug Therapy for Peptic Ulcer Disease and
Hyperacidity
Chapter 52: Drug Therapy for Migraines and Other Headaches
Chapter 54: Drug Therapy for Anxiety and Insomnia
Chapter 57: Drug Therapy for Attention Deficit Hyperactivity
Disorder and Narcolepsy

Elizabeth Stuesse, MSN, RNC-OB, RNC-MNN,

C-EFM, CLC
Clinical Assistant Professor
Catherine McAuley School of Nursing
Maryville University
St. Louis, Missouri
Chapter 6: Pharmacology and the Care of Pregnant or Lactating
Woman

Dana Todd, PhD, APRN

Professor
Department of Nursing
Murray State University
Murray, Kentucky
Chapter 7: Pharmacology and Women’s Health

Gladdi Tomlinson, MSN, RN

Professor of Nursing
Harrisburg Area Community College
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania
Chapter 47: Drug Therapy for Myasthenia Gravis, Alzheimer’s
Disease, and Urinary Retention
Chapter 48: Drug Therapy for Parkinson’s Disease, Urinary
Spasticity, and Disorders Requiring Anticholinergic Drug
Therapy

Jeannette Zelhart-Smith, RN
Maternity Course Coordinator
University of Saint Francis
Crown Point, Indiana
Chapter 36: Drug Therapy for Weight Management
Chapter 43: Drug Therapy for Pituitary and Hypothalamic
Dysfunction

Nina Zimmermann, MSN, APRN, ANP-BC, AE-

C
Assistant Director of Nursing
Director of the MSN Nurse Practitioner Program
Assistant Professor of Nursing
Catherine McAuley School of Nursing
College of Health Professions
Maryville University
St. Louis, Missouri
Chapter 33: Drug Therapy for Asthma and Bronchoconstriction
Reviewers

Marilyn Adair, MSN, BSN

Nursing Professor
Department of Nursing
South Puget Sound Community College
Olympia, Washington

Barbara Blackwell, EdD

Director
School of Nursing
Holy Name Medical Center School of Nursing
Teaneck, New Jersey

Billie E. Blake, EdD, MSN, BSN, RN, CNE

Professor
Associate Dean Nursing
Director BSN
Department of Nursing
St. Johns River State College
Orange Park, Florida

Judith Bradford, DNS, MSN

Associate Professor
Department of Nursing
Southeastern Louisiana University
Hammond, Louisiana

Adina Carrillo, RN, MSN, CNP, CNS

Professor of Nursing
Department of Nursing
College of the Canyons
Valencia, California
Sandy Carroll, EdD, MSN, RN
Professor
Department of Nursing
College of the Canyons
Valencia, California

Brigitte Casteel, MSN

Associate Professor
Department of Nursing
Virginia Highlands Community College—Virginia Appalachian
Tricollege Nursing Program
Abingdon, Virginia

Darlene Clark, MS, RN

Senior Lecturer in Nursing
Department of Nursing
The Pennsylvania State University
University Park, Pennsylvania

JoAnn Crownover, DNP

Associate Professor
Department of Pre-Licensure
Regis University
Denver, Colorado

Kathleen M. Reilly Dolin, DNP, RN

Professor of Nursing
Department of Nursing
Northampton Community College
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania

Mary Fabick, MSN, MEd, BSN, RN, CEN

Associate Professor of Nursing
Department of Nursing
Milligan College
Milligan College, Tennessee

Susan Golden, MSN, RN

Nursing Program Director, Nursing Faculty
Department of Nursing
Eastern New Mexico University–Roswell
Roswell, New Mexico

Rhonda Gonzalez, MSN, RN

Assistant Professor of Nursing
Department of Nursing
The University of West Alabama
Livingston, Alabama

Amy Graham, MSN, FNP-BC

Assistant Professor
Department of Nursing
James Madison University
Harrisonburg, Virginia

Teresa Gwin, EdD, MSN, NP

Director of Entry Level Masters program
Department of Nursing
Samuel Merritt University
Oakland, California

Sue Hafer, MSN, NP, ANP, FNP, RN

Instructor
Department of Pharmacology
Delta College
University Center, Michigan
NP Coordinator
Heart Failure Clinic
Bay Heart and Vascular
Bay City, Michigan
Kimberly Hurley, PhDc, MSN
Assistant Professor
Black Hawk College
Moline, Illinois

Kimberly Kennel, MSN, RN-BC, CCRN, CNE

Assistant Professor
Department of Nursing
Baptist College of Health Sciences
Memphis, Tennessee

Pamela King, PhD, MSN, APRN

MSN Program Director
School of Nursing
Spalding University
Louisville, Kentucky

Sonya Kowalski, MSN, RN, ACNS-BC

Assistant Professor
Department of Nursing
University of Detroit Mercy
Detroit, Michigan

Regina Lama, MS, RN

Lecturer
Department of Nursing
College of Staten Island
Staten Island, New York

Stacy Lutter, DEd, RN

Assistant Professor
Department of Nursing
York College of Pennsylvania
York, Pennsylvania
Cynthia Malinowski, MSN
Instructional Assistant Professor
Mennonite College of Nursing
Illinois State University
Normal, Illinois

Caron Martin, MSN

Associate Professor
Department of Nursing
Northern Kentucky University
Highland Heights, Kentucky

Kim McCarron, MS, CRNP

Clinical Assistant Professor
Nursing
Towson University
Towson, Maryland

Vicki Moran, PhD, RN, CNE, APHN-BC, MPH

Assistant Professor
School of Nursing
Saint Louis University
St. Louis, Missouri

Dana O’Brien, MSN/MHA, RN

ADN Faculty
Southwest Wisconsin Technical College
Fennimore, Wisconsin

Jeanne Papa, MBE, MSN, CRNP, CCRN

Professor
Department of Nursing
Neumann University
Kennett Square, Pennsylvania
JoAnne Pearce, PhDc, MS
Director of Nursing Programs
Nursing—College of Technology
Idaho State University
Pocatello, Idaho

Patricia Prechter, EdD, MSN, BSN

Chair of Nursing
Department of Nursing
Our Lady of Holy Cross College
New Orleans, Louisiana

Margaret Riley, PhD

Assistant Professor
Loretto Heights School of Nursing
Regis University
Denver, Colorado

L. Jane Rosati, EdD, MSN, RN

Professor
School of Nursing
Daytona State College
Daytona Beach, Florida

Elizabeth M. Scarano, MSN, RN

Associate Professor
Department of Nursing and Health Sciences
Lewis-Clark State College
Lewiston, Idaho

Loretta Sernekos, PhD, MSN, AGPCNP-BC

Lecturer
Department of Nursing
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Sharon Souter, PhD, RN, CNE
Professor
College of Nursing
University of Mary Hardin Baylor
Belton, Texas

Gladdi Tomlinson, MSN, RN

Professor of Nursing
Department of Health
Harrisburg Area Community College
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania

Kimberly Valich, MSN, RN

Nursing Professor
Department of Nursing
University of St. Francis
Crown Point, Indiana

Karen A. Vercellino, MSN, RN-BC, CNE

Assistant Professor of Nursing
Department of Nursing
Richland Community College
Decatur, Illinois

Jill Weese, MSN-Education

Nursing Instructor
Department of Nursing
Ivy Tech Community College
Logansport, Indiana
Foreword

Health care delivery settings continue strategic efforts to improve patient

care quality and safety since the release of the 1999 Institute of Medicine
report, To Err Is Human. Multiple policy and regulatory agencies have
helped focus attention on system design to reduce health care errors.
Medication administration is a major component of safety culture but can
be challenging. Medication administration is a multifaceted, complex,
team-based patient intervention with the possibility of multiple failures.
A report on the risks of medication administration revealed disturbing
quality issues across all health care settings in the United States (Aspen,
Walcott, Bootman, & Cronenwett, 2007). At least seven million
preventable adverse drug events costing more than 21 billion dollars
occur in the health care system each year (New England Health Institute,
n.d.).
Nurses are a last line of defense in administering medications safely.
It is essential that nurses recognize the risks associated with the multiple
aspects of administering medications. On average, there is one
medication error per day per hospitalized patient (Aspen et al., 2007).
Quality varies in different facilities; some have higher error rates than
others. At least 1.5 million preventable adverse drug events occur each
year. Why are patients so vulnerable to medication errors? What are the
roles and responsibilities of nurses in improving quality and safety in
clinical drug therapy?
Nurses are accountable for current knowledge of a particular
patient’s medication regimen and what is involved in the safe and
reliable administration of drugs for that particular patient. To achieve
reliability, nurses must have practices that assure the right medication is
administered in the right dose, by the right route, at the right time, and to
the right patient, all the time. Application of new safety science concepts
provides direction for safe medication administration that includes
awareness of the potential for error, willingness to report reporting errors
and near misses, and organizational leadership and support for a safety
culture. In “just culture” organizations, all personnel are accountable for
reporting near misses and breakdowns in care. Trained risk management
personnel analyze the reports to determine the root causes of critical
errors and near misses by analyzing the pathway of actions at every
juncture along the medication pathway. Processes can then be redesigned
based on lessons learned to prevent the same event from happening
again.
This new edition of Abrams’ Clinical Drug Therapy by Frandsen and
Pennington expands the integration of the quality and safety
competencies defined by the national award-winning Quality and Safety
Education for Nurses (QSEN) (Cronenwett et al., 2007) project.
Designed to incorporate disease characteristics as well as clinical drug
knowledge, the text provides a comprehensive approach to safe
medication administration.
To address medication safety, the first step is knowledge of the
medications, including evidence-based standards for administration. The
second step is recognition of the organizational challenges and
opportunities for careful medication administration. Clinicians and
faculty in schools of nursing can work together to determine clear best
practices to outline the many steps in administering and documenting
medications. The learning actions included in this text help learners at all
levels to look beyond medication administration and think of related
actions in the total process to assure reliability and apply safety science.
To help define a new paradigm in nursing to integrate quality and
safety into the daily work of nurses, the QSEN project has identified the
knowledge, skills, and attitudes that make up the six competencies
required to deliver quality, safe care—patient-centered care, teamwork
and collaboration, evidence-based practice, quality improvement, safety,
and informatics. To apply the new safety framework to medication
administration, nurses must consider patient-centered preferences and
situations, collaborate across interprofessional teams, apply evidence-
based standards for the medication and within the patient’s context,
participate in continuous quality improvement, apply safety science
concepts, and use informatics in planning and managing the
pharmacology needs of their patients. These six competencies are
integrated into the national curriculum standards for nursing so that all
nurses are accountable for integrating safety and quality responsibilities
into their daily work.
How do nurses apply these competencies in medication
administration?
 Patient-centered care means basing care decisions on knowledge of
patient values and preferences. It is important for health care
professionals (1) to treat all patients and families with respect and
honor and (2) to include patients and families as partners in care and
as safety allies. For example, when patients and their family
members are included in making decisions about the treatment plan,
this encourages active engagement in the team and helps make
appropriate choices to fit the context of their situation that are more
likely to have the desired therapeutic effects.
Teamwork and collaboration use the health professional’s personal
strengths to foster effective team functioning. A medical team
working with the patient may include a nurse, a physician, a nurse
practitioner, and a physician assistant, as well as a pharmacist,
social worker, dietitian, physical therapist, occupational therapist,
and speech language pathologist. To help coordinate the
complexities of safe medication administration, teamwork
behaviors include flexible leadership, standardized communication,
mutual support, and constant environmental scans.
Evidence-based practice involves using the best available
information in pharmacotherapeutics, which appears in the QSEN
Alerts throughout the text. Safe medication administration uses
evidence-based practice standards to ensure that appropriate
precautions are taken to assess for adverse effects.
Quality improvement is integral to safe medication administration.
Nurses must develop skills to measure care in their own setting to
compare with benchmark data to determine areas to improve and to
use quality improvement tools to raise performance.
Safety is based on constantly asking how actions affect patient risk,
where the next error is likely to occur, and what actions can prevent
near misses. Safety science positions individual accountability
within the context of the system so that mistakes are analyzed to
identify ways to change actions in future situations.
Informatics is the thread in all the competencies for managing care,
documentation, and decision support tools. Knowledge, skills, and
attitudes in informatics enable the nurse to seek evidence and
measure care outcomes as well as to benchmark data to assess
current practice.

As noted throughout this text with its QSEN Alerts, nurses who develop
a spirit of inquiry reflect before they act, reflect during action, and reflect
on action. With a spirit of inquiry, nurses will ask questions that lead to
best current evidence and best practices and practice with an attitude of
continuously improving one’s practice.
In using this text, central questions guide professional development.

What are the roles and responsibilities for each team member in the
complex steps in medication administration? Maintaining awareness
of the scope of responsibility for each discipline involved is critical,
particularly in transitions in care.
How do I ensure medication safety during transitions in care when I
hand over my patient to another provider?
What do I need to know about this medication for safe
administration? With the wide range of pharmacologic agents
available, each nurse must acknowledge and ask questions about his
or her own limitations in knowledge and skills to be able to seek
expert advice and current clinical information before administering
medications.
What communication skills will help me understand my patient’s
preferences and values related to medications?

Reflecting on questions like these will help develop a quality and safety
mindset so that by following the guidance in this book, nurses will
ensure that the next national medication safety measures will show
improvement.
Gwen Sherwood, PhD, RN, FAAN
Professor and Associate Dean for Practice and Global Initiatives
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Nursing
REFERENCES
Aspen, P., Walcott, J., Bootman, L., & Cronenwett, L. (Eds.); the Committee on Identifying and
Preventing Medication Errors, (2007). Identifying and preventing medication errors.
Washington, DC: National Academies Press.
Cronenwett, L., Sherwood, G., Barnsteiner, J., Disch, J., Johnson, J., Mitchell, P., et al. (2007).
Quality and safety education for nurses. Nursing Outlook, 55(3), 122–131.
Institute of Medicine. (1999). To err is human: Building a safer health system. Washington, DC:
National Academies Press.
New England Health Institute. (n.d.). Preventing Medication Errors: A $21 Billion Opportunity.
Retrieved from
http://www.nehi.net/bendthecurve/sup/documents/Medication_Errors_%20Brief.pdf
Preface

Abrams’ Clinical Drug Therapy has a long tradition of guiding students

and instructors through the practice of safe and effective medication
administration. The 11th edition has expanded on this tradition with
further inclusion of Quality and Safety Education for Nurses (QSEN)
content in each chapter. Each chapter also includes information about the
pathophysiology of disease and associated drug therapy for prevention
and treatment of disease.
Another Random Scribd Document
with Unrelated Content
 On the 14th of March, two guns of the troop were present in a
small affair with the Hazarehs at Fouladee, about six miles from
Bamian. A mud fort had to be captured, and the surrounding hills to
be cleared of a considerable body of Hazarehs; the gateway was
knocked down by a few round shot, and the fort was then carried by
the infantry, while a few rounds of shrapnels cleared the
neighbouring hills of the Hazarehs. The whole affair did not last
much above half an hour. The artillery lost one European laboratory-
man, one syce, and one horse killed, and one trooper wounded. Dr.
Lord admitted the chiefs of the refractory tribe to terms, and affairs
resumed their wonted peaceful aspect.
In July, however, there seemed to be every prospect of hostilities
being renewed; Dost Mahomed, who had for months been a prisoner
at Bokhara, had effected his escape to Kooloom, and the Usbegs
began to arm in his cause. The British infantry had been pushed
forward to Bajgah, twenty-five miles northward of Syghan, and had
come into contact with the unfriendly tribes. At the beginning of
August, a small affair occurred near Kamurd, in which two
companies of infantry suffered a very severe loss. On the 4th of
August, two guns of horse-artillery were sent to Syghan,[90] more as a
demonstration than with any other object, as the roads to Kamurd
and Bajgah, across the Dundan-Shikun and Nal-i-Ferish passes, were
totally impracticable. The Dost was now advancing from Kooloom,
accompanied by the Wallee of that place, at the head of about 10,000
men, and every prospect of his force increasing daily.
On the 13th of September, Brigadier Dennie arrived from Cabul
with reinforcements, which had been despatched on hearing of the
Ameer’s advance. The force at Bamian, besides the troop, consisted
now of the 35th native infantry, the Goorkah regiment, a resallah of
irregular cavalry, and 400 janbaz, or Afghan horse. The Afghan
infantry had been disarmed and sent to Cabul.
On the 17th, in the evening, the Dost’s piquets entered the Bamian
valley at Soorukdhurrah, about four miles distant, and on the
following morning the brigadier having received information which
led him to believe that merely the advanced guard of the enemy had
arrived, took out a small detachment of only eight companies, and
engaged the whole Usbeg force, who were completely routed and
driven from the field in great confusion. Two guns of the troop,
under Lieutenant Mackenzie, were present in this affair. The Usbegs
fell back almost immediately when the guns opened on them,
abandoning in succession three positions in which they attempted to
make a stand, but from which they were instantly dislodged by the
guns advancing. Thus in the valley itself, where the main body of the
enemy was, the contest was decided by the horse-artillery, but on the
heights the infantry were engaged with some other parties of the
enemy, mostly foot-men. The cavalry pursued the Usbegs for some
miles up the defile of Soorukdhurrah. The enemy has been variously
computed at from 5,000 to 10,000 men in the field.
Four guns of the troop accompanied Brigadier Dennie in his
subsequent pursuit of the enemy, but the movements of the Usbegs
had been too rapid to allow it to be effectual; but the results were
most happy, as it induced the Ameer to leave the Usbeg camp, and
forced the Wallee to abandon his cause. The rest is well known: the
Dost threw himself into the Kohistan of Cabul, and the theatre of war
being thus changed, the British troops were recalled from Bamian,
and on the 8th October (exactly a year and a day after its arrival), the
troop marched in progress to Cabul with Colonel Dennie. At the
commencement of the following year the troop returned to India
with the escort in charge of the captive Ameer.
In the expedition to the Kohistan, under Brigadier Sale, Captain A.
Abbott and his battery, and Lieutenant Warburton with two of the
Shah’s bodyguard guns, were employed. The fort of Tootundurra was
carried with little loss, a fact attributed “in a great measure to the
dread inspired by the excellent practice of the artillery under the able
direction of Captain Abbott, assisted by Lieutenants Maule and
Warburton.”
In breaching Julga in October, these same guns were again
employed, and Captain A. Abbott and Lieutenant Warburton are
reported as having distinguished themselves in the service of the
artillery.
In November the detachment was engaged with the Dost’s
followers at Purwundurrah, and two guns of No. 6 battery, under
Lieutenant Dawes, covered the successful attack on the heights after
the shameful flight of the cavalry.
At this period, a brigade marched from the provinces under
Colonel Shelton, to relieve part of the Cabul force; with it was
Captain Nicholl’s (1st company 1st brigade) troop of horse artillery—
Lieutenants Waller and Stewart, subalterns—and the newly-formed
mountain-train under Captain Backhouse and Lieutenant Green. The
brigade advanced as far as Jellalabad, when rumours arising of the
disaffection of the Sikhs in the rear, it returned by forced marches to
Jumrood, but, finding its presence not required, again marched
without rest to Jellalabad. By the difficulty and rapidity of this march
the horses of the troop were much knocked up, and their distress was
much increased by the officer commanding the brigade having
insisted, in spite of Captain Nicholl’s remonstrances, on the troop
marching in rear of the infantry, checking the natural pace of the
horse, and subjecting the troop to continual halts. Two of its guns,
under Captain Nicholl, were employed in February in reducing forts
in the Nazian valley, as also was the mountain-train.
While the artillery with the Cabul force was thus employed, that at
Candahar was not inactive. In April, 1840, Captain W. Anderson,
with one of his troops of horse-artillery and a body of the Shah’s
troops, marching in the direction of Ghuznee, fell in with a large
body of insurgent Ghilzies, and defeated them near Tazee, on the
Tornuek river. The enemy made a firm stand, twice charged our line,
and were driven back by the steadiness of the troops and the well-
sustained fire of the guns under Lieutenant Cooper.
Colonel Wymer’s detachment was attacked at Ealmee on the 19th
May, on its route to Khelat-i-Ghilzie, by a large body of Ghilzies. Two
of the Shah’s horse-artillery guns under Lieutenant Hawkins were
present, “and opened upon the enemy’s dense masses of attack at
about 900 yards, with beautiful precision and effect, causing them to
break into three columns, which still continued the attack,” but were
driven back by the steady fire of the line, though they continued their
efforts from five till nearly ten at night. “Too much cannot be said of
the scientific and destructive manner in which the artillery practice
was conducted by Lieutenant Hawkins, which created awful havoc in
the ranks of the enemy, to the admiration of the troops present.”
In July, Lieutenant Cooper, with two guns, accompanied Captain
Woodburn against Uctar Khan, in the neighbourhood of Girisk. The
enemy attacked the left “with great boldness, but were repulsed by
the well-directed fire of the guns, and three companies on the left;
failing in this, they attacked the right, but were again met by a most
destructive fire from the guns and five companies which were on the
right.” The rear was then attacked, but a gun being reversed, and the
rear rank of the infantry facing about, the enemy were driven off,
after standing three rounds of case shot.
“Lieutenant Cooper deserves my best acknowledgments for the
rapidity and admirable manner in which he brought his guns to play
upon the enemy; and I had frequent opportunities of noticing the
precision of his practice. His guns are never in difficulty,” are
Captain Woodburn’s words in his official report, in which also he
speaks in another place of the “admirable conduct of the artillery.”
In August, this same officer, with four guns, when attached to
Captain Griffin’s force, was again in action with the enemy near
Khawind, and again rendered effectual assistance, and earned the
praises of his superiors for himself and his details.
On the arrival of Shah Soojah at Cabul, a grand durbar was held,
and a new order of chivalry was instituted,—that of the “Dur-i-
Dooranee,” or Pearl of the Dooranee Empire, consisting of three
ranks, similar to those of the Bath. The annexed is a representation
of the star of the order. It was conferred on several artillery officers
at various times previous to Shah Soojah’s death.

Hitherto we have had the gratifying task of recounting the exploits

of a victorious army; a darker page must now follow; but though
success no longer brightens the narrative, we have still the
consolation of knowing that those parts of the regiment employed,
heroically performed their duty in scenes of no common trial, and
that their exertions, in a cause which from the first was evidently
hopeless, only ceased when the cold hand of death laid them low in
the dark defiles of the Koord Kabool and Jugdulluck.
In October, the Eastern Ghilzies occupied the passes between
Bhootkhak and Jellalabad. Brigadier Sale, with a brigade, was sent to
clear them; No. 6 battery and the mountain-train accompanied.
Lieutenant Dawes with the two 9–pounders was with the advance-
guard, on whom, in forcing the Kabool pass, the chief brunt fell. In
the Tezeen valley, all the guns were brought into action, in a
succession of skirmishes which lasted till dusk, with much effect. The
march was now a daily struggle; two guns, sometimes commanded
by Lieutenant Dawes, sometimes by Captain Backhouse (part of
whose train, under Lieutenant Green, had returned with the 37th
regiment of native infantry to Cabul), on the rear-guard, were
engaged daily; at Jugdulluck a severe struggle ensued, and its
favourable conclusion was insured by the guns seizing an unoccupied
position, which took the enemy’s line in reverse; the rear-guard was,
however, suddenly attacked and the baggage seized; “soon, however,
by the praiseworthy exertions, and cool and soldier-like orders and
example of Captain Backhouse, * * * confidence was restored and
the rear-guard extricated from the defile.”
“I have been much pleased,” continues the report, “with the
address and able arrangements of Captain Abbott, who has twice
commanded the advance-guard.”
The insurrection burst out on all sides; myriads of Ghilzies, &c., re-
occupied the passes in the rear, and cut off all communication with
Cabul, forcing Sir Robert Sale to seek the safety of his brigade by
occupying Jellalabad. The Kohistanees rose in Charekar, and
murdered Lieutenant Maule, of the artillery. Candahar was
surrounded. Ghuznee fell. The Khyberees sealed the mouth of their
pass. Colonel Wild’s[91] attempt to force it failed, and the last act of
the tragedy was completed in the annihilation of the Cabul garrison
on its fatal and ill-judged retreat. The details of these sad events have
been so graphically described, that we need here do no more than
record the losses of the regiment, and extract from the accounts of
eye-witnesses their testimony to the admirable conduct of that noble
troop, the 1st troop 1st brigade horse-artillery, both during the siege
and the retreat.
After detailing the disastrous action of the 23rd November,
Captain Melville says, “Here, amidst so much that was condemnable,
let me again bear just and heartfelt testimony to the behaviour of
that brave, though small, body of men, whose conduct on this, and
every other occasion during the war, was that of a band of heroes,
and who, preferring death to dishonour, met their fate, nobly
fighting to the last for the gun they had so ably served. I allude to the
horse-artillery; when Sergeant Mulhall and six gunners, whose
names I feel deep sorrow I cannot here record, sword in hand
awaited the advance of the foe, and it was not until they saw
themselves alone in the midst of thousands of the enemy, that they
dashed at full gallop, cutting their way through them, down the hill;
and though surrounded by cavalry and infantry, yet they managed to
bring their gun safely to the plain, where, however, only three of
them being alive, and they desperately wounded, they were obliged
to leave it, and contrived to reach cantonments.” Again, during the
retreat, he says, “On reaching the extremity of the (Khoord Cabool)
pass, the horse-artillery, that noble branch of the service, whose
courage, even in extremity, never failed, and who supported all their
misfortunes cheerfully, halted, and, turning a gun on the pass,
awaited the debouchment of our troops and the arrival of the
enemy’s. This soon happened, and we received them with some well-
directed rounds of grape.” * * * After their guns and horses were
lost, “the artillerymen, those few that remained, formed in the ranks
of the 44th, and gallantly supported on foot that deathless reputation
they had gained when urging their steeds into the heart of the
battle.”
Lieutenant Eyre, speaking of the siege, says, “The gunners, from
first to last, never once partook of a full meal or obtained their
natural rest; of the hardships and privations undergone, it would be
difficult to convey an adequate idea.” * * * “On the retreat from
Cabul, owing to the starved condition of the horses, which disabled
them from pulling the guns through the deep snow and rugged
mountain-passes, the guns were, one by one, spiked and abandoned.
In the Khoord Cabool pass, a whole gun’s crew perished rather than
desert their charge; on nearing Jugdulluck, some horse-artillerymen,
headed by Captain Nicholl, acting as dragoons, charged and routed a
party of the enemy’s cavalry.”
“Throughout the last struggle, up to Gundamuck, all eye-witnesses
concur in testifying to their stubborn valour.”
Of his troop, Captain Nicholl, Lieutenant Green (who joined it on
the loss of the mountain-train early in the retreat), and Lieutenant
Stewart, were killed; Lieutenants Eyre and Waller, both of whom
were wounded during the siege, were given over, with their families,
by the orders of Major-General Elphinstone, to Akbar Khan; 8 non-
commissioned officers and gunners were killed in Cabul, 30 in the
Khoord Cabool pass, 26 between that and Jugdulluck, 32 in reaching
Gundamuck, 3 were taken prisoners at the close, 3 left wounded at
Cabul, and 3 doing duty with No. 6 battery and the mountain-train at
Jellalabad. Sergeant Mulhall was killed at Gundamuck on the 13th
January, 1842.
The regiment raised a monumental column to the memory of this
gallant troop, on the base of which, on one marble slab, the
circumstances under which they fell are narrated, and on another,
the names of every non-commissioned officer and gunner are
inscribed.
Previous to the insurrection breaking out, the 3rd company[92] 2nd
battalion moved from Ferozepore to relieve the 4th company at
Candahar; it dropped down the Indus to Sukkur, and marched to
Quettah, where it arrived on the 27th November, 1841, and
remained, on account of the communications with Candahar being
closed. Here it was employed in throwing up defences and field-
works, for the protection of the cantonment, whenever the frost and
snow intermitted. The only building available for their barracks
becoming unsafe, during the winter they were forced to occupy their
tents, and the severity of the weather in which they were exposed to
this insufficient shelter, may be judged of by the fact of 180 camels of
the company having perished from it. In the second advance of
Major-General England, and the successful attack on the heights of
Hykulzye, this company shared; a party under Lieutenant Cornish
assisting in working the guns of Captain Leslie’s troop of Bombay
Horse Artillery, and with that force it joined the head-quarters of the
Candahar army on 10th May.
 Before this junction occurred, the Candahar force had been on
more than one occasion moved out to clear the neighbourhood of the
insurgents. In January, they came up with them on the Urghandab,
and after driving them from their position, the horse-artillery and
cavalry pursued them some distance. In the report of this action,
Captain W. Anderson’s name was brought to the favourable notice of
Government.
In March, the army again took the field, and on the 9th the horse-
artillery under Captain Anderson got within range, and opened on
the enemy with good effect; they broke and fled too rapidly for the
infantry to come up with them. While the main body was absent, an
attack was made on the city, but without success: part of the 4th
company 2nd battalion was present with the garrison.
On the 25th March, the insurgents were attacked near Baba Wala
by Colonel Wymer. The well-directed fire of two guns under
Lieutenant Turner soon drove in on the pass a large body of the
enemy, and they were finally put to flight by the arrival of the main
body under Major-General Nott. In his report, Colonel Wymer
writes, “I trust that I may be permitted to bring to the Major-
General’s notice the admirable practice of the artillery under
Lieutenant Turner’s guidance, every shot from which told with
beautiful effect on the dense masses of the enemy.”
A small garrison, with which was one-half the 3rd company 2nd
battalion artillery, under Lieutenant Walker, had been left in Khelat-
i-Ghilzie in November, 1841; the insurrection isolated them from the
Candahar force, and for several months they underwent very great
hardships; an insufficient supply of firewood exposed them to cold,
barracks without doors, and piercing cold winds, bread and water for
rations for days together, and an enemy at the gates; under these
privations the artillerymen never grumbled nor lost their good
temper, but continued to work as if they had been highly fed. The
enemy gradually closed in round the fort, and on the night of the 21st
May commenced a simultaneous attack on two points; at one point,
there were two 6–pounders, under Lieutenant Walker, at the other
only one. The enemy came on in a determined manner, crossing the
ditch by means of scaling-ladders, and some even reached the
parapets; so closely were the artillery assailed, that at one time they
were forced to turn to their small-arms to assist in driving them off;
towards morning the attack ceased, and the little garrison was left in
quiet possession of their fort, and in the course of a few days Colonel
Wymer arrived from Candahar with a force to relieve them.
This service was rewarded by a medal to all engaged, the
handsomest of any by which the campaigns in Afghanistan are
marked.

Brigadier Sale’s force, on reaching Jellalabad, immediately

occupied themselves in rendering its defences tenable, collecting
provisions, preparing ammunition, and mounting their guns on the
most advantageous positions. In availing himself of the resources of
the country, and keeping up our communications, Captain
MacGregor’s services were most conspicuous and successful, and
perhaps to his exertions it may mainly be attributed that the
“illustrious garrison” were enabled to hold out, and earn for
themselves the undying honour they have gained. The exertions also
of Captain Abbott, Captain Backhouse, and Lieutenant Dawes, are
honourably recorded in the records of that siege, records which have
been so fully published that little is left to us beyond extracting a few
passages; and we shall first refer to the report of the construction of
the works. “With the exception of a few of the larger bastions, all the
batteries were prepared by the artillerymen themselves, both Captain
Abbott’s company and Captain Backhouse’s mountain-train, under
the superintendence of their own officers; besides this, a party of
Captain Abbott’s artillerymen was always ready to assist in the works
generally, and they were most ably superintended by Lieutenant
Dawes, to whom I am indebted for aid as constant as it was valuable,
and willingly given. Captain Backhouse, with his own men and
detachment of the 6th infantry Shah Soojah’s force, not only
prepared the parapets and embrasures for his own guns, and
repaired the damages done to them by the earthquake, but he
undertook and completed several of the most useful and laborious
operations executed.” * * *
“Captain MacGregor, political agent, gave me,” writes Brigadier
Sale, “the aid of his local experience, and through his influence and
measures our dâk communication with India was restored, and a
great quantity of grain collected. * * * Captain Abbott made the
artillery dispositions in the ablest manner, and used every exertion to
add to and economize our resources, in the way of gun and musket
ammunition.”
“The artillery practice of No. 6 light field battery has ever been
excellent, and has been equalled by that of the mountain-train.
Captains Abbott and Backhouse and Lieutenant Dawes have proved
themselves excellent ordnance officers.”
The siege, or rather blockade, continued from November to April.
The greatest want at times prevailed of everything but grain; but the
men preserved their cheerfulness under all privations, the native
artillerymen of the 2nd company 6th battalion vying with the
Europeans of H. M.’s light infantry in setting an example of good
discipline and patient and cheerful endurance of hardship and
danger. In April, Akbar Khan collected a large body of troops in the
neighbourhood, both to overwhelm the garrison and meet the army
advancing to its succour through the Khyber. This body the garrison
attacked on the morning of the 6th April, and completely overthrew,
capturing standards and baggage, and four of the guns lost by the
Cabul force. In the action, No. 6 battery, with which, in addition to
Captain Abbott and Lieutenant Dawes, were Captains Backhouse and
MacGregor, as volunteers, was most effective; moving rapidly to the
front, it covered the advance of the infantry, and held in check a large
body of cavalry which threatened the flank. This success was most
complete, and the garrison achieved its safety by its own prowess. Its
gallantry was rewarded by a medal to all engaged; the corps were
permitted to wear a “mural crown,” with the word “Jellalabad” on
their appointments, and a donation of six months’ batta was granted
as a compensation for the various losses suffered, and at the close of
the campaign the rank of major, with the companionship of the Bath,
was bestowed on Captains Abbott, Backhouse, and MacGregor.

On the news of the insurrection reaching India, steps were taken

for despatching a force to aid the troops in Affghanistan. Major-
General Pollock, C.B., of the artillery, was selected for its command,
and joined it at Peshawur in February. The artillery with it was very
insufficient. A troop of horse-artillery and half a light field battery, a
second troop (Captain Delafosse’s), and the remainder of the field
battery, did not join until after the entrance to the Khyber was won.
Troop. Brigade. Company. Battalion. Captains. Lieutenants.
Richardson,
3 1 Delafosse Money,
Abercrombie.
A. Fitzgerald,
3 2 Alexander
Larkins.
L. Smith,
2 2
Douglas.
A. Christie,
4 6
Robertson.
Captain Lane, commissary of ordnance, Lieutenant Pollock, aide-
de-camp, Lieutenant Sir R. Shakespear, military secretary, Captain
H. M. Lawrence, political agent.
On the 5th April, the attack was made on the Pass; the guns were
directed on the barriers raised to defend the entrance; two columns
attacked the heights on either side, and the main body carried the
Pass when the way had been opened by the fire of the guns. The
arrangements of General Pollock were admirable. The attack was
completely successful; and the enemy evacuated Ali-Musjid at our
approach. Captains Alexander and Lawrence, Lieutenants
Shakespear and Pollock, are mentioned in the despatches.
Jellalabad was reached, but the enemy had disappeared, and here
the force halted, pending the receipt of orders for an advance on
Cabul, and till arrangements for carriage could be made to enable
them to carry out the order. This halt was not altogether inactive; in
July, No. 6 battery, with Captains Abbott and Dawes, was engaged
with Brigadier Monteith’s force in the Shinwaree valley with much
credit. Captain MacGregor accompanied the brigade, and “when
opportunity offered itself, served with the guns.”
While the force remained halted, a supply of rockets reached the
artillery, which had been forwarded by dâk banghy from Allahabad,
under the impression that the weapon was particularly calculated to
be serviceable in the passes at points where artillery could not be
used at all, or without the greatest difficulty. The expectation was not
realized,—the rockets being too delicate to bear the shaking they
underwent; this, together with the expansion of the iron case and the
contraction of the composition from the heat to which they were
exposed, rendered them nearly useless on reaching their destination.
Towards the end of August the arrangements were completed, and
the force moved on; the artillery strengthened by No. 6 battery and
the mountain-train, which had formed part of the “illustrious
garrison.” On the 24th, the enemy were driven by General Pollock
from Mammoo Khel, in which action the services of Captains Abbott
and MacGregor, and Lieutenant Pollock are mentioned. On the 8th
September, some fighting occurred near Jugdulluck, and on the 10th,
the enemy assaulted the rear-guard on all sides, but “were checked
by the very effective fire of the guns, ably directed by Captain
Lawrence (political agent), who volunteered his services, and by
Lieutenant Abercrombie.” The brigades were collected in the Tezeen
valley, for which purpose Major-General Pollock halted on the 12th,
and on the 13th were attacked by the whole of Akbar Khan’s troops,
who were defeated with much loss. Two of the guns, a 24 and 12–
pounder howitzer, lost on the retreat, were here recaptured. The
rear-guard was hard pressed in defending the entrance to the pass as
the troops moved on, and the effective services of Captains
Alexander and Lawrence, and Lieutenant Douglas, in the use of the
guns at this period, are acknowledged. In the despatches of Major-
General Pollock, the names of Major Delafosse, Captains Abbott,
Backhouse, Alexander, MacGregor, Lieutenants Fitzgerald,
Shakespear, and Pollock, are mentioned with applause.
On the 15th, the force reached Cabul, and on the 16th possession
was taken of the Bala Hissar, under a salute from Major Delafosse’s
troop.
Major-General Nott, after being joined by Major-General
England’s force, as related in a previous page, continued to hold
Candahar, pending final instructions. Towards the end of May the
enemy, collecting in numbers, endeavoured to carry the town, when
Major-General Nott moved out against them. Both Captain
Anderson’s troops were engaged in this affair with credit. Early in
August, Candahar was evacuated: one column with the baggage
retired by the Kojuck pass; with this was Lieutenant Cooper’s troop
of horse-artillery and the 3rd company 2nd battalion artillery under
Lieutenant Walker. In its route to Sukkur this force met with little or
no opposition.
The main force marched on the 8th August. The artillery consisted
of Major Sotheby, commandant; Lieutenant Brougham, adjutant, S.
S. Horse Artillery, Captain W. Anderson, Lieutenants Turner and
Hawkins; 3rd company, 2nd battalion, Lieutenant Cornish, four 18–
pounder guns attached.
On the 31st August, within forty miles of Ghuznee, the governor,
with about 12,000 men, moved out to meet the British, but he was
defeated with the loss of guns, tents, &c. Major Sotheby was
mentioned in the despatch, which concluded by saying, “I cannot
close this despatch without expressing my admiration of the dashing
and gallant conduct, rapid movements, and correct practice, of
Captain Anderson’s troop of horse-artillery; nothing could exceed it,
and I beg to bring this officer and Lieutenant Turner, attached to the
same troop, to the particular notice of his Lordship, as officers who
have on many occasions rendered me most essential service.”
Ghuznee yielded without opposition; its walls and bastions were
destroyed—the gates of Somnath and the Zubber Jung rewarded the
conquerors and graced their triumphant march to Cabul, which they
reached on the 17th, after defeating the enemy at Beni Badam and
Mydam on the 14th and 15th, in which actions “the artillery” are
reported as having “distinguished themselves,” and the names of
Captain Anderson and Lieutenant Turner are particularly
mentioned.
A body of Kuzzilbash horse, despatched under Sir R. Shakespear
towards Bamean, to aid the prisoners, met them on their return, they
having effected their escape; of the artillery, Lieutenants Eyre,
Waller, and Warburton; Sergeants MacNee and Cleland; gunners
A’Hearne, Kean, and Walton, were the sole survivors.
A force was sent against Istaliff on the 30th September, in which
the mountain-train under Captain Backhouse, and two 18–pounders
under Lieutenant Cornish, were employed. Lieutenants Richardson
and Pollock accompanied the force, and the former was slightly
wounded.
The combined armies now turned homewards, meeting with many
difficulties from the exhausted state of the cattle and the obstacles in
the passes; so much so, that the four 18–pounders which had
originally marched with the Army of the Indus were burst in the
passes and their carriages burnt. Daily skirmishes took place, and in
passing a ravine near Alee Musjid just at dusk, a rush was made by
the Afredis on a small detachment of artillery with a gun of the
mountain-train under Lieutenant A. Christie. He was killed, and the
gun carried off, but afterwards recovered.
Of the trophies, the Zubber Jung was burst at Cabul; the Kazee
travelled with difficulty as far as Lundi-khana, in the Khyber, where,
upsetting into a ravine, it was burst and abandoned; the Somnath
gates alone reached Hindustan, travelling on a spare 18–pounder
carriage; but they were fated, even after 800 years of absence, not to
pass their kindred threshold; they got no further than Agra in the
attempt, and were there deposited in the armoury of the magazine.
The troops were received on their return by the Army of Reserve at
Ferozepore, assembled in case its aid should have been wanted, and
medals bestowed for the different services, bearing the inscriptions
of Candahar—Candahar, Ghuznee, Cabul, 1842—Ghuznee, Cabul,
1842—and Cabul, 1842; the obverse of all was similar, and this, and
all the medals since that for Ghuznee, were worn on a particoloured
ribbon of light tints, called “the ribbon of India,” ill fitted for a
military decoration.
 For these distinguished services General Pollock was rewarded
with the first class of the order of the Bath, and received the thanks
of both Houses of Parliament. He was subsequently appointed a
member of the Supreme Council of India, and on being compelled to
quit the country on account of ill-health in 1846–7, a pension of
£1,000 per annum was bestowed upon him by the East-India
Company, with the unanimous approbation of the Court of
Proprietors. The freedom of the city was also voted him by the
corporation of London.
Of the artillery officers who served under Generals Pollock and
Nott, the following received honorary distinctions:—Captains
Anderson, Alexander, Lane, and Lawrence, were gazetted brevet-
majors; and Majors Delafosse, Sotheby, and Anderson, companions
of the Bath.
Before closing this account of the war in Afghanistan, it should be
mentioned, that in the political department several artillery officers
were greatly distinguished. The names of Captains Todd and
MacGregor are associated with important historical events at Herat
and Jellalabad; whilst Captain Abbott and Lieutenant Richmond
Shakespear (who was subsequently knighted for these services) will
be remembered for their enterprising and perilous journeys to Khiva
and the Caspian for the purpose of liberating the Russian slaves
confined in the former place.
 CHAPTER IX.

State of affairs at Gwalior—The Army of Exercise—The battle of

Maharajpore—Want of heavy ordnance—The battle of Punniah—
The Gwalior contingent—Honours conferred on the artillery—
The ordnance commissariat remodelled—The artillery in Sindh—
Reorganization of the regiment—Increase of horse-batteries.
In the following year (1843) the attention of the Supreme
Government was directed towards a new quarter. The death of the
Maharajah Junkojee Rao Scindiah was followed by alarming
disturbances at Gwalior. The army became dominant in the State.
The Regent, who had been nominated to preside over the Durbar,
during the minority of the adopted son of the deceased ruler, was
incompetent to control the rebellious soldiery; the widow of the late
king took part against the minister, and the hostilities, which
commenced with a bed-chamber intrigue, ended in a civil war. Such,
indeed, became the anarchy and confusion at Gwalior, that the
British Resident quitted Scindiah’s court, and the Governor-General,
though not contemplating immediate interference, began to watch
with some anxiety the progress of events at the Mahratta capital. As
the year advanced, the Ranee’s party, at the head of which was the
Dadur Khasgeewallah, a man whose temper and designs were
notoriously hostile to the British, became stronger and stronger.
Such of the officers, in the service of the Maharajah, as were known
to be friendly to the paramount state, were ill-treated and dismissed.
Covert hostility began to rise into open defiance; and it now became
apparent, that from the other side of the Sutlej, the Sikhs were
watching, with undisguised satisfaction, the excitement at Gwalior,
and waiting to take advantage of any disaster that might befall us, to
declare themselves on the side of the Mahrattas.
 As the cold weather approached, the aspect of affairs became more
and more threatening. To bring about a satisfactory settlement by
mere diplomacy, appeared difficult, if not impossible; and Lord
Ellenborough determined on assembling an army on the banks of the
Jumna. The force assembled at Agra, in the month of November,
under the personal command of Sir Hugh Gough, the Commander-
in-Chief, and was called the “Army of Exercise.” At the same time a
left wing was formed, under the command of General Gray, to
operate upon Gwalior from the Bundlekhund country, whilst the
main army advanced from Agra. On the 16th of December, Sir Hugh
Gough commenced his march. Affairs were growing worse, and
armed intervention was inevitable. When at length, the
Khasgeewallah was given up, with the hope of arresting the progress
of the British, the Army of Exercise was in full march upon Gwalior,
and was not to be stayed.
The artillery division of the Army of Exercise was commanded by
Brigadier G. E. Gowan, Captain J. H. Macdonald being his assistant
adjutant-general. Colonel J. Tennant was appointed, with the rank of
brigadier, to the command of the foot-artillery; Lieutenant and
Brevet-Captain A. Huish, acting as major of brigade; and Captain E.
F. Day, as commissary of ordnance. The components of the horse-
artillery force were the 2nd troop 2nd brigade, commanded by
Captain C. Grant, with Lieutenants Clifford and P. Christie, as
subalterns; the 3rd troop 2nd brigade, commanded by Brevet-Major
Alexander, with Brevet-Captain A. Fitzgerald (adjutant of the
brigade, who had volunteered to do subaltern’s duty with the troop),
and Lieutenant Wintle; and the 2nd troop 3rd brigade, with which
were Brevet-Major Lane (commanding), Brevet-Captain C. Mills, and
Lieutenant Moir. The foot-artillery consisted of the 1st company 1st
battalion (with No. 10 light field-battery) under Brevet-Major
Saunders; Lieutenants Bruce, Milligan, and Sladen, subalterns; and
the 1st company 4th battalion, commanded by Captain B. Brown,
with Lieutenants Holland and Remington. In addition to these were
the heavy batteries, consisting of six 18–pounders and four 8–inch
howitzers, manned by the reserve companies of the 4th battalion
(European) and the 6th golundauze; the former under Lieutenant-
Colonel Farrington, with Lieutenant Whiteford, adjutant; and the
latter under Lieutenant-Colonel Denniss, with Lieutenant Warner,
adjutant.
 The artillery with the left wing was commanded by Lieutenant-
Colonel Biddulph (Captain Austin, major of brigade), and was
composed of the 1st troop 3rd brigade, commanded by Captain F.
Brind, Lieutenants Coxe and Bourchier, subalterns; the 3rd troop 3rd
brigade, under Captain George Campbell, with whom was Lieutenant
Humfrays; and the 6th company 6th battalion, with No. 16 light
field-battery, under Lieutenant W. Olpherts.
On the arrival of the advanced columns at Dholpore, they were met
by the Khasgeewallah, whose surrender, now become a matter of
fact, was regarded as a prelude to a general compliance with the
terms dictated by the Governor-General. The bulk of the siege-train
was therefore halted, and eventually ordered back to Agra.
On the 27th of December information was obtained that the enemy
had advanced to Choundah, a village within eight miles of the
position occupied by the “Army of Exercise” at Hurgonah, and
arrangements were made next day to attack them on the 29th. On
the morning of that day, the army advanced upon the village of
Maharajpore. It was believed that the enemy were some miles
distant; but, as the British troops ascended the rising ground, the
Mahratta batteries opened suddenly upon our advancing columns;
and as our own heavy artillery was in the rear, it was no easy matter
to silence the destructive fire kept up by the enemy, with a spirit and
a precision which could scarcely be excelled by the best gunners in
the service of any European state.
Our light field-batteries were overmatched by the heavy metal of
the Mahratta ordnance; but their steadiness under fire was never
exceeded, and the determined resolution with which they carried on
the unequal contest, elicited the highest praise. Captain Grant’s troop
of horse-artillery came into action about half-past eight o’clock,
when it engaged one of the enemy’s batteries, drawn up on the left of
the village of Maharajpore. Here it was joined by Major Alexander’s
troop, when “both advanced to within 500 yards of the enemy, and
soon drove him from his guns, which were taken possession of by the
3rd brigade of infantry. On following up the enemy, the two troops
were suddenly exposed to a cross fire, from two of the enemy’s
batteries, which had hitherto been concealed; one in front, and the
other on our left flank. Captain Grant was ordered to oppose the
former, and Major Alexander the latter, which was soon after
stormed and taken by the 3rd brigade of infantry; upon which Major
Alexander followed up the retreating enemy with great effect, and
Major Lane, with the 2nd troop 3rd brigade, joined them in the
pursuit. In the mean time, Captain Grant had advanced to within
600 yards of the Choundah position, and was opposed singly to the
fire of a heavy battery of 12 guns, for upwards of half an hour, and I
regret to say, sustained a considerable loss in men and horses. So
well chosen,” adds Brigadier Gowan, from whose report to the
Commander-in-Chief these details are taken, “was the enemy’s
position, that even on horseback, I could only discern the muzzles of
their guns, which in weight of metal, as well as in number, were very
superior to the troop’s. More than once, however, the enemy were
driven by our fire from their guns, but being unsupported at the
time, except by a weak troop of cavalry, no advantage of this could be
taken, and he returned to his guns.”
In another letter, addressed to the assistant adjutant-general of
artillery, Brigadier Gowan, with reference to the other details of field
artillery, says, “Major Lane’s troop (2nd troop 3rd brigade) advanced
with the 4th brigade of cavalry, under Brigadier Scott, forming the
left column, and Nos. 17 and 10 light field-batteries, with the 4th and
5th brigades of infantry, respectively forming the centre column of
attack. These came into action on the opposite side of the village of
Maharajpore from that on which we were first engaged.... The
conduct of officers and men was highly satisfactory, and everything I
could desire.”
Nothing could have exceeded the resolute courage with which the
Mahratta batteries were defended, alike by infantry and artillerymen,
or the precision with which the guns were served by the latter. “I
never witnessed,” wrote the Commander-in-Chief, “guns better
served, nor a body of infantry apparently more devoted to the
protection of their regimental guns, held by the Mahratta corps as
objects of worship.” “The fire of the enemy,” wrote Brigadier Gowan,
“was remarkably accurate, and was maintained with a smartness
which surprised me. At one time they got the range of Captain
Grant’s troop so exactly, that nearly every shot fell between the guns
and waggons of the battery.”
It was only by the steady gallantry of the British infantry, who
charged the enemy’s batteries in the face of destructive showers of
grape and round shot, that their position at last was carried. Her
Majesty’s 39th and 40th regiments headed the columns. Nothing
could have been more gallant than the attack, more obstinate than
the resistance. The enemy’s golundaz stood to be bayoneted in their
batteries, and only yielded up their guns with their lives.
It is probable that, if in this engagement better use had been made
of the artillery, the loss that fell upon the British army would have
been much less severe. Brigadier Tennant, who commanded the foot-
artillery, had brought up four 8–inch howitzers in line with H. M.’s
39th, but he was not permitted to advance. Had he been allowed, as
was his expressed desire, to move up within 800 yards’ distance,
where he could see the enemy’s position more distinctly, and
therefore operate with greater precision, he might, it was the opinion
of those present, have knocked the Mahratta batteries to pieces, and
enabled the infantry columns to advance in comparative safety to the
attack.
On the same morning of the 29th of December, General Gray, who,
with the left wing of the army, had been advancing upon Gwalior
from the Sindh river, came up with the enemy at Punniah, a village a
few miles to the south of the capital. Here the Mahratta batteries
were strongly posted, as at Maharajpore, on commanding ground,
and in gorges flanking one another. The 3rd Buffs, who led the
column sent forward to attack the enemy’s position, were supported
by Captain Brind’s troop of horse-artillery, 1st troop 3rd brigade,
which “opened upon the guns to the left of Mangore, whilst Major
Geddes, with Captain Campbell’s troop, 3rd battalion 3rd brigade,
and two guns of Captain Brind’s, opened upon the battery of seven
guns in rear of Mangore; and their practice was beautiful, silencing
all but one of the enemy’s guns, which was served with the greatest
accuracy to the last moment. Lieutenant Olpherts, with four guns of
No. 16 light field-battery, took up a position south of Mangore, and
opened on the enemy as they retreated up the hills, with good effect.
Lieutenant Tombs, with two guns of light field-battery attached to
the rear-guard, fired with great precision several shots upon the
enemy’s left.”[93] The Mahrattas made a gallant defence, but were
driven from their guns with considerable loss; and night closed upon
their total dispersion.
 In these engagements on the 29th of December, the artillery lost at
Maharajpore, 1 2nd lieutenant, 1 serjeant, 1 gunner, killed; and 1
serjeant, and 21 gunners, wounded; besides syces, ordnance-drivers,
and a considerable number of horses. At Punniah, the loss was much
smaller, only one man and one horse having been killed. The officer
who fell at Maharajpore, was Lieutenant Leathes. He was posted
with the rear-guard, and had ridden forward, it would seem, to watch
the progress of the action, when coming too close to the Mahratta
batteries, a round shot carried off his head.
For services rendered during this campaign, Colonel Gowan
received the companionship of the Bath; Majors Geddes, Sanders,
Alexander, and Lane, were promoted to the rank of lieutenant-
colonel by brevet, and Captains Brown, Grant, Brind, Campbell, and
Macdonald, were gazetted as brevet-majors. In the political
transactions with which these military operations were connected,
Lieutenant Sir Richmond Shakespear, of the artillery, took a
conspicuous part. He acted as an aide-de-camp to the Commander-
in-Chief, during the battle of Maharajpore, and was thanked in his
Excellency’s despatch. Captain Macdonald also received the thanks
of the Commander-in-Chief. On the subsequent settlement of the
affairs of Gwalior, four batteries were raised for service with the new
Gwalior contingent; and placed under the command of Lieutenants
Eyre, Warburton, T. H. Smyth, and Hawkins; Brevet-Captain Frank
Turner being appointed brigade major.
In honour of these victories, a bronze star, with “Maharajpore” or
“Punniah” in the centre, was struck, and distributed to the troops
engaged.
Early in the year 1844, the 4th troop 1st brigade of horse-artillery,
and the 4th company 6th battalion of foot, which formed part of the
relief ordered to Scinde, had their fidelity severely tried by the
conduct of two native infantry regiments who refused to cross the
Sutlej, on the plea that their just allowances had been withdrawn.
The artillery, consisting of a native troop and a native company, who
must have come under the operation of the same order, do not
appear to have taken a leading part in the mutinous movement.
In the autumn of this year (1844), a reorganization of the ordnance
commissariat department was ordered by the Supreme Government.
Instead of a principal commissary of ordnance, resident, as
heretofore, in Fort William, an inspector of magazines, with his
head-quarters at Allahabad, was appointed; and the arsenal of Fort
William was placed under the charge of the deputy principal
commissary of ordnance.
In the beginning of the year 1845, Sir Henry Hardinge, then
Governor-General, directed his attention to the state of the artillery,
and, in conjunction with Sir George Pollock, the military member of
council, introduced several important improvements. “The number
of regular horse field-batteries had been gradually increased to five.
[94]
These were at first equipped with 89 horses, which allowed six
horses each for six guns and six waggons, one spare per team, and
five for the staff; the gun-teams were subsequently allowed eight
horses to each. In 1845, the number of batteries was increased to
nine, and the complement of horses to each fixed at 120, which gave
eight horses to each gun and waggon, and allowed a team for the
forge-cart, with six saddle-horses, including one spare and one spare
draught-horse per team. On the frontier or on service, ten additional
horses were sanctioned.[95]
“In July, 1845, a new organization of the whole of the Indian
artillery took place, by which the corps in Bengal received a nominal
increase, but a practical decrease, except in the establishment of
officers. The five European battalions of five companies each, were
formed into six battalions of four companies each, and the two
golundaz battalions of ten companies, into three battalions of six
companies each, causing a total reduction of one European, and two
native companies.
“One important advantage was, however, obtained by the increase
of European officers, the want of which had been seriously felt on
various previous occasions. The relief thus granted could not of
course be felt immediately, but its beneficial effect is now becoming
manifest.
“This gave an establishment of three brigades and nine battalions,
each having a complement of officers similar to the infantry, with the
exception that an additional captain was allowed to the latter, which
has not been accorded to the artillery, although greatly wanted.”
The important subject of elephant-draught at this time engaged
the attention of the Governor-General. These animals had been long
in use with the light post-guns in Arracan and other places, and an
experimental elephant-battery had been recently established at
Dum-dum. But Sir Henry Hardinge now turned his thoughts towards
the application of this description of draught to heavy ordnance,
convinced that, for the transport of siege-guns, artificers’ carts, &c.,
elephants would be found more serviceable and more economical
than bullocks. During the Sikh campaign, the services of the former
were tested, especially on the march to and from Kote Kangra; and
the result more than justified the expectations of the Governor-
General.
 CHAPTER X.

The Sikh invasion—Battle of Moodkee—Services of the artillery—

Battle of Ferozeshuhur—Scarcity of ammunition—Measures
taken for its prevention—The artillery reinforced—Affair at
Buddowul—Battle of Aliwal—Battle of Sobraon—Honours
conferred on the artillery—The occupation of Lahore.
As the year 1845 drew towards its close, the state of affairs in the
Punjab demanded the most anxious attention of the Governor-
General. Eager to maintain peace, but at the same time determined
to be prepared for war, Sir Henry Hardinge had noiselessly increased
the strength of the frontier army, and had himself proceeded, in
September, to the North-west, apparently on an ordinary tour of
inspection. In July, 1844, there had been between Meerut and
Ferozepore 24,000 men, and 66 field-pieces. This force he had, with
as little ostentation as possible, increased to 45,500 men, and 98
field-guns. The most important position was Umballah. As it was
from this point that any attack from beyond the Sutlej must have
been met, the Governor-General, by December, 1845, had placed
there, in the front line, 32,470 men, and 66 field-guns, where before,
in July, 1844, there had only been 13,530 men, and 48 field-guns.
But all these preparations were made in the manner least calculated
to alarm or to irritate the Sikhs, and it was hoped that, in spite of the
boastings of the turbulent soldiery, they would be restrained by their
own intestine feuds from advancing to the attack of their neighbours.
The middle of December, however, saw them preparing to cross the
river; and the great event, which had for many years been talked of in
every cantonment in India, was now on the eve of accomplishment;
the war in the Punjab was about to commence.
We come now to speak more in detail of the disposition of the
artillery at this time. At the commencement of the war, there were
stationed at Ferozepore, the 5th troop 1st brigade, under Captain E.
F. Day; the 3rd troop 3rd brigade, under Brevet-Major George
Campbell; the 4th company 6th battalion, with No. 19 light field-
battery, under Captain J. Fordyce; and the 2nd company 7th
battalion, with No. 6 light field-battery, under 1st Lieutenant A. G.
Austen (Captain Boileau, lately posted, not having joined), in all 12
horse-artillery guns and howitzers (6 and 12–pounders), and 12 foot-
artillery guns and howitzers (9 and 24–pounders). Besides these
troops and companies, there was a reserve company (the 2nd
company 2nd battalion) for the service of heavy guns and rockets.
The whole were under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel
Huthwaite, of the 3rd brigade.
At Loodianah were posted the 1st troop 1st brigade, under Captain
F. Dashwood; and the 4th troop 3rd brigade, under Captain H.
Garbett (total 12 guns); the whole commanded by Lieutenant-
Colonel Geddes.
But the largest force of artillery was posted at Umballah, under
Lieutenant-Colonel George Brooke, of the 1st brigade horse-artillery.
At that station were the 2nd troop 1st brigade, under Captain D’Arcy
Todd; the 3rd troop 1st brigade, under Captain G. H. Swinley; the 1st
troop 3rd brigade, under Major F. Brind; the 3rd company 4th
battalion, under Captain Jasper Trower; and the 2nd company 6th
battalion, under Captain R. Horsford; Nos. 7 and 9 light field-
batteries being attached to these two companies. There were also at
Umballah, the 2nd and 4th companies (reserve) 4th battalion, under
Lieutenant-Colonel G. Denniss.[96]
Thus the Sirhind division of artillery, commanded by Lieutenant-
Colonel Brooke, numbered forty-two horse-artillery and twenty-four
foot-artillery guns and howitzers. The four 9–pounder batteries were
horsed; but No. 19, at Ferozepore, having only lately been changed
from a bullock-battery, and being incomplete in harness, was obliged
to take the field with bullock-draught. The Governor-General was at
this time at Umballah; and he had with him on escort duty, two
horse-artillery guns, under 1st Lieutenant George Moir, of the 2nd
troop 3rd brigade horse-artillery, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel
Lane, then at Muttra.
The Sikhs crossed the Sutlej on the 11th and 12th. On the latter day
Sir Hugh Gough marched from Umballah to Rajpoora, with the
head-quarters of the Sirhind division, a distance of 18 miles; and on
the 13th, Sir John Littler moved his troops into camp, to protect the
cantonments of Ferozepore; one regiment being detached with three
guns, from No. 6 battery, under Lieutenant Tulloch, to defend the
city. On the same day, he brigaded his force; Lieutenant-Colonel
Huthwaite, of the 3rd brigade, being temporarily appointed a
brigadier of artillery; Lieutenant Abercrombie, adjutant of the 3rd
brigade, being his brigade-major.
On the 13th, the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief
being then only a few miles distant from each other, and in constant
communication, the Army of the Sutlej was formed into brigades and
divisions. Lieutenant-Colonel Brooke was appointed brigadier to
command the artillery; consisting of all the troops and companies
before mentioned, as stationed at Ferozepore, Loodianah, and
Umballah, as well as the two guns under Lieutenant Moir, from the
escort of the Governor-General. Brevet-Captain Murray Mackenzie,
adjutant of the 1st brigade, was appointed major of brigade to the
artillery, and Brevet-Captain Warner, adjutant of the 4th battalion,
commissary of ordnance.
On the 13th, the troops at Loodianah received orders from Sir H.
Hardinge to march to Busseean, a distance of twenty-eight miles;
and at the same time, the two horse-artillery guns from Muttra, and
the 5th cavalry, which formed part of the Governor-General’s escort,
were sent thither to join them. The object of this movement was to
cover Busseean, full as it was of supplies for the British army, which,
but for the interposition of the Loodianah force, would in all
probability have been destroyed by the enemy. By this movement
also, the force under the Commander-in-Chief, marching up from
Umballah, was augmented by 4,000 men and 12 guns.
On the 15th the troops halted, and on the following day moved on
to Wudnee, of which place a Sikh garrison was in possession. On
their refusal to furnish supplies to the force, the two troops of
artillery were brought into position before the town—a movement
which had the desired effect. Here the Umballah force, with the main
body of the artillery, under Brigadier Brooke, joined the troops from
Loodianah.
On the 17th the army made a short march of ten miles to Chirruck,
where the troops suffered much from scarcity of water.
 On the 18th the whole force moved to Moodkee. During the march
a message was received from Major Broadfoot, who was
reconnoitring in front, to the effect that the Sikhs were in possession
of the fort and village of Moodkee, and that a portion of their cavalry
were in advance of that place. The horse-artillery and cavalry were
immediately ordered to form line to the front; the enemy’s pickets,
however, had abandoned their advanced position, and Moodkee
opened its gates at the sight of a few guns.
It was half-past two o’clock before the army was encamped. The
horses had been picketed, and men and officers were about to seek
some refreshment after the fatigues of the march, when Major
Broadfoot brought intelligence that the enemy was within three miles
of our lines. The Governor-General himself rode down the front of
the artillery camp, and the guns were quickly in motion.
The camp of the British army was, at this time, formed on a tract of
cultivated ground immediately to the west of Moodkee. In front, for
about a mile, extended ploughed fields, beyond which there
stretched a dense jungle of low brushwood and stunted trees.
Through this the Sikh columns were now advancing. The horse-
artillery, with cavalry on the flanks, moved rapidly across the
ploughed fields. The dust caused by the march of the Sikh columns
rose densely against the blue sky above the brush-jungle; but when
the enemy perceived that the British line was in motion, they halted
in the jungle to make their arrangements for the battle. The horse-
artillery proceeded in line across the fields, but halted before
entering the jungle. The light field-batteries, which had been directed
to follow, with the infantry columns, came up soon after the action
commenced; and in a short time 30 horse-artillery and 12 field-
battery guns were in full play.
Our fire soon told upon the enemy, who were hidden in a thick
jungle, and their position only indicated by the smoke from their
guns. Soon, apparently, some of the Sikh pieces were either silenced
or withdrawn, for their fire gradually slackened. Brigadier Brooke, in
his official despatch, reports, that “the line of artillery kept up a
heavy fire on the enemy, nearly silencing their guns;” and the
Commander-in-Chief corroborates this statement, saying, that the
enemy “opened a very severe cannonade upon our advancing troops,
which was vigorously replied to by the battery of horse-artillery
under Brigadier Brooke, which was soon joined by the two light field-
batteries. The rapid and well-directed fire of our artillery appeared
soon to paralyze that of the enemy.”
Rather more than half an hour after the commencement of the
action, the Commander-in-Chief directed Colonel Geddes to take two
troops of horse-artillery, and to proceed with the 4th light cavalry
and 9th irregulars to the left, to oppose a demonstration of the Sikhs
from their right flank. The 1st and 4th troops of the 3rd brigade
(under Major Brind and Captain Garbett), being on the left of the
line, were those which accompanied Colonel Geddes. The two troops
with the cavalry moved rapidly into the jungle towards the left front,
and came into action against some Sikh cavalry and infantry, who
had apparently been creeping round with the intention of turning
our left flank. Colonel Geddes, who was the senior officer on the left,
perceiving this body of the enemy retiring before the fire of our guns,
directed the 9th irregular cavalry to charge. This was accordingly
done. As the cavalry moved forward, the guns ceased firing, and
again advanced through the jungle, which at every step grew denser
and denser, and much impeded the movements of the horse-artillery.
At the same time that this occurred on the left, a similar movement
was made from our right to turn the enemy’s left flank, and to check
their cavalry, who were endeavouring to circle round our right. The
1st[97] and 3rd troops 1st brigade, under Captains Dashwood and
Swinley, and Captain Trower’s battery, were pushed forward to
support the 3rd dragoons and a brigade of native cavalry, who were
now ordered to charge the enemy’s left flank. The 2nd troop 1st
brigade, under Captain Todd, and Captain Horsford’s battery, still
remained in the centre, covering the advance of the infantry
brigades. After the brilliant and successful charges of our cavalry on
both flanks, the troops and batteries detached to the right and left
were ordered to close in to the centre, in order to support the attack
of the infantry. It was nearly dusk. The early evening of a winter day
had set in whilst the action still raged furiously. The jungle at every
pace grew denser, and it was with difficulty that the guns could force
their way through the brushwood. Captain Swinley’s troop, in
covering the advance of an European regiment, suffered much from a
close discharge of grape and musketry, and one gun, having lost all
its horses, was temporarily disabled. The 1st troop 1st brigade
sustained great loss from the close fire of the enemy’s artillery and
infantry. Captain Dashwood, who commanded the troop, was, at this
period of the action, with his staff-serjeant and several of his men,
struck down by grape. Lieutenant Pollock, of the 3rd troop 1st
brigade, also received a mortal wound; and Captain Trower was shot
at the head of his battery by a Sikh soldier concealed in a bush. At
this time darkness was rapidly covering the field, and the artillery,
being within a few paces of the enemy’s line, were suffering much
from their galling fire. But at length the Sikh line gave way before the
advance of the British infantry, who, supported by a part of the
artillery, pursued for a considerable distance the retreating enemy;
but, as the Commander-in-Chief observed in his despatch, “night
saved them from worse disaster.”
The action commenced at half-past three in the afternoon, and, as
the day was one of the shortest of the year, the rapid closing in of
night prevented the British force from taking full advantage of its
success. The Sikhs saved a portion of their ordnance, some of their
guns being apparently withdrawn early in the action. It is supposed
that they had in all from thirty to forty guns engaged, of which
seventeen fell into our hands.
The artillery suffered more in this action from grape and musketry
than from the round shot of the enemy, which did comparatively
little mischief. Only one or two waggons were blown up, and in fact
scarcely any loss was sustained until the troops and field-batteries
were pushed up through the jungle close to the enemy’s fire. It was
then that Captains Dashwood and Trower, and Lieutenant R. H.
Pollock (son of Major-General Sir George Pollock, G.C.B.), received
their death-wounds. The first was struck down by grape, receiving
two wounds, one on the arm and the other on the foot, the latter of
which proved mortal. Lieutenant Pollock had his knee smashed by a
musket-ball, and being for a long time exposed to the cold night air,
lying in a waggon, though the limb was amputated immediately upon
his arrival in camp, sunk on the 19th. Captain Trower, as we have
said, was shot by a Sikh concealed in the jungle; the ball passed
through his body, and he died during the night. There were several
Sikhs—Akalis and others—lying concealed behind the bushes, who
waited until our troops came close upon them, to pick out our
officers. The total loss of artillery was (killed) 2 European officers, 4